Online Appendix for: "Perceiving Fact-Checks as Biased but Nevertheless Persuaded? Effects of Fact-Checking News Delivered by Partisan Media"

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A Treatment materials

A.1 Study 1

Following two statements are criticizing (or advocating) the economic policy of liberal government based on factually incorrect information. After reading one of the statements, participants are required to read fact-checking news by liberal media (*Hankyoreh*) or conservative media (*Chosunilbo*) debunking the information was wrong. Actual treatment materials of fact-checking news are from Figure A1 to Figure A4.

Statement including misinformation (by liberal politician)

The legislator [pseudonym], a member of the Minju Party (the ruling party), expressed his view on the economic policies of President Moon's administration last January 8. He argued that future economic prospects are not as murky as it seems, on the basis that "the economic growth rate of South Korea is very high compared to other OECD countries", and "proportion of low–income workers is the lowest compared to earlier years" as a result of the economic stimulus package.

Statement including misinformation (by conservative politician)

The legislator [pseudonym], a member of the Hankuk Party (the opposition party), expressed his view on the economic policies of President Moon's administration last January 8. He criticized the current economic policy arguing that "the government is fracturing the economy," on the basis that "only the economic situation of South Korea is plummeting while the economic situation of other countries is stable."



[팩트체크] 자유한국당 이창석, 文 정부 비판 근거 타당한가?

기사입력 2019-01-18 09:12 || 기사수정 2019-01-19 10:58

지난 1월 8일 자유한국당 이창석 의원은 문재인 정부의 경제정책에 대해 자신의 페이스북 글을통해 비판했다. 이의원은 "글로벌 경기는 순항 속에 있는데 우리나라만 거꾸로 하강 국면으로들어가고 있다"는 근거 하에 문재인 정부가 "경제를 망가뜨리는 정책실험을 계속하고 있다"며 비판했다. 이 같은 이의원의 비판의 근거가 타당하지 확인해보았다.

지난 9일(현지시간)에 발표된 국제통화기금(IMF) 세계경제전망 수정보고서에 따르면, 올해 세계경제성장률 전망치는 3.7%다. 지난 7월에 비해 0.2%p 하락했다.

IMF는 그 이유로 글로벌 무역 긴장이 심화되고 신흥국 투자자금이 빠져나가는 등의 위험요인을 들었다.

지난 7월과 비교하면, 미국의 경제성장률 전망치는 2.9%로 그대로였고, 일본은 0.1%p 높아졌지만 여전히 1.1%였다. EU 회원국의 경제성장률 전망치는 0.2%p 낮아져 2.0%였다. 신흥국의 경제성장률 전망치도 0.2%p 낮아진 4.7%로 나타났다. 한국도 같은 기간 0.2%p 낮아져 2.8%다.

한국이 특별히 낮아지는 것이 아니라, 세계 경제 전반적으로 성장세가 주춤할 것이라는 전망이다.

국내 경제연구원도 같은 전망을 내놨다. 지난 9월 LG 경제연구원은 '2019년 국내외 경제전망'보고서를 통해 올해 세계 경제성장률 전망치가 상반기 3.9%에서 하반기 3.7%로 낮아졌다고 분석했다. 미국이 금리를 연달아 인상해 유동성 효과가 점차 사라지고, 미·중 무역 갈등으로 교역위축 효과가 본격화한 영향으로 풀이된다.

한국개발연구원 우천식 글로벌경제실 실장은 "국가별로 차이가 있겠지만, 글로벌 경제는 2008년 글로벌 위기 이후 조정기의 국면에 있는 것으로 보인다"며 "여기에 무역전쟁, 금리인상 등은 추가적인 부담을 줄 수 있다"고 설명했다. 이어 "OECD 국가들을 봤을 때 글로벌 경제가 호황이라고 보기에는 무리"라고 밝혔다.

결론적으로 '글로벌 경기는 순항하고 있다'는 이창석 의원의 말은 사실이 아니다.

윤동환 기자(ydh2058@chosun.com)

Figure A1: Conservative-consistent × Conservative media, Chosunilbo (Study 1)



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한국이 특별히 낮아지는 것이 아니라, 세계 경제 전반적으로 성장세가 주춤할 것이라는 전망이다.

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결론적으로 '글로벌 경기는 순항하고 있다'는 이창석 의원의 말은 사실이 아니다.

윤동환 기자(ydh2058@hani.com)

Figure A2: Conservative-consistent × Liberal media, *Hankyoreh* (Study 1)



[팩트체크] 한국 고성장?… OECD 18 위로 1996 년 이후 최저 순위

기사입력 2019-01-18 09:12 || 기사수정 2019-01-19 10:58

더불어민주당 이창석 의원이 지난 1월 8일 문재인 정부의 지난 2년간 경제 정책을 평가한 발언이 논란이다.

그는 지금까지의 경제 상황이 좋다고만은 할 수 없으나 앞으로의 상황까지 부정적으로 볼 필요는 없다고 주장하며, G20 국가나 OECD 국가중 한국은 상당히 고성장이라는 근거를 제시했다.

이 발언과 관련해 정부에 유리한 수치와 통계만 인용하고, 그 반대 자료는 무시해 보고싶은 것만 본다는 지적이 일고 있다.

이에 해당 근거에 대한 사실관계를 확인해보았다.

이의원의 발언은 지난해 '30-50 클럽(소득 3 만 달러, 인구 5000 만 명 이상)' 7개국(미국, 일본, 독일 등) 가운데 한국의 경제성장률이 미국 다음으로 높았다는 점에 근거한다.

하지만 0ECD 36개 회원국 가운데 우리나라의 성장률 순위는 18위에 그쳤다. 0ECD 성장률 18위는 우리나라가 0ECD에 가입한 1996년 이후 가장 낮은 순위(외환위기 때 제외)다. 문대통령은 최저임금 인상과 소득주도성장의 효과를 설명하며 "저소득 노동자 비중이 역대 최고로 낮아졌다"고 말했다.

그러나 최저임금 인상 부작용 등으로 저소득층의 실제 소득이 떨어진 것은 언급하지 않았다.

통계청에 따르면 소득 1분위(하위 20%) 소득은 지난해 1분기(전년 대비, -8.0%), 2분기(-7.6%), 3분기(-7.0%), 4분기(-17.7%) 등으로 악화했다.

결론적으로 이창석 의원이 제시한 근거는 사실이 아니다.

윤동환 기자(ydh2058@chosun.com)

Figure A3: Liberal-consistent × Conservative media, *Chosunilbo* (Study 1)



[팩트체크] 한국 고성장?… OECD 18 위로 1996 년 이후 최저 순위

더불어민주당 이창석 의원이 지난 1월 8일 문재인 정부의 지난 2년간 경제 정책을 평가한 발언이 논란이다.

그는 지금까지의 경제 상황이 좋다고만은 할 수 없으나 앞으로의 상황까지 부정적으로 볼 필요는 없다고 주장하며, G20 국가나 OECD 국가중 한국은 상당히 고성정이라는 근거를 제시했다.

이 발언과 관련해 정부에 유리한 수치와 통계만 인용하고, 그 반대 자료는 무시해 보고싶은 것만 본다는 지적이 일고 있다.

이에 해당 근거에 대한 사실관계를 확인해보았다.

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하지만 OECD 36개 회원국 가운데 우리나라의 성장률 순위는 18위에 그쳤다. OECD 성장률 18위는 우리나라가 OECD에 가입한 1996년 이후 가장 낮은 순위(외환위기 때 제외)다. 문대통령은 최저임금 인상과 소득주도성장의 효과를 설명하며 "저소득 노동자 비중이 역대 최고로낮아졌다"고 말했다.

그러나 최저임금 인상 부작용 등으로 저소득층의 실제 소득이 떨어진 것은 언급하지 않았다.

통계청에 따르면 소득 1분위(하위 20%) 소득은 지난해 1분기(전년 대비, -8.0%), 2분기(-7.6%), 3분기(-7.0%), 4분기(-17.7%) 등으로 악화했다.

결론적으로 이창석 의원이 제시한 근거는 사실이 아니다.

윤동환 기자(ydh2058@hani.com)

Figure A4: Liberal-consistent × Liberal media, *Hankyoreh* (Study 1)

A.2 Study 2

The statement of the U.S. President Joe Biden

In his first presidential news conference, president Joe Biden said the following:

"Truth of the matter is nothing has changed. As many people came—28% increase in children to the border in my administration; 31% in the last year in 2019, before the pandemic—in the Trump administration. It happens every single solitary year. There is a significant increase in the number of people coming to the border in the winter months of January, February, March. It happens every year."

The statement of the Arizona Governor Doug Ducey

Arizona Gov. Doug Ducey in an interview with ABC News' "This Week," said the following: Ducey, a Republican, said there has been a "460% spike in illegal apprehensions, over 100,000 people in custody," and blamed "the reverse of the Biden administration of the Trump policies, and it needs attention."

JOE BIDEN · Published 1 month ago

FACT-CHECK: Biden Skews Figures on Border

By Melvin Harrison | Fox News



President Biden on Thursday misstated the reality at the U.S.-Mexico border when he asserted that "nothing has changed" when it comes to the number of children coming to the United States since his predecessor, Donald Trump, was in office. The numbers are up since Biden became president on Jan. 20.

A look at Biden's remarks:

BIDEN, asked about the increase in immigrant children crossing the border: "Truth of the matter is nothing has changed. As many people came — 28% increase in children to the border in my administration; 31% in the last year in 2019, before the pandemic — in the Trump administration. It happens every single solitary year. There is a significant increase in the number of people coming to the border in the winter months of January, February, March. It happens every year.

THE FACTS: The president erred. Unaccompanied immigrant children have come to the border in higher numbers than what he said.

According to statistics published by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, authorities encountered 9,457 children without a parent in February, a 61% increase from January, not 28%. The numbers of unaccompanied children did rise 31% between January 2019 and February 2019.

Asked about Biden's statement, the Homeland Security Department pointed to figures for all border crossings, including adults and families traveling together. There was a 28% rise in all encounters with migrants between January and last month, compared with 31% between the same months in 2019. But Biden specifically noted a rise "in children."

Biden correctly noted seasonal trends in migration and a tendency in many years for border crossings to increase before the hot summer months. But while he tried to play down his inauguration as a reason many children and teenagers have decided to migrate to the U.S., migrants interviewed by The Associated Press have expressed hope that the country would be more permissive to migrants under Biden than under Trump.

Melvin Harrison is an editor for Fox News. Follow him on Twitter @melvin_harrison.



Figure A5: Biden \times Fox (Study 2)





Figure A6: Biden × Rueters (Study 2)



April 21, 2021, 6:31 PM

By Melvin Harrison

President Biden on Thursday misstated the reality at the U.S.-Mexico border when he asserted that "nothing has changed" when it comes to the number of children coming to the United States since his predecessor, Donald Trump, was in office. The numbers are up since Biden became president on Jan. 20.

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Figure A7: Biden \times MSNBC (Study 2)

JOE BIDEN · Published 1 month ago

FACT-CHECK: Arizona Governor Cherry-Picks Illegal Immigration Data to Exaggerate Rise Under Biden



Arizona Gov. Doug Ducey exaggerated the rise in people trying to cross the southern border illegally under President Joe Biden, when he said there has been a "460% spike in illegal apprehensions."

Ducey made his remarks in an interview with Martha Raddatz, host of ABC News' "This Week," who toured the southern border with the governor. Ducey, a Republican, said there has been a "460% spike in illegal apprehensions, over 100,000 people in custody," and blamed "the reverse of the Biden administration of the Trump policies, and it needs attention."

The 460% figure caught our attention, so we asked the governor's office for Ducey's source. A spokesperson for the governor referred us to U.S. Customs and Border Protection data for "border encounters"

"The Governor based his comments on total apprehensions from April 2020 (17,106) to February 2021 (100,441)," Bobby Charette told us in an email. That's actually a 487% increase, but it's misleading. The governor's office is using the wrong data and cherry-picking dates. CBP data for "border encounters" includes "inadmissibles," who are "individuals encountered at ports of entry who are seeking lawful admission into the United States but are determined to be inadmissible."

Ducey referred to "illegal apprehensions" — and his office referred to "total apprehensions" — so we looked at data for "border apprehensions." There were 96,974 apprehensions in February, not quite the 100,000 that the governor said. But, more importantly, Ducey compares the February data with April 2020, when both the U.S. and Mexico responded to the coronavirus pandemic with

Apprehensions dropped to 16,182 in April 2020. But then, they started to rise again, increasing noticeably in late summer and fall. By October, 69,022 people were apprehended on the southwest border — a 327% rise from April. So, apprehensions were rising while Trump's policies were in place and before the Nov. 3 election that would ultimately result in Biden's victory. That trend continued after Biden took office.

Ducey blamed Biden's policies for the rise, but the Democratic president didn't take office until Jan. 20. Comparing Trump's last full month in office in December (71,047) to Biden's first full month in office in February (96,974), apprehensions have risen 36% — not 460%.

Melvin Harrison is an editor for Fox News. Follow him on Twitter @melvin_harrison.



Figure A8: Ducey \times Fox (Study 2)





Figure A9: Ducey \times Rueters (Study 2)



April 21, 2021, 6:31 PM

By Melvin Harrison

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Ducey made his remarks in an interview with Martha Raddatz, host of ABC News' "This Week," who toured the southern border with the governor. Ducey, a Republican, said there has been a "460% spike in illegal apprehensions, over 100,000 people in custody," and blamed "the reverse of the Biden administration of the Trump policies, and it needs attention."

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Figure A10: Ducey \times MSNBC (Study 2)

A.3 Study 3

Factual misinformation about U.S. economic policy exposed to Democrats

In May, making his pitch for a bipartisan infrastructure proposal that he said would create "millions" of new jobs. A look at his claims in La Crosse, Wisconsin:

"After months of careful negotiation, of listening, of compromising together ... a bipartisan group of senators got together and they forged an agreement to move forward on the key priorities of my American Jobs Plan. ... As a result this is a generational investment — a generational investment to modernize our infrastructure, creating millions of good paying jobs. And that's not coming from me, it's coming from Wall Street."

Factual misinformation about U.S. economic policy exposed to Republicans

In May, House Republican leader Kevin McCarthy and other members of his party blamed President Joe Biden for higher gasoline and lumber costs. A look at the claims:

MCCARTHY: "Gas prices are the highest since 2014 — just as summer starts. The recent hack of the Colonial Pipeline exposed the flaws of Biden's approach to our country's energy policies. On day one he signed an executive order cancelling the Keystone XL Pipeline." — blog post Monday.

REP. LIZ CHENEY: "From cancelling the Keystone Pipeline to banning new oil & gas leasing on federal lands, Biden's energy policies are having devastating consequences. We've already seen a glimpse of this devastation with prices skyrocketing & gas shortages hitting communities across the country." — tweet Friday.

FACT-CHECKING · Published 4 hours ago

FACT CHECK: Biden distorts bipartisan infrastructure deal

By Melvin Harrison | Fox News



President Joe Biden overstated the expected employment gains Tuesday in making his pitch for a bipartisan infrastructure proposal that he said would create "millions" of new jobs. That might or might not have resulted from his initial plan, but there's a smaller one on the table now.

A look at his claims in La Crosse, Wisconsin:

BIDEN: "After months of careful negotiation, of listening, of compromising together ... a bipartisan group of senators got together and they forged an agreement to move forward on the key priorities of my American Jobs Plan. ... As a result this is a generational investment — a generational investment to modernize our infrastructure, creating millions of good paying jobs. And that's not coming from me, it's coming from Wall Street."

THE FACTS: The bipartisan proposal is not forecast to create "millions" of new jobs, according to Wall Street, but only a fraction of that.

That plan would provide \$579 billion in new infrastructure spending and create new jobs by fixing and updating the nation's crumbling roads, bridges and ports, expanding public transit and building half a million electric charging stations. But it is significantly scaled back from Biden's initial proposal for \$2.3 trillion in new spending, which Moody's Analytics estimated would create roughly 2.6 million jobs over the next decade.

Peter Williams, an analyst at investment bank Evercore ISI, estimates the bipartisan compromise package would create 450,000 to 775,000 jobs, and mostly not until 2025-2026, because infrastructure projects can take years to win approval. He projects the package would increase the economy's total output 1% in those years.


While Biden and congressional Democrats are aiming to pass the remainder of the president's proposal in separate legislation, that is meeting Republican resistance and is far from certain. Nor is that what Biden said Tuesday when he asserted the creation of "millions" of jobs just from the bipartisan pact.

The Biden team has previously offered vastly inflated projections of how many jobs his American Jobs Plan is expected to create, initially claiming it would mean 19 million new jobs before his press secretary ultimately corrected the accounting to over 2 million.

Melvin Harrison is a fact checker for Fox News. Follow him on Twitter @MelvinHarrison.



Figure A11: Democrat \times Fox (Study 3)




All quotes delayed a minimum of 15 minutes. See here for a complete list of exchanges and delays.

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Figure A12: Democrat \times Rueters (Study 3)

V



Sept. 1. 2021. 10:20 PM

By Melvin Harrison, MSNBC Fact Checker

President Joe Biden overstated the expected employment gains Tuesday in making his pitch for a bipartisan infrastructure proposal that he said would create "millions" of new jobs. That might or might not have resulted from his initial plan, but there's a smaller one on the table now.

A look at his claims in La Crosse, Wisconsin:

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Figure A13: Democrat \times MSNBC (Study 3)

FACT CHECK · Published 5 hours ago

FACT CHECK: House GOP falsely blames Biden for gas prices

By Melvin Harrison | Fox News



House Republican leader Kevin McCarthy and other members of his party are falsely blaming President Joe Biden for higher gasoline and lumber costs.

Gas prices have risen in recent weeks because a key pipeline was forced to close after a cyberattack on the Colonial Pipeline. And lumber shortages — which existed during former President Donald Trump's administration — were worsened by an unexpected housing boom. Shortages have bedeviled the economy this spring, but most economists attribute the bulk of them to the difficulties of restarting the U.S. and global economies.

A look at the claims and reality:

MCCARTHY: "Gas prices are the highest since 2014 — just as summer starts. The recent hack of the Colonial Pipeline exposed the flaws of Biden's approach to our country's energy policies. On day one he signed an executive order cancelling the Keystone XL Pipeline." — blog post Monday.

REP. LIZ CHENEY, R-Wyoming: "From cancelling the Keystone Pipeline to banning new oil & gas leasing on federal lands, Biden's energy policies are having devastating consequences. We've already seen a glimpse of this devastation with prices skyrocketing & gas shortages hitting communities across the country." — tweet Friday.

THE FACTS: Biden's action on the Keystone XL pipeline has nothing to do with the recent spike in gasoline prices. The pipeline handles crude oil, running from Canada to Texas through the Midwest, not gasoline, which had shortages on the East Coast after the Colonial Pipeline hack.

Biden's order on his first day in office rescinded the construction permit for an extension to the main Keystone pipeline, which is still operating and runs about 2,687 miles (4,324 km) from Alberta to Illinois and Texas.

An expanded 1,210-mile (1,947-km) pipeline was planned to allow the system to carry up to 800,000 barrels of crude oil a day, passing through Montana, South Dakota and Nebraska.

But shortages of crude oil haven't been a factor.

Noteworthy is that while gas prices are at their highest level in six years, oil prices are still slightly below where they were in 2018. That suggests oil supplies are adequate and the refining and distribution of gasoline — through such networks as the Colonial Pipeline — are the problem.

Melvin Harrison is a fact checker for Fox News. Follow him on Twitter @MelvinHarrison.



Figure A14: Republican \times Fox (Study 3)




Figure A15: Republican \times Rueters (Study 3)



Aug. 30, 2021, 6:30 PM

By Melvin Harrison, MSNBC Fact Checker

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Figure A16: Republican \times MSNBC (Study 3)

B Covariates and Sample Demographics Breakdown

B.1 Study 1

Age (21% 18°29 years, 20% 30°39 years, 21% 40°49 years, 19% 50°59 years, 19% older), gender (51% Male), education (1% less than high school, 21% high school, 66% up to 4-year college degree, 13 postgraduate), political ideology (27% liberal, 41% moderate, 32% conservative), and party affiliation (35% Minju Party, 31% Hankuk Party, 34% Independent) were measured as demographic variables.

B.2 Study 2

Party affiliation was identically measured as to Study 1, both in a discrete manner (Democrats: n = 351 [39%], Republicans: n = 307 [34%], Independent or other: n = 246 [27%]) and on a 7-point scale (M = 3.85, SD = 2.26). Expectably, party affiliation and political ideology (both on a 7-point scale) are strongly correlated (r = .81, p < .001).

We also measured *issue involvement* with two questions in 5-point scale (1: 'Extremely important/interested' – 5: 'Not at all important/interested') asking the perceived importance and interest to U.S. immigration issue (M = 3.07, SD = 1.19, $\alpha = .91$), general political knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996) with five questions (M = 4.55, SD = 0.84), knowledge on the U.S. immigration issue also with five questions (M = 2.57, SD = 0.91), and finally, media trust (Strömbäck et al., 2020) with five questions on a 7-point scale (1: 'Strongly agree' – 7: 'Strongly disagree') asking one's beliefs regarding trustworthiness of news media in the U.S. (M = 3.18, SD = 1.64, $\alpha = .96$).

Age (2% 18°24 years, 28% 25–34 years, 28% 35–44 years, 18% 45–54 years, 16% 55–64 years, 7% over 65 years), gender (51% male), education (9% high school, 16% some college, 13% 2 year degree, 44% 4 year degree, 15% professional degree, 1% doctoral degree), political ideology (in 7-point scale, M = 4.03, SD = 1.89) were measured as demographic variables.

B.3 Study 3

Other covariate variables including party affiliation (Democrat: n=369 [54%] and Republican: n=309 [46%]), political ideology (M=4.1,SD=2.1), issue involvement (M=3.34,SD=0.97), media trust (M=3.23,SD=1.6), and general political knowledge (M=4.63,SD=0.74) were all measured identically as to Study 1 and 2. Age (1% 18–24 years, 23% 25–34 years, 31% 35–44 years, 19% 45–54 years, 16% 55–64 years, 9% over 65 years), gender (51% male), education (1% less than high school, 9% high school, 16% some college, 13% 2 year degree, 46% 4 year degree, 14% professional degree, 1% doctoral degree), and political ideology (in 7-point scale, M=4.1,SD=2.1) were measured as demographic variables.

C Mean comparisons and regression tables

C.1 Study 1

Table C1: Mean comparison of degree of agreement in each sub-group (Study 1, South Korean sample)

		P	re	Po	ost			
	n	M	SD	M	SD	t	p	Cohen's d
Debunking cons	serva	tive-co	nsister	nt × C	onserv	ative m	edia	
Liberal	31	4.65	1.43	4.10	1.40	-3.07	.005	0.39
Moderate	55	3.31	1.35	3.11	1.50	-1.09	.282	0.14
Conservative	51	2.14	1.34	2.16	1.47	0.17	.868	0.01
Debunking cons	serva	tive-co	nsister	nt × Li	beral 1	media		
Liberal	38	4.42	1.48	3.92	1.63	-2.84	.007	0.32
Moderate	49	3.37	1.58	2.94	1.45	-3.37	< .001	0.28
Conservative	43	2.51	1.61	2.70	1.70	1.35	.186	0.11
Debunking liber	ral-c	onsiste	$nt \times C$	onserv	ative r	nedia		
Liberal	33	2.42	1.58	2.45	1.35	0.21	.839	0.02
Moderate	58	4.17	1.96	3.67	1.68	-3.58	< .001	0.27
Conservative	41	5.80	1.60	4.98	1.70	-4.86	< .001	0.50
Debunking liber	onsiste	nt × L	iberal	media				
Liberal	40	2.33	1.53	2.17	1.53	-0.69	.492	0.10
Moderate	56	3.98	1.92	3.59	1.90	-3.39	< .001	0.21
Conservative	36	5.58	1.66	4.78	1.53	-5.08	< .001	0.50

Table C2: Mean comparison of hostile media effect (Study 1, South Korean sample)

	n	M	SD	t	p	Cohen's d
Debunking conservative-consistent × Conservative med						
Liberal	31	0.72	0.25	4.95	< .001	0.89
Conservative	51	0.43	0.20	-2.60	.012	0.36
Debunking cons	serva	tive-co	nsister	nt × Lil	beral me	dia
Liberal	38	0.58	0.21	2.42	.021	0.39
Conservative	43	0.53	0.28	0.66	.513	0.10
Debunking liber	ral-c	onsiste	$nt \times C$	onserv	ative me	dia
Liberal	33	0.66	0.24	3.82	< .001	0.66
Conservative	41	0.48	0.22	-0.63	.532	0.10
Debunking liberal-consistent $ imes$ Liberal media						
Liberal	40	0.46	0.23	-1.16	.254	0.18
Conservative	36	0.64	0.25	3.30	.002	0.55

Note: Hostile media perception values were compared to 0.5 (perception of neutrality)

Table C3: Regression results of degree of agreement, Post minus Pre (Study 1, South Korean sample)

	Libe	erals	Moder	rates	Conserv	vatives
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Debunking: LC	-0.579^*	-0.545^{*}	0.300	0.293	0.849***	0.852***
	(0.235)	(0.258)	(0.233)	(0.249)	(0.209)	(0.218)
Fact-check by LM	-0.180	-0.134	0.107	0.111	0.024	0.080
-	(0.266)	(0.276)	(0.183)	(0.196)	(0.236)	(0.240)
Age		-0.038		-0.041		0.089
_		(0.076)		(0.058)		(0.050)
Education		0.264		0.041		0.006
		(0.255)		(0.152)		(0.107)
Male		-0.126		0.074		-0.116
		(0.190)		(0.157)		(0.146)
Involvement		0.182*		-0.007		-0.035
		(0.091)		(0.056)		(0.043)
Media Trust		0.031		0.077		-0.022
		(0.099)		(0.062)		(0.070)
$LC \times LM$	0.229	0.163	-0.336	-0.323	0.143	0.138
	(0.368)	(0.409)	(0.291)	(0.310)	(0.299)	(0.302)
Constant	0.030	-1.898	-0.500***	-0.739	-0.829***	-0.873
	(0.150)	(1.288)	(0.141)	(0.765)	(0.173)	(0.589)
N	142	142	218	218	171	171
\mathbb{R}^2	0.045	0.099	0.011	0.021	0.195	0.218
Adjusted R ²	0.024	0.045	-0.003	-0.017	0.180	0.179

Notes: LC = Liberal-Consistent misinformation; LM = Fact-checking by Liberal Media. Robust standard errors (HC3) are in parentheses. (–) value of dependent variable denotes persuasive effect (i.e., reduced agreement towards initial misperception) whereas (+) value of dependent variable denotes backfire effect (i.e., increased agreement towards initial misperception).

p < .05; *p < .01; *p < .001.

Table C4: Regression results of hostile media perception (Study 1, South Korean sample), excluding moderate sample

	Libe	erals	Conse	rvatives	Combine	d Partisan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Debunking: LC	0.062	0.051	-0.051	-0.038	-0.051	-0.057
C	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Fact-check by LM	-0.200***	-0.196^{***}	0.161**	0.182**	0.161**	0.149**
•	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.056)
Involvement		0.051**		-0.020		0.005
		(0.019)		(0.013)		(0.011)
Media Trust		-0.045^{*}		-0.005		-0.024*
		(0.018)		(0.016)		(0.012)
Male		-0.022		-0.028		-0.019
		(0.039)		(0.038)		(0.028)
Age		0.004		-0.027*		-0.012
		(0.016)		(0.012)		(0.010)
Education		-0.016		0.045		0.030
		(0.037)		(0.026)		(0.023)
Liberal (vs. Conservative)					0.180**	0.155**
					(0.055)	(0.054)
$LC \times LM$	0.062	0.078	-0.060	-0.079	-0.060	-0.051
	(0.080)	(0.083)	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.075)	(0.078)
$LC \times Liberal$					0.112	0.110
					(0.076)	(0.077)
$LM \times Liberal$					-0.361^{***}	-0.359^{***}
					(0.079)	(0.078)
$LC \times LM \times Liberal$					0.123	0.133
					(0.110)	(0.111)
Constant	0.658***	0.554**	0.478^{***}	0.496***	0.478***	0.459***
	(0.042)	(0.199)	(0.035)	(0.142)	(0.035)	(0.120)
N	142	142	171	171	313	313
\mathbb{R}^2	0.158	0.274	0.096	0.159	0.149	0.179
Adjusted R ²	0.139	0.231	0.080	0.117	0.130	0.146

Notes: LC = Liberal-Consistent misinformation; LM = fact-checking by Liberal Media. Robust standard errors (HC3) are in parentheses. (+) value of dependent variable denotes higher bias perception against their partisan in-group. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

C.2 Study 2Table C5: Mean comparison of degree of agreement in each sub-group (Study 2, U.S. sample)

		P	re	Po	ost			
	n	M	SD	M	SD	t	p	Cohen's d
Debunking Bid	en ×	Fox						
Democrat	61	5.21	1.14	4.28	1.60	-4.62	< .001	0.67
Independent	40	3.95	1.68	3.52	1.66	-1.93	.061	0.25
Republican	53	2.79	1.78	2.28	1.68	-2.58	.013	0.29
Debunking Bid	en ×	Reute	ers					
Democrat	58	5.17	1.09	3.72	1.59	-6.93	< .001	1.06
Independent	41	3.95	1.76	3.15	1.56	-2.95	.005	0.48
Republican	49	3.39	1.81	2.43	1.63	-4.25	< .001	0.56
Debunking Bid	en ×	MSN	BC					
Democrat	58	5.05	1.28	3.53	1.66	-6.68	< .001	1.03
Independent	42	3.93	1.58	2.43	1.29	-6.09	< .001	1.04
Republican	52	2.52	1.50	1.85	1.14	-3.44	< .001	0.50
Debunking Due	cey ×	Fox						
Democrat	58	2.67	1.50	2.05	1.56	-4.05	< .001	0.41
Independent	42	4.19	1.89	3.60	2.14	-2.49	.017	0.29
Republican	51	5.43	1.49	4.14	1.79	-5.63	< .001	0.79
Debunking Due	cey ×	Reute	ers					
Democrat	59	2.97	1.73	2.17	1.68	-3.86	< .001	0.47
Independent	41	3.71	1.75	2.95	1.92	-5.00	< .001	0.41
Republican	51	5.41	1.55	4.47	1.97	-4.03	< .001	0.53
Debunking Due	cey ×	MSN	BC					
Democrat	57	2.25	1.24	1.63	1.19	-3.44	< .001	0.50
Independent	40	3.67	1.99	2.88	2.03	-4.74	< .001	0.40
Republican	51	5.59	1.51	4.92	1.85	-3.45	< .001	0.39

Table C6: Mean comparison of factual belief in each sub-group (Study 2, U.S. sample)

		P	re	Po	ost			
	n	M	SD	M	SD	t	p	Cohen's d
Debunking Bid	en ×	Fox						
Democrat	61	5.28	1.19	4.26	1.49	-5.54	< .001	0.75
Independent	40	4.32	1.64	3.55	1.60	-3.80	< .001	0.48
Republican	53	3.08	1.88	2.19	1.58	-4.58	< .001	0.51
Debunking Bid	en ×	Reute	ers					
Democrat	58	5.28	1.14	3.57	1.58	-8.48	< .001	1.24
Independent	41	3.95	1.84	3.05	1.38	-3.43	< .001	0.55
Republican	49	3.29	1.76	2.24	1.60	-6.12	< .001	0.62
Debunking Bid	en ×	MSNI	BC					
Democrat	58	5.34	1.12	3.60	1.67	-7.65	< .001	1.22
Independent	42	3.86	1.62	2.52	1.31	-5.61	< .001	0.91
Republican	52	2.58	1.64	2.08	1.38	-2.03	.048	0.33
Debunking Due	cey ×	Fox						
Democrat	58	3.02	1.48	2.07	1.53	-4.96	< .001	0.63
Independent	42	4.31	1.80	3.43	2.11	-3.18	.003	0.45
Republican	51	5.00	1.44	3.90	1.66	-5.70	< .001	0.71
Debunking Due	cey ×	Reute	ers					
Democrat	5 9	3.03	1.65	2.08	1.73	-4.58	< .001	0.56
Independent	41	4.07	1.56	3.02	1.90	-4.88	< .001	0.60
Republican	51	5.06	1.53	4.45	1.87	-2.87	.006	0.36
Debunking Due	cey ×	MSN	BC					
Democrat	57	2.44	1.35	1.74	1.06	-4.38	< .001	0.58
Independent	40	3.75	1.84	2.88	1.96	-4.24	< .001	0.46
Republican	51	5.16	1.50	4.47	1.79	-3.20	.002	0.42

Table C7: Mean comparison of hostile media perception (Study 2, U.S. sample)

	n	M	SD	t	p	Cohen's d					
Debunking Bi	Debunking Biden \times Fox										
Democrat	61	0.76	0.20	10.13	< .001	1.30					
Republican	53	0.43	0.16	-3.07	.003	0.42					
Debunking Bi	Debunking Biden × Reuters										
Democrat	58	0.52	0.16	0.89	.378	0.12					
Republican	49	0.50	0.15	0.19	.852	0.03					
Debunking Bi	den :	× MSN	BC								
Democrat	58	0.51	0.15	0.30	.765	0.04					
Republican	52	0.55	0.17	1.99	.052	0.28					
Debunking Du	ıcey	× Fox									
Democrat	58	0.52	0.15	1.22	.228	0.16					
Republican	51	0.60	0.21	3.30	.002	0.46					
Debunking Du	ıcey	× Reu	ters								
Democrat	59	0.51	0.17	0.62	.54	0.08					
Republican	51	0.70	0.25	5.72	< .001	0.80					
Debunking Du	ıcey	× MSN	NBC								
Democrat	57	0.49	0.14	-0.34	.739	0.04					
Republican	51	0.67	0.27	4.54	< .001	0.64					

Note: Hostile media perception values were compared to 0.5 (perception of neutrality).

Table C8: Regression results of degree of agreement, Post minus Pre (Study 2, U.S. sample)

	Democ	Democrates		endents	Republ	licans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ducey (vs. Biden)	0.652*	0.679*	0.049	0.041	0.018	-0.066
	(0.296)	(0.306)	(0.316)	(0.345)	(0.328)	(0.335)
Fox (vs. Reuters)	0.514	0.526	0.380	0.424	0.450	0.344
	(0.293)	(0.295)	(0.355)	(0.400)	(0.303)	(0.328)
MSNBC (vs. Reuters)	-0.069	-0.063	-0.695	-0.805	0.286	0.268
	(0.311)	(0.313)	(0.372)	(0.414)	(0.302)	(0.300)
General knowledge		-0.099		-0.140		-0.187
		(0.119)		(0.140)		(0.150)
Immigration knowledge		0.012		0.110		-0.064
		(0.090)		(0.105)		(0.122)
Media trust		-0.019		-0.246^{**}		-0.019
		(0.067)		(0.082)		(0.088)
Involvement		0.178^{*}		0.008		0.215**
		(0.082)		(0.102)		(0.081)
Gender		-0.125		0.092		-0.278
		(0.170)		(0.184)		(0.183)
Age		0.043		0.061		-0.040
		(0.073)		(0.071)		(0.068)
Education		0.038		-0.013		-0.040
		(0.071)		(0.084)		(0.076)
Income		0.009		-0.038		-0.004
		(0.027)		(0.034)		(0.029)
Race		-0.027		0.008		0.039
		(0.034)		(0.013)		(0.043)
$Ducey \times Fox$	-0.338	-0.371	-0.219	-0.353	-0.803	-0.613
	(0.391)	(0.399)	(0.456)	(0.510)	(0.448)	(0.475)
$Ducey \times MSNBC$	0.252	0.192	0.651	0.712	-0.012	-0.017
	(0.415)	(0.425)	(0.437)	(0.477)	(0.430)	(0.427)
Constant	-1.448***	-1.628*	-0.805**	0.072	-0.959***	0.158
	(0.211)	(0.807)	(0.277)	(1.125)	(0.228)	(1.103)
N	351	351	246	246	307	307
R^2	0.056	0.080	0.055	0.135	0.029	0.072
Adjusted R ²	0.042	0.042	0.035	0.083	0.012	0.028

Notes: Ducey = Debunking misinformation in Doug Ducey's statement. Each cell includes regression coefficient and standard errors are in parentheses. p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Table C9: Regression results of factual belief, Post minus Pre (Study 2, U.S. sample)

	Democrates		Indepe	ndents	Republicans	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ducey (vs. Biden)	0.758**	0.763*	-0.146	-0.224	0.433	0.451
• •	(0.291)	(0.304)	(0.344)	(0.346)	(0.274)	(0.280)
Fox (vs. Reuters)	0.691*	0.697^{*}	0.127	0.127	0.154	0.086
	(0.275)	(0.279)	(0.337)	(0.352)	(0.260)	(0.274)
MSNBC (vs. Reuters)	-0.034	0.001	-0.431	-0.642	0.541	0.517
	(0.306)	(0.309)	(0.359)	(0.379)	(0.302)	(0.302)
General knowledge		0.026		-0.176		-0.033
		(0.122)		(0.140)		(0.158)
Immigration knowledge		0.023		0.144		0.001
		(0.097)		(0.109)		(0.117)
Media trust		-0.022		-0.355***		-0.071
		(0.067)		(0.077)		(0.086)
Involvement		0.123		0.031		0.186^{*}
		(0.080)		(0.096)		(0.090)
Gender		-0.080		0.215		-0.191
		(0.170)		(0.187)		(0.172)
Age		0.035		0.100		-0.069
		(0.071)		(0.076)		(0.071)
Education		0.085		-0.024		0.026
		(0.078)		(0.083)		(0.069)
Income		0.028		-0.049		-0.033
		(0.028)		(0.033)		(0.029)
Race		-0.018		-0.004		-0.051
		(0.025)		(0.008)		(0.041)
$Ducey \times Fox$	-0.690	-0.657	0.040	-0.037	-0.644	-0.642
	(0.395)	(0.400)	(0.490)	(0.496)	(0.389)	(0.405)
$Ducey \times MSNBC$	0.282	0.243	0.605	0.754	-0.619	-0.735
	(0.405)	(0.417)	(0.469)	(0.483)	(0.429)	(0.443)
Constant	-1.707***	-2.702**	-0.902***	0.132	-1.041^{***}	-0.527
	(0.203)	(0.822)	(0.266)	(1.052)	(0.172)	(1.135)
N	351	351	246	246	307	307
R^2	0.066	0.087	0.015	0.164	0.022	0.061
Adjusted R ²	0.053	0.049	-0.006	0.113	0.006	0.016

Notes: Ducey = Debunking misinformation in Doug Ducey's statement. Each cell includes regression coefficient and standard errors are in parentheses. p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Table C10: Regression results of Relative hostile media effect, excluding Independents (Study 2, U.S. sample)

	Demo	crates	Repu	blicans	Partisans combined	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ducey (vs. Biden)	-0.005	-0.003	0.196***	0.194***	-0.005	-0.013
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Fox (vs. Reuters)	0.238***	0.240***	-0.070*	-0.080*	0.238***	0.235***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.034)
MSNBC (vs. Reuters)	-0.012	-0.014	0.044	0.026	-0.012	-0.020
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.031)
General knowledge		-0.010		0.030		0.005
-		(0.011)		(0.017)		(0.010)
Immigration knowledge		0.010		0.010		0.010
		(0.010)		(0.012)		(0.007)
Media trust		-0.005		-0.048***		-0.031***
		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.006)
Involvement		0.003		0.017		0.017*
		(0.011)		(0.010)		(0.007)
Gender		-0.003		-0.008		-0.005
		(0.018)		(0.021)		(0.014)
Age		-0.004		0.011		0.007
		(0.008)		(0.009)		(0.006)
Education		0.013		-0.010		0.004
		(0.007)		(0.009)		(0.006)
Income		-0.002		-0.0004		-0.001
		(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.003)
Race		0.0003		0.012		0.004
		(0.004)		(0.008)		(0.005)
Republican (vs. Democrat)					-0.014	-0.079^*
					(0.030)	(0.033)
$Ducey \times Fox$	-0.228***	-0.232^{***}	-0.034	-0.048	-0.228***	-0.218***
•	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.044)	(0.046)
$Ducey \times MSNBC$	-0.008	-0.012	-0.072	-0.073	-0.008	-0.005
•	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.061)	(0.054)	(0.041)	(0.044)
Ducey × Republican					0.200***	0.209***
•					(0.051)	(0.048)
Fox × Republican					-0.308***	-0.310***
-					(0.045)	(0.045)
MSNBC × Republican					0.056	0.055
-					(0.044)	(0.044)
Ducey \times Fox \times Republican					0.194**	0.173*
-					(0.071)	(0.068)
$Ducey \times MSNBC \times Republican$					-0.065	-0.074
-					(0.074)	(0.071)
Constant	0.518***	0.525***	0.504***	0.403**	0.518***	0.520***
	(0.021)	(0.074)	(0.022)	(0.123)	(0.021)	(0.069)
N	351	351	307	307	658	658
\mathbb{R}^2	0.254	0.267	0.170	0.368	0.209	0.276
Adjusted R ²	0.243	0.237	0.156	0.337	0.195	0.253

Notes: Debunking misinformation in Dough Ducey's statement. Each cell includes regression coefficient and standard errors are in parentheses. (-) value of dependent variable denotes lesser bias perception against one's in-group, whereas (+) value of dependent variable denotes greater bias perception against one's in-group (i.e., perceiving greater favorability towards out-groups) *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

C.3 Study 3Table C11: Mean comparison of degree of agreement in each sub-group (Study 3, U.S. sample)

		P	re	Post						
	n	M	SD	M	SD	t	p	Cohen's d		
Fox × High N										
Democrat	59	5.69	0.95	4.92	1.47	-5.16	< .001	0.63		
Republican	52	6.00	1.37	5.10	1.72	-4.95	< .001	0.58		
Fox × Low Nf	$Fox \times Low NfC$									
Democrat	64	5.48	1.07	4.70	1.40	-4.89	< .001	0.63		
Republican	52	5.79	1.39	4.77	2.06	-5.12	< .001	0.58		
MSNBC × Hi	MSNBC × High NfC									
Democrat	60	5.47	1.20	4.32	1.59	-7.23	< .001	0.82		
Republican	51	5.92	1.20	5.20	1.69	-3.99	< .001	0.50		
MSNBC × Lo	w Nf	C								
Democrat	64	5.30	1.31	4.02	1.55	-7.52	< .001	0.89		
Republican	51	5.82	1.41	5.18	1.77	-2.96	.005	0.40		
Reuters × Hig	Reuters × High NfC									
Democrat	60	5.37	1.04	3.83	1.68	-10.27	< .001	1.10		
Republican	51	5.82	1.51	5.35	1.86	-2.37	.022	0.28		
Reuters \times Low NfC										
Democrat	62	5.50	1.36	3.94	1.72	-9.12	< .001	1.01		
Republican	52	5.77	1.42	4.69	1.83	-5.79	< .001	0.66		

Table C12: Mean comparison of factual belief in each sub-group (Study 3, U.S. sample)

		Pre		Post					
	n	M	SD	M	SD	t	p	Cohen's d	
Fox × High NfC									
Democrat	59	5.63	1.13	4.75	1.61	-4.83	< .001	0.63	
Republican	52	5.77	1.25	5.10	1.72	-3.31	.002	0.45	
Fox × Low Nf	$Fox \times Low NfC$								
Democrat	64	5.52	1.04	4.69	1.44	-5.39	< .001	0.66	
Republican	52	5.81	1.21	4.77	2.10	-4.59	< .001	0.61	
MSNBC × Hi	gh N	fC							
Democrat	60	5.55	1.17	4.30	1.48	-7.70	< .001	0.94	
Republican	51	5.71	1.15	5.04	1.80	-3.31	.002	0.44	
MSNBC × Lo	w Nf	C							
Democrat	64	5.34	1.34	4.08	1.50	-6.98	< .001	0.89	
Republican	51	5.67	1.31	4.94	1.79	-3.66	< .001	0.46	
Reuters × Hig	Reuters × High NfC								
Democrat	60	5.37	1.18	3.77	1.65	-10.89	< .001	1.12	
Republican	51	5.82	1.21	5.25	1.78	-2.84	.007	0.37	
Reuters × Low NfC									
Democrat	62	5.71	1.05	3.87	1.72	-9.54	< .001	1.29	
Republican	52	5.50	1.48	4.62	1.87	-3.98	< .001	0.53	

Table C13: Mean comparison of hostile media effect (Study 3, U.S. sample)

	n	M	SD	t	p	Cohen's d			
Fox × High NfC									
Democrat	59	0.75	0.25	7.81	< .001	1.02			
Republican	52	0.68	0.21	6.11	< .001	0.85			
Fox × Low NfC									
Democrat	64	0.75	0.22	9.30	< .001	1.16			
Republican	52	0.68	0.21	6.22	< .001	0.86			
MSNBC × Hi	gh N	fC							
Democrat	60	0.58	0.15	4.08	< .001	0.53			
Republican	51	0.80	0.25	8.70	< .001	1.22			
MSNBC × Lo	w Nf	C							
Democrat	64	0.54	0.14	2.15	.035	0.27			
Republican	51	0.80	0.23	9.41	< .001	1.32			
Reuters \times High NfC									
Democrat	60	0.54	0.15	2.27	.027	0.29			
Republican	51	0.74	0.25	7.02	< .001	0.98			
Reuters × Low NfC									
Democrat	62	0.52	0.14	1.13	.263	0.14			
Republican	52	0.74	0.21	8.18	< .001	1.13			

Note: Hostile media perception values were compared to 0.5 (perception of neutrality).

Table C14: Regression results of degree of agreement, Post minus Pre (Study 3, U.S. sample)

	Demo	crates	Republ	icans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Low NfC (vs. High NfC)	-0.002	-0.038	-0.115	0.032
,	(0.222)	(0.231)	(0.273)	(0.263)
MSNBC (vs. Fox)	-0.370	-0.338	0.178	0.291
	(0.221)	(0.226)	(0.260)	(0.259)
Rueter (vs. Fox)	-0.754***	-0.739***	0.433	0.591*
	(0.214)	(0.221)	(0.273)	(0.271)
General knowledge		-0.085		-0.111
		(0.102)		(0.145)
Media trust		0.014		-0.150^{*}
		(0.055)		(0.072)
Involvement		0.095		0.164
		(0.082)		(0.085)
Gender		-0.112		-0.326
		(0.128)		(0.178)
Age		0.066		-0.011
		(0.052)		(0.061)
Education		0.027		0.178^{*}
		(0.057)		(0.069)
Income		-0.035		-0.011
		(0.024)		(0.027)
Race		0.010		-0.085
		(0.027)		(0.072)
Low NfC \times MSNBC	-0.130	-0.096	0.194	-0.086
	(0.323)	(0.334)	(0.396)	(0.398)
Low NfC \times Reuter	-0.030	0.003	-0.491	-0.662
	(0.319)	(0.326)	(0.387)	(0.388)
Constant	-0.780^{***}	-0.792	-0.904***	-0.773
	(0.152)	(0.660)	(0.184)	(0.948)
N	369	366	309	308
R^2	0.060	0.083	0.023	0.101
Adjusted R ²	0.047	0.049	0.007	0.061

Table C15: Regression results of factual belief, Post minus Pre (Study 3, U.S. sample)

	Democ	crates	Repub	olicans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Low NfC (vs. High NfC)	0.053	0.016	-0.365	-0.217
	(0.241)	(0.252)	(0.307)	(0.287)
MSNBC (vs. Fox)	-0.369	-0.344	0.006	0.072
	(0.246)	(0.252)	(0.289)	(0.267)
Rueter (vs. Fox)	-0.719**	-0.711**	0.104	0.201
	(0.236)	(0.242)	(0.288)	(0.289)
General knowledge		-0.107		-0.173
		(0.112)		(0.172)
Media trust		-0.036		-0.291**
		(0.060)		(0.093)
Involvement		0.128		0.128
		(0.081)		(0.094)
Gender		-0.267		-0.246
		(0.137)		(0.187)
Age		0.051		-0.002
		(0.053)		(0.059)
Education		0.008		0.106
		(0.060)		(0.070)
Income		-0.006		-0.009
		(0.026)		(0.028)
Race		0.028		-0.041
		(0.032)		(0.072)
Low NfC \times MSNBC	-0.069	-0.039	0.307	0.014
	(0.344)	(0.356)	(0.419)	(0.410)
Low NfC × Reuters	-0.292	-0.289	0.049	-0.093
	(0.343)	(0.349)	(0.431)	(0.444)
Constant	-0.881^{***}	-0.504	-0.673**	0.301
	(0.184)	(0.660)	(0.205)	(1.116)
N	369	366	309	308
\mathbb{R}^2	0.069	0.096	0.011	0.091
Adjusted R ²	0.056	0.063	-0.005	0.051

Table C16: Regression results of hostile media effect (Study 3, U.S. sample)

	Demo	ocrates	Repu	blicans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Low NfC (vs. High NfC)	-0.003	0.007	0.000	0.030
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.036)
MSNBC (vs. Fox)	-0.173***	-0.164***	0.123**	0.136***
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.037)
Rueter (vs. Fox)	-0.209***	-0.215***	0.061	0.081*
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.046)	(0.038)
General knowledge		0.035*		0.040*
_		(0.017)		(0.019)
Media trust		-0.008		-0.098***
		(0.008)		(0.009)
Involvement		0.006		0.021
		(0.010)		(0.013)
Gender		-0.005		-0.006
		(0.018)		(0.025)
Age		0.022**		0.021^{*}
_		(0.008)		(0.009)
Education		-0.009		0.010
		(0.008)		(0.010)
Income		-0.001		0.002
		(0.003)		(0.004)
Race		-0.001		-0.0001
		(0.004)		(0.010)
Low NfC \times MSNBC	-0.039	-0.055	-0.008	-0.080
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.064)	(0.053)
Low NfC \times Reuters	-0.021	-0.015	0.0001	-0.026
	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.062)	(0.051)
Constant	0.753***	0.559***	0.682***	0.478***
	(0.033)	(0.098)	(0.030)	(0.132)
N	369	366	309	308
\mathbb{R}^2	0.236	0.288	0.045	0.401
Adjusted R ²	0.225	0.261	0.029	0.374

D Replication of Study 2 & Study 3 with Strict Attention Check Threshold

There are concerns about the data quality of the MTurk sample, especially regarding the bot problem (see Webb & Tangney, 2022). However, different from Webb & Tangney (2022), we used standard screening procedures when recruiting Mturk respondents (e.g., only approved participants can take the HIT by setting the eligibility criteria based on a prior HIT acceptance rate of 98%). Also, during the experiment, we additionally included a few attention check questions (before and after misinformation and correction exposure) for monitoring potential data quality. Attention check problem asks what the news source where delivering fact-checking news was. Here, we replicate our analysis with samples only who passed this attention check. For both Study 2 and Study 3, there is no significant difference.

D.1 Study 2

Table D17: Mean comparison of degree of agreement in each sub-group (Study 2, U.S. sample)

		P	re	Po	ost						
	n	\overline{M}	SD	\overline{M}	SD	t	p	Cohen's d			
Debunking Bid	Fox										
Democrat	50	5.22	1.15	4.32	1.54	-3.81	< .001	0.66			
Independent	37	3.89	1.73	3.49	1.66	-1.81	.079	0.24			
Republican	43	2.72	1.76	2.14	1.63	-2.63	.012	0.34			
Debunking Bid	en ×	Reute	ers								
Democrat	40	5.32	0.86	3.70	1.52	-6.79	< .001	1.31			
Independent	27	4.07	1.88	2.96	1.48	-3.20	.004	0.66			
Republican	33	3.06	1.77	2.18	1.45	-3.90	< .001	0.54			
Debunking Bid	Debunking Biden × MSNBC										
Democrat	44	5.09	1.24	3.50	1.62	-6.01	< .001	1.10			
Independent	35	3.97	1.65	2.37	1.35	-5.56	< .001	1.06			
Republican	42	2.38	1.50	1.79	1.20	-2.57	.014	0.44			
Debunking Du	cey ×	Fox									
Democrat	45	2.56	1.44	2.02	1.51	-3.14	.003	0.36			
Independent	37	4.27	1.91	3.59	2.22	-2.60	.014	0.33			
Republican	42	5.33	1.52	4.10	1.82	-4.70	< .001	0.74			
Debunking Due	cev ×	Reute	ers								
Democrat	30	2.70	1.64	1.70	1.12	-3.48	.002	0.71			
Independent	20	3.90	2.10	3.55	2.14	-1.68	.11	0.17			
Republican	29	5.24	1.70	4.52	1.90	-2.37	.025	0.40			
Debunking Due	cey ×	MSN	BC								
Democrat	39	2.31	1.24	1.59	1.19	-3.46	< .001	0.59			
Independent	31	3.87	1.94	2.97	2.11	-4.97	< .001	0.45			
Republican	39	5.56	1.50	4.97	1.97	-3.30	.002	0.34			

Table D18: Mean comparison of factual belief in each sub-group (Study 2, U.S. sample)

		P	re	Po	ost					
	n	M	SD	M	SD	t	p	Cohen's d		
Debunking Bid	en ×	Fox								
Democrat	50	5.30	1.16	4.28	1.47	-4.84	< .001	0.77		
Independent	37	4.24	1.66	3.51	1.64	-3.46	< .001	0.44		
Republican	43	2.84	1.85	2.05	1.41	-3.98	< .001	0.48		
Debunking Bid	en ×	Reute	ers							
Democrat	40	5.40	0.87	3.58	1.39	-9.65	< .001	1.57		
Independent	27	4.11	1.91	2.93	1.33	-3.38	.002	0.72		
Republican	33	3.03	1.67	2.06	1.48	-4.70	< .001	0.62		
Debunking Bid	Debunking Biden × MSNBC									
Democrat	44	5.34	1.12	3.55	1.62	-6.72	< .001	1.29		
Independent	35	3.89	1.68	2.46	1.38	-5.36	< .001	0.93		
Republican	42	2.50	1.69	1.98	1.30	-1.85	.072	0.35		
Debunking Due	cey ×	Fox								
Democrat	45	3.00	1.49	2.09	1.50	-4.23	< .001	0.61		
Independent	37	4.30	1.76	3.43	2.19	-2.79	.008	0.43		
Republican	42	4.90	1.54	3.98	1.72	-4.34	< .001	0.57		
Debunking Due	cey ×	Reute	ers							
Democrat	30	2.70	1.49	1.67	1.21	-3.72	< .001	0.76		
Independent	20	4.30	1.89	3.55	2.14	-2.26	.036	0.37		
Republican	29	5.03	1.50	4.52	1.79	-2.30	.029	0.31		
Debunking Due	cey ×	MSN	BC							
Democrat	39	2.69	1.38	1.74	0.99	-5.17	< .001	0.79		
Independent	31	3.81	1.83	2.97	2.14	-3.61	< .001	0.42		
Republican	39	5.15	1.61	4.49	1.90	-2.93	.006	0.38		




Figure D17: Persuasive Effect of Fact-checking News, Study 2 (U.S. Sample, strict attention check subset). Each point indicates the mean value of net agreement and factual belief (i.e., difference between before and after exposure to the treatment). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals and each number is the effect size Cohen's *d*.

Table D19: Mean comparison of hostile media perception (Study 2, U.S. sample)

	n	M	SD	t	p	Cohen's d				
Debunking Bi	den	× Fox								
Democrat	50	0.79	0.19	10.99	< .001	1.55				
Republican	43	0.44	0.16	-2.54	.015	0.39				
Debunking Biden × Reuters										
Democrat	40	0.54	0.11	2.47	.018	0.39				
Republican	33	0.52	0.16	0.81	.424	0.14				
Debunking Biden × MSNBC										
Democrat	44	0.49	0.13	-0.63	.529	0.10				
Republican	42	0.56	0.17	2.34	.024	0.36				
Debunking Du	ıcey	× Fox								
Democrat	45	0.53	0.13	1.28	.208	0.19				
Republican	42	0.59	0.21	2.72	.009	0.42				
Debunking Du	ıcey	× Reu	ters							
Democrat	30	0.52	0.10	0.91	.37	0.17				
Republican	29	0.67	0.27	3.54	< .001	0.66				
Debunking Ducey × MSNBC										
Democrat	39	0.48	0.13	-1.04	.306	0.17				
Republican	39	0.73	0.26	5.64	< .001	0.90				

Note: Hostile media perception values were compared to 0.5 (perception of neutrality).




Figure D18: Hostile media effect of Fact-checking News, Study 2 (U.S. Sample, strict attention check subset). Each point indicates the mean value of hostile media effect. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals and each number is the effect size Cohen's d.

Table D20: Regression results of degree of agreement, Post minus Pre (Study 2, U.S. sample)

	Democ	rates	Indepe	endents	Repub	licans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ducey (vs. Biden)	0.625	0.592	0.761	0.581	0.155	0.214
• •	(0.380)	(0.411)	(0.414)	(0.499)	(0.386)	(0.399)
Fox (vs. Reuters)	0.725^{*}	0.708*	0.706	0.724	0.297	0.241
	(0.340)	(0.346)	(0.421)	(0.541)	(0.320)	(0.332)
MSNBC (vs. Reuters)	0.034	-0.024	-0.489	-0.635	0.284	0.280
	(0.361)	(0.366)	(0.459)	(0.546)	(0.327)	(0.323)
General knowledge		-0.084		-0.073		-0.273
		(0.170)		(0.226)		(0.219)
Immigration knowledge		0.037		0.080		-0.109
		(0.106)		(0.122)		(0.143)
Media trust		-0.061		-0.293**		-0.068
		(0.089)		(0.099)		(0.106)
Involvement		0.203*		-0.087		0.254*
		(0.099)		(0.120)		(0.099)
Gender		-0.040		0.141		-0.056
		(0.207)		(0.241)		(0.195)
Age		0.007		0.114		-0.020
		(0.078)		(0.087)		(0.073)
Education		-0.005		0.002		-0.076
		(0.079)		(0.113)		(0.078)
Income		0.030		-0.003		0.029
		(0.033)		(0.049)		(0.031)
Race		-0.010		-0.002		0.011
		(0.028)		(0.006)		(0.041)
$Ducey \times Fox$	-0.258	-0.233	-1.031	-0.975	-0.811	-0.736
•	(0.480)	(0.514)	(0.541)	(0.647)	(0.520)	(0.543)
Ducey × MSNBC	0.248	0.248	-0.064	0.103	-0.149	-0.241
	(0.510)	(0.539)	(0.539)	(0.652)	(0.486)	(0.479)
Constant	-1.625***	-1.735	-1.111**	-0.585	-0.879^{***}	0.206
	(0.242)	(1.049)	(0.354)	(1.800)	(0.229)	(1.312)
N	248	248	187	187	228	228
R^2	0.073	0.100	0.083	0.159	0.028	0.083
Adjusted R ²	0.054	0.046	0.058	0.091	0.006	0.022

Notes: Ducey = Debunking misinformation in Doug Ducey's statement. Each cell includes regression coefficient and standard errors are in parentheses. p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Table D21: Regression results of factual belief, Post minus Pre (Study 2, U.S. sample)

	Demo	crates	Indep	endents	Republ	icans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ducey (vs. Biden)	0.792*	0.781*	0.435	0.149	0.452	0.576
•	(0.341)	(0.360)	(0.493)	(0.507)	(0.311)	(0.330)
Fox (vs. Reuters)	0.805**	0.807**	0.455	0.417	0.179	0.115
	(0.286)	(0.292)	(0.416)	(0.480)	(0.290)	(0.304)
MSNBC (vs. Reuters)	0.030	0.112	-0.243	-0.513	0.446	0.448
	(0.331)	(0.338)	(0.448)	(0.488)	(0.355)	(0.353)
General knowledge		0.165		-0.241		-0.199
		(0.163)		(0.213)		(0.234)
Immigration knowledge		0.042		0.152		-0.130
		(0.102)		(0.137)		(0.139)
Media trust		-0.064		-0.379^{***}		-0.123
		(0.082)		(0.095)		(0.103)
Involvement		0.156		-0.070		0.238*
		(0.094)		(0.117)		(0.103)
Gender		0.090		0.342		-0.169
		(0.205)		(0.233)		(0.193)
Age		-0.055		0.176		-0.082
		(0.078)		(0.090)		(0.074)
Education		0.052		-0.008		0.034
		(0.084)		(0.106)		(0.078)
Income		0.054		-0.047		-0.009
		(0.033)		(0.047)		(0.031)
Race		-0.023		-0.010		-0.065
		(0.028)		(0.007)		(0.045)
$Ducey \times Fox$	-0.683	-0.571	-0.570	-0.480	-0.590	-0.615
	(0.457)	(0.472)	(0.623)	(0.647)	(0.429)	(0.448)
$Ducey \times MSNBC$	0.055	-0.043	0.155	0.461	-0.595	-0.804
	(0.473)	(0.495)	(0.610)	(0.654)	(0.482)	(0.493)
Constant	-1.825***	-3.328**	-1.185**	-0.022	-0.970***	0.369
	(0.191)	(1.007)	(0.357)	(1.628)	(0.210)	(1.448)
N	248	248	187	187	228	228
R^2	0.071	0.112	0.027	0.189	0.015	0.083
Adjusted R ²	0.052	0.059	0.0005	0.123	-0.007	0.023

Notes: Ducey = Debunking misinformation in Doug Ducey's statement. Each cell includes regression coefficient and standard errors are in parentheses. p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Table D22: Regression results of Relative hostile media effect, excluding Independents (Study 2, U.S. sample)

	Demo	crates	Repu	blicans	Partisans	combined
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ducey (vs. Biden)	-0.025	-0.024	0.151**	0.155**	-0.025	-0.044
-	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.025)	(0.028)
Fox (vs. Reuters)	0.252***	0.255***	-0.083*	-0.108**	0.252***	0.244***
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.033)
MSNBC (vs. Reuters)	-0.054*	-0.057^{*}	0.040	0.017	-0.054^{*}	-0.063^{*}
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.026)	(0.027)
General knowledge		-0.020		0.046		-0.002
		(0.013)		(0.026)		(0.013)
Immigration knowledge		-0.002		0.009		0.0002
		(0.011)		(0.014)		(0.008)
Media trust		0.001		-0.047***		-0.029***
		(0.008)		(0.010)		(0.007)
Involvement		0.009		0.012		0.020*
		(0.011)		(0.012)		(0.008)
Gender		0.004		-0.001		0.001
		(0.019)		(0.025)		(0.016)
Age		0.001		0.012		0.010
-		(0.008)		(0.011)		(0.007)
Education		0.014		-0.013		0.005
		(0.008)		(0.012)		(0.007)
Income		-0.001		-0.003		-0.001
		(0.003)		(0.005)		(0.003)
Race		0.0002		0.008		0.004
		(0.005)		(0.008)		(0.005)
Republican (vs. Democrat)					-0.019	-0.100**
_					(0.033)	(0.036)
$Ducey \times Fox$	-0.243***	-0.252***	-0.004	-0.011	-0.243***	-0.220***
•	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.070)	(0.065)	(0.042)	(0.045)
$Ducey \times MSNBC$	0.015	0.013	0.018	0.015	0.015	0.028
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.076)	(0.065)	(0.039)	(0.042)
Ducey × Republican					0.176**	0.209***
					(0.063)	(0.058)
Fox × Republican					-0.335***	-0.330^{***}
					(0.049)	(0.050)
MSNBC × Republican					0.094*	0.102*
					(0.047)	(0.047)
$Ducey \times Fox \times Republican$					0.239**	0.196*
					(0.082)	(0.079)
$Ducey \times MSNBC \times Republican$					0.002	-0.031
					(0.085)	(0.081)
Constant	0.541***	0.545***	0.523***	0.373*	0.541***	0.562***
	(0.017)	(0.075)	(0.028)	(0.168)	(0.017)	(0.076)
N	248	248	228	228	476	476
\mathbb{R}^2	0.417	0.439	0.186	0.367	0.281	0.341
Adjusted R ²	0.405	0.405	0.167	0.325	0.264	0.312

Notes: Debunking misinformation in Dough Ducey's statement. Each cell includes regression coefficient and standard errors are in parentheses. (-) value of dependent variable denotes lesser bias perception against one's in-group, whereas (+) value of dependent variable denotes greater bias perception against one's in-group (i.e., perceiving greater favorability towards out-groups) *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

D.2 Study 3Table D23: Mean comparison of degree of agreement in each sub-group (Study 3, U.S. sample)

		P	re	Po	Post						
	n	M	SD	M	SD	t	p	Cohen's d			
Fox × High N	fC										
Democrat	58	5.67	0.94	4.88	1.45	-5.18	< .001	0.65			
Republican	49	6.00	1.40	5.14	1.73	-4.71	< .001	0.54			
Fox × Low Nf	C										
Democrat	60	5.50	1.08	4.70	1.38	-4.92	< .001	0.64			
Republican	49	5.76	1.42	4.65	2.07	-5.39	< .001	0.62			
MSNBC × Hi	MSNBC × High NfC										
Democrat	52	5.40	1.19	4.23	1.55	-6.69	< .001	0.85			
Republican	50	5.92	1.21	5.20	1.70	-3.89	< .001	0.49			
MSNBC × Lo	w Nf	C									
Democrat	57	5.30	1.34	3.98	1.55	-7.08	< .001	0.91			
Republican	50	5.80	1.41	5.14	1.77	-2.97	.005	0.41			
Reuters × Hig	gh Nf	\mathbf{C}									
Democrat	52	5.29	1.05	3.65	1.62	-10.36	< .001	1.20			
Republican	38	5.95	1.39	5.24	1.94	-3.24	.003	0.42			
Reuters × Lov	w Nf	С									
Democrat	50	5.50	1.37	3.66	1.56	-10.26	< .001	1.25			
Republican	47	5.74	1.48	4.72	1.85	-5.21	< .001	0.61			

Table D24: Mean comparison of factual belief in each sub-group (Study 3, U.S. sample)

		P	re	Po	ost					
	n	M	SD	M	SD	t	p	Cohen's d		
Fox × High N	fC									
Democrat	58	5.60	1.12	4.71	1.60	-4.84	< .001	0.65		
Republican	49	5.76	1.27	5.16	1.70	-3.03	.004	0.39		
Fox × Low Nf	$Fox \times Low NfC$									
Democrat	60	5.48	1.07	4.67	1.46	-5.09	< .001	0.64		
Republican	49	5.78	1.23	4.67	2.12	-4.68	< .001	0.64		
MSNBC × Hi	gh N	fC								
Democrat	52	5.60	1.12	4.25	1.47	-7.76	< .001	1.03		
Republican	50	5.72	1.16	5.04	1.82	-3.32	.002	0.45		
MSNBC × Lo	w Nf	C								
Democrat	57	5.33	1.35	4.09	1.49	-6.26	< .001	0.87		
Republican	50	5.64	1.31	4.90	1.79	-3.67	< .001	0.47		
Reuters × Hig	gh Nf	C								
Democrat	52	5.25	1.20	3.58	1.60	-10.49	< .001	1.18		
Republican	38	5.76	1.28	5.24	1.82	-2.21	.033	0.33		
Reuters × Lov	w Nf	С								
Democrat	50	5.68	1.13	3.68	1.63	-10.10	< .001	1.42		
Republican	47	5.49	1.53	4.60	1.90	-3.72	< .001	0.52		




Figure D19: Persuasive Effect of Fact-checking News, Study 3 (U.S. Sample, strict attention check subset). Each point indicates the mean value of net agreement and factual belief (i.e., difference between before and after exposure to the treatment). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals and each number is the effect size Cohen's *d*.

Table D25: Mean comparison of hostile media effect (Study 3, U.S. sample)

	n	M	SD	t	p	Cohen's d				
Fox × High N	fC									
Democrat	58	0.77	0.23	8.81	< .001	1.16				
Republican	49	0.69	0.21	6.43	< .001	0.92				
$Fox \times Low NfC$										
Democrat	60	0.75	0.22	8.91	< .001	1.15				
Republican	49	0.68	0.21	6.18	< .001	0.88				
MSNBC × High NfC										
Democrat	52	0.57	0.15	3.54	< .001	0.49				
Republican	50	0.80	0.25	8.47	< .001	1.20				
MSNBC × Lo	w Nf	C								
Democrat	57	0.52	0.13	1.23	.224	0.16				
Republican	50	0.81	0.22	9.91	< .001	1.40				
Reuters × Hig	gh Nf	°C								
Democrat	52	0.52	0.13	1.37	.178	0.19				
Republican	38	0.80	0.20	9.18	< .001	1.49				
Reuters × Lov	w Nf	С								
Democrat	50	0.53	0.12	1.72	.092	0.24				
Republican	47	0.77	0.20	8.99	< .001	1.31				

Note: Hostile media perception values were compared to 0.5 (perception of neutrality).




Figure D20: Hostile media effect of Fact-checking News, Study 3 (U.S. Sample, strict attention check subset). Each point indicates the mean value of hostile media effect. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals and each number is the effect size Cohen's d.

Table D26: Regression results of degree of agreement, Post minus Pre (Study 3, U.S. sample)

	Democrates		Republicans	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Low NfC (vs. High NfC)	-0.007	0.017	-0.245	-0.108
	(0.225)	(0.236)	(0.277)	(0.265)
MSNBC (vs. Fox)	-0.380	-0.335	0.137	0.259
	(0.235)	(0.239)	(0.262)	(0.260)
Rueter (vs. Fox)	-0.842^{***}	-0.787***	0.147	0.356
	(0.222)	(0.236)	(0.289)	(0.293)
General knowledge		0.043		-0.012
		(0.158)		(0.163)
Media trust		-0.010		-0.173*
		(0.058)		(0.078)
Involvement		0.029		0.141
		(0.088)		(0.092)
Gender		-0.129		-0.255
		(0.133)		(0.187)
Age		0.057		-0.041
		(0.053)		(0.065)
Education		0.017		0.177^{*}
		(0.060)		(0.072)
Income		-0.036		-0.022
		(0.026)		(0.028)
Race		-0.006		-0.073
		(0.032)		(0.070)
Low NfC × MSNBC	-0.136	-0.182	0.305	0.032
	(0.342)	(0.355)	(0.403)	(0.405)
Low NfC × Reuters	-0.198	-0.219	-0.066	-0.296
	(0.330)	(0.343)	(0.407)	(0.417)
Constant	-0.793***	-0.967	-0.857^{***}	-0.964
	(0.154)	(0.815)	(0.184)	(0.992)
N	329	327	283	282
R^2	0.089	0.101	0.015	0.091
Adjusted R ²	0.075	0.064	-0.003	0.047

Table D27: Regression results of factual belief, Post minus Pre (Study 3, U.S. sample)

	Democ	crates	Republicans	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Low NfC (vs. High NfC)	0.080	0.134	-0.510	-0.363
	(0.247)	(0.260)	(0.309)	(0.284)
MSNBC (vs. Fox)	-0.450	-0.401	-0.088	0.010
	(0.256)	(0.259)	(0.286)	(0.261)
Rueter (vs. Fox)	-0.777**	-0.735**	0.066	0.218
	(0.247)	(0.257)	(0.312)	(0.319)
General knowledge		0.116		-0.097
		(0.161)		(0.200)
Media trust		-0.070		-0.302**
		(0.061)		(0.101)
Involvement		0.078		0.120
		(0.087)		(0.098)
Gender		-0.250		-0.169
		(0.144)		(0.193)
Age		0.069		-0.045
		(0.056)		(0.061)
Education		-0.014		0.112
		(0.062)		(0.074)
Income		-0.004		-0.012
		(0.028)		(0.030)
Race		-0.003		-0.040
		(0.037)		(0.070)
Low NfC × MSNBC	0.021	-0.064	0.450	0.144
	(0.363)	(0.379)	(0.424)	(0.415)
Low NfC × Reuters	-0.407	-0.469	0.143	-0.056
	(0.356)	(0.367)	(0.461)	(0.487)
Constant	-0.897***	-1.266	-0.592**	0.142
	(0.187)	(0.774)	(0.197)	(1.212)
N	329	327	283	282
\mathbb{R}^2	0.088	0.112	0.016	0.100
Adjusted R ²	0.074	0.075	-0.001	0.056

Table D28: Regression results of hostile media effect (Study 3, U.S. sample)

	Democrates		Republicans	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Low NfC (vs. High NfC)	-0.014	-0.001	-0.010	0.020
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.038)
MSNBC (vs. Fox)	-0.193***	-0.186^{***}	0.107^{*}	0.129***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.039)
Rueter (vs. Fox)	-0.241***	-0.239***	0.103*	0.127***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.045)	(0.037)
General knowledge		0.056**		0.027
		(0.017)		(0.021)
Media trust		-0.010		-0.091^{***}
		(0.008)		(0.008)
Involvement		0.001		0.033*
		(0.010)		(0.013)
Gender		-0.001		-0.015
		(0.018)		(0.025)
Age		0.018^{*}		0.017
		(0.008)		(0.009)
Education		-0.011		0.010
		(0.008)		(0.010)
Income		-0.001		0.003
		(0.003)		(0.004)
Race		-0.003		-0.002
		(0.004)		(0.010)
Low NfC × MSNBC	-0.037	-0.056	0.015	-0.058
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.064)	(0.054)
Low NfC \times Reuters	0.018	0.015	-0.019	-0.053
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.062)	(0.053)
Constant	0.766***	0.515***	0.694***	0.515***
	(0.030)	(0.099)	(0.030)	(0.140)
N	329	327	283	282
\mathbb{R}^2	0.286	0.333	0.054	0.387
Adjusted R ²	0.275	0.305	0.037	0.357

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