NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
(11-2015)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)

(See NUREG-1022, R 3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/)

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. LER NUMBER		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.
Cooper Nuclear Station	05000- 298	2016	- 010	- 00

NARRATIVE

monitor sump levels. As such, Operations placed the Torus area and Reactor Building floor drain valve control switches in the OPEN position and commenced hourly checks of the Reactor Building floor drain sump levels for unusual changes.

Detector FP-TD-19-2 was replaced, post work testing completed satisfactory, and the detector was declared unimpaired on July 15, 2016, at 14:32 hours. Additionally, the control switches for the applicable valves were placed to AUTO.

It was subsequently determined that by placing the drain valve control switches to OPEN, the automatic flood protection function that is credited in CNS' internal flooding analysis, was defeated.

During the time the detector was impaired, there were no compensatory actions taken to ensure Division 1 CS and Division 1 RHR systems were protected from postulated flooding caused by a high-energy line break. As such, it was determined that both Division 1 CS and Division 1 RHR were inoperable for a period greater than allowed by TS 3.5.1, Condition H.

BASIS FOR REPORT

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications, and also in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) as any event or condition that as a result of a single cause could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function for two or more trains or channels that are needed to remove residual heat.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

The safety significance of this event is low. The Division 1 CS and Division 1 RHR Systems were inoperable for approximately 4 days. In the case of postulated flooding caused by a main feedwater break, Division 2 RHR system and the ADS were available to mitigate the event. This event did not cause an impact to the safety of the general public, nuclear safety, industrial safety, or radiological safety.

CAUSE

The apparent cause was determined to be that when the flooding requirements in the Reactor Building changed, a review of alarm cards did not identify alarm card FP-1/C-4 as needing updated.