# "WHEN YOU ARE A BEETHOVEN": KINDS OF RULES IN SCHENKER'S *COUNTERPOINT*

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## I

In writing a treatise on species counterpoint Schenker undertook the uncharacteristic task of explaining how another theorist got something right.[1] This is not to say that the censorious impulse is suppressed in his *Counterpoint*; for while he develops a set of contrapuntal rules virtually identical to those of Fux's *Gradus ad Parnassum*, he argues vigorously that Fux (and such successors as Albrechtsberger, Cherubini, and Bellermann) utterly misunderstood the relationship these rules bear to free composition. Schenker's *Counterpoint* might therefore be taken to be about how species counterpoint could have managed to work even in the hands of those who didn't know how it worked.

As is often the case with Schenker, his real quarrel seems to be not so much with individual writers (however copiously the ones named are quoted in a running point-by-point appendix to the text) as with the world at large. Certainly it is no one in particular, but the musical establishment *im allgemeinen*, whom he accuses of

> the response—as fatuous as it is barbaric—with which many a teacher dismisses his inquisitive students . . . : "Yes, when you are a Beethoven, you, too, may write that way." (I, 1)

—although not without a specific echo of Bruckner's "*Segn's, mein' Herrn, dass ist die Regl, i schreib' natirli not a so.*"[2]

Since this remark is objectionable from so many sides, it is interesting to see which one draws Schenker's first and most direct fire. A teacher (hypothetical or otherwise) who makes it is charged with "giving the impression that Beethoven had composed *poorly!*" (I, 1)—to which Schenker heatedly returns "No, it is a thousandfold lie: Beethoven never composed poorly, and has no need of indulgence from a teacher who is not able to hear" (I, 1). But who ever said that Beethoven composed poorly—that is, when did anyone ever mean such a brushoff to denigrate anything but the rules? (Presumably Bruckner didn't.) Schenker's interpretation is of interest in that it shows just how extreme are his ambitions for the rules of counterpoint: he intends them never to be suspended in free composition.

In light of this, it is surprising to encounter another of Schenker's many summaries of his predecessors' misprision: "This absolute and invariable *identification of counterpoint and theory of composition* must thus be considered the original and fundamental error that our time has unfortunately inherited" (I, 2). Surely the Beethoven wisecrack at least acquits its maker of *this*. A moment ago, the cause for complaint was the idea that contrapuntal rules might sometimes cease to apply, and now it is that the rules are too directly applied.

The resolution of this paradox must of course be that Schenker has a novel account to give of the relation between contrapuntal rules and compositional practice. And in fact, at the high point of his Introduction, his program for "Clearing Up the Misconception"[3]—which, as a whole, is formed by reference to the second complaint, in that "counterpoint must somehow be thoroughly separated from composition" (I, 10)—is subdivided into two tasks: "(a) at the outset to draw the boundaries between the *pure theory of voice leading* and *free composition,*" and "(b) to reveal the *connection between counterpoint . . . and the actual work of art*" (I, 10). "For," he continues,

> there is indeed a relationship between counterpoint and composition, although it is far from being one of complete identity, and is therefore completely different from what has been supposed by theorists of both the old and the new schools. (I, 10)

In a single word, Schenker's account of this relationship is *prolongation*—which, *as* a single word, means no more than Schenker's compulsively repeated slogan *Semper idem sed non eodem modo* (which makes its first appearance in Book I and heads every division of Book II). It amounts to an insistence that apparent departures from the rules be understood somehow as extensions of them—which is, among other things, a tactic for making the rules im-

mutable. That the theory behind this insistence is not entirely explicit, Schenker reports without discernible chagrin: "The new forces that accompany free composition in music form an apparently new order; yet those who have true understanding see the fundamental contrapuntal principles profoundly and mystically at work in the background" (I, 13). How "those who have true understanding" is supposed to improve on "when you are a Beethoven" is not instantly clear; to discover what Schenker means, it is necessary to read him with a charity he habitually withheld from his colleagues.

He almost says so himself. After subdividing and elaborating the first, boundary-drawing phase of his program for several pages, he announces that "regarding the second task, its execution in the course of the work itself will most clearly reveal the method to be used" (I, 12). He thereupon adverts to an analogy with grammar: discussion of a sentence from *Faust* whose elided subject and deviations from standard word order are explained by reference to "considerations of verse (prosody, rhyme), and Faust's vexation . . . also his zeal, which makes that vexation truly credible," and are therefore said not to "constitute an offense against German grammar," but "only prolongations of the most ordinary grammatical laws" (I, 13).

Incomplete and indirect as it may be, this is still a revealing description of prolongation. It reveals, first of all, that the kind of entity that gets prolonged is a *rule*—which is to say that little in this book supports the standard latter-day application of the concept to pitches and harmonies.[4] Only under this interpretation is it coherent, for example, for Schenker to speak of three-voice counterpoint as "merely a prolonged phenomenon" in relation to two-voice counterpoint, or, more specifically, of "the concept of triad . . . evolved in the vertical dimension of three-voice counterpoint" as a "prolongation of the law of consonance" from two-voice counterpoint (II, 1–2).

Beyond this, it reveals something about the idea of grammar in which the analogy is grounded. Schenker means grammar more or less in the grammar-school sense: the organization of his exemplary sentence stands in contrast to "the way that one would have to teach a beginner to express the same thoughts" (I, 13), and it is this "grammar" that is prolonged rather than offended against. But if this is not to amount to telling the linguistic beginner "When you are a Goethe, you, too, may write that way," then Schenker must have some looser set of constraints in mind as well, to delimit the range of what he would accept as "prolonged" German; and these constraints are not grammar, but something outside it. The considerations of verse and character he invokes amount to "psychic compulsion toward freer formations," such that "if we imagine these psychic forces to be absent, we see immediately that without them it would be childish,

indeed impossible, to use the same construction" (I, 13). You, too, may write that way, then, if you have Goethe's extragrammatical reasons.

What is still unclear is how Schenker would distinguish between ordinary grammar and prolonged grammar except very informally, on the basis of intuitions about what is "normal," or perhaps even observations of pedagogical practice. Neither the elision nor the reordering in Goethe's sentence is so unusual as to fall outside the "common practice" of German. Fortunately it is not necessary to resolve this question in the domain of language; it is sufficient to be alerted by it to the possibility of the parallel question arising in the musical theory.[5]

The musical theory, that is, is likewise based on some idea of what is "normal," in the sense of what will happen in the absence of unusual countervailing forces. Like the implicit linguistic theory, it thus divides the phenomena within its domain into those which require special explanation and those which do not. And although *Counterpoint* is ostensibly concerned primarily with the normal—"it teaches the most characteristic effect of tones" (I, 14)—most of what it says about the normal is defined by, and derives its interest from, the demonstrations it makes of these contrapuntal norms continuing to operate in music that is not bound by them.

The element of "effect" just mentioned (and not mentioned in the linguistic sketch) is crucial to Schenker's thinking about these norms. It appears again in a stronger statement with which Schenker advertises the contrapuntal enterprise:

> In this study, the beginning artist learns that tones, organized in such and such a way, produce one particular effect and none other, whether he wishes it or not. One can predict this effect: it *must* follow! (I, 14)

Thus where his version of grammar still more or less directly addresses the question of what to write (under normal circumstances), his version of counterpoint addresses the question of what will (normally) happen—in the mind's ear of a qualified listener, presumably—when certain things are written. There must be a notion of effect involved in the linguistic theory, too, though it is not made explicit (and, like the musical notion, it is easier to see at work in connection with prolonged than with ordinary grammar); and in any case, the point is not to distinguish between the linguistic and musical schemata on this basis, but only to use the comparison to uncover a difference in the kinds of questions that systems of rules might address.

In line with this difference, two quite different kinds of statements come to be thought of as rules. The first kind, for which grammar-

school rules provide the model, says to the student "Write (or do not write) thus." It is the kind of law that Beethoven and Goethe are not required to obey, and Schenker's intended reform of it is a restriction of its scope to exercises, as distinct from artworks. The second kind, for which scientific laws (or "laws of nature") provide the model, says to the student "*If* you do this, *then* such-and-such an effect will result." It is the kind of law that even Beethoven and Goethe were bound to obey; indeed Schenker more than once implies that they are geniuses precisely in that they obey such laws *better* than ordinary people do.

Rules of the second kind do not ever directly tell anyone what to write, although they may (or must) figure in decisions about what to write. They might say "Scrambled word order produces an effect of vexed utterance," but not "Scramble your word order" or even "Do not scramble your word order." To yield decisions about what to write, they must be combined with notions of *purpose*—as in "*If* the effect of vexed utterance is what you want, *then* scramble the word order (and if not, then don"t)."

Schenker is neither completely clear nor consistent about this distinction (nor are most other music theorists, which is what makes the subject compelling);[6] but still his effort to be clear about it—more specifically, his basic (and brilliant) determination to frame the study of counterpoint as a matter of the second kind of rule rather than the first—is, as he realizes, the defining and distinguishing feature of this book. When he wavers, it seems to be because he cannot give up his inclination to tell composers what to do. Since he is so committed in general to the idea that great writing, literary or musical, involves *getting something right*, he prefers whenever possible to represent the purposes that turn one kind of law into the other as themselves "necessities." For instance, the study of a Chopin passage will make it possible "to understand the poetic reason and thus grasp the necessity for" a peculiar exposed tritone (I, 57). And his pursuit of such necessities often entails a belief in rules of quite another kind.

## II

An elaborate illustration of the foregoing, accompanied by a cryptically suggestive methodological statement, may be found in Schenker's discussion of the Beethoven passage shown in Example 1. The context is the prohibition of chromatic motion in the cantus firmus, for three reasons: "the chromatic progression is . . . in a certain sense . . . a kind of *tone-repetition*," which retards the line; "the altered tone [assuming the first tone to be the diatonic one] . . . produces the expression of a *passing tone*," which "ties all three tones together all

Beethoven, String Quartet Op. 50 No. 3, I




Example 1. (Book I, Example 35)

too closely as a unit"; and the juxtaposition of diatonic and altered tones "has the detrimental effect of a '*mixture*' of keys," which, with its "drastic and forced character," can "in no way . . . enter into a healthy and normal relationship within the narrow scope of the cantus firmus" (I, 46). The first two objections are, in effect, to the functional differentiation that would be introduced into the cantus firmus by a tone that is a *version* of another tone—the disturbance of the "equilibrium of the tones in relation to each other" (I, 18) which is the fundamental premise of the cantus firmus. The third objection is more complex; its point seems to be not the danger of grouping or ranking the notes but the simple difficulty of expressing two keys clearly without such differentiation (and within a very short span of time). After illustrating all the forbidden possibilities with citations from free composition, Schenker moves to close the matter—until, in the *Literaturübersicht*, he catches Bellermann saying that cadences including the chromatic progression of two forms of the seventh degree "are entirely impossible and sound unpleasant even in free composition" (I, 50).

This draws Schenker out once again, to say that Beethoven can, too, write that way—and even that he has to. Schenker explains the passage as "an abbreviated version" of the succession shown in Example 2—three hypothetical forms of the motive that begins the *Allegro vivace*. Since on each of its first two occurrences this motive initiates the *Auskomponierung* of a *Stufe* as a local tonic—first I, then II—Schenker feels justified in reading its third occurrence as referring to a IV *Stufe* not otherwise represented before $V^7$ and I conclude the



Example 2. (Book I, Example 37)

progression.[7] The sense of the explanation, then, is that the "drastic and forced" effect of mixture is acceptable in connection with the comparably drastic and forced treatment of the motive, and may even help to clarify it. Therefore

> Who can deny that Beethoven, in view of the particular motivic circumstances, had the right, even the obligation, to compose the chromatic succession as daringly as he did? (I, 51)

Beethoven's "right" (like Goethe's) comes from a situation to which the extraordinary effect of what he has written is appropriate; and his "obligation," if he indeed faces one, comes from essentially the same source—the same situation, viewed as one to which this effect is necessary. About this obligation Schenker is not absolutely clear: when he writes that "Beethoven underscored the motivic connection (which in itself really cannot be misunderstood) through its harmonization" (I, 51), he appears to be toying with the idea that such a motivic compression might not be recognized for what it is if it were harmonized smoothly; and if he rejects the argument for this particular case, he nonetheless raises the possibility of its obtaining sometimes. And he still refers several more times to the "necessity" for the progression.

Perhaps the most interesting way to read Schenker is as saying not that there would be no way to get through this moment in the piece without a chromatic progression (there might or might not be), but that this moment would not be what it is without a chromatic progression. What both readings have in common is the ascription of some kind of *function* to the progression, be it the function of making the passage go at all or the function of giving the passage some special quality. And this function can then be invoked to explain (or even justify) the progression—either to explain the progression absolutely, if it is the *only* progression that would fulfill that function (which is apparently what Schenker hopes for), or, more likely, to explain the progression up to a point, as belonging to a certain range of possible progressions, any of which might fulfill that function.[8]

From this point of view, what is wrong with Bellermann, prior to (and responsible for) his undesirable conclusion, is his apparent assumption that there could be no such function, so that the progression will always be undesirable. This is to say the least: it is also possible to read him as reasoning according to a different scheme which does not include functions at all—a version of the grammar-school scheme in which configurations are sorted into acceptable and unacceptable and only the acceptable are employed. And it is predictably the harsher reading that Schenker adopts.

At the climax of Schenker's remonstration with Bellermann comes this methodological maxim:

> And how profitable it is when contrapuntal doctrine touches upon a problem of effect only through a restriction instead of a prescription! All that remains is to become aware of the reasons that reside in the cantus firmus in order to grasp the depth and breadth of the problem outside its domain as well. (I, 51)

The first sentence is particularly hard to understand, and it is helpful to consult the original in the effort. "And how profitable it is" renders "*Und wieviel ist denn nicht auch schon damit gewonnen*," clearing away a swarm of Schenker's beloved "little words," more of which hover around the "prescription": "*auch nur mit einem Gebot*"; and the contrast between "restriction" and "prescription" is at once starker—more like "proscription" versus "prescription"—and less central to the sentence in "*Verbot (statt Gebot)*." Thus the sense of the sentence includes something like "And how much is gained besides when contrapuntal doctrine just touches on a problem of effect with a proscription (instead of prescription)?"—where what is gained is what the next sentence describes, namely, insight into situations beyond those the rule governs.

In any case the first sentence is unclear if its main point really is the contrast between negative and positive legislation. For on one hand it is easy to see how Schenker's *Gebot* could go in this case—"If you want a forced and drastic effect, then write a chromatic progression" (along with "In species counterpoint, you do not want such an effect"); and on the other hand it does not seem that Bellermann means to advance the *Gebot* "Do write diatonic successions." Both writers are thinking equally negatively, at least up to this point. The difference between them is in what they see their species-counterpoint prohibitions as saying about the configurations they forbid: Bellermann (as Schenker reads him) says nothing—beyond the rule is no-man's-land (or *Beethovensland*)—while Schenker (as he wishes to be read) gives insight into "the depth and breadth of the problem outside its domain."

## III

The purpose of contrapuntal doctrine is therefore in large part to give information about what it rules out. It may also give information about what it rules in, of course, but in Schenker's *Counterpoint* one is constantly struck by how much more is said about what is *verboten* than what is *geboten*. To take the most obvious example, the discussion of cantus-firmus writing in Book I fills nearly one hundred pages,

not because of the rules themselves, but because of the reasoning behind the rules and, most of all, the illustration of this reasoning in the analysis of musical passages that do not follow the rules. The rules themselves do indeed tend to take the form of prohibitions, or lend themselves to being understood as such. Some, such as the initial restriction to equal durational values, could be formulated either way—"Do write equal values" or "Do not write unequal values"—but the force of the explanation is practically always negative—as, in this case, "all rhythmic variety must . . . be avoided" so that "no note enjoys any particular weight or preference" (I, 18). In general, the intention behind the cantus-firmus rules is to "prevent *groups of several tones* from establishing . . . *units based on rhythm or harmony*" (I, 17); although this intention can be stated positively as "we must aim for a complete equilibrium of the tones in relation to one another" (I, 17), the positive statement is less accurate, less specific—and ultimately less revealing about what happens in real music.

For it is not clear in principle how "complete equilibrium" could be maintained in even the simplest tune—even in a descending scale (which Schenker later settles on as systematically the simplest tune there can be) a certain weight will attach to the beginning and ending points, and a direct connection will obtain between them. And in practice Schenker has no objection to internal differentiation within the cantus firmus, provided that it does not (as per the negative statement) create groups among the notes. He even goes so far as to analyze Fux's "Dorian" cantus firmus as unfolding the D-minor triad, as shown in Example 3, concluding that "Such unavoidable aggregates . . . cannot and should not be subject to any restriction. The difficulty lies, rather, only with smaller and more limited aggregates, which, because they tend to form subunits, must be prohibited in all—but also in *only*—those contexts in which . . . they become too sharply defined as subunits within an otherwise prevailing condition of homogeneity" (I, 54).

Thus, once more, it is easier and more exact to say what the rules are intended to prevent than what they are intended to secure. Exactness can be further promoted, however, by distinguishing among several rather different conditions grouped together under Schenker's rubric "*units based on rhythm or harmony*." For his purposes, "rhythm" is taken care of by restriction to equal durations, as noted


(Allegedly Dorian, but in fact also easily understandable simply as D minor)

Example 3. (Book I, Example 40)

a moment ago. His concept of "harmony" begins with "successions of pitches that would protrude sharply as arpeggiation or figuration of a single chord" (I, 19), though the associated example makes it clear that objectionable figuration can include neighboring motion about a single pitch; and when the formation of units is subsequently invoked against repetition of pitches and figures, and (leading up to the Beethoven example) against chromatic progression, it seems that "based on pitch" might have been a better thing to say. The sense in which "harmony" still figures in the definition is roughly that all the offending formations can too easily be heard as *elaborations of* one thing or another, which thing is displaced in its entirety by some succeeding tone—so that succession within the unit and succession into and out of the unit are significantly different; and this, surely, is an extreme generalization, in terms of quality of movement, of what it means to pass through a series of tones expressing a single entity such as a harmony.[9]

The language about the D-minor cantus, however, suggests another emphasis—on separation at the boundaries of a group, rather than connection within it. And this conception of the problem can be generalized to cover configurations in which notes are sharply separated even though no groups are formed, as for instance when a large leap is followed by another large leap in the opposite direction: here the objection cannot be to the formation of groups, since whatever registral groups may be formed are not temporally contiguous, but only to the sense that the middle note does not belong to the same line as the notes before and after—is a "detour" (I, 91), as Schenker puts it.

To summarize, perhaps a little from the standpoint of Schenker's later theory, it might be possible to say that what is bad in a cantus firmus is anything that removes it too far or too obviously from being a single voice on a single structural level. All these principles may be seen in play in Schenker's discussion of the freely composed melody in Example 4, whose overt subject is the augmented fourth in the first measure. The underlying lines are separated—"the melody . . . traverses the path from the tonic, *B*, to the subdominant, *E*" in a passing motion—and "the eighth-note *G*" is subordinated to *F*♯ "in the context of the large configuration that grows out of the tonic scale




Example 4. (Book I, Example 41)

degree" so that it "in reality produces more the effect of a 'passing' tone (in the broader sense . . . ) than that of a tritone" (I, 55–56).

Departing even further from the perspective of Schenker's earliest work, it might be possible to say that species counterpoint teaches—by prohibition—what kind of musical configuration might seem, right on the face of it, to *be* a prolongation (of *something*). The prolongation's "effect" of *being* a prolongation is usually elaborated much more than any "effect" of the configuration it prolongs. It is along this line that being "aware of the reasons that reside in the cantus firmus" translates into understanding "the depth and breadth of the problem outside its domain." The cantus-firmus rules thereby take on some of the attributes of (extremely informal) "well-formedness" rules for "middleground" analytical representation; though Schenker would not yet say any of this (and would never say some of it), it seems clear enough when he offers Example 5a to illustrate "the precepts of melodic fluency . . . at work" in a line which represents "the most concealed result, the ultimate product of ascending and descending figurations" (I, 96) in Example 5b.[10]

Although this last example is precisely the sort that might be expected to fill a counterpoint book by Schenker, it is in fact almost a unique one—in that it is intended to show a *similarity* between counterpoint and composition. Normally (to reemphasize the point of this section) the examples are of dissimilarity. And the "effects" discussed are mostly the effects of what species forbids (whence the unusual nature of the example: "melodic fluency" is already an "effect," and in this case the musicality of the species-counterpoint model has more or less straightforward explanatory relevance). Therefore, once again, the focus of discourse in Book I is perhaps not so much, or at any rate not so directly, on what one might at first understand by "the one particular effect" of "tones, organized in such and such a way"—that is, not on the effect of tones organized in the relatively simple ways its rules allow—as it is on which ways of organizing tones might demand to be understood as prolongations of simpler ways. One might say that it directs attention to a particular domain of effect—




Example 5a. (Book I, Example 120)



Example 5b. J. S. Bach, English Suite No. 6, *Prélude*, 1–15

"prolongedness" and "unprolongedness"—while saying comparatively little about the unprolonged itself.[11]

Though this emphasis, with the concomitant omissions, may make for a degree of theoretical frustration, it is not at all objectionable from the pedagogical point of view which was Schenker's. Fundamentally this *Counterpoint*, like its predecessors, is not devised to *describe* anything, but to direct a course of activity meant to instill a working

awareness of something; and this is often important to keep in mind when combing the text for evidence of Schenker's *theory*.

## IV

To be more precise about the last observation, it may be helpful to invoke the distinction Benjamin Boretz has drawn between *attributive* and *descriptive* theories in music.[12] For the kind of theory he calls attributive, the use of the word "theory" at all may seem eccentric, since an attributive theory "isn't *descriptive* or *explanatory* of anything; what it does is ascribe properties to and thereby determine what there is." This theory is "the mental configuration" through which some sounds are received and interpreted as music—the frame of mind in which musical meaning is "read (or heard) into" the sounds. A descriptive theory is a "verbal portrait" (or perhaps a portrait in some other symbolic system) of an attributive theory or of the result of an attributive theory's operation on a sequence of sounds—to put it roughly, what is usually called a theory or an analysis. The point of extending the application of the term "theory" in this way is to emphasize that *every* attribution of musical meaning to a sound—*every* way of hearing—is contingent; there is no such thing as "untheoretical" hearing. And the "degree of theoreticity" of any way of hearing has nothing to do with the degree of *articulation* to which the implicit theory can be brought.

Against this backdrop it is relatively simple to define Schenker's mission, not only in *Counterpoint* but in all his work, as the attempt to get his readers' attributive theories into shape—into what he regards as the only acceptable shape. Providing bits of descriptive theory here and there may be part of the process, but providing a descriptive theory never *is* the process. To a considerable degree, the appropriate attributive theory—that is, the appropriate frame of mind for the ascription of musical meaning—is to be installed in the pupil through exercises in composition limited to the configurations fundamental to the attributive theory. By Schenker's account, as noted above, Fux and others managed to make these exercises work even while having inadequate descriptive theory to go with them; and while Schenker does have more and better descriptive theory to offer, this theory is mostly about the construction of more elaborate meanings from the "primitive" meanings—it does not provide verbal renderings of the primitive meanings themselves.

It seems conceivable that Schenker might even have accepted at least part of this account of his enterprise. For one thing, it is an account that makes some sense of the cranky argument that makes up most of *Counterpoint*'s two Prefaces. In the "Herculaneum and Pompeii of music" in which Book I notoriously sets itself, "all musical

culture is buried"—which means even that "the very tonal material . . . is demolished." This "tonal material" is not the notes, exactly, but "that foundation of music which artists, transcending the spare clue provided by the overtone series, created anew in all respects from within themselves" (I, xvii)—which is to say that the "material" is a *system of relations*. This is even clearer in a stronger statement from Book II: "charlatans have . . . destroyed the pure tonal material—the art of voice leading and harmony—to such an extent that it is no longer possible to achieve even mediocre results, such as could at least have been attained in previous ages in regions below that of genius" (II, xv-xvi). This is awfully exaggerated language just for the observation that harmony and counterpoint teaching are off track, unless these disciplines are recognized as representing the way of hearing that, to Schenker's thinking, alone makes master-music possible. No one, in short, has the right attributive theory any more; so not only can no one compose, but no one can perform or listen either. And the social criticism to which the reader is treated for most of the Prefaces is presented as a "brief and perfunctory" report of the "causes" of the "decline." The issue is not the quality of the argument (let alone of the social criticism), but Schenker's feeling that such an argument was relevant and even necessary. The "demolition" of "the tonal material" subsists just in "tones organized in such and such a way" *failing* to produce the "effect" they "must produce"—failing as they must in minds unconfigured by the proper attributive theory.

In this light, Schenker's retort to "When you are a Beethoven" might be understood as, in effect: Yes, Beethoven may (and does) write anything he wants, because he hears whatever occurs to him through the filter of the right attributive theory—which is to say, he recognizes the "effect" it "must produce" and composes it out. Beethoven's chromatic progression is not ruled out because he "knew enough" to hear it as a mixture of scales and set it so that it *made sense* for it to be a mixture of scales. What would have constituted a crime against "the tonal material" is failure to treat the progression as such a mixture—by, for instance, employing it when there was no motivic support for a construal of it as involving two scales and drastically forcing their juxtaposition; this would have meant not noticing its real effect.

Schenker's actual formulation has it that

> In the best of cases—and this applies precisely to geniuses, and only to them—intention (that is, prediction of effect) and effect correspond perfectly; but in the great majority of cases the tones, acting entirely on their own and, so to speak, behind the back of the composer, produce an effect completely different from that intended. (I, 14–15)

The image of notes having their own way is a consistent one in Schenker's work, to the point where he sometimes seems actively to minimize the role of choice in composition. To a degree he does this even by presenting his analyses from background to foreground; for his tendency then is, if possible, to represent the content of each layer as *motivated* by the content of preceding layers. To take a very familiar example: Schenker can be counted on, practically every time a root progression of an ascending second arises in one of his analyses, to speak of a "threat" of parallel fifths, which must be avoided by some further contrapuntal elaboration such as 5–6–5. But what kind of threat is there? Leaving aside the manifest unreality of the generative process in which the threat supposedly arises, there is still the point that any fool can lead voices to avoid the fifths. And if the threat is of *structural* parallelism (which it usually is not, since the most common configuration is probably a I *Stufe* followed by a distinctly subordinate altered II functioning as V of V), then a voice-leading fix won't work anyway. Almost always, it would make more sense in such a case simply to say "the middle chord of the sequence can be interpreted as prolonging the first one in a 5–6–5 progression connecting it to the second"; but by fabricating a motivation instead, Schenker is able to achieve two things he likes very much: a depiction of the composer doing what the material demands rather than making a choice, and, along with this, a directly influential role for a contrapuntal rule.

This tendency to invent motivations is perhaps more remarkable as the motivations become more *ad hoc*. For instance: in the analysis of the *Sarabande* of Bach's C-major cello suite,[13] the *F* of the octave *Urlinie* and a trailing *Terzzug* turn up an octave above their primordial register. The explanation offered is not any form of "to account for this passage of the piece, a registral transfer must be invoked," let alone "this passage has the effect of something pulled up out of the register in which most of the piece's activity has occurred thus far; therefore representing it as the result of a registral transfer will capture that much of how it sounds"; rather it is "This octave-coupling fulfills the need of the instrument, which, like a human essence, likes to manifest itself in its fullness: as long as enough is done for the *Urlinie*, why should the instrument not also permit itself such fulfillment?"[14] This is to say, first, that the matter to be accounted for is not the appropriateness of the analytical assertion of an octave transfer, let alone the appropriateness of the analytical system, but the compositional decision; and, second, that the way to account for such a decision is to represent it as *caused*—rather than, say, as particularly fantastic, or as likely to have interesting implications for what follows. It *had* to be done that way—if not because of the highest law of

the *Ursatz*, which could be satisfied otherwise, then because of *some* need.[15]

And, once more, the need is not created by the composer, but by the material or by the medium. Even when the need is still more *ad hoc* than in the last example—neither inherent in the tones nor inherent in the instrument, but essentially unique to one piece—something of the kind must be so: when the *C*-minor Fugue from Book I of the *Well-Tempered Clavier* makes a habit of—indeed, adopts as a rule—following each statement of its principal subject with a descending scale in sixteenth-notes, Schenker insists that "Just as unique as this fugue is, just so unique is the law that is its law of life: the fugue itself gave birth to this law, not Bach—with the strength of a genius, he only recognized it and submitted to it."[16]

From the point of view developed since the first section of this essay, Schenker's thought slips its moorings here. He gives in completely to his unworthy wish to explain why his "masters" *had* to do what they did. Surely what one would want to hear from him about, say, the cello *Sarabande* example is that it is somehow desirable to conceive of the notes in that passage as being lifted out of what would otherwise have been their register; or, to put it a little more Schenker's way, the "effect" of "notes organized" as they are in that passage is that of a registral transfer; or, to put it a little more Boretz's way, it is in some way advantageous to approach this passage with a "mental configuration" such that one would attribute the "quality" of "an octave-higher-than-'normal' " to the passage. And in any case the *Urlinie* is a (faintly cartoonish) representation of the set of norms against which this perception might be attained, mixed with some sense of the further connections, before and after, that might help make this particular set of norms sustainable.

With this, one will have moved closer to an explanation of *why* Bach wrote what he wrote only in that one will have developed a more elaborate sense of *what* he wrote—or perhaps, in a more dashing formulation, *what* what he wrote *means* (though not, please, what *he* meant by it). That is, one will be in a position to read more into—or hear more in—these measures than one could with a less elaborate attributive theory, such as one which made it possible to observe only that the passage is the highest in the movement, but not that its "highness" is enhanced by its actually being something less high transferred out of its "proper" place. (It is interesting that one's sense of the cello cutting loose would be enhanced by the same token; and, needless to say, the present comments on Schenker's logic take nothing away from the pertinence of his musical observations.)

To be a little more precise about one of the last paragraph's assertions: the way this increased attributive power might contribute to

an explanation of Bach's compositional decisions is by making it possible to imagine more in the way of *function* for what he wrote (in the sense developed in the Beethoven discussion above). But "function," it must be kept in mind, does not have to mean (and in this context generally does not mean) satisfaction of a necessity such that there would be no piece if the necessity went unsatisfied; the only necessity in sight is the one such that if it went unsatisfied then the piece would not be what it is—where the richest possible sense of what the piece is comes from a well-tuned attributive theory.

If there are "rules" or—it may as well be said—"laws" anywhere in this picture, they should not be laws leading from one's general notion of music down to the score produced by the genius under the direction of those laws. If laws at all, they should be laws about what *sound*—what "effect"—an arrangement of notes, appropriately interpreted, will lead to; and such sounds will provide the imaginable basis for compositorial choice of one arrangement or another, should there be an interest in explaining such choices.

Why anyone would want to respond to a highly esteemed composition by telling a story of how it *had to be* exactly as it was is something of a mystery in any case—a mystery faintly suggestive of some character defect in the storyteller. Wouldn't it be enough to say that the piece *is* as it is, and that hearing it well means realizing how everything about it contributes in a variety of ways to a very full sense of *how* it is (so that, incidentally, even a small change might make the piece something significantly different—which is *not* necessarily to say less good)? What of value would be lost under this less grandiose explanatory program? The sense of the composer as inspired somnambulist, perhaps? But what is the value of *that*?[17]

To bring these questions back down to a real case: once the Beethoven string-quartet passage is parsed as motivic compression and scalar mixture, what on earth is added by the claim that it is also *compulsory*? Even if it could somehow be discovered that Beethoven, at this point, felt that he had no choice—that of all the possibilities he could imagine, this was by far the best, or even that he could imagine no others—this would still not mean that the composition would collapse if a different move were made; it only means that if a different move were made, the composition would not be what it is—and thus the discussion comes back again to giving the richest possible description of exactly *what* composition this composition, under this hearing, is.

The attraction of the idea of necessity probably derives from the lingering on of the older idea about rules, the very one Schenker is working so well to transcend. While the chromatic progression may not be *wrong* in the pedant's sense, it is still not *normal* according to

the contrapuntal "*Effektenlehre*," and so Beethoven would not have written it "without a good reason." It is as though strict-contrapuntal rules, even if they do not forbid things in free composition, may still discourage things. Or, to be more precise—and to return to the sense of some earlier speculations about this point—the rules bring it about that some things a composer might choose will place special conditions on other choices. And with this the imagery of right and wrong—and of right and wrong senses of right and wrong—may give way just to the imagery of with and against the grain (of larger norms).

This is still something to have—quite a bit, in fact. It is, in particular, what one might miss in a hypothetical "Schoenbergian" analysis of the passage[18] which claimed that the quartet's wildly chromatic *Introduzione* establishes a piece-specific norm, of which the moment in the *Allegro* is a straightforward reflection (as are the *stringendo* measures sixth through fourth from the end of the movement, and many choice spots in between). For surely one would want to perceive this chromaticism as odd, and therefore as characteristic of a particular and limited situation: if it is odd, then there is more meaning to the exact timing of the *Allegro*'s reference to it, just before the moment when the new tempo, only hesitantly expressed for such a long time, really takes hold—as if these measures were a last vestige of the *Introduzione*. Moreover, one would want to maintain some sort of norms of harmonic and voice-leading progression even in the *Introduzione* in order to be able to recognize the progression from the sixteenth measure to the seventeenth—from a dominant-seventh of *F* (presumably minor) to a *C*-minor triad (tonic for the end of the *Introduzione*)—as abnormal even by prevailing standards, so that there is more meaning to the *Allegro*'s abnormal treatment of $V^7$ of *F*, of all possible harmonies[19]—as if this moment still needed to be thought over, even after the *Introduzione*'s immediate function had been discharged.

But none of this would have at all the point of making the chromatic progression necessary or right; it just makes it *much*. And insofar as one is concerned to appreciate a musical composition as a human invention rather than as a quasi-natural object, this is altogether preferable. Herein lies the musical point of this essay's distinction between different types of law: Schenker is wise enough to reject the image of the "masters" arriving at their "masterworks" by obeying some supernal set of harmonic and contrapuntal rules, as well as the vulgarly complementary image of their mystical antinomianism; and though some substantial trace of this attitude may remain in his idea of a natural force operating in the genius to dictate the course of a composition, he is still able, much of the time, to address his laws

to the relation between what the composer writes and what a listener can make of it using an attributive theory adequately aligned with the composer's. Alignment with the composer's attributive theory must of course also be taken as a slightly confused conception of virtue for listeners' attributive theories—that is, a roundabout way of referring to a candidate theory's power to produce satisfyingly rich and specific hearings; but there is no serious difficulty in reading around this.

## V

One of the great attractions of Schenker's *Counterpoint*, in fact, is the relative ease of reading it in the spirit just described. Book I in particular owes everything to its felicitous and consistent refusal to stick to its overt subject: even while Schenker promises to tell how things are, his libido attaches much more to what happens when they aren't that way (or to "knowing the reason why"). The pedagogical significance of this peculiarity is hard to overstate; teaching species counterpoint—or, better, teaching *through* species counterpoint what species counterpoint is a tool to teach—is a much more sensible operation when the effort to assert similarity between species and free composition is placed in relation to the effort to affirm and articulate the dissimilarity. The air of coverup, of "trust me," dissipates when the teacher can say "*Of course* this isn't like real music: here's a piece of real music that does what we've just ruled out—and here's how the rule shows us a way into it." In the early stages of learning, nothing speaks better for a theory than the possibility of showing its benefits before all of it is assimilated; and it is in this respect, not just in respect of its clear organization and (for Schenker) relatively circumscribed metaphysics, that the *Counterpoint* is Schenker's most nearly "practical" success.[20]

This is not an idle commendation, or a peripheral one, for a pragmatic justification is the most appropriate kind for principles like those of the *Counterpoint*. Schenker is emphatic about the point that they cannot be justified by simple appeal to the music they are meant to describe:

> It is always a serious mistake, as I have stated repeatedly, to call upon the practice of the masters in free composition to decide problems in strict counterpoint. (I, 273)

That is, it is a mistake to settle contrapuntal questions on the basis of what is or is not found in compositions; the question is what the maintenance of a particular contrapuntal principle will make it possible to attribute to passages.

A fairly clear statement of this point comes through in an otherwise bizarre passage about how Bach repeatedly "misharmonizes" the chorale "*Gelobet seist du, Jesu Christ*" in *G* major rather than *C* major—evidently because he hears it as "Mixolydian" on *G* (starting as well as ending on the mode's final).[21] In support of a *C*-major reading Schenker advances three arguments: one that is "analytical" in the familiar sense, essentially to the effect that the fourths and fifths in the melody collectively imply *C*-*G*, defining the *C* triad, more than *G*-*D*, defining the *G* triad (an argument whose acceptance requires a strong preference for deciding on key as early as possible and maintaining that decision against increasing difficulty); one that is simply hostile to the "church modes" (recalling—especially in its obsessiveness—the exasperating §§26–30 of *Harmony*); and, finally, the one of interest here:

> Now, is it not an accomplishment when a natural system (in this case the major system) enables a melody to return to its natural key and even permits it to appear in some respects more individual than other melodies belonging to the same system? (I, 39)

The argument in question is expressed by only part of the quote—the part, reminiscent of the methodological comments after the Beethoven example, about how much more "individual" the melody can be if it is construed by reference to a standard that is relatively independent of what it does. The modal system, in contrast, though "undoubtedly based on good will and most detailed and faithful observation," yet remains "merely descriptive" (I, 39); that is, it does not sufficiently *interpret* what it describes (and so tends toward the same kind of error as does the wrong application of contrapuntal doctrine).

The references to "nature," meanwhile, may be understood as efforts to ward off a problem: if contrapuntal (or other) principles stand or fall, not by whether what they describe is found in free composition, but "only" by how interesting particular compositions become when interpreted by reference to them, then what is to stop a listener from adopting utterly perverse principles—principles by reference to which the ascription of the most extreme peculiarity to compositions becomes "too easy"? Schenker does not *ask* this question, of course, but much of what he writes can be understood as an effort to ward it off. Accordingly, to recover it and criticize it in detail is unfeasible in this essay, devoted as it is to other matters; but it is relevant to criticize at least the presumption that there is some criterion of "rightness" for attributive theories. For one thing, "rightness" is not an issue—only richness of result is; which is incidentally to say that discourse between holders of contrasting attributive theories is not rel-

evantly directed toward ranking and possible correction of the theories but toward exchange and exercise of them, to the end of giving both participants more options for how to listen. For another, maintaining a disadvantageous attributive theory is about as perfectly victimless a crime as can be imagined (something which cannot so easily be said about disadvantageous descriptive theories), as well as, in general, one with few attractions for the miscreant. And for yet another, abandoning the notion that a single best attributive theory is *determined* by conditions outside the listener has nothing to do with claiming that the choice of a theory is not *affected* by such conditions; as Boretz once put it, "I believe there's a real world out there, because not all of my fantasies work."[22]

It is tempting to say that the author of *New Musical Theories and Fantasies* stakes everything on a real world going his way (in sharp contrast to large sections of the world of appearances, especially the social world); but it is fairer to him to say that he is confused, as he clearly is in the quote about the chorale. Obviously his theory seemed right to him because he preferred the experiences of music it allowed him to have; and it is in any case unlikely that he had direct intuitive contact with the natural realities that are purportedly its basis. It may be only that he could think of no better way to account for the operation of his attributive theory than to imagine it naturalistically: if a particular configuration constituted a relevant point of reference for listening to a passage that departed from it, then the normal passage had to have some kind of *existence*. It had to be somewhere, created by something (the nature of sound, perhaps as this interacted with the traits of a correctly ordered mind). And yet Schenker was happy to acknowledge that the perception of this underlying "nature" did not come naturally: "primitives" did not attain it to any appreciable degree (according to all the discussions of mode), only geniuses attained it fully, and everyone in between had to be elaborately schooled to it. He simply could not accept the idea that it might be in any important respects contingent.

Fortunately this theory, too, is to be evaluated by what it does; and two examples of Schenker's epistemology in action, with traces of its attendant psychology, are fascinating. The first is his analysis of a few measures just before the "recapitulation" in the first movement of Mozart's *Linz* Symphony—the most elaborate and protracted analysis anywhere in *Counterpoint*. It presents a perceptual theory whereby listeners pass through some sort of mental representation of the norms to "arrive at" perception of the nonnormative music shown in Example 6.

It is adduced as the first illustration of the way free composition "justifies" successions of major thirds that strict counterpoint




Example 6. (Book I, Example 200)

excludes (and, as the first illustration, suggests that scalar mixture loomed larger in Schenker's mind than *mi contra fa*). On Schenker's account the overriding V *Stufe* "demotes" these thirds "to the status of merely transient chromatic advancements"; but even so "the ear grasps very well too the operation of the whole process that necessarily produced this effect of transience, and we gain finally the insight that we are dealing here with only apparent major thirds, which in fact originate simply from minor thirds instead" (I, 148–49). This process is explained with the aid of Example 7, which shows three "intervening stages" through which "our perception . . . rushes with lightning speed." The first stage is a diatonic passing motion in which the middle two thirds, *a*-$c^1$ and *b*-$d^1$, are indeed minor. The second stage is divided: one of its branches fills in the previous stage's upper voice chromatically while leaving the lower voice unchanged, while the other does the reverse. (Schenker labels all the chromatic notes




Example 7. (Book I, Example 201)

"passing," whether they precede their diatonic counterparts—as $a\flat$ does $a$—or follow them—as $c\sharp^1$ does $c^1$.) The third stage combines the branches of the second, so that every chromatic change now occurs against a sustained diatonic note in the other voice.

For Schenker, this hypothetical passage is real enough to call forth a page of analysis—including blow-by-blow dramatization like "[the upper voice] advances . . . while the lower voice . . . remains waiting and passive" (I, 150) and a table correlating each diatonic tone with its pair of chromatic partners (which is to say repeating the information of stages b and c). And although he then starts toward the music, saying "it certainly amounts to exactly the same thing if the two tones—the diatonic one and the chromatic one in each case—instead of waiting and following upon one another, throw caution to the winds and run together," the pull of his norms is strong enough to elicit from him yet another description of stage c: "at the second quarter the third was indeed originally minor . . . until it was enlarged to major . . . only by means of preempting the chromatic passing tone" (both quotes I, 150). Finally "the ear . . . accepts the abbreviation . . . , relinquishes the . . . minor thirds . . . , and thus arrives immediately at the perception of major thirds . . ." (I, 150).

The musical substance of this analysis is plausible enough; obviously the passage owes its snaky sound to its calculated disregard of the diatonic norm, so laboriously portrayed by Schenker—to its opportunistic reproduction of major thirds, no matter what the going scale has to offer. And this sound would be lost by an attributive theory that simply accepted the parallel major thirds as a local norm without maintaining a diatonic norm for it to conflict with. What is remarkable is the just-so story about the psychological mechanism by which the musical point is appreciated: to perceive the passage as an "abbreviation" of something closer to the norm, the "ear" must *pass through* ("with lightning speed") a representation of what is abbreviated. That is, the story is not just that the more normal, "explanatory" version is constructed somehow during the process of relating the passage to the *C*-major scale; it is that this version is *more readily* available than the music itself. There is nothing wrong with just-so stories, of course: Boretz's story of an unarticulated theory is one, no less than Schenker's of unheard notes, even if its lesser "naturalism" makes it more plausible; and for present purposes it is a purely contingent matter which one is taken to explain better how an attribution of snaky opportunism gets made. Thus, rather than read the passage simply as an instance of fanciful psychologizing, one might better read it as an instance of near-clarity about the invocation of a reference outside the music to make the music more than it otherwise would be.[23] As suggested a moment ago, the interesting lapse of

clarity is not really about the cognitive process, but about the optional nature of the whole business. Since Schenker is so determined that this particular set of norms not be considered optional (and, very probably, since he himself was unable to get on without them), he finds himself inclined toward an image of them as psychologically inevitable (and perhaps even physically real), and toward an image of contrapuntal (and other) teaching as the awakening of perceptions of what is already there but unnoticed, rather than as the installation of a system that might prove useful for a particular repertory.

The second example tends the same way, but is less easy to read as indulgently. It comes up during a spat with Riemann, in the discussion that follows Schenker's "Final codification" of the rules of fourth species in two voices. Schenker is explaining that, while consonant preparation and dissonant suspension may represent the normal conditions for suspensions, free composition permits "*prolongations* of the basic form" (I, 278) in which (among other things) any element of the figure may take on a "*harmonic character*" different from the normal one (I, 280): the preparation may be dissonant, the resolution may be the seventh of a seventh chord, and so on. He then asserts of the "double suspension a $\frac{6\text{-}4}{5\text{-}3}$" that "it is not permissible to speak of a sixth that has turned into a dissonance . . . or of a 'make-believe consonance' (*Scheinkonsonanz*) as Riemann does"; rather, "in the case of the sixth-suspension we must always be content with just the feeling of suspension, at the same time allowing the sixth to retain its fully consonant character" (I, 281).

Between "feeling" and "character" it may be difficult reliably to locate *sound*—that is, it is not clear what *hearing* ought to go with such a sixth—but Schenker's "effect," if it is what species counterpoint teaches, apparently is of consonance. Even if the *Stufe* that would presumably be in effect when this situation arises in free composition makes it possible to "sense the consonant sixth-suspension," and indeed both suspensions, "more clearly" than in counterpoint (I, 281), still Schenker feels a line has to be drawn. If instead we were to "draw the monstrous theoretical conclusion that culminates in the proposition that just on account of increased clarity . . . a sixth should be counted as a dissonance," "wouldn't it then be necessary to treat all other consonances similarly, and to regard them as dissonances the moment they occur with the function of suspensions? For example, in a case like the following: [Example 8]."

Schenker apparently prefers to believe about this example that the twelfth $c\text{-}g^1$, as a form of fifth, is unalterably consonant; and, therefore, that even in this context it consonates for all it's worth, although its consonance is drowned out by the countervailing force of the I




Example 8. (Book I, Example 420)

*Stufe*.[24] To many readers, Riemann's contrary thoughts may not seem "monstrous" at all:

> Dissonance is therefore completely general: disturbance, by foreign elements, of the clarity of chordal meaning. (I, 356)[25]

> A chord represents consonance or dissonance only when understood in its relationships to others—that is, in its logical context. We will discover, therefore, that it can be possible, or, rather, necessary, to understand a major or a minor triad as a dissonance. (I, 281–82)[26]

The latter quotation even sounds like something Schenker would say, if the issue were not the consonance or dissonance of a triad, but its status as a *Stufe* or as passing. But Schenker wants none of it:

> Isn't the thing we call a "relationship" in truth merely a mode of conceptualizing (like "time" and "space"), and in no way an objective reality? But why should a "mode of thought" have such power over the natural phenomenon of consonance as to alter its innermost nature?! (I, 282)

Schenker's quarrel with Riemann is clearly not about musical hearing, but about epistemology. It seems safe to assume that neither party to the dispute would *hear* a consonant twelfth in Example 8, that both parties believe that twelfths are normally consonant, and that both have more or less the same reasons for hearing the $g^1$ in question as the dissonant delay of $a\flat^1$. But they are committed to different stories about how it is reasonable for this particular twelfth to have its dissonant effect (different *explanations* of the effect).

Schenker is unshakably committed to an eternal consonant essence for the interval, even though that essence has no effect in this case (and there is reason to think he would be very hard on any theorist who thought it did).

Indeed, it is possible to infer from this example that any "effect" taught in species counterpoint might under the right conditions be "prolonged" to the point of imperceptibility. And on the whole it would seem wiser to regard the matter in a different way: to interpret Schenker's primordial, essential, "it-*must*-follow" consonance as *susceptibility* to the attribution of consonance, if the circumstances (notably the *Stufengang*) are such as to reward that attribution; and therewith to interpret the study of species counterpoint not as the introduction of fundamental truths about "the tonal material," but as a field in which to practice making attributions which, in Schenker's (not ungrounded) opinion, it will be useful to be able to make consistently and fluently. The "inmost nature" of consonance is precisely that it *is* a "mode of thought."

Since there is so much evidence that Schenker was close to being able to say this, one wishes for some understanding of why he could not quite manage it. And while the state of availability of better conceptual models is certainly a contributing issue (just as it is right now, when the point must be made by way of unexpressed theories or incompletely accessible "mental representations"), it remains true that Schenker himself was obviously capable of invention at this level. Therefore it is inevitable to wonder how much the desire for an immutable basis for art—a set of "laws" after all, even if few in number and linked to creation in an unfathomably complex way—might itself have been the reason. (Is it not a demand for *something* immutable that all the extramusical commentary is trying to impress on us?)[27] To put it another way, the impression can grow very strong that Schenker's *Semper idem* is not his summary observation, but his fundamental premise.

## VI

In pursuit of a methodological point, the immediately preceding discussion has seized on a particular notion of "effect"—the kind of which the consonance or dissonance of an interval is the exemplar. Schenker probably had this kind uppermost in his mind when he described strict counterpoint as the study of effects; but if he did, it was an oversimplification, for he also considers other effects of quite different kinds. The effects of the chromatic step are a case in point: obviously they are not so well defined as the effect of consonance,

and Schenker's description accordingly only tries to give a sense of the range and type of complexity that a chromatic step might entail under various conditions (and that might constrain its use). On other occasions his description concerns the position of a configuration within his theoretical world, rather than its sound as such; for instance, his description of "the third" (in his "Specific observations about the nature of the permissible intervals" in the cantus firmus) reads in its entirety:

> The third is of two types: the major third, which is a consonance born of nature, and the minor third, which, on the contrary, is merely the artificial counterpart of the major. The third is included in the content of the triad and represents, so to speak, its internal organs. (I, 81)

The first of these statements is unlikely to mean anything in compositorial practice, but only ties the intervals into the "natural"-and-"artificial" system asserted in *Harmony*; while the second perhaps specifies in its ghoulish way that the third does not determine a triad the way the fifth does,[28] but may be inferred (given a scale) from a fifth.

Beyond all these is one more kind of effect which seems to be a still "purer" attribution, which is to say one that is harder to imagine as "forced" by the arrangements of notes and yet—more remarkably—one that never goes away: the effect of being "passing." The sense in which it never goes away is that a consonant chord brought into existence to harmonize a dissonant passing tone takes on the passing nature of the tone, and retains it even under subsequent transformations that change its voicing and produce more chords in elaboration of it; indeed "Schenker's theory" as we know it can be construed as an enormous extension of just this claim. Schenker can use the passing tone as the basis for his entire model of musical coherence precisely because he believes that the effect of "being passing" can never be drowned out—not only never removed, that is (which is something he believes of *all* his effects), but not even overridden the way the consonant nature of the twelfth $c$-$g^1$ can be. When several lines present passing tones together, forming consonant intervals between them, Schenker will speak directly of "dissonant effects by means of detours through consonant sounds" (II, 208). And ultimately the *Ursatz*, whatever else it may be, is an assertion that most of the events of a piece, however protracted, stable, and locally well defined and independent, are passing toward the final tonic.

To present and develop the concept of the passing tone, therefore, is the single most important contribution *Counterpoint* makes to Schenker's theory. It is the most radical and decisive contribution: in the conceptual frame of this essay, the extended—the "prolonged"—

passing tone is Schenker's signal contribution to tonal attributive theory. That is, a definition of "passing" character under which this character may be attributed to a wide variety of musical phenomena besides passing tones in the familiar sense is something essentially new in Schenker's work; a "passing event" in this extended sense is a more or less new thing for events to be *heard as*—a new "thing for things to be." Accordingly the final task for this examination of *Counterpoint* is to examine this concept of passing note, to find out something about how this particular effect comes by its distinction.

Presumably this distinction has something to do with Schenker's choice of the passing tone as the model for all dissonance. His case for it, in two-voice second species (I, 176–79), is essentially that it relates no more closely to one of its flanking consonances than to the other (as a dissonance approached or left by skip might seem to) and that, in contrast to the neighboring tone, it at least has the significance of keeping a line moving from consonance to consonance (rather than the significance only of elaborating a stationary tone). An especially interesting remark is that "the second used in this way . . . contributes just as little of harmony to the tone that follows as to the one that precedes"—that is, "it relates to both just as a dissonance" (I, 178); the implication is that if another tone is present, consonant with the first tone and dissonant with the passing tone, then this sounding dissonance is not in principle very different from the dissonance already attributed to the passing tone just in comparison with the preceding tone in its own line. This opens the way to another thought, whose formulation in Book I is cryptic: that even though the dissonance is "the mark of an independence . . . of the one voice in relation to the other," still "the transient independence increases the value and power of the unity of the two" (I, 184). In the section of Book II about three-voice second species, a crucial addition is made:

> It is precisely the dissonant passing tone that confirms the harmony of the downbeat more reliably and emphatically than the consonant upbeat, which . . . does not imply a unity of harmonic effect [within the bar] and often leads to a more or less explicit change of harmony. (II, 57)

Why "more reliably"? Because a dissonant passing tone, unable to express a harmony, cannot *change* the harmony against the cantus-firmus tone, and so leaves the listener to hold the downbeat harmony in memory until another harmony comes along; whereas a consonant upbeat, even when it continues the downbeat harmony, can express this harmony adequately on its own, and so does not exact this mental effort—does not *force* the listener to hold the downbeat harmony

(even if it also does not interfere). From this follows perhaps the most consequential statement of the entire work:

> Alongside all the corporeality . . . of the intervals available in strict counterpoint, the first appearance of the dissonant passing tone produces a curious intrusion of the imaginary: it consists in the covert retention, by the ear, of the consonant point of departure that accompanies the dissonant passing tone on its journey through the third-space. It is as though the dissonance would always carry with it the impression of its consonant origin. . . . (II, 57–58)

Here, apparently, is the passing tone's signal distinction. The "curious intrusion of the imaginary" lies in the fact that—unlike some of the other "effects" discussed earlier—the effect of passing is in no way an effect of the individual event, but necessarily an effect of the event in relation to other events. ("Consonant nature," by contrast, is precisely an effect of the individual interval; and it is through the interval's relation to other events that its consonance can be overridden. Much the same could be said of an interval's power or lack of power to determine a triad. For an effect like "forced and drastic mixture," the matter is more equivocal: this is not quite the same kind of effect as these others, but is in some respect an effect of resistance to "mental retention," in which a change of scale makes it difficult to hear one version of the degree confirming another.) Thus "the curious intrusion of the imaginary" might well be described as a welcome incorporation of the temporal: what the activated imagination does is carry an impression from one *time* into another. And so it is in this respect—the respect of hearing together different times—that hearing an event as passing differs from hearing it as consonant; it is as though passing's being a relational quality in this sense is what makes it so much less likely to disappear in free composition.[29] (Perhaps similarly for "forced and drastic mixture," which cannot be escaped but instead must be accepted and accommodated.)

The passing *tone* in particular then stands out among the many configurations to which passing *effect* may be ascribed as the one that offers no choice—the one that can be understood in no other way than by mental retention of the preceding consonance until another consonance comes along. And in light of this, much of Schenker's later work can be read as arguing for the ascription of this effect to other configurations—up to large sections of pieces—even though they do not force it in this way. (Typically, Schenker tries to argue that this effect *must* be ascribed to other configurations—though without telling exactly how the trick is to be done, and indeed while insisting that "the drafting of extensive analytical sketches" involves

"creative powers" which cannot be expected of even the ordinary "musical person" [*Free Composition*, xxiv]; naturally he ends up only arguing, inexplicitly, that it is desirable to do so, given certain presuppositions about the temporal organization of "masterworks.")

In this light it is fascinating to see the form that Schenker's "negative examples" take in the case of the second-species passing tone. They are, as might be expected, examples of dissonance approached or left by skip, but what they are meant to exemplify is not at all what might be expected: not, that is, other-than-passing configurations in which dissonance might occur, but other-than-stepwise configurations to which the character of "passing" might be attributed:

> As far as free composition is concerned, it emancipates the passing dissonance from the postulate of the second, so that it is possible, as an extension of the concept, to regard as passing dissonance even a dissonant note that leaps between two points of a given definite harmony. (I, 184)

The musical examples that follow (Examples 248–76 [I, 184–94]) speak for themselves; the sampling presented in Example 9 includes those that depart far enough from the ordinary conception of the passing tone to have elicited qualifying commentary from the editor:

> Later, Schenker might well have renounced his explanation of the $c^2$ in Example [9a] as a passing tone in the space of a fourth. So far as the upper voice is concerned, this $c^2$ undoubtedly progresses to the $d^2$ in the fourth bar of the example. . . . In Examples [9b and 9c] the asterisked notes are neighboring notes from which the upper voice leaps away; in both cases the normal complete neighboring-note configuration is executed by another voice or instrument. . . . Generally speaking, the dissonant tones by leap discussed in this section all represent prolongations of more basic phenomena (e.g., suspensions in Example [9d—presumably the second excerpt]). (I, 354–55)

This seems to be a delicate way of saying that all these passages, by virtue of their leaps, really involve kinds of dissonance other than passing tones; and it is absolutely right as far as that goes. But since Schenker's remark just cited makes it clear that he knows the leaps are there, and therefore that this is somehow precisely the point, there is more important interpretive work to do than just promise that he would eventually cease to say such things—such as find out what he *means* here when he does say it. And the answer, at least provisionally, is that the essential definition of the passing tone, at least at this point in Schenker's development, is simply *not* that it is a dissonance approached by step and resolved by step in the same direction; rather, it is a note, dissonant with its predecessor, through

Brahms, *Ein deutsches Requiem*, IV




Example 9a. (Book I, Example 250)

Brahms, "Nachtwache," Op. 104 No. 2




Example 9b. (Book I, Example 251)

Mendelssohn, Symphony No. 3, IV




Example 9c. (Book I, Example 252)

J.S. Bach, English Suite No. 6 J.S. Bach, Organ Prelude and Fugue in C Minor (BMV 546)



Example 9d. (Book I, Example 248)

which its predecessor is "mentally retained"—that is, one which does not *displace* its predecessor—and the pattern of stepwise approach and resolution is only the most normal (or the paradigmatic) configuration of notes by which this effect might be produced. Thus "passing tone" is one term in Schenker's *Counterpoint* that means something substantially different from what it means in *Gradus ad Parnassum*—because Schenker is adjusting its meaning to facilitate his fantastic and profound extension of its scope. He is attaching the term to a particular "psychological" rhythmic effect, rather than to the arrangement of notes that most characteristically produces that effect. And surely this may be seen as the most amazing consequence of his motivating intuition that the entities to which a theory should address itself are not arrangements of notes, but *sounds*.

Within *Counterpoint*, the most obvious sign of this attitude toward the passing tone is Schenker's explanation of all the other dissonance

types as "prolongations" of the passing tone. The neighboring tone, which in second species is "less natural" than the passing tone (I, 178–79), is still not part of the "strictest formulation" of third species in two voices (I, 230); while in the presentation of three-voice third species various neighboring-note configurations are evaluated on the basis of how well they "[reflect] the underlying passing tone"—whereby "is confirmed the priority of the passing-tone concept, as a fundamental concept, to the neighboring-note concept, as a concept merely derived from it" (II, 74–75).

Far more remarkable than this account of neighbors, however, is the notorious explanation of why suspensions resolve downward—one phase of Schenker's thinking that has never been accepted by even his most committed disciples.[30] His argument, probably uniquely in the literature, does not even address the issue of downward or upward *direction*; rather it examines each possible dissonance's two possible resolutions, chooses in each case by intervallic criteria specific to that case—and happens to choose the lower resolution every time. (That is, the argument's structure leaves it conceivable that some suspensions would best resolve upward and others downward.) And—the crucial point here—the basis for these intervallic preferences is a consideration of suspensions *as if* they were passing tones.

The premise for this maneuver is ("we are surprised to find") that the two phenomena "have a common characteristic, namely that in both, the dissonant element is situated only between two consonances!" (I, 260) What elicits the exclamation point is what elicits it again a few lines later: "*Consonance—Dissonance—Consonance!*" (I, 261), which is to say, the temporal-qualitative "essence" of the passing tone, a dependent element between the two on which it depends. Now stepwise passing motion is the most normal means by which this quality is achieved; accordingly, when a dissonant suspension is encountered, "strict counterpoint . . . , in order to lend some interpretation to the tone, invokes the only means available to it, namely consonance. . . . [I]t provides the tone . . . with the consonance that is only fitting" (I, 265). This is the consonance *from which* the dissonant suspension *would* have come, had it been a dissonant passing tone; "the syncope is thus to be understood only as a product of abbreviation" (I, 267)—that is, of the elision of the passing motion's starting point.

For each dissonance there are then two possibilities to be considered, as shown in Example 10. Under the principle that "if the tied dissonance is from the outset only a passing dissonance, then the basic rule of the dissonant passing tone remains fully as applicable here as before, specifically, that the direction of motion by which it




Example 10. (Book I, Example 399)

arrived be maintained," "the answer . . . depends on which *direction* of passing motion should be assumed"; and this should be the one that offers "the fullest possible, or most *definitive*, measure of consonance, so as to shape at least the brief moment of consonance-

effect for the tone in the most satisfactory way" (I, 267)—the direction that secures the "best" sonority, not for the resolution, but for the imaginary stepwise preparation.

The "fullest possible, or most *definitive*, measure" is determined according to three principles (not explicit in Schenker's case-by-case presentation, but inferably at work there). First: if possible, imagine a preparatory consonance that permits the cantus-firmus tone to be heard as a root. This principle settles case 1 of the example in favor of option a), 7–6 (because an imaginary octave lets *c'* be a root, while a sixth does not), and case 5 in favor of option a), 2–3 (because an imaginary unison has a similar advantage over an imaginary lower third). Second: in cases not decided by the first principle—that is, cases in which either of the possible consonances allows the cantus-firmus tone to be a root—if possible, imagine a preparatory consonance that *forces* it to be a root (that is, a fifth in preference to any other interval). This settles only case 2, in favor of option a), 4–3. Third: in cases not decided by the first two principles, imagine the preparatory consonance that provides the fuller sonority (that is, a third or a sixth in preference to a fifth in preference to an octave or unison). This settles all the remaining cases—as ever, for the descending option a): case 3 in favor of 9–8 (because a tenth is fuller than an octave) and case 4 in favor of 2–1 (because a third is fuller than a unison); case 6 in favor of 4–5 (because a third beats a fifth); and case 7 in favor of 7–8 (because a sixth beats an octave).

Later some of the suspensions chosen by these rules are rejected—7–8 completely, 9–8, 2–1, and 4–5 under most conditions—for various *ad hoc* reasons, including serious conflicts between the three principles and "practical" unwieldiness resulting from resolution to perfect consonances.[31] Yet it is significant that, in general, considerations of *presented* sonority—sonority of resolution—give way before considerations of *imagined* sonority: apparently there is no point in inferring anything but the optimal preparation (and perhaps no possibility of doing so).

Since this line of argument can hardly have won Schenker over by its elegance—nor, one must suspect, for want of an alternative, since an invocation of "gravity" or "natural urges" would not have been beneath him—his choice of it must be explained by his attachment to the premise that suspensions are elliptical passing tones. How productive he considers this premise is perhaps most compactly shown in his Preface to Book II, in the list of phenomena that he regards as "prolongations" of "the essence of passing tones": in "the framework of three-voice settings," consonant passing and neighboring tones, passing motion through a fourth, rhythmic displacements of the neighboring tone, composing-out, nodal points, and substitutions;

and, in "the combined species," the leaping passing tone, the accented passing tone, and the "obbligato two-voice setting" of passing tones (II, xviii-xix)—in short, virtually every technique of diminution beyond arpeggiation. In an access of sentiment, he even associates the premise of the passing tone with the image of good domestic order:

> In whatever guise (resulting from substitution or other abbreviation-processes) the dissonant passing tone may be used [even in free composition], the consonance lying a second higher or lower stands at its cradle—just as is demanded by the original phenomenon. (II, 59)

Above all, of course, the concept of the passing tone is the main tributary to the concept of *Stufe*, as is made clear again and again. In the most striking of these places, the consequences of this "curious intrusion of the imaginary" are derived: with second-species passing tones,

> Our power of imagination must on its own carry forward the harmony of the downbeat; and by doing so, it prepares itself most appropriately to grasp that greatest marvel of imagination which governs free composition: the scale degree, which represents the highest ramification of that lingering of a harmony through the duration of passing events. (II, 59)

*Counterpoint*'s final section, "On the Elision of a Voice as Bridge to Free Composition," offers a simplified picture of *Stufen* on the model of implied cantus-firmus tones. Example 11 shows a Fuxian mixed-species exercise with its cantus firmus deleted; the deletion produces apparently unruly dissonance treatment in a few places, such as the third measure, and Schenker proposes that each such dissonance treatment can be understood through mental assimilation of it to the single span of an imaginary cantus-firmus tone. In the third measure, such an inferred note is constrained to be consonant with both notes of the lower voice—$c^1$ because it is on the downbeat and *a* because it is approached and left by skip—and with the resolution of the suspension, $c^2$, in the upper voice. While this would leave a number of possibilities—$e^2$ if the third line were to be imagined on



Example 11. (from Book 2, Example 395)

top, $a^1$ or $e^1$ (Fux's actual note) if in the middle, and *f*, *C*, *A* or *F* if on the bottom—Schenker's argument does not really entertain all of them. Rather, his preference, explained *not* in the "Bridge" chapter but in the three-voice second-species chapter, is to place the inferred note in the bass as a representation of the harmony the actual voices already imply (a strategy closer to Rameau's than Schenker cared to notice)—so that he would almost certainly choose *A* in this case. The thought behind this seems to be just that it is from lower voices that harmonic information "normally" comes: when a dissonant second-species passing tone occurs in the lower voice, "the lower voice gives up the means to do what it was above all obliged to do, namely to provide an audible continuation of the harmony established on the downbeat," leaving the note to be mentally retained; Schenker then represents "the tone to be prolonged in a lower register—since it is purely imaginary (*geistig*) in nature" (which does not seem to mean that the lower register is the place for imaginary notes, exactly, but that imaginary notes may be placed in any register appropriate, and the appropriate register for harmony-giving notes is the bass)—so that the original bass voice, with its passing tone, "takes on the meaning of another upper voice" (II, 57).

In sum, this is the model sketched by Schenker:

> It is possible in some way to find a unifying tone of longer value that interprets the movement and voice leading of voices in various rhythms. . . . Usually it will be supplied there by our own perception . . . in the lower register, where it provides a substructure for the upper voices and, especially, confers altered meanings upon the dissonances. (II, 270–71)

He rounds it off with uncharacteristic modesty: "Our guess is that it is the scale degrees that complete the setting in this way" (II, 271). Presumably he is aware that he has not yet provided a theory of how the *Stufen* arise, but only pointed toward *Stufen* using the materials of species.[32]

Accordingly, there are several different ways to describe what Schenker is doing with his talk of prolonged passing tones and imaginary cantus firmus tones. He could be thought simply to be giving an inadequate, or merely sketchy, account of the matter, which, for adequacy and completeness, would require a more formal and exhaustive account than he ever gives (even in *Free Composition*) of exactly what configurations, under what conditions, could be heard as passing, heard as constituting *Stufen*, and so on. Closely related to this is the idea that species counterpoint gives him the chance to define the important attributes roughly, by reference to familiar musical examples, and to show them in action in musical contexts simple enough

that the roughness of the definitions will not be a problem; thus, in the artificial world of species the theory can acquire a plausibility that might not accrue to it in its necessarily more *ad hoc* operation in free composition. Carrying this trend of redescription one step further, one might say that the circumscribed music of strict counterpoint serves mostly as a source of imagery; that is, that Schenker uses the second-species passing tone essentially as a *metaphor* for the relation of one free-composition passage to another—a metaphor unlike what most theorists probably imagine under that name because it has no *extramusical* element: it compares the musical thing that it describes to another thing that is also music. In this sense, it is *by design* that Schenker never develops a rigorous set of rules to derive analyses from pieces; he must have realized (as little as he may have liked the idea) that arrangements of notes do not *determinine* the attributions that can be made to them—though they certainly *affect* the ease of making various attributions and the consequences they will have. (He probably conceived this as a matter of not trying to limit in advance what the "masters" might be able to come up with by way of of prolongation; he seems to have thought of this as itself a domain of compositional invention, and in a sense to have tried to portray such invention by casting his own analyses as fantasy recompositions of the "masterworks.")[33] It should be obvious that the language of attributions that can be made, as opposed to effects that must follow, has above all the advantage of implying no such determinism.[34]

The progression across these several descriptions is probably from more to less traditional; there may be reason to think it is also from less to more accurate as a description of what Schenker actually is doing (with room left for any number of positions on whether he *should* have been doing something else). On any of these accounts, Schenker deserves credit for augmenting the tonal-theoretic ontology, essentially by expanding the concept of "passing" so that it could be applied to many entities besides paradigmatic passing notes; that is, he created (or made much more useful) a category of possible attribution. The nature of his "expansion" is to identify the attribute of being "passing" not with the pitch-structural definition "stepwise in between," but with an essentially *rhythmic* definition that generalizes it: "within the time of: that is, not yet displacing—and inferably on the way to a successor entity on the same level as." (And in this sense his expansion amounts to the concept of structural levels.)

## VII

It is a striking consequence of this way of reading Schenker—one that brings this essay finally around to a close—that it can eventually

make the search for analytical rules attaching directly to arrangements of notes seem as misconceived as the search for compositional rules that directly require or forbid such arrangements. It is not so clear after all that there are laws leading from "tones organized in such and such a way" to "effects" that they "*must*" produce. If there are laws operating at all, they may be only those inherent in the meaning of a particular attribution, that determine what it will be like to let a given stretch of sound sustain that attribution. A little more abstractly, there very well may not be rules of the form "all and only configurations with such and such properties will (or can) be heard as passing," but only rules of the form "to hear a configuration as passing means to read such and such into it"; so that carrying out an analysis does not mean following rules (at least at this level), but trying things out to discover how they work.

Perhaps this observation is not news—certainly it shouldn't be—but when it is put to work as a premise for reading Schenker's later analyses it does tend to make them look different from the way they are usually represented. A much-discussed analysis—actually not quite an analysis, but a sketch, namely that of "*Aus meinen Tränen spriessen*," the second song of Schumann's *Dichterliebe*, in *Free Composition*—contains a little-discussed peculiarity that will serve as an illustration.[35] The graph, reproduced in Example 12, is presented to support the theoretical claim of §88 that "The return to ($\hat{3}$) [in an interruption] is not a cadence"; but it is also referred to in a number of other places (§§117, 170, 189, 197, and 211), and some of the ancillary points are of greater interest here.

The crux is the song's second measure. According to Schenker's generative scheme, the background's initial $c\sharp^2$ is elaborated by an upper-neighboring $d^2$ in the middleground (or, more precisely, in the first of several distinguishable layers that Schenker's middleground graph conflates). In the next of those layers, $d^1$ in the bass harmonizes the neighboring $d^2$, and, presumably in yet another layer, the bass $d^1$ is sustained through $d^2$'s return to $c\sharp^2$, converting what was "originally" $d^2$'s resolution into a dissonant passing tone from $d^2$ down to $b^1$, the next pitch of the background succession. In §196 Schenker remarks of such transformations that "when the main tone in a neighboring-note figure returns at a dissonant interval . . . , then a five-note diminution results in which the neighboring note seems to fall away"; since to have *five* notes this diminution must be the entire succession $c\sharp^2$-$d^2$-$c\sharp^2$-$b^1$-$a^1$ (which is borne out by a citation of *Free Composition*'s Figure 76), Schenker evidently conceives of the ambiguity of the middle elements as somehow smoothing over the figure's internal articulations. In particular, neither the second note nor the third, apparently, can be securely subordinated to the other. (In




Example 12. (*Free Composition*, Figure 22b)

this sense, what has just been described as conflation of layers may actually be functional rather than merely inexplicit.)[36]

So far, then, the sketch says that $c\sharp^2$ (over *a*) is to be "retained mentally," as a way of listening to $d^2$ (over $d^1$), which "prolongs" it, until it finds a successor at its own level in $b^1$ (over $e^1$). Meanwhile $d^2$ (over $d^1$) is to be "retained mentally" as a way of listening to $c\sharp^2$ (still over $d^1$, in theory)—again, until $d^2$ (over $d^1$) finds a successor at its own level or better (in this case, better).[37] And unless Schenker is contradicting himself gratuitously, this implies that a tone can function as neighboring even without returning to what it neighbors. At any rate, in the sketch up to this point it is treated as a "concidence" that the passing tone down from the neighboring tone has the same pitch that a resolution of the neighboring tone would have; that is, although it somehow has the "potential" to resolve the neighboring tone, it does not succeed in doing so.

This peculiarity becomes more peculiar at the next level. Schenker remarks in §170 that "passing sevenths in the case of $IV^{8-7}$–V . . . are usually transformed into consonances," and he cites this passage as an instance.[38] Thus, in the foreground graph, *a* now harmonizes the dissonant passing tone $c\sharp^2$, producing nothing less than a root-position tonic triad. This *a* remains in parentheses, presumably so as not to interrupt the $d^1$-to-$e^1$ movement that stands for the IV-to-V *Stufengang*.

Very well—how does *this* make sense? How, in particular, is the attribution "return to *Kopfton*, resolving the neighbor" to be withheld from the pitch of the *Kopfton* over the tonic triad (indeed, arguably a *stronger* tonic than the first one—particularly when the song is heard in the cycle, with an initial unclarity conferred on its tonic by the ending of the first song)?[39] One way it doesn't make sense, surely, is on the assumption of a law somewhere to the effect that "tones organized as they are in these measures produce the effect of a consonant passing tone, whether one wants it or not." On the contrary, the analysis seems strange precisely because—as a rule—tones organized as they are in these measures produce the effect of the allegedly passing chord *resolving* the neighboring chord.

On the other hand, it also doesn't make very much sense as an analytical mistake. A wisecrack of Wittgenstein's makes the point nicely:

> You might say: 'For a blunder, that's too big. If you suddenly wrote numbers down on the blackboard and then said: 'Now, I'm going to add,' and then said: '2 and 21 is 13,' etc. I'd say: 'This is no blunder.'

There are cases where I'd say he's mad, or he's making fun. Then there are cases where I'd look for an entirely different explanation altogether.[40]

The present case is of the last type. The sketch doesn't represent the *misapplication* of an analytical method that tells how various configurations of notes will fall into perceptual hierarchies, "whether one wants it or not." Rather, it is a sign that the analytical method must be something quite different.

One alternative is suggested, subversively, by Schenker's own language: the effect of passing may be an effect that these notes *can* produce if one *does* want it. The effect isn't automatic, but it's possible—if it's desirable. This alternative is also suggested, even more strongly, by the reflection that this unscrupulous-sounding mode of thought is exactly characteristic of musicians who are *doing* something—like composing, performing, or listening—rather than trying to describe something. Perhaps this is clearest in the case of performers: when a score does not specify every last detail of performance (of balance, timing, and so on), a performer makes decisions about these things according to a conception of the passage (under the guidance of an attributive theory, that is); this conception is not of what the passage automatically *is* (even if the performer never entertains any other conception), but of what it *can be*. It is constrained, but not fully determined, by what is in the score. Composers confront the same situation—more literally, if anything: imagining an only partially specified passage, a composer is apt to be reading into it (attributing to it, that is) much more than the sounds so far chosen would convey on their own; so that completing the passage may involve specifying more aspects of it that would conduce to this so far underdetermined attribution. And every serious listener knows the experience of casting about for a better way to hear something that persists in sounding not quite right.[41]

In short, the thought processes that constitute music have everything to do with figuring out—not necessarily *determining*, but perhaps *deciding*—how something might be heard, what it would take to hear it that way, what would happen if it were heard that way: quite a bit besides what the passage *is*. And Schenker's sketch is easiest to interpret in the imagined context of a singer and pianist performing the song's second measure in such as way as to round off a unit with the second chord—perhaps by means of a generous small-scale *diminuendo* from the first chord and a slight pause before the anacrusis to the next measure. An imaginary Schenker might then coach them: "No—shape that beat so that you keep moving, on into the next

measure. Phrase across the rest (as if the $c\sharp^2$ were a passing tone)." If the performers had been so educated as to object that the chord in question is perfectly suited to resolve the neighbor and conclude a unit, and indeed that letting it do so is precisely what would constitute analytically informed performance, their coach might continue: "Well, yes—and in fact I want it to do *both* things (as you can see in my apparently self-contradictory sketch): ideally I'd like the listener to be able to feel the closure and *then* to realize that it's only the most provisional closure, that the line is still moving." (In declining to impose the final-state analysis on the passage from the first moment, this Schenker is becoming more imaginary.) "But (as you quite rightly observe) the pitches will take care of the closure, more or less by themselves; what you have to do is promote the non-closural side a little more." If more support were needed, this phantasmal coach might also point out that Schumann's two accents, on the downbeats of the second and third measures, cut across the slur over measures one (including upbeat) and two, in more or less the same way—so that, once one thinks to look for it, there is quite a bit in the notation to imply just this kind of tension between two different groupings of it. (Furthermore—if the performers had not yet had their fill of talk—*der Geistige* might add that doubting the closural value of root-position tonic triads is an essential listening strategy for measures three and four, and for analogous places, as well.)[42]

This is, at any rate, one story that might be told to make sense of Schenker's image of a consonant passing tone coinciding with the resolution of, but not resolving, a large-scale neighbor. In this story there is no issue of whether the note in question "really *is*" what Schenker says—only of what would be involved in making it so, including the issue of how much of Schumann's score can be interpreted how deeply in the attempt.[43] The quality of "passing" is here clearly not an automatic outcome of the way the tones are organized, but an interpretation to which the tones' organization leaves them open, and to which rewards accrue by way of the interpretations to which tones' organization over longer timespans leaves them open.

If Schenker's overt contribution in *Counterpoint* is his rejection of the very idea of rules directly determining the compositional choices of "a Beethoven," in favor of rules for the "effects" of arrangements of notes (in terms of which such choices can be explained, if at all), a careful reading of his work points to a partial rejection of these rules in turn—or at least a rewriting of them in terms of rules determining the content of possible attributions (and thereby roughly constraining the making of these attributions). And in this context his analytical system clearly has the appearance, not of a set of rules for adding notes, layer by layer (let alone for removing them), but at most of a

set of rules for formulating (even if not for deciding upon) complex attributions by making simpler attributions, layer by layer.

In this light, perhaps his most remarkable contribution is to have generalized the definition of a particular kind of attribution, namely that of passing status, so that it could be made of many more kinds of entity than just the "passing tone." So radical is this extension of application that it can seem an outright invention (or, for those who prefer, discovery) rather than just a redefinition. And as such it is luminously exemplary for the music-theoretic enterprise, which, in its happiest and most relevant manifestations, is precisely a matter of ontological invention—of the prodigal multiplication of qualities, of "things for things to be"—rather than a matter of accounting for or justifying anything.

Musicians in the act—composers only most obviously—are in the business of making up sounds for things to have (by way of arranging for things to have those sounds); the reason to think and talk and write about what musicians do is to sharpen the experience of those sounds, by adding discourse to our means of access to them. And at least to this extent analysis must be invention. If there is anything healthy to be read out of Schenker's sad resolution that

> Just to participate in the masterwork is a truer life than to dissipate oneself in unfulfillment. In this sense the masterwork is the only path for all those who are not called[44]

it is perhaps the idea that someone else's masterly musical invention can be a way of getting something into one's own ear that one might not have been able to invent unassisted. In any case it is along this line—the line, that is, of reciprocal, responsive invention, rather than of mere gatekeeping—that Schenker might most appropriately have associated himself with Beethoven; and along this line that he might most appropriately inspire his successors.[45]

## NOTES

1. *Counterpoint: A Translation of* Kontrapunkt *by Heinrich Schenker*. Volume II of *New Musical Theories and Fantasies* [Book I: Cantus Firmus and Two-Voice Counterpoint; Book II: Counterpoint in Three and More Voices, Bridges to Free Composition], translated by John Rothgeb and Jürgen Thym, edited by John Rothgeb (New York: Schirmer Books, 1987). In this article *Counterpoint* will be cited by book and page number, and the other two volumes of *New Musical Theories and Fantasies*, *Harmony* (edited and annotated by Oswald Jonas, translated by Elisabeth Mann Borgese; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954, paperback reprint Boston: MIT Press, 1973) and *Free Composition* (translated and edited by Ernst Oster, New York: Schirmer Books, 1979), by title and paragraph number.
2. "Look, gentlemen, that is the rule; naturally I don't write that way" (*Harmony*, 177).
3. A disappointingly timorous rendering of "*Wie ich die Übelstand beseitige*," which could come out as "How I do away with this abuse," but which in any case should be in the first person. To comment briefly on a matter which this article will not treat at length: a tendency to improve Schenker's deportment in this way is perhaps the only respect in which the translators' work can be faulted.
4. I am grateful to Jason Gibbs for helping me to recognize this during our discussions of his dissertation essay "Prolongation in Order-Determinate Music" (University of Pittsburgh, 1989).
5. Meanwhile there is certainly a study worth doing of the image of language and linguistics in Schenker's work—and perhaps specifically of the influence on his theory of the structure of German. Most immediately suggestive is the observation, in the first section of "*Fortsetzung der Urlinie-Betrachtungen*" in the second Yearbook of *Das Meisterwerk in der Musik* (Munich: Drei Masken Verlag, 1926; all three *Jahrbücher* reprinted in one volume, Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1974), that *"Die Spannung eines Zuges entspricht der Spannung im Nacheinander einer sprachlichen Einheit, deren Inhaltsbildung ebenfalls nur durch eine geistige Spannung verbürgt wird"* (p. 11). ("The tension of a *Zug* corresponds to the tension in the succession of a linguistic unit, the formation of whose content is likewise secured only through a mental tension.")
6. Matthew Brown and Douglas J. Dempster's "The Scientific Image of Music Theory" (*Journal of Music Theory* 33: 65–106) is a particularly lurid recent example. (See also note 8.)
7. It would have been reassuring to see some distinction drawn between the middle element of Example 2 and the others—along the lines of the first and last presenting melodic minor seconds within scales, which the middle one only simulates across the divide between scales, so that the middle motive is a good deal less plausible than the last. (And it might in any case have been more consistent with Schenker's main text for him to have invoked the combination of the motive forms *A*-*B*♭ harmonized VI-V$^7$ of IV, and *A*-*B*♮ , harmonized II-V$^7$; Marion A. Guck has pointed out that this might make the passage more an extension of one motive form than a compression of several—which suggests interesting possibilities of hearing the motive's continuation wildly transformed in the sequel.) As is often the case, the very infelicities of the explanation make

it a particularly strong illustration of the author's intent—in the sense that, since it could not have been recommended by elegant conclusiveness, it must all the more clearly have been recommended by the *type* of explanation it is.

8. In outline, the explanatory strategy here attributed to Schenker corresponds to the one called "functional" by Carl Hempel in "The Logic of Functional Analysis" (in *Aspects of Scientific Explanation And Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science*, New York: The Free Press, 1965, pp. 297–330). Hempel represents functional explanation as a specially circumscribed form of "deductive-nomological" explanation (an account of which may be found in the volume's title article, which has made the music-theoretic rounds to some extent), and that many problems can result from confounding it with the standard form. My "Function, Explanation, and Interpretation" (a lecture to the 1991 joint meeting of the AMS/SEM/SMT in Oakland, California) explores this issue further.
9. Roger Sessions, in "Heinrich Schenker's Contribution" (*Modern Music* 12: 170–78; reprinted in *Roger Sessions on Music: Collected Essays*, edited by Edward T. Cone, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, pp. 231–40) makes the same extension in a characteristically unorthodox and astute definition of *Stufe*: "According to this conception a harmony . . . may be roughly defined as a complete unit, formed as often of many 'chords' as of a single one, or frequently consisting not of chords at all but of single notes, or traits of melodic character" (pp. 232–33). And indeed Schenker's *Harmony* protractedly flirts with, though it never quite declares for, the notion that a harmony must have motivic content to be a *Stufe*.
10. As this sort of underlying line develops, in Schenker's thought, into the upper line of the *Ursatz*, many of its *qualities* as a melody fall away—which is in many respects a great loss. A particularly interesting intermediate stage may be seen in the *Urlinie* Schenker attributes to the first movement of Beethoven's F-minor Piano Sonata, Op. 2, No. 1, in his analysis in the second *Tonwille* pamphlet (Vienna and Leipzig: Tonwille-Flugblätterverlag [A. Gutmann and Friedr. Hofmeister], 1922, 25–48): its *Merkmale* are not only intervallic (up a third and down a sixth, all by step), but include (consistently) placement of the ascending tones in metrically "weak" measures or parts of measures and, with this, an initial hesitation followed by acceleration toward the change of direction.
11. This state of affairs will not seem unfamiliar to readers of the first volume of the *Theories and Fantasies* who have attempted to divine a definition of *Stufe* from the passages ostensibly devoted to providing one (*Harmony*, §§78–81 especially). The definition, under the heading "The Scale-Step as Guiding Device as Contrasted with the Triad," essentially restates the heading, saying that the "concept of the scale step . . . is far loftier and far more abstract," that "not every triad must be considered a scale-step," and that it "is a higher and more abstract unit," which "at times . . . may even comprise several harmonies" (138–39). The ensuing "How To Recognize Scale-Steps: Some Hints" is devoted completely to hints for recognizing harmonies that are *not* scale-steps, on the grounds that they are easily recognized as passing or neighboring, or that they do not make an acceptable progression with the other scale-degrees in the vicinity (and it should be noted that *Harmony*'s theory of acceptable *Stufengang* never disappears from Schenker's later theory). The pattern is similar to that of *Counterpoint*: grand claims for the favored entity, derision of rival concepts, astute suggestions for representing more complex formations as elaborations

and extensions of the favored entity, but very little direct characterization of the entity itself.

12. In so many words in "Musical Cosmology," *Perspectives of New Music* 15/2: 122–32, and "What Lingers On (, When The Song Is Ended)," *Perspectives of New Music* 16/1: 102–10; but implicitly in *Meta-Variations* as well (published serially in *Perspectives of New Music* 8–11), and, more recently, in particularly compressed but complete form in "The Logic of What?" (*Journal of Music Theory* 33: 107–16). The short quotations that follow in the text are all from p. 104 of "What Lingers On".
13. *Das Meisterwerk II*, pp. 97–104.
14. "Diese Oktav-Koppelung erfüllt das Bedürfnis des Instruments, das, einem menschlichen Wesen gleich, sich gern in seiner Fülle offenbart: wenn nur dem Ursatz Genüge geschieht, warum sollte denn nicht auch das Instrument eine solch Erfüllung verstatten?" (p. 100) (The *Music Forum* translation [by Hedi Siegel, Volume II: 274–82], taking a stronger line on what Schenker should be allowed to say, denatures the cello by quite a bit: "The octave coupling exploits the resources of the instrument, which, in almost human fashion, likes to express itself fully; if the requirements of the fundamental structure are satisfied, why should the instrument be denied like satisfaction?"; even the imaginable ambiguity of "*eine solche Erfüllung*" seems to be resolved in favor of a comparison to the *Ursatz*'s, not the human essence's, satisfaction, by the change of pattern: "exploits . . . fully . . . is satisfied . . . like satisfaction" for "*erfüllt . . . in seiner Fülle . . . Genüge geschieht . . . eine solche Erfüllung.*")
15. Perhaps it is professionally unstrategic to express even this much skepticism about the ideology on which composing well means maintaining a true relation to some body of preestablished (and not necessarily conscious) knowledge; since the myth under which composers are accepted (or at least tolerated) in music departments appears to be that they may possess such knowledge (expressed in "mastery" of a "craft")—not that they are "simply" good at making things up.
16. "Genau so wie diese Fuge einmalig ist, genau so einmalig ist das Gesetz, das ihr Lebensgesetz ist: die Fuge selbst hat dies Gesetz geboren, nicht Bach—mit der Kraft eines Genies hat er es nur erkannt und sich gefügt." From "*Das Organische der Fuge: aufgezeigt an der I. C-Moll Fuge aus dem Wohltemperierten Klavier von Joh. Seb. Bach*," in *Das Meisterwerk in der Musik, Jahrbuch II*, p. 66. I am grateful to Fred Everett Maus for calling my attention to this remarkable quote in this context.
17. One suspects that this image may have had its distinct value for an author reluctantly deciding to give up composition while wishing to believe he knew what composers must know. In any case the image of master-composition taking place beyond the realm of choice is consistent, and has its place in the structure of the analytical method, in the form of the method's consistent background-to-foreground orientation and, therewith, Schenker's pointed refusal to provide rules of reduction. (In this connection, see also note 33.)
18. "Schoenbergian" is here meant rather loosely to refer to the ardently anti-hierarchical attitude expressed in, among other places, the marvelous "'Non-Harmonic' Tones" chapter of his *Harmonielehre* (*Theory of Harmony*, translated by Roy E. Carter, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, pp. 309–44) and attacked by Schenker in the "*Fortsetzung der Urlinie-*

*Betrachtungen*" in *Jahrbuch II* of *Das Meisterwerk* (pp. 9–42); Schoenberg appears never to have committed himself to print on the subject of this movement.

19. $V^7$ of F has a noteworthy history in the rest of the movement, of which the high spots are: its reinterpretation, in the "development," as "German augmented-sixth chord," so that the $B\flat$-to-$B\natural$ move, now locally motivated, leads to a short passage on V of *E* minor—after which the chord reappears as V of *F* and at last leads to a sustained *F* major (whose dissolution into local *D* minor may be heard to reflect the approach to this chord in the focal passage); and the hearty, decisive (even structurally "final") cadence, late in the "recapitulation," in which the chord is produced one last time (it is avoided in the chromatic rise at the very end) and successfully domesticated as applied V to the IV introducing a big cadence.
20. Any practical success is still apt to be compromised by the work's tremendous length (not to mention impressive cost); so that the enrichment of some other book with negative examples remains the likeliest expedient. While *Counterpoint* is the work of Schenker's that has been most directly and completely assimilated in the secondary literature, in two highly sophisticated and highly contrasting textbooks—*Counterpoint in Composition* by Felix Salzer and Carl Schachter (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969) and *An Introduction to Tonal Theory* by Peter Westergaard (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1975)—as well as a clear and comprehensive article by John Rothgeb—"Strict Counterpoint and Tonal Theory", *Journal of Music Theory* 19: 260–84)—its use of negative examples has never been remarked or imitated. (Also mentionable in this connection is *Elemente der Stimmführung (Der strenge Satz)* by Schenker's pupil Herman Roth [Stuttgart: Verlag von Carl Grüninger Nachf. Ernst Klett, 1926?], which gives Schenker's rules and essentially Schenker's reasons, with some of Schenker's examples but by and large not the negative ones; I am grateful to Milton Babbitt for alerting me to its existence and providing me with a copy.) Schenker's attitude has been noted by Nicholas Cook, whose statement "doing a Schenkerian analysis means conceptualizing the discrepancies between the principles of strict counterpoint and the elaborated surface of the music in question" ("Schenker's Theory of Music as Ethics," *Journal of Musicology* 7: 437) captures the point compactly—even seeming to represent the implicit practice of *Counterpoint* more directly than the later practice; parts of his "Music Theory and 'Good Comparison': A Viennese Perspective" (*Journal of Music Theory* 33: 117–41) elaborate the same view.
21. The accusation is of unqualified error, bringing Bach down to the mortal level: "Thus Bach and Bellermann force themselves—just for the sake of theory!—to begin as well as end the chorale harmonically with the triad on *G*" (I, 38). There is a paper yet to be written about what these two chorale settings (Riemenschneider Nos. 51 and 160) become when they are restored to their status as parts of larger compositions (Cantata No. 91, "*Gelobet seist du, Jesu Christ*" and Cantata No. 64, "*Sehet, welch' eine Liebe hat uns der Vater erzeiget*," respectively); in general it is curious that Schenker, so sensitive to the breadth of context needed to understand individual events *within* movements, rarely if ever considered the possibility that relevant contexts might extend beyond movements' boundaries.
22. "To Henry Martin" in "Two Replies," *Perspectives of New Music* 15: 242.

23. This discussion incidentally offers a good illustration of how far the aims of music theory are from providing the simplest possible explanations of passages: the passage in question is obviously simpler as an unqualified succession of major thirds than as what Schenker makes it. One might almost say that the aim of listening (that is, of an exercise of attributive theory) is precisely to make a passage more complex; whereafter, if there is any simplifying work to be done, it is to simplify as much as possible the explanation of how the notes "produce" all the "effects" attributed to them (one might therefore say: to produce the simplest possible explanation of the data, once one has complicated the data as much as possible).
24. Two collateral reflections seem appropriate. First, it would be inconsistent with the general stance of this paper to imagine that there was a fact of the matter; as it is, there is not very much to be made of the $c$-$g^1$ twelfth except in the minutely local connection of 5–6 over $d\flat$ and then $c$ (and perhaps, through this, the implausibly remote one to m. 116 of the last movement and its environs), and in this sense very little reward for attributing consonance to the interval. If §77 of *Harmony* is any indication, Schenker would probably include it among those "fifth-relationships" that are not "perceptible in the foreground" but "do their work more discretely [*sic*] in the background"—under definitions of "foreground" and "background" rather different from the familiar ones, needless to say (though there is something suggestive in the possibility that the "background" is where the rules are simply *true*). On the other hand—and this is the second reflection—§54 of the same work suggests a different way out: deny that $c$-$g^1$ is an interval (because it is not "harmonizable")—from which it follows that it cannot be a fifth, let alone a dissonant one.
25. Quoted from *Handbuch der Harmonie* (3rd ed., Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1898), p. 138; in the translation the citation is for some reason displaced from the text, where it is in the original, to a footnote.
26. *Handbuch der Harmonie*, p. 139.
27. For all that may be blood-curdling about such statements as

    > We live in an era in which all values in human relations are turned upside down, by reason of false, unworthy sentimentality: those who need to be led become leaders; the woman assumes the man's role; the child is pampered as an "individuality" and excused from work before even having learned to work; workers who represent mere instruments in human form consider themselves producers. (I, xix)

    there may be some compensation—certainly there is some illumination—in a counterpart confession like

    > It is my fervent wish that mankind may ultimately be permitted to be guided through the euphony of art to the noble spirit of selection and synthesis, and to shape all institutions of his earthly existence, such as state, marriage, love and friendship, into true works of art according to the laws of artistic synthesis! (II, xx)

    Be this as it may, it is difficult to go along with editorial urging

    > to recognize that however much Schenker may have regarded his musical precepts as an integral part of a unified world-view, they are, in fact, not at all logically dependent on any of his extramusical speculations. Indeed no broader philosophical context is necessary—or even relevant—to their understanding. (I, xiv)

—not so much the first sentence, which can be saved by a strict enough reading of "logically dependent," as the second, which after all does not insulate these precepts from philosophical presuppositions but merely attaches them to new ones. For presenting *Counterpoint*—uniquely in the *Theories and Fantasies* series—in a fully unexpurgated form, with nothing omitted and nothing hustled to the back of the book, Rothgeb and Thym are much to be commended.

28. In its capacity as "boundary interval" [*Grenzintervall*] (I, 79)—a puzzling term, ambiguous as between "triad-determining interval" and, conceivably, "outside interval of a closely spaced triad" (which seems to have something to do with the dissonant "nature" of the fifth's inversion).
29. A conversation with Steven Dembski helped greatly to promote this realization.
30. Salzer and Schachter invoke the "relaxing of melodic tension" (p. 81), as, in effect, does Westergaard (p. 147); and Rothgeb, in his notes to the translation, takes exception to "Schenker's rather unconvincing argumentation" (I, 356), which "often appears somewhat casuistic" (II, 277).
31. This kind of thinking is made completely explicit in Westergaard's classification of suspensions as "strong" (and always permitted), "intermediate" (usable only in conjunction with a strong suspension in another voice), and "weak" (never usable) (pp. 148–49).
32. The guess that the *Stufen* fill the cantus firmus tones' function is the one that Schenker made almost at once—notably in §88 of *Harmony*, where a diagram makes the analogy explicit. (Jonas eliminated this diagram from the translation, but cited it in his own *Introduction to the Theory of Heinrich Schenker* [translated and edited by John Rothgeb, New York: Longman Inc., 1982], p. 57; I am grateful to Robert Snarrenberg for reminding me of this.)
33. Thus Allan R. Keiler is abundantly right—perhaps right in even more senses than he meant in the immediate context—to say

    > When Schenker claims that "there are no rules which could be laid down once and for all for recognizing scale steps," he means what he says. We could make this more explicit still and argue now that Schenker has no desire to replace his generatively conceived analytic system with one that would assign analyses to pieces in the form of a strict system of rules of reduction. And he probably knew instinctively that he could not achieve the results that he intended with any such attempt.

    in his astute paper "On Some Properties of Schenker's Pitch Derivations," *Music Perception* 1: 210. This essay is also indebted in various ways to two other papers of Keiler's: "The Empiricist Illusion: Narmour's *Beyond Schenkerism*," *Perspectives of New Music* 17/1: 161–95; and "Music as Metalanguage: Rameau's Fundamental Bass," in *Music Theory: Special Topics*, edited by Richmond Browne, New York: Academic Press, 1981, pp. 83–100.
34. There may be something in the idea of using attributive theories—that is, listeners' frames of mind—and arrangements of notes as bases for (more or less) "deductive" explanations of those arrangements' sounds (under those attributive theories); but this is another paper (or a series of papers begun by my lecture cited in note 8).
35. The sketch is the primary example in Allen Forte's 1959 article "Schenker's Conception of Musical Structure" (reprinted in *Readings in Schenker Analysis and Other Approaches*, Maury Yeston, ed., New Haven: Yale, 1977, pp. 3–37,

preceded by a brief but substantial commentary by Yeston); with this article's wide circulation in mind, Joseph Kerman made the sketch the primary target of his "How We Got into Analysis, and How to Get Out" (*Critical Inquiry* 7: 311–32); and Arthur Komar took issue with it in "The Music of *Dichterliebe:* The Whole and its Parts," his analytical contribution to his edition of *Dichterliebe* (New York: Norton, 1971).

36. If true, this suggestion would be completely consonant with what Gregory Proctor and Herbert Lee Riggins say about "replacement figures" in "Levels and the Reordering of Chapters in Schenker's *Free Composition*" (*Music Theory Spectrum* 10: 102–26).
37. Notice that this is what it means for the passing tone to be of the "second-species" type rather than the "third-species" type. Thus it is embedded in Schenker's conception at the deepest level that a prolongation need not close with a return to what is prolonged.
38. Forte makes a point of this passing tone's transformation between middleground and foreground, which Yeston underscores; but neither of them mentions the relation of the passing consonance to the ambiguity between the middleground and background. Although it is impossible to base a reliable interpretation primarily on an omission, it is possible to speculate that this particular omission is easier to make if the generative process is conceived as adding notes layer by layer than if it is conceived as making assertions layer by layer.
39. This is in fact Komar's main reason for placing the first representation of the *Kopfton* later (as Yeston also notes); and Komar makes a very nice point about the final (and initial, and recurrent) harmonic progression of the preceding song turning up again in the middle section of this one.
40. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief*, Compiled from notes taken by Yorick Smythies, Rush Rhees, and James Taylor, edited by Cyril Barrett; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966?, pp. 61–62.
41. The logic of these remarks was particularly well formulated and exemplified in two papers given at the 1989 AMS/SMT meeting in Austin: "A Performer's Use of Musical Analysis" by Charles Fisk, and "Musical Performance as Composition" by Fred Everett Maus.
42. If quite unconcerned about wasting everyone's time, the psycho-Schenker might complain about how unobservant Kerman had been of his treatment of the matter, and suggest that all parties review §120 of *Harmony*.
43. And not only of the musical part of the score, of course: the impossibility of breaking sharply after "*spriessen*" (and, similarly, after "*werden*" and "*klingen*" in the comparable places later) is also taken in by this interpretation. (Forte and Kerman both do other interesting things with these verbs.)
44. "An den Meisterwerk nur teilzuhaben ist ein wahreres Leben, als sich in Nichterfüllung zu vergeuden. In diesem Sinne ist das Meisterwerk der einzige Weg für alle, die nicht berufen sind." *Das Meisterwerk in der Musik*, I, "*Vorwort.*"
45. A few acknowledgements are due, beyond those already made: to Marion A. Guck, for extensive comparison of notes about passing tones; and, for various contributions (including gracious acceptance of rehearsals of this essay in the guise of conversation), to Nadine Hubbs and to the members of my Schenker seminar at the University of Pittsburgh: Deborah Barber, Lars Brøndum, John Marcinizyn, Yong Yang, and especially Iris Berent.