

AGENCY, POWER, AND INJUSTICE IN METALINGUISTIC DISAGREEMENT

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In this paper, I explain the kinematics of non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement. This occurs when one speaker has greater control in the joint activity of pairing contents with words in a context. I argue that some forms of non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement are deeply worrying, namely those that involve certain power imbalances. In such cases, a speaker possesses illegitimate control in metalinguistic disagreement owing to the operation of identity prejudice. I call this metalinguistic injustice. The wrong involves restricting a speaker from participating in the processes that determine the epistemic / linguistic resources of a conversation, and/or undermining a speaker's ability to affect metalinguistic outcomes.

Keywords: metalinguistic disagreement, metalinguistic negotiation, epistemic injustice, linguistic injustice, power, social environment.

I. INTRODUCTION

Suppose you're at a bar. You overhear the following disagreement:

Madison: This martini is fabulous!

Mindi: That's not a martini, it has vodka in it.

You ask yourself: What's happening in this dispute? Do the disputants agree on what martinis are but disagree as to whether the drink in front of them counts as one? Or are they disputing what the criteria of martinis should be? Listening a little while longer you hear the exchange unfold:

Mindi: *Real* martinis have only gin and vermouth.

Madison: Come on, almost *all* bars make martinis with vodka.

From this, you infer that because the disputants are trading reasons to accept one set of criteria (i.e. ingredients) over another, the disagreement must be of the second kind. Another way to put it is this: Madison and Mindi are arguing

over which content ought to be expressed by the shared term ‘martini.’ They disagree as to what the relevant word-content pair should be. Madison appeals to common usage; Mindi appeals to historical usage.

This kind of dispute has been the focus of much analysis in recent time.¹ It is called *metalinguistic disagreement*. And, it is a common form of exchange in everyday life. Many theorists have argued for the importance of pursuing such disagreement (Plunkett and Sundell 2013; Sterken 2020; Davies 2020; Cantalamessa 2021). However, I shall argue that much of this literature seems to presuppose that exchanges over word-content pairs take place under *ideal* or *near-ideal* conditions. This obscures our effort to understand the ways that metalinguistic disagreements often play out. After all, such exchanges regularly, if not always, take place within real-world power structures. Thus, failing to account for the role of power in metalinguistic disagreement is a setback in social justice theorizing. We miss out on identifying and explaining the challenges those face in advocating for or resisting particular word-content pairs; especially those that matter for marginalized experience.

This paper has two motivations. First, it sets out to explain the critically under-theorized kinematics of *non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement*. In particular, I will focus on non-ideal metalinguistic *negotiation*. To separate metalinguistic disagreement from metalinguistic negotiation, I will understand the latter as a type of disagreement in which speakers aim to *complete* the joint activity of pairing contents with words – this is by adopting the same understanding of a term, rather than just dropping the conversation or changing the subject. The purpose is to come to a conclusion about the content a word will express in a context.² In non-ideal cases, one speaker has more control in this process.³ Consider an example.

Suppose that Fig and Fil are both chefs, deciding on the items that should be on a menu. Fig is the head-chef, Fil is the sous-chef. Fil believes that animals aren’t food, and Fig thinks otherwise:

Fil: Cows aren’t food. They’re persons, after all.

Fig: Of course cows are food. Look around you, they’re on menus everywhere.

At this point, all seems well in this back-and-forth: Fig and Fil are engaging in a paradigm metalinguistic disagreement. However, imagine how the exchange might unfold.

¹ See: Plunkett and Sundell (2013), Marques (2017), Thomasson (2020), Sterken (2020), Cantalamessa (2021), Hansen (2019), Mühlebach (2019), Davies (2020).

² This isn’t strictly the definition provided by Plunkett and Sundell (2013). Nevertheless, the primary cases they explore lend itself to this interpretation. I defend this idea in §II.

³ This is not the goal for all power-infected metalinguistic disagreements. In cases of gaslighting, a dominant speaker might simply want to confuse his target by provoking her to question the appropriateness of her conceptual understanding. For more discussion of this possibility see Podosky (2021) on second order gaslighting.

Fig: I'm sick of your animal advocacy. In this restaurant, cows are food!

Fil: Yes, chef.

We can see that there is a clear difference in what Fig and Fil are able to achieve in this disagreement. Fig has more influence in the joint activity of pairing contents with words *in virtue of* her social position in the context. An explanation of this difference in control over word-content pairs has not been given proper treatment in the existing literature. And the significance of this must be stressed. Given that we are embedded in systems of hierarchy, non-ideal metalinguistic disagreements are common; plausibly more common than ideal exchanges. Thus, failure to account for non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement is a failure to explain how metalinguistic disagreements tend to play out in the real world.

Not all non-ideal metalinguistic disagreements are ideological. Despite being hierarchical, some involve an unequal but non-problematic distribution of control over word-content pair determination.⁴ However, some non-ideal cases are deeply worrying. This is the second motivation of the paper. I will argue that when we pay attention to certain power imbalances in metalinguistic disagreement, we are able to locate a distinctive moral wrong. This occurs when a speaker possesses *illegitimate* control in metalinguistic disagreement owing to the operation of identity prejudice in the context. I call this *metalinguistic injustice*. It can take the form of an *epistemic* injustice, a *linguistic* injustice, or both. The wrong involves restricting a speaker from participating in the processes that determine the epistemic or linguistic resources of a conversation, and/or undermining a speaker's ability to affect metalinguistic outcomes.⁵

Uncovering metalinguistic injustice sheds important light on the difficulties that marginalized speakers face in metalinguistic discourse. While there might be reasons for some to pursue metalinguistic disagreement, such reasons aren't always, if ever, available to marginalized speakers.

II. METALINGUISTIC DISAGREEMENT

When I apply a context-sensitive expression to an object, I can do one of two things: I can rely on the context to make sense of the properties of the object, or I can rely on the properties of the object to make sense of the context. Plunkett and Sundell (2013) call the latter *metalinguistic usage*. When

⁴ Deference to expertise is a clear case. If an attending doctor is having a metalinguistic disagreement with an intern, it seems that the attending doctor *should*, at least in an epistemic sense, have greater control.

⁵ My focus in this paper is on identity-prejudicial wrongs. I leave it open as to how the non-identity related wrongs of particular forms of non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement should be cashed out.

interlocutors exchange conflicting metalinguistic usages, they are engaging in *metalinguistic disagreement*. We might ask: What reasons does one have to pursue disagreement of this kind? Of course, there are many. I will take time to explore three prominent reasons, none of which are essential to metalinguistic disagreement.

One reason to pursue metalinguistic disagreement is to *complete* the joint activity of pairing contents with words. Call this *metalinguistic negotiation*. This isn't strictly the definition provided by Plunkett and Sundell (2013: 3). For Plunkett and Sundell, metalinguistic negotiation *just is* metalinguistic disagreement as I have described it above. Nevertheless, a distinction is warranted. After all, sometimes in an exchange of metalinguistic usages, speakers do not have the goal of pairing contents with words. For instance, imagine two philosophers who simply want to assess the relative merits of alternative contents that could be expressed by 'woman' without coming to a conclusion. Moreover, the definition of metalinguistic negotiation that I have offered seems to appear implicitly in Plunkett and Sundell's discussion of a fictional disagreement between Oscar and Callie over the content that should be expressed by 'spicy.' They argue the following:

Why would Oscar and Callie consider it worth their time to engage in such a disagreement, when they already agree on what the chili actually tastes like? . . . [B]ecause how we use words matters. For Oscar and Callie, as for many of us, an agreement amongst all the cooks in the kitchen that the chili can be described as 'spicy' plays an important role in . . . decision-making about whether to add more spice (2013: 15).

In this case, the reason for pursuing metalinguistic disagreement is not simply for the sake of exchanging metalinguistic usages. Rather, the goal is to complete the process of pairing contents with words. Particular to this example, it seems that the speakers have the goal of completing metalinguistic disagreement in order coordinate or cooperate on the use of an expression, which will achieve a practical end that both speakers care about.

In this paper, I will be primarily concerned with metalinguistic negotiation as I have defined it. However, I am not going to discuss cases in which speakers aim to achieve consensus in order to realise a shared practical interest. Moreover, I will not be so interested in cases where the goal metalinguistic negotiation, for both speakers, is to cooperate on the use of an expression. Instead, I will focus on situations in which the need for resolving metalinguistic disagreement is forced or imposed onto an interlocutor; typically, to realise an end, practical or otherwise, that only one speaker wants to establish. This I will explore in §V.

Other theorists have offered alternative reasons to pursue metalinguistic disagreement. Such reasons won't be essential to this paper. Nevertheless, I will spend time explaining them since my discussion sheds light on difficulties for metalinguistic disagreement broadly conceived.

Alex Davies (2020) argues that not all metalinguistic disagreements are deliberate exchanges that aim at resolution. Often, such disagreements are used as a platform on which identity is displayed. When a word is context-sensitive, or polysemous, there are several criteria that one could use in a context. Engaging in metalinguistic disagreement, where one advocates for one or more criteria, serves as a means of ‘giving off’ information that isn’t merely about getting an audience to recognise an intention to use a word in a certain way. Thus, for Davies, identities can be displayed through disagreement insofar as information can be conveyed about the social category to which one belongs, or through the performance of a ritual that expresses shared identity (*ibid.*: 11).

Another reason why one might pursue metalinguistic disagreement is for the purpose of prompting an audience to counterfactually reflect on extant word-content pairs. Rachel Sterken (2020), in her advocacy for this position, responds to the following challenge: Deploying an improved word-content pair, a product of conceptual engineering, will hamper effective communication since the use of such a pair is a *linguistic transgression* – it involves speaking outside the language of a community.⁶ However, Sterken argues that this is a feature of ameliorative analysis, not a bug. We needn’t worry about deploying revised word-content pairs since it serves as a *linguistic disruption*, unsettling common ground so as to cause an audience to reflect on their linguistic decisions. The hope is that this will constitute a *transformative communicative disruption*. The hearer reflects on the ameliorated word-content pair, recognizes it as a viable alternative, and sees it as an improvement. Elizabeth Amber Cantalamessa (2021) argues for something similar. However, Cantalamessa does not think that all disruptions must aim at causing another to adopt an ameliorated word-content pair. One can simply encourage an audience to reassess their confidence in existing ones.

I take such practical, social, and political reasons to be appealing. At the same time, however, I recognise that these reasons are not wholly sensitive to the realities in which metalinguistic disagreements tend to take place. Each appears to presuppose something about the participants to metalinguistic disagreement, and the social environment in which they are embedded. Specifically, the presupposition is that metalinguistic disagreement takes place under *ideal* or *near ideal* conditions:

Ideal Metalinguistic Disagreement: A metalinguistic disagreement that takes place between *S* and *T*, such that *S* and *T* (1) are *metalinguistic peers* with (2) a high degree of *local metalinguistic agency*.

This is a mouthful. In §III, I will take time explicating the relevant concepts needed to understand this definition: *metalinguistic move*, *metalinguistic agency*, and

⁶ Jennifer Saul (2006) has raised this concern for Haslanger’s ameliorative definition of *woman*.

metalinguistic peerhood. Further, in §IV, I will show that not all metalinguistic disagreements are ideal. Many, if not most, are *non-ideal*:

Non-Ideal Metalinguistic Disagreement: A metalinguistic disagreement that takes place between *S* and *T*, such that *either S* or *T* (1) are not metalinguistic peers, or (2) at least one does not have a high degree of local metalinguistic agency.

A note before I continue. I want to make it clear that I am not suggesting that each of the foregoing reasons cannot be present in non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement. My point is simply that there is a critical omission of discussion from theorists working on metalinguistic disagreement about the ways in which the kinematics of such disagreements is often influenced by the (illegitimate) power operating within a context. Elucidating this is my primary task.

III. MOVES, AGENCY, AND PEERHOOD

III.1. *M-move*

An action counts as a move in an activity when it contributes to that activity (McGowan 2019: 86). The activity under discussion is metalinguistic disagreement. Thus, a *metalinguistic* move (m-move) is a conversational move that counts as a contribution to metalinguistic disagreement. Such moves involve two features: *type* and *impression*. An m-move type is the kind of speech act it is; the illocutionary force of a metalinguistic speech act. The impression of an m-move is the degree to which the speech act contributes to metalinguistic disagreement; its perlocutionary effect. Let's first explore the former.

Metalinguistic speech acts, or m-move types, are the kinds of speech acts one can perform in a metalinguistic disagreement. To date, no one has offered an exhaustive taxonomy of this category of speech acts. However, there are some examples. Nat Hansen has brought to light a range of m-move types that fall under the banner *metalinguistic proposals*: A speech act, which is a sub-category of advisories, where a speaker intends for an audience to come to have a reason to use an expression in a certain way (2019: 1). There could be others. Metalinguistic *assertions* could be understood as speech that involves asserting that certain content is paired with a word as if it were true (e.g., 'Non-human animals are not food'). Metalinguistic *questions* could be understood as speech that involves asking which content is paired with a word. And it is plausible that metalinguistic speech acts are often *indirect*. After all, some speech acts can have two illocutionary forces.⁷ When someone asserts, 'Non-human animals aren't food,' this could be understood as an object-level assertion *and* a meta-level proposal, or request, or demand, etc. for the use a word in a context.

⁷ For a detailed analysis of indirect speech acts, see Jörg Meibauer (2019).

Proposals, it seems, do not require holding a certain kind of *authority* to be felicitous. Plausibly, however, the felicitous performance of other m-moves depends on contingent environmental facts, such as having authority over a hearer.⁸ According to Nat Hansen, *metalinguistic directives* are one such category (2019: 3). Within the category of directives, there are: *metalinguistic requirements*, speech that *requires* a hearer to use a word-content pair; *metalinguistic prohibitives*, speech that *forbids* a hearer from using a certain word-content pair; and *metalinguistic permissives*, speech that *allows* a hearer to use a word-content pair (*ibid.*: 3). Despite this, it is unclear that we need to make a strong commitment to authority being a constitutive condition for such speech acts. Perhaps someone without authority could felicitously perform a metalinguistic directive. However, those without authority will typically not be able to have a desired effect on conversation. Authority might have more to do conversational outcomes rather than the kind of speech act one can perform. This takes us to the *impression* of an m-move.

The impression of an m-move is the degree to which the move contributes to the activity of metalinguistic disagreement. This is roughly the perlocutionary effect on conversation about word-content pairs. And the degree to which an m-move contributes to metalinguistic disagreement depends on the type of disagreement in question. For metalinguistic negotiation, the impression of an m-move is its contribution to resolving a dispute; for identity-display, the impression of an m-move is its contribution to having one's identity recognised; for linguistic disruption, the impression of an m-move is its contribution to convincing another to (minimally) downgrade their confidence in an extant word-content pair.

My primary interest is in the relationship between authority and impression (i.e., perlocutionary effects of m-moves on metalinguistic disagreement). I won't take a stance on whether certain m-moves require authority to be felicitously performed. Rather, I accept that such moves might require authority, but nevertheless my concern is with the impact one can make on conversational outcomes.

To see the distinction between type and impression more clearly, think back to the exchange between Fil and Fig. Let's imagine Fil believes that, in the broader linguistic community, 'food' should be paired with content that excludes non-human animals. Fil also takes the moralised, ameliorated 'food'-content pair to make sense of his social identity (i.e., vegan). This informs the type of the m-moves that Fil wants to make (i.e., metalinguistic proposals) and their intended impression. He wants Fig to know that he is vegan; he wants Fig to downgrade her confidence in the extant, less moralized 'food'-content pair; and he has beliefs about the sort of m-moves that will resolve the disagreement in his favour.

⁸ Making them a sub-category of *authoritative illocutions* (Langton 1993: 305).

Recall how the exchange unfolded. Fed up with Fil's animal advocacy, Fig says, 'In my restaurant, cows are food!' We can see that this type of utterance is a metalinguistic requirement: Fig has performed a speech act requiring Fil to use a specific 'food'-content pair. And the impression is strong. The possibility of losing his job means that Fil must now use a specific 'food'-content pair, at least in the restaurant. Fig has made a profound impact on conversational outcomes. She has exercised power to affect the character and direction of conversation in a way that is less available—if available at all—to Fil.

With the concept of m-move on the table, let's introduce *metalinguistic agency* (m-agency) and *metalinguistic peerhood* (m-peerhood).

III.2. *M-agency*

M-agency is a scalar concept. It refers to the m-moves one can perform and the overall impression of such moves. There are a number of ways that m-agency can be affected. One can have *more* m-agency in virtue of being able to perform more moves or being able to perform moves that leave a stronger impression. One can have *less* m-agency in virtue of being able to perform fewer moves or being able to perform moves that leave a weaker impression.⁹ We might ask: *more* or *less* relative to what?

One answer is that the degree of m-agency one possesses is determined by the type and impression of m-moves one can perform *relative to an interlocutor*. Call this *local m-agency*. Consider the foregoing exchange. Fig can perform m-moves with a stronger impression, relative to Fil. She's the boss, he is the subordinate.

Another answer is that the degree of m-agency one possesses is determined by the type and impression of m-moves one can make *relative to a range of contexts*. Here, m-agency concerns what one can do *throughout* social space. It refers to the m-moves a speaker can perform, and the impression of such moves, across a set of possible and actual conversations, and in virtue of which variables (e.g. gender, race, etc.) one is enabled or constrained. Call this *global m-agency*.

Local and global m-agency are explanatorily interdependent. We cannot make sense of the typical range and impression of m-moves that a speaker can make without having a sense of what the speaker can do relative to a specific interlocutor; and we cannot make sense of a speaker's global m-agency by examining a specific conversation alone. Moreover, one's local m-agency may not always reflect what one can typically achieve in disagreement. There are times at which one might strong-arm their way into a dominant metalinguistic position, but this would be unusual across the board.

⁹ How should we understand the m-agency of someone has the ability to perform fewer m-moves, but with a stronger impression? I leave this question open.

I am interested in what one can do in a specific conversation. For this reason, my interest lies in local m-agency. However, I am also concerned with what it is in virtue of that one's local m-agency is enabled or constrained. An examination of this requires understanding broader social practices that influence conversational kinematics. Specifically, I am interested in the role that *identity prejudice* plays in shaping the character and direction of metalinguistic disagreement. Thus, I am also interested in global m-agency. If identity prejudice plays a role in metalinguistic disagreement, this should affect a speaker across a variety of conversational contexts.

III.3. *M-peerhood*

M-peerhood is specific to a conversation. It is a feature of metalinguistic disagreement when interlocutors have available to them the ability to perform the *same* range of m-moves (or roughly the same), with a similar degree of impression. In other words, participants to metalinguistic disagreement are *m-peers* when there is no m-move¹⁰ that one participant can perform that the other cannot, and neither participant can leave a stronger impression with the same m-move. Further, m-peerhood does not assume a degree of m-agency possessed by interlocutors. Participants to metalinguistic disagreement can have low levels of local m-agency yet still be m-peers.

IV. IDEAL AND NON-IDEAL

Earlier, I suggested that the reasons offered in existing literature as to why one might pursue metalinguistic disagreement are not wholly sensitive to the realities in which metalinguistic disagreements tend to take place. The kinds of metalinguistic disagreements commonly explored are those that *ideal* or *near ideal*. We are now in a position to properly understand what this means:

Ideal Metalinguistic Disagreement: A metalinguistic disagreement that takes place between *S* and *T*, such that *S* and *T*(1) are m-peers with (2) a high degree of local m-agency.

Put differently: Metalinguistic disagreement is ideal when participants to conversation can make the same extensive range of m-moves with the ability to leave (roughly) the same impression on conversation with the performance of such moves. Why think that theorists presuppose this?

Consider metalinguistic negotiation. Take an example that is representative of the paradigm cases that interest Plunkett and Sundell (2013). Suppose two friends are arguing over the status of a jacket:

¹⁰ Or no importantly different m-move.

George: That jacket isn't smart casual. Black is too formal.

Kelly: But it doesn't even have shoulder pads!

We can see that the friends are not arguing over facts about the jacket—they agree on what it looks like. Instead, the dispute concerns whether the jacket should count as *smart casual*. George believes that because the jacket is black, it is too formal; Kelly believes that this isn't a problem because it lacks shoulder pads. And, in this case, George and Kelly are aiming at consensus. Kelly will wear the jacket depending on what is decided.

What makes this exchange ideal? First, George and Kelly are m-peers. There is no m-move, or no importantly different m-move, that is only available to either George or Kelly; and both can perform such moves with a similar degree of impression on conversation.¹¹ Second, George and Kelly have a high degree of local m-agency. Both are able to perform a wide range of m-moves, with a strong impression, because the conversation is between friends (and *vice versa*).¹²

Not all metalinguistic disagreements are this pleasant. Each condition can fail. Sometimes speakers are not m-peers; and sometimes a speaker does not enjoy high local m-agency. Further, such failures are often interrelated. The fact that speakers are not m-peers can mean that the local m-agency of one party to conversation is severely constrained. To see this, recall the exchange between chefs:

Fil: Cows aren't food. They're persons, after all.

Fig: Of course they're food! Look around you; they're on menus everywhere.

At this point, the interaction appears to be ideal. Fig and Fil seem like m-peers and both seem to enjoy high-levels of local m-agency. However, remember how the disagreement unfolded:

Fig: I'm sick of your animal advocacy. In this restaurant, cows are food!

Fil: Yes, chef.

This reveals something important: Fig and Fil are not m-peers. That is, Fig is able to have a more profound impact on the outcome of disagreement over which 'food'-content pair will be operative in the context. In other words, Fig can perform a metalinguistic directive that will greatly affect the character and direction of the disagreement. One consequence of Fig's speech is that it delimits the local m-agency of Fil.¹³ He is unable to freely express attitudes

¹¹ Some friends may not be m-peers, but a *typical* friendship involves the ability to freely express oneself.

¹² There could be m-moves that are inappropriate for George and Kelly to perform owing to their friendship, such as metalinguistic directives.

¹³ Though speakers may not be m-peers, both could nevertheless enjoy high-levels of local m-agency.

about his preferred ‘food’-content pair without the risk of punishment. In sum, the joint activity of pairing contents with words is heavily skewed in Fig’s favor.¹⁴

This example shows that the conditions for ideal metalinguistic disagreement can fail. The speakers are not m-peers; and at least one speaker does not enjoy high local m-agency. From this, we can define *non-ideal* metalinguistic disagreement as follows:

Non-Ideal Metalinguistic Disagreement: A metalinguistic disagreement that takes place between *S* and *T*, such that *either S and T* (1) are not m-peers, *or* (2) at least one does not have high local m-agency.¹⁵

Metalinguistic disagreements are a feature of everyday life. And given that power structures dictate almost all areas of our social existence, non-ideal exchanges are plausibly more common than ideal ones. The case above might not strike one as particularly important. And it must be made clear that not all non-ideal metalinguistic negotiations are unjust. Some involve a fair but unequal distribution of control over the joint activity of pairing contents with words. Perhaps this is even true in the foregoing case. However, there are many instances of non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement to which we should be especially attentive. Consider the following:

Woman: You brushed up against my butt, that’s sexual harassment!

Man: Don’t be so sensitive, that’s way too trivial to count.

This disagreement concerns the content that should be expressed by ‘sexual harassment.’ And we should be deeply worried about how exchanges of this kind unfold. Settling on a ‘sexual harassment’-content pair has significant practical and psychological consequences. If the man is able to have his preferred word-content pair accepted by the woman, certain things follow. The woman must update her belief that sexual harassment didn’t occur. She might feel the need to apologise for accusing the man of sexual harassment. She might second-guess herself when touched again. She might feel over-sensitive, hysterical, and paranoid. She might force herself to work in an unsafe environment. Etc.

The task of the rest of this paper is to examine cases of non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement that *are* unjust. In particular, I will explore the role of power and identity in determining who has greater local m-agency in a context. I will argue that the joint activity of pairing contents with words can be corrupted by the operation of *identity prejudice*.

¹⁴ Further, Fil cannot (easily) display his identity nor attempt a linguistic disruption without risking his job.

¹⁵ This definition is inclusively disjunctive. And, the disjuncts are scalar, which means that a metalinguistic disagreement can be *more* or *less* non-ideal.

What is identity prejudice? Ordinary understanding tells us that ‘prejudice’ is an aspect of individual psychology. *People* are prejudiced when they have an unfounded attitude. This over-psychologizes what is a more useful concept. Prejudice, as I will understand it, is a property of social environments. It is a feature of social structure. And it involves how one’s actions and thoughts are enabled or constrained in virtue of belonging to a particular social category.¹⁶ *Identity prejudice*, then, is a structural phenomenon in which one’s actions and thoughts are enabled or constrained owing to the identity category to which one belongs. This includes gender, race, ability, class, etc. For example, think of a predominantly Black neighbourhood in which there is a non-accidental absence of polling booths for a presidential election. This is a racist social environment that is prejudiced against a particular identity category (i.e., Black Americans). Thus, when I say that I am interested in exploring the role that identity prejudice plays in metalinguistic negotiation, I am not (just) interested in the attitudes of bad eggs. I am concerned with properties of the external world.¹⁷

A final note before I continue. It is plausible that an illegitimate difference in m-agency can be unjust, unfair, harmful, wrongful, etc. without involving identity prejudice. Given this, I want to explicitly state that my interest is in forms of identity-based oppression. I leave it open as to how one might spell out non-identity related wrongs of particular non-ideal metalinguistic disagreements.

V. POWER, ASYMMETRY, AND SITUATEDNESS

Going forward, I will focus on non-ideal metalinguistic *negotiation*. In particular, I will examine situations in which the need to complete metalinguistic disagreement is forced or imposed onto a marginalized speaker.¹⁸

V.1. *Metalinguistic power*

Metalinguistic negotiation, as I have understood it, involves speakers aiming to complete the joint activity of pairing contents with words. Moreover, metalinguistic negotiations can be (more or less) ideal or non-ideal. I will focus on *non-ideal metalinguistic negotiation*. Specifically, I am interested in what makes metalinguistic negotiation non-ideal and whether this can be unjust.

¹⁶ Kate Manne (2018) says something similar in her account of misogyny.

¹⁷ This comes close to Fricker’s notion of *structural identity prejudice* (2007: 155).

¹⁸ To reiterate, the aim to complete the joint activity of pairing contents with words is not always shared by speakers in power-infected metalinguistic disagreement. See Podosky (2021) on what he calls ‘second order gaslighting.’

In the joint activity of pairing contents with words, one speaker can have more or less control over this process. Often this control is not equally distributed across speakers. One can have greater influence over the content that a word will express in a context. This is the hallmark of non-ideal metalinguistic negotiation. However, this difference in control can be innocent. Not all non-ideal metalinguistic negotiations with unequal control are unfair. After all, we should expect a speaker to defer to another on the grounds of epistemic expertise—it seems that an intern ought to accept the preferred word-content pair of an attending doctor, at least under normal conditions.

Despite this, unequal control in metalinguistic negotiation is often a function of being situated in unjust systems of dominance and subordination, such as hierarchical relations between members of certain identity groups (e.g., White/Black). When one has greater control in the joint activity of pairing contents with words *in virtue of* belonging to an identity group in a position of unjust dominance over the identity group of an interlocutor, then this control is illegitimate. Call this *metalinguistic power*.¹⁹ Metalinguistic power is the possession of unjust control in metalinguistic negotiation that is a function of interacting parties from social categories implicated in oppressive social relations. To explore this further, let's return to the foregoing example:

Woman: You brushed up against my butt, that's sexual harassment!

Man: Don't be so sensitive, that's way too trivial to count.

To reiterate, this disagreement concerns the content that should be expressed by 'sexual harassment.' The man thinks that his intentional action isn't sexual harassment; the woman thinks that it is. Suppose the man gets his way in this exchange. I argue that we can understand this as occurring in virtue of the man having metalinguistic power over the woman; a power derived from the operation of identity prejudice in the context. But to see this more clearly, we need to know about the *social environment* in which the exchange takes place.²⁰

1.2. *Social environments*

A social environment is a network of interrelated and regular patterns of coordinated social behaviour (Podosky 2021). Such patterns depend on the culturally available information that agents draw on, such as tropes, narratives, social

¹⁹ I am using 'power' as *power-over* (Weber 1978).

²⁰ One might worry about my reliance on fictional cases. However, there are many cases out in the wild of which my analysis makes sense. Teresa Marques (2020) argues that the expression of 'free election' has a positive connotation. However, certain politicians often use the term not as a means of protecting the rights of citizens, but instead to manipulate people into thinking that particular 'elections' involve fair or just processes. This difference in usage constitutes a type of (unjust) power-affected metalinguistic disagreement.

meanings, schemas, roles, etc. This information frames expectation, and serves to stabilise behaviour by providing rules that govern social interaction. Agents rely on such information to render intelligible experience, which then facilitates intentional engagement and coordination with others and surroundings. Moreover, *social environments can be unjust*. This occurs when the extant patterns of coordinated behavior unfairly privilege some and subordinate others. Consider an example.

During a visit to the hospital, a woman finds that her testimony is not being taken seriously, leading to a misdiagnosis. This owes to the salience of the schema ‘woman’ that triggers prejudicial stereotypes associated with women, such as being ‘too sensitive.’ That is, the doctor engages in a pernicious pattern of deflating his assessment of the woman’s credibility by drawing on defective culturally available information which he uses to make sense of the situation, and to guide his decision-making practices.

With respect to the sexual harassment case above, we can tell a similar identity prejudicial story. Let’s imagine that when the woman accuses the man of sexual harassment, she does so in the context of a male dominated workplace, situated in a patriarchal social environment. Here, gender schemas are salient: A *woman* has accused a *man* of sexual harassment in a workplace where men are perceived as better qualified, objective, and more legitimate. When the man retorts, ‘Don’t be so sensitive’ it should not come as a surprise that the woman downgrades her self-trust, and subsequently comes to doubt the accuracy or aptness of her ‘sexual harassment’-content pair. The man has gaslighted the woman through controlling the outcome of metalinguistic negotiation (*ibid.*: 2020).

What we can see is that the culturally available information of a patriarchal social environment corrupts epistemic judgments (Fricker 2007). Women are often, and incorrectly, perceived as over-sensitive, paranoid, hysterical, unreasonable, subjective, etc., which subsequently subjects them to persistent and pernicious challenges to their epistemic reliability (e.g., ‘Did you lead him on?’ etc.). Because of this, women tend not to be believed when they testify to sexual harassment (or sexual assault). Thus, it is ‘fitting’ for women to downgrade their self-trust in the face of such challenges. It is what is expected and demanded of them, especially in a workplace where men are perceived as more reasonable.

Going back to our example, we might begin to see how the man comes to have metalinguistic power over the woman. Given the social environment, the man unfairly occupies a position of epistemic dominance. And this owes to the *identity* of each speaker and the prevailing social stereotypes that affect coordination of cognition, affect, and practice. He is a man, and men are trusted sources of information. She is a woman, and women are irrational and unreliable. In sum: The power to affect metalinguistic disagreement is

distributed unequally in society. Importantly, this unequal distribution is often along identity categorial lines.²¹

V.3. *Metalinguistic power, M-peerhood, and M-agency*

How does metalinguistic power relate to the discussion in §III? *The presence of metalinguistic power in the joint activity of pairing contents with words entails non-ideal conditions.*²² When one has metalinguistic power, one has more control in the joint activity of pairing contents with words. When one has more control, one is not an m-peer with their interlocutor. And when one is able to do more with their words, the local m-agency of the other is constrained.

In the foregoing case, metalinguistic power has more to do with the *degree of impression* one can have on conversation with the performance of an m-move, rather than the types of m-moves one can perform. The impression of the man's m-moves, in resolving metalinguistic negotiation, is far stronger than the woman's. He is more able to profoundly impact conversational outcomes. Thus, the woman's local m-agency is constrained. She is unable to perform m-moves with the same impression. And this constraint owes to her being a woman situated in a patriarchal social environment. Her words carry less weight *in virtue of belonging to a particular identity group*.

The rest of the paper will explore the idea that when identity prejudice plays a role in constraining what one can achieve in metalinguistic negotiation, this constitutes a distinctive wrongdoing. I call this *metalinguistic injustice*. I will explore possible ways of understanding its wrong-making features. In particular, I will examine whether metalinguistic injustice is an *epistemic injustice*, a *linguistic injustice*, or both.

VI. METALINGUISTIC INJUSTICE

As we all probably know by now, *epistemic injustice* occurs when one is undermined in their capacity as an epistemic subject (Fricker 2007). According

²¹ We might also interpret this situation as an instance of *accommodation*. The notion of accommodation has received a lot of attention in socio-political theorising (e.g. Langton and West 1999; Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt 2018; Langton 2018). Roughly, accommodation occurs when a speaker says something that requires a hearer to accept that what was said is correct play. And accommodation has been said to be responsible for instituting oppressive contexts. For example, McGowan (2009) argues that rules of accommodation can make utterances count as correct play by enacting permissibility facts. Thus, when one performs racist or sexist speech, one changes what is permissible to say in a 'game of oppression.' In the case above, what might be happening is that the man has performed sexist speech, which enacts permissibility facts responsible for constraining the moves that the woman is able to make. A full analysis of this option goes beyond the scope of this paper.

²² Note that non-ideal conditions do not entail the presence of metalinguistic power.

to Miranda Fricker, forms of epistemic injustice have something in common: ‘prejudicial exclusion from participation in the spread of knowledge’ (2007: 162). For *testimonial injustice*, the primary harm involves ‘exclusion from the pooling of knowledge owing to identity prejudice on the part of the hearer’; and the primary harm of *hermeneutical injustice* involves ‘exclusion from the pooling of knowledge owing to structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource’ (*ibid.*: 162). As a general characterization, epistemic injustice can involve either identity prejudice in the hearer *or* identity prejudice in the production and dissemination of shared epistemic resources.

I will explore whether metalinguistic injustice can be construed as involving either of these forms of epistemic exclusion. Further, I will examine whether metalinguistic injustice constitutes a *linguistic injustice*. This is a critically under-theorised notion. Similar to epistemic injustice, linguistic injustice involves identity prejudice in the hearer or identity prejudice in the production and dissemination of shared linguistic resources.

Overall, my aim will be to assess whether metalinguistic injustice constitutes (i) identity prejudice in the hearer or (ii) identity prejudice in the pooling of local interpretive resources. If metalinguistic injustice satisfies (i) or (ii), then it is either an epistemic injustice, a linguistic injustice, or both simultaneously.

VI.1. *Metalinguistic Injustice as Exclusion From the Pooling of Epistemic Resources*

In his work on gaslighting, Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky (2021) distinguishes between two types: first and second order. Most important is his account of the latter. Second order gaslighting occurs when there is disagreement over which content should be expressed by a shared term in a context, and where the use of words by a speaker is apt to cause a hearer to doubt her reliability in virtue of doubting the accuracy of her preferred word-content pair. In other words, second order gaslighting occurs in non-ideal metalinguistic negotiation.

According to Podosky, second order gaslighting constitutes a distinctive epistemic injustice. This is because there are times at which metalinguistic negotiation involves exclusion from the pooling of epistemic resources. However, contrary to hermeneutical injustice, the resources in question are not shared on a global scale. Instead, they are features of a local context.²³ He argues that just as groups can be prevented from contributing to the set of epistemic resources shared across or within communities, individuals be prevented from

²³ A substantive discussion of the difference between hermeneutical injustice and metalinguistic deprivation can be found in Podosky (2021). One thing I will note about the relationship here is that if metalinguistic deprivation is pervasive, this constitutes one mechanism by which dominant groups can control the collective hermeneutical resource, therefore contributing to hermeneutical injustice. However, sometimes the resources we choose in a context may deviate from dominant ones. Thus, metalinguistic negotiation can also be a site for *resisting* extant terms of epistemic engagement.

contributing to the local epistemic resources of contexts such as conversation. Thus, he continues:

... like groups, individuals are undermined in their capacity as an epistemic subject when this occurs. Thus, an epistemic subject is, *inter alia*, someone *who is entitled to have their conceptual understanding given consideration in the decision as to which [content] will be expressed by a shared term in a context*. When one is prevented from full participation in [content]-determining conversation, this constitutes a denial of someone's capacity as an epistemic subject (*ibid.*: 13).

Podosky calls this *metalinguistic deprivation*:

Metalinguistic deprivation is an epistemic injustice that occurs when one is prevented, or restricted, from contributing to the processes involved in determining the [content] that will be expressed by a word, or set of words, in a context. . . (*ibid.*: 13).

This doesn't yet give us *identity prejudicial* exclusion. Thus, one might be sceptical that this constitutes an epistemic *injustice*. After all, there seem to be times at which one can be innocently restricted in their ability to contribute to content-determining conversation, such as being beholden to the preferred word-content pair of an expert. In other words, metalinguistic deprivation does not appear to be a *discriminatory* epistemic injustice (Fricker 2013: 1318). This occurs when one is undermined in their capacity as an epistemic subject *owing* to the operation of identity prejudice (Fricker 2007: 44).

Anticipating this, Podosky argues that metalinguistic deprivation becomes a discriminatory epistemic injustice when one is restricted from content-determining conversation owing to the operation of 'prejudicial stereotypes that are made salient in the context' (2021: 13). He calls this *discriminatory metalinguistic deprivation*.

We can see the presence of discriminatory metalinguistic deprivation in the case we explored above. The woman is unable to contribute equally to the processes that determine what will be expressed by 'sexual harassment' *because she is a woman*. This case represents a paradigm instance of metalinguistic injustice. Further, it is an instance of discriminatory metalinguistic deprivation. As a first pass, we might say that metalinguistic injustice *is* discriminatory metalinguistic deprivation. Call this metalinguistic injustice (EI):

Metalinguistic Injustice (EI) occurs when: (i) One is entitled to contribute to the epistemic resources of a local context, but (ii) one is restricted in their ability to participate in the joint activity of pairing contents with words in virtue of (iii) the operation of metalinguistic power in the context.

VI.2. *Metalinguistic injustice as exclusion from the pooling of linguistic resources*

Apart from being an epistemic injustice, metalinguistic injustice may constitute a *linguistic injustice*. Following Ishani Maitra (2017), we can understand linguistic

injustice in different ways. On one view ‘a linguistic injustice may be an injustice committed against someone in their capacity as a linguistic agent, e.g., a speaker or hearer. . . And on yet another view a linguistic injustice may be unfair exclusion from a linguistic community. . . And there may be further options as well’ (2017: 288).

The wrong present in some forms of non-ideal metalinguistic negotiation could be captured by either suggestion. Metalinguistic negotiation could be wrongful because: (1) a speaker is undermined in their capacity as a linguistic subject in virtue of being unable to perform certain m-moves, or being unable to perform m-moves that leave a strong impression on conversation, or (2) a speaker is prevented from contributing to the pool of linguistic resources that would enable them to accurately describe their experience. I will first examine (2).

(2) appears to be the kind of wrong that Fricker calls *hermeneutical injustice*, a species of epistemic injustice (2007, Ch. 5). However, Maitra suggests that there are grounds for thinking that the injustice here is distinctively *linguistic*, not epistemic. The reason for this is because, owing to hermeneutical marginalization, the ‘agent suffering this wrong is prevented from accurately *describing* their own experience, and as a result, from *communicating* the nature of that experience to others’ (2017: 289 my emphasis). For Maitra, describing and communicating are paradigm linguistic capacities.²⁴

Importantly, we can connect these thoughts to our discussion above. Instead of thinking of metalinguistic injustice as concerning contribution to *epistemic* resources, we can understand it as concerning contribution to *linguistic* resources. Drawing similarities to metalinguistic injustice (EI), we can say that metalinguistic deprivation constitutes a linguistic injustice as follows. One has to be *entitled* to contribute to the *linguistic* resources of a local context (e.g. the content of ‘sexual harassment’); one has to be restricted in their ability to contribute to the processes that determine the content that will be expressed by a shared word in a context (i.e. metalinguistic deprivation); and one must be subject to metalinguistic deprivation *in virtue of* the operation of identity prejudice in that context (i.e. metalinguistic power). When metalinguistic deprivation constitutes a linguistic injustice, in the sense we’ve been considering, call it *metalinguistic injustice* (LI):

Metalinguistic Injustice (LI) occurs when: (i) One is entitled to contribute to the linguistic resources of a local context, but (ii) one is restricted in their ability to participate in the joint activity of pairing contents with words, in virtue of (iii) the operation of metalinguistic power in the context.

²⁴ We can say that hermeneutical injustice is *both* an epistemic injustice and a linguistic injustice.

VI.3. *Metalinguistic injustice as identity prejudice in the hearer: testimonial injustice*

I want to move away from thinking about the wrong of metalinguistic injustice as prejudicial exclusion from the pooling of resources, be it epistemic or linguistic. I will now focus on whether metalinguistic injustice involves identity prejudice in the *hearer*.

For Fricker, when one's basic epistemic capacities are undermined, this constitutes 'epistemic objectification' (2007: 132–3). This draws on a distinction between *informants* on the one hand, and *mere sources of information* on the other:

Broadly speaking, informants are epistemic agents who convey information, whereas sources of information are states of affairs from which the inquirer may be in a position to glean information. Thus, while objects can only be sources of information, people can be either informants. . . or sources of information. . . (*ibid.*: 132).

Fricker argues that treating someone as a *mere* source of information constitutes epistemic objectification. It is a denial of epistemic agency. It is no different from treating someone like a tree from which we can infer information about its age by observing its rings. This implies that there are certain things to which epistemic subjects have a right in relation to others, such as receiving a fair credibility assessment. When this right is not fulfilled, one is treated as an object. When one suffers from epistemic objectification, one is not treated as fully human. This is the primary harm of *testimonial* injustice.

Might metalinguistic injustice be construed as a testimonial injustice? The presence of metalinguistic power could be due to a speaker affording less credibility to another who advocates for an alternative word-content pair. For example, the woman who accuses the man of sexual harassment might not be taken seriously when she endorses a 'sexual harassment'-content pair that conflicts with the pair preferred by the man. However, it is also possible that one can possess metalinguistic power owing to the operation of identity prejudice *without* a speaker being subject to a deflated credibility assessment. For instance, a marginalized speaker might have internalized pernicious stereotypes about their own reliability, and thus doubt themselves and their preferred word-content pairs. Given this, the marginalized speaker might limit their speech in metalinguistic negotiation. Consequently, the hearer gains metalinguistic power. Yet, the testimony of the speaker isn't given an unfair credibility assessment since little testimony was given.²⁵ Thus, metalinguistic injustice can occur without testimonial injustice. Metalinguistic injustice is *not* testimonial injustice.

²⁵ This idea is similar to Kristie Dotson's (2011) notion of *testimonial smothering*. Another closely related idea is Podosky's notion of *perspectival subversion* (2021: 16).

VI.4. *Metalinguistic injustice as identity prejudice in the hearer: linguistic objectification*

The claim that the primary harm of testimonial injustice is epistemic objectification has its critics. José Medina argues that one can be treated as an informant and still be undermined as an epistemic subject, such as when an informant is not treated as an inquirer (2012: 203–4). Gaile Pohlhaus (2014) argues that it is unintuitive to think of the primary harm of epistemic injustice as a kind objectification since some forms of epistemic injustice structurally depend on the epistemic subjectivity of a speaker (Pohlhaus 2014: 103). Aiden McGlynn (2019) argues that the main problem with Fricker's account is that it seems that when one perpetrates epistemic injustice, they are not treating someone as lacking epistemic agency in the sense of a mere source of information.

Despite these concerns, McGlynn contends that Fricker's account of epistemic objectification is stronger than most critics assume. In an attempt to save Fricker's account, McGlynn suggests that we should look more closely at Nussbaum's (1995) seven ways of treating someone as an object (*ibid.*: 12). I won't spend time listing them here. Nevertheless, McGlynn argues that if Fricker expands her notion of objectification she can accommodate the cases that have troubled her.

McGlynn's insight helps to understand another plausible means of construing the wrong of metalinguistic injustice as linguistic injustice, which brings us to (1). Instead of metalinguistic injustice being a form of *epistemic* objectification, we can think of it as a form of *linguistic* objectification. What is linguistic objectification?

A first guess is that it is the denial of an agent's capacity to do certain things with words. One is linguistically objectified when one loses control over exercising basic linguistic capacities, such as describing one's experience, communicating experiences across social space, being the receiver of experiential information, performing certain actions with an utterance, etc. It isn't hard to recognize these capacities as fundamentally and distinctively human (Hornsby and Langton 1998: 37). They enable speakers to convey information across social space, which undergirds coordination of thought, talk, and practice; all of which are paramount for one to flourish in a highly social world (*ibid.*: 37). Thus, when one's linguistic capacities are restricted, one is undermined as a linguistic subject.

Understood in this sense, linguistic objectification comes close to Nussbaum's (1995) notion of *inertness*; one of her seven forms of objectification. The objectifier treats the subject as *lacking agency*; for my purposes, linguistic agency. This is on the right track, however it admits cases that seem unintuitive. A classroom rule of 'no swearing' prevents students from saying curse words. This looks like a non-problematic denial of agency. Thus, in order for linguistic objectification to constitute linguistic *injustice*, we might say that one has

to lose control over their words *under certain conditions*. In particular, we might say that linguistic objectification occurs when one loses control of their words *owing to identity prejudice*. And there appear to be clear examples of this in existing literature.

Consider *silencing*. This refers to the systematic interference with communicative capabilities of a speaker in conversation (McGowan 2017: 39). It is generally agreed that problematic forms of silencing involve a causal connection between one's disadvantaged social identity and one's (in)ability to exercise basic linguistic capacities. Which capacities or capabilities are undermined in a context depends on the nature of the situation.

One might not have the capacity to perform certain speech acts. This is called *illocutionary disablement*. In such cases, a speaker utters words yet those words fail to constitute an intended action. Hornsby and Langton (1998) argue that this kind of silencing owes to a communicative interference that constitutes uptake failure. For example, in a social environment in which men are heavily influenced by pornography, women are often unable to perform the act of refusing sex since 'no' is taken up as 'yes' by men.²⁶ The wrong lies in the systematic failure of members of one identity group to recognise the illocutionary intentions of members of another identity group owing to being situated in a particular social environment.

Another way that linguistic capacities might be unfairly affected is through *perlocutionary frustration* (Langton 1993). This occurs when a speaker successfully pulls off a speech act, yet the speech act fails to have its intended effect on conversation. Continuing with our example, consider a woman who refuses sex and a man recognises her illocutionary intention yet fails to take seriously the implications of this act. The refusal is successful, but its intended effect is frustrated. She is denied an outcome on conversation to which she is entitled.²⁷ The wrong lies in the systematic failure of members of one identity group to respect the communicative implications of the speech of members of another identity group owing to being situated in a particular social environment.

We, as humans, are entitled to exercise certain linguistic capacities, whether illocutionary or perlocutionary. This constitutes (part of) our linguistic agency. When such capacities are undermined owing to the operation of identity prejudice, this constitutes linguistic objectification. And, linguistic objectifica-

²⁶ For others who have similar, yet competing views about illocutionary silencing, see Maitra (2009), Hesni (2018).

²⁷ McGowan (2017) identifies three (additional) ways in which one might suffer from this kind of communicative interference in refusal cases. A hearer might fail to recognize: (i) the authority of a speaker, (ii) that the speaker is sincere, or (iii) the speaker's 'true feelings' (2017: 47–50). And there may be further possibilities too.

tion is the primary harm of linguistic injustice. We might ask: Does linguistic objectification ever occur in non-ideal metalinguistic negotiation?

Consider the exchange over the ‘sexual harassment’-content pair. As discussed, the man has metalinguistic power over the woman. Specifically, the woman cannot perform m-moves with same impression as the man, subsequently having less influence over the word-content pair that will be operative in the context. The woman cannot (fully) exercise particular metalinguistic capacities. She cannot leave her desired mark on conversation. Put differently, she suffers from a form of perlocutionary frustration at the level of metalinguistic discourse. Further, she cannot exercise such capacities *in virtue of being a woman*. Identity prejudice plays a role in what the woman can do with her words in metalinguistic negotiation. Thus, she suffers from linguistic objectification. There is a causal connection between the speaker’s disadvantaged social identity and her (in)ability to exercise certain metalinguistic capacities. Call this *metalinguistic injustice* (LI*).

Metalinguistic Injustice (LI*) occurs when a speaker suffers from linguistic objectification owing to the operation of metalinguistic power in a context.

Metalinguistic injustice (LI*) is not simply preventing someone from performing certain metalinguistic speech acts; it is not just illocutionary disablement. Metalinguistic injustice (LI*) includes cases in which one can perform a desired speech act, but nevertheless fail to leave a strong impression with the performance of this act. Metalinguistic Injustice (LI*) is often an instance of perlocutionary frustration.

A final note about metalinguistic injustice (LI*). Unlike metalinguistic (EI) and (LI), which depend on the aim of completing metalinguistic negotiation in order to determine the epistemic or linguistic resources of a context, metalinguistic injustice (LI*) can occur without this aim. It simply involves one suffering linguistic objectification at the metalinguistic level, whether or not the goal is to settle on the content that will be expressed by a word in a context.

I want to end this section by saying that metalinguistic injustice could, and perhaps does, involve all what has been suggested. Metalinguistic injustice is either metalinguistic injustice (EI), (LI), (LI*), or all simultaneously.

VII. CONCLUSION

The foregoing had two aims. First, it set out to explain the kinematics of non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement. I argued that speakers are often not peers in metalinguistic negotiation, and/or at least one speaker lacks a certain degree of metalinguistic agency.

Second, the paper explicated a distinctive wrong that occurs in non-ideal metalinguistic disagreements where there is a power differential owing to the operation of identity prejudice in a context. I called this *metalinguistic injustice*. I argued that we can think of metalinguistic injustice in three ways: (1) as an epistemic injustice that occurs when one is restricted in participating in the joint activity of determining the available epistemic resources, (2) as a linguistic injustice that occurs when one is restricted in participating in the joint activity of determining the available linguistic resources, or (3) as a linguistic injustice that occurs when one is unable to exercise linguistic capacities to which they are entitled.²⁸

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