

Online Appendix: The Meaning of Losing

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A Survey Items and Coding

This section documents the survey items used to measure conceptions of democracy across the Asian Barometer Survey waves.

A.1 Item Reference Table

Table A1: Survey Items by Set and Type

Set	Value	Item Label	Item Type	Subtype
Wave 2				
W2	1	Elections	procedural	electoral
W2	2	Criticize power	procedural	liberal
W2	3	Income equality	substantive	redistribution
W2	4	Basic necessities	substantive	welfare
Set 1 (W3/W4/W6)				
Set1	1	Reduce gap rich/poor	substantive	redistribution
Set1	2	Free elections	procedural	electoral
Set1	3	No waste	governance	quality
Set1	4	Free expression	procedural	liberal

Set 2 (W3/W4/W6)

Set2	1	Legislature oversight	procedural	accountability
Set2	2	Basic necessities	substantive	welfare
Set2	3	Organize groups	procedural	liberal
Set2	4	Quality services	governance	quality

Set 3 (W3/W4/W6)

Set3	1	Law and order	governance	quality
Set3	2	Media freedom	procedural	liberal
Set3	3	Jobs for all	substantive	welfare
Set3	4	Party competition	procedural	electoral

Set 4 (W3/W4/W6)

Set4	1	Protest freedom	procedural	liberal
Set4	2	Clean politics	governance	quality
Set4	3	Court protection	procedural	accountability
Set4	4	Unemployment aid	substantive	welfare

Note: Wave 2 employed a single forced-choice item with four response options, while Waves 3, 4, and 6 used four separate item sets (Sets 1–4), each presenting four response options. The W2 instrument differs from the later waves and is analyzed separately.

B Electoral Status Coding

This section documents how respondents are classified as electoral winners or losers, the reference elections used for each country-wave, and independent verification of the coding for three countries featured in the trajectory analysis.

B.1 Variable Construction

Electoral status is derived from the ABS vote-choice variable: q34a in Waves 4 and 6, q33a in Wave 3, and q39a in Wave 2. For each country-wave, the ABS research team matches each respondent's self-reported vote choice to the outcome of the most recent national election held prior to fieldwork. Respondents are classified as:

- **Winner** (coded 1): voted for the winning party, elected president, or a coalition partner in the governing coalition.
- **Loser** (coded 2): voted for any non-governing party.

This binary classification is applied uniformly across all eleven analysis countries. Respondents with missing, refused, or invalid vote-choice responses are excluded from the analysis. The variable `electoral_status` used throughout the paper reflects this binary coding.

B.2 Reference Elections

Table B1 reports the reference election for each country-wave in the analysis, including the election type, date, winning and runner-up parties or candidates, and source. Dashes indicate the country was not surveyed in that wave. Wave 5 is excluded from the analysis because it did not include the relevant democracy conception items.

Table B2: Reference Elections by Country and Wave

Country	Wave	Election Type	Date	Winner	Runner-up	Source
Japan	W2	House of Reps	Sep 2005	LDP (Koizumi)	DPJ	IFES
Japan	W3	House of Reps	Aug 2009	DPJ (Hatoyama)	LDP	IFES
Japan	W4	House of Reps	Dec 2012	LDP (Abe)	DPJ	IFES
Japan	W6	House of Reps	Oct 2021	LDP (Kishida)	CDP	IFES

(continued)

Country	Wave	Election Type	Date	Winner	Runner-up	Source
S. Korea	W3	Presidential	Dec 2007	Lee Myung-bak (GNP)	Chung Dong-young	NEC
S. Korea	W4	Presidential	Dec 2012	Park Geun-hye (Saenuri)	Moon Jae-in	NEC
S. Korea	W6	Presidential	Mar 2022	Yoon Suk Yeol (PPP)	Lee Jae-myung	NEC
Mongolia	W2	Parliamentary	Jun 2004	MPRP	MDC	IFES
Mongolia	W3	Parliamentary	Jun 2008	MPRP	DP	IFES
Mongolia	W4	Parliamentary	Jun 2012	DP	MPP	IFES
Philippines	W2	Presidential	May 2004	Arroyo (Lakas)	Poe (KNP)	IFES
Philippines	W3	Presidential	May 2010	Aquino III (LP)	Estrada	IFES
Philippines	W4	Midterm	May 2013	LP coalition	UNA	IFES
Philippines	W6	Presidential	May 2022	Marcos Jr. (PFP)	Robredo (LP)	IFES
Taiwan	W2	Presidential	Mar 2004	Chen Shui-bian (DPP)	Lien Chan (KMT)	CEC
Taiwan	W3	Presidential	Mar 2008	Ma Ying-jeou (KMT)	Hsieh (DPP)	CEC
Taiwan	W4	Presidential	Jan 2012	Ma Ying-jeou (KMT)	Tsai Ing-wen (DPP)	CEC
Taiwan	W6	Presidential	Jan 2020	Tsai Ing-wen (DPP)	Han Kuo-yu (KMT)	CEC
Thailand	W3	Parliamentary	Dec 2007	PPP (pro-Thaksin)	Democrat Party	ECT
Thailand	W4	Prior electoral	Post-coup	ABS-coded (N = 382)	See Appendix B.4	ABS
		behavior				
Thailand	W6	Parliamentary	Mar 2019	PPRP coalition	Pheu Thai	ECT
Indonesia	W2	Presidential	Sep 2004	SBY (Democrat)	Megawati (PDI-P)	IFES
Indonesia	W3	Presidential	Jul 2009	SBY (Democrat)	Megawati (PDI-P)	IFES
Indonesia	W4	Presidential	Jul 2014	Jokowi (PDI-P)	Prabowo (Gerindra)	IFES
Indonesia	W6	Presidential	Apr 2019	Jokowi (PDI-P)	Prabowo (Gerindra)	IFES
Cambodia	W3	National	Jul 2008	CPP (Hun Sen)	SRP	IFES
		Assembly				
Cambodia	W4	National	Jul 2013	CPP (Hun Sen)	CNRP	IFES
		Assembly				
Cambodia	W6	National	Jul 2018	CPP (Hun Sen)	CNRP dissolved	IFES
		Assembly				
Malaysia	W2	General election	Mar 2004	BN (Abdullah)	PAS/DAP	IFES
Malaysia	W3	General election	Mar 2008	BN (Abdullah)	PR coalition	IFES

(continued)

Country	Wave	Election Type	Date	Winner	Runner-up	Source
Malaysia	W4	General election	May 2013	BN (Najib)	PR (Anwar)	IFES
Malaysia	W6	General election	Nov 2022	PH (Anwar)	PN (Muhyiddin)	IFES
Myanmar	W4	General election	Nov 2015	NLD (Aung San Suu Kyi)	USDP	IFES
Australia	W4	Federal election	Sep 2013	Coalition (Abbott)	ALP (Rudd)	IFES

Note: Dashes indicate the country was not surveyed in that wave. For Thailand W4, no standard reference election existed; the ABS coded winner/loser status based on prior electoral behavior (see Appendix B.4). Source abbreviations: NEC = National Election Commission of Korea; CEC = Central Election Commission of Taiwan; ECT = Election Commission of Thailand; IFES = IFES ElectionGuide [@IFES2026-nw].

B.3 Independent Verification — Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand

For the three countries featured in detailed trajectory analysis, the ABS winner/loser coding was independently verified against official election commission data. The verification procedure involved four steps:

1. Raw vote-choice codes were extracted from the ABS microdata (q34/q33/q39 depending on wave).
2. Wave-specific party crosswalks were constructed, mapping each numeric vote-choice code to the corresponding party name and coalition alignment.
3. Coalition assignments were matched to official election outcomes to determine winner/loser status.
4. Results were cross-checked against published data from national election commissions.

Table B2 reports the verification results.

Table B3: Independent Verification of Electoral Status Coding

Country	Wave	Election	Official Winner (%)	Official Runner-up (%)	Our Coding	Status
Taiwan	W2	2004 Pres	Chen (DPP) 50.1%	Lien (KMT) 49.9%	pan-green = winner	Verified
Taiwan	W3	2008 Pres	Ma (KMT) 58.5%	Hsieh (DPP) 41.6%	pan-blue = winner	Verified
Taiwan	W4	2012 Pres	Ma (KMT) 51.6%	Tsai (DPP) 45.6%	pan-blue = winner	Verified
Taiwan	W6	2020 Pres	Tsai (DPP) 57.1%	Han (KMT) 38.6%	pan-green = winner	Verified
S. Korea	W3	2007 Pres	Lee (GNP) 48.7%	Chung (UNDP) 26.1%	conservative = winner	Verified
S. Korea	W4	2012 Pres	Park (Saenuri) 51.6%	Moon (DUP) 48.0%	conservative = winner	Verified
S. Korea	W6	2022 Pres	Yoon (PPP) 48.6%	Lee (Dem) 47.8%	conservative = winner	Verified
Thailand	W3	2007 Parl	PPP 233 seats	Democrat 164 seats	pro-Thaksin = winner	Verified
Thailand	W4	Post-coup	ABS-coded (N = 382)	Based on prior electoral behavior	Retained; see B.4	Verified
Thailand	W6	2019 Parl	PPRP coalition	Pheu Thai 136 seats	pro-military = winner	Verified

Note: Sources: Central Election Commission of Taiwan (2004, 2008, 2016); National Election Commission of Korea (2008, 2012, 2020); Election Commission of Thailand (2007, 2019); IFES Election Guide (2024).

Two features of the party coding warrant elaboration:

Party code instability in South Korea. South Korea's frequent party reorganizations mean that the same numeric vote-choice code in the ABS microdata can represent different parties across waves. For example, code 301 corresponds to the progressive Uri Party in Waves 2–3, the conservative Saenuri Party in Wave 4, and the progressive Democratic Party in

Waves 5–6. Wave-specific crosswalks were constructed to ensure correct coalition assignment despite this instability.

Party lineage in Thailand. Pro-Thaksin parties underwent successive dissolutions by court order—Thai Rak Thai (dissolved 2007), People’s Power Party (dissolved 2008), and the successor Pheu Thai Party. The crosswalk tracks party lineage rather than party name, assigning all pro-Thaksin successor parties to the same coalition alignment across waves.

B.4 Special Cases

Thailand Wave 4 (fieldwork August–October 2014). Thailand’s February 2, 2014 general election was annulled by the Constitutional Court on March 21, 2014, and the military seized power in a coup on May 22, 2014—before ABS fieldwork began. Despite the absence of a valid recent election, the ABS nevertheless coded winner/loser status for 382 of 1,200 respondents (31.8%) based on prior electoral behavior. A cross-tabulation of the vote-choice variable against q34a confirms that ABS used the July 2011 parliamentary election as the reference: all 186 Pheu Thai voters are coded as winners (Pheu Thai formed the government under Yingluck Shinawatra), while all Democrat Party and minor-party voters are coded as losers. The relatively high rate of missing data on q34a (51.1%) likely reflects respondent reluctance to disclose vote choice under military rule rather than a failure of the survey instrument. This country-wave is retained in the main analysis; Appendix Table K1 verifies that excluding it changes no pooled coefficient by more than 0.28 percentage points.

Thailand Wave 6 — government formation. In the March 2019 election, Pheu Thai won the most seats (136) but Palang Pracharath (PPRP, 116 seats) formed the governing coalition

with allied parties and the support of the military-appointed Senate. Respondents are coded as winners or losers based on government formation rather than seat plurality, consistent with the standard practice of defining winners by who governs (Election Commission of Thailand 2019).

Cambodia Wave 6. The Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) was dissolved by court order in November 2017, before the July 2018 election. The CPP ran effectively unopposed. Respondents who reported voting for minor parties are coded as losers, though the meaningful opposition had been eliminated.

C Sample Composition

C.1 Sample Size by Country and Wave

Table C4: Sample Composition by Country and Wave

Country	W2	W3	W4	W6	Total
Australia	0	0	0	1,018	1,018
Cambodia	0	894	907	851	2,652
Indonesia	1,145	1,144	1,123	1,364	4,776
Japan	701	1,348	762	0	2,811
Malaysia	507	589	673	0	1,769
Mongolia	996	1,027	1,054	884	3,961
Myanmar	0	0	818	0	818

Philippines	861	748	894	866	3,369
South Korea	644	774	786	873	3,077
Taiwan	990	1,139	1,150	1,024	4,303
Thailand	591	885	413	345	2,234
Total	6,435	8,548	8,580	7,225	30,788

C.2 Response Distributions by Winner/Loser Status

Table C5: Response Distributions by Electoral Status (Pooled)

Set	Item	Winner	Loser	Diff
Set 1				
Set 1	Reduce gap rich/poor	20.9%	19.9%	-1.0
Set 1	Free elections	37.0%	34.6%	-2.3
Set 1	No waste	18.3%	19.2%	+0.9
Set 1	Free expression	23.8%	26.2%	+2.4
Set 2				
Set 2	Legislature oversight	13.9%	15.2%	+1.3
Set 2	Basic necessities	32.7%	30.8%	-1.9
Set 2	Organize groups	15.5%	16.8%	+1.3
Set 2	Quality services	37.8%	37.2%	-0.6
Set 3				
Set 3	Law and order	29.8%	25.2%	-4.6
Set 3	Media freedom	16.9%	20.8%	+3.9
Set 3	Jobs for all	35.2%	34.2%	-1.0
Set 3	Party competition	18.1%	19.8%	+1.7
Set 4				

Set 4	Protest freedom	18.5%	18.8%	+0.4
Set 4	Clean politics	36.8%	37.9%	+1.1
Set 4	Court protection	22.8%	22.6%	-0.2
Set 4	Unemployment aid	21.9%	20.7%	-1.2

Note: Diff = Loser - Winner. Positive values indicate losers are more likely to choose that item.

C.3 Non-Voter Rates by Country and Wave

The main analysis restricts attention to respondents who reported voting in the most recent national election. Table @ref(tab:tbl-nonvoter-rates) reports the proportion of non-voters among respondents with valid democracy conception responses.

Table C6: Non-Voter Rates by Country and Wave

Country	Wave 1		Wave 2		Wave 3		Wave 4		Wave 5		Wave 6	
	N	% NV										
Australia	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1508	3.1	1111	3.7
Cambodia	NA	NA	NA	NA	1196	21.3	1195	16.8	NA	NA	1196	11.9
Indonesia	NA	NA	1573	8.5	1525	8.2	1538	7.4	1524	2.7	1519	5.9
Japan	1349	22.0	1043	12.9	1845	13.7	1034	17.1	1037	27.2	NA	NA
Malaysia	NA	NA	963	24.8	1017	22.3	1039	14.3	1061	18.5	NA	NA
Mongolia	1108	13.2	1196	12.5	1202	11.0	1226	9.6	1264	15.2	1261	15.1
Myanmar	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1567	26.2	1622	22.1	NA	NA
Philippines	1197	29.2	1179	18.0	1032	20.2	1105	15.7	1149	13.8	1068	14.5
South Korea	1464	15.6	1115	25.8	1123	17.4	1150	14.9	1229	15.9	1214	11.1
Taiwan	1400	9.8	1512	13.3	1522	12.9	1580	15.8	1195	16.8	1480	18.1
Thailand	1526	3.6	1496	9.6	1494	2.2	1152	7.6	1122	4.5	1115	4.6

Note: N = total respondents with valid vote status; % NV = percentage who reported not voting. Australia's low non-voter rate reflects compulsory voting.

C.3.1 Sample Selection Considerations

Because the analysis conditions on reported vote choice to assign electoral status, non-voters are excluded by design. In most country-waves, non-voter rates fall between 8 and 25 percent, consistent with the moderately high turnout typical of Asian democracies. Two patterns stand out.

First, Myanmar exhibits the highest non-voter rate among the analysis countries, reaching

26 percent in Wave 4. The elevated non-voter rate likely reflects the challenging political environment during the transitional period following decades of military rule, where many citizens may have been uncertain about electoral participation or faced practical barriers to voting.

Second, Australia and Thailand represent near-compulsory or high-turnout contexts where non-voter rates remain below 5 percent across waves. In these cases, selection into voting is effectively eliminated as a confound, and the persistence of the loser effect in Thailand—where the gap grew dramatically despite minimal sample selection—is consistent with the inference that the findings are not driven by differential turnout between winners and losers.

The exclusion of non-voters means the analysis characterizes democratic conceptions among the politically engaged electorate rather than the population at large. However, the consistency of the loser effect across countries with vastly different non-voter rates (from 3.7 percent in Australia to 26 percent in Myanmar) suggests the pattern is robust to variation in the scope of sample selection.

D Full Country-Wave Results

D.1 Item-Level Average Marginal Effects

Table D7: Country-Wave AMEs: Sets 1-2

Country	Wave	Set 1				Set 2			
		Elections	Free expre	No waste	Reduce gap	Necessities	Legislatur	Organize g	Quality se
Australia	W6	+0.5	+0.3	+2.0	-2.7	-5.0	+2.5	+3.0	-0.6
Cambodia	W3	-5.7	+8.2*	+0.3	-2.8	-7.3*	+2.3	+12.2***	-7.2†

(continued)

Country	Wave	Elections	Free expre	No waste	Reduce gap	Necessities	Legislatur	Organize g	Quality se
Cambodia	W4	-3.8	+11.2**	-3.3**	-4.2†	-5.8†	+1.3	+7.9**	-3.4
Cambodia	W6	-17.1**	+19.7**	+0.9	-3.6	-15.6*	-7.3†	+19.6**	+3.4
Indonesia	W3	-2.1	+0.4	+0.0	+1.7	-3.6	-2.0	-1.7	+7.4*
Indonesia	W4	+2.8	-3.2	+0.5	-0.2	-2.0	+0.5	-3.4	+4.9
Indonesia	W6	-6.2*	+2.8	+2.4	+1.0	-4.2	-0.7	+0.7	+4.2
Japan	W3	+2.7	+3.8	-7.7**	+1.1	-0.3	+1.4	+0.3	-1.4
Japan	W4	-4.3	+6.4*	-1.8	-0.3	-3.7	+2.7	-1.3	+2.3
Malaysia	W3	+0.8	+2.2	+1.9	-5.0	-10.2*	+15.5***	+5.6	-10.8†
Malaysia	W4	-2.5	-2.2	+13.3***	-8.7*	+0.4	+5.7	+1.6	-7.8†
Mongolia	W3	+3.3	-0.5	-3.2	+0.5	-0.2	-4.8†	-1.4	+6.5*
Mongolia	W4	-3.1	-0.9	-0.1	+4.1	+0.0	+1.0	+0.9	-1.9
Mongolia	W6	+0.8	+6.6†	-2.4	-5.0†	-4.3*	-3.7	+3.1	+4.9
Myanmar	W4	+4.6	+6.8*	-1.8	-9.7**	-7.5*	+5.3*	+10.3**	-8.1*
Philippines	W3	-0.3	+7.3*	-5.2*	-1.8	-0.0	-4.4†	+8.4**	-3.9
Philippines	W4	-0.6	+0.5	-0.9	+0.9	+0.2	+1.6	+4.3	-6.1†
Philippines	W6	-8.1*	+10.8**	-4.0†	+1.4	+0.7	-4.7†	+2.3	+1.7
South Korea	W3	-9.6**	+13.0***	-1.2	-2.2	-6.4†	+2.3	-2.8	+6.8†
South Korea	W4	-0.6	+4.8	-2.6	-1.6	-1.0	+2.7	-1.3	-0.4
South Korea	W6	+0.1	+1.6	+3.0	-4.7	-9.1**	+3.2	-0.2	+6.0†
Taiwan	W3	-1.1	+6.4*	-1.5	-3.8	+3.3	+2.3	+5.0*	-10.5***
Taiwan	W4	-2.1	+6.3*	-2.4	-1.8	-1.9	+5.3*	+4.3*	-7.7**
Taiwan	W6	-4.5	-3.7	+6.9*	+1.3	+7.6*	-0.3	-1.6	-5.7†
Thailand	W3	-0.7	+2.4	-0.7	-1.0	+5.3	+0.0	+3.2*	-8.5*
Thailand	W4	+0.0	+6.9†	+5.5	-12.4**	-11.8*	+5.4	+4.3	+2.1
Thailand	W6	+10.2†	-1.5	-6.0	-2.7	-22.1***	+11.9**	+9.6**	+0.6

*

Table D8: Country-Wave AMEs: Sets 3-4

Country	Wave	Set 3				Set 4			
		Jobs	Law and or	Media free	Parties	Clean poli	Court prot	Protest fr	Unemployme
Australia	W6	-3.4	+2.1	+4.3	-2.9	+6.4*	-3.2	-1.0	-2.2
Cambodia	W3	-11.6**	-8.6**	+3.8	+16.4***	+1.4	-2.0	+9.5*	-8.9*
Cambodia	W4	-10.2**	-5.4*	+8.2**	+7.4*	+2.9	+0.3	+8.9**	-12.1***
Cambodia	W6	-7.8	-13.9***	+4.4	+17.3*	-3.0	+6.1	+2.4	-5.5
Indonesia	W3	+3.3	+1.1	-2.7	-1.8	+1.1	-3.7	-2.5	+5.2†
Indonesia	W4	+0.1	-3.5	+2.6	+0.7	-3.5	+4.8*	+1.0	-2.3
Indonesia	W6	+5.9*	-10.9***	+5.8**	-0.8	-3.2	-0.1	+4.5†	-1.1
Japan	W3	+2.3	-2.9	-1.3	+1.9	-1.8	+0.7	-3.7*	+4.8*
Japan	W4	-6.9*	-6.0†	+7.9**	+5.0†	-4.9	+0.7	+3.5	+0.7
Malaysia	W3	-9.0†	-9.6†	+11.6*	+7.0	+13.7*	+2.3	-1.1	-14.8***
Malaysia	W4	-9.1*	-7.4†	+9.3**	+7.2†	-10.0*	+3.0	+7.6**	-0.6
Mongolia	W3	-2.9	+0.6	+1.4	+0.9	-5.0	+3.7	-3.6	+4.9*
Mongolia	W4	+3.1	-1.8	+0.0	-1.3	-1.0	+1.9	-1.0	+0.0
Mongolia	W6	+0.5	-10.8**	+10.9**	-0.6	+2.6	-5.7*	+5.7	-2.5
Myanmar	W4	-11.5**	-3.2	+8.2**	+6.5*	-1.4	+5.0†	+7.2*	-10.8**
Philippines	W3	-8.6*	-2.8	+11.1**	+0.3	-0.9	-0.9	-1.1	+2.9
Philippines	W4	-3.8	-4.6	+8.1*	+0.2	-3.1	+4.5	+4.5	-5.9†
Philippines	W6	+1.3	-2.7	+1.0	+0.3	-7.2*	+9.1**	-4.3	+2.5
South Korea	W3	-4.2	-5.1	+6.7†	+2.7	+2.6	-1.1	-0.6	-0.9
South Korea	W4	+2.1	-10.4**	+6.4†	+1.9	+2.7	-7.4*	+3.3	+1.4
South Korea	W6	-1.7	+0.7	-1.6	+2.6	+3.2	-4.6	-2.4	+3.7†
Taiwan	W3	+4.8	-14.7***	+2.5	+7.4**	-7.2*	-0.3	+8.5***	-1.0
Taiwan	W4	+1.5	-11.6***	+5.0**	+5.1*	-9.9***	+6.6*	+5.1*	-1.9

(continued)

Country	Wave	Jobs	Law and or	Media free	Parties	Clean poli	Court prot	Protest fr	Unemployme
Taiwan	W6	+2.1	-4.4	+5.9*	-3.6	+10.3***	-0.4	-9.1***	-0.8
Thailand	W3	-1.0	-1.3	+1.6	+0.7	+1.0	-3.5	+0.4	+2.0
Thailand	W4	-3.7	+0.0	+0.7	+3.0	-10.5*	+0.7	+10.3***	-0.5
Thailand	W6	-16.4**	+4.3	+7.6	+4.6	+6.4	+5.6	+12.0**	-23.9***

*

Note: Values are average marginal effects in percentage points. Significance: *** p<0.001,

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10.

D.2 Procedural-Substantive Gap by Country-Wave

Table D9: Procedural-Substantive Gap by Country and Wave

Country	Wave	Gap (pp)	95% CI
Australia	W6	+3.8	[+0.8, +6.8]
Cambodia	W3	+13.2	[+8.9, +17.5]
Cambodia	W4	+13.2	[+9.7, +16.8]
Cambodia	W6	+13.8	[+6.5, +21.0]
Indonesia	W3	-3.7	[-6.8, -0.5]
Indonesia	W4	+1.8	[-1.4, +5.0]
Indonesia	W6	+0.4	[-2.8, +3.5]
Japan	W3	-1.2	[-4.0, +1.5]

Japan	W4	+5.1	[+1.5, +8.8]
Malaysia	W3	+15.2	[+9.7, +20.8]
Malaysia	W4	+8.2	[+3.6, +12.8]
Mongolia	W3	-0.7	[-3.9, +2.5]
Mongolia	W4	-2.1	[-5.4, +1.2]
Mongolia	W6	+5.0	[+1.2, +8.7]
Myanmar	W4	+16.6	[+12.6, +20.6]
Philippines	W3	+4.5	[+0.6, +8.3]
Philippines	W4	+5.1	[+0.8, +9.4]
Philippines	W6	-0.7	[-4.6, +3.3]
South Korea	W3	+4.8	[+1.1, +8.4]
South Korea	W4	+1.0	[-2.5, +4.5]
South Korea	W6	+2.8	[-0.5, +6.1]
Taiwan	W3	+3.1	[-0.3, +6.4]
Taiwan	W4	+5.5	[+2.4, +8.6]
Taiwan	W6	-4.7	[-8.2, -1.3]
Thailand	W3	-0.8	[-4.5, +2.9]
Thailand	W4	+11.0	[+5.9, +16.2]
Thailand	W6	+23.8	[+17.3, +30.2]

Note: Gap = (Mean Procedural AME) - (Mean Substantive AME). Positive values indicate losers favor procedural items more than substantive items relative to winners.

E Country Trajectory Plots




Figure E1: Procedural-Substantive Gap Trajectories by Country

Note: Countries are ordered by the magnitude of change in the procedural-substantive gap across waves, with Thailand (largest change) first. Positive gap values indicate losers prioritize procedural items more than substantive items, relative to winners.

F Demographic Controls Comparison

This section compares pooled average marginal effects estimated with and without demographic controls to assess the stability of the loser effect.

Table F10: Comparison of AMEs With and Without Demographic Controls

Item	Type	AME with controls (pp)	AME without controls (pp)	Difference (pp)
Set 1				
Reduce gap rich/poor	substantive	-1.5†	-2.6*	+1.12
Free elections	procedural	-1.0	-0.1	-0.94
No waste	governance	-0.7	-0.6	-0.04
Free expression	procedural	+3.2**	+3.3*	-0.14
Set 2				
Legislature oversight	procedural	+1.0	+1.1	-0.16
Basic necessities	substantive	-2.1*	-4.3***	+2.20
Organize groups	procedural	+2.3*	+4.0**	-1.71
Quality services	governance	-1.2	-0.9	-0.33
Set 3				
Law and order	governance	-5.0***	-5.4***	+0.39
Media freedom	procedural	+3.8***	+4.3***	-0.53
Jobs for all	substantive	-0.9	-2.1	+1.22
Party competition	procedural	+2.1†	+3.2†	-1.08
Set 4				

Protest freedom	procedural	+1.2	+2.2	-1.01
Clean politics	governance	-0.7	-1.2	+0.48
Court protection	procedural	+0.3	+1.6	-1.32
Unemployment aid	substantive	-0.8	-2.6*	+1.85
Wave 2				
Elections	procedural	+2.8*	+2.9†	-0.09
Criticize power	procedural	+0.7	+2.6	-1.94
Income equality	substantive	-1.3*	-1.8*	+0.47
Basic necessities	substantive	-2.1†	-3.6***	+1.56

Note: Demographic controls include age, gender, education level, and urban/rural residence.

The stability of estimates across specifications indicates that the loser effect is not driven by compositional differences between winner and loser populations. Significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10.

G Wave 2 Detailed Results

Table G11: Wave 2 Multinomial Logit Results

Item	Type	AME (pp)	SE	95% CI	Sig
Elections	procedural	+2.8	(1.4)	[+0.0, +5.5]	*
Criticize power	procedural	+0.7	(1.1)	[-1.4, +2.7]	
Income equality	substantive	-1.3	(0.6)	[-2.6, -0.1]	*
Basic necessities	substantive	-2.1	(1.1)	[-4.3, +0.1]	†

Note: Wave 2 employed a single forced-choice item asking respondents to identify the

“most essential characteristic of democracy” from four options. Unlike Sets 1–4 in later waves, these options directly compared procedural (elections, criticize power) and substantive (income equality, basic necessities) conceptions within a single item. The AMEs represent the percentage-point difference in the probability of selecting each option between electoral losers and winners, controlling for country fixed effects and demographic characteristics.

H Non-Voter Rates and Sample Selection

Because the analysis conditions on reported vote choice to assign electoral status, non-voters are excluded by design. This section assesses the scope and consequences of this exclusion.

Table G1 reports non-voter rates by country and wave for the eleven countries in the analysis sample. In most country-waves, non-voter rates fall between 8 and 25 percent, consistent with the moderately high turnout typical of Asian democracies. Rates are lowest in Thailand, where they never exceeded 10 percent, and highest in select waves of Malaysia, Myanmar, and Mongolia.

Table H12: Non-Voter Rates by Country and Wave

country_name	wave	N_total	N_voter	N_nonvoter	pct_nonvoter
Australia	6	1111	1070	41	3.7
Cambodia	3	1196	941	255	21.3
Cambodia	4	1195	994	201	16.8
Cambodia	6	1196	1054	142	11.9
Indonesia	3	1525	1400	125	8.2
Indonesia	4	1538	1424	114	7.4
Indonesia	6	1519	1429	90	5.9
Japan	3	1845	1592	253	13.7
Japan	4	1034	857	177	17.1
Malaysia	3	1017	790	227	22.3
Malaysia	4	1039	890	149	14.3
Mongolia	3	1202	1070	132	11.0
Mongolia	4	1226	1108	118	9.6
Mongolia	6	1261	1070	191	15.1
Myanmar	4	1567	1156	411	26.2
Philippines	3	1032	824	208	20.2
Philippines	4	1105	932	173	15.7
Philippines	6	1068	913	155	14.5
South Korea	3	1123	928	195	17.4
South Korea	4	1150	979	171	14.9
South Korea	6	1214	²¹ 1079	135	11.1
Taiwan	3	1522	1325	197	12.9

A more direct test examines whether non-voters' democratic conceptions systematically resemble those of winners or losers. Table G2 reports the procedural-substantive gap across three groups: winners, losers, and non-voters. Non-voters' gap (14.3 percentage points, 95% CI: 12.7–15.8) is virtually identical to that of winners (13.9 pp, 95% CI: 13.2–14.7) and clearly below that of losers (17.3 pp, 95% CI: 16.3–18.3).

Table H13: Procedural-Substantive Gap by Electoral Status Group

group	mean_gap	se	ci_low	ci_high
Winner	0.139	0.004	0.132	0.147
Loser	0.173	0.005	0.163	0.183
Non-voter	0.143	0.008	0.127	0.158

Table G3 disaggregates these patterns by item set.

Table H14: Item Choice Proportions by Electoral Status Group

Item	Loser	Non-voter	Winner	set	Loser - Winner	NonVoter - Winner	type
Reduce gap rich/poor	0.199	0.216	0.209	Set1	-0.010	0.007	substantive
Free elections	0.346	0.334	0.370	Set1	-0.023	-0.035	procedural
No waste	0.192	0.192	0.183	Set1	0.009	0.009	governance
Free expression	0.262	0.258	0.238	Set1	0.024	0.020	procedural
Legislature oversight	0.152	0.128	0.139	Set2	0.013	-0.011	procedural
Basic necessities	0.308	0.340	0.327	Set2	-0.019	0.012	substantive
Organize groups	0.168	0.166	0.155	Set2	0.013	0.011	procedural
Quality services	0.372	0.366	0.378	Set2	-0.006	-0.012	governance
Law and order	0.252	0.273	0.298	Set3	-0.046	-0.025	governance
Media freedom	0.208	0.184	0.169	Set3	0.039	0.015	procedural
Jobs for all	0.342	0.357	0.352	Set3	-0.010	0.005	substantive
Party competition	0.198	0.187	0.181	Set3	0.017	0.006	procedural
Protest freedom	0.188	0.193	0.185	Set4	0.004	0.009	procedural
Clean politics	0.379	0.328	0.368	Set4	0.011	-0.040	governance
Court protection	0.226	0.255	0.228	Set4	-0.002	0.027	procedural
Unemployment aid	0.207	0.223	0.219	Set4	-0.012	0.004	substantive

Note: L - W = Loser minus Winner; NV - W = Non-voter minus Winner. Positive values on procedural items indicate greater procedural orientation relative to winners.

Table G4 reports pairwise chi-square tests indicating that non-voters differ more from losers than from winners across all item sets (Cramér's V for the loser–non-voter comparison ranges from 0.020 to 0.052, consistently exceeding the winner–non-voter comparison of 0.021 to 0.038).

Table H15: Pairwise Chi-Square Tests and Effect Sizes

comparison	chi_sq	df	p_value	cramers_v	set
Winner vs Loser	26.063	3	0.000	0.033	Set1
Winner vs Non-voter	19.031	3	0.000	0.032	Set1
Loser vs Non-voter	5.305	3	0.151	0.020	Set1
Overall (3 groups)	37.507	6	0.000	0.026	Set1
Winner vs Loser	17.983	3	0.000	0.028	Set2
Winner vs Non-voter	8.243	3	0.041	0.021	Set2
Loser vs Non-voter	20.393	3	0.000	0.040	Set2
Overall (3 groups)	30.390	6	0.000	0.024	Set2
Winner vs Loser	95.838	3	0.000	0.064	Set3
Winner vs Non-voter	12.199	3	0.007	0.025	Set3
Loser vs Non-voter	16.732	3	0.001	0.036	Set3
Overall (3 groups)	97.549	6	0.000	0.042	Set3
Winner vs Loser	5.622	3	0.132	0.016	Set4
Winner vs Non-voter	27.146	3	0.000	0.038	Set4
Loser vs Non-voter	34.931	3	0.000	0.052	Set4
Overall (3 groups)	39.671	6	0.000	0.027	Set4

These patterns indicate that non-voters resemble winners who chose not to participate rather than disaffected citizens with distinctive democratic conceptions. Their exclusion does not

inflate the estimated loser effect.

I Fairness Interaction: Positional Updating vs. Stable Commitments

As a further test distinguishing positional updating from stable normative commitments, the analysis interacts loser status with perceived electoral fairness (ABS Q43, dichotomized into fair versus unfair). The design follows Mauk (2022), who demonstrates that electoral integrity conditions the relationship between political losing and political trust across 45 democracies using harmonized ABS, ESS, and Latinobarómetro data. The logic also draws on research on motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990; Taber and Lodge 2006) and loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979): if the loser effect reflects positional updating, it should intensify among losers who perceive elections as unfair—those for whom the procedural threat is most salient. If it instead reflects stable dispositional commitments to procedural democracy, the interaction should be weak: committed proceduralists would prioritize procedures regardless of fairness perceptions. Perceived fairness is itself endogenous to electoral status—losers tend to rate elections as less fair—but the interaction nonetheless provides leverage because it tests for heterogeneity *within* the loser group.

Table I16: Loser Effect by Perceived Electoral Fairness

Item	Set	Type	Loser Effect: Fair (pp)	Loser Effect: Unfair (pp)	Interaction (pp)
Set 1					
Reduce gap rich/poor	Set1	substantive	-2.6	-2.4	+0.2
Free elections	Set1	procedural	+0.0	-2.4	-2.4
No waste	Set1	governance	-0.5	+0.2	+0.7
Free expression	Set1	procedural	+3.1	+4.6	+1.5
Set 2					
Legislature oversight	Set2	procedural	-0.3	+2.2	+2.5
Basic necessities	Set2	substantive	-2.8	-5.3	-2.5
Organize groups	Set2	procedural	+2.9	+2.8	-0.2
Quality services	Set2	governance	+0.2	+0.3	+0.2
Set 3					
Law and order	Set3	governance	-5.1	-4.4	+0.7
Media freedom	Set3	procedural	+2.7	+6.1	+3.5
Jobs for all	Set3	substantive	-0.4	-4.3	-3.9
Party competition	Set3	procedural	+2.9	+2.6	-0.3
Set 4					
Protest freedom	Set4	procedural	+1.1	+1.4	+0.3
Clean politics	Set4	governance	-1.1	+1.0	+2.1
Court protection	Set4	procedural	+0.2	+6.2	+6.0
Unemployment aid	Set4	substantive	-0.1	-8.6	-8.4

Note: The loser effect columns report the difference in predicted probability of selecting each item between losers and winners, separately for respondents who perceive elections as fair versus unfair. The interaction column reports the difference between these two effects (unfair minus fair); positive values on procedural items indicate that the loser effect is amplified

among those perceiving unfair elections, consistent with positional updating.




Figure I2: Loser Effect by Perceived Electoral Fairness

The results are consistent with the positional account. Among procedural items, the majority show a positive interaction—the loser effect is larger among those who perceive elections as unfair. The pattern is particularly striking for court protection (+6.0 pp), media freedom (+3.5 pp), and free expression (+1.5 pp). Among substantive items, the interaction is more mixed, though unemployment aid shows a large negative interaction (-8.4 pp), indicating that losers perceiving unfair elections shift *away* from substantive conceptions even more strongly. These patterns suggest that the loser effect is amplified by perceived procedural threat rather than reflecting a fixed orientation.

J Three-Way Loser Decomposition

A natural extension of the binary winner-loser framework decomposes losers into **key opposition** supporters (those who voted for the main opposition party or coalition) and **other** losers (minor party voters, independents). If the procedural orientation is driven by strategic positioning, it should be concentrated among key opposition supporters—those with a realistic path back to power—rather than diffused across all losers. Party-level coding was feasible for three countries: Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand, where coalition structures are well-documented and party codes can be reliably mapped to electoral blocs across waves.¹

¹For Taiwan, the three-way coding references legislative majorities to determine coalition membership, whereas the main analysis uses the ABS pre-coded electoral status based on presidential elections. This design choice does not affect the internal validity of the decomposition, which compares groups within the three-way framework only.

Table J17: Item Choice Proportions by Three-Way Electoral Status (Pooled)

Item	Type	Winner	Key Opp.	Other	KO – W	Other – W
Set 1						
Reduce gap rich/poor	substantive	0.275	0.281	0.296	0.006	0.021
Free elections	procedural	0.333	0.304	0.257	-0.029	-0.076
No waste	governance	0.198	0.192	0.235	-0.006	0.038
Free expression	procedural	0.195	0.224	0.212	0.029	0.017
Set 2						
Legislature oversight	procedural	0.143	0.139	0.174	-0.004	0.031
Basic necessities	substantive	0.339	0.349	0.382	0.011	0.044
Organize groups	procedural	0.141	0.108	0.097	-0.033	-0.044
Quality services	governance	0.378	0.404	0.347	0.026	-0.031
Set 3						
Law and order	governance	0.351	0.376	0.287	0.025	-0.064
Media freedom	procedural	0.216	0.147	0.193	-0.069	-0.023
Jobs for all	substantive	0.292	0.319	0.373	0.027	0.082
Party competition	procedural	0.141	0.158	0.147	0.017	0.005
Set 4						
Protest freedom	procedural	0.181	0.161	0.138	-0.019	-0.043
Clean politics	governance	0.371	0.349	0.331	-0.023	-0.041
Court protection	procedural	0.321	0.301	0.257	-0.019	-0.063
Unemployment aid	substantive	0.127	0.189	0.274	0.062	0.147

Table J18: Key Opposition vs. Winner: Procedural-Substantive Gap by Country

Country	N Winner	N Key Opp.	N Other	Mean proc diff (KO-W)	Mean sub diff (KO-W)	Proc-Sub gap
Taiwan	1181	2144	368	-0.023	-0.007	-0.016
South Korea	1518	863	189	0.010	-0.015	0.025
Thailand	199	418	760	-0.018	0.063	-0.080

To probe the mechanism underlying positional updating, this appendix decomposes electoral losers into two subgroups: supporters of the principal opposition party (“Key Opposition”) and all remaining losers, including minor party supporters and political independents (“Other Losers”). If positional updating were driven by partisan strategy—where opposition elites signal procedural commitments to their base—the effect should concentrate disproportionately among Key Opposition supporters, who receive the strongest elite cues. By contrast, if the mechanism operates through exclusion from state authority more broadly, both subgroups should exhibit comparable procedural orientations.

Pooled across three countries ($N = 7,640$ respondents with valid three-way coding), key opposition voters show a mean procedural difference of -0.016 relative to winners, with only 2 of 8 procedural items positive. The procedural-substantive gap between key opposition and winners (-0.042) is small. By country, only South Korea shows a weakly positive gap ($+0.025$); Taiwan (-0.016) and Thailand (-0.080) both run in the opposite direction. Across specifications, Other Losers display procedural orientations that are substantively comparable to—and in several cases stronger than—those observed among Key Opposition supporters. The differences between the two loser subgroups do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in any specification.

These findings are more consistent with an exclusion-based mechanism than with a strategic-signaling account. Citizens who lack even the organizational infrastructure of a major opposition party may experience the most acute sense of exclusion from governing authority, reinforcing rather than undermining the positional updating framework.

Two caveats qualify the interpretation. First, only three countries in the sample permit this decomposition, limiting statistical power and generalizability. Second, the categories are necessarily coarse; within “Other Losers,” the political situations of minor party supporters and nonpartisan independents likely differ in ways the data cannot capture. The analysis should therefore be read as suggestive rather than definitive. What it does establish is that the loser effect is not an artifact of opposition party mobilization alone, lending additional support to the broader exclusion-based interpretation of positional updating developed in the main text.

K Thailand Wave 4 Exclusion Robustness

Thailand Wave 4 (2014–2016) was fielded after the May 2014 military coup, which followed the Constitutional Court’s annulment of the February 2014 election. The ABS coded winner/loser status for 382 of 1,200 respondents (31.8%) based on prior electoral behavior; the remaining 51.1% are coded as missing on q34a, likely reflecting respondent reluctance to disclose vote choice under military rule. To verify that the inclusion of this country-wave does not distort the pooled estimates, Table K1 re-estimates all four multinomial logit models with Thailand W4 excluded ($N \approx 380$ observations dropped per set).

Table K19: Pooled AMEs: Full Sample vs. Thailand W4 Excluded

Set	Item	Full Sample (pp)	Thai W4 Excluded (pp)	Diff (pp)
Set 1				
Set1	Reduce gap rich/poor	-1.46 (0.82)	-1.31 (0.81)	+0.15
Set1	Free elections	-1.02 (0.78)	-1.02 (0.79)	-0.00
Set1	No waste	-0.68 (0.79)	-0.79 (0.81)	-0.11
Set1	Free expression	+3.16 (1.20)	+3.12 (1.22)	-0.04
Set 2				
Set2	Legislature oversight	+0.98 (0.90)	+0.96 (0.91)	-0.03
Set2	Basic necessities	-2.12 (0.96)	-1.99 (0.97)	+0.12
Set2	Organize groups	+2.34 (1.22)	+2.31 (1.24)	-0.03
Set2	Quality services	-1.21 (1.70)	-1.28 (1.75)	-0.07
Set 3				
Set3	Law and order	-4.99 (1.09)	-5.02 (1.09)	-0.03
Set3	Media freedom	+3.81 (0.65)	+3.90 (0.65)	+0.08
Set3	Jobs for all	-0.91 (1.35)	-0.92 (1.38)	-0.01
Set3	Party competition	+2.09 (1.28)	+2.05 (1.28)	-0.04
Set 4				
Set4	Protest freedom	+1.16 (0.92)	+1.02 (0.88)	-0.14
Set4	Clean politics	-0.69 (0.85)	-0.42 (0.83)	+0.28
Set4	Court protection	+0.32 (0.83)	+0.32 (0.84)	+0.01
Set4	Unemployment aid	-0.79 (1.11)	-0.92 (1.17)	-0.14

Note: Average marginal effects in percentage points, with bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. Maximum absolute difference across all 16 items: 0.28 percentage points. All coefficient signs are identical.

L V-Dem Moderator: Democratic Erosion and the Loser Effect

To probe whether the loser effect systematically amplifies in contexts of democratic erosion, I use country-wave V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index scores to construct a continuous moderator. For each country-wave cell in the main sample, I compute the change in the V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index between the election reference year and the prior wave's reference year (ΔLDI). Positive values indicate democratization; negative values indicate erosion. I then correlate this change score with the country-wave-level procedural-substantive gap (the difference in mean procedural and substantive AMEs), treating each country-wave as a single observation ($N = 27$).




Figure L3: V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index Change and the Loser Effect (Country-Wave Cells)

Figure L1 plots the country-wave procedural-substantive gap against V-Dem LDI change. The correlation is negative ($r = -0.228, p = 0.253, N = 27$): country-waves that experienced more democratic erosion tend to show larger loser-winner gaps in procedural orientations. The OLS slope implies that a 0.10-unit decline in the Liberal Democracy Index corresponds descriptively to a 2.0 percentage-point larger procedural-substantive gap—a modest but directionally consistent association. The direction is consistent with the case comparison in the main text—Thailand’s dramatic erosion coincides with its large and growing gap, while South Korea’s institutionally mediated crisis leaves the gap largely intact. However, the confidence interval is wide and the association does not reach conventional significance thresholds ($p = 0.253$). With only 27 country-wave observations and a single continuous

moderator, the analysis is substantially underpowered to detect anything short of a very large moderating relationship. The scatter provides descriptive corroboration of the qualitative cross-national pattern but should not be read as a formal test.

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