IOT'S CYBER SECURITY LUCKY 13

Jennifer Janesko

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JENN JANESKO

- 20+ years in IT
- 6 years in Cyber Security
 - security testing (network, web, automotive, ICS)
 - architecture & risk analysis & secure design
 - application security / DevSecOps
 - cloud (GCP, AWS)
- Organizer: MUC:SEC and BSidesMunich
- running, hiking, ukulele playing, puzzling, tinkering, language learning, (bouldering)
- Twitter: @jennjanesko



OUR JOURNEY TODAY





AWS IOT STACK



AWS IOT BASICS AWS MQTT /TLS Remote **AWS** HTTPS ı Office Account MQTT/TLS loT Rule MQTT/TLS **HTTPS** Greengrass AWS loT **AWS** (Linux + SDK) Thing ΙoΤ SDK Analytics **MQTT** Core over Websockets /TLS MQTT/TLS Cognito User /Identity Pool ΙoΤ Thing SDK







DeepLens

NOT IN SCOPE....

ETSI EN 303 (45)



CYBER SECURITY FOR CONSUMER 10T: BASELINE REQUIREMENTS

		Page	#of Provisions
5 Cybersecurity Provisions for Consumer IOT			
5.1	No universal default passwords	13	5
5.2	Vulnerability reporting	14	3
5.3	Keep software updated	15	16
5.4	Securely store sensitive security parameters	18	4
5.5	Communicate securely	19	8
5.6	Minimize exposed attack surfaces	20	9
5.7	Ensure software integrity	21	2
5.8	Ensure that personal data is secure	22	3
5.9	Make systems resilient to outages	22	3
5.10	Examine system telemetry data	23	I
5.11	Make it easy for users to delete data	23	4
5.12	Easy installation and maintenance	24	3
5.13	Validate input data	24	1
6 Data F	Protection Provisions for Consumer IoT	24	5

SECURITY BASELINE CHECKLIST


Table B.1: Implementation of provisions for consumer IoT security

Clause number and title							
Reference	Status	Support	Detail				
5.1 No universal default passwords							
Provision 5.1-1	M C (1)						
Provision 5.1-2	M C (2)						
Provision 5.1-3	M		ant				
Provision 5.1-4	M C (8)		wremennal				
Provision 5.1-5	M C (5)		ry require andition				
5.2 Implement a mea	5.2 Implement a means to manage reports of vulnerabilities						
Provision 5.2-1	M		is a mair mendaire ament ar conal				
Provision 5.2-2	R		ision 13 acomme requirer condition				
Provision 5.2-3	R	1.0	provide a is a reculatory less and co				
5.3 Keep software up	Provision 5.1-3 M Provision 5.1-4 M C (8) Provision 5.1-5 M C (5) 5.2 Implement a means to manage reports of vulnerabilities Provision 5.2-1 M Provision 5.2-2 R Provision 5.2-3 R Provision 5.2-3 R 5.3 Keep software updated Provision 5.3-1 R Provision 5.3-1 R Provision 5.3-2 M C (5) Provision 5.3-3 M C (12) Provision 5.3-4 R C (12) Provision 5.3-5 R C (12) Provision 5.3-6 R C (9, 12) Provision 5.3-6 R C (9, 12)						
Provision 5.3-1	R		ne provincia a rimenta				
Provision 5.3-2	M C (5)	1.1	rovision				
Provision 5.3-3	M C (12)	M	the pre sion is a				
Provision 5.3-4	R C (12)	R	provisio				
Provision 5.3-5	R C (12)		the P				
Provision 5.3-6	R C (9, 12)	MC					
Provision 5.3-7	M C (12)						
Dravision F 2 0	M C (42)	RC					


EZTEA & ETSILUCKY 13




DESIGN DECISION TIMELINE



5.5 COMMUNICATE SECURELY



5.7 ENSURE SOFTWARE INTEGRITY




Application
Image /
OS +
application
with
signature(s)

Bootloader


Secure Module

public verification key

- key can be read
- key integrity protected
- cryptographic processor in isolated execution environment
- cryptographic accelerator



5.3 KEEP SOFTWARE UPDATED



5.8 & 6 PROTECT PERSONAL DATA

ADMIN


Data EZTea Collects

- Volume of water heated per use
- Water volume low alarm
- Times of device use
- Heating coil maximum temperature per use
- Heating coil heating pattern per use...

Purpose ...

User: jan-admin

Jan Madhatter 123 Darjeeling Ln. 73AA37 Somewhere




- -Configure
- -Kettle-Link
- -Descale
- -Privacy
- -Data Collection
- -Factory Reset
- -System Update





5.4 PROTECT SENSITIVE SECURITY PARAMETERS

Crypto Material	Confidentiality	Integrity
CA Certificate for Authentication		X
Private Keys for Authentication	X	X
Public Keys (secure boot, software update)		X
Encryption keys (private data)	X	X



Tamper resistant

(physical, electrical)

(physical, electrical)

Use open, peer

reviewed standards


reviewed standards

sensitive security

Sensitive should be

measures should,

"stored securely"



5.6 MINIMIZE ATTACK SURFACES

nginx


root@eztea:~\$ ps -ef CMD UID PID PPID TIME 00:00:01 /sbin/init root 123 1 00:00:03 [watchdogd] root eztea-D 897 0 00:05:45 tea-service 00:05:47 eztea-D 9000 smtpd

00:06:01






eztea-D 9871







5.12 EASY DEVICE MAINTENANCE

I feel confident about turning on my EZTea kettle with the app because it helped me set up 2-factor authentication.






5.9 MAKE SYSTEMS RESILIENT







5.1 NO UNIVERSAL DEFAULT PASSWORD



5.10 EXAMINE SYSTEM TELEMETRY DATA



5.13 VALIDATE INPUT DATA



5.2 ENABLE VULNERABILITY REPORTING

Hacking a Smart Kettle

Earlier this year, Packetlabs was asked by the Hackable podcast to investigate a smart, WiFi enabled kettle and create some working exploits to demonstrate on the podcast. After our research we found a way to steal the WiFi password of a user's home network from the kettle, the only requirement is to be within WiFi range of the kettle. The episode, number 26, is titled "Malicious Brews" and can be listened to here.

Here's how it works at a high-level:

- Send crafted WiFi messages to the kettle to deauthenticate it from its current WiFi network
- Create a fake WiFi network that mimicks the original WiFi network
- → The kettle joins the rogue WiFi network
- Connect to the kettle using the default password of "000000"
- Enter a command to display the WiFi passwords the kettle has stored.

Once the attacker has the victims WiFi password, they can connect to the network and attack any devices on the network. In the podcast, the attacker ends up compromising Geoff's Facebook credentials; an attacker could also hack into laptops and smartphones to install malware, steal documents, or monitor any traffic on the network to steal account credentials for email and online banking.

https://www.packetlabs.net/hackable-podcast-kettle/ https://hackablepodcast.com/episodes/malicious-brews



ISO/IEC 29147:2018

OWASP

5.11 EASY USER DATA DELETION

ADMIN

Are you sure you want to reset this EZTEA device back to factory settings?

Yes No


User: jan-local-admin

Jan Madhatter 123 Darjeeling Ln. 73AA37 Somewhere

- -<u>Configure</u>
- -Kettle-Link
- -Descale
- <u>Privacy</u>
- -Factory Reset
- -System Update







DESIGN DECISION MATRIX: HARDWARE, SOFTWARE, PROCEDURE

ID	Provisions Category	Hardware	Software	Procedure
5. I	No universal default passwords		(V)	
5.2	Vulnerability reporting			9 6-8
5.3	Keep software updated		Ţ,	9-9
5.4	Securely store sensitive security parameters		(V)	9
5.5	Communicate securely		(V)	9-9 9-9
5.6	Minimize exposed attack surfaces		(V)	
5.7	Ensure software integrity		Ţ,	
5.8 & 6	Ensure that personal data is secure		(V)	9 -9
5.9	Make systems resilient to outages			
5.10	Examine system telemetry data			9 9-9
5.11	Make it easy for users to delete data			9-9
5.12	Easy installation and maintenance		(V)	9-9
5.13	Validate input data			

ETSI LUCKY 13: GREAT START, AND...



- API
 https://owasp.org/www-project-api-security/
- Mobile App
 https://owasp.org/www-project-mobile-security/
- Web
 https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
- Logging
 https://github.com/OWASP/CheatSheetSeries/blob/master/cheatsheets/Logging Cheat Sheet.md
- Device-Device Authentication & Authorization...
- Cloud...

THANK YOU!

Jennifer Janesko @jennjanesko

Ímage References

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- https://pixabay.com/vectors/browserweb-internet-technology-4026002/
- Zuzu, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Fil e:Netgear_ProSafe_Dual_WAN_VPN_ Gigabit_Firewall_FVS336G_JTAG_inter face.jpeg
- https://pixabay.com/photos/usb-outletconnection-informatica-2327518/
- https://pixabay.com/illustrations/mobilephone-smartphone-2468068/