Fact-Checking and Partisan Cheerleading

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  - Fact-checking news dissemination within social media platforms (Bakshy et al., 2015; Barberá et al., 2015)

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  - Illustration of two-step flow on Twitter and Facebook (Barberá et al., 2015; Wells et al., 2016)

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  - Preference of directional goals over accuracy in news sharing, in line with motivated reasoning principles (Kunda, 1990)

Research Questions

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3. What traits define those who frequently share political fact-checking content on social media (**RQ3**)?

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    - 3.3 Leave only commonly existing samples in both dataset: $N = 153,797$ (≈ 83 % of *PolitiFact* Retweeters)

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

Figure 1: Proportion of fact-checks sorted by the adjudication and party affiliation or political leaning of the target factual claim, conducted by *PolitiFact* from January 1, 2016, to December 31, 2021 ($N = 6,458$).

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

Figure 2: Number of fact-checking articles that are congruent with Liberal/Democrats or Conservative/Republicans over time, presented on a monthly basis ($N = 4,598$).

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

Figure 3: Comparative distribution of ideological scores for Twitter users ($N = 153,807$) who retweeted fact-checking posts and the overall Twitter user base ($N = 64,579,485$).

Results



Figure 4: Distribution of mean ideological scores of Twitter users who shared fact-checking posts, subdivided by each adjudication and the party affiliation/political leaning of the fact-check target.

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

Figure 5: Timeline displaying the partisan selective sharing behavior of users from each political ideology (normalized by the maximum month's count in each ideology; $N_{\text{Max: Libs/Dem}} = 131,743$; $N_{\text{Max: Cons/Rep}} = 14,201$).

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

Figure 6: Lorenz curve depicting the cumulative distribution of users sharing political fact-checks, stratified by users' political ideology.

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

Figure 7: Plot depicts the correlation between political ideology intensity and the proportion of selective fact-check sharing, with separate evaluations for Conservative-leaning and Liberal-leaning users.

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Conclusion

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4. This pattern of partisan cheerleading is also pronounced among liberal users, especially during election periods.

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