

Value-based argumentation and the Transition to Low Carbon Economy in Turkey and Portugal: Values, Uncertainty and Actions

HUTHAIFAH BUSUULWA

Ibn Haldun University TR

Huthaifah.busuulwa@ibnhaldun.edu.tr

This paper goes deeper into the values debate, according greater importance to the role of values in practical reasoning and argumentation. I argue that action on uncertain events, depend profoundly on values of the agents or the values that are incited by circumstances and the desire to achieve a desired goal. In such situations even if value premises are not always made explicit, they are nevertheless present in the decision-making process.

KEYWORDS: Circumstantial values, Endogenous motivations, Environmental argumentation, Exogenous motivations, Low carbon economy, Normative values, Practical reasoning.

1. INTRODUCTION

Argumentation analysis as a distinct part of discourse analysis has become one of the most suitable tools to discuss environmental issues. (Rodrigues, Lewinski & Üzelgün, 2019; Dryzek, 2013) Argumentation theory is better poised to be espoused to understand environmental issues because of its precise methods of analysis and evaluation of naturally-occurring argumentation (Lewinski & Üzelgün, 2019; Van Eemeren et al, 2014; Lewinski & Mohammed, 2016). Environmental argumentation has existed over the last century with various arguments and positions on environmental concerns (Lewinski & Üzelgün, 2019, p.1). Most of the time reasoning about the environment is **Practical reasoning**, people who are engaged in mitigation efforts deal with the question of what to do. It arises from problems that we face as agents in the world (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2011, p.6) it “*starts from an action-question: What shall we do?*” (Rodrigues, Lewinski & Üzelgün, 2019, p. 23) and involves arguing in favour of a conclusion, using selected means to reach some desirable goal. The World is in a period of transition

towards the desired goal of a low carbon economy where the sustainability of the world's resources and economic activities go together hand in hand. A transition is difficult to achieve and it is often a messy process. It is getting widely recognized that the challenge of the 21st century is to transition towards a more sustainable energy system efficient and characterized by low carbon sources. This transition effort mirrors an earlier version from the 19th century that emphasized a transition from wood to water and from coal to oil in the twentieth. As (Dryzek, 2013) noted, a lot has happened in the field of environmental affairs.

Differing views are clearly manifested when it comes to the **practical reasoning**, which include debates about climate change. Like other political processes, actions are based on a deliberative process where decisions are arrived at cooperatively (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012). Some believe that protecting the environment makes good economic sense (Balmford et al. 2002; Turner et al. 2003). Others disagree, arguing that protecting the environment because of an expected economic gain is not a right thing to do, simply because the environment ought to be valued intrinsically, not just for its instrumental value. They aver that it is because the environment exists that we can even take a step to think about economics, a step which in other words diminishes the value we ought to attach to the platform which makes our human existence possible in the first place. They therefore find it appalling that the environment is not prioritised by the economic-oriented people. Yet others take a middle position arguing that whether the environment is protected because of its intrinsic or its instrumental value, the end is the same; that at least efforts would be put in place to protect it. Whether the purpose is achieved through proper, morally thoughtful methods or without regard to moral values at all, if the end result is an action that protects the environment no one should complain. The best thing to do, they say, is to be sensitive to all environmental values and develop institutions that enable broad participation in the making of difficult environmental decisions.

Disagreements on difficult issues like climate change may not be easily allayed and the best outcome may not be winning the debate (for this could be hardly attained, especially where uncertainty reigns) but instituting processes that more people can agree upon to guide all through an outcome that could be welcomed by the majority. This is a challenge, but not impossible to achieve. Studying people's Values is a necessary condition for efforts towards compromise to bear fruit. Some people favour radical solutions now for fear that postponing action may lead to devastating and irreversible impacts. On the other hand, taking action immediately without getting to know more about the impacts risks potentially irreversible investments that would have been to

greater benefit. This is also the case with the debate on lowering carbon emissions. There are no clear-cut criteria to know the consequences of either action, as a result, the actors turn to their value system for a verdict at that particular point in time. Uncertainty, with or without the ability of learning is sure to elicit divergent views which further engenders differing actions.

2. VALUES

It is generally accepted that values are an important element in every argument and practical reasoning (Allport, 1961; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Audi, 2004; Brandom, 1998, Fairclough & Fairclough, 2011; 2012). Recently interest in the subject of values has resurfaced under the novel field of argumentation research. We need to look at the various ways that values have been utilized in literature and in natural language. This will help us be in position to identify values whenever they are used in a deliberation or argumentation.

2.1 *Values as a tool for evaluation*

Early usages of the word denote the act of appraising something's worth. It was used to "refer to the fairness and equivalence of the amount of a commodity in an exchange" (Rohan, 2000, p. 256). This understanding of values continues to be most prevalent in the day to day usage. When someone says she values (x) it often means that she attaches a deserving degree of worth to it. Early value theorists faced a dilemma of determining whether values should be investigated from the perspective of the entity being investigated or from the perspective of the person doing the evaluation? (Feather, 1975, p.3; Rohan, 2000, p. 256). According to Rohan, the dilemma has since been settled as contemporary value theorists investigate values from the perspective of the person, their priorities and the stimuli in environment in which they develop those motivations (Rohan, 2000, p. 256). Values now assumed broader meaning, not just evaluating something's worth, but also seen as a guide for action, motivation and adherence to beliefs (Audi, 2004, Fairclough & Fairclough, 2011;2012).

2.2 *Values as Conformity, adherence (to beliefs and norms)*

Another prominent usage of the term values is used to denote a principle for conformity to some standard or forms of behaviour such as obligation, fidelity, loyalty, solidarity and discipline (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, 1969, p.77). People use the term to require themselves to live up to what they believe in as persons and as a collection of persons. As a result, several scholars have distinguished two kinds of values; personal and societal values (Rohan, 2000;

Williams, 1979). There is consensus that values are important predictors of behaviour and attitudes and are cherished across cultures. (Pakizeh et al., 2007; O'Brien, 2009, p. 166). Some values are universal while others are particular to an individual or group. Confucius's five universally binding obligations- between rulers and the ruled, father and son, husband and wife, older brother and younger brother, friend and friend can apply in most societies and therefore can be said to be universal values. Here the values are norms, forming a part of the social/ cultural background (Durnova p. 721; Blakeley & Evans, 2006, p.29). Schwartz (1994) for instance identified ten types of universal values found in all societies; security, tradition, conformity, power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism and benevolence (see also O'Brien, 2009, p. 167). Before Schwartz, Rokeach (1958) identified thirty-six values which he believed existed within all societies, he classified them into two, eighteen 'terminal' and eighteen 'instrumental' values. Generally, here values are seen as conceptions of the desirable, and often times people are eager to follow or to see them followed. This is because values are emotionally charged and people are mobilized to follow those with whom they share similar values creating identities and clashes (Durnova, 2018, p. 722; Barnes, 2008; Hochschild, 1990; Stavrakakis, 2008; Honneth, 1996). These are reflected in differences of opinion, policy and planning controversies (Durnova, 2018, p. 721; Griggs & Howarth, 2004, Gualini & Majoor, 2007; Huxley, 2010; Schön & Rein, 1994).

2.3 Values as motivation, Principles for guiding actions

The third broad conceptualisation of values denotes values as motivation, guiding principles for action. According to Rokeach, (2000, p.2) they serve as standards or criteria to guide judgment and action. In this case, concepts such as choice, attitude, evaluation, rationalization, attribution of causality among others are espoused (O'Brien, 2009, p. 166). As rational beings, people's actions are formed as a result of some kind of deliberation or thinking, and the resultant actions then deserve to be called rational judgements. There is always an element of beliefs in actions, whether they are due to ethical reasoning or practical reasoning and argumentation or not. According to Robert Audi (2004, p.123) beliefs are needed to guide action. Audi suggested that motivational reasons are one of the main kinds of reasons for action others being normative and explanatory reasons (Audi, 2004 p 120). For Schwartz (1987) motivational goals underlie value priorities. People are always motivated to engage in situations or actions they deem to produce positive affect (Schwartz, 1987; Rohan, 2000) In this case, values are defined as motivating factors, the principles upon which a person is

moved to act, evaluate action or inaction and potential consequences. They are what we care about, and they portray our internal and external inclinations. (Fairclough, 2011, p.8, Keeney, 1992, pp 3-6).

2.3.1 Fairclough's method

In Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), values as premises are a part of their proposed structure of practical argumentation scheme. This structure includes a circumstantial premise, or the current state of affairs which is seen as a problem and ought to be solved, a goals premise which depicts the desired action that should be achieved in the future once action is taken, a claim for action premise which discuss what needs to be done considering the current state of affairs, a means-goals premise which shows how the desired outcome can be achieved and a values premise which supports the other values. Values and emotions are necessary premises in a practical argumentation because without them nothing would matter (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2011, p.5; Blackburn, 1998 cited in Fairclough). He emphasizes that all arguments have a motivational component and the results portray what one wants and values (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2011, p.5). Values justify the goal that an individual or party chooses to adopt, points out the problematic circumstances that calls for action and what ought to be done to ameliorate them in the best possible way.

When a string of positions is studied, it becomes easier to discern the value system with or without prior background knowledge about the subject under consideration. For instance, a college educated pro-choice, pro-marriage equality, pro-cannabis, climate change activist American even without describing her political inclinations would most likely identify or be identified as a progressive liberal acting under the influence of progressive liberal values. A person who has a strong conservative value system would most likely be against allowing same sex marriage. Values can therefore be empirically investigated.

3 DISAGREEMENTS, VALUES AND ACTION: POPULATION PRESSURE AND THE GOAL OF LOW-CARBON ECONOMY IN PORTUGAL AND TURKEY

3.1 On Normative and Circumstantial Values

I classify Fairclough's values as Normative values. The key concern they address is whether or not the agent acts on what he/she is concerned about or ought to be concerned about. Disagreements on the necessary course of action engender actions that can be said to follow normative rules and those that do not. Here agents act consciously or otherwise with cognition of what they ought to do, or what they ought to be concerned about in the course of their actions.

In addition to this normative understanding of values, I find it necessary to distinguish such values that are shaped primarily by the context, the conditions without which a different action would have been undertaken. These I call Circumstantial values.

Disagreements emanating from this category often stem from the means-goals, the strategies to achieve a desired future state of affairs. In this case, there is often a general agreement on the circumstances leading to the dilemma. What causes disagreement is how to achieve the goal.

Circumstantial values accrue from the background informing an action. They can be constrained by normative obligations, but deciding on whether to act in a certain way depends on the weight of the circumstances faced. Both normative and circumstantial values are mutually constraining.

From our research it was noticed for instance that most respondents agree on the desirability of achieving a low carbon economy. However, there is no consensus on how to address the present challenges. At this stage, values come in. What motivates some to believe in one course of action and others to be opposed to it?

To answer this question, I analysed the discourse on population and found out that respondents implicitly espouse both normative and circumstantial values.

Many respondents pointed out that overpopulation is a huge challenge that threatens to derail achieving the desired state of low carbon economy. Here I notice a general acceptance of the goal and the circumstance premises as exemplified below;

"I think that the largest problem that we have is over-population and that's driving everything. Because, while we know that ten people can live in this planet, because we have enough resources, right? But the question is, can ten billion people live, even if it's 100% efficient, even if you're absolutely efficient in the way you use your resources, can ten billion people live on this planet? Maybe. Can 20 billion people live on this planet, probably not. Can 100 billion people live in this planet, absolutely not" (Interviewee P.1)

"Not one of the problems is population. Major problem is population. You know for example in 2014 there was the election for mayor here in İstanbul, and everybody wanted to be a mayor here in İstanbul, you know, for money, for power, for everything. So, they asked me they actually, one of the candidates let's say had a meeting with the scientists and asked "what is the major problem of İstanbul?" Everybody said that "traffic etc." I said population..." (Interviewee T22)

Argument reconstruction

1. The largest problem we have is over-population

1.1. We are faced with a circumstantial problem of over-population

1.1.1. Over-population takes precedence above all other problems

We notice that both respondents agree on the circumstance and the goal. They both agree that population is a challenge that needs to be ameliorated. From here disagreement on the course of action begins to surface.

"So, I think that the real, big question, is how do you limit the growth of the population. Because, the problems that arise from climate change, from everything, are much bigger because of the extensively large amount of people that live on this planet" (Interviewee P.1)

"Yes. I mean, we are growing steadily - except the big epidemic in the middle ages...but apart from that, there has to be a correction. Either we have, we will have to correct our population by ourselves. By saying that no more than one child because there is no food for us. Or the government will say, like in China, "No more than one child." Or, we will be 15 billion people, and suddenly there will be a famine, and we will die" (Interviewee T2)

Despite an agreement on the goal, circumstances may require different means- goals because of differences in values and circumstances at play. In China, for instance, the government could easily come in and put a limit on the number of kids one could have. Yet, as one respondent noted, the same policy would not be necessary in a country like Portugal. The difference in circumstances between the two countries play a fundamental role in having different course of action as observed below;

"And this comes to a sociological problem, that the Chinese have kind of solved, because in China, which is you can only have one child, right? But you cannot do this in Portugal. You cannot say "hey, you can only have one child", actually because we should have more here. So the problem that the Chinese have is the opposite of the problem that we have, but overall the population is growing and growing faster every year, so, right now, there are more living people, than people that ever lived in the face of the Earth, from the beginning of time" (Interviewee P1)

Argument Reconstruction

1.1 Whereas there is a general problem of population,

1.2. And the goal is the same,

1.3. The route that was taken in China should not be taken in Portugal,

1.4. Because the circumstances are different

Faced with such a dilemma the normative and circumstantial values are weighed and the actor may select from either depending on what he or she prioritises. This is done either implicitly or explicitly. Let us take for instance these two submissions below;

"And the problem is that, from time to time there were like these huge wars that killed twenty, thirty, forty million people. Right now, even if one of those wars occurred, forty million people it's absolutely nothing. And

I'm not saying that I want a war, of course (smiles), I'm just saying it's historical. You know, there has been recycling, the plagues have recycled, the wars have recycled people, so less people were there. Right now, there is nothing beside a huge cataclysm that can recycle what's happening... So ... I don't know, I don't have an answer for that" (Interviewee P1)

Argument Reconstruction

- 1.1. There is a problem of over-population
- 1.2 a. It can only be solved by a huge catalyst to solve that problem
- 1.2 b. I think we need that catalyst
- 1.3. I cannot say it explicitly, it does not sound right to want a war
"So, they asked me they actually, one of the candidates let's say had a meeting with the scientists and asked "what is the major problem of Istanbul?" Everybody said that "traffic etc." I said population. Everything depends on population. The water, because we are 17 million, the traffic and the pollution, everything comes from the population. We have to kill some, like Hitler." (Interviewee T22)

Argument Reconstruction

- 1.1. To solve Istanbul's problems
- 1.2 a. There are too many people in Istanbul
- 1.2 b. We have to be concerned about the over-population
- 1.3. We have to solve the problem of population
- 1.4. The way to do it is by killing some people.

Respondent T 22, explicitly gives a solution that respondent P1 implied but was hesitant to make explicit, perhaps because of normative reasons. Respondent T22 appears to have weighed that the circumstantial values needed to take precedence over normative values, and the value priority in this case was in favour of circumstances rather than the moral implications of killing people and thus did not find it impulsive to prescribe the remedy of death to thousands or even millions of human beings.

Those that are explicit in most cases do so when attaching a worth to something which acts as stimuli. Here it is easy to identify that a value has been invoked, because they are often overt. However, when it comes to other ways of espousing values, more detailed investigation is necessary to detect that indeed values are present. We can only do so using inference. Conclusions in such cases can only be plausible, there is room for error. Yet, like Brandon (1998) noted, we licence others to infer our beliefs from our explicit claims and our implicit or overt actions (Brandon, 1998: 129). Two ways can be identified as a starting point to highlight values from texts, endogenous and exogenous motivations.

3.2 Endogenous motivations

Some people are motivated to act on climate change because of reasons that can best be described as endogenous. They are inspired to act because of reasons such as personal interest in the field, fear for what the future could be, love for their family among others. These are often independent motivations forged not from the out but from within the actor's interests. Apportioning blame for climate change and its negative consequences is a major source of differences. A sizeable number think that it is humans who are responsible for it, the Anthropocene are contrasted by others who believe that the role of humans is very limited or negligible in the broader sense. The Anthropocene fear that the recent actions of man have worsened the environment and fear that if things continue, the future will be bleak.

Fear is one of the main drivers that's inspiring action on Climate Change in both Turkey and Portugal. The general fear is that without proper action, the following generations might suffer irreparable consequences if action on ensuring a low carbon economy is not implemented. This fear is often exacerbated by events such as changing weather patterns, disasters among others which upon being attributed to climate change leads to fear that trouble is coming even sooner than expected.

Those with families and children take fear even further, imagining a bleak future for their children. One interviewee from Portugal had this to say;

"Unfortunately, I'm very sceptic about the future, of the environment and the world, I have four kids, four daughters, and I'm really worried about their future, because the climate change and the warming of the world, cannot be addressed with the measures that we have now. We have to invest a lot more than we have invested until now" (Interviewee P8)

For that person all other considerations including money are not as important as the future of her children, which in this case is the priority value. This can be seen from the argument below;

"There is this economic reasoning beside the company, that I have of course to be concerned, but I think you can be balanced, the sense and the concern that I have in my guts, talking like this, about the environment, about the climate, about the future of my own children, I don't see it shared by all the directors of this company or other companies worldwide" (Interviewee P8)

We can see several values from the statement, economics which the respondent acknowledges is important. But even more important to her is concern about the environment and the future of her children.

3.3 Exogenous motivations

The source of motivation in this category is external to the actor or her immediate others like children and relatives. It does not mean however that the strength of motivation is questioned, far from it. An externally generated motivation can still be the key reason for action surpassing all others in value attached. *“we have to deal with the idea that we have a target, we have a deadline.... and that we still don't know how to deal with that deadline, but we have to do it.... And we have to keep investigating and trying new things and... fast tracking everything that we try” (Interviewee P1)*

External conditions may present the urgency requiring to act immediately rather than later. A growing number of actors have warned of a looming danger of catastrophes, and deadlines have been proposed in order to avert tragic occurrences. This has inspired many to want to act as soon as possible.

4. CONCLUSION

In a nutshell, values are the reason to dissent. It is because of one's values that they are motivated to act in one way or another. In environmental argumentation, values have featured prominently as the supporting premise to the goal, means to goal, circumstantial premises. In this paper we have endeavoured to portray the extent of the relevance of values in argumentation. To this end, we have distinguished two main separate but complimentary categories of values; the normative values and the circumstantial values. The normative values are the ones dealing with what one is concerned about or ought to be concerned about. On the other hand, Circumstantial values accrue when circumstances, rather than the deontic influence is prioritised before an action is taken. Motivation being a key component of the value structure is engendered by either endogenous or exogenous influences. From our research, we noticed that the actor's determination to do to not to do something was influenced either by factors that could be categorised as personal like the desire to earn more, to protect their family and children and fear. Others were influenced more by external considerations such as the policy of the European Union or market considerations.

Trying to solve differences necessitates understanding the value considerations that are fronted or that are driving a person or group. To Resolve disputes and conflicts generally requires careful deliberation targeting the opposite side's values and motivations. It helps to see the

person's point of view and makes coming to a middle ground more achievable.

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