Asymmetric Cryptography Cryptographic Primitives

Design and Verification of Security Protocols and Security Ceremonies

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- And ease of computation.

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
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- The key should control the mapping between the Domain and Image of the MAC function, but not determine its spread.

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
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
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 - Symmetric CBC-MAC;
 - CMAC;
 - Hash based HMAC;




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- IV is fixed.

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 Secure for messages of a fixed number of blocks assuming the block cipher is Pseudo-Random Permutation;


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
- Secure for messages of a fixed number of blocks assuming the block cipher is Pseudo-Random Permutation;
- Not secure with variable lengths;
- Needs to be used with one key to each message length or do length pre-pending;

CMAC




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- Derives 2 keys to cypher the last block;

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
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- Have a well-understood analysis of the strength of the authentication mechanisms;

HMAC



Security of HMAC

- Security of HMAC relates to that of the underlying hash algorithm;
- If used with a secure hash functions and according to the specification (key size, and use correct output), no known practical attacks;

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- Usually it is thousand of times more computationally intensive than symmetric cryptography.

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- For security and authenticity, encrypt the signed message with the receiver's public key;

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Questions????



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