Dissent, Disadvantage, Testimony and the Ideological 'Truth' of Presumptions

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This paper takes up Trudy Govier's account of how people who are marginalized in socioeconomic terms can also be rhetorically disadvantaged. It argues that the rhetorical disadvantage of people who are socially marginalized entails that they carry a higher burden of proof resulting in an *I-burden injustice* in the context of presumptions than those less marginalized, which is regularly compounded by their dissent regarding the status quo. It draws on work in cognitive psychology along with Nicholas Rescher's philosophical epistemology.

KEYWORDS: [I-burden injustice, burden of proof, rhetorical disadvantage, argumentative injustice, common knowledge effect, ideology, presumptions, testimony, credibility, trustworthiness]

1. INTRODUCTION: WHAT DO WE KNOW TO BE TRUE?

In their 1966 book "The Social Construction of Reality", Berger and Luckmann introduced *social construction*. Social theorist Tom Andrews explains social constructionists view "knowledge as created by the interactions of individuals within society" (Andrews, 2011, para. 7) where "truth [is] created not discovered by the mind" (Andrews, 2011, para. 6). However, additional theories have offered that this does not preclude constructionists from being, at least partially, realists.

> One can believe that concepts are constructed rather than discovered yet maintain that they correspond to something real in the world. This is consistent with the idea of Berger and Luckmann (1991) […] in that reality is socially defined but this reality refers to the subjective experience of every day life[;] how the world is understood rather than to the objective reality of the natural world (Andrews, 2011, para. 7).

Andrews says "most of what is known and most of the knowing that is done is concerned with trying to make sense of what it is to be human, as opposed to scientific knowledge. Individuals or groups of individuals define this reality" (Andrews, 2011, para. 7).

This is not to say that there is not a "real world" and that everything reduces to being relative. Cultural theorist Joseph Maxwell points to *critical realism* which helps to clarify. "Critical realists… retain an ontological realism (there is a real world that exists independently of our perceptions, theories, and constructions) while accepting a form of epistemological constructivism and relativism (our understanding of this world is inevitably a construction from our own perspectives and standpoint)" (Maxwell, 2012, p. 5). If this is accurate, one's standpoint (or perspective) is linked to assessing their credibility when they testify to what they know. Trudy Govier says "[t]estimonial claims are especially important…to [h]uman knowledge [as we are] utterly dependent upon our acceptance, much of the time, of what other people tell us" (Govier, 1993, p. 93) and if they believe us. This is how we pass on knowledge and learn language over generations and gain access to historical experiences we have not ourselves experienced.

Sociologist Elizabeth Borland notes Feminist Standpoint Theory has been especially critical of how we come to understand and know the world. It "argues that knowledge stems from social position [and] denies that [even] traditional science is objective [suggesting instead] that research and theory have ignored and marginalized women and feminist ways of thinking" (Borland, 2017, para. 1). Here, "[i]n societies stratified by gender and other categories, such as race and class, one's social positions shape what one can know" (Borland, 2017, para. 1). "[I]t is easy for those at the top of social hierarchies to […] miss critical questions about the social and natural world in their academic pursuits" because they lose sight of certain human and natural experiences (Borland, 2017, para. 2). In contrast, those situated at the bottom of social hierarchies have a "unique standpoint that is a better starting point for scholarship. Although such people are often ignored, their marginalized positions actually make it easier for them to define important research questions and explain social and natural problems" (Borland, 2017, para. 2). We have further reason, then, in this view to give weight to testimony given by those at the bottom of social hierarchies when they testify to their lived experiences.

Yet socioeconomically disadvantaged people often still find it difficult to have their voices heard and or be believed when they testify to what they know. This is particularly relevant if their testimonial claims are used to situate their arguments against presumptions dominantly accepted as "Truths" within a status quo. Moreover, as the

burden of proof tends to fall on those who dissent, they must be rhetorically effective in order to have their testimony be heard and viewed as credible (let alone persuasive). In what follows I show how socioeconomically disadvantaged people can be viewed as non-credible due to identity prejudices which can either lock them into a perpetual state of bearing the burden of proof when they attempt to argue against certain common knowledge "Truths" they feel are actually presumptive and should be defeated, or render their testimonial claims as unjustly unbelievable so their arguments cannot even be advanced. Effective dissent against a status quo is hindered, then, and runs the risk of perpetuating what I call an *I-burden injustice*. Finally, I offer how a concept from cognitive psychology known as the *common knowledge effect* (CKE) can further ensure wrong presumptions stand as 'True' if most people know them to be so.

2. IDEOLOGY OR THE TRUTH?

The theories of Michel Foucault and cultural theorist Stuart Hall are helpful in addressing how, what is essentially ideology becomes enacted as "the Truth". For Foucault, there is an inextricable link between knowledge and power. Hall explains for Foucault, "[k]nowledge linked to power not only assumes the authority of 'the truth,' but has the power to make itself true. All knowledge once applied in the real world, has real effects and, in that sense at least, 'becomes true'." (Hall, 1997, p. 33). Therefore, knowledge produced and reinforced by those in power (so, those charged with determining what counts as true) leads people to act according to these "truths", thereby circulating and reinforcing that "truth." The "real world" here is not one that exists independently of our perceptions, theories and constructions. According to Foucault, "[t]here is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time, power relations" (Foucault, 1977, p. 27 in Hall, 1997, p. 33). This relationship of immanence produces what Foucault calls a "regime of truth" (Hall, 1997, p. 36). For Foucault, it is "the combination of discourse and power – [what he calls] power/knowledge [that becomes] more important…than the question of 'truth'" (Hall, 1997, p. 33). Power/knowledge is enacted through the *social body*. "This body is produced within discourse, according to the different discursive formations – the state of knowledge about…what counts as 'true'… This is a radically historicized conception of the body – a sort of surface on which different regimes of power/knowledge write their meanings and effects" (Foucault, 1977, p. 63 in Hall, 1997, p. 35). It is because of this that our subjectivities are honed and conditioned through historical exposure to disciplinary enforcement by institutions

like schools, the military, the family and hospitals; where what were once outside social constructs become habituated, and, over time, imperceptibly enacted as "Truth" through exposure to these social mechanisms, thus we have ideology.

For Hall "ideologies are not the product of individual consciousness or intention. Rather we formulate our intentions within ideology. […] We have to "speak through" ideologies which are active in our society and which provide us with the means of "making sense" of social relations and our place in them" (Hall, 1995, p. 18-19). Like for Foucault, Hall says ideologies "work unconsciously" (Hall, 1995, p. 19) through discourse. "[I]deologies "work" by constructing for their subjects (individual and collective) positions of identification and knowledge which allow them to "utter" ideological truths as if they were their authentic authors" (Hall, 1995, p. 19). This is directly related to our presumptive reasoning as it relies on common knowledge for its plausibility (Rescher, 1977).

Anne Makus has used Hall's work to critique rhetorical theory. Her observations are helpful as they explain

> the power of "the ideological" [lies in] 'the movement towards the winning of a universal validity and legitimacy for accounts of the world which are partial and particular, and towards the grounding of these particular constructions in the taken-for-grantedness of 'the real' ("Rediscovery," p. 65). Hall argues that the legitimacy of an ideological claim depends on that part of the truth which it takes for the whole truth, and that these particular and partial constructions are taken to be natural and real phenomena. That is, they are represented as what is transparent, inevitable, and wholly natural. The ideological moment occurs when codes have become profoundly naturalized, when through habitual use they have developed an appearance of equivalence with their referents so that instant recognition occurs" (Makus, 1990, p. 498).

For instance, "[e]verybody knows," […] what democracy is. The fact that ideological constructions are socially formed tends to be lost to consciousness" (Makus, 1990, p. 498). Hence, I suggest subjective reality may function as objective reality ("the Truth") in the plausibility of certain common knowledge presumptions, and in our evaluative judgments of a speaker's credibility, particularly, if they wish to dissent against such presumptions.

Nicholas Rescher (1977) says a presumption is a kind of necessary place holder, or "for now" approach, to standing in for the truth as arguers attempt to meet their burdens of proof, or to counter burdens of proof. "A presumption is a plausible pretender to truth

whose credentials may well prove insufficient" (Rescher, 1977, p. 35). However, these presumptive truths are "able to stand provisionally…until somehow undermined" (Rescher, 1977, p. 34). But, if our presumptions hold as true, based on our common knowledge (what "everybody knows") until proven otherwise, then we run the risk of accepting certain problematic ideological presumptions as "True" because their socially constructed "Truth" may not be consciously considered due to the unconscious nature of ideology. Indeed, if we take into account social construction, critical realism and standpoint theory, presumptions are a murky business. Additionally, concerning to this common knowledge problem is that "[a] presumption is not merely something that is 'possibly true' or that it is 'true for all I know about the matter.' To class a proposition as a presumption is to take a definite and committal position with respect to it, so as to say 'I propose to accept it as true insofar as no difficulties arise from doing so'" (Rescher, 1977, p. 42). If problematic ideologies function as "Truth" in our presumptive reasoning, then the people with the power to make things true may find no difficulties arise from saying that a presumption is acceptably true. They may not even consciously recognize why it is a problem (or be untrue) rendering the presumptive nature of the thing hidden. So, if no difficulties arise, problematic ideological claims may be used as evidentiary support or proof for the 'truthfulness' of what is actually a presumption. Moreover, counterclaims and evidence for such may not be sought as the presumption becomes "the Truth". Thus, any difficulties that may arise (dissent say) can therefore be dismissed as untrue.

Berger and Luckmann (1991) have theorized how the subjective passes for objective "through the interaction of people with the social world, [which]… influenc[es] [them,] resulting in routinisation and habitualization [generally what holds for Foucault and Hall as well]. That is, any frequently repeated action becomes cast into a pattern, which can be reproduced without much effort" (Andrews, 2011, para. 8). While the positive result is that people are free "to engage in innovation rather than starting everything anew. In time, the meaning of the habitualization becomes embedded as routines, forming a general store of knowledge. This is institutionalised by society to the extent that future generations experience this type of knowledge as objective [and, hence, how social constructions can become adopted as objective common knowledge or how presumptions can become the 'Truth']. Additionally, this objectivity is continuously reaffirmed in the individual's interaction with others" (Andrews, 2011, para. 8).

3. TESTIMONY, RHETORICAL DISADVANTAGE, ARGUMENT AND INJUSTICE

In "When Logic Meets Politics: Testimony, Distrust, and Rhetorical Disadvantage" Trudy Govier argues that stereotypes and social power dynamics are intimately linked to how we accept or reject testimonial claims. She defines testimonial claims as "those which describe or purport to describe a particular person's observations, experience and related memories" (Govier, 1993, p. 93). Whether or not testimonial claims are believed is a matter of credibility, which relates to trustworthiness. In "a normative sense, a person's credibility may be defined as his or her worthiness to be believed… It depends on a person's sincerity, honesty, and reliability" (Govier, 1993, p. 93). They are reliable "if and only if [they are] honest and… in an appropriate position to be a believable asserter of the sort of claim made" (Govier, 1993, p. 93). A putative expert speaking about their field can serve as the example. In contrast, rhetorical credibility is

> the extent to which one is regarded as believable, and is believed, by others. People who are white and male, who dress well, look professional, appear middle class or upper middle class, speak without an accent in a deep or low-toned voice, and seem unemotional, rational and articulate, tend in many contexts to have more rhetorical credibility than others. Often those who lack such qualities are, in effect, rhetorically disadvantaged (Govier, 1993, p. 94).

Take, then, the example of our putative expert to make the point clear, particularly with regard to mounting an argument. Khameiel Al Tamini claims that a person's general lack of perceived authority in society due to their identity, i.e.: their words are dismissed generally in society because of an identity prejudice against them, can affect their credibility if that person tries to make an argument from a justified position of authority. In "A Gendered Analysis of the Role of Authority in Argumentation" she uses the example of a male scientist and female scientist (experts who should be equal) as it relates to *ad verecundiam* citing two related issues. The first has to do with discrediting the expertise of the female as Al Tamini points to a "general lack of authority [that] women receive from society as a whole" (Al Tamini, 2009, p. 5) which can lead to a denial of the woman's expert credibility if she is up against a male expert. The second relates directly to the authority of the speaker. Al Tamini says "[s]ince women generally lack authority and are dismissed [in society…] their bringing forth an authority in order to defend a claim or establish an argument is going to have less weight" (Al Tamini, 2009, p. 5). Thus, expert knowledge also

needs “gender or social authority to back it up” (Al Tamini, 2009, p. 6). Al Tamini concludes “[q]uestions and evaluation of arguments from authority [specifically Walton’s critical questions] should be mindful of gender bias that can distort the rating of the credibility of the expert, concerns that can easily be mapped onto other social identities and evaluations.

Govier more broadly demonstrates these concerns. “Standards of rationality, seriousness, and maturity incorporate norms that are not neutral as regards age, gender, race, class, culture and style” (Govier, 1993, p. 97). People who are socioeconomically disadvantaged are “easily dismissable-and dismissed-as incapable of making serious, reasonably articulated assertions” (Govier, 1993, p. 97) which can lead to their testimony unjustly being rendered as non-credible or not trustworthy or believable. Yet

> [t]he prevailing view is that people are deemed trustworthy as to their own experience *unless* there is some clear evidence to the contrary. This is to say, in effect, that *the onus is in favor of normative credibility* [for example] B should grant, or assume, that A, who *seems* to be telling B his or her story, *is indeed truthfully doing so* and *is sufficiently competent to get that story right.* These premises are granted other things being equal—granted unless there is clear evidence to the contrary (Govier, 1993, p. 101).

But how, as Al Tamini seeks to demonstrate, do we assess what counts as clear evidence to the contrary? “Insofar as B may tend to systematically discredit women, the aged, blacks, [Indigenous], children and others, B thinks he or she has ‘clear evidence’ to justify doing so” (Govier, 1993, p. 101). This lends itself to linking rhetorical disadvantage to burden of proof and indeed to challenging common knowledge presumptions within a status quo which I contend requires the use of both testimony and argument for the challenger. In my view, if I want to challenge an oppressive status quo I first have to testify to my lived experiences in it in order to then argue that these experiences are oppressive and based on erroneous presumptions that are acting as “Truth”. Phyllis Rooney helps to make the point clear because identity prejudices are “likely to be exacerbated in skepticism-informed argumentative exchanges where minority members [A], whose experiences and claims are likely to be given less credibility [by B], are thereby assigned greater burdens of proof” (Rooney, 2012, p. 319). This is especially problematic “when they [A] seek to address concerns that are of special significance for their subgroup” (Rooney, 2012, p. 318) like in cases of arguing against an oppressive status quo.

Miranda Fricker (2007) has also argued that people who face a systematic identity prejudice can face what she terms *testimonial injustice*. In "Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing" Fricker argues testimonial injustice occurs when an unfair credibility deficit is assigned to a speaker by a hearer due to the hearer's prejudice against some aspect of the speaker's identity. This injustice tracks the subject through various aspects of their life (economic, social, professional etc.). Thus, an epistemic injustice is committed against the speaker and harm is done to them in their capacity as a knower.

Patrick Bondy uses testimonial injustice as an analogue for what he terms as *argumentative injustice,* but it can be both a credibility deficit and excess which can lead to harm.

> [W]hen identity prejudices cause reduced or excessive credibility judgments, reasons can fail to have the rational force that they ought. If elements in an argument do rely on an arguer's credibility, identity prejudices can skew the correct evaluation of those aspects of the argument; if no elements in an argument rely on the arguer's credibility, identity prejudices can still skew the evaluation, by introducing judgments of credibility where they are irrelevant (Bondy, 2010, p. 264).

Argumentative injustices directly harm people in their capacities as arguers but can also harm them as knowers. "[O]ur capacity as arguers often has a bearing on our capacity as knowers" (Bondy, 2010, p. 266). He takes the view of arguments as manifest rationality so, "harm to people in their capacity as arguers is harm to them in their capacity as people capable of employing and criticizing reasons in order to persuade each other of truths" (Bondy, 2010, p. 266). The harm happens in three ways: first, "it undermines the rationality of the endeavour, so that the force of reasons does not determine the outcome, and the arguers are deprived of" the rational outcome they are trying to achieve (Bondy, 2010, p. 266). "Second, it can distort an arguer's status in the community of arguers, if the prejudice is such that people take [the arguer] to be unable to argue well" (Bondy, 2010, p. 266). Therefore, the arguer would not be permitted to engage in arguments. Finally, "if repeated enough, credibility deficits can [become a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy by] undermining the way that [the arguer] thinks of [them]self as an arguer" (Bondy, 2010, p.266) so, they may not bother to offer arguments even when it is appropriate to do so. Credibility excess is also harmful in relationship to the same three reasons. First, that the force of the better reasons may not be determined rationally; second an arguer's self-perception may be skewed to believe they are a better arguer than others and they may not

seek out or grant credibility to others' arguments, and other people's perceptions can be distorted "by placing [the arguer] on a pedestal in their eyes, and preventing them from seeking to engage [them] in arguments" (Bondy, 2010, p. 267). As I posit that the combination of testimony and arguments are required by someone who wishes to dissent against a status quo, the above theories offer how one can be doubly served an injustice if their standpoint falls outside of common knowledge presumptions masquerading as "Truth" which I further relate to burden of proof below.

4. PRESUMPTIONS, BURDEN OF PROOF AND I-BURDEN INJUSTICE

In his consideration of who has the burden of proof in social criticism Juha Räikkä gets at the crux of my concerns. He defines social criticism as "an argumentative situation where an opponent or a group of opponents publicly oppose certain social practices while proponents defend these practices" (Räikkä, 2005, p. 229). In practice, we need to know who has the burden of proof as we "must frequently make decisions and act, not on the basis of conclusive evidence, but on the basis of what is reasonable to presume as true" (Räikkä, 1997, p. 228). Again, for Rescher this relates to the plausibility of a presumption where the "conception of plausibility is the notion of the extent of our cognitive inclination towards a proposition-of *the extent of its epistemic hold upon us* in the light of the credentials presented by the basis of its credibility. The key issue is that of how readily the thesis in view could make its peace within the overall framework of our cognitive commitments" (Rescher, 1977, p. 38-39). Again, rhetorical disadvantage/advantage and the injustices outlined earlier are deeply woven into our cognitive commitments.

Räikkä's account provides acknowledgment for these concerns as he notes, frankly, it can be difficult to "see exactly what is reasonable to presume in a given argumentative situation… Sometimes people disagree not only about how …things are but also about what the reasonable presumption is" (Räikkä, 2005, p. 228). He situates the problem I see in what he calls *conservative presumptionism*. Noted as a "widely accepted burden of proof rule", the doctrine is "she who asserts must prove" (Räikkä , 2005, p. 232). If one asserts something contrary to the status quo, the burden of proving the claim falls to her. Referencing C. L. Hamblin, Räikkä holds "that 'there is a presumption in favour of existing institutions and established doctrines, and against anything paradoxical, that is, 'contrary to the prevailing opinion'" (Hamblin in Räikkä, 2010, p. 232). He further asserts Douglas "Walton's view, [that] 'someone who sets out to disprove a proposition that is widely accepted or popularly presumed to be true will have to mount a

strong argument if [they are] to meet a reasonable burden of proof that would convince an opponent in a reasonable dialogue'" (Walton in Räikkä, 2010, p. 232). In this view, then, "people have a burden to present some reasons when they make accusations or statements that run counter to common opinion" so it is "the opponent, and not the defender, [who] must lead the attack" (Räikkä, 2010, p. 232). As Rooney says, "B is expected to challenge and question any of A's claims that [B] finds less than plausible, thus placing the burden of proof on A" (Rooney, 2012, p. 325).

Conservative presumptionism also requires distinguishing between the *evidential burden of proof* (E-burden) and the *initiating burden of proof* (I-burden). "Roughly, an I-burden is a burden to support one's view within the dialogue if the view is presented first; an E-burden is a burden to produce further evidence when a sufficient reply is made to one's position" (Räikkä, 2010, p. 231). The I-burden remains on the side of the challenger while the E-burden can shift between them provided the I-burden is able to be met at the outset. In my view two things can go wrong constituting what I am calling *I-burden injustice,* if we consider rhetorical disadvantage/advantage, testimonial and argumentative injustices against this view. First, the one opposing the status quo presumption may not have the rhetorical credibility to be permitted to testify to their experiences so they cannot proceed to an argument as they will be dismissed from testifying outright. A subtle advancement may be that the challenger is permitted to give testimony, however, it will not be granted weight, credibility or sufficiency to meet their I-burden and either be dismissed or see the challenger required to continue attempts to meet their I-burden. This leads to the second major problem I see, which I also think is the one that occurs in a greater number of cases. If a status quo challenger is rhetorically disadvantaged, which being socioeconomically disadvantaged often means is the case, they may be permitted to reach the stage of I-burden yet be locked in at this stage as the prejudice they face exacerbates the already heavy burden at this stage. Moreover, the challenger may attempt to move to the stage of E-burden when giving their testimony, but only be permitted to shift from testimony to an argument and be held at I-burden.

Räikkä argues there are certain instances, like in social criticism, where questions remain open. But "[w]hen a case is open, any *action* should proceed from the view that the one who does not have I-burden is right" (Räikkä, 2010, p. 232). In this view the problem is that "it is not justified to change the holder of the I-burden during the discussion (which keeps on going), and in effect, those who are criticizing existing institutions have an I-burden, practically speaking, forever (i.e. until the presently existing institutions are no longer the existing ones)" (Räikkä,

2010, p. 235). In the cases, then, of oppressed groups of people who face systematic identity prejudices seeking to dissent against a status quo that enacts and enforces these injustices, there is a risk of having common knowledge presumptions pressing against them for substantial periods of time. Racism and sexism can serve as generational examples which address the kind of lingering of ideological "Truths" I am considering here. In spite of a constant gnawing at the status quo presumptions that oppress these social strata, and the sustained challenges which have been raised as difficulties for accepting these presumptions as "True", racism and sexism systematically persist, and the I-burden has remained on the side of the challengers. This may in part be due to what Räikkä considers as a lack of rules in social criticism. Unlike in law, where the burden of proof rules are strictly organized, "[i]n social criticism, there are no shared values [between opponents] which would uncontroversially determine what is the reasonable presumption and who [should have] the burden of proof" and there are no rules to determine when a debate should stop and a winner be declared (Räikkä, 2010, p. 238).

As many oppressed groups have pointed out that even in the law rules can be problematic (and worthy of social criticism!), I am hesitant to go so far as to suggest the kind of structural rigidity under which the law is organized be applied to social criticism. It seems to me, however, that we need to account for the *I-burden injustice* levelled against status quo dissenters in common knowledge presumptions so that harm and injustice do not persist for generations. I suggest harm here should serve as the guiding principle for determining not only what counts as an oppressed social stratum, but for establishing the sufficiency of meeting the I-burden. Now, it has been put to me that those who espouse extreme views like white supremacists or people who deny climate science may themselves then argue that they feel oppressed. While there is not sufficient space to handle the complexity of this here, I suggest that we ought to establish benchmarks for harm, and in the case that it can be demonstrated harm is being done to whomever claims it then we ought to move past the I-burden and hash it out at the stage of E-burden.

Finally, we ought to account for psychological concerns that can further complicate I-burden injustice. Psychological researcher Daniel Gigone notes the Common Knowledge Effect (CKE) "describes the impact of group decision making" based on "whether knowledge relevant to a decision is shared by all group members prior to discussion" (Gigone, 2017, para. 1).

> [l]aboratory studies have shown that information known by everyone prior to discussion has a more powerful influence on

> decisions than information not shared by everyone. [CKE] demonstrates that an irrelevant factor—the number of members who know a particular piece of information—can affect group decisions. If a piece of unshared information is crucial to making a correct decision, the result may be an incorrect decision (Gigone, 2017, para. 1).

As rhetorical disadvantage and testimonial and argumentative injustices have outlined, there are serious social reasons why a piece of crucial information important to making a correct decision may not be shared. Thus, until the information is received, wrong decisions about the credibility of our presumptive 'truths' may persist.

CONCLUSION

Räikkä agrees with conservative presumptionism, as do I, that we must start from something. Rescher says presumptions are a necessary "epistemological task in the structure of rational argumentation. For there must clearly be some class of claims that are allowed at least *pro tem* to enter acceptably into the framework of argumentation, because if everything were contested then the process of inquiry could not progress at all" (Rescher, 1977, p. 34). I like Räikkä's question, however, about whether our starting point should be conservative presumptions? For instance, on issues of social criticism, perhaps, the I-burden should rest with the status quo to demonstrate harm is not being committed if a challenge should arise. At the very least, I think wherever we begin, our theories must include an account of bias and harm. Even if we continue to deploy a heavy burden of proof on those who challenge the status quo, we must, no matter the struggle to achieve it, seek to eliminate the harm caused by the I-burden injustice.

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