

France in Focus:

Exploring the Relationship between Proximity to Ethnic Enclaves and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment

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Senior Honors Thesis
International & Area Studies
Washington University in St. Louis, 2016

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank several people for helping to make this thesis project possible, and for their unwavering support over the past year. My primary thesis advisor, Dr. Jeremy Caddel, deserves special recognition for answering my many questions, for reading and editing my many drafts, and for challenging me to go outside my comfort zone and undertake a statistical analysis. I am grateful for his support and guidance throughout the duration of the project.

I am also grateful for Dr. Samba Diallo, who served as my cultural advisor for this project. He has instilled in me an interest in the realm of French-Francophone African relations, connected me with first-hand opinions of French immigration, and guided me as I developed the cultural parameters for my ethnographic research.

I would also like to thank David Epstein, Stacey Hader Epstein, Alicia Salvino, Jenna Goff, and Rachel Epstein for their motivation and support as I worked through the many phases of this project.

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ABSTRACT

The recent wave of terror attacks and ongoing refugee crises push the topic of immigration into the global spotlight. Notably in the European context, this heightened focus consequently affects public sentiment towards people of differing origins. This research project seeks to identify how coexisting alongside ethnic minorities affects French natives' feelings towards immigration in their national context. Given the conflicting theories in the literature, my study tests two competing hypotheses: that proximity to concentrated ethnic groups increases anti-immigrant sentiment, and that proximity to concentrated ethnic groups decreases anti-immigrant sentiment. In using votes for the extreme-right 2012 presidential candidate Marine Le Pen of the *Front National* (FN) as a proxy for anti-immigrant sentiment in France, my research provides a tangible example of how quantitative electoral results represent a more qualitative variable - anti-immigrant sentiment. In order to test these competing hypotheses, I used a two-tier methodological approach. The cross-city comparison uses a statistical model to evaluate the relationship between percentages of immigrants in the arrondissements of Paris, Marseille, and Lyon and votes for Le Pen. In the Paris case study, I introduce a new explanatory variable: ethnic enclaves. After defining ethnic enclaves and their adjacent populations, I classify the 869 Paris voting bureaus in relation to such enclaves, and explore the relationship between proximity to these areas and voting patterns. By conducting both a cross-city level comparison and an in-depth exploration of Paris, the findings collectively support the hypothesis theorizing that proximity to greater immigrant populations (immigrant-populous arrondissements across the three cities, and voting bureaus in close proximity to ethnic enclaves in Paris) decreases anti-immigrant sentiment. The results of the study suggest that interaction between different groups is beneficial to improving attitudes towards immigrant populations in France.

INTRODUCTION

November 13, 2015 – a series of coordinated terrorist attacks erupted throughout the French capital. At the hands of ISIS, 130 innocent civilians lost their lives, hundreds of others were left physically and psychologically harmed, and the increasingly multiethnic French society was pushed into the global spotlight. The *Front National* (FN), the extreme-right political party in France, continues to capitalize on this period of national vulnerability to enhance public following of the party's anti-immigrant stance. In grounding her rhetoric in the fear of the outsider, current FN president Marine Le Pen conveys immigrants as the threat to French nationalism, thus amplifying her position as a protector of French cohesiveness. The emphasis on fear of the immigrant threat thus trickles down from the political stage and into the minds of civilians. Such anti-immigrant discourse influences the public perception of ethnic minorities in the national context, consequently shaping the motivations and decisions of French voters.

Without taking into account studies of social psychology or personal backgrounds leading to preconceived biases as to why people feel the ways that they do about immigrants, I seek to identify how coexisting alongside ethnic minorities affects feelings of French natives towards immigration in their national context. Given the conflicting theories in the literature, my study tests two competing hypotheses: that proximity to concentrated ethnic groups increases anti-immigrant sentiment, and that proximity to concentrated ethnic groups decreases anti-immigrant sentiment. While the correlation between political preference for extremist parties and anti-minority group attitudes has been previously identified and explored across various research dimensions, electoral results are not used as quantitative indicators of public sentiment. The FN staunchly supports the anti-immigrant agenda, and the majority of their voters cite the immigration issue as their reason for gravitation towards the party. In using votes for the FN as a

proxy for anti-immigrant sentiment in France, my research seeks to contribute to the literature by providing a tangible example of how electoral results represent a more qualitative variable - anti-immigrant sentiment.

In order to assess my hypotheses, I evaluate the data in two different ways. The first method involves a cross-city comparison that looks at the votes for Le Pen and percentage of immigrants living in the arrondissements of Paris, Marseille, and Lyon. I then move to an in-depth granular analysis of Paris, looking at FN votes in the 869 voting bureaus relative to ethnic enclaves throughout the city. What is also scarce in the literature is the exploration of spatial orientation of ethnic neighborhoods throughout Paris. To fill this gap in the literature, I introduced a new dataset based on my own research and ethnographic fieldwork to specifically define the boundaries of ethnic enclaves in Paris. By defining ethnic enclaves and their adjacent populations, I established a method to evaluate and quantify the relationship between living in close proximity to close-knit ethnic centralities and discriminatory sentiment towards immigrants. While both methods look at FN votes in relation to proximity to ethnic groups, the Paris case study hones in on the more granular, ethnic enclave level. While the overall findings do not provide overwhelming support for the hypotheses tested, the results do lean in favor of the hypothesis that proximity to ethnic populations decreases anti-immigrant sentiment. Thus, it is ultimately suggestive of the idea that interaction between different groups is beneficial to improving attitudes towards immigrants in France.

BACKGROUND

Part I: History of Immigration to France in the Twentieth Century

A. 1900-1945

In the early twentieth century, French colonial presence played an integral role in catalyzing the movement of North Africans – commonly referred to as Maghrebis – to France. Algeria, France's largest African colony, witnessed the movement of many Arab-Berbers to the French mainland. Push factors such as political instability and economic inequality motivated Algerians to move to metropolitan cities on the French mainland. As citizens of a colony of France, Algerians were viewed as extensions of the French national population; they were not perceived as “immigrants” – they were simply moving from one French territory to another. Algerian migrants in the early part of the century were integral to the development of the labor force, and between 1901 and 1914, Algerians accounted for nearly 10,000 of the workers in metropolitan France. On average, these migrant workers received the same salary and benefits as French mainland citizens. The exchange was mutually beneficial – the migrants profited from employment opportunities and the French colonial economy benefited from their labor in the industrial sector. Other Maghrebis from countries like Morocco and Tunisia also made their way to the French mainland throughout the first half of the twentieth century, but their rapid settlement did not take off until the post-World War II period.

Throughout the same decades leading up to World War II, the Négritude cultural movement in Francophone Africa led several Sub-Saharan African politicians and students to move to France. The French mainland, as a place of opportunities for enhanced education and career mobility, was an attractive place for Francophone elites and intellectuals to settle. Furthermore, the whole concept of a collective global French empire – as the Francophone

colonies were viewed as extensions of the French mainland prior to decolonization in the 1960s – encouraged movement between the continents.

As a result of widespread economic and political instability, the 1920s and 1930s also saw the vast movement of neighboring European national groups to France. European immigrants influenced the national landscape of foreigners, with some groups even outnumbering migrants from African colonies. In fact, in 1926, African migrants only consisted of 3% of the total foreign population in France, whereas Italians represented 31% (Mauco 1933). The majority of Italians who arrived in France during this time were political exiles seeking refuge from Mussolini's regime; their repression from their national government coupled with France's need for unskilled laborers motivated their emigration, and they remained single largest national group in France until 1968. Many Belgians also arrived in France at this time to pursue job opportunities, specifically in the coal, steel, and textile industries. A sizable population of Poles also began to settle, notably taking jobs working in the agricultural and mining sectors. In 1931, Poles came to account for nearly half of all foreign workers in France's mining industry (Hargreaves 2007). Other immigrant communities sought refuge in France to escape persecution, such as the Spanish during their Civil War of 1936 and German and eastern European Jews amidst the rise of fascism (Hargreaves 2007).

B: 1945-1972

It is evident that France has an extensive history of immigration, with migrant flows crossing the country's borders for various decades; however, honing in on the mid-twentieth century to the present provides the effective platform for examining prominent French political and cultural responses to an increasingly multiethnic context.

The end of World War II brought about a dramatic increase in immigration to France. The war essentially paralyzed national economic growth, so in response to the economic pressure to bolster the labor force coupled with efforts to compensate for war casualties, economists such as Jean Monnet led the push for immigration to remedy such labor shortages (Hargreaves 2007). An alternative to domestic labor, migrant workers were more likely to accept lower wages and more willing to work in the agriculture and manufacturing industries than in their French counterparts, so their labor was welcomed by these industrial sectors at the bottom tier of the developing economy. The French government issued an ordinance on November 2, 1945 that set out to encourage European rather than African or Asian immigration to France. However, improved living standards throughout Western Europe and the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1957 reduced the desire for other Europeans to leave their home countries (Hargreaves 2007). Migrant communities from other European countries like Italy, Portugal, and Spain did increase in size in the post World War II era, but not nearly to the extent of those from the Maghreb. As a result, Maghrebi immigrants – specifically those from Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco – were the ones who filled this demand for lower class workers and took the opportunity to move to the French mainland. A sizeable population of sub-Saharan Africans also migrated to France during this decade to help fill the demand for workers. The concept of a united global French empire – uniting the Francophone African world and the French mainland – further perpetuated such collective migration.

While they were welcomed at first due to the urgency of replenishing the French labor force, tensions between the African migrants and mainland French citizens amplified in the early 1950s and 1960s. France witnessed increased visibility of this migrant group, as Algerian migration to France stood at 32.5%, a stark contrast from the overall immigration rate of 1.3%

(Hargreaves 2007). After the immediate post-war period, the demand for laborers began to wane, and the presence of Algerian workers was soon viewed as a detriment to French mainland citizens seeking employment. The Algerian war from 1954 to 1962 led even more Algerians to seek refuge in France; however, due to the war conflict and heightened tension between Algerians and the French colonial power, these immigrants were no longer welcomed into the country. Tensions peaked in October of 1961 with a massacre of Algerians demonstrating on the streets of Paris, and over fifty Algerians lost their lives at the hands of French security forces. Following Algerian independence in 1962, Algerians enjoyed relative freedom to move between their home country and France. By 1965, over 500,000 Algerians resided on French soil. However, as France moved out of its thirty-year period of post-war economic modernization, the government started to view the influx of Algerian immigrants – as well as other Maghrebis – as a hindrance to the state (Hargreaves 2007).

Large-scale settlement on the part of Southeast Asians took shape in the 1970s. Originating in the former French Indochina, many sought asylum in France following the communist victory in the Vietnam War. Altogether, Vietnamese exiles, Cambodians fleeing the authoritarian regime of Pol Pot, and Laotians fearing their safety amounted to nearly 100,000 Southeast Asian migrants to France. In contrast to African migrants, they were an altogether more educated group with higher levels of certified skills. These “boat people” – named for the mode of transportation in which they fled – were perceived as victims of political intolerance who possessed valuable entrepreneurial skills. Thus, they were met with less hostility than African migrants, and throughout the 1970s, most Southeast Asian migrants were granted refugee status (Hargreaves 2007). France also hosts a sizable population of Chinese immigrants, many of whom arrived during the Vietnam War period after France evacuated Indochina. The

year 1975 specifically witnessed a huge Asian diaspora to Paris, not only with those arriving from former French Indochina, but also those leaving the Chinese mainland following the Community Party rule (Shen 2009). A sizeable population of Chinese migrants came from Wenzhou. Collectively, these groups of Southeast and East Asian migrants settled in various Parisian areas, but most notably in a pocket of the thirteenth arrondissement that would later become popularly known as “Chinatown” or “Triangle de Choisy.”

Part II: Immigration in the Face of French Politics (1973-1993)

The increased settlement of immigrant minorities – specifically those from Africa and Asia – challenged the preconceived homogenized image of French society. Following decolonization and heightened xenophobic feelings towards foreigners, the French government sought to halt the trajectory towards a multicultural France, and the 1970s saw the imposition of stricter regulations on immigrants. African migrants were the primary targets of such restrictions, as their post-colonial minority image challenged the desire for a collective French national identity. European ethnic groups were smaller in number and did not present themselves as visible threats to the French image, and Southeast Asians were seen as victims to communist authoritarianism rather than as post-colonial minorities.

Following the Middle East War of 1973, a time when a sharp rise in oil price sparked widespread apprehension over the prospects for economic growth throughout western Europe, fears of rising unemployment among the French citizens led the government to take action. Headed by President Giscard d’Estaing, the government closed the country’s borders to foreign workers in 1974 with a “zero-immigration” policy. This ban did not apply, however, to other members of the European community, nor did it stop the flow of asylum-seekers. Furthermore,

certain categories of higher-skilled and entrepreneurial immigrants were also exempt from restriction (Hargreaves 2007). Despite these exemptions, this national suspension of immigration marked the beginning of an era of increased hostility towards foreigners, with anti-immigrant sentiment reverberating throughout both the political and domestic spheres.

By 1977, the government wanted to make the 1974 suspension on immigration to a permanent measure by not only halting inward migratory flows, but also by reducing the current population of immigrants within the country. This resulted in the creation of financial incentives to encourage voluntary repatriation as well as discretionary powers taken by the ministry of the interior to expel as many individual foreigners as possible. While these efforts proved largely unsuccessful, they signified a visible shift towards a staunch and more hostile anti-immigrant stance, resulting in anti-immigrant sentiment trickling down into the minds of the public.

The 1980s were marked by the revival of the *Front National* (FN), the extreme right party in French politics. The increased popularity for the FN mirrors the rise of France's immigrant population, especially those originating in former French colonies in North and West Africa that became predominantly Islamic countries. The 1980s and 1990s saw politicians and public opinion obsessed with what was widely portrayed as a serious threat to French national identity and social cohesion arising from the settlement of such minorities (Hargreaves 2007). Politicians like Jean-Marie Le Pen capitalized on this fear by asserting that unlike earlier immigrants from other parts of Europe, it would be impossible for those from the Maghreb to integrate within the French societal context. Staunchly opposed to the idea of multiculturalism, an idea considered incompatible with the French republican model of integration, the French government refused to acknowledge these foreigners as part of “ethnic minority” groups (Hargreaves 2007). While such acknowledgement would have labeled them as different,

formally recognizing them as a group would have implied that they existed as a category within the French population, and this prospect of incorporation was inconceivable.

To combat this perceived challenge to collective French identity, the government continued efforts to halt inward migration, while subsequently enhancing the national anti-immigrant agenda. The Pasqua laws epitomized these reform efforts. Led by former Interior Minister Charles Pasqua, this restrictive immigration legislation passed in 1986 and 1993 limited family reunification, tightened identity checks for migrants, prohibited polygamous marriages, and eliminated automatic nationality rights for migrant children born in France (Sargent & Larchanché-Kim 2006).

Part III: Evolution of the *Front National*

While it was originally founded in 1972, the *Front National* (FN) and its founder – Jean-Marie Le Pen – remained absent from the prominent political scene until for nearly twelve years after its establishment. While the FN only mustered a mere 0.4% vote in the 1981 parliamentary elections, the year 1984 marked a dramatic revival of the FN in the elections for European Parliament, as the party won 11% of the vote and 10 out of 81 French seats (Fysh & Wolfreys 2002). This election marked the turning point for FN visibility not only in the French political sphere, but also for the rest of Europe grappling with the reality of extreme-right organizations becoming viable contenders in electoral processes.

The breakthrough in the FN's popularity in the 1980s reflects a period of national insecurity, as France grappled with rising unemployment rates and ethnic scapegoating (Hargreaves 2007). Jean-Marie Le Pen capitalized on this national vulnerability and pushed immigration to the forefront of his party's agenda. Portraying immigrants as the threat to

cohesive national French identity, the FN politicized the immigration issue, thus increasing its salience in the public context. As a result, immigration quickly became a large motivation for voters to support the FN in national elections. From just 1984 to 1988, the percentage of voters citing immigration as the motivation for voting for the FN jumped from 26% to 59% (Schain 2008). In both the 1993 and 1997 elections, 72% of FN voters indicated that the immigration issue was their primary motivation for voting for the FN candidate (Schain 2008). Thus, the heightened importance of the immigration issue in FN party politics moved increasingly to the forefront of the party platform.

The FN continued to push the anti-immigration stance as its key policy after the turn of the century, and their presence reinforced discriminatory sentiment. The party continued to attract mostly male voters from a wide population base, but the groups most specifically and consistently represented included white ex-colonials and small businessmen (Pettigrew 1998). In 2002, FN candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen made it to the second round of the presidential election, largely thanks to support from working-class voters who feared the increasing number of immigrants. Although he lost the election to republican candidate Jacques Chirac, the increased popularity and visibility of the FN as a viable political party contender further solidified the immigration issue as a priority for the new presidency (Shen 2009). The FN discourse leveraged events such as the headscarf affair and the 2005 riots to heighten anxieties over the social incorporation of people of recent immigrant origin (Hargreaves 2007). Thus, it is clear that anti-immigrant rhetoric from the top continued to infiltrate the minds of the national population.

Following in her father's footsteps, Marine Le Pen¹ rose her way through the FN to become the second president of the party, a position she began in January 2011. In the first round of the 2012 presidential election in France, Marine Le Pen garnered the best support for the FN

¹ From this point forward, all mentions of "Le Pen" refer to Marine Le Pen

than in any other election with 17.9% of the vote. Much like the supporters of her father, she attracted voters sharing her ethnocentric and authoritarian values, notably the intense rejection of immigrants and other minorities (Mayer 2013). An electoral survey conducted in 2012 asked voters their opinion about the number of immigrants in France. FN voters cited immigration as the most important issue, at +35 percentage-points above the sample mean, and significantly above security, the second-highest voted issue at +18 points (Mayer 2013). While Le Pen's numbers surpassed those of her father in the 2002 election by one percentage point and 1.6 million votes, she did not qualify for the second round of the election, a contest in which only the two candidates with the highest percentages in the first round compete (Mayer 2013). Le Pen came up short, and she took third place behind François Hollande at 28.6% and Nicolas Sarkozy at 27.2% (Mayer 2013; France Ministry of the Interior). Even though she did not advance to the two-candidate round, the election marked the highest support for the FN in any election, thus encouraging further exploration of the relationship between the FN anti-immigrant agenda and Le Pen's voter base.

Part IV: Diversity and Discrimination in Twenty-First Century France

A. France (in general)

The most recent data collected on immigrant² countries of origin comes from the 2006 census. While the census is not allowed to ask questions about ethnicity or race, country of origin is now included. Thus, using this category, one can infer the gist of where immigrant flows are coming from. See Table 1 for this breakdown of immigrants and their countries of origin.

Table 1: Immigrants in France by Country of Origin (2012)

² For the purposes of consistency throughout this study, I use the widely accepted definition of an “immigrant” as defined by France’s Haut Conseil à l’Intégration (HCI). According to the HCI, an immigrant is a person residing in France but was born elsewhere.

<i>Continent/Country of Origin</i>	<i>Number of Immigrants</i>
Europe	2 101 209
EU-27	1 838 056
Spain	245 077
Italy	292 592
Portugal	599 333
United Kingdom	152 592
Other EU-27 Countries	548 461
Other European Countries	263 153
Africa	2 470 100
Algeria	748 034
Morocco	692 923
Tunisia	251 220
Other African Countries	777 922
Asia	823 487
Turkey	248 159
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam	161 466
Other Asian Countries	413 862
America, Oceania	319 249
Total	5 714 045

Source: INSEE 2012 Population Census

In regards to the localization of immigrants, the largest populations are concentrated in the region of Île-de-France (notably consisting of Paris and its suburbs). There are large numbers of immigrants in the Rhône-Alps and Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur regions, concentrated in the cities of Lyon and Marseille, respectively.

Table 2: Number of Immigrants in Regions of France (2012)

<i>Region</i>	<i>Number of Immigrants</i>
Alsace-Champagne-Ardenne-Lorraine	462 338
Aquitaine-Limousin-Poitou-Charentes	326 410
Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes	681 779
Bourgogne-Franche-Comté	179 013
Bretagne	95 678
Centre-Val de Loire	158 869
Corse	32 076
Île-de-France	2 160 215
Languedoc-Roussillon-Midi-Pyrénées	469 325
Nord-Pas-de-Calais-Picardie	288 709
Normandie	126 626
Pays de la Loire	119 408
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur	499 811

Source: INSEE 2012 Population Census

Regardless of the ever changing and increasingly multiethnic French landscape, political elites overwhelming reject the idea of multiculturalism in the French context. They view this model, relying on the recognition and valorization of ethnic communities and their cultural differences, as incompatible with French integration and the concept of a one-dimensional national identity (Simon 2012). Eurobarometer data collected twice each year since 2003 highlights that a number of French citizens perceive immigration not only as a threat to collective national identity, but as one of the biggest, most pressing problems facing France. Survey responses from over 1,000 French participants during each research term shed light on this reality, as between Fall 2003 and Spring 2015, between 8% and 12% cited immigration as one of the two most pressing issues (standard Eurobarometer surveys 59-83). The omnipresence of the immigration issue is nothing new to public knowledge, but this national data

demonstrating public perception of immigration as a threat encourages further exploration into what specific contexts breed such negative perceptions.

B. Paris

Paris today has the reputation of an increasingly multiethnic space. An attractive area for immigrants seeking new lives, the percentage of ethnic minorities comprising the Parisian population continues to rise. In this way, metropolitan Paris crosses international borders without even traversing the bordering Boulevard Périphérique. While Paris has become a multicultural hub, it does not mean that the diversity has diffused equally throughout the city.

There is evident segregation of large groups of foreigners from their French citizen counterparts. Pockets of the city have become ethnic enclaves, centralities of one or more ethnic minority groups expressing their original cultures by way of restaurants, markets, shops, and religious spaces. By carving out cultural pockets within the Parisian patchwork, foreigners bring aspects of their original cultures to their new context in attempt to retain a sense of belonging with their original cultural identities in a new and overwhelming context. However, in popular discourse, these ethnic enclaves epitomize a sense of otherness and exoticism, inherently limiting assimilation into French nationalistic mindset that political discourse has promoted since the 1974 formal halt on immigration.

The rising multidimensionality of Paris is not without consequences of discrimination. Stereotypes and generalizations about certain ethnic groups - albeit foreigners as a whole - reverberate throughout the city. The French Republic has an extensive history of refusing to recognize differences based on separate origins, and this longstanding republican tradition inherently “exoticizes” those who appear different. The French anti-multiculturalism discourse

furtherns the condition for the marginalization of visible minorities (Simon 2012). Deemed incompatible with the French national context, such minorities are caught in a web of discrimination and exclusion from which they cannot escape.

While there have been some efforts spearheaded by immigration advocates to enact measures against racial and ethnic discrimination, the widespread fear that immigrants pose a threat to public order and safety - referred to by the French term “*insécurité*” - has hindered the actual enactment of changes in public policy (Hargreaves 2007). Various incidences of violence, like the 1995 terrorist bombings carried out by second generation Maghrebi immigrants, and the November 13 massacre in 2015, only perpetuated the feelings of fear and insecurity among the French towards racial and ethnic outliers, especially immigrants.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In evaluating the relationship between minority populations and discriminatory sentiment, there are conflicting ideas presented in the literature regarding whether proximity has a negative or positive effect on the development of anti-minority sentiment. Forbes highlights this discrepancy, noting that more contact between members of different population groups may generally reduce prejudice, but it can sometimes be associated with more prejudice and discrimination (Forbes 1997). Given that my study seeks to test the two simultaneous hypotheses, it is necessary to explore the literature on both sides of the debate in order to gain comprehensive understandings of the conflicting theories at play. In defining terminology, this study uses the term “in-group” to denote a population in the majority, and “out-group” to describe minorities in the same national context.

A major theory explored throughout the literature is that the presence of large out-group populations - notably ethnic minorities - fosters feelings of fear and distrust in the minds of the ethnic majority (Massey, Hodson, & Sekulic 1999). Several studies explore size of the out-group population as an indicator of a major threat, and consequently a major determinant of prejudice and immigration. (Semyonov, Rajman, & Gorofzeisky 2006). Out-group population size, though, is not the only explanatory variable. In addition, distinctions often described as ethnic differences further perpetuate negative feelings towards the out-group. (Massey, Hodson, & Sekulic 1999). Prevalent throughout the literature is the idea that anti-immigrant attitudes should be seen as a reaction to rising levels of ethnic diversity (Quillian 1995; Semyonov, Rajman, & Gorofzeisky 2006; Hooghe & de Vroome 2013). Thus, it is the combination of numerical superiority of such out-groups and distinctions noted as ethnic differences that form the collective basis for negative sentiments. In his cross-country comparative study, Coenders

defines an ethnic majority group of a given country as the dominant ethnic group in that country, in terms of political power and economic status (Coenders 2001). These negative attitudes of such dominant groups towards those outside of their population – namely ethnic minorities and immigrants – are therefore labeled as ethnic exclusionism (Coenders 2001).

William Sumner introduced the concept of ethnocentrism in 1906. He defined his term as the technical name for the view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it (Sumner 1906). Thus, it is this phenomenon of ethnocentrism that drives the nationalistic attitudes of the majority group seeking to solidify a cohesive national identity. Ethnocentric ideals, however, perpetuate ethnic exclusionism and inherently foster feelings of division in a context where not everyone is a member of the majority.

Such ethnocentrism among members of the in-group, coupled with the growing size of out-group populations, leads to prejudice and discriminatory sentiment against such outsiders. There is an extensive body of existing research discussing the tendency of individuals to fear the presence of out-group populations, as they are seen as a threat to the collective national identity. While many ethnic minorities view having multiple nationalities as compatible with a full commitment to “Frenchness,” in the minds of French nationals, such “hyphenated identities” are incompatible with truly being French. (Simon 2012). This fear, then, escalates into prejudice and discriminatory sentiment against those seen as challenging the cultural, national, and ethnic homogeneity of that society (Semyonov, Rajzman, & Gorofzeisky 2006).

Several studies have evaluated the relationship between majority group sentiment and proximity to large out-group populations, but they have done so largely on a comparative level across countries. What is less represented in the literature, however, is a localized approach to

identifying not only the relationship between the two variables, but also what factors at a more granular level contribute to anti-immigrant sentiment across different portions of a specific city.

Marc Hooghe and Thomas de Vroone carried out a study consistent with my localized approach to exploring the relationship between ethnic diversity and anti-immigrant sentiments. They conducted a multilevel analysis of local Belgian communities to demonstrate that individuals who perceive more immigrants to be present in their communities are more hostile, while also showing the impact that perceived size of a migrant group has on anti-immigrant sentiments versus the actual number of ethnic minorities present. While I am not seeking to measure the effects of perceived group size versus actual of ethnic minority group sizes, the localized approach to identifying patterns of anti-immigrant sentiment based on proximity to concentrations of ethnic minorities is particularly useful in structuring my own study.

In addition to the numerical superiority of certain out-group populations, the question of proximity also comes into play. Prior research conducted on the role of ethnic enclaves in influencing public sentiment towards minorities highlights the proximity question. Attention to the role of enclaves is important for understanding of ethnic and racial separatism and integration in multiethnic societies (Massey, Hodson, & Sekulic 1999). The study of ethnic enclaves and intolerance in former Yugoslavia sheds light on this issue, highlighting the theory that majority group members living in an enclave dominated by minority groups are more intolerant than in any other situation (Massey, Hodson, & Sekulic 1999). Furthermore, Massey et. al draw upon research conducted by Herbert Blumer in the 1950s noting the importance of spatial arrangements in generating fear and “a threat to [the] status, security and welfare of the dominant ethnic group” (Blumer 1958). Drawing upon this point, they hypothesize that the concentration or dispersal of similarly identified people can be the cornerstone for development certain

sentiments - like fear - towards other groups (Massey, Hodson, & Sekulic 1999). This demonstrates the concept that close proximity to out-groups - especially those with large populations clustered in enclaves - fuels the anti-minority sentiment.

It is evident that there is also a strain in the literature supporting that both size of out-groups and proximity to their spaces increases tolerance between groups. A common thread throughout such literature is that out-groups with larger populations have more opportunities for positive intergroup contact, consequently lessening anti-out-group attitudes (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998; Hooghe & de Vroome 2013). Several studies specifically build upon Gordon Allport's contact hypothesis, which argues that contact and interaction between members of differently identified groups are critical to recognizing similarities and develop feelings of trust and tolerance (Allport 1954). Furthermore, it explains that high levels of contact between different communities improves intergroup relations by making people more willing to deal with each other as equals (Allport 1954; Forbes 1997). Hooghe and de Vroome studied this contact, as they hypothesized that the greater number of social contacts with members of migrant groups, the lower the anti-immigrant sentiment (Hooghe & de Vroome 2013).

Several studies elaborate upon this hypothesis, pointing out that mere casual contact between members of different groups does not inherently foster tolerance. They argue that in addition to intergroup contact, situational variables such as pursuit of common goals, cooperative dependence, and possible support from authorities are key conditions to ultimately yield positive effects (Pettigrew 1998; Forbes 1997). However, given the various facets of intergroup relations, the psychological complexity of prejudices, and the influence of participants on situational variables, researchers have experienced difficulty in testing the contact hypothesis experimentally (Forbes 1997). The results of the Massey, Hodson, & Sekulic (1999) study on

relations between provinces in former Yugoslavia support the contact hypothesis, as tolerance levels proved highest in the most diverse provinces (Massey, Hodson, & Sekulic 1999). While these findings were contrary to their theory that majority group members living in an enclave dominated by minority groups are more intolerant, it shows that inter-group contact and subsequent reaction cannot be generalized across all societies, and thus studies of proximity and attitudes need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

Studies of proximity are those evaluating contexts in which there are opportunities for interaction between various groups (Forbes 1997). In hypothesizing a causal relationship between proximity and increased interaction, Forbes sites the incorporation of proximity as an important variable in studies testing the contact theory, a dimension which much of the literature has ignored (Forbes 1997). Quillian (1995) illustrates the difficulty in drawing simple conclusions about the relationship between proximity and prejudice. The study used data from the Eurobarometer 30 survey of 1988 to look at how contact, in the sense of neighborhood proximity, influences feelings towards nearby racial and ethnic minorities. The study did prove conclusive results, indicating that individuals with more contact with out-groups show lower levels of racial and anti-immigrant prejudice (Quillian 1995).

Existing research and literature on the effects of proximity to certain groups on anti-group behavior is rather limiting in reference to the French context. In regards to other settings – notably other European countries and their cities – there is not a consistent answer on the relationship between immigrant concentration and anti-immigrant sentiment. The conflicting literature on the topic proves that the theory cannot be generalized to every scenario; rather, when seeking to evaluate the relationship between immigrant concentration and public attitudes, it is imperative to account for factors specific to each context.

HYPOTHESES

- H1: Proximity to areas with high concentrations of immigrants³ increases anti-immigrant sentiment.
- H2: Proximity to areas with high concentrations of immigrants decreases anti-immigrant sentiment.

METHODS

In order to test these competing hypotheses, I used a two-pronged methodological approach. Conducting a cross-city level comparison and an in-depth exploration of Paris provided a comprehensive platform for exploring the relationship between the variables. The cross-city comparison utilized electoral data accessible through the French Ministry of the Interior and population statistics from the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE - the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies). The Paris-level study incorporates electoral data provided by the Paris city government office, as well as data created by a combination of prior research and my own ethnographic fieldwork.

³ In the cross-city comparison, immigrant concentration is measured on the overall arrondissement (district) level. In Paris, these areas with high concentrations of immigrants are the “ethnic enclaves.”

CROSS-CITY COMPARISON: METHODS

In the cross-city comparison, I looked at three of the most populous cities in France with the greatest percentages of immigrant inhabitants: Paris, Marseille, and Lyon. As discussed in the background section, there is a longstanding history of immigration flows to France. Paris, Marseille, and Lyon are the three largest cities in France, and are consequently the largest cities in their respective regions of Île-de-France, Rhône-Alpes, and Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur. In 1999, the INSEE reported the regional distribution of immigrant populations, and noted that 57.5% of the immigration population of France, compared with 36% of the French population as a whole, was concentrated in these three regions. This trend is consistent with the 2012 census, indicating that the regions collectively contain 58.5% of all immigrants in France, compared to 37.2% of the total national population. Given that Paris, Marseille, and Lyon are the largest cities in the country as well as in their respective regions, they are key for a cross-city comparison.

I sought to evaluate the relationship between votes for Le Pen in the 2012 presidential election and the percentage of immigrants living the districts comprising the cities. The independent variable in this comparison test is the percentage of immigrants of the total population of each respective arrondissement. Each city consists of arrondissements, or administrative districts. There are twenty arrondissements in Paris, sixteen in Marseille, and nine in Lyon. The most specific data available across all cities for percentages of immigrants is at the arrondissement level, and the population breakdown in each arrondissement is available on the INSEE website. I recorded the number of immigrants and the number of total people living in each arrondissement and calculated the percentage of immigrants (*imm.*) in each respective area.

The dependent variable in the test is the percentage of votes for Le Pen in the 2012 French presidential election. I accessed this data on the website for the French Ministry of the

Interior and recorded the percentage votes for Le Pen in each arrondissement in the three cities.

While there was more granular data available for the city of Paris and its 869 voting bureaus (each arrondissement is made up of a number of smaller voting precincts), this data was not accessible for Marseille and Lyon. As a result, the finest level of data available across the three cities was the percentage votes for Le Pen by each arrondissement.

Given the reality that all individuals who vote for Le Pen do not solely base their choice on one factor (such as the number of immigrants living in each area), it was imperative to include a control variable to account for another important factor: income. I recorded data from the INSEE on the median income (*med. income*) for each arrondissement in 2012 alongside the other two variables. Several sources indicated that French citizens earning lower incomes are more likely to vote for Le Pen, and such data could be confounded with votes. For example, many French voters earning low incomes perceive immigrants in France as taking jobs away from French natives, thus augmenting unemployment rates. A main component of the FN's solution to unemployment in France is the deportation of immigrants (Fysh & Wolfreys 2002). This xenophobia drives these lower-class French nationals to support the FN and their anti-immigrant platform. Thus, given this relationship between income and political party voting preference, it is effective to account for median income in the study and include it as a control variable.

$$Le\ Pen \approx imm. + med. income$$

The statistical model incorporates these variables and explores their relationships. In the model, percentage votes for Le Pen is the dependent variable, percentage of immigrants in an arrondissement is the categorical (independent) variable, and the control is median income (measured in thousands of euros).

CROSS-CITY COMPARISON: ANALYSIS

The summary statistics of the cross-city comparison, displayed in Table 3, reveal relatively straightforward results. Given the R-squared of 0.83, the summary statistics reveal that the model explains 83% of the variation; however, this variation is largely coming from the city differentials. This means that there are still some noise variables and controls that are not accounted for in the model.

Table 3: Effect of Proximity to Immigrants on Le Pen Votes

	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>Significance (p)</i>
(Intercept)	17.5513	3.6401	2.05×10^{-5} ***
Paris	0.1546	2.0433	0.9401 .
Marseille	10.7249	1.4063	0.006 **
Median income	-0.0002	0.0001	2.55×10^{-9} ***
Immigrant pop.	-0.2780	0.1243	0.0310 *
<i>R</i> ²	0.8355		
<i>N</i>	45		

Note: Note: $p \leq 0.1$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Note: Median income measured per one euro

Note: Lyon (city) used as base

Throughout the comparison model, the city of Lyon was used as the base, so Paris and Marseille were evaluated in relation to Lyon. Lyon, then, is the intercept, which sits at 17.9 % (17.9, 0). In looking at the immigrant population variable, the model indicates that for every percent increase in immigrant population, there is a 0.3% decrease in votes for Le Pen. Thus, the model reveals that there is a clear but weak relationship between higher immigrant populations and lower support for Le Pen. For the median income variable, for every one-euro increase, there is a 0.002% decrease in votes for Le Pen. This relationship highlights a clear connection between the variables, in that lower income leads to greater support for Le Pen. Ultimately, however, the model concludes that both the percentage of immigrants and median income

variables are not statistically significant. This could be a result of a variety of factors or controls unaccounted for in the data, such as the interactions and consequent attitudes between natives and immigrants across arrondissement boundaries.

In looking simply at the scatter plots, both comparisons show weak correlations. In looking at percentage of immigrants and percentage of votes for Le Pen (see Figure 1) one can see a slight, weak downward sloping trend, thus indicating a weak negative correlation between the variables. A similar weak negative correlation also appears in the scatterplot depicting the relationship between median income and percentage of votes for Le Pen (see Figure 2). Thus, without even looking further at the actual numbers from the model, the figures provide a visual depiction of a weak relationship between the variables. Given that the interaction is negative, though, it indicates that the greater the percentage of immigrants in an arrondissement, the lower support for Le Pen. Given that votes and support for Le Pen is a proxy for anti-immigrant sentiment, the negative correlation shows that areas with greater ethnic diversity yield more positive feelings towards immigrants.

Figure 1: Effect of Percentage of Immigrants on Votes for Le Pen (Cross-City)





Figure 2: Effect of Median Income on Votes for Le Pen (Cross-City)




In order to gain a clearer understanding of the relationship, we evaluate an example using median income and votes for Le Pen. A voter in Paris in the third quartile of median income (32,255 euros) and divides the median income by the rate of percent support for Le Pen (0.0002%, decreasing). This yields 6.5%. Another voter in Paris is in the first quartile of median

income (25,843 euros), which, divided by the rate of percent support for Le Pen (0.0002%, decreasing) equals 4.9%. Thus, support for Le Pen among voters in the third quartile of median income is expected to be 1.5% lower than those in the first quartile.


While these results do not prove statistically significant, the results reveal a unique phenomenon occurring in the city of Marseille. In looking at distribution of foreign population throughout Marseille, it is evident that there is a huge spread. The arrondissement with the least amount of recorded immigrants is 2.3%, in contrast to the one with 21.8% immigrants, with a median of 6.3% (see Figure 3). This statistic indicates that Marseille experiences a high level of population segregation between the arrondissements. In order to explore this idea further, research on gentrification and social housing distributions throughout the city could shed light on the city's segregated and segmented population. In addition, there is a wider spread for percentage of votes for Le Pen in Marseille than in the other two cities, as the values range from 9.9% to 27.2% across the arrondissements. This vast spread is visible just from looking at the numbers across all 16 arrondissements, but the model of comparing the variables across cities reveal that something else is occurring between the arrondissements in Marseille.

Figure 3: Spread of Immigrant Populations Across Arrondissements in Three Cities



Just by virtue of living in Marseille, there is an expected 10-percentage point increase in votes for Le Pen per each decrease in percentage of immigrants. This indicates that voting preferences for Le Pen are highly related to the presence of immigrants in a respective arrondissement. Thus, a very strong relationship exists between higher immigrant populations and greater support for Le Pen. This positive correlation is the opposite as to what was found (even though it was a weak relationship) when looking at the three cities collectively. Not only does the distribution of percentages of foreigners have a large spread in Marseille, but Figure 4 clearly shows that the distribution of Le Pen votes is also significantly wider than that of the other two cities. This finding further solidifies the reality that effects of segregation in Marseille are key to understanding the relationship between voters and proximities immigrant populations, but it requires further research and exploration beyond the scope of this study.

Figure 4: Spread of Vote for Le Pen Across Arrondissements in Three Cities



PARIS CASE STUDY: METHODS

The second approach – honing into one specific city – was needed to look at the relationship between sentiment and proximity to ethnic enclaves at the most granular level possible, and Paris provides a unique platform for deeper study. This localized approach evaluates how actual proximity to various ethnic enclaves changes in different districts using four variables. As previously discussed in the cross-city comparison, median income as a control variable is important to include in the tests. The study also includes the dependent variable of votes for the FN (Marine Le Pen in the 2012 election), but the variable unit of measurement is even more specific - the voting district level. Such data is available to the public on Open Data, an extensive online collection of datasets overseen by the City of Paris. The collective data resource base permits sharing and usage of its resources, with adherence to the stipulations outlined in the Licence ODbL (Open Database License) - Paris. One of the datasets available encompasses the electoral results for all of the 869 Parisian voting bureaus in the 2012 presidential election. This was the only city in which such granular data was accessible, as there were not other open database sources providing such detailed data for other French cities. While limited research has been conducted on the geography of immigration on French electoral results, it was done so solely at the regional and arrondissement levels (Shvets 2004). My research design adds a new dimension to the question, as instead of just comparing voting patterns and immigrant sentiment across arrondissements - the twenty overall districts in such a large city - I evaluate interactions on a more specific, granular level. Given the demographic and spatial arrangements of Paris, coupled with the accessibility of granular-level data, Paris is an optimal location for such a detailed case study.

Furthermore, given that Paris is a multicultural hub with ethnic minority communities diffused throughout, it is the optimal setting for introducing a new variable to account for such ethnic diversity. This new explanatory (independent) variable - “ethnic enclaves” - contextualizes the study, allowing for evaluation of the relationship between spatial arrangement and anti-immigrant sentiment throughout the city.

Ethnic Enclaves: Definition and Identification

The concept of an “ethnic enclave” first emerged in sociological literature in Robert Park’s study of cities (Faris & Bloom 1967). Since the term was coined, it has been widely used throughout ethnographic and sociological discourse; however, with its expansion, its definition has not always remained consistent between studies. For the purposes of my research, I have based my definition upon that which is provided by Massey et. al, as it encompasses the big picture of the function of such a space: an *ethnic enclave* is place of residence with a high concentration of similarly identified individuals and families; a distinct area surrounded by people of another ethnicity, race or nationality (Massey, Hodson, & Sekulic 1999).

The process for identifying and classifying the ethnic enclaves throughout metropolitan Paris was a multifaceted endeavor, due to the lack of formal records documenting ethnic and minority population, as it is illegal to inquire about race or ethnicity on the census or other governmental surveys. Thus, I looked to existing research on the settlement of immigration populations over the past century, demographic studies on Parisian arrondissements, Google Maps, and my own ethnographic fieldwork.

After conducting research on immigration settlement patterns and arrondissement demographics, I pinpointed certain areas with histories of ethnic economic activity and migration

settlement. Studying immigration patterns was key to identifying ethnic areas not only to learn about their general history, but also about how their boundaries have evolved into what they are today. By focusing in on different immigrant populations, specifically those with the largest presence in Paris, I was able to identify where they congregated and formed respective communities. For example, research of North African migration patterns to Paris revealed the importance of the Goutte d'Or area, which I then explored further through articles and observations documented by prior researchers. The multi-volume French publication *Hommes & Migrations* was essential to such detailed research.

After identifying the general spaces encompassing immigrant groups, I then delved deeper into the literature and learn about the evolution of ethnic minority activities (such as commerce, religious spaces, and gastronomy) to enhance my definition of what comprises an ethnic enclave. This involved extensive readings, notably referencing several yearly editions of *Hommes & Migrations*, and research on the evolution of ethnic commerce in Paris.

I then turned to first-hand accounts of ethnic area observations. Prior to conducting my own ethnographic research in Paris, I spoke extensively with my cultural advisor for this project. He spent twelve years living, studying, and working in a variety of diverse areas across Paris, so he was an essential resource for discussing the changing dynamics of ethnic spaces. Originally hailing from Senegal, he understands the experience of being a visible ethnic minority in the French context. Discussions of his perceptions and experiences proved integral in my exploration of the changing dynamics in different Parisian areas.

Based on my cultural research in conjunction with the insight from my advisor, I set out to create a classification system of these ethnic enclave spaces. To accomplish this, I traveled to Paris to conduct my own ethnographic research. Prior to walking the streets of the previously


identified general ethnic areas, I engaged in conversation with some friends of my cultural advisor who, as settled African immigrants, live and work in multicultural areas of Paris. Through discussion, their observations from the perspectives of immigrants living and breathing the multiethnic experience every day provided me with a better background understanding of where I should specifically explore.

I also visited the Musée national de l'histoire de l'immigration, not only to familiarize myself with the exhibits highlighting the history of immigration patterns and ethnic congregation in Parisian spaces, but also to conduct further research at their on-site library. The museum's "médiathèque," or multi-media library, houses extensive literature, research, and other materials relevant to the history and current state of immigration in France. I spent several hours reviewing national reports on immigrant flows, reading through literature on the development of ethnic spaces, as well as news and magazine articles discussing the anti-immigrant policies of Marine Le Pen and her political party.

I then walked the streets of these pre-identified spaces observed with longstanding pockets of immigrants. With a notebook, a camera, and a map in hand, I meandered through neighborhoods including La Goutte d'Or, Little Jaffna/La Chapelle, Passage Brady, Petite Turquie, Château d'Eau, and Belleville. I documented cultural and ethnic markets, studying aspects such as names of shops, markets, religious spaces, and street signs, to construct the overall idea of an ethnic enclave. While I already had a general idea of the vague boundaries of each area due to prior research, the ethnographic data allowed me to zoom in on each space to look at the specifics of what cultural markets define each area. Thus, I ultimately defined the boundaries of each enclave using a combination of my previous research, ethnographic

observation, and information from detailed maps and descriptions located at the Musee national de l'histoire de l'immigration on-site immigration archives.

Figure 5: Map of Ethnic Enclaves in Paris



After obtaining the coordinates and shapes of the voting bureaus - accessible through the OpenData platform discussed above - I created a comprehensive map to overlay these spaces with the ethnic enclaves I had already noted (see Figure 5). In layering these different sets of visual data, it was then easy to identify which voting bureaus were located within the boundaries of defined ethnic enclaves. I then coded all 869 voting bureaus as a 0, 1, or 2. All bureaus coded as “0” contain no ethnic enclave. All bureaus coded a “1” contain ethnic enclave presence within the boundaries of that voting bureau. All bureaus coded as “2” represent enclave-adjacent bureaus in that they adjacently touch - to any degree - the borders of the 1s (those bureaus

containing enclaves). The reason for coding the enclave-adjacent bureaus even though they did not contain a portion of an enclave inside of their boundaries was that these areas represent the people that are not living in the heart of ethnic areas, but have the most interaction with them by virtue of living in such close proximity. In this way, the “proximity” of the question not only targets the members of the French ethnic majority living alongside ethnic minorities in the same voting bureau as an enclave, but also those living close by in different bureaus. Furthermore, the sheer number of ethnic minorities living in the bureaus with ethnic enclaves are likely not voting for Le Pen on account of her anti-immigrant policies and rhetoric. Thus, in order to get to the effect of the out-group national majority presence, it is key to evaluate those who are living beyond the bounds of ethnic enclaves but are still in very close proximity, as they are predicted to be the drivers of the test results.

After coding all of these enclaves, this localized approach to identifying the relationship between proximity to ethnic enclaves and anti-immigrant sentiment was tested with two different models - one statistical and one visual. For the statistical approach, I ran a model looking at the interaction between the variables of proximity (the coded enclaves) and anti-immigrant sentiment (percentage votes for Le Pen).

I included the control variable of median income, just like in the cross-city comparison model. Data for median income was only available on the arrondissement level (not voting bureau level, as data was not accessible for any variable besides electoral votes in such a granular unit of measurement). By controlling for median income, it ensured that the results would not be skewed on account of income within the areas, and thus economic diversity would not be factoring into the variable relationship in question.

The other control variable I included in this model was immigrant population in each of the arrondissements. Again, such data was not accessible on a voting bureau level, so comparison between variables all on the same granular unit of measurement was not possible. The percentage of immigrants living in each arrondissement, though, still provides an effective method of assessing the overall relationship between living in a multiethnic space and attitudes towards such minorities.

$$Le\ Pen \approx enclave + adjacent + imm. + med. income$$

Overall, the statistical model did not prove to be a good fit for assessing the relationship between the variables. The correlations between the variables were extremely weak and not statistically significant. These inconclusive results, then, do not paint the whole picture of the interactions between groups on the Paris level. Thus, I turned to a visual method for honing in further on this spatial relationship between ethnic enclaves and immigrant sentiment.

For the visual method, I once again overlaid my data layer of ethnic enclaves with that of the voting bureaus, but this time I styled the voting bureaus to be displayed on a color gradient according to the percentage of votes for Le Pen recorded in each. The darker the shade of color shown on the map, the higher the percentage of votes for Le Pen in that respective voting bureau.

PARIS CASE STUDY: ANALYSIS

Prior to interpreting the data shedding light on the relationship between certain Parisian ethnic enclaves and immigrant sentiment, it is key to understand the dynamics of the specific spaces. Thus, the analysis calls for descriptions of the spaces themselves before delving into exploration of the findings.

“Le[s] quartier[s], présenté[s] comme ‘ethnique’, constitue[nt] un Ailleurs tout comme l’immigré constitue un Autre qui n’est pas assimilable à la figure normative du Parisien, mais ajoute une touche d’exotisme à la destination” (Lazaridis & Weber 2014).⁴

Descriptions of Enclaves

I. Goutte d’Or/Château Rouge

This enclave is known for being a central hub for Africans in Paris, boasting large numbers of Maghrebis (North Africans) as well as those of sub-Saharan African origins. As soon as one emerges from the Château Rouge stop on metro line 4, the DeJean open-air market is in full view, crowded with shoppers bustling about. This “Château Rouge” area is considered the epicenter of La Goutte d’Or, but the names are often used interchangeably to describe the overall neighborhood. Full of vendors selling African foods, spices, and small goods, the market is the focal point of the area in highlighting the ethnic roots of its inhabitants. The residential immigrants living in the space are not the only customers of such business; people from all over Paris and the surrounding suburbs visit the area to benefit from the variety and specificity of products, low prices, and exotic appeal. Based on my research and observations, I found that boundaries of this area are widely accepted as being the Boulevard de La Chapelle to the south,

⁴Translation: “The neighborhoods presented as ‘ethnic’ constitute an Elsewhere, all as the immigrant constitutes an Other who is not assimilated to the typical Parisian space, but who add a touch of exoticism to the destination.”

the train tracks beyond Rue Stephenson to the east, Rue Ordener to the north, and Rue de Clignancourt to the west. I used these boundaries to define and classify the enclave.



Market on Rue DeJean (Goutte d'Or/Château Rouge)



Street art and pro-immigrant propaganda (Goutte d'Or/Château Rouge)

II. La Chapelle/Little Jaffna

The area of La Chapelle/Little Jaffna, a portion of the large multiethnic hotspot known as the Faubourg Saint-Denis area, is known for its mélange of Turkish, Indian, Sri-Lankan, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi communities. The most visible cultures in the area are those of Sri Lanka and South India. This presence becomes quickly clear when walking the streets, as the Tamil language is heard in passing conversations, and the names of restaurants and storefronts pay homage to South Asian culture. In the 1980s, many waves of Sri Lankans fled to France to seek asylum from the violence of civil conflict in their homeland. In 1987, the French government legally opened its doors to the group to settle as refugees, and an influx of Tamils arriving between 1988 and 1993 settled in what soon became known as La Chapelle/Little Jaffna. The first Tamil boutique in Paris opened in 1982 in this area, catalyzing the explosion of Tamil commerce that continued through the next two decades. By June 2005, 156 South Asian stores existed in the neighborhood, a large portion of them selling traditional Tamil products

(Dequirez 2007). In this way - like in La Goutte d'Or - these businesses function as conduits, perpetuating and diffusing native culture, in turn aiding immigrants find a sense of belonging in a new context. A section in the 2014 edition of *Hommes & Migrations* devoted a chapter to discussing this neighborhood. Thus, based on the prior research on the area and the map created for the publication, I used these boundaries to map the shape of this South Asian enclave.

III. Passage Brady

To the immediate south of La Chapelle/Little Jaffna lies Passage Brady, a small but dynamic space encompassing an Indian population representing their heritage in restaurants and shops side-by-side along the alley. Described frequently as “Little India,” this area is home to a myriad of restaurants serving traditional Indian meals and shopkeepers selling textiles and other products integral to the Indian culture. At one entrance to the passage, the restaurant “Reine de Kashmir” prominently displays decorations and statues representing the Hindu culture (Quien 2007). Many view this area as an extension of Petite Turquie due to the proximity of the two areas, but given the high concentration of specifically Indian inhabitants and commercial activities, it differentiates itself from the previously discussed enclave.



*Indian restaurants and storefronts
(Passage Brady)*

IV: Petite Turquie

The other ethnic enclave situated in the Faubourg Saint-Denis area of the 10th and 19th arrondissements is Petite Turquie, or “Little Turkey.” Turkish immigrants began congregating in this space in the 1970s, a trend that continued on through the rest of the 20th century. Since their arrival, Turkish immigrants have built their success around local economic activities, notably the creation of confection shops. They also created several political and cultural associations, some of which encouraged political refugees in Turkey to emigrate, thus further transforming the enclave into a central hub for welcoming those of Turkish origin (Dequirez 2007). The overall feeling of “welcomeness” that characterized the area in the 1970s and 1880s remains present today. Numerous restaurants, food shops, tourist bureaus, cultural organizations, and religious spaces line the streets. In addition to the large population of Turkish immigrants, pockets of Pakistani, Indian, and Tunisian immigrants also inhabit the space, namely due to the close proximity to the other enclaves within the Faubourg Saint-Denis area.



A row of Turkish restaurants (Petite Turquie)

V: Château d'Eau

The Château d'Eau area, named for the “Château d'Eau” metro stop along line 4, is an African centrality known for the presence of salons and hair-braiding shops. Its proximity to the Goutte d'Or/Château Rouge enclave – not only by the metro line 4 but also by food – creates an augmented, collective African space carved out of the overall Parisian metropolis. The large population sub-Saharan African migrants in the area comprise the primary target for the hairdressing businesses and shops selling cosmetic products for black skin. While the immigrant population is sub-Saharan African, a portion of southeast Asian immigrants have also made their mark, notably in the selling of telephone cards for migrants to communicate in their new context and with others in their home countries. Given the fluidity of the space and its businesses, it is difficult to define specific boundaries, but the common consensus is that the neighborhood lies directly north of Passage Brady and to the east of Petite Turquie.



Selling telephone cards (Château d'Eau)

VI: Chinatown

The “Chinatown” enclave of Paris is also sometimes referred to as the “Triangle de Choisy.” Chinese migrants arriving from the 1960s onwards – evacuating former French Indochina in the post-Vietnam war era, escaping the mainland following the communist party rule in the 1970s, and student refugees in the 1980s – tended to settle in this pocket of the thirteenth arrondissement. In addition to a large population of Chinese migrants, those from former French Indochina – Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam – have also come to call this space theirs. The neighborhood transformed from an industrial and working-class area to a space of Asian entrepreneurship and booming economic prosperity. Commercial activities reflect their cultural origins – such as Asian supermarkets and various traditional specialty shops lining the streets. Furthermore, businesses for basic necessities – like banks and doctors offices – also boast signs and advertisements in languages appropriate to the East Asian clientele (Shen 2009). Mandarin language is heard in business interactions and casual conversations, and Chinese newspapers circulate throughout the area.

VII: Belleville

Encompassing portions of the 19th and 20th arrondissements, the enclave of Belleville is the ultimate ethnic mélange of immigrant cultures – Asians, Turks, North Africans from the Magrheb, sub-Saharan Africans, Tunisians, Spanish, Portuguese, and Sephardic Jews (Drivaud & Peretz-Julliard 1984). These groups also all coexist alongside French natives within this same multiethnic space. The neighborhood is known for its vibrant diversity, as evidenced by the various shops, street vendors, and markets selling goods representative of a gamut of cultures. One overhears a slew of languages used in interactions between salespeople and their clients, and

different dialects are audible upon sitting down in the middle of the Parc du Belleville. Overall, Belleville is the epitome of multiethnic Paris, a microcosm in which immigrants from a slew of cultures – as well as French natives – interact and thrive in a setting of openness and acceptance.



Asian-inspired architecture (Belleville)



African textile shop (Belleville)

The detailed breakdown of specific pockets of immigrants within the larger context of Parisian arrondissements aided the exploration of the voting data, as I identified the voting bureaus that overlapped with the ethnic enclaves. Thus, the evaluation did not just look at the entire arrondissement as being “immigrant” or not, but rather used this more granularized level of an “enclave” to analyze voting activity from each of the 869 bureaus in relation to the respective proximity (or comprisal) of an ethnic enclave.

Table 4: Effect of Proximity to Ethnic Enclaves on Le Pen Votes

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Significance (<i>p</i>)
(Intercept)	8.606	0.849	$2 \times 10^{-16} ***$
Enclave	-1.683	0.353	$4.09 \times 10^{-6} ***$
Adjacent	-0.790	0.284	0.006 **
Median income	-0.086	0.012	$5.29 \times 10^{-12} ***$
Immigrant pop.	0.004	0.031	0.886
<i>R</i> ²	0.083		
<i>N</i>	869		

Note: $.p \leq 0.1$, $*p \leq 0.05$, $**p \leq 0.01$, $***p \leq 0.001$

Note: Median income measured per thousand euros

The model yields results as shown in the summary table (Table 4). The R-squared value of 0.083 indicates that the model only explains 8.3% of the variation, and thus a sizable portion of the relationship between the variables is not revealed through the statistics. The voting bureaus coded as “0s” – those neither comprising an ethnic enclave nor classified as adjacent to an ethnic enclave – were used as the base category for this study. This variable is the intercept, sitting at (8.606, 0). Given this intercept, Le Pen receives 8.606 percent of the vote, on average.


The summary statistics reveal that *ceteris paribus* (all things being equal), a voting bureau that comprises a portion or entirety of an ethnic enclave is less likely to vote for Marine Le Pen. While the absolute value coefficient for a bureau containing an enclave (1.683) is greater than the absolute value of the coefficient of an enclave-adjacent bureau (0.790), given that both values move at a negative rate (indicating a decrease in support for Le Pen), voters in these bureaus – those in greater proximity to immigrant enclaves – are less likely to vote for Le Pen. While the difference in rates is not large, note that the findings indicate that the bureaus consisting of enclaves are even less likely support Le Pen than those in the adjacent bureaus.

Both the median income control variable and the immigrant population categorical variable are measured on the arrondissement level, as such data is not accessible for the granular level of voting bureaus. As expected, the known relationship between median income and votes for Le Pen is highly significant. The coefficient for median income – 0.086 – shows that for every thousand euros a voter earns, that person is 0.086 less likely to vote for Le Pen. The relationship between immigrant population and Le Pen vote, though, is not significant. This is why both a more detailed breakdown and an analysis of immigrant concentrations in ethnic enclaves provide a closer look at the relationship. For example, just because two arrondissements have similar percentages of immigrant populations, they could be diffused or concentrated in

various patterns. Thus, spatial arrangement of ethnic areas and surrounding areas needs to be accounted for in such a detailed study looking the effect of proximity on voting choices.


Both of these coefficients are negative, indicating that proximity to ethnic enclaves decreases anti-immigrant sentiment, as shown by the lesser likelihood to support for Le Pen in the 2012 election. These findings weakly support H2 (proximity to ethnic enclaves decreases anti-immigrant sentiment). While both of these do hold various levels of statistical significance (enclave $p \leq 0.01$, adjacent $p \leq 0.001$), it is imperative to reiterate, though, that the model only accounts for 8.3% of the variation. Thus, another approach for looking at the effect of proximity to ethnic areas affects attitudes of voters is key to identifying patterns on the interactions occurring at such a granular level. Figure 6, portraying the slew of outliers in the base variable of non-enclave, non-adjacent voting bureaus (“0s”) provides further evidence as to why another form of analysis is needed.

Figure 6: Distribution of Votes for Le Pen Across Voting Bureaus



This realization leads to a visual analysis of spatial arrangement of ethnic enclaves to understand the effect of proximity on immigrant sentiment and consequent voting patterns. Thus, I turned to creating a visual map of ethnic enclaves overlaid on percentages of Le Pen votes across all voting bureaus to provide an interesting, detailed platform for looking at the relationship between the variables.

Figure 7: Map of Ethnic Enclaves and Vote for Le Pen in Paris



The visual method was effective in not only portraying the variable interaction, but in shedding light on interactions between French natives and specific minority populations. Focus in on the Faubourg-Saint-Denis area (containing the ethnic enclaves of Petite Turquie, Passage

Brady, and Château d'Eau), for example. The lighter gradient of blue throughout this area – not only within the marked confines of the enclaves, but also the adjacent bureaus – reveals that support for Le Pen is less in this immigrant-abundant and ethnically-diverse area. The majority of these immigrants are Turkish and Indian, perhaps indicating that less anti-immigrant sentiment exists towards these ethnic groups than those of other origins. In looking at the Goutte d'Or/Château Rouge enclave, the gradient across the bureaus within the enclave varies, as there are some areas that are light blue and others that have a much darker hue. This reveals varying degrees of attitudes towards immigrants within the actual enclave. Surrounding this enclave, though, the adjacent bureaus are at least of the same hue or darker than those within the enclave. One can conclude that interaction between those voters living in the enclave and those outside influences voting patterns and consequent immigrant sentiment. Especially in the northern side of the enclave approaching the Paris city boundary, one can observe that support for Le Pen is greater than in other city areas. This result is twofold: not only does it indicate that proximity to the Goutte d'Or/Château Rouge enclave increases votes for Le Pen, but it also reveals that the proximity to the Parisian suburbs (unaccounted for in this study) has a degree of impact in increasing votes for Le Pen. Given that there is a clear pattern throughout the city showing darker blue shading – increased votes for Le Pen – in voting bureaus close to the Parisian city border, the suburbs of Paris have historically large populations of immigrants. However, given the accessible data on voting patterns and demographics, such exploration was beyond the scope of this study. The support for Le Pen in bureaus adjacent to the Goutte d'Or/Château Rouge area is more evident than near other enclaves, so this area suggests a positive relationship between votes for Le Pen and immigrant presence. Thus, from a purely visual point of view, this specific area is more supportive of H1 (proximity ethnic enclaves increases anti-immigrant sentiment).

The enclave contains a large portion of both North African (Mahgrebis) and sub-Saharan African immigrants, and the population of immigrants in the suburb of Saint-Denis to the north mirrors this ethnic pattern. Thus, given the ethnicities of these immigrants, one can infer that interaction with African immigrants increases anti-immigrant sentiment in the minds of voters.

Furthermore, in looking at the East Asian enclaves (Chinatown and Little Tokyo), one can observe that there is not a difference in gradient between the bureaus within the enclaves and the adjacent bureaus. The medium shade of blue, though, does indicate more support for Le Pen than in the heart of the Goutte d'Or/Château Rouge district, for example. This is not to say that people are more anti-immigrant when thinking about East Asian immigrants, since it would be the East Asian immigrants within the enclaves themselves doing the voting. Rather, the lack of difference in Le Pen support between those living and voting inside the enclave and directly outside of it indicates that the interaction between French voters and East Asian immigrants does not have much of an impact on public sentiment towards this minority group. This is consistent with prior research on East Asian immigrant flows in that such groups are traditionally perceived as "model immigrants" who are hard working and keep a low profile, thus not experiencing much racism compared to their Mahgrebi and sub-Saharan African immigrant counterparts (Tan & Wong 2013).

Overall, the results portrayed on the map encourage further exploration to find out how to extract more conclusive evidence for what is going on in regards to in and out-group interactions on the Parisian level. By providing a visual of Le Pen vote distribution overlaid with the ethnic enclaves, one can interpret interactions between the variables in a more comprehensive and impactful manner than through the numerical, not significant results from the statistical model. It is key, though, to look at the interactions occurring between voters in enclaves and their adjacent

voting bureaus. In this way, results can then be interpreted in terms of sentiment towards specific ethnic and immigrant groups, instead of general anti-minority sentiment. Cases can be made supporting both hypotheses when looking at specific ethnic enclave bureaus and their interaction with adjacent ones, thus revealing that interactions of native French voters with certain ethnic groups affect their attitudes in different ways. However, given the absence of census data collected on immigrant origins, coupled with the reality that migrant flows are not always documented, evaluating the variable relationship according to specific immigrant ethnic group presence is not feasible at this time.

IMPLICATIONS

The findings of the study do weakly support the hypothesis (H2) theorizing that proximity to greater immigrant populations (immigrant-heavy arrondissements across the three cities, and voting bureaus in close proximity to ethnic enclaves in Paris) decreases anti-immigrant sentiment. The inconclusiveness of such a weak correlation, though, points to a more complex relationship existing between the variables, including those factors that remain unaccounted for and omitted from this analysis.

Given that the study only numerically accounts for “immigrants” by definition, the results do not account for inevitable bias towards individuals that are of minority descent and look different than the majority, but are actually naturalized French citizens. There is also the population of immigrants who have acquired French nationalities, but because of their appearances, social circles, and living arrangements, are perceived as outsiders and also as “immigrants”. While ethnic enclaves are also home to many ethnic minorities that are French or have recently acquired nationality - and thus are not “immigrants” - using the spaces to measure anti-immigrant sentiment is still extremely relevant, as historical demographic patterns in the INSEE census consistently denote large concentrations of immigrants in the enclave areas. Also, given the proven existence of large immigrant populations present in the areas, it is still provides most efficient picture of immigrant spatial arrangement in the city's context. Furthermore, just the fact that many majority population members view those who appear different as “immigrants,” even if they actually do not fit the formal definition, still shows how perception of immigrant presence affects majority attitudes towards the out-group. Given the complexities of establishing who exactly is an immigrant and who is not, the data and results are not infallible.

Future research can take various directions to explore this topic further. Perhaps most important would be discovering the breakdown of immigrant minorities by ethnic origins living in the arrondissements in the specific voting bureaus of Paris. While data does exist on country of origin for documented French minorities in each arrondissement, there is no such data accessible on the more granular voting bureau level. By shedding light on different interactions between specific ethnic minorities and their national French neighbors, further research can thus explore other phenomena occurring in the enclaves and their surrounding areas. One could even apply the group conflict theory to a specific enclave and look at how specific ethnic groups, containing ethnicities from specific regions or countries, interact differently with their French neighbors and develop certain attitudes. Furthermore, the overall design of the localized Paris study could be applied to the cities of Marseille and Lyon once voting bureau-level data from past elections becomes available. This would allow for not only a more specific cross-city comparison going beyond the arrondissement level, but also would provide an opportunity to explore the role of ethnically concentrated areas in the other high-immigrant French cities. In particular, given the findings for Marseille, research looking at the high correlation between immigrants and support for Le Pen on a deeper level could provide interesting insights on the segregation patterns and interactions.

Furthermore, given the November 13 attacks and the increased hostility to minorities embedded both in political discourse and public fear, this study should be repeated following the 2017 election. The horror inflicted upon Paris by those of foreign origin – several of them reported to have entered the country amidst the Syrian refugee flow – only perpetuates anti-foreigner sentiment and resistance welcoming a multiethnic population, specifically those of African and Middle Eastern origin. A change-over-time comparison between Le Pen support in

the 2012 and 2017 elections would assess how the attacks influence attitudes towards immigrants not only in those living in close proximity to immigrant-populous areas, but would also reflect any changes in overall national sentiment. As the president of the FN, Marine Le Pen continues her ascent to public popularity, as the attacks and resultant xenophobia have only bolstered her anti-immigrant platform.

The findings of the study – both on the cross-city comparison and Paris levels – reveal that people of different backgrounds who live in close proximity and interact with each other have more positive relationships than those who live farther apart from concentrated groups of ethnic minorities. Based on this knowledge, integration is key to fostering positive relationships between diverse groups in Paris. Regardless of the anti-immigrant and public discourse rejecting the ideas of multiculturalism and integration, the reality is that these people are indeed interacting, and judgments and attitudes (both positive and negative) result from such contact. Instead of containing along the path of rejecting this multiethnic reality, the French government should pursue changes in public policy to find ways to bring people together and promote integration to reduce hostilities and prejudice, which undermine the whole idea of a unified and strong country on the global scale. There is great potential for increased civic engagement opportunities between groups across not only the Parisian landscape, but in other immigrant-populous cities as well.

CONCLUSION

Overall, the findings of this two-tier study do weakly support the hypothesis (H2) theorizing that proximity to greater immigrant populations (immigrant-heavy arrondissements across the three cities, and voting bureaus in close proximity to ethnic enclaves in Paris) decreases anti-immigrant sentiment. The inconclusiveness of such weak correlations, though, point to more complex relationship existing between the variables, including those factors that remain unaccounted for and omitted from analysis.

In order to assess the conflicting hypotheses, I evaluated the data in two different ways. The first method involved a cross-city comparison looking at the votes for Marine Le Pen and percentage of immigrants living in the arrondissements of Paris, Marseille, and Lyon. The statistical model revealed that there is a clear but weak relationship between the variables: the greater the percentage of foreigners in an arrondissement, the lower the support for Le Pen. Given that votes for Le Pen is a proxy for anti-immigrant sentiment, the negative correlation shows that areas with greater ethnic diversity yield more positive feelings towards immigrants. For the median income variable, for every one-euro increase, there is a 0.002% decrease in votes for Le Pen. This relationship highlights a clear connection between the variables in that lower income leads to greater support for Le Pen. Ultimately, however, the model concludes that both the percentage of immigrants and median income variables are not statistically significant. This could be a result of a variety of factors or controls unaccounted for in the data, such as the interactions and consequent attitudes between natives and immigrants across arrondissement boundaries. The cross-city comparison also indicated that something unique is happening with group interaction in Marseille, in that a very strong relationship exists between higher immigrant populations and greater support for Le Pen. This positive correlation is the opposite of what was

found (even though it was a weak relationship) when looking at the three cities collectively. Not only does the distribution of percentages of foreigners have a large spread in Marseille, but the distribution of Le Pen votes is also significantly wider than that of the other two cities. This finding further solidifies the reality that effects of segregation in Marseille are key to understanding the relationship between voters and proximities immigrant populations, but it requires further research and exploration beyond the scope of this study.

In order to gain a more localized understanding of the variable interaction, I moved to an in-depth granular analysis of Paris, looking at FN votes in the 869 voting bureaus relative to ethnic enclaves throughout the city. Through my own research and ethnographic fieldwork, I introduced a new dataset to classify voting bureaus in relation to ethnic enclaves and adjacent populations. The new explanatory variable - “ethnic enclaves” - contextualized the study, allowing for evaluation of the relationship between spatial arrangement and anti-immigrant sentiment throughout the city. In this way, I established a method to evaluate and quantify the relationship between living in close proximity to close-knit ethnic centralities and discriminatory sentiment towards immigrants.

While both methods – cross-city and Paris case study – looked at FN votes in relation to proximity to ethnic groups, the Paris case study hones in on the more granular, ethnic enclave level. The overall findings of the two studies do not provide overwhelming support for the hypotheses tested, but collectively the results do lean in favor of the hypothesis that proximity to ethnic populations decreases anti-immigrant sentiment. In conclusion, the results of the study suggest that interaction between different groups is beneficial to improving attitudes towards immigrant populations in France.

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