APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION EXPIRES: (11-2015) 10/31/2018 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and (See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block) Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the (See NUREG-1022, R 3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/) of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE 05000298 1 of 4 Cooper Nuclear Station 4. TITLE Inadequate Compensatory Measures Results in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications **5. EVENT DATE** 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 6. LER NUMBER REV **FACILITY NAME** DOCKET SEQUENTIAL MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NO. 05000 NUMBER **FACILITY NAME** DOCKET 07 11 2016 2016 -010 -00 02 15 2017 05000 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: 9. OPERATING MODE (Check all that apply) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 1 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 10. POWER LEVEL 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 73.71(a)(5) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 73.77(a)(1) 100 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) \Box 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 73.77(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 73.77(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) ☐ OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER LICENSEE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (402) 825-2788 Jim Shaw, Licensing Manager 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT REPORTABLE MANU-CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-**FACTURER FACTURER** TO EPIX TO EPIX Υ BO Α 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

From July 11, 2016, to July 15, 2016, the Torus area and Reactor Building floor drain valve control switches were placed in the OPEN position, per alarm card FP-1/C-4, due to fire detector FP-TD-19-2 being impaired. Subsequently, it was determined that by placing the floor drain valve control switches to OPEN, the automatic flood protection function that is credited in Cooper Nuclear Station's internal flooding analysis, was defeated. During the time the detector was impaired, there were no credited compensatory actions taken to ensure Division 1 Core Spray (CS) and Division 1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) systems were protected from postulated flooding caused by a high-energy line break. As such, it was determined that both Division 1 CS and Division 1 RHR were inoperable for a period greater than allowed by Technical Specifications.

No

SUBMISSION

DATE

The cause was determined to be that when the flooding requirements in the Reactor Building changed, a review of alarm cards did not identify alarm card FP-1/C-4 as needing updated.

Alarm card FP-1/C-4 was revised to remove taking radwaste valves out of AUTO for each quad. In addition, the applicable procedure has been revised to ensure actions taken will ensure operability is maintained for environmentally qualified components in each of the Reactor Building quads; and a review of fire panel alarm cards will be performed for similar occurrences where monitoring is the only action taken.