"Algorithmic Attention and Content Creation on Social Media Platforms"

by Yi Chen, Fei Li, and Marcel Preuss

Discussion by
Jesse Yao (Chinese University of Hong Kong)

• I really like this paper!

Very elegant, lots of cool insights, beautifully written

Attention allocation on social media is an important problem

Look at it from a two-sided mechanism design perspective

- A platform (the mechanism designer)
- Two-sided users: content creators and viewers
- A content creator decides how much effort to incur
 - Higher effort → higher quality
- A viewer decides how much recommended content to see
 - Higher quality & relevant content → higher consumption utility
 - Irrelevant content or ads → no consumption utility
 - A linear attention cost
- Algorithm (mechanism): content creators' effort recommendation and users' attention allocation (relevant content, irrelevant content, and ads)

- The platform wants as many ads as possible (revenue max. objective) subject to the constraints that
 - Viewers want to see the recommended content
 - Creators want to incur the recommended effort
- Viewers' participation constraint:
 - More relevant content
 - Higher quality content
 - Fewer ads
- Creators' participation constraint:
 - More attention
 - Lower recommended effort

- Viewers' participation constraint:
 - More relevant content
 - Higher quality content
 - Fewer ads
- The algorithms observes the horizontal type of creators and viewers
- → can avoid recommending any irrelevant content (no consumption utility + attention cost)
- But there is also an indirect effect

Creators' participation constraint:

More attention

Lower recommended effort

Viewers' participation constraint:

More relevant content

Higher quality content

Fewer ads

- <u>Observation</u>: a creator's effort is a fixed cost (0 marginal cost of allocating the content to an additional viewer)
 - recommending a creator's content to unmatched viewers
 - → more attention
 - → relaxing the creator's participation constraint
 - →can recommend a higher effort level
 - →higher content quality
 - → relaxing viewers' participation constraint
 - → more ads

Creators' participation constraint:

More attention

Lower recommended effort

Viewers' participation constraint:

More relevant content

Higher quality content

Fewer ads

- The direct effect of less relevant content tightening viewers' participation constraint is still there
- Recommending irrelevant content requires a strong enough indirect effect
 - \rightarrow a unit increase in attention can lead to a large enough increase in content quality $(q = \theta e)$
 - \rightarrow high ability creators (high θ)

What's so good about this paper?

- Own experience on social media: still encounter irrelevant content
 - Most straightforward reasoning: imperfect technology by the platform
 - This paper: a different force strategic consideration of the platform
- Very carefully executed
- Intuitions are crystal clear
- Relevant to empirical research (especially the monetary incentives section)

Some additional thoughts

- Usually in mechanism design: some uncertainty about the type/effort
- →IC constraints
- This paper: only IR constraints
- Why?
 - Mapping from effort to quality is deterministic $q = \theta e$ (can perfectly infer the effort from the realized quality)
 - The platform has perfect information: content quality, creator ability and horizontal type, user type
- Not possible/necessary to model everything, but may be worth it to have some uncertainty

Some additional thoughts

- Mainly discussed existence and properties of the optimal mechanism
 - Maybe some discussions about the uniqueness?

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- Mainly discussed existence and properties of the optimal mechanism
 - Maybe some discussions about the uniqueness?

- Discussed some empirical evidences consistent with the theoretical findings
 - This paper is very relevant to empirical research as well
 - Maybe say more about testable implications

Thanks!