

Supporting Information

Sexism and the far-right vote: The individual dynamics of gender backlash

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A. The Spanish Political Attitudes Dataset

The Spanish Political Attitudes Dataset has been conducted yearly since 2010. Respondents are invited to participate in each wave of the panel, even if they did not participate in the immediately preceding wave. Refreshment samples have been added at certain points to address the challenges to representativeness and sample size resulting from panel attrition. This was the case in 2017 (when our key measure of modern sexism was first introduced) as well as in 2018 and 2020. Table A1 provides an overview of the number of respondents and the sample composition in each of the waves used in the paper.

Table A1. 2017-2020 Panel Waves

Year	Fieldwork	Total respondents	Respondents in the preceding wave	Not in the preceding but in other previous waves	Refreshment sample
2017	29 May - 15 June	1,981	814	172	995
2018	9 May - 8 June	2,120	1,433	184	503
2019	31 May - 11 June	1,741	1,578	163	—
2020	7-18 May	2,008	1,380	211	417

B. Panel attrition

Our main analyses rely on participants' responses over two (Table 2) or three (Table 3) panel waves. Respondents who fail to participate in any of the waves involved in a given analysis are dropped from the models reported in the main text. This might be problematic if panel attrition is nonrandom, particularly if it is unevenly distributed across levels of the paper's key variable (i.e., sexism). In order to ascertain systematic patterns in nonresponse, we modeled respondents' probability of surviving across waves, for each combination of waves considered in our analyses. The dependent variables take a value of one if respondents participating in the first of the considered waves is also present in the subsequent wave(s), and a value of zero if they fail to participate in (any of) the subsequent wave(s). We regressed survival on a set of sociodemographic and attitudinal variables, all measured in the first of the waves considered (e.g., 2018 for 2018-19, 2017 for 2017-19). As shown in Table A2, there is some evidence that respondents were more likely to survive if they were old, male, highly educated, and (somewhat surprisingly) uninterested in politics. These differences, however, have a relatively small impact on the composition of the surviving samples as compared to the initial samples. For example, focusing on the 2018-19 model, respondents with tertiary education were 46 per cent of the final sample, only one per cent less than in the original sample; likewise, the average interest in politics was 0.45 (on the 0-1 scale) in the final sample, compared to 0.46 in the original sample. We also find that nativist individuals were more likely to survive from 2017 to 2019, but again this translates into a difference of only 0.01 points in the nativism scale between the final and the original sample averages (0.56 vs. 0.55, respectively, on the 0-1 scale). Most importantly, across the different models we find no evidence of differential attrition by levels of modern sexism.

To gain a sense for the potential bias introduced by systematic patterns of panel attrition, we calculated the predicted probability of survival in each of the analyses and then replicated the models in Tables 2 and 3 of the main text weighting observations by the inverse of this probability. As shown in Tables A3 and A4, these analyses yield essentially the same results as those presented in the paper. These results are thus reassuring, in that they suggest that panel attrition is not significantly biasing our estimates.

Table A2. Predicting the Probability of Surviving over Waves

	(1) 2018-19	(2) 2019-20	(3) 2017-19	(4) 2018-20
Female	-0.113 (0.118)	-0.254 ⁺ (0.142)	-0.130 (0.106)	-0.243 [*] (0.105)
Age	0.026 ^{***} (0.006)	0.036 ^{***} (0.008)	0.029 ^{***} (0.005)	0.033 ^{***} (0.005)
Upper secondary	0.311 ⁺ (0.169)	0.186 (0.208)	0.262 ⁺ (0.149)	0.157 (0.148)
Tertiary	0.496 ^{***} (0.139)	0.116 (0.166)	0.376 ^{**} (0.123)	0.399 ^{**} (0.123)
Income	-0.404 (0.249)	0.249 (0.290)	-0.313 (0.217)	-0.156 (0.219)
Lives with partner	-0.017 (0.123)	-0.152 (0.148)		-0.039 (0.109)
Interest in politics	-0.547 ^{**} (0.210)	0.003 (0.255)	-0.359 ⁺ (0.191)	-0.514 ^{**} (0.186)
Authoritarianism	0.179 (0.224)	0.293 (0.269)	-0.112 (0.200)	0.220 (0.198)
Ideological identification	0.466 (0.334)	-0.499 (0.383)	-0.171 (0.306)	0.519 ⁺ (0.296)
Nativism	0.125 (0.293)	0.193 (0.360)	0.575 [*] (0.258)	0.048 (0.259)
Territorial preference	0.154 (0.180)	-0.258 (0.228)	-0.121 (0.163)	0.052 (0.160)
Populism	0.145 (0.321)	0.294 (0.405)	0.251 (0.286)	0.176 (0.285)
Sexism	-0.012 (0.346)	0.034 (0.413)	0.040 (0.334)	-0.420 (0.305)
Constant	-0.001 (0.438)	0.015 (0.532)	-0.795 ⁺ (0.421)	-0.732 ⁺ (0.389)
Observations	1942	1651	1782	1942

Note: The dependent variable is respondents' survival over the waves mentioned in the heading. The independent variables are measured in the first of the waves considered. The variable Living with a partner was not included in the 2017 wave. Education categories in the main text are referred to as "Middle school or less", "High school / vocational training", and "College" instead of "Lower secondary or less", "Upper secondary", and "Tertiary", respectively. Logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A3. Effect of Prior Attitudes on Intended Vote for Vox, Weighted by the Inverse Probability of Panel Survival

	2019	2020
Female	0.115 (0.284)	-0.101 (0.304)
Age	-0.009 (0.015)	-0.025 (0.017)
Upper secondary	-0.880 ⁺ (0.493)	-0.356 (0.451)
Tertiary	-0.050 (0.307)	-0.114 (0.348)
Income	0.131 (0.568)	0.123 (0.641)
Lives with partner	-0.083 (0.290)	0.022 (0.315)
Interest in politics	0.939 ⁺ (0.496)	1.284 ^{**} (0.498)
Prior values (t – 1)		
Vox intention	3.096 ^{***} (0.706)	3.378 ^{***} (0.356)
Authoritarianism	0.686 (0.537)	0.432 (0.583)
Ideological identification	3.408 ^{***} (0.756)	2.162 ^{**} (0.814)
Nativism	0.646 (0.629)	3.859 ^{***} (0.725)
Territorial preference	-1.460 ^{**} (0.495)	-1.109 [*] (0.535)
Populism	1.500 ⁺ (0.785)	1.082 (0.800)
Sexism	2.342 ^{**} (0.755)	1.319 (0.826)
Constant	-6.995 ^{***} (1.122)	-7.224 ^{***} (1.291)
Observations	1503	1360

Note: The dependent variable is intended vote for Vox at time t . Education categories in the main text are referred to as “Middle school or less”, “High school / vocational training”, and “College” instead of “Lower secondary or less”, “Upper secondary”, and “Tertiary”, respectively. All analyses use weights to account for unequal probability of panel survival, based on the estimates of Table A2. Logistic regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. ⁺ $p < 0.1$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$

Table A4. Effect of Prior Change in Attitudes on Intended Vote for Vox, Weighted by the Inverse Probability of Panel Survival

	(1) 2019	(2) 2020	(3) 2019	(4) 2020
Female	0.030 (0.327)	-0.106 (0.288)	0.046 (0.318)	-0.104 (0.286)
Age	-0.020 (0.017)	-0.032 ⁺ (0.017)	-0.018 (0.017)	-0.032 ⁺ (0.017)
Upper secondary	-0.481 (0.574)	-0.558 (0.494)	-0.534 (0.586)	-0.553 (0.495)
Tertiary	0.454 (0.370)	-0.209 (0.315)	0.467 (0.364)	-0.209 (0.314)
Income	-1.152 ⁺ (0.633)	0.213 (0.625)	-1.217 ⁺ (0.637)	0.214 (0.623)
Lives with partner	0.020 (0.331)	-0.059 (0.290)	0.060 (0.339)	-0.060 (0.287)
Interest in politics	1.919 ^{**} (0.658)	1.227 ^{**} (0.443)	1.877 ^{**} (0.653)	1.228 ^{**} (0.444)
Prior values (t – 2)				
Vox intention	2.823 ^{***} (0.582)	4.642 ^{***} (0.570)	3.063 ^{***} (0.627)	4.620 ^{***} (0.584)
Authoritarianism	1.019 (0.723)	1.083 ⁺ (0.561)	1.060 (0.733)	1.085 ⁺ (0.559)
Ideological identification	5.024 ^{***} (1.092)	1.745 ⁺ (0.975)	4.880 ^{***} (1.059)	1.753 ⁺ (0.972)
Nativism	0.007 (0.955)	4.006 ^{***} (0.855)	-0.069 (0.925)	3.997 ^{***} (0.852)
Territorial preference	-1.404 ⁺ (0.751)	-1.415 [*] (0.549)	-1.355 ⁺ (0.736)	-1.415 ^{**} (0.546)
Populism	1.422 (1.110)	0.408 (0.874)	1.182 (1.135)	0.409 (0.871)
Sexism	2.902 [*] (1.222)	0.945 (0.871)	2.997 [*] (1.254)	0.942 (0.871)
Prior change (t – 2 minus t – 1)				
Vox intention	4.714 ^{***} (0.919)	3.236 ^{***} (0.390)	4.243 ^{***} (0.786)	3.230 ^{***} (0.394)
Authoritarianism	0.497 (0.714)	0.233 (0.750)	0.578 (0.704)	0.233 (0.745)
Ideological identification	2.173 (1.373)	2.086 [*] (0.997)	2.142 (1.358)	2.081 [*] (0.992)
Nativism	0.761 (0.901)	3.369 ^{***} (0.810)	0.736 (0.887)	3.364 ^{***} (0.809)
Territorial preference	-0.636 (0.609)	-1.034 [*] (0.525)	-0.544 (0.596)	-1.035 [*] (0.526)
Populism	0.809 (1.098)	1.588 (1.040)	0.729 (1.051)	1.592 (1.038)
Sexism	2.786 [*] (1.135)	0.554 (0.905)		
Increase in sexism			5.246 ^{**} (1.770)	0.490 (1.347)
Decrease in sexism			-0.157 (1.409)	0.571 (1.622)
Constant	-7.534 ^{***} (1.514)	-6.283 ^{***} (1.258)	-7.686 ^{***} (1.518)	-6.269 ^{***} (1.267)
Observations	1092	1264	1092	1264

Note: The dependent variable is intended vote for Vox at time t . Education categories in the main text are referred to as “Middle school or less”, “High school / vocational training”, and “College” instead of “Lower secondary or less”, “Upper secondary”, and “Tertiary”, respectively. All analyses use weights to account for unequal probability of panel survival, based on the estimates of Table A2. Logistic regression coefficients estimated using penalized maximum likelihood, standard errors in parentheses. ⁺ $p < 0.1$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$

C. Measurement

Income

Monthly net household income (in Euros).

300 or less, 301-600, 6001-900, 901-1050, 1051-1200, 1201-1500, 1501-1800, 1801-2400, 2401-3000, 3001-4500, 4501-6000, more than 6000

Missing values were imputed from other waves if available.

Interest in politics

How interested would you say you are in politics?

Very much, somewhat, a little, not at all

Ideology

In politics people sometimes talk of 'left' and 'right'. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

0 = Extreme left, 10 = Extreme right

Authoritarianism

Although there are a number of qualities that people think children should have, every person thinks that some are more important than others. Please tell me which one of each pair you think is more important for a child to have. [Authoritarian choice underlined]

Independent – Respectful of their elders

Curious – Good mannered

Obedient – Self-reliant

Considerate – Well-behaved

α (across waves) = 0.48 - 0.52

Nativism

Please indicate your opinion using the following scales:

0 = The effect of immigrants on the economy is very negative, 10 = The effect of immigrants on the economy is very positive [reversed]

0 = It is not at all important for coexistence that immigrants have the same culture and customs as people here, 10 = It is not very important for coexistence that immigrants have the same culture and customs as people here

Territorial preference

Which of these territorial organization schemes do you prefer for Spain?

A state with a single central government, without autonomous communities; A state in which autonomous communities have less powers than they have now; A state with autonomous communities in its current form; A state in which autonomous

communities have more powers than they have now; A state that recognizes the possibility for autonomous communities to become independent nations

Populism

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

- a) The Spanish MPs need to follow the will of the people
 - b) I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a professional politician
 - c) What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles
 - d) The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions
 - e) The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people
 - f) Elected officials talk too much and take too little action
- 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree

α (across waves) = 0.74 - 0.80

Modern sexism

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

- a) Discrimination against women is no longer a problem in Spain
 - b) Women often miss out on good jobs due to sexual discrimination (reversed)
 - c) It is rare to see women treated in a sexist manner on television
 - d) On average, people in our society treat husbands and wives equally
 - e) Society has reached the point where women and men have equal opportunities for achievement
 - f) It is easy to understand the anger of women’s groups in Spain (reversed)
 - g) It is easy to understand why women’s groups are still concerned about societal limitations of women’s opportunities (reversed)
 - h) Over the past few years, the government and news media have been showing more concern about the treatment of women than is warranted by women’s actual experiences
 - i) Our country no longer needs institutional campaigns to mitigate the effects of discrimination against women [this item is not in Swim et al.’s (1995) original battery of modern sexism]
- 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree

α (across waves) = 0.86 - 0.89

Women’s Day protest engagement (March 8, 2018)


Did you do any of the following on the occasion of Women’s Day (8 March)?

- a) Went on strike
 - b) Participated in a demonstration or rally
 - c) Sent information or made comments inviting others to participate
 - d) Talked about these activities with people around me
- 1 = Yes, 7 = No

α (2018 wave) = 0.71

D. Distribution of sexist attitudes

Figure A1. Distribution of Modern Sexism across Waves



Note: Sexism was measured on a 0-1 scale, with higher values denoting more sexist attitudes.

E. Multilevel growth curve models

Table A5. Multilevel Growth Curve Models of Modern Sexism


	(1)		(2)	
	b	(SE)	b	(SE)
Fixed part				
Female	-0.091***	(0.011)	-0.075***	(0.011)
<i>Cohort (ref. 15-29)</i>				
30-44	0.004	(0.016)	-0.008	(0.016)
45+	-0.011	(0.017)	-0.022	(0.017)
<i>Education (ref. Lower 2ry or less)</i>				
Upper 2ry	0.005	(0.016)	0.008	(0.016)
3ry	-0.040**	(0.013)	-0.037**	(0.013)
<i>Ideological identification (ref. Far left)</i>				
Left	0.034*	(0.015)	0.029+	(0.015)
Center	0.089***	(0.016)	0.076***	(0.016)
Right	0.124***	(0.022)	0.106***	(0.022)
Far right	0.230***	(0.029)	0.206***	(0.028)
Lives with partner	0.011	(0.012)	0.013	(0.011)
<i>Income (ref. Low)</i>				
Mid income	-0.002	(0.013)	-0.003	(0.012)
High income	0.013	(0.015)	0.013	(0.014)
High interest	-0.054***	(0.011)	-0.038***	(0.011)
<i>Vote in 2016 (ref. PP)</i>				
PSOE	-0.043*	(0.020)	-0.038+	(0.020)
Podemos	-0.075***	(0.020)	-0.063**	(0.020)
Ciudadanos	-0.045*	(0.020)	-0.043*	(0.020)
Others	-0.067***	(0.019)	-0.060**	(0.019)
<i>Year (ref. 2017)</i>				
2018	-0.025	(0.028)	-0.015	(0.028)
2019	0.009	(0.029)	0.010	(0.029)
2020	0.039	(0.029)	0.039	(0.030)
Female # 2018	-0.019+	(0.010)	-0.013	(0.011)
Female # 2019	-0.017	(0.011)	-0.017	(0.011)
Female # 2020	-0.006	(0.011)	-0.005	(0.011)
30-44 # 2018	0.016	(0.016)	0.012	(0.016)
30-44 # 2019	0.007	(0.016)	0.007	(0.016)
30-44 # 2020	0.016	(0.017)	0.016	(0.017)
45+ # 2018	0.026	(0.017)	0.022	(0.017)
45+ # 2019	0.022	(0.018)	0.022	(0.018)
45+ # 2020	0.028	(0.018)	0.027	(0.018)
Upper 2ry # 2018	-0.018	(0.015)	-0.017	(0.015)
Upper 2ry # 2019	-0.020	(0.016)	-0.020	(0.016)
Upper 2ry # 2020	-0.015	(0.016)	-0.015	(0.016)
3ry # 2018	0.017	(0.013)	0.018	(0.013)
3ry # 2019	0.012	(0.013)	0.012	(0.013)
3ry # 2020	0.011	(0.013)	0.012	(0.013)
Left # 2018	-0.012	(0.015)	-0.013	(0.015)
Left # 2019	-0.004	(0.016)	-0.004	(0.016)
Left # 2020	-0.011	(0.016)	-0.011	(0.016)
Center # 2018	-0.003	(0.015)	-0.008	(0.016)
Center # 2019	-0.005	(0.016)	-0.005	(0.016)
Center # 2020	-0.008	(0.016)	-0.009	(0.017)
Right # 2018	0.005	(0.021)	-0.002	(0.021)
Right # 2019	0.014	(0.022)	0.013	(0.022)
Right # 2020	0.007	(0.022)	0.007	(0.023)
Far right # 2018	0.044	(0.028)	0.036	(0.028)
Far right # 2019	0.047+	(0.029)	0.047	(0.029)

	(1)		(2)	
	b	(SE)	b	(SE)
Far right # 2020	0.037	(0.029)	0.036	(0.030)
Lives with partner # 2018	-0.018	(0.011)	-0.018	(0.011)
Lives with partner # 2019	-0.002	(0.012)	-0.002	(0.012)
Lives with partner # 2020	0.012	(0.012)	0.012	(0.012)
Mid income # 2018	0.013	(0.012)	0.012	(0.012)
Mid income # 2019	-0.010	(0.013)	-0.010	(0.013)
Mid income # 2020	-0.010	(0.013)	-0.010	(0.013)
High income # 2018	0.004	(0.014)	0.004	(0.014)
High income # 2019	-0.014	(0.015)	-0.014	(0.015)
High income # 2020	-0.021	(0.015)	-0.021	(0.015)
High interest # 2018	0.018 ⁺	(0.011)	0.024*	(0.011)
High interest # 2019	0.014	(0.011)	0.014	(0.012)
High interest # 2020	0.039***	(0.012)	0.040***	(0.012)
PSOE # 2018	-0.017	(0.020)	-0.016	(0.020)
PSOE # 2019	-0.009	(0.020)	-0.009	(0.020)
PSOE # 2020	-0.039 ⁺	(0.021)	-0.039 ⁺	(0.021)
Podemos # 2018	-0.023	(0.019)	-0.018	(0.019)
Podemos # 2019	-0.013	(0.020)	-0.012	(0.020)
Podemos # 2020	-0.040 ⁺	(0.021)	-0.040 ⁺	(0.021)
Ciudadanos # 2018	0.016	(0.019)	0.017	(0.019)
Ciudadanos # 2019	0.011	(0.020)	0.012	(0.020)
Ciudadanos # 2020	-0.003	(0.021)	-0.003	(0.021)
Others # 2018	-0.012	(0.018)	-0.010	(0.018)
Others # 2019	-0.003	(0.019)	-0.003	(0.019)
Others # 2020	-0.019	(0.020)	-0.019	(0.020)
Women's Day protest engagement			-0.107***	(0.018)
2018 # Women's Day protest engagement			-0.037*	(0.018)
2019 # Women's Day protest engagement			-0.003	(0.019)
2020 # Women's Day protest engagement			-0.004	(0.019)
Constant	0.416***	(0.029)	0.445***	(0.028)
Random part				
sd(2018)	0.116	(0.911)	0.116	(2.568)
sd(2019)	0.122	(0.865)	0.123	(2.430)
sd(2020)	0.127	(0.831)	0.128	(2.337)
sd(Intercept)	0.134	(0.393)	0.131	(1.135)
corr(2018, 2019)	0.596	(1.445)	0.597	(4.104)
corr(2018, 2020)	0.518	(0.284)	0.519	(0.848)
corr(2018, Intercept)	-0.315	(3.386)	-0.346	(8.915)
corr(2019, 2020)	0.636	(1.862)	0.635	(5.175)
corr(2019, Intercept)	-0.299	(3.449)	-0.310	(9.699)
corr(2020, Intercept)	-0.300	(3.347)	-0.311	(9.410)
sd(Residual)	0.057	(0.924)	0.057	(2.630)
Observations	3228		3228	
Groups (respondents)	807		807	

Note: The dependent variable is the modern sexism scale running from 0 to 1. Independent variables are measured in the first wave (2017), except for *Lives with partner* and *Women's Day protest engagement*, which are measured in the second wave (2018). *Ideological identification*: 0-2 = Far left, 3-4 = Left, 5 = Center, 6-7 = Right, 8-10 = Far right. *Income*: 1200€ or less = Low, 1201 to 2400€ = Mid, 2401 or more = High. *High interest* (in politics): 0 = Not at all/A little, 1 = Somewhat/Very much. *Partisanship*: based on reported vote in the 2016 general election; "Others" includes voters of other parties and nonrespondents. *Women's Day protest engagement*: 0-1 composite score where 1 indicates participation in all four activities asked, including striking, demonstrating, mobilizing others to participate and talking about the protests. Education categories in the main text are referred to as "Middle school or less", "High school / vocational training", and "College" instead of "Lower secondary or less", "Upper secondary", and "Tertiary", respectively. Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.

⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure A2. Predicted Levels of Modern Sexism by Cohort, Education, Income, Marital Status and Interest in Politics



Note: Education categories in the main text are referred to as “Middle school or less”, “High school / vocational training”, and “College” instead of “Lower secondary or less”, “Upper secondary”, and “Tertiary”, respectively. Predicted levels of modern sexism with 95 percent confidence intervals, based on the estimates of Table A5.

F. Placebo tests

Table A6. Effect of Prior Attitudes and Vote Intention on Intended Vote for PP

	2018	2019	2020
Female	-0.114 (0.355)	-0.143 (0.296)	0.276 (0.266)
Age	0.014 (0.020)	0.015 (0.017)	-0.002 (0.015)
Upper secondary	0.024 (0.494)	0.217 (0.396)	-0.411 (0.418)
Tertiary	-0.156 (0.434)	-0.459 (0.345)	0.228 (0.317)
Income	-0.090 (0.790)	0.689 (0.613)	1.398* (0.581)
Lives with partner	0.075 (0.384)	0.406 (0.337)	-0.093 (0.286)
Interest in politics	0.149 (0.599)	0.707 (0.534)	0.190 (0.461)
Prior values (t – 1)			
PP intention	4.829*** (0.458)	2.938*** (0.302)	3.578*** (0.338)
Authoritarianism	-0.383 (0.662)	0.040 (0.571)	0.610 (0.506)
Ideological identification	2.562* (1.153)	2.560** (0.856)	3.571*** (0.756)
Nativism	-0.555 (0.862)	0.382 (0.704)	0.365 (0.684)
Territorial preference	-0.949 (0.668)	-1.149* (0.517)	-0.174 (0.471)
Populism	-0.798 (1.001)	-1.138 (0.748)	-0.166 (0.779)
Sexism	0.030 (1.139)	0.355 (0.810)	-0.137 (0.756)
Constant	-5.459*** (1.454)	-5.439*** (1.150)	-5.950*** (1.140)
Observations	1348	1503	1360

Note: Education categories in the main text are referred to as “Middle school or less”, “High school / vocational training”, and “College” instead of “Lower secondary or less”, “Upper secondary”, and “Tertiary”, respectively. Logistic regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A7. Effect of Prior Change in Attitudes and Vote Intention on Intended Vote for PP

	(1) 2019	(2) 2020	(3) 2019	(4) 2020
Female	0.426 (0.368)	0.357 (0.295)	0.420 (0.368)	0.356 (0.295)
Age	0.025 (0.021)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.027 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.016)
Upper secondary	0.374 (0.475)	-0.395 (0.442)	0.329 (0.480)	-0.396 (0.443)
Tertiary	-0.500 (0.451)	-0.034 (0.347)	-0.508 (0.450)	-0.034 (0.347)
Income	0.641 (0.800)	1.906** (0.645)	0.667 (0.798)	1.906** (0.645)
Lives with partner	0.078 (0.406)	-0.178 (0.309)	0.091 (0.408)	-0.178 (0.309)
Interest in politics	0.294 (0.642)	0.034 (0.497)	0.272 (0.640)	0.034 (0.497)
Prior values (t – 2)				
PP intention	3.684*** (0.466)	4.266*** (0.480)	3.704*** (0.470)	4.267*** (0.481)
Authoritarianism	0.443 (0.832)	-0.402 (0.623)	0.498 (0.838)	-0.401 (0.624)
Ideological identification	0.870 (1.324)	4.012*** (0.997)	0.805 (1.331)	4.010*** (1.000)
Nativism	-0.289 (1.103)	0.418 (0.830)	-0.319 (1.099)	0.418 (0.830)
Territorial preference	-0.767 (0.758)	-0.418 (0.564)	-0.760 (0.759)	-0.418 (0.564)
Populism	-1.365 (1.162)	-0.701 (0.962)	-1.389 (1.163)	-0.702 (0.963)
Sexism	1.724 (1.290)	-0.043 (0.921)	1.743 (1.297)	-0.045 (0.922)
Prior change (t – 2 minus t – 1)				
PP intention	1.216** (0.463)	3.134*** (0.366)	1.228** (0.464)	3.134*** (0.366)
Authoritarianism	-1.218 (0.884)	1.143+ (0.638)	-1.207 (0.885)	1.144+ (0.639)
Ideological identification	-0.201 (1.412)	2.908** (0.908)	-0.209 (1.413)	2.908** (0.908)
Nativism	-0.441 (1.102)	0.251 (0.854)	-0.409 (1.100)	0.251 (0.854)
Territorial preference	-0.329 (0.758)	0.180 (0.609)	-0.337 (0.757)	0.182 (0.610)
Populism	-1.013 (1.153)	1.046 (0.915)	-1.078 (1.156)	1.044 (0.917)
Sexism	-0.715 (1.313)	-0.474 (1.083)		
Increase in sexism			1.270 (2.587)	-0.440 (1.522)
Decrease in sexism			-1.806 (1.783)	-0.535 (2.177)
Constant	-5.772*** (1.682)	-5.384*** (1.320)	-6.016*** (1.706)	-5.387*** (1.323)
Observations	1092	1264	1092	1264

Note: Education categories in the main text are referred to as “Middle school or less”, “High school / vocational training”, and “College” instead of “Lower secondary or less”, “Upper secondary”, and “Tertiary”, respectively. Logistic regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

G. Replication with the original modern sexism battery

Tables A8 and A9 replicate the analyses in Tables 2 and 3 of the main text using Swim et al.'s (1995) original, 8-item battery of modern sexism, instead of the scale with one additional item used in the paper. The results are very similar to those reported in the paper.

Table A8. Effect of Prior Attitudes on Intended Vote for Vox, Using the Original Modern Sexism Scale

	2019	2020
Female	0.093 (0.283)	-0.120 (0.305)
Age	-0.009 (0.015)	-0.027 (0.017)
Upper secondary	-0.908 ⁺ (0.495)	-0.390 (0.448)
Tertiary	-0.040 (0.306)	-0.132 (0.347)
Income	0.140 (0.564)	0.108 (0.641)
Lives with partner	-0.078 (0.288)	0.053 (0.314)
Interest in politics	0.924 ⁺ (0.496)	1.243 [*] (0.497)
Prior values (t – 1)		
Vox intention	3.087 ^{***} (0.698)	3.374 ^{***} (0.355)
Authoritarianism	0.703 (0.538)	0.369 (0.582)
Ideological identification	3.597 ^{***} (0.752)	2.228 ^{**} (0.817)
Nativism	0.722 (0.626)	3.907 ^{***} (0.722)
Territorial preference	-1.437 ^{**} (0.496)	-1.101 [*] (0.538)
Populism	1.518 ⁺ (0.784)	1.091 (0.799)
Sexism	2.257 ^{**} (0.761)	1.309 (0.830)
Constant	-7.124 ^{***} (1.127)	-7.181 ^{***} (1.305)
Observations	1503	1360

Note: Education categories in the main text are referred to as “Middle school or less”, “High school / vocational training”, and “College” instead of “Lower secondary or less”, “Upper secondary”, and “Tertiary”, respectively. Logistic regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.

⁺ $p < 0.1$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$

Table A9. Effect of Prior Change in Attitudes and Vote Intention on Intended Vote for Vox, Using the Original Modern Sexism Scale

	(1) 2019	(2) 2020	(3) 2019	(4) 2020
Female	0.038 (0.355)	-0.144 (0.313)	0.069 (0.353)	-0.144 (0.313)
Age	-0.025 (0.020)	-0.033 + (0.018)	-0.023 (0.020)	-0.033 + (0.018)
Upper secondary	-0.553 (0.595)	-0.576 (0.463)	-0.593 (0.601)	-0.572 (0.461)
Tertiary	0.448 (0.397)	-0.251 (0.351)	0.461 (0.394)	-0.252 (0.351)
Income	-1.062 (0.705)	0.273 (0.648)	-1.148 (0.707)	0.273 (0.647)
Lives with partner	0.047 (0.369)	-0.010 (0.316)	0.112 (0.375)	-0.012 (0.315)
Interest in politics	1.876 ** (0.644)	1.217 * (0.510)	1.867 ** (0.640)	1.221 * (0.510)
Prior values (t – 2)				
Vox intention	3.030 + (1.580)	4.726 ** (1.535)	3.280 * (1.646)	4.723 ** (1.530)
Authoritarianism	1.146 (0.754)	0.963 (0.699)	1.185 (0.763)	0.970 (0.698)
Ideological identification	5.389 *** (1.097)	1.707 + (1.002)	5.221 *** (1.099)	1.729 + (1.004)
Nativism	0.058 (0.965)	4.099 *** (0.839)	0.029 (0.962)	4.099 *** (0.837)
Territorial preference	-1.247 + (0.707)	-1.365 * (0.626)	-1.187 + (0.702)	-1.368 * (0.625)
Populism	1.487 (1.120)	0.281 (0.933)	1.234 (1.118)	0.283 (0.931)
Sexism	2.891 * (1.200)	1.042 (0.953)	2.995 * (1.208)	1.014 (0.951)
Prior change (t – 2 minus t – 1)				
Vox intention	4.748 ** (1.824)	3.225 *** (0.378)	4.213 * (1.663)	3.225 *** (0.379)
Authoritarianism	0.407 (0.769)	0.098 (0.667)	0.477 (0.767)	0.101 (0.666)
Ideological identification	2.715 * (1.208)	1.914 * (0.936)	2.635 * (1.205)	1.917 * (0.934)
Nativism	0.822 (1.000)	3.464 *** (0.818)	0.736 (0.988)	3.468 *** (0.819)
Territorial preference	-0.590 (0.701)	-0.921 (0.621)	-0.500 (0.696)	-0.932 (0.624)
Populism	0.977 (1.155)	1.454 (0.905)	0.905 (1.142)	1.463 (0.903)
Sexism	2.427 * (1.156)	0.697 (1.038)		
Increase in sexism			5.271 ** (1.755)	0.512 (1.418)
Decrease in sexism			-0.849 (1.704)	0.813 (2.060)
Constant	-7.777 *** (1.567)	-6.194 *** (1.412)	-8.002 *** (1.586)	-6.165 *** (1.415)
Observations	1092	1264	1092	1264

Note: The dependent variable is intended vote for Vox at time t . Education categories in the main text are referred to as “Middle school or less”, “High school / vocational training”, and “College” instead of “Lower secondary or less”, “Upper secondary”, and “Tertiary”, respectively. Logistic regression coefficients estimated using penalized maximum likelihood, standard errors in parentheses.

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$