vernment finally in power in this to pick up the pieces in Cape Town frica where heretofore government tly in order to segregate the races. 's accession represents a revolution? ıl legacy of apartheid" will be swept nents? Yet, a major consideration in eable urban future is the degree to gress' assumption of power is a revomatter for dispute among political t does the ANC want to do with the Vith roots in late nineteenth century ianism, with its Freedom Charter for o 1950s-style British welfare socialist -reiterated article of faith of nonracial ical revolutionary force. Indeed, over rom Mandela's release (and indeed be-Tay 1994 of a government led by him, s long-held projects—such as nationalmines-and then upon being elected n no political party as Minister of Fi-Pan-Africanist Congress come to power Black appeal and its ideological dis-Africans as mere "settlers"—and thereht have signaled possibilities of more Pan-Africanist Congress, however, long ation movement in South Africa, gained a risible 1.2% of the vote in the 1994

t on truly radical change—as the ANC is constrained by the limited resources at African economy bear the cost of wholege cities? The ANC-led government has nlimited financial, natural, or human rethis is a moderately sized postcolonial again on middle-income status in an other

ployment. Moreover, the phrase "taken as a whole" papers over the deep divide within the country between Third World majority and First World minority, a divide so sedulously fostered for so long along "racial" fault-lines that by one measure (the Gini coefficient) South Africa had the highest income inequality of any country in the world. To actively dismantle the apartheid city which is so evidently and intendedly reflective and indeed constitutive of this inequality would cost a great deal. The money it would take to pursue social engineering significant enough to somehow rescramble the racial and/or ethnic groups (as formerly defined) seems to make such a prospect utterly remote. A frontal ideologically driven assault on the accreted fabric of the present city—actually knocking large parts of the apartheid city down, or pursuing extensive remodeling—would mean the destruction of shelter in a time of ever-continuing severe housing shortage. And this in a country which is not rich.

No, a more realistic government policy would be to pour resources into low-income, basic public housing. Thus the city would be changed only in areas of new construction, mostly on its periphery. This is indeed one of the main ways in which over four decades the apartheid city was achieved, but it was an enormously demanding and ongoing diversion of energies for the Afrikaner Nationalist governments. To them it was an ideological and strategic commitment of the highest order, for in it they saw one of the hopes for their survival. As a numerical minority, they felt they had to keep the cities mainly White and to put the Black African majority at arm's length, safely under surveillance in controllable, custom-built peripheral townships. Yet even the Nationalists with all their planned Sowetos and Mdantsanes could hardly keep up with the Black demographic realities of rural-urban migration and absolute population increase. At immense cost, they as it were ran as fast as they could, only to stay in the same place.

It seems unlikely that such expensive schemes for low-income public housing will loom so high on the ANC-led government's agenda. Whether it be the erosion of the council housing idea in Thatcherite Britain in the 1980s or the collapse at the end of that decade of "actually existing socialism" in Eastern Europe and then in the Soviet Union, state-provided completed housing seems at least for the moment to have globally gone into partial eclipse. Communist ANC leader and 1994 Minister of Housing Joe Slovo's last efforts were to