Threat Modelling for Symbolic Evaluation

Design and Verification of Security Protocols and Security Ceremonies

Programa de Pós-Graduacão em Ciências da Computacão
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

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- Phrased another way, how can we be sure that a given protocol/ceremony meets a given security goal?
- Whom are we defending against?

Notes about Security

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- Is security a sensation?

Notes about Insecurity

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- As the security is related to the threats:
  - Assume no threats and you will be secure!
  - Assume weaker threats and you still be secure;
  - Are we able to foresee all the threats in a scenario?

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- The name of this baseline is a Threat Model.

Changing the Baseline Matters

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  - Gavin Lowe assumed an internal could engage in the protocol to take advantage;
  - The protocol is considered broken since.

Importance of Threat Models

Lesson from NSSPK

To claim security and not to be surprised in the future you need to clearly specify the threat model of your protocol or ceremony and it must be as close as the environment where the protocol or ceremony will run within.

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- Most mechanised formal methods for security analysis use some version of this model.

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- The underlying public key system is 'perfectly secure':
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  - Only the peer knows his private key.

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  - Can read any message, decompose it into parts and re-assemble.

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- We assume that cryptographic functions have no special properties.

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  - It is simple to describe protocols in this model;
  - Adversary has unlimited power, so although this is a conservative approach this may not be realistic;
  - Protocols have a 'black-box' nature, which means that linking individual protocols with others is extremely difficult. Dolev-Yao helps on that.

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- No other security properties are considered.

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- For this reason, these protocols have been named "ping-pong" protocols;
- We observe that the stateless restriction is only put on the honest parties, and the adversary can maintain state, record communications, and store values that are subsequently used in the construction of messages;

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- The computational cryptography community started addressing the important issue of concurrency only in the 90's.

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- The honest participants follow the steps of the protocol without deviation;
- The attacker does not follow the rules;
- The peers do not share long term secrets, even the attacker keeps things for himself.

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- If a message is cast in the network, it go to the destination's knowledge set and the attackers knowledge set (Eavesdrop);

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  - He can break down messages to atomic components (Atomic Breakdown);
  - He can re-arrange all the components he knows in all possible ways to form new messages (Fabricate);

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- He can mimic the identity of any peer in the network (Spoof).

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- It uses free variables to allow for the powers to happen;
- Although the amount of knowledge the attacker can have is potentially unbound, it is finite;
- Some techniques create other significant limits to the Dolev-Yao Threat Model.

Discussion

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- Can you foresee some capability missing?
- Is Dolev-Yao sufficient to compare two security protocols?
- What can go wrong when we compare two security protocols that use Dolev-Yao as Threat Model?

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- DY can be considered the standard threat model to study security protocols;.
- The DY attacker controls the entire network although he cannot perform cryptanalysis;
- The DY model has remarkably favoured the discovery of significant protocol flaws, but the attacker has significantly changed today;
- To become an attacker has never been so easy.

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- The Ugly would be ready to either behaviour.

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- The principle behind this threat model is that the attackers do not share long term secrets.

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- This complicates a lot the mechanisations of the attacker, because all behaviour is possible.

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- Analysing a protocol under the Rational Attacker requires specifying each principal's cost and benefit functions.

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- The Rational Attacker bring all game theory into the protocols' scenarios.

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- Mechanisation is not only and issue of representativeness of the formal verification technique, but an entangled problem.

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  - This is confirmed by a formal proof.

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- Such messages include both the legal ones, conforming to the protocol in use, and the illegal, forged ones, which he can build from the analysis of the traffic though without cryptanalysis.

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  - This happens because he knows everyone's secrets.

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- For attacks against the attacker, the model will feature the attacker attacking himself, thus stretching the interpretation of the victim to an extreme;
- Perpetrator and victim are naturally expressed in GA because its gist is exactly to reflect modern everyone-for-themselves scenarios.

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- It helps to understand some new types of attacks.

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- This changes the game of how a powerful attacker would attack, because retaliation may let the attacker vulnerable.

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- The Multi Attacker do not use its full capabilities to derive partial information;
- By being powerful and knowing what is going on, he could anticipate what other Multi Attacker have on their knowledge set;
- This is not encoded on the attacker;
- This would make competition between the attacker fiercer.

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- It was conceived in 2015;
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- It is reasonable to use in protocol verification because the real capabilities of the multi-attacker we have are not clear and eventually will not be the same.

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- It was shown that we can mechanise such attacker using First-Order Logics;
- No issues were brought so far due to its freshness within the protocol and ceremony verification communities.

Discussion

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- Choosing one Threat Model to work invalidate the others?

Questions????

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