

Born Under a Lucky Star: Financial Aid, College Completion, Labor Supply, and Credit Constraints

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Abstract

Financial aid can affect both college enrollment and graduation. The effects on graduation can be driven either by students induced to enroll by financial aid, students who would have enrolled anyway but graduate as a result of the financial aid, or both. This paper isolates the effect of financial aid on the second group by examining a change in financial aid that did not change enrollment. I study a change in the amount of federal financial aid available to financially independent students using regression discontinuity. I find that additional financial aid causes some university seniors to graduate one year earlier.

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1 Introduction

Students who complete college have substantially higher wages than those who do not ([Oreopoulos and Petronijevic, 2013](#); [Ost, Pan and Webber, 2016](#)). In spite of large economic returns, many students fail to complete college due to tuition. Financial aid, therefore, has the potential to increase college completion by reducing the tuition students pay for college.

Financial aid may increase college completion along two enrollment margins. First, financial aid may induce new students to enroll in college, some of whom go on to complete college. This channel increases college completion by increasing initial enrollment. I will call this channel the extensive margin of college enrollment and will refer to these students as marginal students. Second, financial aid may increase the graduation rate among students whose initial enrollment was not affected by financial aid. Students along this margin would enroll but ultimately fail to complete college absent the financial aid. I will call this channel the intensive margin of college enrollment and will refer to these students as inframarginal students.¹

Most studies that consider the effect of financial aid on graduation estimate the combined intensive and extensive margin effects of financial aid on completion ([Dynarski, 2003](#); [Scott-Clayton, 2011](#); [Cohodes and Goodman, 2014](#); [Castleman and Long, 2016](#)). As an example, [Castleman and Long \(2016\)](#) examine a Florida need-based grant. They show that grant eligibility increased the probability of graduation within 7 years by 5.2 percentage points. However, they also show evidence that initial enrollment changed. Hence, the 5.2 percentage point increase in graduation represents a combination of the effects of aid eligibility on marginal and inframarginal students.

And yet this distinction between extensive and intensive margins is important for policy. In the extreme, the estimated graduation gains from financial aid could come entirely

¹I refer to these students as inframarginal because their initial enrollment decisions are not affected by financial aid.

from inframarginal students while students induced to enroll all fail to graduate. Hence, the benefits to inframarginal students must be weighed against potential costs to marginal students who enroll but do not graduate. Further, understanding the effect of financial aid on the intensive margin is important for policies targeting college completion.

This paper provides evidence of the effect of an increase in financial aid for student on the intensive margin by considering already-enrolled students. For these students, I show that enrollment was not affected by financial aid. Since these students' enrollment decisions were unchanged, I can estimate the effect of financial aid for inframarginal students.

I examine additional financial aid for students who are declared financially independent from their parents. Students typically must report their parents' income and assets to determine eligibility for need-based financial aid. However, if students are declared financially independent, parents' income and assets are not included in the eligibility calculation which increases aid eligibility. All students who are 24 years old before January 1 are considered financially independent for the entire school year whereas students who turn 24 on or after January 1 are typically classified as dependent.² Thus, a student who turns 24 on December 31 will receive more financial aid than a student born on January 1. This age cutoff increases grants and loans by approximately \$900 and \$500 respectively. I use a regression discontinuity design to compare students just-declared independent to students who just miss the age cutoff. I combine this policy variation with administrative enrollment, financial aid, and graduation records from all public universities in Texas linked to administrative earnings records.

I find that additional financial aid of approximately \$1,450 induces a 1.8 percentage point increase in the probability that college seniors graduate a year earlier. I also find that the additional aid induces some sophomores and juniors to return to college rather than dropping out. The acceleration in graduation seems to work by giving students the

²18.6 percent of students who are 23 to 24 years old are financially independent, author's calculations 2011-12 National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey ([National Center for Education Statistics, 2012](#))

money and time to enroll in more courses. Students who receive more aid take heavier course loads without lowering their GPA and are less likely to face binding credit constraints. I also present suggestive evidence that additional aid causes students to work less.

The results are robust to varying the bandwidth used to estimate the discontinuity and excluding students born three days before or after January 1. Changes in credits attempted and other academic outcomes do not vary at the same cutoff for students who turn 21, 22, or 23, where there is no change in financial aid.

The findings of this paper can inform financial aid policy as well as decisions about the definition of financial independence. Financial aid decreases time to graduation. Since most postsecondary institutions are publicly subsidized, reducing time-to-degree represents potential cost savings for taxpayers and should be accounted for in estimating the fiscal cost of increased financial aid. Moreover, the additional financial aid arising from financial independence is poorly targeted. The largest increases in aid go to the students with wealthier parents. However, wealthier students' graduation is least affected by the aid. This result suggests that targeting resources to poorer students would improve graduation rates at no cost.³ Further, this study complements the existing literature by demonstrating that some graduation gains from financial aid come from inframarginal students. This highlights the need to consider the effects of financial aid for both marginal and inframarginal students.

This paper lies at the intersection of three trends in higher education in the United States. The first is a substantial increase in the price students pay for college, making tuition costs an increasingly imposing barrier to graduation.⁴ Second, while college enrollment rates have grown since 1970, college completion rates have declined and time to

³Targeting can also have costs that are disproportionately born by poorer students (?). However, ? demonstrate that dramatically reducing the amount of information collected for the purpose of targeting would retain the ability to target low-income students.

⁴Since 1982, the average amount for total tuition, fees, and room and board has increased by over 350 percent after adjusting for inflation ([National Center for Education Statistics, 2013](#)).

degree has increased ([Bound, Lovenheim and Turner, 2010, 2012](#)). Last, student employment has increased over this same time frame.⁵ While these trends would appear to be related, there is a paucity of evidence that causally ties them together. The results from this paper suggest that some of the growth in time to degree and student labor supply is likely a result of tuition increases.

The rest of the paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 will describe the relevant literature. Section 3 will discuss the institutional details of financial independence. Section 4 will introduce the data used, and Section 5 will discuss how the effect of financial aid on already-enrolled students is identified. Section 6 will present the results of estimation and Section 7 will conclude.

2 Literature Review

Several papers measure the combined extensive and intensive margin effects of financial aid on graduation.⁶ However, the effect of financial aid for inframarginal students has received far less attention. There are a few notable exceptions. [Goldrick-Rab et al. \(2016\)](#) examine the effect of privately financed aid for freshman in Wisconsin and find that additional financial aid increased persistence and graduation within four years.⁷ [Barr \(2016\)](#) studies veteran students enrolled at the time of the expansion of education benefits for veterans and finds increased persistence. [Murphy and Wyness \(2016\)](#) consider financial aid in the United Kingdom that did not affect initial enrollment and find that additional

⁵The rise in student work has been examined in [Scott-Clayton \(2012\)](#), and the author concludes that different factors have driven the growth at different times.

⁶Some papers have considered merit aid which gives awards based on academic achievement ([Dynarski, 2003, 2008](#); [Scott-Clayton, 2011](#); [Cohodes and Goodman, 2014](#); [Scott-Clayton and Zafar, 2016](#); [Sjoquist and Winters, 2012](#)). Other programs have considered need-based aid that uses financial need as the criteria for assigning aid. ([Castleman and Long, 2016](#)) And yet still other programs have elements of both need and merit-based aid ([Angrist et al., 2014](#); [Bettinger et al., 2016](#)). The current paper considers need based aid. Most papers have found positive effects on graduation but some have found negative effects ([Cohodes and Goodman, 2014](#)).

⁷[Anderson and Goldrick-Rab \(2016\)](#) find that additional aid at community colleges did not help enrolled students persist or graduate.

financial aid increases the chances of earning a “good” degree.⁸ Relative to these studies, the current paper has several advantages. This paper considers the effect of financial aid on inframarginal students in the U.S. federal financial aid system. I study the primary source of financial aid for students in the United States whereas the other studies mentioned consider privately financed aid, aid only available to veterans, or aid in the United Kingdom. Further, I use administrative data with detailed records on grant receipt, loan take up, credits attempted, GPA, graduation, and earnings.⁹

This paper focuses on older students. The change in financial aid studied in this paper affects older students, who are sometimes called “nontraditional” students. However, these students are more common than this label might suggest. In 2011-12, 51.3 percent of all undergraduate students were classified as financially independent and 43.8 percent were 24 years or older ([U.S. Department of Education, 2013a](#)). Financially independent students feature prominently among federal aid recipients and made up nearly 60 percent of Pell Grant recipients in 2010–11 ([U.S. Department of Education, 2013b](#)).¹⁰ Older students represent an increasing share of college students. In 1970, students 25 and older constituted 27.7 percent of all undergraduate enrollment, and by 2010 they accounted for 42.6 percent ([National Center for Education Statistics, 2013](#)).

Despite their growing prominence in enrollment and financial aid receipt, the response of older students to financial aid has rarely been studied. Notably, the effect of financial independence on educational outcomes has previously been studied in [Seftor](#)

⁸College dropout is uncommon in the United Kingdom. Instead, degrees have final grades indicating a student’s performance. [Murphy and Wyness \(2016\)](#) examine the probability of receiving a First Class or Upper Second Class degree which are colloquially known as “good degrees”.

⁹[Bettinger \(2004\)](#) examines the effect of Pell Grants conditional on enrollment but the results are sensitive to specification. Additionally, [Bettinger \(2015\)](#) discusses the effect of financial aid on enrolled students by making assumptions about the behavior of marginal versus inframarginal students. [Garibaldi et al. \(2012\)](#) examine Bocconi University in Italy, which is notably a different setting from public universities in the United States or, specifically, Texas. Moreover, the policies are different, as [Garibaldi et al. \(2012\)](#) examine anticipated discontinuities in tuition and the present study examines changes in financial aid that are likely to be unanticipated. The differences in these settings may lead to different graduation responses to college price.

¹⁰[Barr \(2015\)](#) also examines nontraditional students by studying the Post 9/11 GI Bill and finds that additional aid increases enrollment.

and Turner (2002). They use the Current Population Survey (CPS) and find that the additional financial aid arising from financial independence increases student enrollment. Seftor and Turner (2002) use a differences-in-differences framework to examine the impact of a 1986 policy change that changed the age at which students were classified as independent. They use a single policy change which requires assumptions that outcomes would have followed parallel trends and no other contemporaneous shock was experienced. The differences-in-differences estimator used by Seftor and Turner (2002) compares students across cohorts within age bins.¹¹ My paper uses a regression discontinuity which performs a different comparison. Namely, I use students born just after January 1 as a counterfactual for students born just before. This approach allows a comparison of very similar students within cohort and school and generates tests of the identifying assumptions. Also, Seftor and Turner (2002) cannot estimate the effects of aid on student performance or graduation due to the limitations of the CPS. The current paper builds on Seftor and Turner (2002) by using student-level administrative data for recent cohorts and considers new outcomes including GPA, credits attempted, graduation, and earnings.¹² I also document the heterogeneous effects of financial aid by family resources.

3 Background

The U.S. federal government has several financial programs that are designed to help students pay for college. A host of factors determine students' eligibility for these programs, including income, assets, and family structure. A primary consideration is whether parent's income and assets are considered—that is, whether students are financially independent. The distinction between dependent and independent students does not need to reflect actual financial dependence but rather deals with statutes governing the amount of

¹¹Alternatively, the comparison is across ages within cohorts.

¹²Seftor and Turner (2002) examine the effect on students aged 21 to 23, where the present study focuses on students aged 23 and 24.

financial aid disbursed. There are two broad categories of federal aid that are affected by financial independence. The first set of programs is administered by the U.S. Department of Education, which I will refer to as “federal financial aid.” The second set of programs is a part of the U.S. tax code, which I will refer to as “tax aid” which I discuss in Appendix A.1 .

Federal financial aid consists of federal grants, student loans, and work study. In order to be eligible for federal need-based financial aid, students must file a Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). The FAFSA asks for information about income, assets, and demographics which is then fed into a complex formula to compute eligibility for need-based federal financial aid programs. In general, federal financial aid awards are calculated yearly.¹³

If students are considered financially dependent, they must include their parents’ information on their FAFSA . Undergraduate students may be classified as financially independent for several reasons, including being over 24 years old before January 1, being married, having dependent children, or a few other reasons.¹⁴ All else being equal, independent students generally qualify for larger amounts of need-based financial aid (both grants and subsidized loans) than dependent students. Independent students are eligible for higher annual (and aggregate) federal loan limits.

Independent status based on age is determined once a year. Students who are turn 24 years old before January 1 will be independent for the entire school year. Students turning 24 on or after January 1 who meet the other conditions for dependent status will be declared dependent for the entire year. This rule leads to students who are are very similar in age (and other characteristics) having different eligibility for financial aid. This institutional oddity will be leveraged to examine the effect of additional financial aid arising from financial independence.

¹³If a life event occurs that would change a student’s Expected Family Contribution (EFC), students can amend their FAFSA to reflect the new information and possibly change their eligibility for need based aid.

¹⁴See <http://studentaid.ed.gov/fafsa/filling-out/dependency> for all conditions that determine independent status.

4 Data

The primary data for this project come from the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB) and contain the universe of students who were enrolled in public universities in the state of Texas from 2002–2003 to 2013–2014. The data contain student demographic information including race, gender, and birth date. They also contain records on student enrollment, credits attempted, and graduation. Importantly, the data include information on financial aid disbursed by the university.¹⁵ Some fields from the FAFSA are available, including Expected Family Contribution (EFC). Data from the Texas Workforce Commission’s (TWC) Unemployment Insurance system are linked to individual student records and contain quarterly earnings.¹⁶

Student outcome variables will be defined by academic year. For instance, graduation in the “current year” means graduation in the year that a student turns 24. Graduation by the “next year” means graduation by the next academic year (the year a student turns 25). Quarterly earnings are aggregated into yearly earnings and correspond to the school year. To be explicit, yearly earnings are defined as quarter 4 in year $t - 1$ and quarters 1, 2, and 3 in year t .

I adjust all financial aid and earnings data to be in constant 2013 dollars for comparability. Importantly for this study, students employed by universities are not included in reporting for the Unemployment Insurance system. However, the financial aid data include total Federal work-study compensation, which is added to the UI earnings data. I discuss the implications of the unavailability of non-work-study earnings at colleges in Section 6 and in Appendix A.4. I winsorize the wages at the ninety-ninth percentile to avoid issues with outliers.

¹⁵The financial aid data has broadening coverage over time. From 2003 to 2006 the data include financial aid for students who received any need-based aid, from 2007 to 2009 they include financial aid for all students who filed a FAFSA, and from 2010 to present they also include financial aid for students who received only merit-based or performance based aid.

¹⁶The unemployment insurance records only include employers who pay at least \$1,500 in gross wages to employees in a quarter. Alternatively employers are included if the employer has at least one employee during 20 different weeks in a calendar year, regardless of the wages.

The primary sample consists of seniors who were enrolled at a public university in Texas in the year they turned 24. This sample restriction would bias the results if students change their enrollment due financial independence. In Section 5, I check for this issue and find that students do not change their enrollment in the year they turn 24 due to financial independence. The sample is also restricted to seniors because students with different classifications have different expected graduation dates. The restriction to seniors keeps 71.5 percent of students turning 24.¹⁷ Section 6.1 considers freshman, sophomores, and juniors separately.

Table 1 contains summary statistics for university seniors. University seniors receive a substantial amount of financial aid, receiving over \$2,100 in grants and taking out over \$4,100 in loans. Graduation is relatively common for these students, as 44 percent of seniors who turn 24 graduate in that year and 70 percent graduate by the end of the following year. Also, 30 percent of students received a Pell Grant in the previous year, and students attempted an average of 22 credits hours within the current year.

I focus on university students in this paper because they see much larger changes in financial aid resulting from financial independence than do community college students. This is possibly because community college students file the FAFSA at lower rates than university students. Results for community college students find no effect on persistence, graduation, GPA, or earnings in college.¹⁸

¹⁷The restriction to seniors is akin to the standard practice of examining rising freshman. It ensures that the outcomes considered have a similar meaning. For example graduation within one year is a relevant outcome for seniors but is not for freshman. Moreover, since over 70 percent of students turning 24 in a school year are seniors it is the most natural group of students to examine. However, examining all students yields similar results. The effects on graduation are attenuated, as expected, but still are marginally statistically significant. These results can be obtained from the author upon request.

¹⁸These results are not presented but are available upon request. Detecting economically meaningful changes in outcomes for community college students is difficult due to the relatively small change in financial aid arising from financial independence.

5 Identification

I leverage the discrete change in the probability of being financially independent arising due to the January 1 cutoff to examine the effect of additional financial aid in a regression discontinuity framework. The outcomes considered include reenrollment, graduation, credits attempted, financial aid, any employment, and annual earnings.

The basic intuition is to compare otherwise similar students, who differ in whether they are classified as financially independent. Specifically, it is to compare students born just before January 1 to students just after January 1 in the year they turn 24. In order to accomplish this the estimating equation is:

$$Y_i = \theta \cdot 1(\widehat{age}_i > 0) + \gamma \cdot \widehat{age}_i + \eta \cdot \widehat{age}_i \cdot 1(\widehat{age}_i > 0) + X_i\beta + \mu_t + \epsilon_{it}, \text{ for } |\widehat{age}_i| < j, \quad (1)$$

where i indexes students and t indexes school year. Equation 1 is estimated using ordinary least squares. Y_i is a student outcome. \widehat{age}_i is the running variable and is a student's age in days. \widehat{age}_i is recentered so that a student who turns 24 on January 1 is 0.¹⁹ The running variable \widehat{age}_i is controlled for using a local linear approximation.²⁰ I allow the slope of the running variable to vary above and below the discontinuity. $1(\widehat{age}_i > 0)$ is an indicator for being 24 before January 1. θ is the parameter of interest and is the effect of the additional financial aid arising from students being declared financially independent because of their age.²¹ X_{it} contains indicators for race and gender and μ_t represents year fixed effects. Finally, ϵ_{it} is an idiosyncratic error term. Standard errors are clustered on \widehat{age} to account for correlation within date of birth. (Lee and Card, 2008).

This equation is estimated on a subset of the data to compare students who are similar ages. Specifically, restricting to students with $|\widehat{age}_i| < j$ means that students whose birthday falls within j days of January 1 are included in estimation. j is chosen using

¹⁹As an example, a student born on December 31 would have $\widehat{age}_i = 1$

²⁰This is equivalent to using estimating the relationship between Y_i and \widehat{age} nonparametrically using a rectangular kernel. (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008)

²¹Some students who are less than 24 will be independent for other reasons, as previously discussed.

the procedure outlined in [Imbens and Kalyanaraman \(2012\)](#) for local linear regression discontinuity frameworks though results are robust to the choice of bandwidth.²²

Assumptions for Identification

There are two assumptions that must be made for Equation 1 to yield unbiased estimates of the effect of age-based financial independence. First, students must not respond to additional financial aid in the year they turn 24 by changing their decision to enroll in that year. Second, birth date cannot be manipulated to gain access to treatment. If either differential enrollment or birth date manipulation occurs, this would appear as additional students who are 24 years old or older before January 1.

If students anticipate the additional financial aid available to independent students, they may change their enrollment or reenrollment. If enrollment is affected, then conditioning the sample on students who turn 24 will yield biased estimates that conflate the effect of additional financial aid on enrolled students and the change in sample composition arising from aid-induced enrollment.

Students do not appear to alter their enrollment decisions in the year they turn 24 based on financial independence. I examine the re-enrollment probabilities of 23-year-old students in Figure 1 and Table 2. Because I focus on seniors, re-enrollment is how financial aid would affect enrollment. If financial independence altered enrollment decisions, it would appear as a discrete change in the re-enrollment probabilities of 23-year-old students at the January 1 cutoff. The estimated discontinuity in re-enrollment probability is 0.0027 with a standard error of 0.0038.²³ Figure 1 shows no apparent discontinuity in the probability of reenrollment for 23 year old students. This can also be seen in Figure 2, Panel B, in which there is no discontinuity in the density of students enrolling in the year they turn 24.

²²Tests for sensitivity to bandwidth will be presented in Section 6.

²³The robustness of this estimate to various bandwidths is checked later.

The lack of a response may be because the age rule governing independent status and the consequence of financial independence are not widely known. It may also be that older students do not change their reenrollment based on financial aid. Because there is no measured effect on reenrollment, I continue to condition the sample on enrollment in the year a student turns 24. This lack of an reenrollment effect allows an examination of the effect of financial aid for inframarginal students.

A second assumption for identification is that birth date is not manipulated to gain access to the financial independence. Obviously, a student's true birth date is not manipulable by the student. Students do have incentives to misreport their birth date to gain additional aid, but the reported birth date is verified by comparison with Social Security Administration records. Students cannot manipulate their birth date, but parents may manipulate their child's birth date. There is evidence that birth dates are manipulated around January 1 by parents in response to tax incentives ([LaLumia, Sallee and Turner, 2015](#); [Schulkind and Shapiro, 2014](#)). This issue is discussed in Appendix Section [A.2](#) and found to likely affect only a very small number of students born within a few days of January 1.

To avoid any issues associated with potential retiming of births, the preferred specification will be a regression discontinuity "donut" estimator ([Almond and Doyle, 2011](#)), in which the three days on either side of January 1 are omitted. The results are quantitatively and qualitatively very similar if three days before and after January 1 are included; these results are presented in Appendix Table [A2](#). A formal McCrary test, after excluding three days before and after January 1, yields a point estimate of -.015 with a standard error of .013. ([McCrary, 2008](#)) ²⁴

Section [A.3](#) in the Appendix and Table [A3](#) confirm that predetermined student characteristics do not change discontinuously at the threshold.

²⁴Including students within three days of January 1 yields an estimate of .054 with a standard error of .010. This discontinuity is seen in Figure [2](#) but is notably absent when excluding the three days before and after January 1.

The testable assumptions of the regression discontinuity estimator are satisfied because 1) there is no change in reenrollment probabilities for 23-year-olds, 2) students are unable to manipulate their date of birth, and 3) observed covariates do not vary discretely by eligibility status. Hence, the results can be interpreted as the causal impact of age-based financial independence on student outcomes for inframarginal students.

6 Results

Educational Outcomes

University students see substantial changes in financial aid arising from financial independence. This is documented in Figure 3 and Table 3. Students who are financially independent appear on the right of the figures and receive an additional \$966 in grant dollars, the bulk of which comes in the form of increased Pell Grants (\$806). They also take out an additional \$486 in loans. Between grants and loans, this represents a significant change to student finances totaling over \$1,452.

Interpreting the effect on loans requires an important caveat. The data do not contain private loans but do contain federal loans as well as state loans such as the College Access Loan (CAL Loan). Federal loans are by far the most common type of loan and typically offer better interest rates than private loans.²⁵ As a result, some of the increase in the amount of federal and state loans could be students switching from private loans to federal and state loans. If financial independence caused switching from private loans to federal and state loans, the estimated increase in loan aid would overstate the change in loan amounts. Because the increase in federal loans (\$864) is larger than the increase in both state and federal loans (\$485) federal loans do appear to crowd out state loans, but

²⁵Private student loans make up about 10 percent of student debt issued since 2009 ([College Board, 2015](#)). Federal loans also offer access to a variety of repayment plans generally unavailable in the private market. These repayment plans include income-based repayment, income-contingent repayment, graduated repayment, or extended repayment.

not completely.

This large change in financial aid allows an examination of whether student outcomes are affected by financial aid. The effect on student outcomes are presented in Figure 4 and Table 3. Financial independence increases student credit hours attempted by 0.39. In attempting more credits, students could see their GPA decrease if they do not change the time devoted to studying. However, despite the larger class load, student GPAs are unaffected, with an estimated discontinuity of 0.001 and a 95 percent confidence interval of -0.022 to 0.025.

Students are 1.8 percentage points more likely to graduate in the year they turn 24 (in the tables this is designated “Grad 4yr this year”) as a result of additional financial aid. This is seen in Figure 4 and in Table 3. This discontinuity is clearly visible in the figure and is statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level. There is an accompanying dip in the probability of enrolling in the next year, which provides evidence that financial aid caused some students to graduate and not enroll in the next year.

The increase in graduation caused by aid could either be permanent or transitory. Additional aid could cause students to graduate who otherwise would not or cause students to graduate earlier than they would have absent additional aid. To determine if the measured change in graduation is permanent or transitory, I consider graduation in either the year students turn 24 or the year afterward. The estimated coefficient (“Grad 4yr Next Year” in the table) is 0.002, which suggests that additional financial aid re-timed graduations rather than induced graduation among students who not have graduated.

There is a positive effect of additional aid on graduation but it is relatively small. The 1.8 percentage point increase represents a 4 percent increase in the graduation rate during the school year a student turns 24. The increase comes at a cost of \$966 in grants and \$485 in loans. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that loans originating in 2017 have a subsidy of 10.32% (?).²⁶ Using this subsidy rate for loans results in a cost of \$50.13 in

²⁶This estimate is imperfect because it applies the subsidy rate for all federal loans regardless of type, type of institution, classification of student, etc. Additionally, the estimated change in loans combines the

addition to the \$966 in grants. These estimates imply that it costs \$58,099 for one student to graduate one year earlier. College enrollees in the sample earn \$12,219, and students who graduate in the year they turn 24 earn \$26,923 in the year they turn 25. This means that graduating a year earlier corresponds to roughly a \$14,704 difference in earnings. On average, the benefits of an additional year in the labor market do not exceed the costs associated with graduating a year earlier. However, Section 6 documents heterogeneity in cost effectiveness for different levels of family income.

Mechanisms

I now investigate mechanisms for the increased credits attempted and reduced time to degree, including reduced time spent working during college and binding credit constraints.

Labor Supply During College

Despite the large number of students in the labor force and the large amount of federal financial aid available, very few studies have attempted to identify the effects of financial aid on student earnings. [Broton, Goldrick-Rab and Benson \(2016\)](#) use random assignment of a state need-based grant and find that students receiving financial aid report that they reduced hours worked by 14 percent. [Scott-Clayton \(2011\)](#) examines the effect of a merit scholarship in West Virginia that affected enrollment and finds that scholarships reduce earnings in some specifications but not in others.²⁷

subsidy on subsidized, unsubsidized, and state loans.

²⁷The sensitivity to specification in [Scott-Clayton \(2011\)](#) may be because the identification strategies measure different local average treatment effects or because there is a bias in one or both of the estimates arising from those strategies. Also, [Scott-Clayton and Park \(2015\)](#) use a regression discontinuity to examine the effect of replacing federal loans with the Pell grants for community college students and find that grants reduce earnings and increase full-time enrollment. However, there is a discontinuity in the density of the running variable, which suggests the results may be biased.

In related work, many studies have tried to quantify the effect of working on educational outcomes. The general finding has been that working in college decreases GPA ([Kalenkoski and Pabilonia, 2010](#); [Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2003](#)) and credits accumulated ([Darolia, 2014](#); [Triventi, 2014](#)). These studies motivate studying the effect of financial aid on labor supply. The financial aid-induced reductions in earn-

Additional financial aid may allow students to reduce time spent working. I explore whether additional aid affects earnings in Figure 5 and Table 3. Financially independent university students do not adjust the probability of positive earnings. The coefficient on whether students have positive earnings is -0.5 percentage points with a standard error of 0.5 percentage points. This rules out reasonably small reductions in the probability of positive earnings up to -1.5 percentage points. Despite no change in the probability of working, there is a significant change in earnings during college seen in Figure 5, Panel B. Students who are financially independent by age 24 see their earnings decrease by \$511.

Interpreting the change in earnings requires caution. In Table A4, I perform a placebo exercise where I use the same specifications except I examine students turning 21, 22, or 23 during the school year. For the 22 and 23 year old samples, there are discontinuities in earnings of \$162 and \$220 respectively that are significant at the 5% level. These two placebo exercises are the only two that are significant at the 5% level. 21-year-old students do not see reduced earnings at the threshold. Because this occurs for both 22 and 23-year-old students, these discontinuities are not likely to be the result of gaming eligibility to insure additional aid. Additionally, the effects on earnings are somewhat sensitive to the choice of bandwidth as can be seen in Figure 6, with smaller bandwidths yielding smaller, insignificant effects on earnings. Given the sensitivity to bandwidth and the issues in the placebo test, I interpret the evidence on earnings as being suggestive of earnings declines due to additional aid.²⁸

ings and accelerated graduation results in this paper are consistent with the aforementioned prior studies on the effects of employment on student outcomes.

²⁸Interpreting the estimates of the effect of additional financial aid on earnings requires additional caution, because earnings for students employed by the university they attend are not included in UI earnings records unless the student is employed as part of the federal work-study program. There is further discussion of on-campus employment in Appendix Section A.4, but if anything, the lack of on-campus, non-work-study earnings likely results in an underestimate of the effect of financial aid on earnings.

Credit Constraints

Financial aid may reduce time to degree because it eases binding credit constraints. This paper tests whether increased financial aid eases credit constraints. Many studies have attempted to identify whether binding credit constraints affect college enrollment and graduation. Early studies tended to find that credit constraints were not prevalent ([Cameron and Heckman, 1998](#); [Cameron and Taber, 2004](#); [Carneiro and Heckman, 2002](#); [Keane and Wolpin, 2001](#)). However, recent studies have shown borrowing constraints matter for educational investment ([Belley and Lochner, 2007](#); [Brown, Scholz and Seshadri, 2012](#); [Cowan, 2016](#); [Lovenheim, 2011](#); [Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2008](#)).

Independent students have access to higher yearly and aggregate federal student loan limits than do dependent students. This provides an opportunity to test for credit constraints among enrolled college students. Specifically, how does financial independence affect the number of students borrowing above the amount that would be allowed had they been born a few days later?

Figure 3 and Table 3 investigate this question. Panel C shows that there is a 15% increase in the number of students borrowing more federal loans than the dependent maximum. This suggests that 15% of students face binding credit constraints and financial independence eases their credit constraints by raising their borrowing limit. This estimate is similar in magnitude to [Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner \(2008\)](#).

There are three important caveats for the estimation of the number of students who are credit constrained—private loans, changes in grant aid, and behavioral factors. As previously discussed, federal loans that offer relatively attractive interest rates are the bulk of student loans. As a result, students are likely to exhaust their federal loan eligibility before turning to private loans. In the 2012 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS), 9.6 percent of students who reported taking out less than the statutory maximum of federal student loans reported having taken out private loans, which suggests that nearly all students will exhaust federal student loan eligibility before taking out

private loans.

Financial independence not only changes the maximum amount of loans students have access to but increases grants and eligibility for subsidized loans. To partially address this issue, I will examine students who had received a Pell Grant or a zero EFC in the previous year in the section on heterogeneity. These students see smaller (or no) changes in grants and subsidized loans, and as a result, they can inform what might happen if subsidized loans and grants were unchanged. Results are similar for students who see no changes in grant aid.

Loan take up has been shown to depend on the amount of the loan offer. Financial independence increases the default loan offer due to a higher yearly maximum for independent students. [Marx and Turner \(2016\)](#) use a randomized controlled trial and demonstrate that the default of packaging the maximum loan amount affects loan take up. The results from [Marx and Turner \(2016\)](#) suggest that behavioral factors complicate measuring credit constraints.

The measure of credit constraints employed in this paper is imperfect. However, borrowing more than the dependent maximum is a necessary condition for credit constraints. Using this measure, I find evidence that additional aid eases binding credit constraints.

Heterogeneity

I examine heterogeneity by a measure of parental income, which affects the size of the change in financial aid. In Table 4, separate discontinuities are estimated for three groups of students: 1) students who had a zero EFC when they were 23 years old, 2) students who received a Pell grant when they were 23 years old, and 3) students who did not receive a Pell Grant when they were 23 years old. These groups are examined separately because financial independence has heterogeneous impacts on financial aid depending on family income.

Students who previously received a zero EFC are examined in Column 1 of Table 4

and see no change in grants or subsidized loans. These are the neediest students in the sample, and so the exclusion of parental income and assets does not affect their eligibility for grants or subsidized loans. However, these students do increase borrowing by \$723. Despite only seeing an increase in student loans, age-induced financial independence causes 4 percent of students to speed up graduation by one year. The larger effects on graduation is somewhat surprising given the lack of a change in grants. However, the increased loans are likely to help these students most, as they are the neediest in the sample.

The second column examines students who received a Pell Grant when they were 23.²⁹ These students see a \$374 increase in grants, a \$727 increase in total loans due to financial independence. This aid causes 2.85 percent of students to graduate one year earlier, which is a larger point estimate than for the sample as a whole. These students also appear to be credit constrained at slightly higher rates to the sample as a whole.

The third column of Table 4 examines students who did not receive a Pell Grant when they were 23 years old. These students are wealthier, so excluding parental income induces larger changes in need-based financial aid. They see a \$1,232 increase in grants and a \$370 increase in loans. Despite a much larger change in grant aid, the effect on time to degree is smaller, with 1.3 percent reducing time to degree by one year though this is not statistically significant.

The heterogeneity analysis shows that the cost of reducing time to degree by one year varies by family income. For students who had previously received an EFC of zero, there is no direct cost from grants. Hence, the increase in loans for independent students reduces time to graduation. Essentially, this decreased time to degree (and increased time in the labor market) comes at cost of administering student loans. Using the subsidy rate for student loans of 10.32% implies a total subsidy of \$74.6 for students who previously received an EFC of 0 (?). Hence, reducing time to degree by one year for one student costs

²⁹Students with a zero EFC in the year they turned 23 are a subset of this sample.

\$1,883. This cost is significantly smaller than the difference in earnings for recent college graduates versus enrollees.

For students who had previously received a Pell Grant, an additional \$15,743 in grants and loan subsidies decreases time to degree by one year. This is very similar to how much more graduates earn as compared to students enrolled in college. For students who had previously received a Pell Grant, additional grant aid is likely to be efficient, because its cost is roughly equal to earnings gained from an additional year in the labor market. For students who had not previously received a Pell Grant, reducing time to degree by one year costs \$101,598 in grants and loan subsidies which is substantially more costly than the benefit of an additional year in the labor market.

Taken together, the results on heterogeneity by previous Pell receipt suggest a few things: Financial independence gives more resources to relatively wealthier students. Despite this, the reduced time to graduation seems to be larger for needier students. In fact, aid to students who qualified for the Pell Grant in the year they turned 23 is likely to be efficient, as the benefits to the students are less than or equal to the costs. These results on heterogeneity highlight the educational attainment benefits of targeting financial aid to the neediest students.

6.1 Other Classifications

The focus of this paper is on seniors turning 24 during an academic year. However, the same change in independent status occurs for students who are not seniors. These students are considered in Table 5. There are very few students turning 24 as freshman and the results presented are imprecise as a result.

There are more sophomores and juniors turning 24 which results in more precise estimates. In both cases, students are more likely to persist to the next year. Sophomores are 7.9 percentage points more likely to persist and juniors are 2.6 percentage points more likely to persist. Juniors also attempt .51 more credit hours. Student earnings are not

affected for freshman, sophomores, and juniors although the estimates are imprecise.

These students provide evidence that additional financial aid benefits students before their senior year. Although 24 year old students are a particular sample, this shows that financial aid affects older students who are not as far along in their schooling.

Robustness

Two additional robustness checks are performed to make sure the results are not spurious. First, Figure 6 checks the choice of bandwidth. Panel A considers graduation. Each of the dots represents an estimated discontinuity, along with 95 percent confidence intervals for different bandwidth choices. For graduation in the year students turn 24, the estimate is stable across bandwidths and is statistically different from zero starting with the bandwidth of 80 days.

For earnings, smaller bandwidths tend to deliver smaller estimates, but once the bandwidth includes 90 days the estimates are statistically different from zero. This figure shows that the effect on earnings is somewhat sensitive to the choice of bandwidth

Panel C shows that there are no bandwidths where the estimate for reenrollment among 23 year olds is statistically significant. The point estimates decline slightly with larger bandwidths, but overall, the majority of the evidence suggests that reenrollment (and thus selection into the estimating sample) was not affected.

Second, I use students turning 21, 22, and 23 as placebo exercises to see if student outcomes systematically vary at January 1. These results are presented in Table A4 and are discussed in Appendix Section A.5. If students anticipated the change in financial aid, there would likely be changes in student outcomes. However, student outcomes do not significantly differ at this same threshold for other ages with the exception of earnings as previously discussed.

7 Discussion and Conclusion

This paper links three trends in higher education: 1) higher tuition, 2) increasing time to degree, and 3) increased earnings in college. In particular, the price of college causally increases time to degree and I present suggestive evidence that it increases student labor supply. The effects of college price on inframarginal students are important because they affect many students and are implicitly included in every financial aid and tuition policy considered but are rarely directly measured.

Several policy lessons emerge from this paper. First, proposals to change tuition or financial aid should consider the implications for time to degree for inframarginal students. Second, the change in financial aid associated with financial independence is poorly targeted. The largest increases in aid go to students who come from the most affluent backgrounds. As a result, the benefits from the change in independence (namely one additional year in the labor market) do not outweigh the costs for the sample as a whole. However, for poorer students who see smaller changes in aid, the effects on time to degree are larger and likely efficient. For students who had previously had a zero EFC, time to degree is reduced simply by allowing additional borrowing of unsubsidized loans.

The heterogeneous effects of financial aid by family income underscore how targeting financial aid to needier students improves student outcomes relative to aid for wealthier students. This targeting could largely be accomplished through relatively little information on student background. (?) This insight is particularly important for evaluating policy that reduces tuition for all students.

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
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8 Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Re-enrollment of 23-year-olds




NOTE: This figure plots the fraction of 23-year-olds who re-enroll in the year they turn 24 by their recentered birth date. The horizontal axis is recentered age in days such that 0 is 24 years old on January 1. The data come from administrative records of the THECB and include the 2002–2003 to 2013–2014 school years.

Figure 2: Density of Birth Dates




NOTE: Panel A plots the number of students born on each day of the year, and Panel B replicates that plot but removes students born three days before or after January 1. The horizontal axis is recentered age in days such that a student who is 24 years old on January 1 is zero. The data come from administrative records of the THECB and include the 2002–2003 to 2013–2014 school years.

Figure 3: Four-Year Colleges, Financial Aid




NOTE: Panel A plots the average amount of grants received by students by their age as of January 1. Panel B plots the amount of loans taken out by the students and Panel C plots the fraction of students who borrow above the annual federal maximum for dependent students. The horizontal axis is recentered age in days such that a student who is 24 years old on January 1 is zero. Each dot represents the average for a group of ten birth dates. The size of the dot is proportional to the number of students for which the average is computed. The data are from administrative records of the THECB and include the 2002–2003 to 2013–2014 school years.

Figure 4: Four-Year Colleges, Educational Outcomes




NOTE: Panel A plots the number of credit hours attempted by student age as of January 1. Panel B plots the probability of graduating in the year a student turns 24 by birth date. Panel C plots the probability of reenrolling in the year after a student turns 24 by birth date. Panel D plots the probability of graduating by the year after a student turns 24 by birth date. The horizontal axis is recentered age in days such that a student who is 24 years old on January 1 is zero. Each dot represents the average for a group of ten birth dates. The size of the dot is proportional to the number of students for which the average is computed. The data are from administrative records of the THECB and include the 2002–2004 to 2013–2014 school years.

Figure 5: Four-Year Colleges, Earnings Outcomes



NOTE: Panel A plots the fraction of students with nonzero earnings in the year they turn 24 by their age as of January 1. Panel B plots earnings by birth date. The size of the dot is proportional to the number of students for which the average is computed. The horizontal axis is recentered age in days such that a student who is 24 years old on January 1 is zero. The data come from administrative records of the TWC and include the 2002–2003 to 2013–2014 school years.

Figure 6: Bandwidth Sensitivity, University Students



NOTE: Each dot is an estimated discontinuity for students who turn 24 on Jan 1. Each estimate is plotted with 95% confidence intervals. The horizontal axis shows the bandwidth used for each estimate. Panel A plots the effect of independence on graduation in the year students turn 24. Panel B plots the estimate of independence on earnings. Panel C plots the estimate of re-enrollment for 23 year old students. The data are from administrative records of the TWC and THECB and include the 2002–2003 to 2013–2014 school years.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.
Male	227,848	0.49	0.50
White	227,848	0.49	0.50
Black	227,848	0.10	0.30
Hispanic	227,848	0.30	0.46
Asian	227,848	0.05	0.21
Hours attempted	227,848	22.09	10.36
Enroll next year	227,848	0.46	0.50
Graduate current year	227,848	0.44	0.50
Graduate by next year	227,848	0.70	0.46
GPA	227,848	2.70	0.97
Borrow at unsub max	227,848	0.06	0.24
Borrow at sub max	227,848	0.12	0.32
Borrow more than unsub max	227,848	0.17	0.38
Total grants	227,848	2,168.59	3,125.50
Pell	227,848	1,449.67	2,111.72
Total loans	227,848	4,155.84	5,421.51
Received Pell last year	227,848	0.30	0.46
Earnings	227,848	12061.83	12424.1
Positive earnings	227,848	0.79	0.41

NOTE: Summary statistics for the sample of seniors at Texas public universities from 2002-2003 to 2013-2014 who are within 200 days of turning 24 on January 1. The data are from administrative records of the THECB and TWC and include the 2003–2004 to 2013–2014 school years. The reference year for variables is the school year a student turns 24. For instance, “Graduate by next year” refers to graduation by the school year a student turns 25. Earnings correspond to earnings for the academic year (Q4 in year t-1 and Q1,Q2, and Q3 in year t.)

Table 2: Reenrollment Probability of 23-Year-Old Students

	Re-Enroll 4yr
Discontinuity	0.0027 (0.0038)
Mean Ineligible	0.5
Observations	257,723

NOTE: This table presents estimates of the change in the probability of reenrolling in the next school year for students who turn 23 during the current school year. The discontinuity is for students whose birthday is January 1. Students born December 29 through January 3, are excluded as discussed in the text. The discontinuity is estimated using a window of birth dates of 100 days from January 1. Mean | Ineligible is the estimated value of the dependent variable at the discontinuity for ineligible students. The regression is a modified version of equation 1 considering students in the year they turn 23. The regression includes controls for gender, race, linear effects of recentered age in days allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on recentered birth date and are in parentheses, with * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 3: Estimated Discontinuities

	Total Grants	Unsub. Loans	Sub. Loans	Pell Amount	Total Loans	Borrow > Unsub. Max
Discontinuity	966.6*** (37.77)	303.6*** (36.53)	560.7*** (27.80)	806.0*** (20.64)	485.8*** (71.42)	0.149*** (0.00484)
Mean Ineligible Observations	1812.2 111,795	1296.8 111,795	1568.9 111,795	1139.4 111,795	3908.5 111,795	0.101 111,795
	Att. Hours	Re-Enroll 4yr	Grad 4yr This Year	Grad 4yr Next Year	GPA	
Discontinuity	0.391*** (0.0883)	-0.0147** (0.00617)	0.0175*** (0.00646)	0.00187 (0.00579)	0.00126 (0.0119)	
Mean Ineligible Observations	21.87 223,772	0.464 111,795	0.435 111,795	0.699 111,795	0.2695 111,795	
	Earnings	Next Year Earnings	Positive Earnings			
Discontinuity	-511.3*** (175.6)	-437.7 (269.6)	-0.00531 (0.00506)			
Mean Ineligible Observations	12369.5 111,795	20634 111,795	0.551 111,795			

NOTE: Each column has an estimate of the discontinuity in student outcomes for students born before January 1. The estimates come from estimating equation 1. The regressions include controls for gender, race, linear effects of recentered age in days allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff, and year fixed effects. Each discontinuity is estimated using a window of birth dates of 100 days around January 1. This bandwidth corresponds to the IK bandwidth except in the case of attempted hours, where a bandwidth of 200 days is used. Students born December 29 through January 3 are excluded, as discussed in the text. Mean | Ineligible is the estimated value of the dependent variable at the discontinuity for ineligible students. The data are administrative records of the THECB and TWC and include the 2002–2003 to 2013–2014 school years. Standard errors are clustered on recentered birth date and are in parentheses, with * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Heterogeneity Analysis

	Previous 0 EFC	Previous Pell	Previous No Pell
Total Grants	-129.0 (101.5)	373.6*** (71.31)	1231.7*** (33.45)
Mean Ineligible	4975.2	4411.2	659.1
Total Loans	723.3*** (155.1)	727.7*** (121.2)	370.9*** (83.73)
Mean Ineligible	5256.6	5486.7	3208.4
Grad 4yr in 0y	0.0396*** (0.0137)	0.0285*** (0.0108)	0.0125 (0.00762)
Mean Ineligible	0.406	0.433	0.437
Grad 4yr in 1y	0.0135 (0.0145)	0.00871 (0.0105)	-0.00122 (0.00644)
Mean Ineligible	0.694	0.712	-0.00122
Earnings	-495.0 (352.9)	-507.1* (261.1)	-520.1** (204.2)
Mean Ineligible	11368.9	11539	12737.6
Borrow >Unsub. Max	0.162*** (0.0129)	0.174*** (0.00997)	0.137*** (0.00481)
Mean Ineligible	0.19	0.184	0.0643
Observations	18,995	33,844	77,951

NOTE: Each entry is an estimate of the discontinuity in student outcomes for students born before January 1. Columns represent different subsamples used in estimation and refer to whether a student had a 0 EFC, received a Pell grant, or did not receive a Pell grant in the year they turned 23. The estimates come from estimating equation 1. The regressions include controls for gender, race, linear effects of recentered age in days allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff, and year fixed effects. Each discontinuity is estimated using a window of birth dates of 100 days from January 1. Students born December 29 through January 3 are excluded as discussed in the text. Mean | Ineligible is the estimated value of the dependent variable at the discontinuity for ineligible students. The data are administrative records of the THECB and TWC and include the 2002–2003 to 2013–2014 school years. Standard errors are clustered on recentered birth date and are in parentheses, with * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: Other Classifications

Freshman	Grants	Loans	Hours	Enroll Next Year	Earn
Discontinuity	157.3 (145.5)	303.9 (192.0)	0.280 (0.349)	0.0132 (0.0306)	356.2 (757.0)
Mean Ineligible Observations	1134.1 4,687	1741.2 4,687	13.94 9,354	0.439 4,687	10657 4,687
Sophomore	Grants	Loans	Hours	Enroll Next Year	Earn
Discontinuity	364.6*** (103.3)	721.1*** (161.2)	0.186 (0.242)	0.0794*** (0.0191)	104.4 (491.1)
Mean Ineligible Observations	1577.3 11,216	2664.6 11,216	16.22 22,759	0.58 11,216	11953 11,216
Junior	Grants	Loans	Hours	Enroll Next Year	Earn
Discontinuity	510.9*** (68.95)	609.7*** (121.8)	0.510*** (0.164)	0.0264** (0.0108)	-116.8 (309.1)
Mean Ineligible Observations	1688.2 28,590	3551 28,590	18.94 57,809	0.739 28,590	12265.3 28,590

NOTE: Each entry is an estimate of the discontinuity in student outcomes for students born before January 1. Each panel represents a different sample based on student classification. The estimates come from estimating equation 1. The regressions include controls for gender, race, linear effects of recentered age in days allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff, and year fixed effects. Each discontinuity is estimated using a window of birth dates of 100 days from January 1 except for hours which is estimated using a window of 200 days. Students born December 29 through January 3 are excluded as discussed in the text. Mean | Ineligible is the estimated value of the dependent variable at the discontinuity for ineligible students. The data are administrative records of the THECB and TWC and include the 2002–2003 to 2013–2014 school years. Standard errors are clustered on recentered birth date and are in parentheses, with * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

A Appendix

A.1 Changes resulting from Tax Aid

The United States tax code gives special treatment to dependent children. Children can be claimed as dependents as long as they are younger than 19 at the end of the year. If a child is a full-time student, that child may be claimed as a dependent if she is younger than 24 at the end of the year and meets certain conditions.³⁰ If students are dependent for tax purposes, parents may claim their student children as dependents and receive exemptions and tax credits that reduce taxable income. Additionally, dependent students may qualify the taxpayer for tax credits like the American Opportunity Credit, the Lifetime Learning Credit, and the Earned Income Tax Credit. During the time period studied in this paper, the Hope Tax Credit and Tuition Deduction could also be used.³¹

Changes in tax aid occur at the same January 1 threshold for some students. Ultimately this paper will be able to identify the reduced-form effect of changes in tax aid and financial aid resulting from financial independence. However, I argue that the changes in federal financial aid are likely to dominate changes in tax aid.

There are several reasons that the effects found in this paper are likely driven by financial aid rather than tax aid. The first is that tax aid is disbursed for the prior financial tax year no earlier than February. This date falls after students have made extensive and intensive margin enrollment decisions for both semesters, which likely limits the extent to which tax aid can influence student outcomes. Furthermore, a student's tax liability is likely to decrease as a result of the change, whereas family tax liability is likely to increase making the effect on student finances ambiguous.

Dependent status for tax purposes changes for a minority of students. In particular,

³⁰Those conditions are that the child must be a full-time student for at least five months in a year, must live with her parents for at least six months of the year, and must receive more than half of her financial support from her parents.

³¹See [Dynarski and Scott-Clayton \(2015\)](#) for a discussion on tax benefits for college. Tax benefits have generally been found to not affect student college enrollment ([Bulman and Hoxby, 2015](#); [Hoxby and Bulman, 2015](#)). Notably, [Turner \(2011\)](#) finds an increase in enrollment with tax aid generosity.

students must live at home for at least six months and provide less than half of their own support. An upper bound on the number of students experiencing a change in dependency status for tax purposes can be gleaned from the 2007–2008 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study. The NPSAS contains information students’ residence with parents while they are enrolled. Students at four-year schools in Texas who are from 23.5 to 24.5 years old on January 1 live with their parents 15.0 percent of the time ([U.S. Department of Education, 2013a](#)). This number is an upper bound on the number of students affected by the change in tax status, because some of those who live at home may receive less than half of their support from their parents.

If a student is declared independent, all else being equal, the parent’s tax liability will increase, as they no longer can claim a dependent exemption or any of the education tax credits. If parents were eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), they are likely to see EITC benefits decrease, as the number of eligible children will be reduced. The students will have their personal tax liability decrease, as they will be able to use the education tax credits on their tax return instead of their parents’ using the education tax credits. In general, the family’s total tax liability will weakly increase as credits or deductions are shifted from parents with relatively high marginal tax rates to students with relatively low marginal tax rates.³²

Financial independence is associated with (weakly) reduced family tax aid but increased student tax aid. How this affects total resources toward college depends on how parents and older students split changes in wealth from marginal tax changes. I am not aware of any studies that examine how families split such tax changes, and data on within-family transfers would be required to answer the question. Tax aid is never “disbursed” per se, and households may differ in the timing of realizing tax benefits.

One test for the impact of tax credits for college is to consider the time before the large expansion of tax credits that occurred in 2009. Tax expenditures increased by 140

³²For very high income families who are not eligible for education tax credits, the total tax burden may decrease, as students will become eligible for tax credits.

percent in 2009. Results from 2002–2003 to 2007–2008 are presented in Table [A1](#) and do not vary substantially from the results presented for all years, except for the expected loss for precision. While imperfect, this test shows that more than doubling the generosity of the tax credits for college does not substantially effect the interpretation of the results.

For these reasons, the results of this study will largely be interpreted as the effects of financial aid rather than of tax aid.

A.2 Birth Retiming

[LaLumia, Sallee and Turner \(2015\)](#) and [Schulkind and Shapiro \(2014\)](#) find that there is a small amount of manipulation in response to tax incentives that is less than half the amount of retiming of births that is typically seen on a weekend. A \$1,000 change in taxes leads to about 1 percent of births being retimed.³³ This may be a concern for identification if children of parents who retime their births in response to tax incentives produce children who systematically respond differently to financial independence 24 years later. It is not obvious how these students would differ systematically, but it is a possibility.

To explore the amount of retiming of births or differential reenrollment that occurs, Figure [2](#) plots the number of students with each birthday among students turning 24 in a given school year for university seniors. The panels on the left include all students. Panels on the right remove students who were born within three days of January 1, and the distribution is much more smooth through the cutoff. There is some retiming of births evident, but the distribution appears to be smooth after removing the three days surrounding January 1.³⁴

³³[Schulkind and Shapiro \(2014\)](#) find that the manipulation is due to increased cesarean rates before January 1.

³⁴There does appear to be a decrease in births associated with Christmas, though that is unlikely to be problematic for the identification strategy.

A.3 Student Characteristics

If either differential (re)enrollment or birth retiming were an issue, student observed and unobserved characteristics may discretely vary across the threshold.³⁵ I test for observable differences by looking for discontinuities in predetermined characteristics like race, gender, grant aid received in the previous year, and EFC for students who had filed a FAFSA in the previous year. Results from these checks for balance of the covariates are found in Table A3. In these regressions there are thirteen discontinuities considered; one is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, and the estimated discontinuities are small.

Data on student performance prior to college is also considered for students who have it. This data was obtained through college applications after 2000. Of the analysis sample, 76% have some information via application data. This includes indicators for students being in the top 10 percent of their high school class and being in the top 11-25 of their high school class. Some students did not provide testing information such as SAT or ACT which explains the smaller sample size for those outcomes. Similarly, prior AGI for students and parents have a smaller sample because that data began being collected in 2007-2008 and is only available for students who were enrolled and filed a FAFSA in the previous year.

A joint test for significance reveals that the discontinuities in characteristics available for all students are not jointly different from zero. Overall, the lack of discontinuities in predetermined covariates suggests that students on either side of the age discontinuity are similar in observable characteristics.

³⁵There may be unobserved variables that also differ on each side of the age cutoff. One example that may be relevant is insurance coverage. In the state of Texas during this time frame employers were required to cover dependent children with health insurance until age 25, so insurance status is not likely to vary discretely at this threshold (Dillender, 2014). Starting in 2011, the Affordable Care Act mandated that all children under the age of 26 be eligible for inclusion on their parents' plans, which would not affect the identification strategy of this paper.

A.4 On-Campus Employment

Work-study is a need-based federal program in which wage subsidies are offered to universities to employ students, typically on campus ([Scott-Clayton and Minaya, 2014](#)). Financial independence increases a student's eligibility for work-study because parents' income and assets are excluded from need calculations. However, the earnings measure in this study includes student earnings from work-study, which eliminates this as a concern.³⁶ There is still the issue of non-work-study employment at universities and colleges. Employment on campus is a small fraction of employment for students age 23.5 to 24.5. In fact, only 8.1 percent of students at public four-year universities work on campus or both on and off campus.³⁷

If financial aid displaces non-work-study employment at colleges and universities in the same way that it does for employment observed in the UI data, then the UI earnings will understate the true effect of financial aid on earnings. This is because there are additional reductions in earnings for students who turn 24 that are not captured by UI and work-study data. If non-work-study employment by universities is insensitive to financial aid, then the estimates using UI data will be accurate. For the estimates presented to overestimate the effect of financial aid on earnings, an unusual result is required in which students respond to additional financial aid from turning 24 by reducing hours worked off campus and increasing non-work-study hours worked on campus. However, this unusual situation seems less plausible, since work-study earnings are accounted for and there is no other clear mechanism that would drive student behavior in this way.

A.5 Placebo—21, 22, and 23 years old

One concern is that students born before and after January 1 are unobservably different and have different outcomes as a result of unobserved differences rather than differ-

³⁶There is a very small, positive estimated discontinuity in student earnings from work study.

³⁷Author's calculations based on the 2012 NPSAS. Additionally, 5.4 percent of students work exclusively on campus, and 2.7 percent work both on an off campus.

ences in financial aid. I perform a placebo test with students turning 21, 22, and 23. The same analysis is the nearly same as before, but instead uses students who are turning 21, 22, and 23 in a school year. These students do not experience any differential change in financial aid if they are 21, 22, or 23 by January 1. Hence, students should have the same outcomes irrespective of where their birthday falls relative to January 1 unless there are some unobserved underlying differences. Table [A4](#) examines 18 different placebo outcomes and finds 2 to be significant at the 5% level—earnings for 22 and 23 year olds. These discontinuities and issues in interpretation are discussed in the main body of the text.

Table A1: Results Pre 08

	Total Grants	Unsub. Loans	Sub. Loans	
Discontinuity	837.3*** (47.88)	274.7*** (37.00)	614.0*** (39.13)	
Mean Ineligible Observations	1445.3 57,613	940.2 57,613	1485.7 57,613	
	Att. Hours 4yr	Grad 4yr in 0y	Grad 4yr in 1y	Re-Enroll 4yr
Discontinuity	0.210 (0.137)	0.0156* (0.00869)	-0.00747 (0.00780)	-0.0155* (0.00881)
Mean Ineligible Observations	22.27 114,819	0.44 57,613	0.704 57,613	0.459 57,613
	Earnings	Positive Earnings	Borrow > Unsub. Max	
Discontinuity	-492.6** (243.4)	-0.00960 (0.00729)	0.139*** (0.00651)	
Mean Ineligible Observations	13199.9 57,613	0.815 57,613	0.1 57,613	

NOTE: Each column has an estimate of the discontinuity for a student outcome for students born before January 1. The sample only includes students in 2003–2004 to 2006–2007, in order to focus on a time with smaller available tax aid. The estimates arise from estimating Equation 1. The regressions include controls for gender, race, linear effects of recentered age in days allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff, and year fixed effects. Students born December 29 through January 3 are excluded, as discussed in the text. Each discontinuity is estimated using a window of birth dates of 100 days from January 1 except in the case of attempted hours, where a bandwidth of 200 days is used. These bandwidths corresponds to the IK bandwidth. The data are administrative records of the THECB and TWC and include the 2002-2003 to 2007-2008 school years. Mean | Ineligible is the estimated value of the dependent variable at the discontinuity for ineligible students. Standard errors are clustered on recentered birthdate and are in parentheses, with * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A2: Estimated Discontinuities, no donut

	Grants	Pell	Unsub	Sub	
Discontinuity	964.1*** (43.90)	798.8*** (30.31)	305.5*** (37.99)	558.5*** (31.37)	
Mean Ineligible Observations	1804.8 115,871	1568.4 115,871	1303.3 115,871	1568.4 115,871	
	Hours Attempted	ReEnroll	Grad in Current Year	GPA	Grad Next Year
Discontinuity	0.386*** (0.0859)	-0.0140** (0.00549)	0.0146** (0.00596)	-0.000978 (0.0112)	-0.00298 (0.00560)
Mean Ineligible Observations	21.9 227,848	0.464 115,871	0.436 115,871	2.7 115,871	0.701 115,871
	Earnings	Positive Earnings	Borrow > Unsub Max		
Discontinuity	-472.3*** (160.9)	-0.00208 (0.00500)	0.146*** (0.00699)		
Mean Ineligible Observations	12340.4 115,871	0.786 115,871	0.102 115,871		

NOTE: Each column has an estimate of the discontinuity in student outcomes for students born before January 1. The estimates arise from estimating equation 1. The regressions include controls for gender, race, linear effects of recentered age in days allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff, and year fixed effects. Each discontinuity is estimated using a window of birth dates of 100 days from January 1, which corresponds to the IK bandwidth except in the case of attempted hours, which uses a bandwidth of 200 days. The data are administrative records of the THECB and TWC and include the 2003–2004 to 2013–2014 school years. Mean | Ineligible is the estimated value of the dependent variable at the discontinuity for ineligible students. Standard errors are clustered on recentered birth date and are in parentheses, with * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A3: Covariate Balance

	Male	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Previous Grants	
Discontinuity	-0.00104 (0.00667)	-0.00154 (0.00706)	0.000446 (0.00384)	0.00938 (0.00613)	-0.00552** (0.00280)	16.80 36.04	
Mean Ineligible	0.484	0.483	0.107	0.3	0.0494	1828.8	
Observations	111,795	111,795	111,795	111,795	111,795	111,795	
	SAT	ACT	Top 10	Top 11-25	Previous EFC	Previous Student AGI	Previous Parent AGI
Discontinuity	1.242 (5.259)	-0.0572 (0.173)	0.00609 (0.00423)	-0.00492 (0.00412)	-51.13 (194.5)	-15.70 (247.1)	-62.62 (3694.1)
Mean Ineligible	1005.9	20.45	0.0926	0.0935	7095.5	7841.8	66088.5
Observations	21,017	10,332	85,413	85,413	64,134	34,892	35,614

NOTE: This tests for discontinuities in covariates for students who were born before January 1. The regressions include controls for gender, race, linear effects of recentered age in days allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff, and year fixed effects. Each discontinuity is estimated using a window of birth dates of 100 days from January 1 which corresponds to the IK bandwidth. Students born December 29 through January 3 are excluded as discussed in the text. The data are administrative records of the THECB and include the 2002–2003 to 2013–2014 school years. Mean | Ineligible is the estimated value of the dependent variable at the discontinuity for ineligible students. Standard errors are clustered on birthdate are in parentheses, with * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A4: Placebo Check

Age 23, All Classifications	Total Grants	Hours Attempted	Loans	Enroll University Next Year	Grad this year	Earnings
Discontinuity	-10.18 (25.27)	0.0707 (0.0819)	70.29* (38.48)	0.00286 (0.00382)	0.000337 (0.00367)	-220.4** (95.50)
Mean Ineligible Observations	1912.6 257,723	22.28 257,723	3746 257,723	0.499 257,723	0.377 257,723	10789.7 257,723
Age 22 Classifications	Total Grants	Hours Attempted	Loans	Enroll University Next Year	Grad this year	Earnings
Discontinuity	-0.113 (26.19)	0.0569 (0.0636)	50.13 (39.45)	-0.000712 (0.00325)	0.00426 (0.00303)	-161.9** (65.62)
Mean Ineligible Observations	2349.7 358,409	25.83 358,409	3787.7 358,409	0.625 358,409	0.263 358,409	8047.3 358,409
Age 21, All Classifications	Total Grants	Hours Attempted	Loans	Enroll University Next Year	Grad this year	Earnings
Discontinuity	7.948 (28.69)	0.0534 (0.0612)	-32.46 (44.92)	0.00126 (0.00246)	0.00172 (0.00133)	-54.28 (50.52)
Mean Ineligible Observations	2646.1 371,100	26.78 371,100	3630.7 371,100	0.844 371,100	0.0335 371,100	6041.6 371,100

NOTE: This placebo exercise tests for discontinuities in outcomes for students who were born before January 1 using students who turn 21, 22, and 23 years old during the school year. Each discontinuity is estimated using a modified version of equation 1 in a window of birth dates of 100 days from January 1 which corresponds to the IK bandwidth. The regressions include controls for gender, race, linear effects of recentered age in days allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff, and year fixed effects effects. Students born December 29 through January 3 are excluded as discussed in the text. The data are administrative records of the THECB and include the 2002–2003 to 2013–2014 school years. Mean | Ineligible is the estimated value of the dependent variable at the discontinuity for ineligible students. Standard errors are clustered on birthdate are in parentheses, with * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.