ELITE UNIVERSITIES AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR MARKET

Frequently updated. Click here for the last version

[*Preliminary, please do NOT cite*]

Julio Rodríguez[*]

Columbia University

Abstract

The prevalence of graduates from elite universities in top positions within the corporate world is similarly observed in government organizations. This paper studies the effect of enrolling in an elite university on post-college labor outcomes within the state administration, a crucial sector in most economies. Using administrative data on the centralized university application process, together with information on all public servants in Chile, I implement a stacked fuzzy regression discontinuity design that exploits variations in the minimum scores needed to access university programs to causally estimate the effect of enrolling into an elite university relative to a non-elite university on the likelihood of working in the public sector and of attaining a top position. I use applicants' listed preferences of programs to narrow the comparison between individuals with similar preferences. I found an overall 9% reduction in the probability of working in the public sector, driven by females, and no effect on having a top position. This result does not vary when I compare elite relative to non-elite universities among the most prevalent programs in top positions. Nevertheless, heterogeneous analyses show that the elite university effect to reach a leading position in the public sector varies by SES and geographic location depending on the group of programs considered. *JEL Codes: I23, I26, J24, J45.*

---

[*]julio.rodriguez@columbia.edu

1 Introduction

The significantly large rate of graduates from elite universities in leadership roles has increased the interest in studying the impact of attending such selective institutions on post-college labor outcomes. Researchers have focused on exploring the effects on upper-tail results, such as securing top positions in prestigious firms and belonging to the highest percentile of the earnings distribution (Chetty et al., 2023; Zimmerman, 2019).

However, the literature has not studied the effect of elite higher education on labor outcomes within the state administration. This is particularly relevant, considering that the public sector plays a fundamental role in most economies. It is generally the largest employer in the labor market (e.g., more than 15 percent of the total workforce in the U.S.) and a major driver of social development (Finan et al., 2017).

Understanding how graduates of elite universities select into the public sector and the returns to those qualifications in its labor market is highly relevant for public administration's productivity and representation. Qualifications and skills of public servants are crucial in the public sector's production function (Best et al., 2023; Fenizia, 2022; Martinez-Bravo, 2017; Tsai et al., 2015), but the sector faces significant challenges in attracting and retaining highly productive workers (Borjas, 2002). On the other hand, higher-ranking positions in the public sector offer access to influential roles that can shape government policies and services. Under hiring policies that consider applicants' qualifications, elite higher education can help ensure equitable access to leading positions, which is critical to promoting a more representative government of the population it serves.

This paper aims to improve the understanding of elite higher education's role in public sector jobs by causally estimating the effect of enrolling in an elite university on the likelihood of working in the public sector and having a top position in Chilean public administration.

The Chilean case is appealing for studying the effect of elite higher education as it is a context where graduates from the two most selective universities in the country are

overrepresented in decision-making spaces. For example, 70% of all Chilean presidents graduated from one of these elite institutions. Between 1990 and 2016, 67% of government ministers, 50% of senators, and 32% of representatives graduated from an elite program (UNDP, 2017). Similarly, in the corporate world, nearly 2% of students accepted into business-focused programs of these elite universities represent 41% of all directors and top managers of publicly traded corporations in Chile (Zimmerman, 2019).

Part of elite higher education's relevance and mission is its capacity to form leaders. One way to increase diversity among leaders would be by modifying the elite institutions' admission practices, such as removing legacy preferences and considering other non-academic ratings (Chetty et al., 2023). Notably, the Chilean higher education application system does not evaluate any other applicants' characteristics or material apart from their entry exam scores for admission. Still, the data shows that elite university graduates in Chile are over-represented in high-rank positions in the public sector, which motivates the study of whether this phenomenon is pure selection or the causal effect of elite university education.

Two main barriers have prevented the study of the effects of elite higher education on public sector labor outcomes. The first is the lack of public servants' detailed information and its usually restricted access. The second is the challenge of finding an exogenous variation in acceptance to higher education institutions and programs.

The setting allows me to overcome these challenges as comprehensive data on the Chilean public sector workforce is available due to the *Ley de Transparencia* (Transparency Law) enacted in 2008, facilitating in-depth analyses. From this administrative data, I obtained post-graduate labor outcomes of all public servants under the executive branch of the Chilean government from 2018 to 2023. The data includes key information regarding the position's classification (government authority, managerial, professional, technical, administrative, and auxiliary) and its position in the salary scale.[1] This allows me to

---
[1] Analogous to the General Schedule of the U.S. Civil Service

clearly define what is considered a top position within the Chilean public administration.

I combine these outcomes with administrative information from Chile's centralized university application process, which takes place annually after the end of the school year. The data includes information on all applications from the year 2000 onward. Importantly, a disproportionate rate of elite university graduates among managers and high-ranked professionals in the public sector is also documented in this sample. Between 2000 and 2017, less than 13% of the students accepted into a university did so in an elite university. This proportion doubles when we consider individuals who held a top position in the public sector between 2018 and 2023.

The characteristics of the higher-education application system in Chile help overcome the identification problems arising from selection. Notably, this system relies solely on standardized test scores, enabling a clear identification strategy for estimating the causal effect of enrolling into an elite university on public sector labor outcomes. High school graduating students willing to apply to tertiary education must take a set of standardized tests and rank up to their preferred 10 program-institution options in a centralized platform after receiving their results. Through a deferred acceptance algorithm, the application system generates an accepted and a waiting list of applicants each year for each degree-institution combination. I take advantage of the fact that the cutoff scores to be accepted in each of the degree-institution combinations cannot be predicted accurately, so applicants just accepted and those marginally waitlisted are comparable, allowing the implementation of a regression discontinuity design (RDD) strategy.

Further, I *stack* specific groups of these program-university RD's and instrument enrollment with acceptance to answer, for compliers (i.e., enroll if accepted) in the neighbor of the cutoffs, what is the average effect of enrollment in an elite university, compared to a non-elite university, on the likelihood of working in the public sector and having a top position. The richness of the data allows me to observe all the program-institution options ranked by the applicants, which I use to define the comparison group unequivocally in

each of the analyses. Additionally, the fact that applicants rank programs and institution combinations provides the opportunity to estimate the difference in outcomes of elite and non-elite graduates from the same groups of programs, narrowing the comparisons and allowing the effect to vary by group.

The estimated results show that enrollment in any program in an elite university, on average, reduces the likelihood of working in the public sector by 9% compared to any program in a non-elite university. A differentiated effect by gender mainly explains these results, as the effect of enrollment into an elite university is considerably larger and statistically significant only for women. Also, the negative effect is concentrated among older individuals who graduated from voucher high schools outside the Metropolitan (central) region. Notably, admission to an elite university, on average, does not affect the probability of reaching a high-rank position.

Elite universities in Chile generally offer a more comprehensive range of programs compared to non-elite universities. Because of this, I identify the most prevalent programs in top positions to facilitate a more accurate comparison and better understand the distinct impact of elite education for specific groups. Then, implementing the same stacked RDD methodology, I compare the probability of having a top position in the public sector between individuals enrolled in these programs at an elite university and individuals with similar preferences in the same programs but at non-elite universities.

For the most prevalent programs among top positions, enrolling in an elite university does not show noticeable effects on the likelihood of reaching top positions in public administration relative to the same program in a non-elite university. Nevertheless, interesting patterns emerge when considering factors such as the geographical location and the SES of the individuals. In health (non-medicine) programs and public administration, enrolling in an elite university reduces the likelihood of attaining a top position in the public sector among graduates from private high schools (high SES), and the effect is positive among graduates of non-private high schools. In terms of location, for architec-

ture, sociology, and journalism, enrolling in an elite university reduces the probability of securing a manager or high-rank professional position in public administration for individuals from the Metropolitan region (Santiago).

A growing body of literature has focused on estimating the causal effect of attending an elite higher education institution on labor outcomes. Findings show positive effects on earnings (Jia and Li, 2021; Anelli, 2020; MacLeod et al., 2017), as well as some null and mixed results (Mountjoy and Hickman, 2021; Hoekstra, 2009; Dale and Krueger, 2002). These findings are usually from contexts where the private sector labor market predominates. This work contributes to this literature by studying returns to elite universities in the public sector. In this setting, job assignment process and career advancement decisions are usually made in a political context, which can substantially differ from a market-driven environment in the private sector and is likely to affect the returns to elite higher education.

More recent works have studied the effect of elite higher education on the formation of leaders and attaining influential positions (Chetty et al., 2023; Zimmerman, 2019). The estimated results show that more selective institutions do not seem to increase overall earnings after graduation, but they do increase the likelihood of reaching top positions at prominent firms and belonging to the top percentile of the earnings distribution. Notably, some of these results are only true for specific groups, such as males from affluent backgrounds. One of the contributions of this paper is to study the effect of elite universities on the likelihood of reaching a different type of leadership position. The Chilean civil service personnel classification and the salary pay scale help rank positions by relevance and level of responsibility, which I use to define a top position within the public sector administration.

Additionally, while quasi-experimental variation from admission cutoffs has been previously used to study the effect of elite universities, in this paper, I take advantage of the richness of the applications' data to explicitly define the counterfactual groups in each

5

of my RDD analyses. This methodological improvement has not been previously implemented by preceding literature on elite education, and it allows a better understanding of the estimated causal effects.

A growing body of the literature has been dedicated to understanding the incentives to attract talented candidates and improve management in the public sector (Muñoz and Prem, 2022; Ashraf et al., 2020; Muralidharan and Singh, 2020; Finan et al., 2017; Dal Bó et al., 2013). The results show that offering career opportunities or higher wages can attract more able applicants and that transparency and competitiveness in selection processes can lead to more effective workers being hired in the public sector. This study extends this existing body of literature by examining the impact of elite universities on the propensity of individuals from different groups of majors to work in the public sector. This offers a unique perspective on the challenges of attracting diverse individuals to the public sector. For example, the results suggest that, on average, it would be more challenging to attract to the public sector individuals from elite universities if they are not from high SES, and if they are outside Santiago. Finally, most of the recent literature studying the public sector has commonly examined a specific type of job or institution within the public sector and, in many cases, in local government settings. This paper expands on understanding the public sector labor market by using data covering the universe of public servants hired in all institutions under the Chilean government (i.e., only excluded legislative and judicial powers institutions).

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides more information about the Chilean public sector and the higher education application system. Section 3 describes the data and estimation samples. Section 4 describes the empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the RDD validation, the main findings, and the results for specific groups of programs. Section 6 concludes.

2   Study Context and Setting

2.1   The Chilean Public Sector

In this study, I use the information on public sector workers under the Chilean executive power in all centralized and decentralized agencies of the 24 existing ministries from 2018 to 2023. Specifically, the outcomes considered are having worked in the public sector and the likelihood of reaching a top position in public administration.

The Chilean public employment model is structured mainly based on the career system, although it has incorporated different elements to the model using more temporary contracts. This system has an ascending structure of positions and remuneration grades linked to the importance of the function performed. A salary scale determines the remuneration structure,[2] and other general and specific allowances complement the base salary.

Civil servants may have two types of contracts: *planta* (staff) and *contrata*, which respectively represent 55% and 22% of the personnel.[3] The former corresponds to the permanent positions assigned by law to each institution, and the latter are those that perform more transitory duties. In the last decades, there has been a steady decline in the proportion of staff officers and an increase in temporary positions.

Within staff positions, there are career officials and trusted servants. For the former group, entry is obtained through a public competition,[4] and they can't be fired arbitrarily, so they can only lose their job under specific legally established causes. On the other hand, trusted servants are staff that have the executive's exclusive confidence,[5] and are subject to the free appointment and removal by the President or of the corresponding authority.

---

[2]Although some functions and sectors have their own assignment of grades based on other remunerations scale.

[3]There is another type of contract, *honorarios*, which represent 10% of the personnel but are not considered public servants (DIPRES, 2023).

[4]Positions that become vacant are replaced through internal competitions or by promotion in which the staff members of the respective service can participate. When these vacancies are not assigned through the mentioned procedures, they are open to a general entry contest.

[5]Ministers, Undersecretaries, and Head Chiefs of Service.

Before the creation of the SADP (for *Sistema de Alta Dirección Pública*, or Public Senior Management System) in 2003, these positions were not under standardized selection procedures. Since the system came into force in 2004, discretion has been attenuated to appoint and remove some of these trusted positions whose functions are predominantly the execution of public policies and direct provision of services to the community. With the SADP implementation, these positions are appointed by the Senior Public Management Council[6] and are submitted to a public contest for periods of three years (renewable).

The contrata positions arose for the need to fulfilling more transitory tasks. At first, these public positions had a maximum duration of one fiscal year, at most, and had to end on December 31st of each year. Since 2017, all public institutions must elaborate and apply transparent recruitment and selection procedures based on merit, suitability, inclusion, and equal opportunities. Finally, the law establishes a limited number of contrata officials that can be hired as staff members, which cannot exceed 20 percent.

Considering this employment structure, my first labor outcome is defined as having been a public employee. This indicator variable takes value 1 if the individual had a contrata or a planta contract between January 2018 and May 2023, and 0 otherwise.

On the other hand, to define the second labor outcome, 'having top position,' it is key to consider that my analytical sample consists of individuals from the higher education application processes of 2000 onward. Therefore, a substantial proportion (90%) falls within the 25 to 45 age group in 2023. As higher-ranking positions are predominantly held by individuals with extensive experience, this demographic limitation restricts my capacity to observe part of the top positions in the analytical sample. Thus, I employ a *relative* measure of top position to address this constraint.

The public sector workforce comprises distinct roles categorized into five types: manager, professional, administrative, technician, and auxiliary. By considering the top positions, the focus inherently falls on those with significant responsibilities and leadership

---

[6]CADP, for *Consejo de Alta Dirección Pública*.

roles, primarily managers and some professionals.

To refine this criterion, I used the public sector salary scale, encompassing 31 grades. I included only professionals at the top 8 positions in the salary scale, constituting the uppermost 15% of the professional hierarchy. The result is a top position definition that only includes managers and some high-rank professionals, and which represents 5% of public sector positions in the analytical sample. The measure is relative as it doesn't necessarily comprehend all the directive and high-ranking professionals in the public sector, but those who applied to the university from 2000 onward. Appendix Figure A.1 highlights the categories considered as top positions among public servants.

2.2 The Higher Education Application System

This subsection provides an overview of Chile's higher education admission system. Understanding this framework is essential to analyze further the effect of elite universities on public-sector employment outcomes.

The CRUCH (for *Consejo de Rectores de las Universidades Chilenas*, or Rector's Council of Chilean Universities) is an organization that comprehends the country's traditional universities. It includes 30 institutions, considered the country's most prestigious and historically significant. Only these universities have the right to direct contributions from the state. All the CRUCH universities, along with six other large private institutions, participate in the national centralized university admission system. Table A.1 lists all universities included.

Students willing to study in any of these 36 institution must take the PSU (for *Prueba de Selección Universitaria*, or University Selection Test), a standardized test that can only be taken at the end of each year. The only requirement to take this test is to complete high school. Most students take the PSU at the end of their 12th grade.

The PSU assesses the cognitive abilities and aptitudes of students in various academic disciplines. The exam includes compulsory tests in two main subjects: mathematics and

Spanish. In addition, depending on the requirements of their preferred programs and institutions, prospective candidates can take two additional tests, natural sciences and history and social sciences. The PSU scores are measured on a scale of 150 to 850 points, with 450 points being the minimum score needed to apply to any program.

Each year, after receiving their PSU results, students apply through a simultaneous, centralized, and integer system.[7] In this process, applicants list their preferred set of eight university-major combinations. Upon reaching a cutoff point, applicants are automatically accepted to their highest listed option through a deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962), so applicants have incentives to rank their options according to their true preferences. All the other institution-major combinations in the list are discarded.

Each university-program combination uses specific and publicly known weights for the different PSU subject exams and the high school GPA. Therefore, the weighted score used to apply to any program is a composite of different PSU subject exams and the average high school GPA.

Importantly, no other factors are considered in the admission process (e.g., statements of purpose), and applicants cannot predict the exact PSU's cutoff point of each institution-major because they vary yearly depending on the available slots in each institution and the applicants' demand.
Students are only accepted to their highest-ranked program-institution combination listed, conditional on their specific weighted PSU score reaching that year's corresponding admission threshold.

The institution's and programs' levels of selectivity vary significantly. The two oldest universities *Universidad de Chile* (UCH) and *Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile* (PUC) are also the most selective. All the programs' admission cutoffs in these two institutions are considerably higher than in other universities, and the average difference is more than

---

[7]SUA, for *Sistema Único de Admisión*, or Single Admission System. This governing body ensures fairness and transparency in the selection process for all CRUCH universities.

a standard deviation of PSU's score distribution. Therefore, the average PSU score of the typical accepted student in UCH or PUC is much higher relative to other applicants.

Both institutions also share the first and second place among Chilean universities in international classifications.[8] Also, Elite university graduates typically obtain better labor outcomes than their counterparts from less selective institutions. To illustrate, these two universities hold 95% of The National Prize[9] winners, and the two Chilean Nobel Laureates. Also, 70% of all presidents have earned degrees from one of these prestigious institutions. Between 1990 and 2016, two-thirds of government ministers, half the senators, and a third part of representatives were alumni of elite programs (UNDP, 2017). Similarly, in the corporate sector, 2% of students admitted to business-focused programs at these two universities account for 41% of directors and top managers in publicly traded corporations (Zimmerman, 2019).

For this large difference in selectivity and their graduates' outcomes, I define UCH and PUC as *elite* universities. Figure 1 shows the distribution of programs' average (through 2000 and 2017) admission cutoffs by type of institution, and Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of elite and non-elite universities. Importantly, elite universities, on average, offer more programs, accept more students, and accept a much larger proportion of students from private high schools and from the Metropolitan region (Santiago).

3   Data and Sample

I use administrative data from different sources to track individuals who applied to university, from high school to their post-college employment outcomes in the public sector. The data can be classified into two types. The first is information on the labor market outcomes of individuals hired by the public sector in Chile, and the second comprises

---

[8]QS World University Rankings, Times Higher Education World University Rankings, Academic Ranking of World Universities.

[9]The National Prize of Chile is the collective name given to a set of awards granted by the government of Chile. Categories include Literature, Natural Sciences, Social Sciences, and Arts, among others.

detailed characteristics of college-admission test takers and their application results.

3.1 Public Sector Data

The public sector data comprises all public servants in Chile from January 2018 to May 2023, spanning two governments from different political coalitions.[10] This is public information available since 2009 when the *Ley de Transparencia* (Transparence Law) came into effect. I restricted my sample to a nearer period because entries before 2018 are incomplete.

The dataset contains monthly registries of all individuals working in the public sector under the President's executive power (i.e., in any institution of the 24 existing ministries). The information considers only the civil personnel, excluding the personnel of the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement, as well as the personnel of public companies, deputies and senators of the National Congress, and members of the judiciary.

The information includes individuals' complete names, type of contract, earnings, institution, position type (i.e., government authority, managerial, professional, administrative, technical, or auxiliary), position on the salary scale, region, and more. Importantly, the dataset does not contain the individuals' national identification number (RUT). I merged the RUT by name[11] using the 2016 Chilean electoral roll.[12]

Figure 2 shows the distribution of the annual average of the total number of public servants by ministry. It should be noted that the institutions of three ministries, Health, Education, and Interior, together employ 4 out of every 5 public servants. The large number of employees in the Ministry of the Interior is explained by all municipal workers. Although the municipalities are autonomous organizations, they are under the Ministry

---

[10]Sebastián Piñera's second government (March 2018 to March 2022) and Gabriel Boric's first year of government (March 2022 to May 2023).

[11]Using first name, middle name, first surname, and second surname. The rate of successful matches is 93%.

[12]Chile's Electoral Service (SERVEL) makes public the electoral registry under the Law N°18.556. It contains the names, RUT, voting locations, and other information of all Chileans over 17 years of age and foreigners with the right to vote.

of the Interior. The large number of employees in Health and Education is because the state, as in many countries, is the largest provider of services in those markets.

Similarly, Figure 3 shows the annual average proportion of individuals with top positions within each ministry. Notably, despite the disproportionate number of public servants concentrated in the ministries of Health, Education, and Interior, the distribution of top positions' proportions is much more homogeneous. In fact, the larger ministries have, in general, a lower proportion of top positions.

In Figure 3, the annual average proportion of individuals holding top positions within each ministry is shown. Not surprisingly, because of the significant concentration of public servants in the Health, Education, and Interior ministries, the proportion of top positions there is remarkably lower. The mean proportion of top positions by ministry is 22%, notably higher than the overall proportion of top positions in the analytical sample. The difference relies on the fact that the analytical sample only includes a subsample of individuals who applied to higher education from 2000 onward.

3.2 Applications Data

For the higher education information, I use administrative data from all yearly college application processes in Chile from 2000 onward. The anonymized information was provided for research purposes by the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) and the Department of Evaluation, Measurement, and Educational Registration (DEMRE).

Each year, applicants rank a maximum of ten program-university combinations according to their preferences. The data is at the application level, and it includes the ranked preference number (1 to 10) and applications' results (i.e., accepted, waitlisted, or rejected). The data also contains applicants' characteristics such as higher education entry exam scores, high school GPA, the school from which they graduated, gender, and date of birth. A survey completed by applicants at college entry exam's online registration provides other applicants' baseline characteristics, such as per capita family income

and parents' occupation, among others. Additionally, individuals' enrollment status after admission is available for all programs and each application year.

3.3 Sample

To combine the applications dataset with the public sector labor outcomes, the MINE-DUC anonymized the public sector information by removing names and replacing the individuals' RUTs with a student-unique identification number that allows the combination of different educational datasets in Chile, preventing individuals from being identified. I collapsed the anonymized public sector data to the public servant level, so the labor outcomes are indicators of whether the individual ever worked in the public sector or reached a top position between January 2018 and May 2023.

I defined the outcome *top position* using the categories established in public administration. The existing position types, and their corresponding share in 2022 (DIPRES, 2023), are manager (2.4%), professional (50.3%), technician (25.6%), administrative and auxiliary (21.8%). Another category included in the data is government authorities (e.g., ministers). They hold political positions that are not subject to standard hiring protocols; instead, they are appointed at the discretion of the President. For this difference, I do not classify government authorities as top positions. Their inclusion does not change the estimated results due to the limited number of individuals in this category.

Only managers and some professionals, which are the following two top categories by earnings and responsibilities, are considered top positions. Only professionals at the top 8 positions (out of 31) in the salary scale are considered top positions. This is the top 15% of professionals. Together, the proportion of applicants reaching a top position represents 5% of individuals in the public sector data. Importantly, the top position indicator variable is coded as zero for individuals not observed in the public sector.

Finally, I merged these outcomes to the 2000-2017 applications data using individuals' masked identification numbers. The result is a higher education applications-level sam-

ple, for admission processes between 2000 and 2017, including individuals' post-college public sector labor outcomes observed between 2018 and 2023. This limits my capacity to observe older individuals in the public sector, as the typical applicant in 2000 would have 42 years in 2023. Nevertheless, the largest proportion of public servants is between 35-44 years of age (32%), while 28% is under 35 (DIPRES, 2023).

Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the analytical (merged) sample. There are roughly 1,400,000 applicants in all the 18 higher education application processes—13.8% worked in the Chilean public sector between 2018 and 2023. The average number of applicants per year is around 80,000, and the mean number of program-university combinations ranked is roughly 5. Almost 70% of applicants are accepted into any institution, while less than 9% are admitted into an elite university (PUC or UCH).

While few differences exist among those who worked in the public sector and those who didn't, three stand out. Gender is balanced among applicants who didn't work in the public sector, but more than two-thirds of those who became public servants are women. Of those who worked in the public sector, fewer graduated from private high schools and more from public high schools, showing a baseline socioeconomic difference in favor of those who didn't work in the public sector,[13] corroborated by a higher per capita family income. Finally, applicants who worked in the public sector graduated in less proportion from high schools in the Metropolitan Region (Santiago).

Regarding top positions, they are much more likely to have been accepted in any university, and importantly, the proportion of accepted in an elite university more than doubles compared to the rest of the applicants. Notably, while the proportion of female employees in top positions is balanced with males, it is 17 percentage points lower relative to all applicants in the public sector. Top positions also come, on average, from better socioeconomic backgrounds.

---

[13]Private schools in Chile cover less tan 10% the total enrollment. They have historically served individuals from wealthier families, so it is usually used as a good proxy of socioeconomic status (e.g., Zimmerman, 2019).

As detailed in the next section, the empirical strategy I use to estimate the effect of enrolling in an elite university on public sector labor outcomes restricts the analytical sample for identification purposes. Specifically, this estimation sample comprises the subgroup of applicants accepted into an elite university program, but whose next preferred option listed where they would have been admitted is a non-elite university. Similarly, it includes applicants who were waitlisted in an elite university and were accepted in a less preferred option in a non-elite institution. The estimation sample also considers a smaller group of applicants to increase statistical power. Those who, conversely, were accepted or waitlisted in a non-elite university program, and their next preferred option for which their score meets the corresponding cutoff (i.e., would have been or were accepted respectively) is in an elite university. This estimation sample allows the comparison between individuals with similar preferences who enrolled in an elite university with those who were admitted into a non-elite university.

The first column in Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the estimation sample, considering all programs offered. The sample includes more than 180,000 applicants, from which a third are accepted in an elite university (at the right of the centered cutoff), and the other two-thirds are accepted in a non-elite university (at the left of the centered cutoff). The proportion of individuals from private high schools and from the Metropolitan region doubles compared to the total of applicants, and 0.9% have a top position.

In the second part of my empirical analyses, I explore the most prevalent programs among top positions. Figure 4 shows the relationship between the program's selectivity and the proportion they represent among top positions. While there is significant variation, the plot shows a positive correlation between programs' selectivity and the proportion of top positions. Also, programs in elite universities, relative to non-elite programs, are distributed considerably to the top right part of the plot. They are more selective and seem to have a relatively higher proportion among top positions. Similarly, Figure 5 shows the same plot, omitting programs with none of their accepted individuals

16

among top positions, but highlighting four groups of programs (independently of university type) that have a higher representation in top positions.

The most prevalent groups of programs among top positions are law, business, and engineering, the denominated "business-oriented" programs, and also the most prevalent among top positions in the private sector (Zimmerman, 2019). The second group comprehends health programs, excluding medicine.[14] I excluded medicine as this program is very different from the rest of health degrees, as it is by far the most selective program, and their graduates have much higher earnings. Importantly, results do not vary if I include medicine in health programs. The third largest presence in top positions is for architecture, sociology, and journalism, while public administration, a program specifically designed to manage the public sector, is in the fourth place.

I estimate the effect of enrollment in an elite university relative to a non-elite university separately for each one of the four sets of programs. This implies the definition of four new estimation samples, using the same process followed for the overall estimates. The only difference is further restricting the sample to individuals accepted and waitlisted in any of the programs in each of the four specified groups. In these cases, applicants at the right of the centered cutoff are admitted into a program of one of the four selected sets of programs in an elite university, while those at the left are accepted into a program from the same set, but in a non-elite university.

The last four columns in Table 3 show descriptive statistics for each of the program groups' estimation subsamples. There are large differences in gender and socioeconomic composition of applicants between the four groups of programs. Notably, top positions represent 1% of individuals in the law, business, and engineering sample and the architecture, sociology, and journalism sample. The group of programs with the lower rate of top positions is health (non-medicine), with 0.5%. The group with the largest proportion is the public administration program, with roughly 6%.

---

[14]Health programs include: nursing, physical therapy, dentistry, psychology, obstetrics, chemistry and pharmacy, occupational therapy, medical technology, and nutrition.

4 Methodology

The greatest challenge to causally estimate the effect of elite higher education on labor outcomes is overcoming the selection problem. Universities choose among their applicants, and students decide which universities and programs to apply. Consequently, the accepted and non-accepted applicants differ in observable and non-observable characteristics. These differences will also likely determine their post-college labor outcomes. Therefore, a simple comparison between the two groups will produce biased estimates of the elite higher education effect.

The Chilean higher education admission system offers a unique opportunity to address this challenge. By the end of each year, those willing to apply to the university must take standardized national exams, *Prueba de Selección Universitaria* (PSU).[15] The only requirement to take the tests is having graduated from high school. Math and Spanish subject exams are mandatory, while History and Sciences exams are optional. Applicants decide which tests they take according to the requirements of the programs they are willing to apply. The weights w^s assigned to the average high school GPA and each subject exam s, vary by program p, university u, and cohort c. Importantly, weights meet the conditions:

i. $\sum_s w^s_{puc} = 1$, $\qquad \forall\, p, u, c.$

ii. $0 \leq w^s < 1$, $\qquad \forall\, s = $ *Math, Spanish, History, Sciences, GPA.*

As a result, applicants have a specific weighted PSU score to apply for each program and institution of interest. Individual's i weighted PSU score to apply for program p, in university u, in cohort c, is defined as:

$$(1) \qquad\qquad PSU_{ipuc} = \sum_s w^s_{puc} \cdot score^s_{ic} \,,$$

---

[15]Before 2004's application process, the exams were named Prueba de Aptitud Académica (PAA).

where $score_{ic}^s$ is the average high school GPA[16] and the results in each PSU subject exam.

After receiving the PSU exam results, applicants rank their ten most preferred program and institution combinations in a centralized online platform. A deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962) matches students and programs considering the ranked preferences. Applicants are admitted only into their most preferred program-institution combination listed, conditional on their weighted PSU score meeting the corresponding cutoff. All other less preferred options listed are discarded. Each year, this process generates an accepted and a waitlist of applicants for each program-institution combination. In a second round, after enrollment, seats that weren't taken make way for waiting lists to move and fill empty slots. Prospective students may retake the entry exams and apply in more than one year, so I only use information from individuals' first application process in my analyses.

Importantly, applicants can't precisely predict the minimum score needed to be admitted to each program. Cutoffs vary in every admission process depending on the available slots for each program in each institution and the corresponding applicants' demand. Consequently, conditional on students' weighted PSU score, falling just above or below a cutoff is considered random, allowing a local comparison at the cut-point neighborhood as observable and non-observable characteristics are balanced between the two groups. In this way, every year, the admission system generates thousands of discontinuities on the probability of acceptance into the corresponding programs.

This quasi-experimental variation on admission allows the implementation of multiple RDs, each corresponding to a specific program and institution combination, with the weighted PSU scores as the running variables. Apart from the mentioned discontinuity on the treatment assignment at the threshold, the RDD identification relies on the assumption of continuity of potential outcomes at the cutoff. While this assumption is not directly testable, it has testable implications. To validate the RDD, I assess the plausibility

---

[16]In Chile, GPA ranges from 1.0 to 7.0. For the higher education applications context, it is transformed to an equivalent PSU score.

of the potential outcomes continuity assumption by implementing Cattaneo et al., 2018 procedure to check for a discontinuity of the running variable's density, which would be a sign of manipulation of the running variable (e.g., increasing effort) to fall just above the threshold. A second testable implication of potential outcomes continuity is the balance of observable pre-treatment characteristics between individuals at each side of the threshold. To check this, I estimate the effect of admission on baseline variables. Statistically significant effects on pre-treatment outcomes are a sign of potential outcomes discontinuity.

The empirical strategy goal is to estimate the effect of elite universities on public sector labor outcomes. To do this, I implement a *stacked* RDD approach following Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2014), Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013), and Hastings et al. (2013). Specifically, the empirical strategy pools the set of accepted and waitlisted individuals across all programs of the two most selective universities (PUC and UCH), centering the program-institution-specific cutoffs.

A new running variable is generated by subtracting the specific program cutoff from applicants' weighted PSU scores, and it represents the distance to the corresponding cutoff ($r_{ipuc} = PSU_{ipuc} - cutoff_{puc}$). The estimated equation is:

$$(2) \qquad Y_{ipuc} = f(r_{ipuc}) + \beta D_{ipuc} + \gamma_{puc} + \varepsilon_{ipuc} \,,$$

where Y_{ipuc} are the labor outcomes of individual i applying to program p, in university u, in application cohort c; $f(\cdot)$ is a smooth function and D_{ipuc} is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the student's weighted PSU score is higher or equal to the program-specific cutoff (and therefore admitted to program p in an elite university u) and 0 otherwise. Importantly, this stacked specification includes program-institution-cohort fixed effects, γ_{puc}, as the level of exogenous variation allowing identification is at the program-specific RD level. The estimated parameter β in this stack represents a weighted average

of program-university LATE of admission in an elite university on the corresponding outcome Y_{ipuc}.

As mentioned, the treatment assignment in the RDD is as good as random conditional on observables. For this reason, the running variable is included in the estimation equation for identification purposes. Depending on the relationship between the outcome and the running variable, the function $f(\cdot)$ can be a polynomial of grade 1, or higher in case of a non-linear relationship. Also, to allow for different slopes at each side of the cutoff, an interaction of the polynomial with the indicator variable can be included. However, choosing an incorrect functional form leads to bias (Gelman and Imbens, 2019), so the literature has usually favored the use of non-parametric local linear regressions (Hahn et al., 2001). Therefore, all results presented are local polynomial RD estimates with optimal bandwidths and robust bias-corrected confidence intervals (Calonico et al., 2020; Calonico et al., 2014d; Calonico et al., 2014b). Finally, while not considered in equation (2), other pre-treatment covariates are included in the specification to increase estimates' precision.

In this stack, meeting the specific criteria set at the centered cutoff point results in admission to an elite university program. However, a significant challenge frequently faced by the empirical literature in similar settings is the capacity to define the comparison group properly. Applicants waitlisted in a program in an elite university might end up admitted into a non-elite university, or in a different program of an elite university, or none.

Following Aguirre et al. (2022), I explicitly define the treatment and comparison groups by restricting the sample of applications considered in my analyses. The richness of the data allows me to observe all preferences ranked by the applicants in each year's admission process. Using this information, I consider (i) individuals who were accepted in an elite university program, but whose next preferred option meeting the corresponding cutoff is in a non-elite university (i.e., would have been accepted in a non-elite univer-

sity); and (ii) individuals who got waitlisted in an elite university program, but whose next preferred option meeting the corresponding cutoff was in a non-elite university (i.e., accepted in a non-elite university). In this setting, the first group of applicants is at the right of the centered cutoff for elite admission, while those from the second group are at the left.

The result is a defined comparison between applicants with similar preferences, but one group is marginally accepted in an elite university (and would have been accepted in a non-elite university otherwise), while their counterfactuals are marginally rejected from an elite university, and accepted in a non-elite university.

To increase statistical power, I also include a smaller group of (iii) individuals who were accepted in a non-elite university program, but whose next preferred option meeting the corresponding cutoff is in an elite university (i.e., would have been accepted in an elite university); and (iv) individuals who got waitlisted in a non-elite university program, but whose next preferred option meeting the corresponding cutoff was in an elite university (i.e., accepted in an elite university). For this smaller group, the running variable is inverted ($r_{ipuc} = cutoff_{puc} - PSU_{ipuc}$), so those accepted in a non-elite university are at the left of the centered cutoff and those accepted in an elite university are at the right. Importantly, results do not vary when I remove this group from the analyses.

Naturally, not all admitted applicants enroll in the program where they are accepted. Therefore, I instrument student enrollment with acceptance into the corresponding program to estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE) of enrollment for the group of compliers[17] near the cutoff point using a fuzzy RDD. This requires the instrumental variable (admission) to be exogenous, relevant, and monotonic. The exogeneity of the instrument is not testable, but the validity of the RDD supports it, as falling just above or below the threshold is random conditional on the running variable. The relevance (strength) of the instrument is directly tested by estimating the effect of admission on enrollment in an

---

[17]Those who enroll if accepted.

elite university in the first stage. The monotonicity assumption in this setting is expected to hold as the presence of defiers seems unlikely. Applicants can't enroll without being admitted, and the rate of enrollment is extremely high after admission.

The stacked fuzzy RDD first- and second-stage estimation equations, respectively, are:

(3)
$$enroll_{ipuc} = f(r_{ipuc}) + \alpha A_{ipuc} + \gamma_{puc} + \epsilon_{ipuc} \text{ ,}$$

(4)
$$Y_{ipuc} = f(r_{ipuc}) + \delta \widehat{enroll_{ipuc}} + \gamma_{puc} + \mu_{ipuc} \text{ .}$$

The variable A_{ipuc} indicates admission into a program in an elite university (i.e., $0 \leq r_{ipuc}$), and $enroll_{ipuc}$ for enrollment in that program. The parameter δ captures the LATE of enrollment in an elite university (vs. a non-elite university) for compliers near the centered cutoffs.

In stacked RD contexts, it is common to cluster the standard errors at the individual level because applicants can be in more than one of the multiple stacked RDs. In this setting, I only consider in my analyses individuals in groups (i) to (iv), which do not overlap. Then, as individuals appear only once in my sample, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in all estimates.

In my second set of analyses, I explore the effect of enrollment in an elite university for the set of programs with higher prevalence among top positions in the public sector: a) Law, business, and engineering; b) Health non-medicine; c) Architecture, sociology, and journalism; and d) Public administration. For that, in each case, I further restrict my estimation sample to those specific groups of programs. The comparison, therefore, is between individuals accepted in the same programs, but in an elite university relative to a non-elite university. Estimation subsamples for groups (i) to (iv) are redefined accordingly.

5 Results

5.1 Stacked Regression Discontinuity Designs Validity

The identification assumption of the RDD approach to obtain unbiased estimates requires the expected value of the potential outcomes to be continuous on the running variable at the threshold. In other words, the potential outcomes' distribution should not jump at the cutoff point in the absence of the treatment. Implicitly, this assumption means that observable and non-observable characteristics that could determine the outcome (Y_{ipuc}) are continuous on the running variable (r_{ipuc}). In practice, the continuity assumption requires applicants near each side of the cutoff to be similar in variables affecting their future labor outcomes, like socioeconomic status and motivation. If these conditions are satisfied, RDD will provide valid (comparable) treatment and control groups at each side of the threshold, as the treatment assignment is as good as random (conditional on observables) near the cutoff.

The assumption would be violated if, for example, applicants can sort themselves at the right of the cutoff to get admitted to an elite university. This invalidates the identification strategy, as treatment and control groups would not be comparable due to a selection problem. In other words, students should not be able to manipulate their test scores (e.g., increasing their effort) to fall just above the acceptance threshold, implying self-selection of the highly motivated applicants into the treatment group. Consequently, factors that could determine future earnings (as motivation) would not be continuous at the cutoff.

The assumption cannot be tested directly, but the standard is to check for two implications of the assumption violation. The first is looking for discontinuities of other predetermined observable characteristics and assessing the balance between the two groups at each side of the cutoff. The second approach examines the distribution density of applicants close to the cutoff point (McCrary, 2008). This selective sorting of applicants is unlikely to happen in the admission to higher education context because students do not

know ex-ante the precise cutoffs (Hoekstra, 2009). Additionally, institutions usually set the acceptance threshold to achieve a target enrollment level and not for specific characteristics of students.

To verify the validity of this assumption, I run manipulation tests for the running variable using a local polynomial density estimation (Cattaneo et al., 2018). In the presence of manipulation, a higher density of applicants just at the right of the centered cutoff should be observed, reflecting the non-random sorting of applicants. Figure 6 shows no accumulation of applicants just above the cutoff point, providing supporting evidence of no manipulation. Additionally, the formal test shows no statistical evidence of systematic manipulation of the running variable, as the null hypothesis of no manipulation can't be rejected.[18]

Further, I also examine applicants' baseline characteristics' continuity. For this purpose, I estimate equation (3) with applicants' characteristics as dependent variables. Figure 7 shows the estimated coefficient ($\hat{\alpha}$) for each case. None of the estimated coefficients are statistically different from zero at 95% confidence. Despite this being a necessary but not sufficient condition, as is also needed balance of unobserved characteristics, these results support the validity of the continuity assumption in my analytical sample.

I further explored the effect of elite relative to non-elite universities on the probability of having a top position for a selected group of programs. This requires generating new stacked RD estimation samples for each of the four groups of programs. Therefore, I also ran balance tests for applicants' baseline characteristics and manipulation tests for each case.

Appendix Figure A.2 shows the distribution of applicants near the corresponding cutoffs. The respective four formal tests can't reject the null hypothesis of no manipulation at 95% confidence, providing evidence of no manipulation of the running variable. Similarly, Appendix Figure A.3 shows the estimated effects of admission to an elite uni-

---

[18]P-value = 0.59

versity on ten applicants' baseline characteristics for each of the four program groups. From the 40 estimated coefficients, only two are statistically different from zero, a result that is expected by chance at 95% confidence. Again, these results provide evidence in favor of the stacked RDD validity.

5.2 Main Results

In this section, I present overall findings of admission to an elite university irrespective of the program, starting with the negative impact on the likelihood of being employed in the public sector and moving on to the effect on attaining top positions. All the estimated results presented are the LATE for compliers (applicants who enroll in an elite university if admitted) near the corresponding cutoff.

Appendix Figure A.4 depicts the change in the probability of enrolling in an elite university when applicants fall at the right of the centered cutoff (i.e., admitted into an elite university). At the specific threshold, there is a significant increase in the likelihood of enrolling in an elite university, an estimated increase of 67 percentage points. This result corroborates the relevance of admission as an instrument for enrollment.

The fuzzy RD second stage estimated results presented in the top panel of Table 4 show that enrolling in an elite university has a negative and statistically significant effect of about 1.4 percentage points on the probability of working in the public sector. This effect represents a 9% decrease over the control group's mean of 15%. These findings show that individuals enrolled in elite universities are later less likely to pursue careers in the public sector.

I further explore the effect of enrolling in an elite university on the probability of attaining top positions in the public sector. Interestingly, the results at the bottom panel of Table 4 show a small but non-significant effect, meaning that enrolling in an elite university does not significantly affect the probability of attaining top positions. Although this finding challenges the hypothesis of a direct link between elite education and leading

positions in the public sector, it raises crucial questions about the complex factors contributing to career development in this context.

Interestingly, when examining the effects of elite universities by gender in the public sector labor market, the analysis reveals an important difference. Regarding the likelihood of working in the public sector, the point estimates for men are small and not statistically significant. Conversely, women's results show a statistically significant negative effect of 2.4 percentage points (roughly a 14% reduction). This difference by gender suggests that the link between elite higher education and employment in the public sector is particularly relevant for women. For the likelihood of having a top position, results by gender do not show important differences, and the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant.

In these analyses, the comparison between elite and non-elite universities is made regardless of the program. Elite universities, on average, offer a larger number of programs relative to less selective universities (Table 1). To narrow the comparison and to check if the results are driven by extremely selective programs in elite universities or by very low selective programs in the control group, I reduced the estimation sample to programs with average entry exam cutoffs between 600 and 700 points. The decision to restrict the sample to those programs is based on what is observed in Figure 1, where the largest mass of overlapping programs is in the chosen range. Appendix Table A.2 shows that results do not vary significantly for this overlapping set. The negative effect on the likelihood of working in the public sector for women and the null effect on attaining a top position seems to not be driven by programs at the tails of the selectivity distribution.

To further understand these results, I also estimated heterogeneous effects by socioeconomic status, geographical location, and age. Appendix Table A.3 presents the results for these different subsamples of applicants and their counterfactuals. The negative effect on the likelihood of working in the public sector is driven, on average, by lower socioeconomic applicants from outside the central region and older than 30 years of age. The null

effect on the likelihood of having a top position remains true for all subgroups.

5.3 Results by Program

In the second part of my analysis, I delve into the probability of securing a top position, explicitly examining a selected group of programs. When considering all programs across elite and non-elite universities, there is a risk of overlooking unique program-related effects. Certain degrees are more adept at preparing individuals for high-ranking roles. To address this concern, I narrowed the scope by comparing outcomes within specific programs. This targeted approach enhances comparability by focusing on individuals accepted into the same programs, enabling a direct comparison between elite and less selective institutions.

The goal is to understand whether elite universities have an impact on reaching a top position among the most prevalent programs in those jobs. Accordingly, I identified four groups that stand out. The first is the group of law, business, and engineering, the so-called business-focused programs (Zimmerman, 2019), which together represent 37% of top positions in the sample. The second group is health programs (excluding medicine), comprising 10% of top positions. Architecture, sociology, and journalism jointly accrue 9% of the top positions, while the public administration program alone represents 7% of the top positions in the analytical sample.

The stacked RDD in each of the four cases is generated in the same way as in the first analysis but for the specific programs explored. Thus, at the right of the corresponding centered cutoffs are individuals who were randomly accepted (conditional on their weighted PSU score) in the selected program in an elite university, while individuals at the left were conditionally randomly accepted to the same program in a non-elite university.

The drastic change in the probability of enrolling into an elite university after admission is shown in Appendix Figure A.3 for all four groups of programs. The first-stage

estimated results range between 50 to 85 points increase in the likelihood of enrollment if admitted, validating the admission as an instrument for enrollment in all four cases.

Table 5 presents the fuzzy RD second-stage estimates of the LATE of enrolling in an elite university for compliers, relative to a non-elite university among the four sets of selected programs. The overall estimated coefficients are not statistically significant, but differences in magnitude and sign appear between the four groups. Panel A shows a very small negative coefficient of 0.1 percentage points of enrollment in elite universities on the likelihood of having a top position among law, business, and engineering programs. Panels B and D show positive effects of 1.2 and 2.6 percentage points for health and for public administration programs, respectively. On the other hand, enrolling in an elite university reduces the likelihood of attaining a top position in architecture, sociology, and journalism by 1.7 percentage points.

The second and third columns in Table 5 show estimated effects for the subsamples of male and female individuals, respectively. The only statistically significant effect is for males in architecture, sociology, and journalism, showing a reduction of 8 percentage points in the probability of having a high-rank position. Notably, except for the law, business, and engineering programs, the LATE of enrolling in an elite university on the probability of having a top position is relatively large for males.

Finally, I estimate heterogeneous effects on the likelihood of having a top position for the four groups of programs. While estimates are less precise, the first two columns of Appendix Table A.4 show that, in health and public administration programs, applicants from higher (lower) SES who enroll in an elite university are less (more) likely to reach a top position in the public sector, compared to their counterparts in non-elite universities. Columns 3 and 4 show that for architecture, sociology, and journalism, the effect of enrolling in an elite university varies by baseline geographical location. Applicants who graduated from high schools in the central region of the country are less likely to reach top positions relative to similar applicants from the same location who were accepted in

the same program but in a non-elite university. The last two columns show that only for public administration, there are heterogeneous effects by age, as individuals older than 30 who enroll in an elite university are more likely to reach top positions.

6   Conclusion

In this paper, I study the impact of attending an elite university on public sector labor outcomes, using Chilean public administration and higher education admissions administrative data. The analysis revealed significant insights into the relationship between elite higher education and career trajectories within the state administration. By leveraging a rigorous stacked regression discontinuity design and using applicants' ranked options to compare individuals with similar preferences, I found that enrollment in an elite university, on average, reduces the likelihood of working in the public sector by 9% among marginally accepted and rejected applicants. Gender and high school backgrounds play crucial roles in shaping these outcomes. Interestingly, attending an elite university did not consistently affect the probability of reaching high-ranking positions across program groups, emphasizing the complexity of this relationship within the public sector context.

Although the study provides a thorough analysis, there are a few limitations to keep in mind. The age range of the sample, in part, limited the opportunity to study older individuals in the public sector's top positions. This suggests the potential for future research to delve into the career paths of more senior professionals, exploring their unique patterns of mobility and success within the public sector.

The gender disparities seem particularly relevant in this context, as in the private sector for business-focused programs (Zimmerman, 2019). The disproportionate impact of elite universities on women's career paths in the public sector suggests underlying systemic factors at play. One possible explanation could be the existence of implicit biases or gender-specific challenges within the workplace, influencing the career progression of

female professionals differently from their male counterparts. Further investigation into the organizational dynamics and cultural factors within public administration could shed light on these disparities and offer valuable insights into devising targeted interventions.

Moving forward, there are several promising avenues for expanding this research. First and foremost, broadening the sample to include pre-2000 application cohorts could provide a more comprehensive understanding of long-term career trajectories and, importantly, get a better picture of positions at the top of the responsibility and relevance distributions. Additionally, a more in-depth analysis of gender differences is crucial, exploring the underlying mechanisms contributing to the observed disparities. Moreover, investigating the influence of family connections, such as having relatives in influential government positions, on attaining top positions could provide valuable insights into the role of social networks in public administration jobs (Riaño, 2021), particularly among top positions.

REFERENCES

Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Angrist, J., & Pathak, P. (2014). The elite illusion: Achievement effects at boston and new york exam schools. *Econometrica*, *82*(1), 137–196. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA10266

Aguirre, J., Matta, J., & Montoya, A. M. (2022). Joining the old boys' club: Women's returns to majoring in technology and engineering. *[Unpublished manuscript]*.

Anelli, M. (2020). The returns to elite university education: A quasi-experimental analysis. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, *18*(6), 2824–2868. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvz070

Ashraf, N., Bandiera, O., Davenport, E., & Lee, S. S. (2020). Losing prosociality in the quest for talent? sorting, selection, and productivity in the delivery of public services. *American Economic Review*, *110*(5), 1355–1394. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180326

Best, M. C., Hjort, J., & Szakonyi, D. (2023). Individuals and organizations as sources of state effectiveness. *The American Economic Review*.

Borjas, G. J. (2002). The wage structure and the sorting of workers into the public sector. *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper #9313*. https://doi.org/10.3386/w9313

Calonico, S., Cattaneo, M. D., & Farrell, M. H. (2020). Optimal bandwidth choice for robust bias-corrected inference in regression discontinuity designs. *Econometrics Journal*, *23*(2), 192–210. https://doi.org/10.1093/ectj/utz022

Calonico, S., Cattaneo, M. D., & Titiunik, R. (2014b). Robust data-driven inference in the regression-discontinuity design. *The Stata Journal*, *14*(4), 909–946. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1536867X1401400413

Calonico, S., Cattaneo, M. D., & Titiunik, R. (2014d). Robust nonparametric confidence intervals for regression-discontinuity designs. *Econometrica*, *82*(6), 2295–2326. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11757

Cattaneo, M. D., Jansson, M., & Ma, X. (2018). Manipulation testing based on density discontinuity. *The Stata Journal*, *18*(1), 234–261. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1536867X1801800115

Chetty, R., Deming, D. J., & Friedman, J. N. (2023). Diversifying society's leaders? the causal effects of admission to highly selective private colleges. *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper #31492*. https://doi.org/10.3386/w31492

Dal Bó, E., Finan, F., & Rossi, M. (2013). Strengthening state capabilities: The role of financial incentives in the call to public service. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *128*(3), 1169–1218. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjt008

Dale, S. B., & Krueger, A. B. (2002). Estimating the payoff to attending a more selective college: An application of selection on observables and unobservables. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *117*(4), 1491–1527. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302320935089

DIPRES. (2023). Informe anual del empleo público 2022. *Dirección de Presupuestos, Ministerio de Hacienda*.

Fenizia, A. (2022). Managers and productivity in the public sector. *Econometrica*, *90*(3), 1063–1084. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta19244

Finan, F., Olken, B. A., & Pande, R. (2017). The personnel economics of the developing state. In A. Banerjee & E. Duflo (Eds.), *Handbook of economic field experiments* (pp. 467–514). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hefe.2016.08.001

Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962). College admissions and the stability of marriage. *The American Mathematical Monthly*, *69*(1), 9–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827

Gelman, A., & Imbens, G. (2019). Why high-order polynomials should not be used in regression discontinuity designs. *Journal of Business & Economic Statistics*, *37*(3), 447–456. https://doi.org/10.1080/07350015.2017.1366909

Hahn, J., Todd, P., & Van der Klaauw, W. (2001). Identification and estimation of treatment effects with a regression-discontinuity design. *Econometrica*, *69*(1), 201–209. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2692190

Hastings, J. S., Neilson, C. A., & Zimmerman, S. D. (2013). Are some degrees worth more than others? evidence from college admission cutoffs in chile. *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper #19241*. https://doi.org/10.3386/w19241

Hoekstra, M. (2009). The effect of attending the flagship state university on earnings: A discontinuity-based approach. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, *91*(4), 717–724. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.91.4.717

Jia, R., & Li, H. (2021). Just above the exam cutoff score: Elite college admission and wages in china. *Journal of Public Economics*, *196*. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104371

MacLeod, W. B., Riehl, E., Saavedra, J. E., & Urquiola, M. (2017). The big sort: College reputation and labor market outcomes. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, *9*(3), 223–261. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20160126

Martinez-Bravo, M. (2017). The local political economy effects of school construction in indonesia. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, *9*(2), 256–289. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20150447

McCrary, J. (2008). Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: A density test. *Journal of Econometrics*, *142*(2), 698–714. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.05.005

Mountjoy, J., & Hickman, B. R. (2021). The returns to college(s): Relative value-added and match effects in higher education. *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper #29276*. https://doi.org/10.3386/w29276

Muñoz, P., & Prem, M. (2022). Managers' productivity and recruitment in the public sector. *[Unpublished manuscript]*.

Muralidharan, K., & Singh, A. (2020). Improving public sector management at scale? experimental evidence on school governance. *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper #28129*. https://doi.org/10.3386/w28129

Pop-Eleches, C., & Urquiola, M. (2013). Going to a better school: Effects and behavioral responses. *American Economic Review*, *103*(4), 1289–1324. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.4.1289

Riaño, J. F. (2021). Bureaucratic nepotism. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3995589

Tsai, T. C., Jha, A. K., Gawande, A. A., Huckman, R. S., Bloom, N., & Sadun, R. (2015). Hospital board and management practices are strongly related to hospital performance on clinical quality metrics. *Health Affairs*, *34*(8), 1304–1311. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2014.1282

UNDP. (2017). Desiguales. orígenes, cambios y desafíos de la brecha social en chile. *United Nations Development Programme*.

Zimmerman, S. D. (2019). Elite colleges and upward mobility to top jobs and top incomes. *American Economic Review*, *109*(1), 1–47. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20171019

Figures

Figure 1: Distribution of Programs' Cutoffs by University Type

Notes: Average (2000-2017) admission cutoff for each program. Elite universities are the two most selective institutions in the country (UCH and PUC).

Figure 2: Public Servants by Ministry

Notes: Average (2018-2022) number of public servants per ministry. Year 2023 not included as only observed until May. Public servants comprehend planta (staff) and contrata (temporary) contracts.

Figure 3: Proportion of Top Positions by Ministry

Notes: Average (2018-2022) proportion of top positions per ministry. Year 2023 not included as only observed until May. The top positions are defined as all directive positions, and the professionals at the top 8 places, out of 31, in the salary scale (i.e., top 15% of professionals).

Figure 4: Programs' Selectivity and Proportion of Top Positions

Notes: Estimation sample of all programs in an elite university relative to a non-elite university. Elite universities are the two most selective institutions in the country (UCH and PUC). Each mark represents the average entry exam score of the accepted applicants in each program between 2000 and 2017, and the share of top positions from that program.

Figure 5: Programs' Selectivity and Proportion of Top Positions

Notes: Estimation sample of all programs in an elite university relative to a non-elite university. Each mark represents the average entry exam score of the accepted applicants in each program between 2000 and 2017, and the share of top positions from that program. The top positions are defined as all directive positions, and the professionals at the top 8 places, out of 31, in the salary scale (i.e., top 15% of professionals). Omitted programs with a proportion among top positions ≤ 0.0005 (0.05%).

Figure 6: Manipulation Test


Notes: Manipulation test using local polynomial density estimation (Cattaneo et al., 2018). Estimation sample of all programs in an elite university relative to a non-elite university. Applications processes from 2000 to 2017. In blue, applicants accepted into any program in an elite university (and would have been accepted or were waitlisted in the same program in a non-elite university). In red, applicants who were accepted into any program in a non-elite university (and were waitlisted or would have been accepted into the same program in an elite university). The formal test doesn't reject the null hypothesis of no manipulation (P-value = 0.59).

Figure 7: Continuity Covariates Test

Notes: Estimation sample of all programs in an elite university relative to a non-elite university. Each point estimate represents the estimated coefficient on admission ($\hat{\alpha}$) from equation (3) using covariates in the vertical axis as outcomes and including program-institution-year fixed effects. Linear RDD model allowing for different slopes at each side of the centered threshold, with MSE-optimal bandwidth selector (Calonico et al., 2014b; Calonico et al., 2014d). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and confidence intervals at 95% confidence level. Non-discrete variables (age, HS GPA, and number of applications listed) are standardized by application process year.

Tables

Table 1: Universities' Characteristics by Type

	Elite Universities (N = 2)	non-Elite Universities (N = 34)
Public university	0.50	0.47
N programs offered	44	36
N students accepted (year avg.)	3,407	1,861
Proportion total students accepted	0.065	0.032
Proportion students enrolled after acceptance	0.88	0.70
Program cutoff score	660.5	551.8
Proportion accepted students female	0.56	0.54
Proportion accepted students from private HS	0.56	0.18
Proportion accepted students from voucher HS	0.25	0.52
Proportion accepted students from public HS	0.18	0.30
Age of accepted student	18.7	19.0
Proportion accepted students from Metrop. region	0.78	0.33
N preferences listed in application by accepted student	4.5	5.1
Per capita family income (2018 CLP)	286,024	163,373

Notes: Elite universities are the two most selective institutions in the country (UCH and PUC). Data from 2000 to 2017 applications collapsed at the institution level.

Table 2: Analytical Sample

	All Applicants		
	Not in Public Sector	Public Sector	Top Positions
Panel A: Applicants' characteristics			
N options ranked in application	4.8	5.0	4.9
Accepted in any university	0.69	0.68	0.79
Accepted in elite university	0.09	0.08	0.21
Female	0.50	0.67	0.49
Age	32.2	33.5	37.5
Graduated HS in Metrop. region	0.38	0.27	0.42
From private HS	0.19	0.14	0.27
From voucher HS	0.51	0.50	0.42
From public HS	0.29	0.36	0.30
Per capita family income (2018 CLP)	169,808	150,771	216,413
Panel B: Positions' characteristics			
Monthly avg. earnings (2018 CLP)	-	1,253,747	2,527,635
In Metrop. region	-	0.30	0.59
N Applicants	1,188,791	190,374	9,452

Notes: All individuals who applied to the university between 2000 and 2017, matched with public sector labor outcomes from 2018 to 2023. Only considered the first application process of each individual. The top positions are defined as all directive positions, and the professionals at the top 8 places, out of 31, in the salary scale (i.e., top 15% of professionals).

Table 3: Estimation Subsamples

	All Programs	Law, Business, Engineering	Health (non-Medicine)	Architecture, Sociology, Journalism	Public Admin.
Proportion accepted in elite univ.	0.32	0.34	0.22	0.37	0.37
Proportion accepted in non-elite univ.	0.68	0.66	0.78	0.63	0.63
Female	0.52	0.35	0.75	0.57	0.53
Private HS	0.39	0.52	0.31	0.44	0.13
Metrop. Region (Santiago)	0.70	0.69	0.68	0.66	0.73
Top position	0.009	0.010	0.005	0.013	0.059
N applicants	183,806	60,695	25,790	11,040	2,547

Notes: Each column corresponds to the subsample used to estimate the effect of enrolling in an elite relative to a non-elite university for the set of programs in each column title. Only considered individuals accepted in an elite university (and would have been accepted in a non-elite university otherwise) or waitlisted in an elite university (and accepted in a non-elite university) in the corresponding set of programs. Also considered a smaller group of individuals accepted in a non-elite university (and would have been accepted in an elite university otherwise) or waitlisted in a non-elite university (and accepted in an elite university) in the corresponding set of programs.

Table 4: Stacked Fuzzy RD Second-Stage Estimates

	Sample		
	Overall	Male	Female
Outcome: Public Sector			
Enrollment	-0.014*	-0.002	-0.024*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Control Group Mean	0.150	0.120	0.178
Bandwidth	14.5	23.4	16.7
N	38,388	29,225	21,145
Outcome: Top Position			
Enrollment	-0.001	-0.002	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Control Group Mean	0.015	0.013	0.016
Bandwidth	12.5	25.9	14.2
N	33,526	31,779	18,264

Notes: Estimation sample of all programs in an elite university relative to a non-elite university. The enrollment variable is instrumented in a first stage with acceptance, and the reported coefficient is the estimated $\hat{\delta}$ parameter of equation (4) using local polynomial RD estimation with robust bias-corrected confidence intervals (Calonico et al., 2020; Calonico et al., 2014d; Calonico et al., 2014b). The model includes program-university-year fixed effects and baseline covariates controlling for HS GPA, number of applications listed, and indicators for gender, age, type of high school, region, and if any parent worked in public sector. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.10$.

Table 5: Stacked Fuzzy RD Second-Stage Estimates by Programs

| | Sample | | |
Outcome: Top Position	Overall	Male	Female
Panel A: Law, Business, Engineering			
Enrollment	-0.001	-0.000	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Control Group Mean	0.012	0.010	0.016
Bandwidth	17.5	18.5	25.3
N	14,021	10,199	6,064
Panel B: Health (non-Medicine)			
Enrollment	0.012	0.014	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.008)
Control Group Mean	0.007	0.005	0.007
Bandwidth	16.1	10.9	19.7
N	5,404	957	4,761
Panel C: Architecture, Sociology, Journalism			
Enrollment	-0.017	-0.082**	-0.005
	(0.019)	(0.042)	(0.021)
Control Group Mean	0.017	0.018	0.017
Bandwidth	17.5	14.2	19.6
N	2,877	1,029	1,791
Panel D: Public Administration			
Enrollment	0.026	0.102	0.004
	(0.049)	(0.094)	(0.052)
Control Group Mean	0.072	0.081	0.064
Bandwidth	27.2	20.6	22.5
N	1,241	470	557

Notes: The enrollment variable is instrumented in a first stage with acceptance, and the reported coefficient is the estimated $\hat{\delta}$ parameter of equation (4) using local polynomial RD estimation with robust bias-corrected confidence intervals (Calonico et al., 2020; Calonico et al., 2014d; Calonico et al., 2014b). The model includes program-university-year fixed effects and baseline covariates controlling for HS GPA, number of applications listed, and indicators for gender, age, type of high school, region, and if any parent worked in public sector. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

A APPENDIX

A.1 Figures

Figure A.1: Top Positions

| Salary Scale	Govt. Authorities	Managers	Professionals	Technicians Administrative Auxiliaries
A	8,424,014			
B	7,805,805			
C	7,217,956			
1-A	3,364,759			
1-B	3,445,450			
1-C	3,389,548	3,458,714		
2	3,334,590	3,334,085		
3	3,179,344	3,178,335		
4	3,032,770	3,031,251	2,982,523	
5	2,655,506	2,693,437	2,568,712	
6		2,461,138	2,417,531	
7		2,232,668	2,207,538	
8		2,031,271	2,011,540	
9		1,846,890	1,847,864	879,621
10		1,694,189	1,695,059	832,244
11		1,556,775	1,557,538	785,374
12		1,430,593	1,431,243	748,362
13			1,300,149	708,331
14			1,192,893	668,721
15			1,094,685	634,628
16			1,004,665	593,75
17			922,263	564,093
18			832,543	539,716
19			761,821	517,885
20			696,221	486,324
21			638,289	460,29
22			587,189	419,867
23			541,325	385,959
24				357,576
25				337,964
26				316,149
27				295,077
28				280,584
29				266,479
30				253,72
31				241,722

Notes: The values are a summary of the remunerations received by officials governed by the Single Salary Scale. Highlighted cells signal the positions considered as top positions in the public sector, all managers and the top-ranked professionals

Figure A.2: Manipulation Test by Programs

Notes: Manipulation test using local polynomial density estimation (Cattaneo et al., 2018). Estimation sample of each set of programs in an elite university relative to a non-elite university. Applications processes from 2000 to 2017. In blue, applicants accepted into the corresponding group of programs in an elite university (and would have been accepted or were waitlisted in the same program in a non-elite university). In red, applicants who were accepted into the corresponding group of programs in a non-elite university (and were waitlisted or would have been accepted into the same program in an elite university). The formal tests don't reject the null hypotheses of no manipulation at 95% confidence (P-value (a) = 0.73; P-value (b) = 0.28; P-value (c) = 0.89; P-value (d) = 0.06).

Figure A.3: Continuity Test by Programs

Notes: Estimation sample of each set of programs in an elite university relative to a non-elite university. Each point estimate represents the estimated coefficient on admission ($\hat{\alpha}$) from equation (3) using covariates in the vertical axis as outcomes and including program-institution-year fixed effects. Linear RDD model allowing for different slopes at each side of the centered threshold, with MSE-optimal bandwidth selector (Calonico et al., 2014b; Calonico et al., 2014d). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and confidence intervals at 95% confidence level. Non-discrete variables (age, HS GPA, and number of applications listed) are standardized by application process year.

Figure A.4: Admission on Enrollment

Notes: Estimation sample of all programs in an elite university rela-
tive to a non-elite university. Applications processes from 2000 to 2017.
At the right of the centered threshold are applicants accepted into any
program in an elite university (and would have been accepted or were
waitlisted in the same program in a non-elite university), and at the left,
are applicants who were accepted into any program in a non-elite uni-
versity (and were waitlisted or would have been accepted into the same
program in an elite university).

Figure A.5: Admission on Enrollment by Programs

Notes: Estimation sample of each set of programs in an elite university relative to a non-elite university. Applications processes from 2000 to 2017. At the right of the centered threshold are applicants accepted into the corresponding group of programs in an elite university (and would have been accepted or were waitlisted in the same program in a non-elite university), and at the left, are applicants who were accepted into the corresponding group of programs in a non-elite university (and were waitlisted or would have been accepted into the same program in an elite university).

A.2 Tables

Table A.1: Universities

Institution Name	Public/Private	Traditional/Non-Traditional	Elite/Non-Elite	Metrop. Region/Other
Universidad de Chie	Public	Traditional (CRUCH)	Elite	Metrop. Region
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile	Private	Traditional (CRUCH)	Elite	Metrop. Region
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso	Private	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad Austral de Chile	Private	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad Alberto Hurtado	Private	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Metrop. Region
Universidad de los Andes	Private	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Metrop. Region
Universidad de Antofagasta	Public	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad de Aysén	Public	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidd del Bío-Bío	Public	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad Católica del Maule	Private	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad Católica del Norte	Private	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad Católica de la Santísima Concepción	Private	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad Católica de Temuco	Private	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad de Atacama	Public	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad de Concepción	Private	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad Diego Portales	Private	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Metrop. Region
Universidad de la Frontera	Public	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad de los Lagos	Public	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad de la Serena	Public	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad de Magallanes	Public	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad Metropolitana de Ciencias de la Educación	Public	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Metrop. Region
Universidad Arturo Prat	Public	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad de O'Higgins	Public	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad de Playa Ancha	Public	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad de Santiago	Public	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Metrop. Region
Universidad de Tarapacá	Public	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad de Talca	Public	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad Tecnológica Metropolitana	Public	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Metrop. Region
Universidad Técnica Federico Santa María	Private	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad de Valparaíso	Public	Traditional (CRUCH)	Non-Elite	Other Region
Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez	Private	Non-Traditional	Non-Elite	Metrop. Region
Universidad Católica Silva Henríquez	Private	Non-Traditional	Non-Elite	Metrop. Region
Universidad del Desarrollo	Private	Non-Traditional	Non-Elite	Metrop. Region
Universidad Finis Terrae	Private	Non-Traditional	Non-Elite	Metrop. Region
Universidad Mayor	Private	Non-Traditional	Non-Elite	Metrop. Region
Universidad Andrés Bello	Private	Non-Traditional	Non-Elite	Metrop. Region

Notes: The table includes all 36 universities considered in the sample. The geographical location is based on their main offices, as many institutions have campuses in more than one region in the country.

Table A.2: Fuzzy RD Second-Stage Estimates.
Overlapping Programs [600-700]

	Sample		
	Overall	Male	Female
Outcome: Public Sector			
Enrollment	-0.021**	-0.008	-0.021*
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Control Group Mean	0.143	0.109	0.171
Bandwidth	18.9	23.5	28.6
N	30,807	16,376	23,535
Outcome: Top Position			
Enrollment	-0.006	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Control Group Mean	0.018	0.02	0.018
Bandwidth	20.3	33.2	19.2
N	32,783	21,090	17,129

Notes: Estimation sample of all programs in an elite
university relative to a non-elite university and only
programs with cutoffs between 600 and 700 points.
The enrollment variable is instrumented in a first stage
with acceptance, and the reported coefficient is the es-
timated $\hat{\delta}$ parameter of equation (4) using local poly-
nomial RD estimation with robust bias-corrected confi-
dence intervals (Calonico et al., 2020; Calonico et al.,
2014d; Calonico et al., 2014b). The model includes
program-university-year fixed effects and baseline co-
variates controlling for HS GPA, number of applica-
tions listed, and indicators for gender, age, type of high
school, region, and if any parent worked in public sec-
tor. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table A.3: Fuzzy RD Second-Stage Estimates. Heterogeneous Effects

	Non-Private HS	Private HS	Non-Metrop. Region	Metrop. Region	Age $\leq$ 30	Age $>$ 30
Outcome: Public Sector						
Enrollment	-0.032**	-0.002	-0.034**	-0.006	0.001	-0.022*
	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Control Group Mean	0.170	0.118	0.195	0.130	0.100	0.190
Bandwidth	13.0	19.6	20.7	13.4	12.9	13.9
N	20,350	20,141	15,895	24,693	15,795	20,163
Outcome: Top Position						
Enrollment	0.002	-0.005	-0.002	-0.002	0.001	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.006)
Control Group Mean	0.016	0.012	0.015	0.015	0.001	0.025
Bandwidth	11.4	17.0	19.3	16.1	19.7	14.1
N	18,093	17,778	14,926	29,079	23,143	20,315

Notes: Each estimation subsample is restricted to the group in the corresponding column title. The enrollment variable is instrumented in a first stage with acceptance, and the reported coefficient is the estimated $\hat{\delta}$ parameter of equation (4) using local polynomial RD estimation with robust bias-corrected confidence intervals (Calonico et al., 2020; Calonico et al., 2014d; Calonico et al., 2014b). All models include program-university-year fixed effects and baseline covariates controlling for HS GPA, number of applications listed, and indicators for gender, age, type of high school, region, and if any parent worked in public sector. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table A.4: Fuzzy RD Second-Stage Estimates. Heterogeneous Effects by Programs. Outcome: Top Position

	Non-Private HS	Private HS	Non-Metrop. Region	Metrop. Region	Age ≤ 30	Age > 30
Panel A: Law, Business, Engineering						
Enrollment	-0.008	-0.001	-0.004	-0.000	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.010)
Control Group Mean	0.013	0.011	0.017	0.010	0.001	0.023
Bandwidth	13.8	29.3	18.5	21.7	26.3	23.5
N	5,032	12,123	4,873	11,381	9,933	9,166
Panel B: Health (non-Medicine)						
Enrollment	0.024**	-0.016*	0.015	0.012	-0.001	0.021
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.017)
Control Group Mean	0.007	0.004	0.007	0.006	0.000	0.017
Bandwidth	15.7	13.5	15.0	10.9	16.0	20.7
N	3,535	1,543	1,872	2,396	3,009	2,949
Panel C: Architecture, Sociology, Journalism						
Enrollment	-0.014	-0.049	0.021	-0.052**	-0.004	-0.041
	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.003)	(0.051)
Control Group Mean	0.022	0.011	0.020	0.016	0.002	0.031
Bandwidth	17.2	14.2	23.8	16.4	16.4	13.8
N	1,553	1,074	1,297	1,787	1,311	1,200
Panel D: Public Administration						
Enrollment	0.143**	-0.101	0.059	0.054	0.016	0.092
	(0.072)	(0.161)	(0.104)	(0.069)	(0.013)	(0.110)
Control Group Mean	0.073	0.067	0.046	0.081	0.007	0.117
Bandwidth	14.7	16.0	18.6	15.9	21.4	17.3
N	630	118	189	630	356	548

Notes: Each estimation subsample is restricted to the group in the corresponding column title. The enrollment variable is instrumented in a first stage with acceptance, and the reported coefficient is the estimated $\hat{\delta}$ parameter of equation (4) using local polynomial RD estimation with robust bias-corrected confidence intervals (Calonico et al., 2020; Calonico et al., 2014d; Calonico et al., 2014b). All models include program-university-year fixed effects and baseline covariates controlling for HS GPA, number of applications listed, and indicators for gender, age, type of high school, region, and if any parent worked in public sector. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.10$.