


The Tor Censorship Arms Race: The Next Chapter






- Online Anonymity
 - Open Source
 - Open Network
- Community of researchers, developers, users and relay operators.
- U.S. 501(c)(3) non-profit organization


A photograph showing the interior of a large stadium or arena. The seating consists of numerous rows of blue plastic chairs arranged in a semi-circular pattern, facing towards the center. The stadium is completely empty, with no spectators or staff visible.

Estimated 2,000,000 to 8,000,000
daily Tor users

Threat model: what can the attacker do?



Anonymity isn't encryption: Encryption just protects contents.



Metadata

Data about data

“Metadata was traditionally in the card catalogs of libraries”

— Wikipedia



“We kill people based on metadata”

Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.


Anonymity



“It's privacy!”


Private citizens

Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.




Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.


“It's traffic-analysis resistance!”



Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.



EFF How Tor Works: 2



Alice



Step 2: Alice's Tor client picks a random path to destination server. **Green links** are encrypted, **red links** are in the clear.




Jane



Bob



Dave





New to Tor Browser?
Let's get started.

Tor Browser 8.5.4

[View Changelog](#)

Explore. Privately.

You're ready for the world's most private browsing experience.



Search with DuckDuckGo






Keep Tor strong. [Donate Now »](#)

Questions? [Check our Tor Browser Manual »](#)

✉️ Get the latest news from Tor straight to your inbox. [Sign up for Tor News. »](#)


The Tor Project is a US 501(c)(3) non-profit organization advancing human rights and freedoms by creating and deploying free and open source anonymity and privacy technologies, supporting their unrestricted availability and use, and furthering their scientific and popular understanding. [Get Involved. »](#)





Total relay bandwidth

Advertised bandwidth Bandwidth history



The Tor Project - <https://metrics.torproject.org/>

Tor's safety comes from diversity

- #1: Diversity of relays. The more relays we have and the more diverse they are, the fewer attackers are in a position to do traffic confirmation. (Research problem: measuring diversity over time)
- #2: Diversity of users and reasons to use it. 50000 users in Iran means almost all of them are normal citizens.

Transparency for Tor is key

- Open source / free software
- Public design documents and specifications
- Publicly identified developers
- Not a contradiction:
privacy is about choice!

Tor censorship epochs

- Background / Phase 1 (2006-2011):
Bridges, pluggable transports
- Phase 2 (2011-2019):
Active probing, obfsproxy, domain fronting, many more countries
- Phase 3 (2019-?):
Snowflake, obfs4, decoy routing, ...


Relay versus Discovery

There are two pieces to all these “proxying” schemes:

a **relay** component: building circuits, sending traffic over them, getting the crypto right

a **discovery** component: learning what relays are available

The basic Tor design uses a simple centralized directory protocol.



Early blocking

- 2006: Thailand blocks our website by DNS
- 2007: Iran/Saudi Arabia/others use websense/smartfilter to block Tor's http directory fetches.

The fix: put everything inside TLS.

خطر!



تصفح بأمان!

عذرا، هذا الموقع غير متاح في دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة.

تشكل شبكة الانترنت وسيلة للتواصل والمعرفة وخدمة متطورة
حياتنا اليومية، وقد تم حجب الموقع الذي ترغب بدخوله لاشتماله
محتوى مدرج تحت "فلاش المحتويات المحظوظة"حسب تصنيف
السياسة التنظيمية لدارة تنظيم الاتصالات "هيئة تنظيم الاتصالات"
بدولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة.

إذا كانت لديك وجهة نظر مختلفة، الرجاء اتفق هنا

Surf Safely!

This website is not accessible in the UAE.

The Internet is a powerful medium for communication, sharing and serving our daily learning needs. However, the site you are trying to access contains content that is prohibited under the ["Internet Access Management Regulatory Policy"](#) of the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of the United Arab Emirates

If you believe the website you are trying to access does not contain any such content, please [click here](#).

© 2009 Jamraas IT LLC.

Your request was denied because of its conte



ء على اللوائح والقوانين
مع

<http://torproject.org/>

يالله بالستر ...!



Surf Safe

This website is

The Internet is a p
serving our daily le
access contains co

غير متاح.

ي أن لا تُحجب

المملكة العربية
www.internet.gov.bh

تم حظر هذا الموقع بسبب احتواه على محتويات تتعارض مع قوانين السلطنة. عليه برجح تعليمة الاستئناف أدناه إذا كنت تعتقد بأن الموقع لا يضم أي من هذه المحتويات.

Notice...



تم حظر هذا الموقع بسبب احتواه على محتويات تتعارض مع قوانين السلطنة. عليه برجح تعليمة الاستئناف أدناه إذا كنت تعتقد بأن الموقع لا يضم أي من هذه المحتويات.

This site has been blocked due to content that is contrary to the laws of the Sultanate. If you believe that the website you are trying to access does not contain any such content, please fill in and submit the form below:

WebSite*	<input type="text" value="http://www.torproject.org/"/>
Email Address*	<input type="text"/>
Comments*	<input type="text"/>

إذا كنت تعتقد أن الموقع الذي تم حظره يجب تفضيله بالضغط [إليك](#) على الرابط التالي.

إذا كنت تعتقد أن الموقع الذي تم حظره يجب تفضيله بالضغط [إليك](#) على الرابط التالي.




Iran throttles SSL (June 2009)

- We made Tor's TLS handshake look like Firefox+Apache.
- So when Iran freaked out and throttled SSL bandwidth by DPI in summer 2009, they got Tor for free

Attackers can block users from connecting to the Tor network

- 1) By blocking the directory authorities
- 2) By blocking all the relay IP addresses in the directory, or the addresses of other Tor services
- 3) By filtering based on Tor's network fingerprint
- 4) By preventing users from finding the Tor software (usually by blocking website)



How do you find a bridge?

- 1) <https://bridges.torproject.org/> will tell you a few based on time and your IP address
- 2) Mail bridges@torproject.org from a gmail address and we'll send you a few
- 3) I mail some to a friend in Shanghai who distributes them via his social network
- 4) You can set up your own private bridge and tell your target users directly

Tor Network Settings



- Tor is censored in my country
- Select a built-in bridge [?](#)
- Request a bridge from torproject.org
- Provide a bridge I know

Enter bridge information from a trusted source.

type address:port (one per line)

- I use a proxy to connect to the Internet [?](#)
- This computer goes through a firewall that only allows connections to certain ports




New to Tor Browser?
Let's get started.

Tor Network Settings

 Tor is censored in my country Select a built-in bridge Request a bridge from torproject.org Pre-

Solve the CAPTCHA to request a bridge.

 I use This

Enter the characters from the image



Cancel

Submit

Keep Tor stro

Questions?



Get the la

For assistance, visit support.torproject.org/#connectingtotor

The Tor Project is a US 501(c)(3) non-profit organization advancing human rights and freedoms by creating and deploying free and open source anonymity and privacy technologies, supporting their unrestricted availability and use, and furthering their scientific and popular understanding. [Get Involved »](#)

Tor Browser 8.5.4

[View Changelog](#)

China (September 2009)


- China grabbed the list of public relays and blocked them
- They also enumerated+blocked one of the three bridge buckets (<https://bridges.torproject.org/>)
- But they missed the other bridge buckets.

Number of directory requests to directory mirror trusted



<https://torproject.org>

Chinese Tor users via bridges




China (March 2010)

- China enumerated the second of our three bridge buckets (the ones available at bridges@torproject.org via Gmail)
- We were down to the social network distribution strategy, and the private bridges

Iran (January 2011)


- Iran blocked Tor by DPI for SSL and filtering our Diffie-Hellman parameter.
- Socks proxy worked fine the whole time (the DPI didn't pick it up)
- DH p is a server-side parameter, so the relays and bridges had to upgrade, but not the clients

Directly connecting users from the Islamic Republic of Iran



The Tor Project - <https://metrics.torproject.org/>

Directly connecting users from Egypt




The Tor Project - <https://metrics.torproject.org/>

Iran (September 2011)

- This time, DPI for SSL and look at our TLS certificate lifetime.
- (Tor rotated its TLS certificates every 2 hours, because key rotation is good, right?)
- Now our certificates last for a year
- These are all low-hanging fruit. Kind of a weird arms race.

Directly connecting users from the Islamic Republic of Iran



The Tor Project - <https://metrics.torproject.org/>

A large crowd of people stands in a field under a cloudy sky. In the foreground, a man's face is partially visible on the left side of the frame.

**MESS WITH ONE OF US.
MESS WITH ALL OF US.**

Supporting totalitarian regimes is our business.
Sleep safe Assad, Blue Coat is here.



Blue ★ Coat



Tunisia (October 2011)

- First country to announce officially that they censor
- Using Smartfilter
- Outsourced to a foreign corporation
- And Tunisia got a discount!

Pluggable transports



The two currently successful PTs

- obfsproxy (2012): add a layer of encryption on top so there are no recognizable headers.
- meek (2014): “domain fronting” via Google, Azure, Amazon


Tor censorship epochs

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Bridges, pluggable transports
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Active probing, obfsproxy, domain fronting, many more countries
- Phase 3 (2019-?):
Snowflake, obfs4, decoy routing, ...

China (October 2011)

- Started its active probing campaign by DPIing on Tor's TLS handshake, and later on obfs2 and obfs3
- Spoofed IP addresses from inside China
- The fix: obfs4 requires the client to prove knowledge of a secret, else it won't admit to being an obfs4 bridge.

Directly connecting users from Ethiopia




The Tor Project - <https://metrics.torproject.org/>

China (March 2015)


- “Great Cannon” targets github
- Greatfire declaring war, “you can’t block us”
- Huge difference from previous “let them save face” approach

Directly connecting users from Russia




The Tor Project - <https://metrics.torproject.org/>

Directly connecting users from Turkey



The Tor Project - <https://metrics.torproject.org/>

Directly connecting users from Venezuela



The Tor Project - <https://metrics.torproject.org/>

China (pre 2018)

- China also shifted to blackholing the entire IP address (not just the offending port).
- Any old probers are enough to get bridges blocked (0.2.9, ORPort, etc)

China (mid 2018)

- Lantern uses obfs4 proxies for its own circumvention tool
- After a while, the proxies they give their users don't work so well.
 - ^ another example of tough feedback loop

China (mid 2019)

- 0.3.2 Tor clients, talking to 0.3.5 Tor bridges, don't trigger active probing anymore.
- We guess it has to do with changes in advertised ciphersuites on the client side.

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 Technology Intelligence

Dozens of US spies killed after Iran and China uncovered CIA messaging service using Google



I CAN HAZ
FREEDOM?



TorProject.org







Tor censorship epochs

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- ~~Phase 2 (2011-2019):
Active probing, obfsproxy, domain
fronting, many more countries~~
- ~~Phase 3 (2019-?):
Snowflake, obfs4, decoy routing, ...~~

New pluggable transport: Snowflake







What do the icons mean?

Working: if your status is light blue or dark blue, your proxy is running.



A plain pink cupcake means the proxy is running but no one is using it right now.



A happy cupcake means someone is using your proxy right now. Neat!

Not working: if your status is grey or black, there was a problem and your proxy is not running. Usually this is due to internet connection problems or firewall settings.



A sad grey cupcake means that the badge has disabled itself. Try restarting your browser.

Streamlined obfs4 deployment

- <https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/bridge>
- The future: “apt install tor-servers” ?


BridgeDB needs a feedback cycle

- Measure how much use each bridge sees
- Measure bridge blocking
- Then adapt bridge distribution to favor efficient distribution channels
- Need to invent new distribution channels, eg Salmon from PETs 2015

Measuring bridge reachability

- Passive: bridges track incoming connections by country; clients self-report blockage (via some other bridge)
- Active: scan bridges from within the country; or measure remotely via indirect scanning
- Bridges test for duplex blocking

ooni.torproject.org



explorer.ooni.torproject.org



OONI Explorer


World

Explorer

Highlights

About

World Map



Other upcoming designs


- FTE/Marionette: transform traffic payloads according to a regexp or a state machine
- Decoy routing: run a tap at an ISP, look for steganographic tags, inject responses from the middle

Arms races


- Censorship arms race is bad
- Surveillance arms race is worse
 - And centralization of the Internet makes it worse still

How can you help?

- Run an obfs4 bridge, be a Snowflake
- Teach your friends about Tor, and privacy in general
- Help find – and fix – bugs
- Work on open research problems (petsymposium.org)
- donate.torproject.org



TOR'S BUG SMASH FUND
donate.torproject.org







Tor

We believe everyone should have private access to the open web.

MISSION

The Tor Project, Inc., is a 501(C)(3) organization headquartered in Seattle with paid staff and contractors, and operational around 15 engineers and many volunteers supporting people. We develop free software, protect privacy and freedom online, protecting people all over the world. Tor develops free and open source software for privacy and freedom online, protecting people from tracking, surveillance, censorship and oppression. The Tor Project's mission is to advance human rights and freedoms by creating and deploying free and open source and privacy and privacy technologies and support that further restricted availability and use, and understanding.

THE TOR NETWORK

The Tor network is a decentralized network of volunteer run servers around the world. Before reaching the website you're visiting, your traffic is encrypted three times as it passes over these servers.

HOW TOR WORKS

Alice encrypts her web page request to Bob. It is the first relay. The first relay removes the first encryption layer but the web page request goes to Bob. The second relay removes another encryption layer and forwards the web page request. The third relay removes the last encryption layer and forwards the web page request to Bob. Alice doesn't know that it comes from Bob because she doesn't know that the web page request came from Alice, unless she tells him so.