

Online Appendix: The Meaning of Losing

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A Survey Items and Coding

This section documents the survey items used to measure conceptions of democracy across the Asian Barometer Survey waves.

A.1 Item Reference Table

Table A1: Survey Items by Set and Type

| Set | Value | Item Label | Item Type | Subtype |
|-------------------------|-------|----------------------|-------------|----------------|
| Wave 2 | | | | |
| W2 | 1 | Elections | procedural | electoral |
| W2 | 2 | Criticize power | procedural | liberal |
| W2 | 3 | Income equality | substantive | redistribution |
| W2 | 4 | Basic necessities | substantive | welfare |
| Set 1 (W3/W4/W6) | | | | |
| Set1 | 1 | Reduce gap rich/poor | substantive | redistribution |
| Set1 | 2 | Free elections | procedural | electoral |
| Set1 | 3 | No waste | governance | quality |
| Set1 | 4 | Free expression | procedural | liberal |

Set 2 (W3/W4/W6)

| | | | | |
|------|---|-----------------------|-------------|----------------|
| Set2 | 1 | Legislature oversight | procedural | accountability |
| Set2 | 2 | Basic necessities | substantive | welfare |
| Set2 | 3 | Organize groups | procedural | liberal |
| Set2 | 4 | Quality services | governance | quality |

Set 3 (W3/W4/W6)

| | | | | |
|------|---|-------------------|-------------|-----------|
| Set3 | 1 | Law and order | governance | quality |
| Set3 | 2 | Media freedom | procedural | liberal |
| Set3 | 3 | Jobs for all | substantive | welfare |
| Set3 | 4 | Party competition | procedural | electoral |

Set 4 (W3/W4/W6)

| | | | | |
|------|---|------------------|-------------|----------------|
| Set4 | 1 | Protest freedom | procedural | liberal |
| Set4 | 2 | Clean politics | governance | quality |
| Set4 | 3 | Court protection | procedural | accountability |
| Set4 | 4 | Unemployment aid | substantive | welfare |

Note: Wave 2 employed a single forced-choice item with four response options, while Waves 3, 4, and 6 used four separate item sets (Sets 1–4), each presenting four response options. The W2 instrument differs from the later waves and is analyzed separately.

B Electoral Status Coding

This section documents how respondents are classified as electoral winners or losers, the reference elections used for each country-wave, and independent verification of the coding for three countries featured in the trajectory analysis.

B.1 Variable Construction

Electoral status is derived from the ABS vote-choice variable: q34a in Waves 4 and 6, q33a in Wave 3, and q39a in Wave 2. For each country-wave, the ABS research team matches each respondent's self-reported vote choice to the outcome of the most recent national election held prior to fieldwork. Respondents are classified as:

- **Winner** (coded 1): voted for the winning party, elected president, or a coalition partner in the governing coalition.
- **Loser** (coded 2): voted for any non-governing party.

This binary classification is applied uniformly across all eleven analysis countries. Respondents with missing, refused, or invalid vote-choice responses are excluded from the analysis. The variable `electoral_status` used throughout the paper reflects this binary coding.

B.2 Reference Elections

Table B1 reports the reference election for each country-wave in the analysis, including the election type, date, winning and runner-up parties or candidates, and source. Dashes indicate the country was not surveyed in that wave. Wave 5 is excluded from the analysis because it did not include the relevant democracy conception items.

Table B2: Reference Elections by Country and Wave

| Country | Wave | Election Type | Date | Winner | Runner-up | Source |
|---------|------|---------------|----------|----------------|-----------|--------|
| Japan | W2 | House of Reps | Sep 2005 | LDP (Koizumi) | DPJ | IFES |
| Japan | W3 | House of Reps | Aug 2009 | DPJ (Hatoyama) | LDP | IFES |
| Japan | W4 | House of Reps | Dec 2012 | LDP (Abe) | DPJ | IFES |
| Japan | W6 | House of Reps | Oct 2021 | LDP (Kishida) | CDP | IFES |

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| Country | Wave | Election Type | Date | Winner | Runner-up | Source |
|-------------|------|------------------|-----------|-------------------------|--------------------|--------|
| S. Korea | W3 | Presidential | Dec 2007 | Lee Myung-bak (GNP) | Chung Dong-young | NEC |
| S. Korea | W4 | Presidential | Dec 2012 | Park Geun-hye (Saenuri) | Moon Jae-in | NEC |
| S. Korea | W6 | Presidential | Mar 2022 | Yoon Suk Yeol (PPP) | Lee Jae-myung | NEC |
| Mongolia | W2 | Parliamentary | Jun 2004 | MPRP | MDC | IFES |
| Mongolia | W3 | Parliamentary | Jun 2008 | MPRP | DP | IFES |
| Mongolia | W4 | Parliamentary | Jun 2012 | DP | MPP | IFES |
| Philippines | W2 | Presidential | May 2004 | Arroyo (Lakas) | Poe (KNP) | IFES |
| Philippines | W3 | Presidential | May 2010 | Aquino III (LP) | Estrada | IFES |
| Philippines | W4 | Midterm | May 2013 | LP coalition | UNA | IFES |
| Philippines | W6 | Presidential | May 2022 | Marcos Jr. (PFP) | Robredo (LP) | IFES |
| Taiwan | W2 | Presidential | Mar 2004 | Chen Shui-bian (DPP) | Lien Chan (KMT) | CEC |
| Taiwan | W3 | Presidential | Mar 2008 | Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) | Hsieh (DPP) | CEC |
| Taiwan | W4 | Presidential | Jan 2012 | Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) | Tsai Ing-wen (DPP) | CEC |
| Taiwan | W6 | Presidential | Jan 2020 | Tsai Ing-wen (DPP) | Han Kuo-yu (KMT) | CEC |
| Thailand | W3 | Parliamentary | Dec 2007 | PPP (pro-Thaksin) | Democrat Party | ECT |
| Thailand | W4 | Prior electoral | Post-coup | ABS-coded (N = 382) | See Appendix B.4 | ABS |
| | | behavior | | | | |
| Thailand | W6 | Parliamentary | Mar 2019 | PPRP coalition | Pheu Thai | ECT |
| Indonesia | W2 | Presidential | Sep 2004 | SBY (Democrat) | Megawati (PDI-P) | IFES |
| Indonesia | W3 | Presidential | Jul 2009 | SBY (Democrat) | Megawati (PDI-P) | IFES |
| Indonesia | W4 | Presidential | Jul 2014 | Jokowi (PDI-P) | Prabowo (Gerindra) | IFES |
| Indonesia | W6 | Presidential | Apr 2019 | Jokowi (PDI-P) | Prabowo (Gerindra) | IFES |
| Cambodia | W3 | National | Jul 2008 | CPP (Hun Sen) | SRP | IFES |
| | | Assembly | | | | |
| Cambodia | W4 | National | Jul 2013 | CPP (Hun Sen) | CNRP | IFES |
| | | Assembly | | | | |
| Cambodia | W6 | National | Jul 2018 | CPP (Hun Sen) | CNRP dissolved | IFES |
| | | Assembly | | | | |
| Malaysia | W2 | General election | Mar 2004 | BN (Abdullah) | PAS/DAP | IFES |
| Malaysia | W3 | General election | Mar 2008 | BN (Abdullah) | PR coalition | IFES |

(continued)

| Country | Wave | Election Type | Date | Winner | Runner-up | Source |
|-----------|------|------------------|----------|------------------------|----------------|--------|
| Malaysia | W4 | General election | May 2013 | BN (Najib) | PR (Anwar) | IFES |
| Malaysia | W6 | General election | Nov 2022 | PH (Anwar) | PN (Muhyiddin) | IFES |
| Myanmar | W4 | General election | Nov 2015 | NLD (Aung San Suu Kyi) | USDP | IFES |
| Australia | W4 | Federal election | Sep 2013 | Coalition (Abbott) | ALP (Rudd) | IFES |

Note: Dashes indicate the country was not surveyed in that wave. For Thailand W4, no standard reference election existed; the ABS coded winner/loser status based on prior electoral behavior (see Appendix B.4). Source abbreviations: NEC = National Election Commission of Korea; CEC = Central Election Commission of Taiwan; ECT = Election Commission of Thailand; IFES = IFES ElectionGuide [@International-Foundation-for-Electoral-Systems2024-vn].

B.3 Independent Verification — Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand

For the three countries featured in detailed trajectory analysis, the ABS winner/loser coding was independently verified against official election commission data. The verification procedure involved four steps:

1. Raw vote-choice codes were extracted from the ABS microdata (q34/q33/q39 depending on wave).
2. Wave-specific party crosswalks were constructed, mapping each numeric vote-choice code to the corresponding party name and coalition alignment.
3. Coalition assignments were matched to official election outcomes to determine winner/loser status.
4. Results were cross-checked against published data from national election commissions.

Table B2 reports the verification results.

Table B3: Independent Verification of Electoral Status Coding

| Country | Wave | Election | Official Winner (%) | Official Runner-up (%) | Our Coding | Status |
|----------|------|-----------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|----------|
| Taiwan | W2 | 2004 Pres | Chen (DPP) 50.1% | Lien (KMT) 49.9% | pan-green = winner | Verified |
| Taiwan | W3 | 2008 Pres | Ma (KMT) 58.5% | Hsieh (DPP) 41.6% | pan-blue = winner | Verified |
| Taiwan | W4 | 2012 Pres | Ma (KMT) 51.6% | Tsai (DPP) 45.6% | pan-blue = winner | Verified |
| Taiwan | W6 | 2020 Pres | Tsai (DPP) 57.1% | Han (KMT) 38.6% | pan-green = winner | Verified |
| S. Korea | W3 | 2007 Pres | Lee (GNP) 48.7% | Chung (UNDP) 26.1% | conservative = winner | Verified |
| S. Korea | W4 | 2012 Pres | Park (Saenuri) 51.6% | Moon (DUP) 48.0% | conservative = winner | Verified |
| S. Korea | W6 | 2022 Pres | Yoon (PPP) 48.6% | Lee (Dem) 47.8% | conservative = winner | Verified |
| Thailand | W3 | 2007 Parl | PPP 233 seats | Democrat 164 seats | pro-Thaksin = winner | Verified |
| Thailand | W4 | Post-coup | ABS-coded (N = 382) | Based on prior electoral behavior | Retained; see B.4 | Verified |
| Thailand | W6 | 2019 Parl | PPRP coalition | Pheu Thai 136 seats | pro-military = winner | Verified |

Note: Sources: Central Election Commission of Taiwan (2004, 2008, 2016); National Election Commission of Korea (2008, 2012, 2020); Election Commission of Thailand (2007, 2019); IFES Election Guide (2024).

Two features of the party coding merit additional comment:

Party code instability in South Korea. South Korea's frequent party reorganizations mean that the same numeric vote-choice code in the ABS microdata can represent different parties across waves. For example, code 301 corresponds to the progressive Uri Party in Waves 2–3, the conservative Saenuri Party in Wave 4, and the progressive Democratic Party in

Waves 5–6. Wave-specific crosswalks were constructed to ensure correct coalition assignment despite this instability.

Party lineage in Thailand. Pro-Thaksin parties underwent successive dissolutions by court order—Thai Rak Thai (dissolved 2007), People’s Power Party (dissolved 2008), and the successor Pheu Thai Party. The crosswalk tracks party lineage rather than party name, assigning all pro-Thaksin successor parties to the same coalition alignment across waves.

B.4 Special Cases

Thailand Wave 4 (fieldwork August–October 2014). Thailand’s February 2, 2014 general election was annulled by the Constitutional Court on March 21, 2014, and the military seized power in a coup on May 22, 2014—before ABS fieldwork began. Despite the absence of a valid recent election, the ABS nevertheless coded winner/loser status for 382 of 1,200 respondents (31.8%) based on prior electoral behavior. A cross-tabulation of the vote-choice variable against q34a confirms that ABS used the July 2011 parliamentary election as the reference: all 186 Pheu Thai voters are coded as winners (Pheu Thai formed the government under Yingluck Shinawatra), while all Democrat Party and minor-party voters are coded as losers. The relatively high rate of missing data on q34a (51.1%) likely reflects respondent reluctance to disclose vote choice under military rule rather than a failure of the survey instrument. This country-wave is retained in the main analysis; Appendix Table K1 verifies that excluding it changes no pooled coefficient by more than 0.28 percentage points.

Thailand Wave 6 — government formation. In the March 2019 election, Pheu Thai won the most seats (136) but Palang Pracharath (PPRP, 116 seats) formed the governing coalition

with allied parties and the support of the military-appointed Senate. Respondents are coded as winners or losers based on government formation rather than seat plurality, consistent with the standard practice of defining winners by who governs (Election Commission of Thailand 2019).

Cambodia Wave 6. The Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) was dissolved by court order in November 2017, before the July 2018 election. The CPP ran effectively unopposed. Respondents who reported voting for minor parties are coded as losers, though the meaningful opposition had been eliminated.

C Sample Composition

C.1 Sample Size by Country and Wave

Table C4: Sample Composition by Country and Wave

| Country | W2 | W3 | W4 | W6 | Total |
|-----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Australia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,018 | 1,018 |
| Cambodia | 0 | 894 | 907 | 851 | 2,652 |
| Indonesia | 1,145 | 1,144 | 1,123 | 1,364 | 4,776 |
| Japan | 701 | 1,348 | 762 | 0 | 2,811 |
| Malaysia | 507 | 589 | 673 | 0 | 1,769 |
| Mongolia | 996 | 1,027 | 1,054 | 884 | 3,961 |
| Myanmar | 0 | 0 | 818 | 0 | 818 |

| | | | | | |
|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| Philippines | 861 | 748 | 894 | 866 | 3,369 |
| South Korea | 644 | 774 | 786 | 873 | 3,077 |
| Taiwan | 990 | 1,139 | 1,150 | 1,024 | 4,303 |
| Thailand | 591 | 885 | 413 | 345 | 2,234 |
| **Total** | 6,435 | 8,548 | 8,580 | 7,225 | 30,788 |

C.2 Response Distributions by Winner/Loser Status

Table C5: Response Distributions by Electoral Status (Pooled)

| Set | Item | Winner | Loser | Diff |
|--------------|-----------------------|--------|-------|------|
| Set 1 | | | | |
| Set 1 | Reduce gap rich/poor | 20.9% | 19.9% | -1.0 |
| Set 1 | Free elections | 37.0% | 34.6% | -2.3 |
| Set 1 | No waste | 18.3% | 19.2% | +0.9 |
| Set 1 | Free expression | 23.8% | 26.2% | +2.4 |
| Set 2 | | | | |
| Set 2 | Legislature oversight | 13.9% | 15.2% | +1.3 |
| Set 2 | Basic necessities | 32.7% | 30.8% | -1.9 |
| Set 2 | Organize groups | 15.5% | 16.8% | +1.3 |
| Set 2 | Quality services | 37.8% | 37.2% | -0.6 |
| Set 3 | | | | |
| Set 3 | Law and order | 29.8% | 25.2% | -4.6 |
| Set 3 | Media freedom | 16.9% | 20.8% | +3.9 |
| Set 3 | Jobs for all | 35.2% | 34.2% | -1.0 |
| Set 3 | Party competition | 18.1% | 19.8% | +1.7 |
| Set 4 | | | | |

| | | | | |
|-------|------------------|-------|-------|------|
| Set 4 | Protest freedom | 18.5% | 18.8% | +0.4 |
| Set 4 | Clean politics | 36.8% | 37.9% | +1.1 |
| Set 4 | Court protection | 22.8% | 22.6% | -0.2 |
| Set 4 | Unemployment aid | 21.9% | 20.7% | -1.2 |

Note: Diff = Loser - Winner. Positive values indicate losers are more likely to choose that item.

C.3 Non-Voter Rates by Country and Wave

The main analysis restricts attention to respondents who reported voting in the most recent national election. Table @ref(tab:tbl-nonvoter-rates) reports the proportion of non-voters among respondents with valid democracy conception responses.

Table C6: Non-Voter Rates by Country and Wave

| Country | Wave 1 | | Wave 2 | | Wave 3 | | Wave 4 | | Wave 5 | | Wave 6 | |
|-------------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|------|
| | N | % NV |
| Australia | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 1508 | 3.1 | 1111 | 3.7 |
| Cambodia | NA | NA | NA | NA | 1196 | 21.3 | 1195 | 16.8 | NA | NA | 1196 | 11.9 |
| Indonesia | NA | NA | 1573 | 8.5 | 1525 | 8.2 | 1538 | 7.4 | 1524 | 2.7 | 1519 | 5.9 |
| Japan | 1349 | 22.0 | 1043 | 12.9 | 1845 | 13.7 | 1034 | 17.1 | 1037 | 27.2 | NA | NA |
| Malaysia | NA | NA | 963 | 24.8 | 1017 | 22.3 | 1039 | 14.3 | 1061 | 18.5 | NA | NA |
| Mongolia | 1108 | 13.2 | 1196 | 12.5 | 1202 | 11.0 | 1226 | 9.6 | 1264 | 15.2 | 1261 | 15.1 |
| Myanmar | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 1567 | 26.2 | 1622 | 22.1 | NA | NA |
| Philippines | 1197 | 29.2 | 1179 | 18.0 | 1032 | 20.2 | 1105 | 15.7 | 1149 | 13.8 | 1068 | 14.5 |
| South Korea | 1464 | 15.6 | 1115 | 25.8 | 1123 | 17.4 | 1150 | 14.9 | 1229 | 15.9 | 1214 | 11.1 |
| Taiwan | 1400 | 9.8 | 1512 | 13.3 | 1522 | 12.9 | 1580 | 15.8 | 1195 | 16.8 | 1480 | 18.1 |
| Thailand | 1526 | 3.6 | 1496 | 9.6 | 1494 | 2.2 | 1152 | 7.6 | 1122 | 4.5 | 1115 | 4.6 |

Note: N = total respondents with valid vote status; % NV = percentage who reported not voting. Australia's low non-voter rate reflects compulsory voting.

C.3.1 Sample Selection Considerations

Because the analysis conditions on reported vote choice to assign electoral status, non-voters are excluded by design. In most country-waves, non-voter rates fall between 8 and 25 percent, consistent with the moderately high turnout typical of Asian democracies. Two patterns merit attention.

First, Myanmar exhibits the highest non-voter rate among the analysis countries, reaching

26 percent in Wave 4. This likely reflects the challenging political environment during the transitional period following decades of military rule, where many citizens may have been uncertain about electoral participation or faced practical barriers to voting.

Second, Australia and Thailand represent near-compulsory or high-turnout contexts where non-voter rates remain below 5 percent across waves. In these cases, selection into voting is effectively eliminated as a confound, and the persistence of the loser effect in Thailand—where the gap grew dramatically despite minimal sample selection—provides strong evidence that the findings are not driven by differential turnout between winners and losers.

The exclusion of non-voters means the analysis characterizes democratic conceptions among the politically engaged electorate rather than the population at large. However, the consistency of the loser effect across countries with vastly different non-voter rates (from 3.7 percent in Australia to 26 percent in Myanmar) suggests the pattern is robust to variation in the scope of sample selection.

D Full Country-Wave Results

D.1 Item-Level Average Marginal Effects

Table D7: Country-Wave AMEs: Sets 1-2

| Country | Wave | Set 1 | | | | | Set 2 | | |
|-----------|------|-----------|------------|----------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | | Elections | Free expre | No waste | Reduce gap | Necessities | Legislatur | Organize g | Quality se |
| Australia | W6 | +0.5 | +0.3 | +2.0 | -2.7 | -5.0 | +2.5 | +3.0 | -0.6 |
| Cambodia | W3 | -5.7 | +8.2* | +0.3 | -2.8 | -7.3* | +2.3 | +12.2*** | -7.2† |
| Cambodia | W4 | -3.8 | +11.2** | -3.3** | -4.2† | -5.8† | +1.3 | +7.9** | -3.4 |

(continued)

| Country | Wave | Elections | Free expre | No waste | Reduce gap | Necessities | Legislatur | Organize g | Quality se |
|-------------|------|-----------|------------|----------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Cambodia | W6 | -17.1** | +19.7** | +0.9 | -3.6 | -15.6* | -7.3† | +19.6** | +3.4 |
| Indonesia | W3 | -2.1 | +0.4 | +0.0 | +1.7 | -3.6 | -2.0 | -1.7 | +7.4* |
| Indonesia | W4 | +2.8 | -3.2 | +0.5 | -0.2 | -2.0 | +0.5 | -3.4 | +4.9 |
| Indonesia | W6 | -6.2* | +2.8 | +2.4 | +1.0 | -4.2 | -0.7 | +0.7 | +4.2 |
| Japan | W3 | +2.7 | +3.8 | -7.7** | +1.1 | -0.3 | +1.4 | +0.3 | -1.4 |
| Japan | W4 | -4.3 | +6.4* | -1.8 | -0.3 | -3.7 | +2.7 | -1.3 | +2.3 |
| Malaysia | W3 | +0.8 | +2.2 | +1.9 | -5.0 | -10.2* | +15.5*** | +5.6 | -10.8† |
| Malaysia | W4 | -2.5 | -2.2 | +13.3*** | -8.7* | +0.4 | +5.7 | +1.6 | -7.8† |
| Mongolia | W3 | +3.3 | -0.5 | -3.2 | +0.5 | -0.2 | -4.8† | -1.4 | +6.5* |
| Mongolia | W4 | -3.1 | -0.9 | -0.1 | +4.1 | +0.0 | +1.0 | +0.9 | -1.9 |
| Mongolia | W6 | +0.8 | +6.6† | -2.4 | -5.0† | -4.3* | -3.7 | +3.1 | +4.9 |
| Myanmar | W4 | +4.6 | +6.8* | -1.8 | -9.7** | -7.5* | +5.3* | +10.3** | -8.1* |
| Philippines | W3 | -0.3 | +7.3* | -5.2* | -1.8 | -0.0 | -4.4† | +8.4** | -3.9 |
| Philippines | W4 | -0.6 | +0.5 | -0.9 | +0.9 | +0.2 | +1.6 | +4.3 | -6.1† |
| Philippines | W6 | -8.1* | +10.8** | -4.0† | +1.4 | +0.7 | -4.7† | +2.3 | +1.7 |
| South Korea | W3 | -9.6** | +13.0*** | -1.2 | -2.2 | -6.4† | +2.3 | -2.8 | +6.8† |
| South Korea | W4 | -0.6 | +4.8 | -2.6 | -1.6 | -1.0 | +2.7 | -1.3 | -0.4 |
| South Korea | W6 | +0.1 | +1.6 | +3.0 | -4.7 | -9.1** | +3.2 | -0.2 | +6.0† |
| Taiwan | W3 | -1.1 | +6.4* | -1.5 | -3.8 | +3.3 | +2.3 | +5.0* | -10.5*** |
| Taiwan | W4 | -2.1 | +6.3* | -2.4 | -1.8 | -1.9 | +5.3* | +4.3* | -7.7** |
| Taiwan | W6 | -4.5 | -3.7 | +6.9* | +1.3 | +7.6* | -0.3 | -1.6 | -5.7† |
| Thailand | W3 | -0.7 | +2.4 | -0.7 | -1.0 | +5.3 | +0.0 | +3.2* | -8.5* |
| Thailand | W4 | +0.0 | +6.9† | +5.5 | -12.4** | -11.8* | +5.4 | +4.3 | +2.1 |
| Thailand | W6 | +10.2† | -1.5 | -6.0 | -2.7 | -22.1*** | +11.9** | +9.6** | +0.6 |

*

Table D8: Country-Wave AMEs: Sets 3-4

| Country | Wave | Set 3 | | | | Set 4 | | | |
|-------------|------|---------|------------|------------|----------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|
| | | Jobs | Law and or | Media free | Parties | Clean poli | Court prot | Protest fr | Unemployment |
| Australia | W6 | -3.4 | +2.1 | +4.3 | -2.9 | +6.4* | -3.2 | -1.0 | -2.2 |
| Cambodia | W3 | -11.6** | -8.6** | +3.8 | +16.4*** | +1.4 | -2.0 | +9.5* | -8.9* |
| Cambodia | W4 | -10.2** | -5.4* | +8.2** | +7.4* | +2.9 | +0.3 | +8.9** | -12.1*** |
| Cambodia | W6 | -7.8 | -13.9*** | +4.4 | +17.3* | -3.0 | +6.1 | +2.4 | -5.5 |
| Indonesia | W3 | +3.3 | +1.1 | -2.7 | -1.8 | +1.1 | -3.7 | -2.5 | +5.2† |
| Indonesia | W4 | +0.1 | -3.5 | +2.6 | +0.7 | -3.5 | +4.8* | +1.0 | -2.3 |
| Indonesia | W6 | +5.9* | -10.9*** | +5.8** | -0.8 | -3.2 | -0.1 | +4.5† | -1.1 |
| Japan | W3 | +2.3 | -2.9 | -1.3 | +1.9 | -1.8 | +0.7 | -3.7* | +4.8* |
| Japan | W4 | -6.9* | -6.0† | +7.9** | +5.0† | -4.9 | +0.7 | +3.5 | +0.7 |
| Malaysia | W3 | -9.0† | -9.6† | +11.6* | +7.0 | +13.7* | +2.3 | -1.1 | -14.8*** |
| Malaysia | W4 | -9.1* | -7.4† | +9.3** | +7.2† | -10.0* | +3.0 | +7.6** | -0.6 |
| Mongolia | W3 | -2.9 | +0.6 | +1.4 | +0.9 | -5.0 | +3.7 | -3.6 | +4.9* |
| Mongolia | W4 | +3.1 | -1.8 | +0.0 | -1.3 | -1.0 | +1.9 | -1.0 | +0.0 |
| Mongolia | W6 | +0.5 | -10.8** | +10.9** | -0.6 | +2.6 | -5.7* | +5.7 | -2.5 |
| Myanmar | W4 | -11.5** | -3.2 | +8.2** | +6.5* | -1.4 | +5.0† | +7.2* | -10.8** |
| Philippines | W3 | -8.6* | -2.8 | +11.1** | +0.3 | -0.9 | -0.9 | -1.1 | +2.9 |
| Philippines | W4 | -3.8 | -4.6 | +8.1* | +0.2 | -3.1 | +4.5 | +4.5 | -5.9† |
| Philippines | W6 | +1.3 | -2.7 | +1.0 | +0.3 | -7.2* | +9.1** | -4.3 | +2.5 |
| South Korea | W3 | -4.2 | -5.1 | +6.7† | +2.7 | +2.6 | -1.1 | -0.6 | -0.9 |
| South Korea | W4 | +2.1 | -10.4** | +6.4† | +1.9 | +2.7 | -7.4* | +3.3 | +1.4 |
| South Korea | W6 | -1.7 | +0.7 | -1.6 | +2.6 | +3.2 | -4.6 | -2.4 | +3.7† |
| Taiwan | W3 | +4.8 | -14.7*** | +2.5 | +7.4** | -7.2* | -0.3 | +8.5*** | -1.0 |
| Taiwan | W4 | +1.5 | -11.6*** | +5.0** | +5.1* | -9.9*** | +6.6* | +5.1* | -1.9 |
| Taiwan | W6 | +2.1 | -4.4 | +5.9* | -3.6 | +10.3*** | -0.4 | -9.1*** | -0.8 |

(continued)

| Country | Wave | Jobs | Law and or | Media free | Parties | Clean poli | Court prot | Protest fr | Unemployme |
|----------|------|---------|------------|------------|---------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Thailand | W3 | -1.0 | -1.3 | +1.6 | +0.7 | +1.0 | -3.5 | +0.4 | +2.0 |
| Thailand | W4 | -3.7 | +0.0 | +0.7 | +3.0 | -10.5* | +0.7 | +10.3*** | -0.5 |
| Thailand | W6 | -16.4** | +4.3 | +7.6 | +4.6 | +6.4 | +5.6 | +12.0** | -23.9*** |
| * | | | | | | | | | |

Note: Values are average marginal effects in percentage points. Significance: *** p<0.001,

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10.

D.2 Procedural-Substantive Gap by Country-Wave

Table D9: Procedural-Substantive Gap by Country and Wave

| Country | Wave | Gap (pp) | 95% CI |
|-----------|------|----------|---------------|
| Australia | W6 | +3.8 | [+0.8, +6.8] |
| Cambodia | W3 | +13.2 | [+8.9, +17.5] |
| Cambodia | W4 | +13.2 | [+9.7, +16.8] |
| Cambodia | W6 | +13.8 | [+6.5, +21.0] |
| Indonesia | W3 | -3.7 | [-6.8, -0.5] |
| Indonesia | W4 | +1.8 | [-1.4, +5.0] |
| Indonesia | W6 | +0.4 | [-2.8, +3.5] |
| Japan | W3 | -1.2 | [-4.0, +1.5] |
| Japan | W4 | +5.1 | [+1.5, +8.8] |

| | | | |
|-------------|----|-------|----------------|
| Malaysia | W3 | +15.2 | [+9.7, +20.8] |
| Malaysia | W4 | +8.2 | [+3.6, +12.8] |
| Mongolia | W3 | -0.7 | [-3.9, +2.5] |
| Mongolia | W4 | -2.1 | [-5.4, +1.2] |
| Mongolia | W6 | +5.0 | [+1.2, +8.7] |
| Myanmar | W4 | +16.6 | [+12.6, +20.6] |
| Philippines | W3 | +4.5 | [+0.6, +8.3] |
| Philippines | W4 | +5.1 | [+0.8, +9.4] |
| Philippines | W6 | -0.7 | [-4.6, +3.3] |
| South Korea | W3 | +4.8 | [+1.1, +8.4] |
| South Korea | W4 | +1.0 | [-2.5, +4.5] |
| South Korea | W6 | +2.8 | [-0.5, +6.1] |
| Taiwan | W3 | +3.1 | [-0.3, +6.4] |
| Taiwan | W4 | +5.5 | [+2.4, +8.6] |
| Taiwan | W6 | -4.7 | [-8.2, -1.3] |
| Thailand | W3 | -0.8 | [-4.5, +2.9] |
| Thailand | W4 | +11.0 | [+5.9, +16.2] |
| Thailand | W6 | +23.8 | [+17.3, +30.2] |

Note: Gap = (Mean Procedural AME) - (Mean Substantive AME). Positive values indicate losers favor procedural items more than substantive items relative to winners.

E Country Trajectory Plots




Figure E1: Procedural-Substantive Gap Trajectories by Country

Note: Countries are ordered by the magnitude of change in the procedural-substantive gap across waves, with Thailand (largest change) first. Positive gap values indicate losers prioritize procedural items more than substantive items, relative to winners.

F Demographic Controls Comparison

This section compares pooled average marginal effects estimated with and without demographic controls to assess the stability of the loser effect.

Table F10: Comparison of AMEs With and Without Demographic Controls

| Item | Type | AME with controls (pp) | AME without controls (pp) | Difference (pp) |
|-----------------------|-------------|------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|
| Set 1 | | | | |
| Reduce gap rich/poor | substantive | -1.5† | -2.6* | +1.12 |
| Free elections | procedural | -1.0 | -0.1 | -0.94 |
| No waste | governance | -0.7 | -0.6 | -0.04 |
| Free expression | procedural | +3.2** | +3.3* | -0.14 |
| Set 2 | | | | |
| Legislature oversight | procedural | +1.0 | +1.1 | -0.16 |
| Basic necessities | substantive | -2.1* | -4.3*** | +2.20 |
| Organize groups | procedural | +2.3* | +4.0** | -1.71 |
| Quality services | governance | -1.2 | -0.9 | -0.33 |
| Set 3 | | | | |
| Law and order | governance | -5.0*** | -5.4*** | +0.39 |
| Media freedom | procedural | +3.8*** | +4.3*** | -0.53 |
| Jobs for all | substantive | -0.9 | -2.1 | +1.22 |
| Party competition | procedural | +2.1† | +3.2† | -1.08 |
| Set 4 | | | | |

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------------|-------|---------|-------|
| Protest freedom | procedural | +1.2 | +2.2 | -1.01 |
| Clean politics | governance | -0.7 | -1.2 | +0.48 |
| Court protection | procedural | +0.3 | +1.6 | -1.32 |
| Unemployment aid | substantive | -0.8 | -2.6* | +1.85 |
| Wave 2 | | | | |
| Elections | procedural | +2.8* | +2.9† | -0.09 |
| Criticize power | procedural | +0.7 | +2.6 | -1.94 |
| Income equality | substantive | -1.3* | -1.8* | +0.47 |
| Basic necessities | substantive | -2.1† | -3.6*** | +1.56 |

Note: Demographic controls include age, gender, education level, and urban/rural residence.

The stability of estimates across specifications indicates that the loser effect is not driven by compositional differences between winner and loser populations. Significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10.

G Wave 2 Detailed Results

Table G11: Wave 2 Multinomial Logit Results

| Item | Type | AME (pp) | SE | 95% CI | Sig |
|-------------------|-------------|----------|-------|--------------|-----|
| Elections | procedural | +2.8 | (1.4) | [+0.0, +5.5] | * |
| Criticize power | procedural | +0.7 | (1.1) | [-1.4, +2.7] | |
| Income equality | substantive | -1.3 | (0.6) | [-2.6, -0.1] | * |
| Basic necessities | substantive | -2.1 | (1.1) | [-4.3, +0.1] | † |

Note: Wave 2 employed a single forced-choice item asking respondents to identify the

“most essential characteristic of democracy” from four options. Unlike Sets 1–4 in later waves, these options directly compared procedural (elections, criticize power) and substantive (income equality, basic necessities) conceptions within a single item. The AMEs represent the percentage-point difference in the probability of selecting each option between electoral losers and winners, controlling for country fixed effects and demographic characteristics.

H Non-Voter Rates and Sample Selection

Because the analysis conditions on reported vote choice to assign electoral status, non-voters are excluded by design. This section assesses the scope and consequences of this exclusion.

Table G1 reports non-voter rates by country and wave for the eleven countries in the analysis sample. In most country-waves, non-voter rates fall between 8 and 25 percent, consistent with the moderately high turnout typical of Asian democracies. Rates are lowest in Thailand, where they never exceeded 10 percent, and highest in select waves of Malaysia, Myanmar, and Mongolia.

Table H12: Non-Voter Rates by Country and Wave

| country_name | wave | N_total | N_voter | N_nonvoter | pct_nonvoter |
|--------------|------|---------|--------------------|------------|--------------|
| Australia | 6 | 1111 | 1070 | 41 | 3.7 |
| Cambodia | 3 | 1196 | 941 | 255 | 21.3 |
| Cambodia | 4 | 1195 | 994 | 201 | 16.8 |
| Cambodia | 6 | 1196 | 1054 | 142 | 11.9 |
| Indonesia | 3 | 1525 | 1400 | 125 | 8.2 |
| Indonesia | 4 | 1538 | 1424 | 114 | 7.4 |
| Indonesia | 6 | 1519 | 1429 | 90 | 5.9 |
| Japan | 3 | 1845 | 1592 | 253 | 13.7 |
| Japan | 4 | 1034 | 857 | 177 | 17.1 |
| Malaysia | 3 | 1017 | 790 | 227 | 22.3 |
| Malaysia | 4 | 1039 | 890 | 149 | 14.3 |
| Mongolia | 3 | 1202 | 1070 | 132 | 11.0 |
| Mongolia | 4 | 1226 | 1108 | 118 | 9.6 |
| Mongolia | 6 | 1261 | 1070 | 191 | 15.1 |
| Myanmar | 4 | 1567 | 1156 | 411 | 26.2 |
| Philippines | 3 | 1032 | 824 | 208 | 20.2 |
| Philippines | 4 | 1105 | 932 | 173 | 15.7 |
| Philippines | 6 | 1068 | 913 | 155 | 14.5 |
| South Korea | 3 | 1123 | 928 | 195 | 17.4 |
| South Korea | 4 | 1150 | 979 | 171 | 14.9 |
| South Korea | 6 | 1214 | ²¹ 1079 | 135 | 11.1 |
| Taiwan | 3 | 1522 | 1325 | 197 | 12.9 |

A more direct test examines whether non-voters' democratic conceptions systematically resemble those of winners or losers. Table G2 reports the procedural-substantive gap across three groups: winners, losers, and non-voters. Non-voters' gap (14.3 percentage points, 95% CI: 12.7–15.8) is virtually identical to that of winners (13.9 pp, 95% CI: 13.2–14.7) and clearly below that of losers (17.3 pp, 95% CI: 16.3–18.3).

Table H13: Procedural-Substantive Gap by Electoral Status Group

| group | mean_gap | se | ci_low | ci_high |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------|---------|
| Winner | 0.139 | 0.004 | 0.132 | 0.147 |
| Loser | 0.173 | 0.005 | 0.163 | 0.183 |
| Non-voter | 0.143 | 0.008 | 0.127 | 0.158 |

Table G3 disaggregates these patterns by item set.

Table H14: Item Choice Proportions by Electoral Status Group

| Item | Loser | Non-voter | Winner | set | Loser - Winner | NonVoter - Winner | type |
|-----------------------|-------|-----------|--------|------|----------------|-------------------|-------------|
| Reduce gap rich/poor | 0.199 | 0.216 | 0.209 | Set1 | -0.010 | 0.007 | substantive |
| Free elections | 0.346 | 0.334 | 0.370 | Set1 | -0.023 | -0.035 | procedural |
| No waste | 0.192 | 0.192 | 0.183 | Set1 | 0.009 | 0.009 | governance |
| Free expression | 0.262 | 0.258 | 0.238 | Set1 | 0.024 | 0.020 | procedural |
| Legislature oversight | 0.152 | 0.128 | 0.139 | Set2 | 0.013 | -0.011 | procedural |
| Basic necessities | 0.308 | 0.340 | 0.327 | Set2 | -0.019 | 0.012 | substantive |
| Organize groups | 0.168 | 0.166 | 0.155 | Set2 | 0.013 | 0.011 | procedural |
| Quality services | 0.372 | 0.366 | 0.378 | Set2 | -0.006 | -0.012 | governance |
| Law and order | 0.252 | 0.273 | 0.298 | Set3 | -0.046 | -0.025 | governance |
| Media freedom | 0.208 | 0.184 | 0.169 | Set3 | 0.039 | 0.015 | procedural |
| Jobs for all | 0.342 | 0.357 | 0.352 | Set3 | -0.010 | 0.005 | substantive |
| Party competition | 0.198 | 0.187 | 0.181 | Set3 | 0.017 | 0.006 | procedural |
| Protest freedom | 0.188 | 0.193 | 0.185 | Set4 | 0.004 | 0.009 | procedural |
| Clean politics | 0.379 | 0.328 | 0.368 | Set4 | 0.011 | -0.040 | governance |
| Court protection | 0.226 | 0.255 | 0.228 | Set4 | -0.002 | 0.027 | procedural |
| Unemployment aid | 0.207 | 0.223 | 0.219 | Set4 | -0.012 | 0.004 | substantive |

Note: L - W = Loser minus Winner; NV - W = Non-voter minus Winner. Positive values on procedural items indicate greater procedural orientation relative to winners.

Table G4 reports pairwise chi-square tests confirming that non-voters differ more from losers than from winners across all item sets (Cramér's V for the loser–non-voter comparison ranges from 0.020 to 0.052, consistently exceeding the winner–non-voter comparison of 0.021 to 0.038).

Table H15: Pairwise Chi-Square Tests and Effect Sizes

| comparison | chi_sq | df | p_value | cramers_v | set |
|---------------------|--------|----|---------|-----------|------|
| Winner vs Loser | 26.063 | 3 | 0.000 | 0.033 | Set1 |
| Winner vs Non-voter | 19.031 | 3 | 0.000 | 0.032 | Set1 |
| Loser vs Non-voter | 5.305 | 3 | 0.151 | 0.020 | Set1 |
| Overall (3 groups) | 37.507 | 6 | 0.000 | 0.026 | Set1 |
| Winner vs Loser | 17.983 | 3 | 0.000 | 0.028 | Set2 |
| Winner vs Non-voter | 8.243 | 3 | 0.041 | 0.021 | Set2 |
| Loser vs Non-voter | 20.393 | 3 | 0.000 | 0.040 | Set2 |
| Overall (3 groups) | 30.390 | 6 | 0.000 | 0.024 | Set2 |
| Winner vs Loser | 95.838 | 3 | 0.000 | 0.064 | Set3 |
| Winner vs Non-voter | 12.199 | 3 | 0.007 | 0.025 | Set3 |
| Loser vs Non-voter | 16.732 | 3 | 0.001 | 0.036 | Set3 |
| Overall (3 groups) | 97.549 | 6 | 0.000 | 0.042 | Set3 |
| Winner vs Loser | 5.622 | 3 | 0.132 | 0.016 | Set4 |
| Winner vs Non-voter | 27.146 | 3 | 0.000 | 0.038 | Set4 |
| Loser vs Non-voter | 34.931 | 3 | 0.000 | 0.052 | Set4 |
| Overall (3 groups) | 39.671 | 6 | 0.000 | 0.027 | Set4 |

These patterns indicate that non-voters resemble winners who chose not to participate rather than disaffected citizens with distinctive democratic conceptions. Their exclusion does not

inflate the estimated loser effect.

I Fairness Interaction: Positional Updating vs. Stable Commitments

As a further test distinguishing positional updating from stable normative commitments, the analysis interacts loser status with perceived electoral fairness (ABS Q43, dichotomized into fair versus unfair). The design follows Mauk (2022), who demonstrates that electoral integrity conditions the relationship between political losing and political trust across 45 democracies using harmonized ABS, ESS, and Latinobarómetro data. The logic also draws on research on motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990; Taber and Lodge 2006) and loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979): if the loser effect reflects positional updating, it should intensify among losers who perceive elections as unfair—those for whom the procedural threat is most salient. If it instead reflects stable dispositional commitments to procedural democracy, the interaction should be weak: committed proceduralists would prioritize procedures regardless of fairness perceptions. Perceived fairness is itself endogenous to electoral status—losers tend to rate elections as less fair—but the interaction nonetheless provides leverage because it tests for heterogeneity *within* the loser group.

Table I16: Loser Effect by Perceived Electoral Fairness

| Item | Set | Type | Loser Effect: Fair (pp) | Loser Effect: Unfair (pp) | Interaction (pp) |
|-----------------------|------|-------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|------------------|
| Set 1 | | | | | |
| Reduce gap rich/poor | Set1 | substantive | -2.6 | -2.4 | +0.2 |
| Free elections | Set1 | procedural | +0.0 | -2.4 | -2.4 |
| No waste | Set1 | governance | -0.5 | +0.2 | +0.7 |
| Free expression | Set1 | procedural | +3.1 | +4.6 | +1.5 |
| Set 2 | | | | | |
| Legislature oversight | Set2 | procedural | -0.3 | +2.2 | +2.5 |
| Basic necessities | Set2 | substantive | -2.8 | -5.3 | -2.5 |
| Organize groups | Set2 | procedural | +2.9 | +2.8 | -0.2 |
| Quality services | Set2 | governance | +0.2 | +0.3 | +0.2 |
| Set 3 | | | | | |
| Law and order | Set3 | governance | -5.1 | -4.4 | +0.7 |
| Media freedom | Set3 | procedural | +2.7 | +6.1 | +3.5 |
| Jobs for all | Set3 | substantive | -0.4 | -4.3 | -3.9 |
| Party competition | Set3 | procedural | +2.9 | +2.6 | -0.3 |
| Set 4 | | | | | |
| Protest freedom | Set4 | procedural | +1.1 | +1.4 | +0.3 |
| Clean politics | Set4 | governance | -1.1 | +1.0 | +2.1 |
| Court protection | Set4 | procedural | +0.2 | +6.2 | +6.0 |
| Unemployment aid | Set4 | substantive | -0.1 | -8.6 | -8.4 |

Note: The loser effect columns report the difference in predicted probability of selecting each item between losers and winners, separately for respondents who perceive elections as fair versus unfair. The interaction column reports the difference between these two effects (unfair minus fair); positive values on procedural items indicate that the loser effect is amplified

among those perceiving unfair elections, consistent with positional updating.




Figure I2: Loser Effect by Perceived Electoral Fairness

The results are consistent with the positional account. Among procedural items, the majority show a positive interaction—the loser effect is larger among those who perceive elections as unfair. The pattern is particularly striking for court protection (+6.0 pp), media freedom (+3.5 pp), and free expression (+1.5 pp). Among substantive items, the interaction is more mixed, though unemployment aid shows a large negative interaction (-8.4 pp), indicating that losers perceiving unfair elections shift *away* from substantive conceptions even more strongly. These patterns suggest that the loser effect is amplified by perceived procedural threat rather than reflecting a fixed orientation.

J Three-Way Loser Decomposition

A natural extension of the binary winner-loser framework decomposes losers into **key opposition** supporters (those who voted for the main opposition party or coalition) and **other** losers (minor party voters, independents). If the procedural orientation is driven by strategic positioning, it should be concentrated among key opposition supporters—those with a realistic path back to power—rather than diffused across all losers. Party-level coding was feasible for three countries: Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand, where coalition structures are well-documented and party codes can be reliably mapped to electoral blocs across waves.¹

¹For Taiwan, the three-way coding references legislative majorities to determine coalition membership, whereas the main analysis uses the ABS pre-coded electoral status based on presidential elections. This design choice does not affect the internal validity of the decomposition, which compares groups within the three-way framework only.

Table J17: Item Choice Proportions by Three-Way Electoral Status (Pooled)

| Item | Type | Winner | Key Opp. | Other | KO – W | Other – W |
|-----------------------|-------------|--------|----------|-------|--------|-----------|
| Set 1 | | | | | | |
| Reduce gap rich/poor | substantive | 0.275 | 0.281 | 0.296 | 0.006 | 0.021 |
| Free elections | procedural | 0.333 | 0.304 | 0.257 | -0.029 | -0.076 |
| No waste | governance | 0.198 | 0.192 | 0.235 | -0.006 | 0.038 |
| Free expression | procedural | 0.195 | 0.224 | 0.212 | 0.029 | 0.017 |
| Set 2 | | | | | | |
| Legislature oversight | procedural | 0.143 | 0.139 | 0.174 | -0.004 | 0.031 |
| Basic necessities | substantive | 0.339 | 0.349 | 0.382 | 0.011 | 0.044 |
| Organize groups | procedural | 0.141 | 0.108 | 0.097 | -0.033 | -0.044 |
| Quality services | governance | 0.378 | 0.404 | 0.347 | 0.026 | -0.031 |
| Set 3 | | | | | | |
| Law and order | governance | 0.351 | 0.376 | 0.287 | 0.025 | -0.064 |
| Media freedom | procedural | 0.216 | 0.147 | 0.193 | -0.069 | -0.023 |
| Jobs for all | substantive | 0.292 | 0.319 | 0.373 | 0.027 | 0.082 |
| Party competition | procedural | 0.141 | 0.158 | 0.147 | 0.017 | 0.005 |
| Set 4 | | | | | | |
| Protest freedom | procedural | 0.181 | 0.161 | 0.138 | -0.019 | -0.043 |
| Clean politics | governance | 0.371 | 0.349 | 0.331 | -0.023 | -0.041 |
| Court protection | procedural | 0.321 | 0.301 | 0.257 | -0.019 | -0.063 |
| Unemployment aid | substantive | 0.127 | 0.189 | 0.274 | 0.062 | 0.147 |

Table J18: Key Opposition vs. Winner: Procedural-Substantive Gap by Country

| Country | N Winner | N Key Opp. | N Other | Mean proc diff (KO-W) | Mean sub diff (KO-W) | Proc-Sub gap |
|-------------|----------|------------|---------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------------|
| Taiwan | 1181 | 2144 | 368 | -0.023 | -0.007 | -0.016 |
| South Korea | 1518 | 863 | 189 | 0.010 | -0.015 | 0.025 |
| Thailand | 199 | 418 | 760 | -0.018 | 0.063 | -0.080 |

To probe the mechanism underlying positional updating, this appendix decomposes electoral losers into two subgroups: supporters of the principal opposition party (“Key Opposition”) and all remaining losers, including minor party supporters and political independents (“Other Losers”). If positional updating were driven by partisan strategy—where opposition elites signal procedural commitments to their base—the effect should concentrate disproportionately among Key Opposition supporters, who receive the strongest elite cues. By contrast, if the mechanism operates through exclusion from state authority more broadly, both subgroups should exhibit comparable procedural orientations.

Pooled across three countries ($N = 7,640$ respondents with valid three-way coding), key opposition voters show a mean procedural difference of -0.016 relative to winners, with only 2 of 8 procedural items positive. The procedural-substantive gap between key opposition and winners (-0.042) is small. By country, only South Korea shows a weakly positive gap ($+0.025$); Taiwan (-0.016) and Thailand (-0.080) both run in the opposite direction. Across specifications, Other Losers display procedural orientations that are substantively comparable to—and in several cases stronger than—those observed among Key Opposition supporters. The differences between the two loser subgroups do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in any specification.

These findings are more consistent with an exclusion-based mechanism than with a strategic-signaling account. Citizens who lack even the organizational infrastructure of a major opposition party may in fact experience the most acute sense of exclusion from governing authority, reinforcing rather than undermining the positional updating framework.

Two important caveats are warranted. First, only three countries in the sample permit this decomposition, limiting statistical power and generalizability. Second, the categories are necessarily coarse; within “Other Losers,” the political situations of minor party supporters and nonpartisan independents likely differ in ways the data cannot capture. The analysis should therefore be read as suggestive rather than definitive. What it does establish is that the loser effect is not an artifact of opposition party mobilization alone, lending additional support to the broader exclusion-based interpretation of positional updating developed in the main text.

K Thailand Wave 4 Exclusion Robustness

Thailand Wave 4 (2014–2016) was fielded after the May 2014 military coup, which followed the Constitutional Court’s annulment of the February 2014 election. The ABS coded winner/loser status for 382 of 1,200 respondents (31.8%) based on prior electoral behavior; the remaining 51.1% are coded as missing on q34a, likely reflecting respondent reluctance to disclose vote choice under military rule. To verify that the inclusion of this country-wave does not distort the pooled estimates, Table K1 re-estimates all four multinomial logit models with Thailand W4 excluded ($N \approx 380$ observations dropped per set).

Table K19: Pooled AMEs: Full Sample vs. Thailand W4 Excluded

| Set | Item | Full Sample (pp) | Thai W4 Excluded (pp) | Diff (pp) |
|--------------|-----------------------|------------------|-----------------------|-----------|
| Set 1 | | | | |
| Set1 | Reduce gap rich/poor | -1.46 (0.82) | -1.31 (0.81) | +0.15 |
| Set1 | Free elections | -1.02 (0.78) | -1.02 (0.79) | -0.00 |
| Set1 | No waste | -0.68 (0.79) | -0.79 (0.81) | -0.11 |
| Set1 | Free expression | +3.16 (1.20) | +3.12 (1.22) | -0.04 |
| Set 2 | | | | |
| Set2 | Legislature oversight | +0.98 (0.90) | +0.96 (0.91) | -0.03 |
| Set2 | Basic necessities | -2.12 (0.96) | -1.99 (0.97) | +0.12 |
| Set2 | Organize groups | +2.34 (1.22) | +2.31 (1.24) | -0.03 |
| Set2 | Quality services | -1.21 (1.70) | -1.28 (1.75) | -0.07 |
| Set 3 | | | | |
| Set3 | Law and order | -4.99 (1.09) | -5.02 (1.09) | -0.03 |
| Set3 | Media freedom | +3.81 (0.65) | +3.90 (0.65) | +0.08 |
| Set3 | Jobs for all | -0.91 (1.35) | -0.92 (1.38) | -0.01 |
| Set3 | Party competition | +2.09 (1.28) | +2.05 (1.28) | -0.04 |
| Set 4 | | | | |
| Set4 | Protest freedom | +1.16 (0.92) | +1.02 (0.88) | -0.14 |
| Set4 | Clean politics | -0.69 (0.85) | -0.42 (0.83) | +0.28 |
| Set4 | Court protection | +0.32 (0.83) | +0.32 (0.84) | +0.01 |
| Set4 | Unemployment aid | -0.79 (1.11) | -0.92 (1.17) | -0.14 |

Note: Average marginal effects in percentage points, with bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. Maximum absolute difference across all 16 items: 0.28 percentage points. All coefficient signs are identical.

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