

electrical provision, and the furnish-
ally limited educational facilities. In-
C-led government appear to have as
t in housing. In early 1995 Minister
utlining the priorities of the govern-
tion and Development Programme,
olute priority" because of its "enor-
st of the economy. He also said, how-
that the government is not in the
rlier, in the first days of the new gov-
of the Building Industries Federation
dicted some 100,000 houses would be
e sixteen months that had elapsed by
ouses were built with state assistance.
ed mortgages, by November 1995 not
000 low-income home loans had been

costs, any attempt to truly undo apart-
cy could incur social and political costs
might quite likely overwhelm the ben-
immediately encountered could prove
African people. Suppose, for example,
als of Whites from neighborhoods in
Group Areas Act, they had supplanted
t White. In many cases this would not
duals who first profited from such resi-
o encourage Whites who possessed skills
South African economic development to
untry. Nor would such urban reordering
e. In some areas Coloureds were obliged
r Indians to supplant Black Africans; and
visions even among Black Africans. The
able of being exacerbated is very long-
passions aroused by such groups' claims
ed the term "ethnic cleansing" in the last
experience of another country just eight
frica, a country cobbled together by out-
as. One fears then, for the perhaps fragile

ment seems unlikely, whether it be either to undo the apartheid legacy in existing urban space or to be directly engaged in the production of a new urban space of mass housing schemes. This being so, I am logically led to agree with David Smith's striking comment of four years ago: "The post-apartheid city is already here."⁴ What does this city look like, and in what ways is it different from its regimented predecessor?

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The villain of *Outcast Cape Town* is the Group Areas Act. It was repealed in 1991. Before we ask how much Cape Town is changing as a result, there is another repeal to bear in mind: that of the Pass Law (properly, the "Urban Areas Act"). Because the focus of *Outcast Cape Town* was on Coloured people, this latter act, being directed at Black Africans, did not loom so large in the book's total narrative. But it is the repeal in 1986 of the Pass Law, and the nonimplementation of subsequent associated administrative controls, plus the abandonment in 1988 of the Coloured Labour Preference Area regulations, that have brought the greatest change to Cape Town. "Unprotected" by these measures, metropolitan Cape Town is now being rapidly Africanized, something foreseen on p. 323 of *Outcast Cape Town*.

The repeal of the Pass Law is central to recent changes in the other South African metropolitan areas also. The series of Urban Areas Acts was an attempt to limit the number of Black Africans coming into the cities in a country in which Whites were decidedly outnumbered by Blacks. The proportion of Whites to Black Africans in South Africa continues to diminish—self-evidently the most basic of reasons behind the eventual turn by the Afrikaner Nationalists to a negotiated settlement. When *Outcast Cape Town* was originally being researched, the proportion of Whites to Black Africans in the country was 1 to 5.2; now it is 1 to 6. More dramatically, the total number of Black Africans in South Africa has in the past twenty years risen from 19.5 million to 40 million. As Dewar succinctly put it, "The dominant demographic tendencies are faster, younger, and poorer."⁵ Such demographic circumstances play their role in South Africa's becoming a labor-surplus economy, the corollary of which is that the unemployment rate among the economically active Black African urban population may be rising as high as 45%. Yet conditions in the rural areas are frequently so miserable that in the absence of Pass Law controls,