HERMENEUTICS AND ENERGETICS: ANALYTICAL ALTERNATIVES IN THE EARLY 1900s

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I start, perhaps perilously, with the thorny question of musical "content." What does music contain? One answer might be "notes." After all, what else does music contain, in the literal sense, besides notes? Yet that answer is too simplistic and spiritually unsatisfying for musicians, especially for performers, who customarily insist on playing more than "just the notes." Perhaps we can pose the question differently: what does music "mean"? Now we are asking, not just about content, but about *symbolic* content, thus raising the aesthetic ante considerably. The notion of symbolic content takes an already thorny question and turns it into a veritable cactus. In trying to handle it, no matter which way we grasp, no matter how delicately, some aesthetic bloodletting is inevitable.

Several nineteenth-century authors tried to characterize and define the content of music. Many agreed that music reflects interior life. Hegel, for example, said, "Music's content is the subjective inner self," "the pure resounding of the inner life."[1] At one point, he connected music with emotions: music "extends its range to cover every specific emotion of the soul, every degree of happiness, merriment, humor, moodiness, rejoicing and jubilation." The goal of music, then,

was "to make this inwardly veiled life and energy echo . . . in notes."[2] Other authors, such as Ferdinand Hand, wrote similarly of music's content as "the direct expression of inner life," and as "feeling having become sound."[3]

It was not uncommon in the early 1900s for writers to offer vividly descriptive and pictorial accounts of music, as did, for instance, E. T. A. Hoffmann, who referred to Haydn's "vast green woodlands" with "laughing children peering out from behind the trees," to Mozart's "bright purple luster of night," and to Beethoven's dancing figures of the spirit realm, "flashing and sparkling, evading and pursuing one another."[4] We understand today that we must read Hoffmann and others of his time (e.g., Tieck, Wackenroder, Schlegel) carefully because for them music was unique among the arts precisely for its transcendent qualities.[5] However, some early nineteenth-century journalistic writers and aestheticians took such poeticizations too literally. Eduard Hanslick, probably the best known mid-nineteenth-century author to address the issue of musical content, discredited such poeticizations and exhorted aestheticians to focus on purely musical processes. In *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen* (*On the Musically Beautiful,* 1854), he warned against taking programmatic descriptions of music literally. To do so would mean listening to music in a "state of waking dreaminess." Enjoying a symphony becomes, then, according to Hanslick, much like enjoying a warm bath. Instead of music, Hanslick wryly recommended ether or chloroform for superior effects.[6]

Hanslick's mid-century revision of music aesthetics was widely read and elicited various responses, positive and negative. Any discussion of musical content should touch on Hanslick, and this is especially so in the case of this essay since the music-theoretical alternatives named in its subtitle are, in the one instance, a challenge to Hanslick's views, and in the other, a fulfillment of them.

It would take us too far afield to explore all the prickly questions raised by the cactus of musical content and meaning, and there is no dearth of literature on the subject. Instead, we will touch selectively on relevant issues as a foil for discussing the assumptions and analytical practices of two early twentieth-century authors, musicologist Hermann Kretzschmar (1848–1924), and composer-theorist August Halm (1869–1929). The two alternatives mentioned in the subtitle of my essay, hermeneutics and energetics, characterize their respective analytical orientations. For the moment, we will let those characterizations stand without comment, and return to clarify them after filling in some background.

Hanslick's basic premise is that music is not, in Leonard Meyer's words, referentially expressive, at least not in any specific and defin-

able way: no laughing children, no purple luster or dancing figures.[7] Such images arise by association and reside in a listener's mind, Hanslick insisted, not in the music. Emotions and images may have stimulated the composer, but they are untranslatable and thus inaccessible to us.[8] Aestheticians and listeners who assert that music contains or expresses emotions, or depicts images, are confusing musical content with its psychological effects. Notes are indeed music's sole content, but not just as raw acoustical material. Music consists of "artistically combined" notes which, according to context, wax and wane in strength, attract and repel each other, and form lines that widen and contract in a lively dynamic interplay. This interplay, Hanslick declared, is what "presents itself to our mental vision."[9] Music in this view possesses "embodied" meaning—again Meyer—based on the relationships and dynamic implications of tones.[10] It is thus not referentially but "absolutely" expressive, "absolute" in the sense of being musically self-sufficient. Dry grammatical rules in theory books may suggest to aestheticians—and especially to musicians—that music's content resides someplace other than in notes. And Hanslick conceded that any emotions or images we intuit may play a role in the pre-compositional origins or in the performance of a work.[11] However, he affirmed that composition itself is "constructive . . . purely objective," and is guided by technique alone, *not feelings*. Consequently, to quote Hanslick's well-known phrase, "Sonorous forms in motion are the single and sole content of music."[12]

During the decades straddling 1900, a resurgence of Romantic sensibilities in Europe challenged Hanslick's absolutist notion of music, perhaps because readers interpreted "form" too narrowly as routine formulas and stereotypical schemata, although he warned against that interpretation. More likely, readers rejected as too cerebral Hanslick's thesis that composing was a purely technical activity and that any affective content inhered in the performance and listener.[13] In a 1907 handbook on music aesthetics, for example, Bruckner advocate Karl Grunsky proclaimed that "we barely pay attention to Hanslick any longer" since nearly all musicians admit and defend the idea that music is expressive.[14] (Despite Grunsky's criticism of Hanslick, the two men actually end up saying much the same thing, namely that music expresses indeterminate and disembodied feelings—in Grunsky's words, "emotionless emotions." Still, Grunsky's critical allusion to Hanslick is important evidence of contemporary anti-formalist tendencies.[15]) In an article of 1921 outlining new goals for musical understanding, Arthur W. Cohn complained about the debilitating effects on society of decades of Positivism. "The 'intellectualism' that has penetrated art must be eliminated," Cohn urged, "and 'emotional' life . . . reawakened."[16] Around 1900 the search was on for a more

spiritually satisfying musical content. Kretzschmar found it in a theory of thematic affects, and Halm in a concretized version of Hanslick's musical dynamism.

Kretzschmar rejected the notion of absolute music. He obliquely mocked Hanslick when he remarked that music was "more than a playground for sonorous forms in motion." For Kretzschmar, music was communicative, and form was merely the "husk and shell" for communicating a spiritual content.[17] To translate this spiritual communication, Kretzschmar proposed "hermeneutic" analysis, an interpretive methodology that "distills the affects from the tones and verbally conveys the structure of their development." Penetrating "past the tones and sonic forms to the affects," he said, "elevates the sensuous pleasure, the formal work, to a spiritual activity."[18] Since Kretzschmar considered form only insofar as it "aids in clarifying the type of emotive and intellectual activity of the composer," he scoffed at the notion of logical formal development as a "fat morsel from the pig-Latin of aesthetics."[19] Kretzschmar dismissed an independent logic of formal development, except as a manifestation of spiritual content. He sought an understanding of music that transcended its formal aspect—'understanding' in the sense that the philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey used that word.[20] After discussing one of Kretzschmar's hermeneutic analyses, we will return to Dilthey, who around 1900 was the principal commentator on hermeneutics and 'understanding'.

Kretzschmar's hermeneutic analysis involves first interpreting the affective content of local events—for example, motives, themes, rhythms, and simple chord progressions—and then determining the spiritual content of the whole by interpreting the cumulative effect of local events. His demonstration piece is Bach's C-major fugue from Book 1 of the *Well-Tempered Clavier.*

According to Kretzschmar the cautious but deliberate ascent of a fourth at the head of the subject (c^1-f^1), coupled with the quicker descent at the tail, gives the theme a "melancholy" content."[21] The two "energetic" ascending fourth leaps (e^1-a^1, d^1-g^1) strive to overcome that affect, though without success, as indicated by the overall descending trend of the two fourths. This miniature struggle within the subject becomes the spiritual content of the fugue as a whole: the gradual triumph of energetic determination over melancholy resignation.

The process occurs in four stages, the first two representing unsuccessful attempts to overcome the melancholy affect (mm. 1–6, 7–14), and the last two representing the triumph (mm. 14–19, 19–27). In the first stage, the soprano sweeps up to g^2 (m. 4) but then sinks back, along with the other voices (m. 5). In the second stage, an energetic



Example 1. Bach: Fugue in C Major, *WTC* I



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

Example 1 (*continued*)

stretto renews the effort to break free (m. 7). The soprano climbs up to a peak by sequencing the tail motive up a step (m. 8). However, the companion voice in the stretto (tenor) fails to follow through with the ascending sequence. The tenor stalls on e^1 (m. 8), and the effort founders on a poignant dissonance at the downbeat of m. 9. The modulation to A minor in m. 11, foreshadowed by the wrenching c^2-$g\sharp^1$ outline in the soprano there, foils the enterprise and dashes hopes of breaking the affect (mm. 11–14).

By referring to readily perceivable phenomena like melodic direction and register (mm. 4–5), imitation and a dissonance (mm. 7–9), and a minor-key modulation (mm. 10–11), Kretzschmar traces the affective discourse in the first half of the fugue. Hanslick would probably recoil in horror from Kretzschmar's emotive interpretations. The evidence offered is indeed a bit thin and the conclusions speculative. However, if we look closer at mm. 1–14, we can locate some technical phenomena that strengthen the analysis.

We will start with the subject. The ascent from scale degree 1 to 4 at its beginning hints at subdominant harmony, which is tonally less "energetic" than the strong $\hat{1}$–$\hat{5}$ outline found near the beginning of many subjects of the *Well-Tempered Clavier.*[22] That helps to explain Kretzschmar's melancholy affect, though I have shifted the emphasis from mood or feeling to energetic content. The descending resolution from f^1 to e^1 in m. 1 could imply a plagal progression, IV–I, which has a more subdued effect than an ascent from f^1 to g^1, indicating an energetic IV–V progression. Kretzschmar finesses these details by highlighting conspicuous features, like melodic direction and register, that invite dramatization.

In referring to the buildup in m. 4 and the downswing in m. 5, he might have pointed out the chromatic note F♯ ($\sharp\hat{4}$) in the applied-dominant progression at the registral peak, and the immediate withdrawal of F♯ and entrance of B♭ in the applied dominant to IV at the downswing. Those events imply an escalation toward the energetic dominant followed by a de-escalation toward the more placid subdominant.

In the second stage, we might point out the dissonances on each tied sixteenth-note of the subject in m. 8; these tied notes were consonant at analogous spots in m. 3 (beat 4), m. 5 (beat 2), and m. 6 (beat 4). Their reinterpretation as dissonances in m. 8 heightens the tension of the stretto and so contributes to the overall drive of the passage. Furthermore, the poignant b^2-f^2 augmented fourth outlined in the soprano at mm. 8–9 consummates the tension generated by the preceding series of dissonances. Hence the effectiveness of Kretzschmar's e-f "crisis" on the downbeat of m. 9. The dynamic implications of the musical events and the logic of their succession is clear. Less clear is whether the whole escalation can be interpreted as a valiant, but failed, attempt to break an assumed melancholy affect.

Lest Kretzschmar appear ridiculous, we should keep in mind that, as an educationist, he was addressing musical amateurs.[23] They no doubt welcomed the intelligibility of the fugue analysis and found it satisfying. Perhaps he was aware of the supplementary analytical points made above. If not, he may have intuited them and framed his remarks as he did for pedagogical as well as ideological reasons. Like others of his generation, Kretzschmar reacted to the infiltration of Positivism and the methods of the natural sciences into the realm of the humanities, or *Geisteswissenschaften,* usually translated as "human studies." The leading spokesman for distinguishing the humanities from the natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaften*) was Wilhelm Dilthey, to whom we now return.

Dilthey devoted a large portion of his career to setting forth the scope, ideology, and methodology of the *Geisteswissenschaften,* what

we today call the humanities and social sciences (cultural-intellectual and socio-political history, cultural anthropology, psychology, art criticism, aesthetics, and related fields). The subject matter of the human studies, according to Dilthey, is the "socio-historical reality," more specifically, "everything on which man has actively impressed his stamp"—i.e., those things that embody the activity and hence bear signs of the human spirit. The subject matter of the natural sciences, by contrast, is the natural world, embracing a "reality which has arisen independently of the activity [*Wirken*] of spirit."[24] While the natural sciences and human studies appear to deal with different areas of study—physical as opposed to spiritual—their subject matter may, and often does, overlap. Rock formations, for example, may be studied from either the geological or anthropological perspective, celestial motions from either the astronomical or astrological perspective. However, while the scientist would focus on natural properties and processes, the humanist would focus on the *meaning* (e.g., cultural, historical, or religious) imparted by the human spirit to objects and events as a product of "reflection" (*Besinnung*) and "lived experience" (*Erlebnis*), the mediatory links between the outer and inner worlds.[25]

The natural sciences and human studies also differ epistemologically. Dilthey characterized the difference by distinguishing between 'explaining' (*Erklären*), the norm for scientists, and 'understanding' (*Verstehen*), the norm for humanists.[26] Scientists explain things by first investigating elemental components, then constructing the unity of natural phenomena with hypotheses about causal connections. Humanists understand things holistically, by studying different sorts of meaningful communications produced by humans.[27] Hypotheses are unnecessary in the human studies since, as Dilthey held, the inherent unity of the human psyche is a given, as is the unity of its communications, its cultural expressions. Humanists come to know political figures, artists, and their cultural expressions directly, as one mind comes to know another, by "rediscovering the I in the Thou," as Dilthey put it. This knowledge is achieved by mental self-projection (*Sichhineinversetzen*)—an identification with the cultural conditions that produced the communication and an immersion in the communication itself.[28] Self-projection is possible because, according to Dilthey, humans share certain psychic traits and structures that transcend temporal and cultural boundaries.

> Every word . . . every gesture . . . every work of art and every historical deed is intelligible because the people who express themselves through them and those who understand them have something in common; the individual always experiences, thinks, and acts in a common sphere and only there does he understand.[29]

Dilthey's epistemology for the human studies took as a point of departure the British school of psychology developed by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. However, Dilthey considered their empirical-rationalistic approach too restrictive. Human understanding, he believed, is shaped by a psyche that not only reasons but also feels and wills, and this under specific historical and cultural conditions. Dilthey put it this way:

> No real blood flows in the veins of the knowing subject constructed by Locke, Hume, and Kant but rather the diluted extract of reason as a mere activity of thought. A historical as well as psychological approach to whole human beings led me to explain knowledge and its concepts . . . in terms of the manifold powers of a being that wills, feels, and thinks . . . [30]

Researchers in the human studies gain knowledge by examining what Dilthey called "life expressions" (*Lebensäußerungen*), cultural phenomena such as political events and documents, literature, art works, and so forth. Of the three types of cultural expressions—concepts, actions, and "expressions of lived experience" *(Erlebnisausdrücke)*—the last are especially valuable. When fixed in writing, as with music, they permit us to return to them repeatedly, and so allow us to evolve an "understanding" of the psychic nexus that produced them. Understanding "runs inverse to the course of production," Dilthey said, leading from a cultural expression—an art work, for example—back to its origins. A complementary cognitive process, "re-experiencing" *(Nacherleben),* completes the interpretive cycle by leading "forward along the line of the [creative] events."[31] The process of re-experiencing may itself be creative, possibly even transcending the original, authorial experience and intention. Following Friedrich Schleiermacher, the "father" of nineteenth-century hermeneutics, Dilthey indicated that with historical perspective and interpretive insight, the researcher, through a "divinatory" process, may come to know an author better than he knew himself.[32]

Our detour into Dilthey's human studies suggests parallels with Kretzschmar's ideas. Early in his career, Dilthey recommended a psychological, divinatory approach to the analysis of cultural expressions as a way of accessing their interior. Kretzschmar, too sought to disclose the spiritual content of music—for him, its affects—in order to grasp its logic and essence. Like Dilthey, Kretzschmar also spoke of arriving at an "understanding" of art works through "aural self-projection" *(Sich Hineinhören).*[33] Kretzschmar assumed a mental affinity between music and listeners. "When the ear hears and the eye sees," he says, "the spirit always hears and sees with them."[34]

In an early essay on poetics (1887), about twenty-five years before Kretzschmar's articles on musical hermeneutics, Dilthey approached literature from a similar, affective point of view:

> Since the formative processes of the artistic imagination are produced by the play of feelings, the basis of their explanation must be sought in an analysis of feelings. . . . An analysis of feeling thus contains the key to the explanation of artistic creativity.[35]

> Whatever is formed from feeling excites feeling again, and does so in the same manner though with diminished force.[36]

In an essay of 1892, on the evolution of aesthetics, Dilthey reinforced the psychological view. He wrote:

> We spontaneously and inevitably attribute something inner to what is given to sense as outer. The essence of aesthetic apprehension and creation, the relation of . . . inner and outer, is based on this. . . . It is mainly the relations of our emotions to our reflex mechanism which provide the basis for the fact that those emotions discharge themselves in expressions, gestures, and tonal relationships, and that we can then always read back something inner in such outer manifestations. The schematic correlations found in speech between intensity, pitch, tempo, rhythm, and the emotions are especially effective in music.[37]

Both Dilthey and Kretzschmar spoke of affective content and reverberative experience in understanding art works, Dilthey in analyzing the psychological genesis of art, and Kretzschmar in revealing the affective content of music.

Late in Dilthey's career, his interest shifted from the interior origins of cultural expressions to their exterior *structure.* He warned against the "common error" of equating "our knowledge of the inner side with the course of psychic life, that is, with psychology." In contrast to the 1887 essay just cited, around 1910 Dilthey now said of poetry,

> what is expressed are not the interior processes in the poet, but a structure created in these processes yet separable from them. . . . Thus the object with which literary history and poetics is involved is wholly distinct from psychic processes in the poet or in his readers. A psychic structure is realized here, which enters the world of the senses, and which we understand through a retreat from that world [into the mental origins].[38]

Dilthey called this exterior structure a "dynamic system," a loose but fitting translation of *Wirkungszusammenhang.* He characterized it as "a sequence of states, interiorly determined, presupposing each

other so that higher levels are built on lower ones."[39] The notion of a dynamic system is important for Halm, as we shall see when we turn to him shortly.

The idea of a dynamic system connotes a teleological form, where each event functions organically within the whole. Earlier, I showed that Kretzschmar's affective analysis of the Bach fugue might be interpreted as such a dynamic system. I referred there to greater and lesser levels of energy in harmonic progressions and in levels of dissonance. I turned Kretzschmar's affective interpretation, which follows Dilthey's early, psychological ideas, into an energetic one, in accordance with Dilthey's later, "hermeneutic" ideas. Dilthey's interest in hermeneutics goes back to around 1860 and re-emerged around 1900, shortly before Kretzschmar published his essays on musical hermeneutics.[40]

If Kretzschmar knew Dilthey's 1900 essay on hermeneutics, he apparently chose to pursue his own, unrelated—indeed ideologically antithetical—mode of hermeneutic analysis as a latter-day doctrine of affections. He confirmed this when he stated that hermeneutics is

> nothing but an attempt to carry out the old doctrine of affections for an entire piece, that is to say, to trace the intentions of the composer based on the character of the theme.[41]

This approach is contrary to Dilthey's mature ideas. Dilthey aimed hermeneutic analysis primarily at linguistic creations, since, he explained, "the inner life of man finds its complete, exhaustive, and objectively understandable expression only in language." Dilthey thus concluded that hermeneutics is "the methodology for the interpretation of written literary monuments."[42] Furthermore, he acknowledged the importance of the so-called "hermeneutic circle," the thesis that a synoptic whole can be understood only in light of its component parts, and yet, conversely, the parts can ultimately be understood only once the whole is grasped.[43] Kretzschmar, however, considered hermeneutic analysis an additive process. He wrote,

> The task of analyzing the sense of 400 measures is essentially no different from doing it for four or eight measures. . . . For the whole is the sum of individual passages.[44]

This would surely make *Gestalt* psychologists turn over in their graves. However, when Kretzschmar wrote about musical hermeneutics, *Gestalt* psychology was not even out of the intellectual womb, although Wilhelm Wundt, Ernst Mach, Christian von Ehrenfels, and Dilthey

had prepared the way for Gestalt psychology long before its "birth" around 1910.

Finally, Kretzschmar's ideas are completely at odds with Dilthey's views on music and its interpretation. In a 1910 commentary on musical understanding, Dilthey declared,

> In the historical study of music, the object is not the psychic process that lies behind the musical work, the psychological, but rather something objective, specifically the tonal nexus [*Tonzusammenhang*] that arises in imagination as an expression. . . . Musical rather than psychological relationships form the object of the study of musical . . . works and theory.[45]

The composer lives in an exclusively musical world, Dilthey insisted, not in the world of feelings. The sign and the signified, form and content, are for Dilthey one and the same in music. "There is no duality of lived experience and music," he explained, "no double world. . . . Genius is simply living in the tonal sphere, as though this alone existed." Whoever seeks a path from the composer's experience to music, he warned, follows a "false beacon," for "there is no determinate path from lived experience to music."[46] Clearly, Dilthey reversed himself in the search for a mode of interpretive analysis. Over the course of a decade, he shifted his attention from the shadowy interior of creative processes and their manifestations in art to the more luminous exterior of dynamic systems. Kretzschmar's two essays on hermeneutics fall chronologically in the middle and toward the end of that shift. In 1902, when Kretzschmar's first essay was published, he may not have known Dilthey's work. After 1904, however, a year before the second essay was published, he may well have known it since both men were then teaching at the Berlin university.[47]

At the outset of this essay I touched on the issue of musical content and summarized Hanslick's ideas on the subject. In short, he is a nonreferential expressionist (not a pure "absolutist," as some have maintained). He argued that music has no external content, emotive or otherwise, but rather consists solely in a dynamic discourse of tones that, as such, can be expressive. Kretzschmar emotionalized that dynamic discourse into an affective discourse, which for him was music's "spiritual content." He referred to intramusical evidence, albeit scanty, and defined an ostensibly non-referentialist position. However, the affect-based, anthropomorphic language puts him in the referential camp. Dilthey focused initially on psychological aspects of the creative process and formulated an emotive-referentialist view. Late in life, he shifted toward a hermeneutics based on the formalist notion of an objectified dynamic psyche, a "dynamic system." Accordingly,

Dilthey, sounding much like Hanslick, then described music as "a free agreement of figures which first attract and then repulse each other."[48]

* * *

Hanslick was primarily a music critic and aesthetician, Dilthey a philosopher. Their ideas on music, though insightful and suggestive, nevertheless lack technical substance. Even Hanslick, who had musical training and knew music literature, did not employ technical analysis to concretize his aesthetic claims. Hanslick's aesthetic and Dilthey's hermeneutic proposals found music-analytical expression in the writings of August Halm.

Halm's work differs essentially from those of his contemporaries. In contrast to the theoretical premises of Riemann and Schenker, for example, Halm's premises are largely aesthetic rather than technical. Further, Halm stuck to conventional analytical tools and symbology rather than devising new ones. Unlike Kretzschmar, Halm deliberately avoided emotive language, characteristically urging us to "guard against being genteel Philistines, who employ music for nervous convulsions, for 'inner experiences,' . . . essentially as a substitute for emotional life."[49]

Like Dilthey, Halm also rejected psychological analysis. "One ought not to take the psychological element in music for the logical element," he warned, and remarked facetiously that if the composer's mental state is the ultimate test of musical quality, "the psychiatrist is declared the rightful judge of music."[50] Like Hanslick, Halm considered dynamic activity music's sole content. He denied any "fictional content behind musical utterances . . . as if the meaning of music could lie in something other than the music." "We have a drama of forces before us," he observed, "not a drama of persons or personifications."[51] Halm also followed Hanslick in maintaining that perfection of form is the composer's main goal, the understanding of form the listener's chief task.

These declarations may sound like so many arm-chair meditations and in another's hands might remain so. But Halm is not content with lofty-sounding aesthetic pronouncements. As an active composer, performer, author, and, above all, teacher, he illustrated his ideas with numerous, close analyses in which, rather than emotionalizing musical events, he *dynamicized* them. To Halm's ear, musical events represented energetic values that sum cumulatively to a teleological dynamic network, which we call "form"; this depiction recalls Hanslick's sonorous forms in motion and Dilthey's dynamic system. Musical content for Halm, then, was the continuum of streaming force. As he put it, "the . . . dràma of dynamics suffices fully for me, is for me

the actually concrete element."[52] Halm's analysis of parts of Beethoven's "Waldstein" sonata, will give an idea of what he meant by a "drama of dynamics."

Halm's first objective here is to explain the escalatory logic of the opening twenty-three measures.[53] Because the first two phrases correspond thematically, Halm hears an overarching, harmonically recessive movement from C in m. 1 to B♭ in m. 5 that overrides the association of the unrelated G and B♭ harmonies between the two phrases (mm. 4–5). The harmonically progressive tendencies of the two *local* ascending-fifth progressions, from C–G (mm. 1–3) and B♭–F (mm. 5–7), are offset by the overarching, or *translocal,* connection from C–B♭. The intrusive G–B♭ connection and the tonic-dominant progression transplanted to the foreign key of B♭ major generate tonal tension, calling for subsequent redirection and resolution. The redirection comes with the expansive dominant in mm. 9–11, enhanced by accelerated rhythm as well as by spatially confined, repeated melodic figures and registral extremes in both hands. Halm interprets the re-orientation toward C through the extended dominant harmony as a logical result of the disorienting tonal tension generated by the B♭ passage. The resolution comes with a dramatic arrival on the resonant, mid-range C-octave in m. 12. The modal shift to minor hereabouts is appropriate since it sustains tension, invoking the urge for resolution to major. The accumulated tension is discharged with the C-major harmony of m. 14. Like the reorienting dominant in mm. 9–11, the return to tonic is a logical outcome of previous events.

The dynamic phase starting in m. 14 absorbs the tension from the first phase and escalates beyond it. Surface details—the higher register, shorter durational values, and the replacement of the previous hammer-stroke style with a fast rocking motion in both hands—modify the original thematic statement, signaling heightened tension and promoting the ongoing escalation. The deeper escalation, involving harmony, has again to do with the local versus the now widened, translocal context. The ascending C–D-minor progression that encompasses mm. 14–18 clearly escalates over the descending C–B♭ progression in the earlier, parallel phase. While the translocal C–B♭ movement in mm. 1–5 neutralizes the energy generated by its interior ascending-fifth progressions, the translocal C–D-minor movement in mm. 14–20 enhances its interior ascending fifths, first from C to G harmony, then from G to D between the phrases, and further from D to A. This gradual ascent surpasses the harmonic events of the opening in a continuous and deliberate escalation of the dynamic discourse.

Besides the intensification just described, there is yet another, less apparent one. The G–D-minor association between the members of



Example 2. Beethoven: Sonata Op. 53 ("Waldstein")



Example 2 (*continued*)

the second phrase pair escalates over the analogous G–B♭ association in the first pair. This interpretation seems counterintuitive at first, since the mediant-related G and B♭ harmonies are more remote, and would thus seem more energetic, than the fifth-related G and D harmonies. However, precisely because the connection between G and B♭ harmonies is remote, we tend to disassociate them. We hear across this harmonic cleft and, based on thematic criteria, associate the B♭ harmony with the C harmony in m. 1, creating the translocal C–B♭ progression mentioned earlier. The fifth-related G and D harmonies in mm. 17–18, on the other hand, invite association. The G–D link is more energetic than G–B♭, Halm explains, due to the implicit B–F tritone in the voice leading. Furthermore, the G–D link produces a more complex associative network of harmonies than before, consisting of the local G–D connection overlaid with the translocal C–D connection. The greater associative complexity and the F–B tritone in the second dynamic phase escalate over the events in the first.

The current escalation peaks on the augmented-sixth chord in m. 22, which prepares the dominant of an implied E-minor harmony. The phase ends when in m. 35 the key of *E major* arrives instead, echoing the modal reversals between C major and C minor in the first phase. Although locally the cumulative tension subsides when E major sets in, globally the underlying tension between C major and E major remains high. The global tension persists up until the end of the exposition, and then dissipates in two stages. First, E major reverts back to E minor, gradually reducing the tension. The remaining tension is discharged when G-major harmony enters just before the repeat sign and leads back to C.[54]

Halm spoke of forces and their unfolding as intramusical properties. However, since the forces reverberate in our psyche, the dynamic drama stimulates a corresponding cognitive drama. Halm continuously re-evaluates the aural impact of local events in light of previous and anticipated ones. According to Halm, the cross-referential dynamic network triggers a continuous interplay of retroauditive and proauditive interpretations. For example, on hearing m. 5 we retroauditively connected the B♭ harmony with the C harmony in m. 1 to create the overarching C–B♭ progression. The anomalous B♭ harmony stimulated a proauditive anticipation of harmonies to redirect the passage back toward C. Energies arise and are either left unresolved or appear contextually resolved, only to be reactivated by the retroauditive implications of later events. Musical understanding builds up progressively out of the dynamic reciprocity between local and translocal events as we shuttle back and forth over an aural "hermeneutic circle." Following Dilthey, we could say that we come to "understand" the dynamic network and then "re-experience" its teleological

unfolding. Dilthey would say we are re-experiencing the "psychic nexus" (*Seelenzusammenhang*), externalized as a "dynamic system" (*Wirkungszusammenhang*).

For Halm, forces are the content of music. They intensify and de-intensify to produce a dynamic drama. Like Hanslick, Halm resisted the lure of emotive interpretations. He condemned program music as aesthetically corrupt and musically ruinous—"no intention can make up for invention," as Hanslick had said.[55] Analyses based on programs, emotive or otherwise, thus legitimize musical ruin. Accordingly, analysis should focus exclusively on what Halm, following Dilthey and others, called the "objective spirit" of the artwork—the dynamic system. Anything else amounts to Halm's "nervous convulsions," Dilthey's "false beacon," or Hanslick's "ether."

* * *

Kretzschmar and Halm wrote at a time when, after roughly a 150-year evolution, syntactic analysis had become quite sophisticated. But that sophistication, based on the model of the natural sciences, tended to resolve distinctively human qualities of music into formalized abstractions. Kretzschmar and Halm chose to follow the methodology of the human studies instead. Although both men relied on syntactic analysis to some extent, they considered it insufficient for dealing with products of an emotive, volitive psyche. Grammatical interpretation needed to be supplemented by what Dilthey called "psychological" interpretation, a penetration to the psychic nexus.[56] Schenker's linear progressions, and *Urlinie,* for example, impressed Halm as revelatory grammatical insights. But such progressions, with all of their implicit dynamic qualities, were for Halm no substitute for the drama of forces in which each section of music has a determinate dynamic character and logical role in a processive form.[57]

For Kretzschmar and Halm music was not just a product of syntactic ingenuity, not simply the unfolding of Nature—whether of Riemann's harmonic functions and agogics, or of Schenker's primordial triad. Rather, music was an "expression of lived experience," the unfolding of a psychic nexus. In moving from analysis to interpretation of such expressions—from explanation to understanding—more than the "diluted extract of reason" is required in the cognitive process. In going beyond the safety of purely syntactic analysis, Kretzschmar and Halm accepted the risk of some aesthetic bloodletting in exchange for real blood flowing in the veins of listeners who not only reason, but also feel and will.

NOTES

1. Peter le Huray and James Day, eds., *Music and Aesthetics in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries* (Cambridge and New York, 1981), 346. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Arts,* trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford, 1988), 2:938.
2. le Huray and Day, *Music and Aesthetics,* 344. Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Arts,* 2:902.
3. Ferdinand Hand, *Aesthetics of Musical Art, Or, The Beautiful in Music,* 2d ed., trans. Walter E. Lawson (London, 1880; orig. 1837), 24, 105. C. R. Hennig speaks similarly in *Die Aesthetik der Tonkunst* (Leipzig, 1896), 55, 57, 59, 87.
4. Oliver Strunk, ed., *Source Readings in Music History* (New York, 1950), 776–77, 779; from Hoffmann's analytical essay (1813) on Beethoven's Fifth Symphony (E. T. A. Hoffmann, *Schriften zur Musik, Nachlese* [Munich, 1963], 34–36.
5. "[Music's] sole subject is the infinite," Hoffmann declared, and affirmed that "music . . . has nothing in common with the external sensual world," including "definite feelings" (Strunk, 775–76). As Carl Dahlhaus has pointed out, literal readings of what are intended as metaphorical descriptions—Romantics' attempts to express verbally that which is by its very nature inexpressible—misinterpret Romantic aesthetics. Hence, "nothing would be more mistaken than to assert that an exegete like Tieck or E. T. A. Hoffmann meant his poetic sketch to be the 'hidden meaning' of the music, to be the 'text' the tones encode" (Dahlhaus, *Die Idee der absoluten Musik* [Kassell-Basel, 1978], 72 [my translation]). One of the most "tenacious prejudices of intellectual history," Dahlhaus laments, is that Romantic aesthetics is confounded with the aesthetics of emotion (referential expressionism). According to Dahlhaus, Romantic aesthetics is as far removed from emotive aesthetics as it is from Hanslickian formalist aesthetics (Ibid., 74). Peter Schnaus explains the historical context and meaning of Hoffmann's emotive and pictorial characterizations of Beethoven's music in *E. T. A. Hoffmann als Beethoven-Rezensent der Allgemeinen Musikalischen Zeitung,* Freiburger Schriften zur Musikwissenschaft, ed. H. H. Eggebrecht, vol. 8 (Munich and Salzburg, 1977), 63–71. Schnaus also highlights the structural-analytical content of Hoffmann's review of the Fifth Symphony (Ibid., 48–55, 89–95).
6. Eduard Hanslick, *The Beautiful in Music: A Contribution to the Revisal of Musical Aesthetics,* trans. Gustav Cohen (New York and London, 1891; rpt. New York, 1974), 124, 125, 126; idem, *On the Musically Beautiful: A Contribution towards the Revision of the Aesthetics of Music,* trans., ed. Geoffrey Payzant (Indianapolis, 1986), 58, 59. At the end of chapter 1 of *On the Musically Beautiful,* Hanslick cites Ferdinand Hand in a long list of authors who stress "feelings" as the content or purpose of music. Payzant explains that Hanslick, in his critique of Hand, quotes him fragmentarily and so gives the impression that Hand was aesthetically more expressionistic than he actually was. Subsequent references to Hanslick's treatise will cite both Cohen's translation (*The Beautiful in Music*) as well as Payzant's (*On the Musically Beautiful*).
7. Leonard B. Meyer, *Emotion and Meaning in Music* (Chicago and London, 1956), 2–3. To be fair to Hoffmann, in light of Dahlhaus's warning quoted in note 5, we should remember that Hoffmann's analysis of Beethoven's Fifth is

largely technical, if superficially so. The metaphorical descriptions are limited to the general, introductory paragraphs of the essay.

8. Hanslick, *The Beautiful in Music,* 34, 36, 71, 99, 102; *On the Musically Beautiful,* 9, 10, 30, 45, 46.
9. Hanslick, *The Beautiful in Music,* 66, 161, 162; *On the Musically Beautiful,* 28, 77, 78.
10. Meyer, *Emotion and Meaning in Music,* 35.
11. Werner Abegg discusses "Music and Feeling" (*Musik und Gefühl*) in Hanslick's writings in *Musikästhetik und Musikkritik bei Eduard Hanslick,* Studien zur Musikgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts, vol. 44 (Regensburg, 1974), 57–68. Payzant tackles the problem in an essay entitled "Hanslick on Music as Product of Feeling," *Journal of Musicological Research* 9 (1989): 133–46. He specifically takes up Hanslick's statement, "As the creation of a thinking and feeling mind, a musical composition has in high degree the capability to be itself full of ideality [*Geistigkeit*] and feeling [*Gefühl*]" (Hanslick, *The Beautiful in Music,* 73; *On the Musically Beautiful,* 31; Payzant, "Hanslick on Music," 133). Payzant tries to pin down what Hanslick, the ostensible opponent of all emotive interpretations of music, means by a composition being full of feeling. He concludes that, in the quotation just cited, Hanslick meant feeling "in the sense in which thought and feeling are complementary aspects . . . of spirit [*Geist*], not in the other sense, in which feeling is opposed to intellect" (Payzant, "Hanslick on Music," 136).
12. Hanslick, *The Beautiful in Music,* 101–102, 67; *On the Musically Beautiful,* 46–47, 29. Payzant provides an essay to help understand what Hanslick means by "sonorous forms in motion" (pp. 93–102). The translation I have given of Hanslick's familiar statement ("Sonorous forms in motion are the single and sole content of music") is my own, based on the wording in the first edition of the treatise: "Tönend bewegte Formen sind einzig und allein Inhalt und Gegenstand der Musik"). In subsequent editions, Hanslick changed the wording to "Das Wesen der Musik sind tönend bewegte Formen." Werner Abegg discusses the meaning of Hanslick's statement in *Musikästhetik und Musikkritik bei Eduard Hanslick,* 47–56.
13. Peter Kivy, who has forcefully argued for an emotive interpretation of music based on its structural properties, concludes in a recent essay that Hanslick's views deny music, as a purely aesthetic object, the power to arouse "garden-variety" emotions. Only when a listener is in an abnormal psychological state (Hanslick says "pathological") and hence is susceptible to emotional responses—that is, when music is *not* being heard as a purely aesthetic object—might one imagine that the music embodies and expresses emotions, when in fact the listener, not the music, is the source of these emotions. Kivy explores possible interpretations of Hanslick's "negative thesis" that music cannot express emotions, in "What Was Hanslick Denying?" *Journal of Musicology* 8 (1990): 3–18. He examines the question of purely aesthetic versus pathological hearing on pp. 12–13.
14. Karl Grunsky, *Musikästhetik* (Berlin and Leipzig: G. J. Göschen'sche Verlagshandlung, 1919 [orig. 1907]), 22 (my translation).
15. Ibid., 25.
16. Arthur W. Cohn, "Das musikalische Verständnis: Neue Ziele," *Zeitschrift für Musikwissenschaft* 4 (Dec. 1921): 129–30 (my translation).

17. Hermann Kretzschmar, "Anregungen zur Förderung musikalischer Hermeneutik," *Jahrbuch der Musikbibliothek Peters* 9 (1902): 57, 51 (full article occupies pp. 45–66). A companion essay was published as "Neue Anregungen zur Förderung musikalischer Hermeneutik: Satzästhetik," *Jahrbuch der Musikbibliothek Peters* 12 (1905): 75–86. Both essays are reprinted in a volume, published under Kretzschmar's name, entitled *Gesammelte Schriften aus den Jahrbüchern der Musikbibliothek Peters,* vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1911), 168–92, 280–93. Edward Lippman translates both in *Musical Aesthetics: A Historical Reader,* vol. 3 (Stuyvesant, New York, 1990), 5–30, 31–46. Translations of excerpts from Kretzschmar's first essay on hermeneutics are in Bojan Bujic's *Music in European Thought 1851–1912* (New York, 1988), 114–20 ("Anregungen," 47–53); and in Carl Dahlhaus's and Ruth Katz's *Contemplating Music: Source Readings in the Aesthetics of Music,* vol. 2, Aesthetics in Music, no. 5 (Stuyvesant, New York, 1989), 619–29 ("Anregungen," 47–48, 50–54, 56–57, 62–63, 66). Quotations in English from these two essays are my translations.
18. Kretzschmar, "Anregungen," 51. Werner Braun examines the premises of Kretzschmar's musical hermeneutics in "Kretzschmars Hermeneutik," in *Beiträge zur musikalischen Hermeneutik,* ed. Carl Dahlhaus, Studien zur Musikgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts, vol. 43 (Regensburg, 1975), 33–39.
19. Hermann Kretzschmar, "Neue Anregungen," 77, 84. Kretzschmar scorns purely formalistic analysis, exemplified by that of Carl van Bruyck (*Technische und ästhetische Analysen des wohltemperierten Klaviers,* 1867), by calling it a "juggling with scientific sounding schoolroom concepts and phrases ("Schulbegriffen und Redensarten"), and accuses such analysis of "distracting from the essence of things with formal hocus-pocus" (84–85).
20. In "Neue Anregungen," 75, Kretzschmar set the word *Verständnis* in quotation marks, suggesting the special philosophical sense of that word as developed during the nineteenth century.
21. Kretzschmar's analysis of the fugue is in "Neue Anregungen," 76–80. A similar presentation of this analysis, along with the one by Halm of Beethoven's Op. 53, appears in my article "The 'New Education' and Music Theory, 1900–1925," *Music Theory and the Exploration of the Past* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming). There, the context is the educational reform movement of the early twentieth century, while the context here is hermeneutics and phenomenology.
22. Some examples, among many, of fugue subjects that begin with strong $\hat{1}$–$\hat{5}$ outlines are *WTC I,* numbers 8, 16, 17, 22, and *WTC II,* numbers 1, 7, 11, and 12.
23. Kretzschmar's pedagogical motivation becomes explicit when he identifies hermeneutic training as the proper focus of "preparatory training in music aesthetics [*Vorschule der Musikästhetik*]" ("Anregungen," 56, 65, 66), and points to the lamentable state of public music education ("Neue Anregungen," 76). He addressed the problems of music education, traced their origins, and suggested remedies in a pamphlet entitled *Musikalische Zeitfragen* (Leipzig, 1903).
24. Dilthey, *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (1883), *Gesammelte Schriften,* 4th ed., vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 1959), 5; trans. Michael Neville in *Introduction to the Human Sciences, Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Works,* vol. 1, ed. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (Princeton, 1989), 56–57. Dilthey, *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften* (1910), *Gesammelte Schriften,* vol 7. ed. B. Groethuysen (Stuttgart, 1927), 148. Makkreel renders *Wirken* as

"efficacy" (*Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies* [Princeton, 1975], 306), which seems too inert for the noun *Wirken.* I have changed "efficacy" to "activity." Roy J. Howard discusses Dilthey's distinction between the natural and human sciences in *Three Faces of Hermeneutics: An Introduction to Current Theories of Understanding* (Los Angeles, 1982), 15–16. There are several good English-language introductions to Dilthey's work. A basic, if older, source is Herbert A. Hodges, *The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey* (London, 1952; rpt. Westport, Conn., 1971). The standard, newer works are Makkreel, *Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies;* and Hans Peter Rickman, *Wilhelm Dilthey: Pioneer of the Human Studies,* Stanford, 1979). William Outhwaite gives a brief introduction to Dilthey's ideas in chapter 3 of *Understanding Social Life: The Method Called "Verstehen"* (London, 1975). The most recent study is Rickman's *Dilthey Today: A Critical Appraisal of the Contemporary Relevance of His Work,* Contributions in Philosophy, vol. 35 (Westport, Conn., 1988).

25. Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften,* 7:118. Dilthey adopts the Hegelian term "objective spirit" (*objektiver Geist*) to denote the externalization—in literature and art, for example—of the human spirit (Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften,* 7:208; Makkreel, *Dilthey, Philosopher of the Human Studies,* 306–08). On the impossibility of distinguishing natural and human sciences based solely on their objects of study, see Makkreel, Ibid., 222, and Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften,* 5:248: "The difference between the *Naturwissenschaften* and the *Geisteswissenschaften* is not grounded in differentiating two classes of objects [*Objekten*]. A distinction of natural objects and spiritual objects does not exist." Dilthey says this because, in addition to intangibles such as ideas and events, the human studies are also concerned with cultural meanings of physical objects, such as paintings and buildings.
26. "Nature we explain," Dilthey says, "mental life [*Seelenleben*] we understand." Dilthey, "Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie," *Gesammelte Schriften,* vol. 5, 2d ed. (Stuttgart, 1957), 144; translated by Richard M. Zaner as "Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology (1894)," in *Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding* (The Hague, 1977), 27.
27. Hans Peter Rickman examines the meaning of 'understanding' in Dilthey's writings in *Understanding and the Human Studies* (London, 1967). William Outhwaite summarizes the distinction between 'understanding' and 'explaining' in *Understanding Social Life,* 11–23. One of the best known critiques of 'understanding' is Theodore Abel's essay "The Operation Called Verstehen," in *The Philosophy of Science,* eds. Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (New York, 1953), 677–87; first published in *Journal of Sociology* 54 [1948]). Rudolf Makkreel dismisses Abel's criticisms as being based on a misinterpretation of Dilthey's notion of 'understanding' (Makkreel, *Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies,* 253n).
28. Wilhelm Dilthey, "Das Erleben und die Selbstbiographie," *Gesammelte Schriften,* vol. 7, 2d ed. (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1958), 191. Dilthey, "Das Verstehen anderer Personen und ihrer Lebensäußerungen," *Gesammelte Schriften,* vol. 7, 2d ed. (Stuttgart, 1958), 214; trans. by Kenneth L. Heiges as "The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Expressions of Life," in *Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding,* 132.
29. Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften,* 7:146. See Makkreel, *Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies,* 308.

30. Dilthey, *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften,* xviii; *Introduction to the Human Sciences,* 50. In the translation, Makkreel and Rodi provide an excellent introduction to Dilthey's *Einleitung* (pp. 3–43). Dilthey enumerates and characterizes the three modes of consciousness—thinking, feeling, and willing—in "Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology," chapter 7 ("The Structure of Psychic Life"), 82–84 ("Ideen," *Gesammelte Schriften,* 5:201–02).
31. Dilthey, "Das Verstehen anderer Personen," 214; "The Understanding of Other Persons," 133.
32. Dilthey, "Das Verstehen anderer Personen," 217; "The Understanding of Other Persons," 136. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutik,* 2d ed., rev. and enl., ed. Heinz Kimmerle, Abhandlungen der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 2 (Heidelberg, 1974 [orig. 1805–33]), 83; *Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts,* ed. Heinz Kimmerle, trans. James Duke and Jack Forstman (Missoula, Montana, 1977), 112. On the psychologically-based "divinatory" method of interpretation, Schleiermacher says, "By leading the interpreter to transform himself, so to speak, into the author, the divinatory method seeks to gain an immediate comprehension of the author as an individual" (*Hermeneutik,* 105; *Hermeneutics,* 150; see also *The Hermeneutics Reader,* ed. Kurt Mueller-Vollmer [New York, 1985], 96). See also Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies,* 329. Schleiermacher's idea of coming to know an author better than he knew himself may stem from August and Friedrich Schlegel, who expressed a similar view in their *Athanaeum,* vol. 1, part 2 (Berlin, 1798, 123; rpt. Stuttgart, 1960, 299), where they explain "In order to understand someone who only half understands himself, one must first understand him completely and better than he does himself, but then must also understand [him] only half and just as good as he does himself."
33. Kretzschmar, "Neue Anregungen," 75.
34. Kretzschmar, "Anregungen," 50–51.
35. Dilthey, "Die Einbildungskraft des Dichters: Bausteine für eine Poetik," *Gesammelte Schriften,* vol. 6 (Stuttgart, *B. G. Teubner,* 1924; 3d ed., 1958), 148; trans. Louis Agosta and Rudolf A. Makkreel as "The Imagination of the Poet: Elements for a Poetics," in *Poetry and Experience, Wilhelm Dilthey, Selected Works,* vol. 5 (Princeton, 1985), 77. As with the translation of Dilthey's *Einleitung* (see notes 24 and 30 above), the translations in *Poetry and Experience* are preceded by an excellent introductory essay (pp. 3–26).
36. Dilthey, "Die Einbildungskraft des Dichters," 194; "The Imagination of the Poet," 124.
37. Dilthey, "Die Drei Epochen der modernen Ästhetik und ihre heutige Aufgabe," *Gesammelte Schriften,* 6:275; trans. Michael Neville as "The Three Epochs of Modern Aesthetics and its Present Task," *Poetry and Experience,* 210. The historian Johann Gustav Droysen (1808–1884), important for his ideas on the relationship between 'understanding' and history, expresses a similar thought in *Grundriss der Historik* (Leipzig, 1867; 2nd ed. 1875), 9, § 9; *Outline of the Principles of History,* trans. E. Benjamin Andrews (New York, [orig. 1893]), 12–13: "The possibility of . . . understanding . . . depends on the fact that humankind's sensuous and spiritual nature expresses every inner process in forms apprehensible by the senses, [and] reflects inner processes in every ex-

pression. On being perceived, the utterance, by projecting itself into the interior of the perceiver, evokes the same inner process" (translation slightly adapted). William Outhwaite discusses Droysen's ideas and their significance for Dilthey in *Understanding Social Life: The Method Called "Verstehen"* (London, 1975), 21–23.

38. Dilthey, *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften, Gesammelte Schriften,* 7:85. See Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies* (Princeton, 1975), 295. Frithjof Rodi traces the evolution of Dilthey's idea of "structure" in "Dilthey's Concept of 'Structure' within the Context of Nineteenth-Century Science and Philosophy," in *Dilthey and Phenomenology,* ed. Rudolf A. Makkreel and John Scanlon, Current Continental Research, vol. 6 (Washington, D.C., 1987), 107–19.
39. Dilthey, *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt,* 169. Makkreel translates *Wirkungszusammenhang* as "dynamic system" in *Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies,* 314. Another Dilthey scholar, Hans Peter Rickman, renders *Wirkungszusammenhang* as "system of interactions," in *Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Writings,* ed. H. P. Rickman (London and New York, 1976), 30.
40. In our correspondence, Rudolf Makkreel wrote me (15 June 1990) that volume 4 of the series *Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Works* (projected for 1992) will include a translation of the philosopher's 1860 "Preisschrift," on hermeneutics ("Hermeneutics and the Rise of Historical Consciousness" ["Verhältnis der Hermeneutik Schleiermachers zur Geschichte der Auslegung in Philosophie und Theologie"]).
41. Kretzschmar, "Neue Anregungen", 80.
42. Dilthey, "Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik," *Gesammelte Schriften,* 5:319, 320. There are two translations of Dilthey's essay on hermeneutics: "The Rise of Hermeneutics," trans. Frederic Jameson, *New Literary History* 3 (1972): 233; and "The Development of Hermeneutics," trans. Hans Peter Rickman, *Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Writings,* 249.
43. Dilthey, "Entstehung," 330.
44. Kretzschmar, "Anregungen," 64. Also, p. 49: "According to the laws of addition . . . an entire composition can be explained as well."
45. Dilthey added these comments to the essay "Das Verstehen anderer Personen," in a section entitled "Das musikalische Verstehen," *Gesammelte Schriften,* 7:221; "Musical Understanding," appended to "The Understanding of Other Persons," *Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding,* 139.
46. Dilthey, "Das musikalische Verstehen," 222; "Musical Understanding," 140.
47. Adolf Nowak discusses the relationship between Kretzschmar's and Dilthey's ideas in "Dilthey und die musikalische Hermeneutik," *Beiträge zur musikalischen Hermeneutik,* 11–32.
48. Dilthey, "Das musikalische Verstehen," 221; "Musical Understanding, 139.
49. August Halm, *Von zwei Kulturen der Musik,* 3d ed. (Stuttgart, 1947), 31 (my translation). *Von zwei Kulturen* was originally published in 1913 by Georg Müller (Munich).
50. Halm, "Humor und Musik," *Von Grenzen und Ländern der Musik* (Munich, 1916), 111–12; "Unsere Zeit und Beethoven," *Die Rheinlande* 11 (1911): 60, rpt. in *Von Form und Sinn der Musik,* ed. Siegfried Schmalzriedt (Wiesbaden, 1978), 153 (my translations).

51. Halm, "Musikalische Bildung," in *Wickersdorfer Jahrbuch II (1909/10)* (Jena, 1911), 63, rpt. in *Von Form und Sinn,* 220. *Von zwei Kulturen,* 50 (my translations).
52. Halm, *Einführung in die Musik* (Berlin, 1926; rpt. Darmstadt, 1966), 139 (my translation).
53. Halm's analysis of the "Waldstein" was first published in the essay "Musikalische Bildung," 50–53, in *Von Form und Sinn,* 212–14. Halm expanded on the analysis in *Von zwei Kulturen,* 107–10.
54. The analytical points in this paragraph are my own, made in the spirit of Halm's analysis. After commenting on measures 1–20, he discusses the recapitulation up to measure 174.
55. Hanslick, *The Beautiful in Music,* 82; *On the Musically Beautiful,* 36. Dilthey agrees with Hanslick and Halm on the error of program music: "Program music is the death of true instrumental music" ("Das musikalische Verstehen," 224; "Musical Understanding," 142).
56. Dilthey discussed "grammatical" and "psychological" (also called "technical") interpretation in the aforementioned 1900 essay "Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik," 331 (Jameson trans., 244; Rickman trans., 259). Dilthey adopted the notions of grammatical and psychological interpretation from Schleiermacher, who discussed them in variously dated manuscripts (1805, 1809–10, 1819): *Hermeneutik,* 86–103 (grammatical), 147–51, 113–20 (technical, psychological); *Hermeneutics,* 117–47 (grammatical), 147–51, 161–73 (technical, psychological). Already in the aphorisms of 1805/1809–10, Schleiermacher distinguished between the two types of interpretation by saying, "Strictly speaking, grammatical interpretation is the objective side, technical, the subjective (*Hermeneutik,* 31; *Hermeneutics,* 42). He contrasted "grammatical" with "technical" to stress the art and special talent required for the latter kind of interpretation.
57. In a letter dated August 19, 1922, Halm told Schenker that he did not share the latter's enthusiasm for the *Urlinie,* as revealed in an analysis of Schubert's song "Ihr Bild" (*Tonwille* 1 [1921]: 46–49). Hellmut Federhofer mentions Halm's letter in *Heinrich Schenker, nach Tagebüchern und Briefen in der Oswald Jonas Memorial Collection, University of California, Riverside,* Studien zur Musikwissenschaft, vol. 3 (Hildesheim and New York, 1985), 145. In another letter (Nov. 6–10, 1923), defending Bruckner, Halm declared "In the case that Bruckner does not possess the *Urlinie,* I would still leave open the question whether that is a fault, i.e., a deficiency in his music, or whether it is the necessary corollary of his compositional procedures—to which I hold now as before" (my translation). Several years later, in *Einführung in die Musik,* 75, Halm reiterated his defense of Bruckner: "If Schenker evaluates the music of Anton Bruckner lower because it lacks the *Urlinie* and synthesis, I counter that, if it were correct that Bruckner does not have an *Urlinie* (I do not know), then for me it would prove its dispensability, and with no less certainty than that with which I conclude from Schenker's studies that non-Geniuses also have the *Urlinie*" (my translation).