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| Jenna anders  jennaanders@virginia.edu  434-243-5294  https://jenna-anders.github.io |  |

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| **Academic Positions** | *Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Economics*, 2025-  University of Virginia, Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy  *S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup Postdoctoral Fellow*, 2024-2025  University of California-Berkeley, Agricultural and Resource Economics |

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| **Education** | **Harvard University** | |
|  |  | Ph.D. Economics, 2018 to 2024  Harvard Environmental Economics Program Pre-Doctoral Fellow |
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|  | **Brown University** | |
|  |  | B.A. Economics (honors), Environmental Studies, 2016 |

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| **Fields** | Primary: Public Economics, Environmental Economics  Secondary: Labor Economics |

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| **Publications** | “[**The Welfare Effects of Eligibility Expansions: Theory and Evidence from SNAP**](https://jenna-anders.github.io/files/ar_eligibility.pdf)” (with Charlie Rafkin). *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, Forthcoming. |

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| **Working Papers** | “[**Good Cop, Bad Cop: State and Federal Environmental Enforcement**](https://jenna-anders.github.io/files/ac_epa1.pdf)” (with Romaine Campbell)  How does federal regulatory capacity affect state enforcement outcomes? In this paper, we provide a model in which a stronger federal regulatory agency can either strengthen or weaken states' negotiating position with their regulated entities. The optimal federal enforcement for the states is one that maximizes state-level negotiated penalties. We apply this in the context of environmental regulation to test whether the EPA’s enforcement is too strong or too lenient in two environmental programs. First, using an EPA database of state-issued penalties, we show that when EPA's budget was cut in 2011, state penalties for Clean Air Act violations shrank by 15%. Second, using a dataset with information about environmental remediation projects under California state jurisdiction, we show that firms are more likely to begin cleanup projects during Democratic federal administrations. Our remediation analysis identifies the mechanism: while firm cleanup behavior is affected by EPA strength, cleanups conducted by the state are not, providing evidence that the effects operate through firm-state bargaining. We conclude that over one-third of EPA's effect on environmental penalties is through its spillovers to state outcomes, and that states would benefit from a stronger EPA. |

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|  | “[**Inefficient Social Disconnection**](https://jenna-anders.github.io/files/anderspallais.pdf)” (with Amanda Pallais)  Social disconnection has increased over the last 25 years, while traditional contexts for forming connections, like churches and in-person workplaces, have weakened. Through a field experiment, we show the effectiveness of an alternative approach to connection formation: mutual friend intermediaries. We hosted a four-week trivia competition where participants could either join friend-organized teams or register to be matched onto teams with strangers. We then randomized which teams could participate. When teams were organized by existing friends, teammates who weren’t initially friends were 20 pp more likely to be friends and 15 pp to be in text communication four months later due to participating, while participating reduced contemporaneous loneliness by 11 pp (24%). In contrast, the intervention did not generate lasting relationships for pairs matched onto teams by the competition. Yet, we propose mutual friends make inefficiently few introductions due to a market failure: it is difficult to compensate friends for organizing costs. Consistent with inefficient underprovision, survey evidence finds substantial untapped supply of friend introductions – 72% of people say they could connect friends, while only 5% recently have – alongside strong demand for such introductions. Finally, we discuss examples of organizations that encourage people to bring their networks together at scale, showing how the organizations best positioned to scale this approach may not be those typically associated with community building |
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| **Work in Progress** | “Welfare Analyses of Firm-Based Government Policies” (with Valerie Chuang, Nathaniel Hendren, and Eric Zwick) |
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| **Fellowships & Awards** | National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship, 2018-2023 |
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| **Teaching** | Using Big Data to Solve Economic and Social Problems, Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professor Raj Chetty, 2022  Labor Market Analysis, Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professor Lawrence Katz, 2021 |
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| **Academic Service** | Referee, *Journal of Public Economics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Urban Economics, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*  MOOC creator, Pathways to Research and Doctoral Careers (PREDOC) Consortium  Co-organizer, Harvard Labor/Public Finance Workshop, 2021-2022 |

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| **Research Grants** | Chae Family Economics Research Fund, Harvard, 2022  Mind, Brain, and Behavior, Harvard, 2020  The Lab for Economic Applications and Policy (LEAP), Harvard, 2020  Foundations of Human Behavior, Harvard, 2019  Warburg Foundation, Harvard, 2019 |