


Anonymity loves Diversity: The Case of Tor

Georg Koppen Alexander Færøy

November 1, 2020

FOSS North



About Georg

- Started volunteering around 2010
- Core Developer at The Tor Project since 2013
- Led the Tor Browser team from 2016-2019
- Transitioned to network health work in 2020




About Alexander

- Core Developer at The Tor Project since early 2017.
- Free Software developer since 2006.
- Worked with distributed systems in the Erlang programming language, WebKit-based mobile web browsers, consulting, and firmware development.
- Co-organizing the annual Danish hacker festival [BornHack](#).



What is Tor?

- Online anonymity, and censorship circumvention.
 - Free software.
 - Open network.
- Community of researchers, developers, users, and relay operators.
- U.S. 501(c)(3) non-profit organization.



History


- Early 2000s** Working with the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory.
- 2004** Sponsorship by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
- 2006** The Tor Project, Inc. became a non-profit.
- 2008** Tor Browser development.
- 2010** The Arab spring.
- 2013** The summer of Snowden.
- 2018** Anti-censorship team created.
- 2019** Tor Browser for Android released.
- 2020** Network Health team created.



Somewhere between 2,000,000 and 8,000,000 daily users.




A Simple Design




Equivalent to some commercial proxy providers.

A Simple Design




A Simple Design




Timing analysis bridges all connections going through the relay.

The Tor Design




Add multiple relays so that no single relay can betray Alice.

The Tor Design




Alice picks a path through the network: R_1 , R_2 , and R_3 before finally reaching Bob.

The Tor Design



Alice makes a session key with R_1 .

The Tor Design




Alice asks R_1 to extend to R_2 .

The Tor Design

Alice


Anonymity Network

Bob




Alice asks R_2 to extend to R_3 .

The Tor Design



Alice finally asks R_3 to connect to Bob.

Anonymity isn't Encryption



Encryption just protects contents.

Metadata




"We Kill People Based on Metadata."

—Michael Hayden, former director of the NSA.

Bridges

Censored Region

Alice



Bob

Bridges


Censored Region

Alice

Bridge



Tor Protocol



Bridges and Pluggable Transports

Censored Region


Alice



PT Client

Obfuscated Protocol

Bridge



PT Server


Pluggable Transports

- Allows people to easily build, experiment, and deploy their own obfuscation technology without having to modify the Tor source code itself.
- The specification for Pluggable Transports is open and allows other vendors to implement support for PTs in their own products.
- Allows people to experiment with different transports for Tor that might not be doing any anti-censorship related obfuscation.

Obfourscator (obfs4)

- Makes it hard for passive DPI to verify the presence of the obfs4 protocol unless the adversary knows the bridge parameters.
- Makes active probing hard unless the adversary knows the bridge parameters.
- Uses Tor's ntor handshake (x25519), but uses Elligator2 to encode the elliptic-curve points to be indistinguishable from uniform random strings. The link layer encryption uses NaCl secret boxes (XSalsa20 and Poly1305).

SNI Domain Fronting using Meek



Snowflake

Censored Region

Alice




Snowflake PT Client

Snowflake Broker

Bridge




Snowflake PT Server



The Tor Network

- An open network – everybody can join!
- Between 6000 and 7000 relay nodes.
- Kindly hosted by various individuals, companies, and non-profit organisations.
- 9 Directory Authority nodes and 1 Bridge Authority node.


The Tor Network



Source: metrics.torproject.org

The Tor Network

Number of Relays



Source: metrics.torproject.org

The Tor Network


Tor's **safety** comes from **diversity**:

1. Diversity of relays. The more relays we have and the more diverse they are, the fewer attackers are in a position to do traffic confirmation.
2. Diversity of users and reasons to use it. 50,000 users in Iran means almost all of them are normal citizens.

Research problem: How do we measure diversity over time?

The Tor Network

Number of Relays per Platform




Source: metrics.torproject.org


The Tor Network

#	Country	Relays
1	Germany	1517
2	United States	1114
3	France	677
4	Netherlands	359
5	Canada	256
6	United Kingdom	246
7	Switzerland	193
8	Sweden	191
9	Russian Federation	187
10	Lithuania	179
22	Norway	69
27	Denmark	44

Number of Relays per Country (2020)



Number of Relays per Country (2020)



The Tor Network

Network	Relays
185.220.0.0/16	216
51.81.0.0/16	97
51.15.0.0/16	87
185.150.0.0/16	68
163.172.0.0/16	59
172.105.0.0/16	57
95.216.0.0/16	56
195.189.0.0/16	55
51.195.0.0/16	49
51.91.0.0/16	40

The Tor Network


AS Number	Name	Relays
AS 16276	OVH, FR	770
AS 24940	HETZNER-AS, DE	403
AS 12876	Online SAS, FR	263
AS 63949	LINODE-AP Linode, LLC, US	240
AS 14061	DIGITALOCEAN-ASN, US	166
AS 208294	ASMK, NL	140
AS 197540	NETCUP-AS netcup GmbH, DE	138
AS 53667	PONYNET, US	136
AS 3320	DTAG Internet service provider operations, DE	118
AS 16125	CHERRYSERVERS1-AS, LT	104

The Tor Network

Malicious relays and what we (plan to) do about them:

- Malicious guard+exit relays (Guard pinning, MyFamily settings)
- Malicious exit relays
 - Exit scanning (e.g. against SSL strip attacks)
 - Blacklisting found relays (but: that's an uphill battle)
 - Application-level improvements (HTTPS-only mode)
 - Limit weight/influence of unknown relays

Applications




Applications

- Many users with different backgrounds helps against singling individuals out
- But how do we prevent all those users from getting fingerprinted due to their different computers?
 - Make everyone look the same
 - Obscure real values by spoofing/faking them


Applications

- Many users with different backgrounds helps with usability, privacy protections, and security



Applications

- There are downsides we have to deal with, e.g. user blocking or CAPTCHAs



Applications

Possible mitigations to Tor blocking:

- Outreach? (but that does not scale)
- PoW schemes? (might help against onion service DoS, too, see: [proposal 327](#))
- Anonymous credentials?
- Paid exit relays?


How can you help?

- Hack on some of our cool projects.
- Find, and maybe fix, bugs in Tor.
- Test Tor on your platform of choice.
- Work on some of the many open research projects.
- Run a Tor relay or a bridge!
- Teach others about Tor and privacy in general.



USE A MASK, USE TOR.

Resist the surveillance
pandemic.



Donate at donate.torproject.org

Questions?



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