

# Jesse Silbert

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## EDUCATION

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<b>Ph.D., Economics</b> <i>Princeton University</i>	Princeton (NJ), USA <i>Fall 2019 - Current</i>
<b>Pre-doctoral Research Fellow</b> <i>Opportunity Insights at Harvard University</i>	Cambridge (MA), USA <i>Jul 2018 - Jul 2019</i>
<b>Pre-doctoral Research Fellow</b> <i>Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research</i>	Stanford (CA), USA <i>June 2017 - July 2018</i>
<b>B.A., Economics-Mathematics</b> <i>Columbia University</i>	New York (NY), USA <i>Fall 2013 - Spring 2017</i>

## RESEARCH FIELDS

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**Primary:** Empirical Industrial Organization,  
**Secondary:** Labor Economics, Economics of AI, Market Design

## REFERENCES

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<b>Alessandro Lizzeri</b> Stanley G. Ivins '34 Professor of Economics Department of Economics, Princeton University <a href="mailto:lizzeri@princeton.edu">lizzeri@princeton.edu</a>	<b>Jakub Kastl</b> Professor of Economics Department of Economics, Princeton University <a href="mailto:jkastl@princeton.edu">jkastl@princeton.edu</a>	<b>Adam Kapor</b> Associate Professor of Economics Department of Economics, Princeton University <a href="mailto:akapor@princeton.edu">akapor@princeton.edu</a>
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## RESEARCH PAPERS

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### Working Papers

- ♦ Making Talk Cheap: Generative AI and Labor Market Signaling (**Job Market Paper**)  
(with *Anaïs Galdin*)

**Abstract:** This paper studies how large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT lower the cost of producing written communication and disrupt markets that have traditionally relied on writing as a costly signal of quality (e.g., job applications, college essays). Using data from *Freelancer.com*, a major digital labor platform, we explore the effects of LLMs' disruption of labor market signaling on equilibrium market outcomes. We develop a novel LLM-based measure to quantify how tailored an application is to a given job posting. Taken to the data, the measure significantly predicts labor demand in the period before LLMs are introduced, but not after. Motivated by this finding, we develop a structural model of labor market signaling, in which workers invest costly effort to produce noisy signals that predict their ability in equilibrium. We estimate the model on pre-LLM data using a novel simulation-based estimator, and then simulate a counterfactual equilibrium in which LLMs reduce writing costs to zero, dismantling workers' capacity to signal their ability. Our

counterfactual analysis suggests that LLMs cause employers to divert hiring away from higher ability, higher cost workers towards lower ability, lower cost ones, thereby lowering wages and leading to a reduction in worker surplus and a modest increase in employer surplus.

- ◇ Job Matching without Price Discrimination (*with Wilbur Townsend*) **Draft**

*Revise and Resubmit at Games and Economic Behavior*

**Abstract:** In many labor markets, firms do not price discriminate among their workers. We study how a labor market with uniform salaries matches workers to jobs. To do so, we construct a job matching model in which each firm views workers as interchangeable and must pay all its workers the same salary. While an efficient stable outcome always exists, inefficient outcomes can be stable as well. Workers' preferred stable outcome is efficient. In contrast, firms prefer inefficient stable outcomes in which they pay lower salaries.

## Work in Progress

- ◇ Congestion and Effortful Information Provision in Two Sided Markets (*with Anaïs Galdin*)
- ◇ Attentional Market Power on Digital Labor Platforms (*with Anaïs Galdin and Yiyang Tan*)

## TEACHING

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<i>Organization and Design of Markets</i> , Assistant Instructor, Prof. Jakub Kastl, Princeton University	<i>Fall 2023</i>
<i>Microeconomic Theory: A Mathematical Approach</i> , Assistant Instructor, Prof. Can Urgan, Princeton University	<i>Fall 2022</i>

## GRANTS, FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

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Princeton University Graduate Fellowship	<i>2019-2025</i>
National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship	<i>2021-2024</i>
Department of Economics Graduate Student Teaching Prize, Princeton University	<i>Fall 2023</i>
William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Summer Research Grant, Princeton University	<i>Summer 2023</i>
Magna Cum Laude with Departmental Honors in Economics, Columbia University	<i>Spring 2017</i>

## PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

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### Referee Service

Journal of Economic Theory