B.U.G. Threat Model Family

Design and Verification of Security Protocols and Security Ceremonies

Programa de Pós-Graduacão em Ciências da Computacão
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

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- The DY attacker controls the entire network although he cannot perform cryptanalysis;
- The DY model has remarkably favoured the discovery of significant protocol flaws, but the attacker has significantly changed today;
- To become an attacker has never been so easy.

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- The Ugly would be ready to either behaviour.

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- It changes the idea of a single attacker since anyone could attack;
- The principle behind this threat model is that the attackers do not share long term secrets.

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- This complicates a lot the mechanisations of the attacker, because all behaviour is possible.

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- Analysing a protocol under the Rational Attacker requires specifying each principal's cost and benefit functions.

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- Although complex to mechanise, the Rational Attacker is more realistic than B.U.G.;
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- The Rational Attacker bring all game theory into the protocols' scenarios.

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- Mechanisation is not only and issue of representativeness of the formal verification technique, but an entangled problem.

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  - This is confirmed by a formal proof.

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- Such messages include both the legal ones, conforming to the protocol in use, and the illegal, forged ones, which he can build from the analysis of the traffic though without cryptanalysis.

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  - Any illegal message that a principal may send in General Attacker may be sent by the single augmented Dolev-Yao attacker;
  - This happens because he knows everyone's secrets.

The General Attacker versus Augmented Dolev-Yao

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- The single attacker will always be the originator of any attack, complicating the identification of the real perpetrator;
- For attacks against the attacker, the model will feature the attacker attacking himself, thus stretching the interpretation of the victim to an extreme;
- Perpetrator and victim are naturally expressed in GA because its gist is exactly to reflect modern everyone-for-themselves scenarios.

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- It was conceived in 2011;
- Multi Attacker can be seen as a refinement of General Attacker with some rationality that avoids the trivial impersonation attacks;
- It helps to understand some new types of attacks.

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- If an attack can be retaliated under Multi Attacker, such a scenario will not occur under Rational Attacker because the cost of attacking clearly overdoes its benefit, and hence the attacker will not attack in the first place;
- This changes the game of how a powerful attacker would attack, because retaliation may let the attacker vulnerable.

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- By being powerful and knowing what is going on, he could anticipate what other Multi Attacker have on their knowledge set;
- This is not encoded on the attacker;
- This would make competition between the attacker fiercer.

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- It was conceived in 2015;
- It was tailored for a layered strategy for security ceremonies;
- It is reasonable to use in protocol verification because the real capabilities of the multi-attacker we have are not clear and eventually will not be the same.

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- Acknowledging that each multi-attacker has different powers it a good strategy that can show us the competition between the attacker for the target;
- It was shown that we can mechanise such attacker using First-Order Logics;
- No issues we brought so far due to its freshness within the protocol and ceremony verification communities.

Discussion

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- Which one would make more sense today?
- Choosing one Threat Model to work invalidate the others?

Questions????

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