Argumentation, dissent, and luck

JOB DE GREFTE
University of Groningen
j.a.m.de.grefte@rug.nl

In this paper, I approach the practice of argumentation and the issue of dissent from the perspective of social and anti-luck epistemology. In particular, I show how dissent can exclude reflective luck, and argue that dissent is epistemically legitimate only if it does so.

KEYWORDS: argumentation, dissent, veritic luck, reflective luck, epistemically perverse dissent

1. INTRODUCTION

In this paper, I integrate findings from anti-luck epistemology, social epistemology and argumentation theory to provide a novel perspective on the epistemic value of argumentation. While the perspective developed in this paper is consistent with current veritistic approaches to argumentation (e.g. Goldman, 1994), it goes beyond existing work by incorporating insights from recent anti-luck epistemology. It is argued that argumentation helps us to exclude certain epistemically problematic forms of luck from our beliefs, and doings so provides epistemic value that exceeds the directly veritistic value of producing true belief.

The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I provide an overview of the findings from anti-luck epistemology and social epistemology that I will be using in this paper. In section 3, I argue that argumentation is a belief-forming method. In section 4, I argue that argumentation eliminates error-possibilities, and doing so, helps us to eliminate certain kinds of luck. Section 5 concludes.

2. ANTI-LUCK EPISTEMOLOGY, SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY, ARGUMENTATION THEORY

Let us start by introducing the background theory relevant for the rest of the paper. In this section I focus on anti-luck epistemology and social epistemology, in the next on argumentation theory.

Anti-luck epistemology is a branch of epistemology that investigates the relation between important epistemological concepts and various forms of luck. Ever since Gettier (1963), epistemologists have recognized that certain kinds of luck are incompatible with knowledge. What prevents knowledge in Gettier cases is that one's belief-forming method produces a true belief but it is a matter of luck that it does. This kind of luck is commonly called *veritic luck* (Engel, 1992; Unger, 1968).[1]

Another potentially problematic form of luck is *reflective luck*. One is reflectively lucky in believing proposition *p* just in case it seems from one's reflective perspective that one's belief is veritically lucky. Reflective and veritic luck are distinct kinds of luck because it may seem that one's belief is veritically lucky without it actually being so, and vice versa. As Duncan Pritchard has argued, externalists about knowledge usually only require the absence of veritic luck. Internalists in addition require the absence of reflective luck (Pritchard, 2005). In this paper, unless otherwise specified, 'knowledge' shall refer to internalist knowledge.

What does it mean to say that one's belief-forming method produced a true belief by luck? On the modal analysis used in this paper, luck is given a modal gloss. One's belief-forming method luckily produces a true belief, if and only if it produces a true belief in the actual world, but there are 'close' possible worlds where it instead produces a false belief. Closeness is then defined in terms of world similarity, as it is in standard Lewesian sphere systems (Lewis, 1973).[2]

To determine whether our beliefs are subject to veritic luck, we need to determine whether they are formed in a way that could have easily produced a false belief. In section 4 I will argue that argumentation is one way to do so. Here I want to note that people have not always thought that eliminating nearby error-possibilities is sufficient for knowledge. Descartes, for example, thought that we could only know if every conceivable source of error has been eliminated (Descartes, 1996). Since that road quickly leads to skepticism, contemporary epistemologists usually demand less; instead of absolute certainty for our beliefs, they demand *safety,* where a belief is safe if and only if not produced by a method that could have easily produced a false

---

[1] Veritic luck has recently been subdivided into intervening veritic luck and environmental veritic luck (Carter & Pritchard, 2015). For our purposes this distinction is insubstantial.

[2] There are many interesting and puzzling open questions regarding the nature of world-similarity and in particular its measure. These issues are not directly relevant to the present paper, and so we leave them open. The only assumption I make is that some measure can be found.

belief. (Pritchard, 2008; Sosa, 1999; Williamson, 2000). By the definition of veritic luck, this entails that knowledge requires the elimination of veritic luck

A second field of relevance for this paper is social epistemology (e.g. Goldman, 1987, 1999). Argumentation is, after all a social process, and studying its epistemic properties is squarely within the purview of social epistemology, a field that studies the epistemic properties of social interactions.[3] It is thus not surprising that argumentation has been a focal point of social epistemology for quite some time (Goldman, 1994, 1997, 2003).

The approach in this paper is to expand on existing work on argumentation in social epistemology by incorporating insights from anti-luck epistemology. I will argue that there are clear benefits of doing so. First, it leads to a better understanding of the epistemic value of argumentation. Second, it enables a novel perspective of an open puzzle in argumentation theory: a puzzle concerning the persistent interlocutor.

So far, argumentation has been investigated from a veritistic point of view, where norms for good argumentation are derived from its ability to produce *true* beliefs (Goldman, 1994). Since knowledge requires truth, these veritistic norms have epistemic value. But knowledge requires more than just truth, among other things, as we saw above, the absence of certain forms of luck. We may thus extend and contribute to the understanding of the epistemic properties of argumentation by investigating the extent to which argumentation may not only produce true belief, but non-luckily true belief. That is the central aim of this paper.

3. ARGUMENTATION AS A SOCIAL BELIEF-FORMING PROCESS

In the previous section we stated that argumentation is a social belief-forming process. In this section, we will provide a more precise description of argumentation as a social belief-forming process, drawing on the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2016; Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Eemeren, 2004).

A belief-forming process is a process that produces beliefs. If that process occurs within the skull of a single agent, we speak of individual belief-forming processes. If it crucially involves other people, we speak of a social belief-forming process. These processes can be mixed: if I form a belief about *p* on the basis of the social belief-forming process 'relying on testimony', then part of this social process will

[3] For recent overviews of field, see (Goldman & O'Connor, 2019; Goldman & Whitcomb, 2010; Haddock, Millar, & Pritchard, 2010)

consist of my individual belief-forming process 'relying on auditive stimuli'.

Argumentation is a social belief-forming process, since it crucially involves different parties arguing with each other. Sometimes, one of the parties' voices is internalized, and we 'argue with ourselves'. Still, the basic case is the social setting were two or more people are involved. That is at least the sense of argumentation with which we will be concerned in this paper.

Belief-forming processes can be described on different levels of generality. The same process may be described as 'relying on eyesight', 'relying on eyesight in good lighting conditions', 'relying on eyesight in good lighting conditions while awake and looking at medium-sized objects from medium distance', etc. Infamously, we lack principled reasons for saying one of these levels is epistemically the most relevant. (Conee & Feldman, 1998). Without such a principled distinction, there seems to be no answer to the question what *the* belief-forming process is in a given case. This problem, known as the generality problem, affects our paper because both veritic and reflective luck draw on the notion of a belief-forming process.

Besides the fact that this problem is not specific to anti-luck epistemology, and in fact plagues all major theories of epistemic justification (Bishop, 2010; Comesaña, 2006), I will sidestep this problem by stipulation. For the argumentation theory literature contains many fairly specific descriptions of the various roles and steps in the process of argumentation, and we may simply select one of those processes and ask whether *that* process will help us eliminate luck.[4]

In particular, the description of the argumentative process that we will draw on in this paper is known as the pragma-dialectical framework of argumentation developed by Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2016; Van Eemeren et al., 2004).[5] According to the pragma-dialectical theory, argumentation is "a complex speech act, the purpose of which is to contribute to the resolution of a difference of opinion, or dispute" (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2016).[6]

---

[5] Not only is this a prominent recent approach, the roles of opponent and proponent, on which our argument primarily depend, are found in other approaches as well, indicating that our findings will generalize. Nevertheless, for reasons of concreteness and clarity, we focus on the pragma-dialectical theory.

[6] A complex speech act is a speech act that may consist of various sentences, contrary to simple speech acts, which can consist only of a single sentence.

According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst, argumentation is an attempt to resolve a difference of opinion. Differences of opinion can take multiple forms. Pragma-dialecticians distinguish two roles in argumentation: that of the proponent and that of the opponent. The role of proponent is to advance and defend a thesis, and the role of opponent is to cast doubt on the thesis. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst speak of an unmixed dispute if proponent only asserts a thesis and opponent merely tries to cast doubt on the thesis, and of a mixed dispute when opponent advances theses of her own (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2016). Mixed disputes can always be broken down into separate unmixed disputes. If proponent asserts, for example, that it will rain tomorrow, and opponent advances the thesis that it will not rain tomorrow, this mixed dispute can be broken down into two separate unmixed disputes: one about proponents thesis that it will rain tomorrow (and opponent expressing doubt about that) and one about *another* unmixed dispute where opponent (now taking the role of proponent in this second unmixed dispute) advances the thesis that it will not rain tomorrow (and proponent taking the role of opponent and expressing doubt about this latter claim). In what follows we will focus on the unmixed dispute, since it is the basic case.

If argumentation is a process, what kind of process is it? Van Eemeren and Grootendorst characterize it as a process that normally proceeds according to a fairly specific set of stages, the first of which is the *confrontation* stage, in which a difference of opinion is recognized. One of the parties expresses an opinion and the other party at least doubts whether the position is tenable.[7]

Recognizing a difference of opinion is only the start of argumentation. After all, proponent and opponent may each go their own ways after recognizing their difference of opinion. For argumentation to start, the process has to move on to the next stage: the *opening stage*. In this stage, proponent and opponent form the intention to *resolve* their difference of opinion, and thus in effect, to engage in argumentation. In this stage, proponent and opponent lay out the rules of engagement: what premises may be assumed as background knowledge, and what inference patterns will count as valid?

Once the starting points and rules of the discussion have been agreed upon, proponent and opponent enter the third stage: the *argumentation stage*. In a unmixed dispute, proponent's sole role in this stage is to defend her standpoint, and opponents only role is to cast doubt on that standpoint, taking into account their common starting points and the agreed upon rules.

---

[7] Again, we look at unmixed disputes here as the basic case.

The result of the argumentation stage is either that proponent has successfully defended her standpoint, or that opponent has successfully been able to cast doubt on this standpoint. Once neither party is able to make further argumentative moves, the discussion moves towards the final stage: the *closing* stage, where the difference of opinion is resolved, either in favor of the standpoint of the proponent or in favor of the doubt concerning that standpoint expressed by the opponent.

Several remarks need to be made about this cursory overview of the stages recognized in pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. The first is that these stages are rarely explicitly recognized in real argumentative settings, and even more rarely do parties to the debate run through these stages in order. Often, argumentation proceeds by leaving much background knowledge implicit, and parties may only find out that some thesis is not part of the background knowledge during the argumentation stage. This does not detract from the theoretical usefulness of the model, nor from the use we make of it in this paper. The pragma-dialectical model of argumentation is meant as an ideal, and in this paper, we are concerned with establishing how argumentation, *if it proceeds as it should*, can help us acquire knowledge. So, we may safely lay any worries about the idealizations in the model to one side.

The above should suffice to show that argumentation on the pragma-dialectical theory is a fairly regimented process or method. But is it a *belief-forming* method? In order to answer this question, we need to establish that the process of argumentation results in the formation of beliefs.

According to pragma-dialecticians, argumentation is a process with a particular aim; namely, to resolve a difference of opinion. Here, we assume that one's opinion about p can be modelled as a belief in either p or its negation. No difference of opinion can be resolved without one party changing their opinion. If opinions are beliefs, then this means the aim of argumentation is to change at least one party's beliefs. Again, this may not always occur in practice, but at least in the ideal case argumentation is concluded in the closing stage with either proponent maintaining their thesis, and thus opponent changing their beliefs about the dubitability of the standpoint, or opponent maintaining their doubt, meaning that proponent has changed her belief about the defensibility of the standpoint. On the pragma-dialectical theory, argumentation has the primary aim of forming new beliefs.

It must be recognized here that the above seems to conflict with one of the methodological principles professed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst, that is, the principle of *externalization*:

> Externalization is achieved by starting from what people have expressed, implicitly or explicitly, instead of speculating about what they think or believe. … Insofar as implicit elements can be made explicit in an adequate reconstruction, they can also be used, so that everything that creates a commitment for the language users is taken into account. (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2016)

According to this quote, the pragma-dialectical theory derives commitments for the parties involved in argumentation not from what is believed but from what is (implicitly) expressed. This is compatible with our claim above, that argumentation has the primary aim of changing people's beliefs. Even if the *legitimacy* of the moves made by proponent and opponent in argumentation depends only on their public commitments and not on their private beliefs, the intended aim of argumentation is still to change parties' private beliefs.

The public commitments are connected to the private beliefs in the following way. Some commitments incurred are commitments *to change one's private beliefs*. In particular, when the argumentation stage is over, and proponent has successfully defended their standpoint, then opponent incurs a commitment to change her belief about the dubitability of the standpoint. Conversely, if opponent has successfully cast doubt on the standpoint, then proponent incurs a commitment to change her belief (about the defensibility of the standpoint). No matter what happens, by the time of the closing stage, one of the parties has incurred a commitment to change their belief.

Two closing remarks are in order. First, actual argumentation may fall short of the ideal described by the pragma-dialectical theory. People are generally stubborn in their beliefs, and sometimes even the best arguments fail to produce an actual belief-change, even if the relevant party has incurred the commitment to make the change. Beliefs are in practice not always under such direct control.[8] But remember that I aim to show that argumentation, *if it lives up to the ideal specified by the pragma-dialectical theory*, will result in belief-change, and this requires the parties to the discussion to live up to the commitments they incurred during the process, and therefore, for at least one of them to change their beliefs.

Second, the closing stage is not the only stage in which the parties to the discussion may form new beliefs. In the argument stage, and even in the confrontation and opening stages, many new beliefs may be formed, for example, beliefs about the beliefs of the other party, about their background knowledge, about the considerations that speak in favor or against a given standpoint, and so on. But this need not

[8] Cf. (Alston, 1989, p. 91ff)

necessarily be the case. Perhaps opponent and proponent know each other and the considerations for and against the standpoint that they are discussion extremely well, and so they may gain no new beliefs in the process of arguing. But if argumentation is aimed at resolving a difference of opinion, this means that in successful argumentation, it has to be at least the case that in the closing stage one of the parties forms a new belief about the standpoint under consideration.

4. NEARBY ERROR

Let us briefly take stock. In the first section, I spelled out the aim of the paper: to combine anti-luck epistemology with social epistemology and argumentation theory to investigate the epistemic properties of argumentation, particularly in terms of epistemic luck. The project is to show that argumentation excludes certain kinds of luck and that, since knowledge is incompatible with this kind of luck, argumentation helps us to acquire knowledge. In the previous paragraph I argued that argumentation is a belief-forming method. In this section I will argue that it is a belief-forming method that helps us eliminate luck from our belief.

Let us start by looking at the different roles in argumentation. On the one hand, we have the proponent of the standpoint, whose task it is to defend her standpoint. On the other, we have the opponent, whose task it is to question the standpoint. How does opponent question a standpoint? There are two possibilities: opponent may pose a motivated or an unmotivated challenge. The difference between these is that a motivated challenge contains a reason for believing the standpoint is false, whereas an unmotivated challenge merely asks the proponent to provide additional support for the standpoint. Consider the following example:

Jill: The earth is round
Jack: Why would that be true?
Jill: Because it appears that way from space.
Jack: But aren't appearances sometimes deceiving?

Here, Jill is the proponent of the thesis that the earth is round, and Jack the opponent. Jack first poses an unmotivated challenge to the thesis, and then poses a motivated challenge. Both of these challenges are legitimate according to the pragma-dialectical theory, and if Jill wants to succeed in defending here standpoint she has to respond to both challenges.

Let us define error-possibilities as possible worlds in which one's belief is false. What I want to suggest is that both motivated and

unmotivated challenges posit error possibilities, and a successful defense of the standpoint by the proponent requires both kinds of error-possibilities to be eliminated. What are the relevant error-possibilities? In the example above, it may not be immediately apparent that Jack's unmotivated challenge posits an error possibility, for Jack does not provide a concrete scenario in which what Jill said is false. But questioning the truth of a statement is tantamount to acknowledging the *possibility* that it is false. Error-possibilities are just that: possibilities of being wrong. If Jack questions the truth of Jill's standpoint, he is in fact raising the possibility that it is false. That Jack does not provide support for his doubt does not make his challenge illegitimate on the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation: rather, puts a burden on the proponent of the standpoint to provide reasons for thinking it is true, to provide reasons, that is, for thinking that this error possibility does not obtain.

Motivated challenges also raise error possibilities. Consider again the example above. Jack's motivated challenge consists of raising the explicit possibility that the appearances used by Jill to support her main standpoint are deceiving, and her standpoint is wrong. To defend herself, Jill has to provide support for the claim that the appearances are not deceiving in this case, and therefore, Jill has to eliminate the error possibility raised by Jack's motivated challenge.

I submit that what goes for the case of Jill and Jack goes for argumentation generally. In the pragma-dialectical framework, opponents are allowed to raise both motivated and unmotivated challenges to the standpoint or standpoints put forward by the proponent. In both cases, such challenges involve positing error possibilities, and in both cases, the proponent incurs a commitment to eliminate these error possibilities. Argumentation (in the ideal case) is a belief-forming process in the course of which at least some error possibilities are excluded.

So far, the claim that argumentation excludes error possibilities may seem fairly obvious. After all, what is argumentation other than a game of giving and asking for reasons, and what are reasons other than considerations that show a standpoint is true, i.e. not false? What is the value of looking at argumentation through an anti-luck lens specifically?

There are two ways in which the present analysis improves upon existing work. First, I have argued that argumentation helps us to eliminate error-possibilities. Since argumentation is a social belief-forming process, this means we have found a belief-forming method that may not only produce true belief, but non-lucky true belief. Since knowledge requires non-lucky true belief, we may hope to acquire knowledge by argumentation. This provides a more detailed view of the epistemic benefits of argumentation than present in the literature.

Standard work on argumentation talks about the reliability of argumentation (e.g. Goldman, 1994, 2003), but we have sketched a picture where argumentation may not only be reliable, but *safe* as well. To the best of my knowledge, this possible epistemic benefit of argumentation has not been identified before.

The findings above allow us to sketch an even more detailed picture of the value of argumentation. For as we saw above, the difference between veritic luck and reflective luck is that for veritic luck, it matters whether one's belief-forming method could have *actually* produced a false belief in a nearby world, whereas for reflective luck it matters whether this appears to be so from one's reflective perspective. In defending her standpoint against raised error-possibilities, proponent can only draw on the information she has reflectively accessible. It is for this reason that the kind of luck that argumentation helps to eliminate is of the reflective kind. Since internalist, *reflective* knowledge requires the elimination of reflective luck, but externalist, animal knowledge does not (de Grefte, 2018; Pritchard, 2005; Sosa, 2007), this means that argumentation will be valuable particularly with respect to acquiring the former kind of knowledge.[9]

Aside from a better picture of the epistemic value of argumentation, our analysis also reveals something about dissent in argumentation. One of the main contributions that anti-luck epistemology has for argumentation theory is that it gives us a principles way of distinguishing between raised error-possibilities. For the anti-luck epistemologist, not all error-possibilities are created equal. As we saw above, a belief is subject to reflective luck just in case it is true and produced by a method that, from one's reflectively accessible perspective, could have *easily* produced a false belief. Crucially, this is not the same as requiring that the belief-forming method could not have produced a false belief at all. To determine whether a belief is reflectively lucky, we thus do not need to exclude *all* error-possibilities, but merely the close ones.

All challenges by opponent raise error-possibilities, but not all raise *nearby* error possibilities. As we saw in section 2, nearby error-possibilities are worlds that are substantially like our own where one's method produces a false belief. By contrast, a far-off error possibility involves a world substantially *unlike* our own where one's method

[9] This does not mean that it is impossible to acquire externalist knowledge by argumentation. As people like Goldman have stressed before, argumentation may simply be a reliable way of forming one's beliefs. Similarly, the reflectively accessible beliefs involved in argumentation may simply be true, and so the process may on occasion eliminate veritic luck as well. But we cannot say that it is an inherent feature of argumentation that veritic luck is diminished in argumentation.

produces a false belief. Opponent may raise either nearby or far-off error possibilities in the challenge to a standpoint. Consider the following exchange:

Jeremy:	Climate change is real
Jaimy:	But have you not heard of several studies concluding it is not?
Jeremy:	Those studies have weak methodologies.
Jaimy:	But what if there is no external world? In that case, there is no climate and consequently no climate change.

In the first case, Jaimy is raising a nearby error possibility. This is so because the error-possibility in question invokes a world where several scientific studies point towards the falsity of climate change and it is indeed false. A world where empirical research is a reliable guide to truth is a world that is (presumably) much like what the world according to Jaimy and Jeremy's reflective perspective is like. That this is so for many people is shown by the many adherents these scientific studies still have.

Now let us look at the second challenge of Jaimy. Here, he raises a far-off error possibility. This is so because it invokes the possibility that there is no external world at all, and such a possible world is presumably very much unlike our own.

We have seen an example of opponent raising a nearby error-possibility, and raising a far-off error-possibility. This suffices to show that it is possible for opponent to raise both kinds of error-possibility. Crucially, however, only the first case will aid in the exclusion of reflective luck, since for this only nearby error-possibilities are relevant.

From the perspective of the pragma-dialectical theory, all challenges by opponent, as long as they respect the shared starting points and inference rules agreed upon in the opening state, are legitimate. So, raising far-off error possibilities is *argumentatively* legitimate. But challenges that involve far-off error-possibilities can be criticized from the epistemic point of view. The elimination of such error-possibilities is not necessary for reflective knowledge. This kind of knowledge is among the most valuable epistemic states, one that arguably includes other valuable epistemic states like animal knowledge and epistemic justification (Sosa, 2009, 2015). If this is so, then discussing far-off error-possibilities is not only irrelevant for reflective knowledge, but for animal knowledge and justification as well. it is hard to see what the *epistemic* value is of eliminating error-possibilities irrelevant for knowledge or justification.

This is not to deny that argumentation may serve other purposes than that of producing reflective knowledge. For such other purposes, raising

far-off error-possibilities in argumentation may be beneficial. But from the epistemic point of view, there is something amiss with discussing such issues; the discussion takes up valuable cognitive resources and contributes nothing to the acquirement of our most coveted epistemic states. Accordingly, we may call argumentation that involves the discussion of far-off error-possibilities *epistemically perverse*, in contrast to epistemically legitimate argumentation that involves nearby error-possibilities.

5. CONCLUSION

Let us recap. In this paper, I have used findings from anti-luck epistemology to provide a novel perspective on the epistemic value of argumentation. In particular, I argued that argumentation is a social belief-forming process that helps to eliminate reflective error-possibilities. In doing so, argumentation excludes reflective luck. Since this kind of luck is incompatible with reflective knowledge, eliminating it will help us achieve this kind of knowledge. But not all dissent in argumentation will help fulfill this function. In contrast to epistemically legitimate challenges, which involve nearby error-possibilities, we may distinguish epistemically perverse dissent, dissent that involves far-off error-possibilities and that is irrelevant to the acquirement of reflective knowledge.

In this paper, we sought to clarify the connection between anti-luck epistemology, social epistemology and argumentation theory. We have seen there are close connections: if done properly, argumentation may help eliminate luck and provide knowledge. But we also saw that the relation between argumentative error and epistemic error is loose. Dissent may be epistemically perverse but argumentatively legitimate. Contrary to what people like Robert Brandom have argued, the game of rational belief and knowledge has different rules than the game of giving and asking for reasons.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: I would like to thank the audience of the European Conference on Argumentation 2019 in Groningen for valuable feedback on an earlier version of this paper.

REFERENCES

Alston, W. P. (1989). *Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Bishop, M. A. (2010). Why the generality problem is everybody's problem. *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the*

Analytic Tradition, *151*(2), 285–298.
Carter, J. A., & Pritchard, D. (2015). Knowledge How and Epistemic Luck. *Noûs*, *49*(3), 440–453.
Comesaña, J. (2006). A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem. *Philosophical Studies*, *129*(1).
Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (1998). The Generality Problem for Reliabilism. *Philosophical Studies*, *89*(1), 1–29.
de Grefte, J. (2018). Epistemic justification and epistemic luck. *Synthese*, *195*(9), 3821–3836.
Descartes, R. (1996). *Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections From the Objections and Replies*. Cambridge University Press.
Engel, M. (1992). Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge? *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, *30*(2), 59–75.
Gettier, E. L. (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? *Analysis*, *23*(6), 121–123.
Goldman, A. I. (1987). Foundations of social epistemics. *Synthese*, *73*(1).
Goldman, A. I. (1994). Argumentation and social epistemology. *The Journal of Philosophy*, *91*(1), 27–49.
Goldman, A. I. (1997). Argumentation and Interpersonal Justification. *Argumentation*, *11*(2), 155–164.
Goldman, A. I. (1999). *Knowledge in a Social World*. Oxford University Press.
Goldman, A. I. (2003). An epistemological approach to argumentation. *Informal Logic*, *23*(1).
Goldman, A. I., & O'Connor, C. (2019). Social Epistemology. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (fall 2019). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
Goldman, A. I., & Whitcomb, D. (2010). *Social Epistemology: Essential Readings*. Oxford University Press.
Haddock, A., Millar, A., & Pritchard, D. (Eds.). (2010). *Social epistemology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. K. (1973). *Counterfactuals*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pritchard, D. (2005). *Epistemic luck*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Pritchard, D. (2008). Sensitivity, safety, and anti-luck epistemology. *The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism*, 437–455.
Sosa, E. (1999). How to Defeat Opposition to Moore. *Nous*, *33*(s13), 141–153.
Sosa, E. (2007). A Virtue Epistemology. In *A Virtue Epistemology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sosa, E. (2009). *Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sosa, E. (2015). *Judgment and Agency*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Unger, P. (1968). An analyis of Factual Knowledge. *The Journal of Philosophy*, *65*(6), 157–170.
Van Eemeren, F. H., & Grootendorst, R. (2016). *Argumentation, communication, and fallacies: A pragma-dialectical perspective*. Routledge.
Van Eemeren, F. H., Grootendorst, R., & Eemeren, F. H. (2004). *A systematic theory of argumentation: The pragma-dialectical approach*. Cambridge University Press.
Williamson, T. (2000). *Knowledge and its Limits*. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.