

# Reputation for Privacy

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# Reputation for Privacy

## Abstract

As consumers become increasingly concerned about their privacy, firms can benefit from committing not to sell consumer data. However, the holdup problem prevents firms from doing so in a static setting. This paper studies whether reputation consideration of the firm can serve as a commitment device in a long-run game when consumers have imperfect monitoring technology. We find that a patient enough monopoly can commit because its reputation will suffer from a persistent punishment if consumers detect the data sale. In contrast, reputation may fail to serve as a commitment device when there are multiple firms. The penalty for selling data is temporary when consumers do not know exactly which firm sold the data. In addition, selling data imposes a negative externality on other firms, but each firm does not take it into account in equilibrium. We characterize conditions under which duopolistic firms lose the ability to commit even if they are arbitrarily patient. Reputation cannot serve as a commitment device under any conditions as the number of firms increases because each firm is penalized less for selling the data but not rewarded more for not doing so. Lastly, we explore several ways of restoring firms' commitment power through regulation.

# 1 Introduction

An information market has emerged in the digital era. The business of collecting and selling consumer data is estimated to be worth around \$200 billion.<sup>[1]</sup> Firms use detailed information about individuals to offer a personalized product, price discriminate, show targeted ads, etc. Aware of the costs of revealing information, consumers are becoming increasingly concerned about their privacy. People started to raise concerns about their privacy in the 1990s. About .01% of the US population opted out of the database of Lotus MarketPlace.<sup>[2]</sup> But most people at that time were either not aware of privacy issues or did not care much about them. By contrast, a 2021 survey of the general US population by KPMG found that 86% of consumers viewed data privacy as a growing concern.<sup>[3]</sup>

One reason people worry about a firm collecting their data is that they do not know how the firm will use it. According to the same survey, 40% of consumers do not trust firms to use their data ethically. Taylor (2004) shows that a firm can be better off by not protecting consumer privacy if consumers are naive and unaware that the firm sells their data. However, selling data can backfire if consumers are sophisticated and expect the firm to sell their data. Since then, a large body of literature has documented that the ability to commit to consumer privacy benefits the firm. As a result, companies pay increasing attention to privacy. Apple, for instance, has invested heavily in operating systems to protect consumer privacy and spent a good deal on advertising its progress in privacy protection. In this particular setting, the firm desires to commit to protecting consumer privacy by not selling consumer data. However, the non-verifiable nature of digital data makes it hard for a firm to commit. Despite the emerging regulations about consumer privacy, such as GDPR and CCPA, there are concerns about the credibility of such policies. Even if firms do not sell data in the presence of such regulation, consumers cannot easily verify it. The firm will not

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<sup>[1]</sup> The source is <https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-11-05/column-data-brokers>.

<sup>[2]</sup> The source is <https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2020/12/14/the-rising-concern-around-consumer-data-and-privacy/?sh=73c76330487e>.

<sup>[3]</sup> The source is <https://kpmg.com/us/en/articles/2023/bridging-the-trust-chasm.html>.

benefit from protecting consumer privacy if it fails to obtain consumers’ trust in how firms handle their data. This paper looks at one possible solution - building trust by reputation. Protecting consumer privacy is more credible and convincing from the consumer’s perspective if it is in the interest of the firm and is an endogenous equilibrium outcome.

The main contribution of the paper is to characterize conditions such that reputation considerations can or cannot serve as a commitment device for privacy. When a monopoly is patient enough, reputation enables it to commit never to sell data. It achieves the Stackelberg payoff (optimal payoff if the firm can commit to any action) in all but a finite number of periods. However, when there are multiple firms, reputation may fail to enable any firms to commit. We find conditions under which the incentive to deviate is so strong that duopolistic firms lose the ability to commit even if they are arbitrarily close to perfectly patient. Furthermore, reputation consideration of the firm cannot serve as a commitment device for privacy under any conditions when there are many firms. Such reputation failure hurts all the firms. We also explore several ways of restoring firms’ commitment power through regulation.

We consider long-lived firms interacting with short-lived consumers repeatedly in two markets. In the product market, the consumer decides how much information to reveal. Each firm infers consumer preferences based on the revealed information and offers a personalized product and price. The consumer then makes the purchase decision. By revealing more information, they get a better recommendation.<sup>4</sup> However, the firm will charge a higher price when it collects more information from the consumer, knowing that they have a higher expected valuation for the product. So, the consumer faces a tradeoff between better product fit and lower price. In the information market, the firm can sell consumer data to third parties (e.g., data intermediaries). Consumers may suffer disutility from the sale of their data because of both intrinsic and instrumental reasons (Lin 2022). They are more vulnerable to data sales if they reveal more information to the firm. Therefore, the consumer’s decision

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<sup>4</sup>We refer to the consumer as the inclusive singular “they” throughout the paper.

as to how much information to reveal in the product market depends on their belief about the firm's behavior in the information market. If the consumer thinks the firm will sell their data, they will reveal no information, to minimize privacy loss. If they trust the firm not to sell their data, they will reveal some information, to get a better product recommendation. The Stackelberg action (optimal action if the firm can commit to any action) of the firm is not to sell data. But whether to sell data or not is decided after the consumer reveals the information. Hence, the *holdup problem* prevents the firm from not selling data in a static setting.

This paper studies whether the reputation consideration of the firm can serve as a commitment device in a long-run game when consumers have imperfect monitoring technology. Reputation can be a commitment device for a patient enough monopoly but may fail to be one when there are multiple firms, even when firms are arbitrarily close to perfectly patient. The intuition is that a monopoly's reputation depends solely on its own actions. The monopoly will never restore its reputation by deviating from selling the data and being caught. The persistent reputation cost strongly incentivizes the monopoly to commit to privacy. In contrast, when there are multiple firms, consumers do not know exactly which firm sold the data, even if they observe data sales. One firm's reputation depends on other firms' actions. Selling data by one firm imposes a negative externality on other firms. Firms do not take this externality into account in equilibrium. The benefit of not selling data is lower because other firms' behavior may still hurt the firm's reputation. Anticipating this externality, consumers penalize each firm less when observing data sales. The penalty for selling data is temporary and the reputation can be restored. In addition, the likelihood that the deviation changes the consumer's future information-revelation decision decreases in the number of firms. Therefore, the cost of selling data is lower, and a firm's reputation may be hurt even if it does not sell data. In this case, the firm has more incentive to deviate.

We find conditions under which the incentive to deviate is so strong that duopolistic firms lose the ability to commit even if they are arbitrarily close to perfectly patient. Furthermore,

the firm is penalized less for selling the data but not rewarded more for not doing so when the number of firms increases. As a result, reputation cannot serve as a commitment device for privacy under any conditions when there are many firms.

We consider several regulatory interventions and extensions. Liability fines with regulator monitoring can restore firms' commitment power if the monitoring technology is good enough. In such cases, the regulation always increases consumer surplus, and improves social welfare if the regulator's monitoring cost is low. Conversely, reputation failure persists even if the regulator limits the amount of data a firm can sell, because this policy does not transform the reputation cost of selling the data from a temporary punishment into a persistent one.

In the main model, consumers never know the exact identity of a data breach. However, in reality, consumers may sometimes observe information about both evidence of data leakage and its source because of media or regulatory exposure. Knowledge of the identity of data leakage does not affect the monopoly case, where there is no uncertainty about which firm sold the data. In the duopoly case, we extend the model by assuming that consumers can identify the source of data leakage with some probability, conditional on detecting data sales. When this ability is perfect, reputation consideration alone can serve as a commitment device, eliminating the need for additional regulatory interventions to sustain the equilibrium of privacy protection. In contrast, when the likelihood of identifying the source of a data breach is low, reputation failure persists under the same set of conditions as in the main model, necessitating additional regulations to maintain the equilibrium of privacy protection.

We also consider the implications of false detection in another extension. In the main model, we account for the possibility of false negatives by allowing consumers to fail to detect some data sales. However, false positives are also possible - sometimes consumers may believe their data were sold when, in fact, they were not. In such scenarios, a rational firm faces a weaker incentive to commit to privacy protection, and the reputation failure result still holds in the multi-firm case. In the monopoly case, the equilibrium effects of false

detection depend on whether consumers recognize the possibility of false-positive signals. If consumers are unaware of this possibility and thinks at least one firm sold their data after observing a signal of data sales, a sufficiently patient rational firm can still commit to privacy protection, provided the false detection rate is low. Conversely, if consumers are aware of false detection and updates their belief with the idea that the signal may be false-positive, the monopoly firm’s incentive structure shifts closer to that of the multi-firm case in the main model. In this scenario, the possibility of false detection erodes the firm’s commitment power because of the higher incentive to deviate.

This paper contributes to the literature on the economics of privacy (see Acquisti, Taylor, and Wagman 2016 for a survey). Goldfarb and Tucker (2012) and Lin (2022) document the existence of substantial consumer privacy concerns. Absent an information market and the possibility of selling data, Chen and Iyer (2002) study competing firms’ incentives to collect data. They find that firms may voluntarily collect less information about consumers to mitigate price competition. Closely related to our paper, Jullien, Lefouili, and Riordan (2020) study a website’s incentive to sell consumer information in a two-period model. Unlike our setup, the website in their paper does not try to change consumers’ beliefs about its type. Instead, the website wants to affect consumer behavior based on their vulnerability and bad experiences because of data sales. In a static framework, Ichihashi (2020) shows that sellers prefer to commit to the price of the good so that buyers will reveal more information. We investigate when such commitment is feasible without an external commitment device. Recent papers have paid much attention to the economic impact of regulations such as GDPR, CCPA, and AdChoices, which seek to protect consumers’ privacy and give them more control over their data (Goldfarb and Tucker 2011, Conitzer, Taylor, and Wagman 2012, Campbell, Goldfarb, and Tucker 2015, Athey, Catalini, and Tucker 2017, Gardete and Bart 2018, Goldberg, Johnson, and Shriver 2019, Montes, Sand-Zantman, and Valletti 2019, Choi, Jerath, and Sarvary 2020, 2023, Johnson, Shriver, and Du 2020, Rafieian and Yoganarasimhan 2021, Choi and Jerath 2022, Hu, Momot, and Wang 2022, Ke and Sudhir 2022,

Lei, Miao, and Momot 2022, Momot and Salikhov 2022, Anderson, Baik, and Larson 2023, Bonatti, Huang, and Villas-Boas 2023, Bondi, Omid, and Yao 2023, Fainmesser, Galeotti, Momot 2023, Johnson, Shriver, and Goldberg 2023, Miklós-Thal et al. 2024, Ning, Shin, and Yu 2024).

There are two reasons why reputation is essential despite various regulations. First, the main focus of those regulations is to give consumers more control over their data usage rather than to provide the firm with commitment power. Second, the opacity and non-verifiability of data transactions raise concerns about the credibility of such policies. Even if a firm does not sell data in the presence of such regulation, consumers still may not believe it. The firm will not benefit from protecting consumer privacy if it fails to obtain consumers' trust in how firms handle their data. Protecting consumer privacy is more credible and convincing from the consumer's perspective if it is in the interest of the firm and is an endogenous equilibrium outcome.

This paper is also related to the reputation literature. The idea of modeling reputation by incomplete information originates from Kreps et al. (1982), Kreps and Wilson (1982), and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). Fudenberg and Levine (1989) show that a patient long-run player will commit to the Stackelberg action in the presence of a behavioral type and perfect monitoring. Reputation serves as a commitment device and selects away bad equilibria for the long-lived player. In contrast, a strand of literature on bad reputation, including Ely and Välimäki (2003) and Morris (2001), shows that reputation concerns may hurt the firm under imperfect monitoring. Different from our papers where a firm can build reputation by always taking the Stackelberg action (optimal action with commitment power) in the absence of other firms, reputation failure in the bad reputation literature relies on a player's inability to build reputation by always taking the Stackelberg action. Substantively, the paper most closely related to ours is Phelan (2006), which studies a problem where the government builds a reputation for trust. Despite perfect monitoring, the reputation shock is non-permanent because the government's type can change over time.



Tirole (1996) initiates the study of collective reputation, where individual reputation and incentive depend on both one’s own and other players’ past behavior. Unlike our paper which looks at the entire equilibrium, Tirole (1996) focuses on the steady state and enforces bad behavior in the initial period. Neeman, Öry, and Yu (2019) compares collective reputation and individual reputation. They characterize conditions such that socially optimal actions are more likely to be sustained and conditions such that socially optimal actions are less likely to be sustained under collective reputation rather than individual reputation. Collective reputation is also studied in the umbrella branding literature (Wernerfelt 1988, Cabral 2000, Kuksov 2007, Miklós-Thal 2012, Moorthy 2012, Kuksov, Shachar, and Wang 2013, Zhang 2015, Klein et al. 2019, Yu 2021, Ke, Shin, and Yu 2023). Despite the long development of the reputation literature, researchers have not paid much attention to the reputation for privacy. Our paper contributes to the reputation literature by investigating the economic and managerial implications of reputation for privacy, and by connecting bad reputation and collective reputation. The underlying mechanism that drives reputation failure is a combination of bad reputation and collective reputation, and is qualitatively different from either the bad reputation literature or the collective reputation literature.

Lastly, by building its reputation for privacy, a firm wishes to separate itself from other firms who do not care about consumer privacy. So, our paper is also related to the literature on signaling (Shin 2005, Gal-Or, Geylani, and Dukes 2008, Iyer and Kuksov 2010, Mayzlin and Shin 2011, Kuksov and Wang 2013, Miklós-Thal and Zhang 2013, Jiang, Ni, and Srinivasan 2014, Xu and Dukes 2019, Dai and Singh 2020, Cao, Chen, and Ke 2023, Yang, Shi, and Lin 2023, Ke et al. 2024).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main model. Section 3 solves the equilibrium of the static game. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium of the repeated game when there is one firm. Section 5 solves the equilibrium of the repeated game when there are multiple firms. Section 6 examines whether some regulatory interventions can restore firms’ commitment power. Section 7 considers two extensions to the main

model. Section 8 concludes.

## 2 Model

Time is infinite,  $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots$ , and the discount factor is  $\delta < 1$ . There are  $N$  long-lived firms and a short-lived consumer in each period. The consumer interacts with all the firms. The firm's payoff is  $(1 - \delta) \sum_{t=0}^{+\infty} \delta^t u_t$ , where  $u_t$  is the stage payoff at time  $t$ . There is a product market and an information market.

### 2.1 Product Market

Consumers have different horizontal preferences and are located uniformly on a circle with a circumference of 1. When a consumer visits a firm in the product market, they choose how much information to reveal. If a consumer located at  $x \sim [0, 1)$  reveals  $\eta \in [0, 1]$  proportion of information, the firm gets a noisy signal  $l^c \sim U[x - (1 - \eta)/2 \bmod 1, x + (1 - \eta)/2 \bmod 1]$  about the consumer's location, as illustrated by Figure [1](#). This implies that the firm will offer a product located at  $l^f = l^c$  given the signal. The firm offers a personalized product and sets the price  $p$  based on the signal. The consumer then makes the purchase decision. Denote the distance between the product's location,  $y$ , and the consumer's location,  $x$ , by  $d = |x - y|$ . We have  $d \sim U[0, (1 - \eta)/2]$ . The baseline valuation of the product is  $v$ , and the disutility from the mismatch of the recommended product and the consumer's horizontal taste is  $td$ . Therefore, the consumer gets  $v - td - p$  if they buy and 0 if they do not buy. Different firms offer different products, so the consumer may buy from multiple firms as long as the product offered by each firm gives the consumer a positive expected payoff. We assume that there is enough horizontal differentiation,  $t > v$ .

The setting of the firm offering one personalized product and price to each consumer based on the information the consumer reveals is analogous to the setting in Ichihashi (2020). The implicit assumption that each firm offers only one product and a consumer cannot purchase




Figure 1: Consumer's location  $x$  and the signal  $l^c$

products not recommended by the firm can be justified by the consumer's limited attention. We acknowledge that the modeling choice does not fully capture the real-world details. However, the product market is not the focus of this paper. This simple setup can concisely reflect the consumer's trade-off between better recommendation and higher price because of the hold-up problem by revealing more information, which is the main economic force in the product market and will be discussed in section [3.1](#).

## 2.2 Information Market

A firm can sell consumer data to third parties (e.g., data intermediaries) in the information market. It has the data directly revealed by the consumer, as well as the consumer's behavioral data (whether they purchase given the product and price offered). It can infer consumers' willingness to pay from the data they reveal directly (Bergemann, Bonatti, and Gan 2022), or from their behavioral data (Shen and Villas-Boas 2018, Taylor 2004, Villas-Boas 1999, 2004). A firm gets  $D(\eta) > 0$  by selling data. We assume that  $D(\eta)$  increases in  $\eta$  to reflect that more accurate information is more valuable. We do not impose other assumptions on the specific form of  $D(\eta)$ .

Consumers may suffer disutility from the sale of their data because of both the intrinsic preference for privacy and the expected economic loss (Lin 2022). They will be more vulnerable to data sales if they reveal more information. So, we assume that the expected

privacy cost of the consumer is  $\eta u_b$ , where  $u_b$  is a constant.<sup>[5]</sup> Consumers can imperfectly monitor firms' behavior in the information market. If a firm sold their data, the consumer detects data sales with probability  $q$ .<sup>[6]</sup> The consumer receives a signal  $s = y$  if they caught any of the sales and  $s = n$  if they did not detect any sales. The assumption that consumers cannot distinguish which firm sold the data gives the sharpest illustration of the main idea. In section 7.1, we relax the assumption by allowing consumers to sometimes know the exact identity of data leakage.

## 2.3 Reputation

We follow the standard way of modeling reputation by incomplete information, originated from a series of papers by Kreps et al. (1982), Kreps and Roberts (1982), and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). There are two types of firms. A rational type (type  $R$ ) maximizes the expected sum of discounted utilities, whereas a behavioral type (type  $B$ ) always sells consumer data. One can view the behavioral type as a myopic firm who only cares about the present. An alternative and better interpretation is not to think about the behavioral type literally. Rather, it is a standard modeling device in the reputation literature that introduces incomplete information in order to model reputation. Our focus is on the equilibrium behavior of the rational firm. The firm's reputation is consumers' belief about the probability that the firm is type  $B$ . The common prior that each firm is type  $B$  is  $\mu_0 \in (0, 1)$ . Consumers update their belief about the firm's type by Bayes' rule. Denote the belief about firm  $i$ 's type at time  $t$  by  $\mu_{i,t}$ . Reputation for privacy in this paper refers to the reputation for protecting consumer privacy in the information market. The consumer's current belief is a measurement of the firm's reputation.

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<sup>[5]</sup>The main property we need is that the consumer's expected privacy loss is larger when the consumer reveals more information. We choose this particular form for simplicity.

<sup>[6]</sup>This simple information structure is analogous to the setting in Tirole (1996).

## 2.4 Timing

At the beginning of each period, a short-lived consumer arrives and chooses an individual amount of information  $\eta_i$  to reveal to each firm  $i$  based on the firm's reputation (the consumer's belief about each firm's type). Subsequently, the firm receives a noisy signal about the consumer's location (preference) and uses this signal to offer a personalized product and price. The consumer then decides whether to make a purchase. Afterward, the firm determines whether to sell the consumer's data to third parties in the information market. The consumer receives an imperfect signal about firms' data-selling behavior and updates their belief about each firm's type. This belief represents the firm's reputation and is observed by the newly arriving consumer in the next period. Firms' reputations can be communicated to future consumers through channels such as word of mouth, media coverage, or third-party grading. The entire history of the game, in contrast, is hard to communicate because of the sheer volume of information involved. So, the period- $t$  consumer observes only the current reputation of the firms,  $\vec{\mu}_t = (\mu_{1,t}, \mu_{2,t}, \dots, \mu_{N,t})$ , rather than the full history. Figure 2 illustrates the timing of the game.




Figure 2: Timing of the Game

## 2.5 Solution Concept

We focus on whether a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) exists in which rational firms commit to never selling consumer data.<sup>7</sup> MPE requires that firms' and consumers' strategies

<sup>7</sup>Technically, the solution concept employed here is the Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, as there is incomplete information about the firm's type. However, the reputation literature commonly uses the notion

depend solely on the current state and not on the entire history of the game. It is widely used in the reputation literature (e.g., Mailath and Samuelson 2001, Bar-Isaac 2003, Phelan 2006, Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn 2013, Pei 2016, Marinovic and Szydlowski 2023). The belief  $\vec{\mu}_t$  is the natural state variable. In the symmetric equilibrium, where all firms maintain the same reputation, we simplify the notation by denoting  $\mu_t = \mu_{i,t}$  as the reputation of each firm. Importantly, a player's strategy in each period is a function of the current belief (and the observations in the current period) rather than the entire history. Heuristically, it is easy for a firm's reputation to be carried over time through an aggregate summary (the consumer's current belief), but hard for the present consumer to know the entire history in the past. Formally, the MPE of this game is defined as follows.

**Definition 1.** Denote the state space as  $K = \{\vec{\mu} \in [0, 1]^N\}$ , the consumer's strategy as  $\sigma^c$ , and the firm's strategy as  $\sigma^f$ . The Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of this game is a profile of strategies  $\sigma^{c*}$  and  $\sigma^{f*}$  such that:

1. Each player's strategy is a Markov strategy, which depends only on the current state (and the observable action in the current period), not on the history of how the state was reached.
2. For every state, each player's strategy maximizes their expected continuation payoff, given that all other players follow the equilibrium strategies.
3. At the end of each period, the state is updated according to Bayes' rule, based on the previous state, the players' equilibrium strategies, and the signal  $s$  regarding the firm's imperfectly monitored data-selling behavior.<sup>8</sup>

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of MPE for this type of equilibrium.

<sup>8</sup> Sections 4.1 and 5.1 provide specific formulas for belief updating (state transition), which depend on the signal  $s$ . Typically, in an MPE, the state transition probability is a function of the previous state and players' actions. We can express the state transition in the same way because a firm's different actions (selling data or not) induce different distributions of the signal  $s$ , thereby different distributions of the updated state.

### 3 Equilibrium in a Static Game With One Firm

We first analyze the equilibrium outcome of a static game with one period and a single firm to prepare us for the analyses of the entire game.

#### 3.1 Firm's Pricing Decision

Given the product recommendation and price, the consumer purchases if and only if the expected payoff is positive,  $v - td - p \geq 0$ . Thus, the firm's pricing problem and the optimal price are:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_p p \cdot \mathbb{P}[v - td - p \geq 0] &= p \cdot \min \left\{ \frac{2(v - p)}{(1 - \eta)t}, 1 \right\} \\ \Rightarrow p^* &= \begin{cases} \frac{v}{2}, & \text{if } \eta \leq 1 - \frac{v}{t} \\ v - \frac{(1 - \eta)t}{2}, & \text{if } \eta > 1 - \frac{v}{t} \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

When the consumer reveals a lot of information,  $\eta > 1 - \frac{v}{t}$ , the firm accurately knows their preference. The recommended product is always close to the consumer's actual location, and the firm can extract a high surplus, even from the consumer located farthest away from the recommended product. Therefore, the firm sets a price such that the consumer always purchases. When the consumer reveals less information, the firm gets a noisier signal about their preference. The profit from each purchase will be too low if the firm wants the consumer to always buy the product. Therefore, only consumers with a high enough valuation for the recommended product purchase it at the optimal price. If the recommended product is located too far away from the consumer, the consumer will not buy it.

#### 3.2 Consumer's Information Revelation Decision

From the consumer's perspective, revealing more information has two opposite consequences in the product market. On one hand, the firm can offer a better-matched product,

which benefits the consumer. On the other hand, the firm will charge a higher price, knowing that the consumer has a higher expected valuation, which hurts the consumer.<sup>9</sup> One can see that the consumer's expected payoff in the product market is  $v^2/[4(1-\eta)t]$  if  $\eta \leq 1 - v/t$  and is  $(1-\eta)t/4$  if  $\eta > 1 - v/t$ . In an extreme case, if the firm knows the consumer's preference perfectly, it will extract all the consumer surplus. Therefore, the consumer never reveals everything. In the other extreme case, if the firm knows nothing about the consumer's preference, it can only recommend a random product. The poor match also hurts the consumer. So, it is optimal for the consumer to reveal partial information if they only consider the product market.

The consumer also needs to consider the effect of information revelation in the information market. Disclosing more information to the firm always hurts the consumer there, as they are more vulnerable when the firm sells their data. Conditional on the firm selling data, the consumer's expected privacy cost is  $\eta u_b$ . Therefore, given a probability  $\mu_s$  that the firm sells data, which is endogenously determined in equilibrium, the consumer's ex-ante expected privacy loss is  $-\mu_s \eta u_b$ .

Putting everything together, the consumer's ex-ante expected payoff is:

$$U_0(\eta) = \begin{cases} \frac{v^2}{4(1-\eta)t} - \mu_s \eta u_b, & \text{if } \eta \leq 1 - \frac{v}{t} \\ \frac{(1-\eta)t}{4} - \mu_s \eta u_b, & \text{if } \eta > 1 - \frac{v}{t} \end{cases} \quad (U)$$

Considering both the product and information markets, it is never optimal for the consumer to reveal too much information, as Figure 3 illustrates. The firm can charge a high price because the product recommendation is pretty accurate, with lots of information about the consumer. In addition, the privacy loss from data sales in the information market is high. Consumers may, however, prefer revealing a moderate amount of information to revealing nothing. By revealing some information, consumers benefit from a better recommendation

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<sup>9</sup>For more discussion about this kind of holdup problem, see Villas-Boas (2009) and Wernerfelt (1994).






Figure 3: Ex-ante consumer payoff as a function of  $\eta$  for  $v = 1$ ,  $t = 2$ ,  $u_b = .75$ , and  $\mu_s = .6$  (left) or  $.2$  (right).

in the product market but suffer a privacy cost if the firm sells it in the information market. If the firm's likelihood of selling the data is high, the high expected privacy loss in the information market outweighs the gain from the better match in the product market. In that case, the consumer reveals no information. On the contrary, the consumer partially reveals their preference for a better recommendation if the firm's likelihood of selling data is low. The following result formalizes our intuition. For the problem to be interesting, we assume that the threshold  $\hat{\mu} \in (0, 1)$ . We also assume that they choose  $\eta = 1 - v/t$  when they are indifferent between  $\eta = 1 - v/t$  and 0, which does not affect any analyses.

**Proposition 1.** *The consumer does not reveal any information if  $\mu_s > \hat{\mu}$ , and reveals  $\eta^* = 1 - v/t$  amount of information if  $\mu_s \leq \hat{\mu}$ , where  $\hat{\mu} = v/4u_b$ .*

**Corollary 1.** *The firm's profit in the product market is  $v/2$  if  $\mu_s \leq \hat{\mu}$  and is  $v^2/2t$  if  $\mu_s > \hat{\mu}$ .*

If the firm could commit not to sell consumer data, the consumer would choose  $\eta = 1 - v/t$ , which gives the firm a stage payoff of  $v/2$ . If, instead, the firm always sells consumer data, the consumer will not reveal any information (i.e., they will choose  $\eta = 0$ ). In that case, the firm obtains a stage payoff of  $v^2/2t + D(0)$ . Denote by  $\Delta u$  the difference between the firm's expected stage payoff with and without commitment.

$$\Delta u := v/2 - v^2/2t - D(0) \quad (\Delta)$$

The firm will always sell consumer data if  $\Delta u < 0$  and the entire problem becomes trivial. So, we focus on the interesting case in which  $\Delta u > 0$  throughout the remaining analyses.

### 3.3 Some Benchmarks

We now analyze the property of the stage game of a single firm by comparing the equilibrium outcome with some benchmarks. If the firm can commit to any action in the information market (e.g., by moving first), the firm takes the *Stackelberg action* and obtains the *Stackelberg payoff*.

**Definition 2.** Suppose player 1 chooses action  $a_1 \in A$  and player 2 chooses action  $a_2 \in A_2$ . Player  $i \in \{1, 2\}$ 's stage-game payoff is  $u_i(a_1, a_2)$ .  $BR_2(a_1) \subset A_2$  is player 2's best response correspondence to  $a_1$ . Then, player 1's Stackelberg action is  $\arg \max_{a_1 \in A_1} [\min_{a_2 \in BR_2(a_1)} u_1(a_1, a_2)]$ , and player 1's Stackelberg payoff is  $\max_{a_1 \in A_1} [\min_{a_2 \in BR_2(a_1)} u_1(a_1, a_2)]$ .

One can see that the Stackelberg action for the firm is not to sell the data. The consumer will reveal  $\eta = 1 - v/t$  proportion of information, and the firm gets the Stackelberg payoff of  $v/2$ .

If the consumer acts first and minimizes the firm's payoff, the firm gets the *minmax payoff*, which is the payoff the firm can guarantee regardless of the consumer's action.

**Definition 3.** Suppose player 1 chooses action  $a_1 \in A_1$  and player 2 chooses action  $a_2 \in A_2$ . Player  $i \in \{1, 2\}$ 's stage-game payoff is  $u_i(a_1, a_2)$ . Then, player 1's minmax payoff is  $\min_{\alpha_2 \in \Delta(A_2)} [\max_{a_1 \in A_1} u_1(a_1, \alpha_2)]$ , where  $\Delta(A_2)$  denotes a set of probability distributions (mixed strategies) over pure strategies  $a_2 \in A_2$ ,  $u_1(a_1, \alpha_2) := \sum_{a_2 \in A_2} \alpha_2(a_2) u_1(a_1, a_2)$ , and  $\alpha_2(a_2)$  denotes the probability that a player using mixed strategy  $\alpha_2 \in \Delta(A_2)$  plays the specific strategy  $a_2 \in A_2$ .

To minimize the firm's payoff, one can see that the consumer will reveal no information. In response, the firm sells data and gets the minmax payoff of  $v^2/2t + D(0)$ .

In a static game, the firm always sells data because it decides whether to sell data after the consumer reveals information. Anticipating this, the consumer reveals nothing. The firm receives the minmax payoff. Our objective in this paper is to study whether reputation considerations in the dynamic game enable the firm to commit to the Stackelberg action and receive the Stackelberg payoff.

## 4 Monopoly

### 4.1 Belief Updating

We first derive the consumer's belief updating processes about a monopoly's type given the observed signal  $s$ , using the Bayes' rule. Because the behavioral type always sells the data, detection of data sales (signal  $y$ ) will increase the consumer's belief that the firm is the bad type, whereas a lack of evidence of data sales (signal  $n$ ) will reduce the belief. Notice that even if  $s = n$ , it is possible that the firm is the bad type but the consumer fails to detect data sales. So, the consumer's belief decreases but is still positive.

**Proposition 2.** *For a given belief  $\mu_t$ , the consumer's updated belief  $\mu_{t+1}$  is  $(1 - q)\mu_t / \{(1 - q)\mu_t + [1 - \sigma_{sell}^{f*}(\mu_t)q](1 - \mu_t)\}$  if they observe signal  $s = n$  and is  $\mu_t / [\mu_t + \sigma_{sell}^{f*}(\mu_t)(1 - \mu_t)]$  if they observe signal  $s = y$ , where  $\sigma_{sell}^{f*}(\mu_t)$  is the rational firm's equilibrium probability of selling data under state  $\mu_t$ .*

The proposition directly implies the following sharper belief-updating process if the rational firm's equilibrium strategy is to never sell the data.

**Corollary 2.** *Suppose the rational type never sells the data in equilibrium. For a given belief  $\mu_t$ , after the consumer receives signal  $n$  for  $k$  consecutive periods, the belief becomes  $\mu_{t+k} = (1 - q)^k \mu_t / [(1 - q)^k \mu_t + 1 - \mu_t]$ , which approaches 0 as  $k \rightarrow +\infty$ .*

In this case, if the consumer observes  $s = y$ , then they know for sure that the firm sold the data in the previous period. So, the firm must be a bad type because the rational type does not sell the data. If the monopoly continues not to sell consumer data, the consumer's belief will keep decreasing. After enough time, the consumer is almost certain that the firm is not the bad type.

## 4.2 Equilibrium

Suppose consumers expect the rational firm never to sell the data in equilibrium. In that case, a signal  $n$  will destroy the firm's reputation by making the consumer believe that the firm is the bad type in all current and future periods. Then, the firm is stuck with the minmax payoff. By deviating, the firm risks being detected by the consumer with a positive probability. The persistent punishment strongly incentivizes the firm not to sell the data for short-term benefit. As a result, regardless of the monitoring technology or the price of data in the information market, reputation can always serve as a commitment device as long as the monopoly is patient enough.

**Proposition 3.** *There exists a  $\hat{\delta} < 1$  such that, for any  $\delta > \hat{\delta}$ , there exists an MPE where the rational firm never sells consumer data and the consumer always reveals  $\eta = 1 - v/t$  proportion of information after a finite period.*

By protecting consumer privacy, the rational firm keeps reducing the consumer's belief that it is a bad type. When the belief is below a threshold, the consumer is willing to reveal some information, which benefits the firm. A patient firm does not want to deviate, because the consumer may observe the deviation and believe that the firm is the bad type. If that happens, future consumers will never reveal any information. So, the firm permanently suffers from less revenue in the product market. This severe punishment provides a strong incentive for the firm to trade the short-term benefit of selling data in the information market for the long-term benefit of earning a higher profit in the product market.

## 5 Multiple Firms

Consumers update their beliefs about firms collectively rather than individually in the presence of multiple firms. The collective belief-updating process generates two opposing effects on a firm's incentive to sacrifice short-term benefits for long-term gains. On one hand, there is a smaller incentive for the firm to build its reputation if the belief is very high or very low because the short-term return is low in such cases. The presence of other firms makes the consumer's belief updating about one firm slower. The less extreme belief implies that the firm has a stronger incentive. On the other hand, the presence of multiple firms and collective reputation leads to noisier signals and worse monitoring. It incentivizes a firm to free-ride on other firms, which implies that the firm has a weaker incentive to build its reputation.

The two opposing forces make it non-obvious whether the reputation consideration of the firm can serve as a commitment device when there are multiple firms. For instance, in a different setting with one market, Neeman, Öry, and Yu (2019) show that, compared to individual reputation, collective reputation can be either more likely or less likely to sustain the socially optimal equilibrium.

### 5.1 Belief Updating

When there are at least two firms, the belief updating is qualitatively different from the monopoly case. Consider the consumer's belief about firm 1's type after observing a signal  $s$ , assuming that a rational firm never sells the data. If  $s = y$ , the consumer knows that at least one firm sold the data in the previous period but is unsure whether firm 1 sold it. So, the belief that firm 1 is a bad type increases but is still lower than 1, unlike the monopoly case. The reputation shock is temporary, and firm 1 can rebuild its reputation. Conditional on other firms' behavior, the likelihood that  $s = n$  if firm 1 is a rational type and did not sell the data is higher than the case where firm 1 is a bad type, but consumers cannot directly

observe the data sales. Consequently, the belief that firm 1 is a bad type decreases but is still positive. Formally, the belief updating is as follows.

**Proposition 4.** *Suppose the rational type never sells the data in equilibrium. For a given firm  $i$ , the posterior belief  $\mu_{t+1}$  is  $(1 - q)\mu_t/(1 - q\mu_t)$  if  $s = n$  and is  $[1 - (1 - q)(1 - q\mu_t)^{N-1}]\mu_t/[1 - (1 - q\mu_t)^N]$  if  $s = y$ . It does not depend on the number of firms  $N$  if  $s = n$  and decreases in  $N$  if  $s = y$ .<sup>10</sup>*




Figure 4: Belief updating as a function of  $\mu_t$  for  $q = .5$  and  $N = 2$ .

Even if firm 1 sold the data and the consumer observes a signal  $y$ , they know that at least one firm sold the data but does not know which firm. Therefore, they penalize firm 1 less than they do in the monopoly case. The reputation cost is temporary, and the consumer's belief will decrease if they receive signal  $n$  in the future. When there are more firms, the signal's noise is larger, and the consumer has less idea about which firm sold the data. Therefore, there will be smaller increases in belief in response to signal  $y$ . If the consumer observes a signal  $n$ , the belief reduction does not depend on the number of firms. So, the firm is *penalized less* for selling the data but *not rewarded more* for not doing so when the number of firms increases. In addition, the realization of the signal depends little on a single

<sup>10</sup>We ignore the subscript  $i$  in the belief  $\mu_{i,t}$  for simplicity.

firm's action when there are many firms. So, the likelihood that firm 1's action changes the consumer's future information-revelation decision decreases in the number of firms. Figure 4 illustrates the belief updating when there are two firms.

## 5.2 Two Firms

In this section, we study whether it is possible to achieve commitment by reputation when there are two firms.

**Proposition 5.** *Suppose there are two firms. There does not exist any MPE in which any rational firm could commit to never selling data, even when  $\delta \rightarrow 1$ , if the following conditions hold:*

$$\Delta u < \overline{\Delta u} := \frac{vq(t-v)}{2t}, \quad (1)$$

$$q(1-q) < \frac{2D(0)}{v}, \quad (2)$$

$$v/u_b < 2, \quad (3)$$

where  $\Delta u$ , the difference between the firm's expected stage payoff with and without commitment, has been defined in equation (Δ).

This proposition identifies sufficient conditions under which firms cannot commit even if they are arbitrarily close to perfectly patient. The role of each condition is the following.

- Condition (1)

The whole idea of building reputation is to sacrifice short-term gains for long-term benefits. This condition means the commitment payoff is not much higher than the one without commitment. The left-hand side of the condition,  $\Delta u$ , is a measure of long-term benefits. Proposition 3 has shown that reputation consideration provides a monopoly with a strong enough incentive to commit not to sell consumer data when there is any long-term benefit,

$\Delta u > 0$ . In contrast, this condition shows that, when there are two firms, reputation consideration may not serve as a commitment device even if there is a positive long-term benefit, as long as it is not too large,  $\Delta u \in (0, \overline{\Delta u})$ .

○ Condition (2)

This condition means that the noise of the monitoring technology is either low or high. Because of the imperfect monitoring technology, consumers may get a false-positive signal  $y$  if a firm did not sell data or a false-negative signal  $n$  if a firm sold data. If  $q$  is high, the consumer will likely get a signal  $y$  even if a firm did not sell data, because the other firm sold data. If  $q$  is low, the consumer will likely get a signal  $n$  even if a firm sold data, because of poor monitoring. In either case, the likelihood that selling data changes the consumer's future information-revelation decision is low, which creates a stronger incentive for the firm to deviate.

○ Condition (3)

The consumer enjoys a positive utility from consuming good products in the product market. The valuation of the product,  $v$ , is related to the benefit of revealing some information to the firm. The consumer incurs a disutility if the firm sells their data. The cost of revealing a certain amount of information increases in  $u_B$ . This condition means that the consumer's benefit from revealing some information to the firm is not too high relative to its cost. A lower benefit-to-cost ratio leads to a lower cutoff belief of revealing information,  $\hat{\mu}$ . In particular, a lower  $\hat{\mu}$  implies that a good reputation is less persistent. Even if the firm does not sell data and reduces the belief below the threshold, signal  $y$  in future periods will more easily raise the belief above  $\hat{\mu}$ , inducing the consumer to stop revealing any information. The fast depreciation of reputation makes building reputation less attractive.

When the above conditions hold, reputation considerations provide no commitment power to rational firms, even if they are arbitrarily close to perfectly patient. The finding is in stark



contrast to the monopoly case. It shows that consideration for bad reputation itself does not drive the reputation failure result in the privacy setting. The joint effect of bad reputation and collective reputation leads to reputation failure.

The mechanism of the reputation failure is the following. When there are two firms, consumers do not know exactly which firm sold the data, even if they observe data sales. One firm's reputation depends on other firms' actions. Selling data by one firm imposes a negative externality on other firms. Firms do not take this into account in equilibrium. The benefit of not selling data is lower because other firms' behavior may still hurt the firm's reputation. Anticipating this externality, consumers penalize each firm less when observing data sales. When the noise of the monitoring technology is either low or high, a firm's deviation is less likely to change the consumer's future information-revelation decision. Therefore, the cost of selling data is lower. In addition, a firm's reputation may be hurt even if it does not sell data. Consequently, the firm has more incentive to deviate.

### 5.3 Many Firms

In the previous section, we have characterized a set of conditions under which reputation consideration of the firm fails to serve as a commitment device for privacy even if duopolistic firms are arbitrarily close to perfectly patient. In this section, we show that it is even harder for each firm to commit not to sell consumer data when there are more firms. In particular, the next result shows that reputation consideration of the firm cannot serve as a commitment device for privacy *under any conditions* when there are many firms.

**Proposition 6.** *For any  $\delta \in (0, 1)$ ,  $\exists N_\delta$  s.t.  $\forall N \geq N_\delta$ , firms always sell data, and consumers reveal nothing in the unique MPE. Consumers' belief about each firm's type is always  $\mu_0$ .*

No matter how patient firms are, they cannot build a reputation for privacy. The intuition for the failure of reputation as a commitment device is the following. On one hand, the consumer has a noisy signal about which firm sold the data. Even if the firm deviates

and the consumer observes it, the penalty for that particular firm is less than that for the monopoly firm. Moreover, the penalty decreases in the number of firms. On the other hand, even if none of rational firms deviates, other firms may be the bad type and sell the data. So, as the number of firms increases, it becomes less likely that an individual firm’s sale of data changes the consumer’s future information-revelation decision. Moreover, the reputation of the firm when the consumer observes a signal  $n$  does not improve at a faster rate when the number of firms increases, as section 5.1 has shown.

Both forces give the firm more incentive to deviate and sell the data. So, it becomes harder to commit when the number of firms increases. Eventually, the firm loses all the commitment power and sells data in every period. Anticipating that the firm will always sell data, consumers do not reveal anything. The belief about each firm’s type remains the same over time, and there is no reputation building.

To summarize, the monopoly can get Stackelberg payoffs in all but a finite number of periods under substantial punishment for selling data. In contrast, each firm can only get the minmax payoff under weaker punishment when there are multiple firms, even if there is no competition. Our findings align with observed differences in privacy protection across markets with different competitive structures. For instance, Apple operates like a monopoly in the iOS ecosystem, controlling both hardware and software. In recent years, it has invested heavily in positioning itself as a brand that prioritizes consumer privacy protection and has built a strong reputation through its App Tracking Transparency feature and privacy-focused marketing campaigns. In contrast, the Android ecosystem is highly competitive. With multiple device manufacturers (Samsung, Google, Xiaomi, etc.) and software developers in the market, privacy often takes a backseat to other business considerations. Those companies do not emphasize privacy in their marketing campaigns nearly as much as Apple does. Moreover, a study by NordVPN shows that more people trust Apple’s privacy protection over Samsung’s.<sup>[1]</sup>

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<sup>[1]</sup>The source is <https://nordvpn.com/blog/iphone-14-privacy-research/>.

## 5.4 Relationship With Previous Work

### Prisoners' Dilemma

One may think the result that a monopoly can commit but more firms cannot commit even though they would be collectively better off with commitment is similar to prisoners' dilemma. However, there are key differences between our results and mechanisms and those in the prisoners' dilemma.

The prisoner's dilemma arises in a static game. The key economic force for each player to deviate from cooperation is the lack of future rewards or punishments. Cooperation can happen when we consider a repeated version of the game because non-cooperation has a long-term impact on the player. Our findings are all based on repeated interactions. Even if there are an infinite number of periods and firms are arbitrarily close to perfectly patient, no firm can commit to never selling consumer data. This result is qualitatively different from the prisoners' dilemma. Our mechanism comes from the joint effect of bad reputation and collective reputation, which has yet to be studied to our knowledge.

### Bad Reputation

In the bad reputation literature, initiated by Morris (2001) and Ely and Välimäki (2003), a rational player's incentive to avoid a bad reputation eliminates all the welfare because the player may need to distort the action from the Pareto-optimal one to the action that hurts everyone's short-term payoffs because of reputation considerations. The reputation failure results appear even if there is only one long-run player. By contrast, in this paper, a patient enough firm can build reputation and achieve the Stackelberg payoff without other long-lived firms and collective reputation.

The key difference is that the firm's reputation may be hurt even if it takes the optimal action for the consumer in the bad reputation literature, whereas a monopoly always improves its reputation by doing the right thing for the consumer in our paper. Fundamentally,

the difference comes from the different market structures. Usually, in the literature on bad reputation, there is a single market, and the incentive of the bad type is partially misaligned with the consumer. The partial misalignment implies that the bad type's action may sometimes be optimal for the consumer. Consequently, the rational/good type may need to take an action that hurts the consumer and itself to distinguish itself from the bad type. In contrast, the unique feature of privacy is that there are two markets. The firm and the consumer's incentives are partially misaligned in the product market: the firm always benefits from more information, whereas the consumer wants to reveal partial information. In the information market, however, the bad type's incentive is completely misaligned with the consumer: the firm wants to sell the data whereas the consumer does not. As a result, the rational type can always separate itself from the bad type by taking the optimal action for the consumer in the information market. Therefore, multiple firms and collective reputation are critical to the reputation failure results.

## 5.5 Practical Implications

Even though commitment may be desirable for the firm, it may not be possible without strict external regulations. In addition, the opacity and non-verifiability of data transactions raise concerns about the credibility of such policies. Even if a firm does not sell data in the presence of such regulation, consumers still may not believe it. The firm will not benefit from protecting consumer privacy if it fails to obtain consumers' trust in how firms handle their data. Protecting consumer privacy is more credible and convincing from the consumer's perspective if it is in the interest of the firm and is an endogenous equilibrium outcome.

A monopoly can always build a reputation for caring about consumer privacy by not selling data. After a finite period, consumers will reward such behavior by sharing more information. The monopoly can enjoy a higher profit by recommending better-fit products and charging a premium. However, when there are multiple firms in the market, it may not be in the firm's best interest to protect consumer privacy. Even if a firm never sells

consumer data, it may not be able to build a reputation for privacy. So, it loses the revenue from selling consumer information, whereas does not have any (or enough) gain. Because firms benefit from committing never to sell consumer data, they need to think about other ways of achieving the commitment.

Our model suggests that the key to commitment power is the tradeoff between the short-term benefit in the information market and the long-term benefit in the product market. From the firm’s perspective, a potential solution is to improve the recommendation algorithm so that it has a higher marginal benefit from consumer information. The firm will have a stronger incentive to maintain a good reputation in order to profit from the product market. It can also consider compensating consumers if the signal is  $y$ . In that case, the firm will face an additional penalty for selling consumer data. Therefore, the “free lunch” in the information market is more costly for the firm. This idea is related to restoring truthful communication between an advisor and a decision-maker through monetary incentives, studied by Durbin and Iyer (2009). In reality, firms actively lobby in favor of or against government regulations. Another implication of our results is that, in markets where firms earn most of their revenue from the actual products rather than advertising,<sup>12</sup> oligopoly firms should support privacy regulations more than monopoly ones because the equilibrium consideration of reputation may not be enough to serve as a commitment device when there are multiple firms.

From the regulator’s perspective, it may invest in additional monitoring efforts and charge liability fines if it catches data sales by a specific firm, increasing the firm’s cost of selling data. It could also limit the amount of data a firm can sell, reducing the benefit of selling data. In the next section, we analyze these regulatory interventions in detail.

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<sup>12</sup>In our model, we do not consider advertising revenue, which depends crucially on the amount of information about individual consumers a firm can collect.

## 6 Regulatory Interventions

The main model shows the delicate nature of a firm's ability to commit to consumer data protection when there is more than one firm. This section examines several regulatory interventions and their impact on equilibrium outcomes. Specifically, we evaluate whether each intervention can help restore firms' commitment power, thereby enhancing privacy protection, and analyze the welfare implications. Because reputation consideration alone can serve as a commitment device for a sufficiently patient monopoly, we focus on the duopoly case in this section.

### 6.1 Liability Fines with Regulator Monitoring

A common regulatory tool is the imposition of liability fines. In the main model, consumers cannot determine which specific firm sold their data in the presence of multiple firms. For liability fines to be feasible, regulators must access additional information to identify, at least occasionally, the specific firm responsible for data sales.<sup>13</sup> So, we assume that the regulator incurs a cost  $c_r$  per period to monitor data sales and that each time a firm sells data, the regulator detects it with probability  $q_r$  and charges the firm a constant fine  $f > 0$ .

**Proposition 7.** *There exists a  $\hat{\delta} < 1$  such that, for any  $\delta > \hat{\delta}$ , there exists an MPE where any rational firm never sells consumer data if the monitoring technology is good enough,  $q_r > (1 - q)/(2 - q)$ . Under these conditions, this regulation improves consumer welfare. Moreover, there exists a threshold  $\hat{c}_r$  such that this regulation can improve social welfare if the regulator's monitoring cost is below this threshold,  $c_r < \hat{c}_r$ .<sup>14</sup>*

The proposition demonstrates that liability fines can restore firms' commitment power as long as the regulator's monitoring technology is sufficiently good. Several observations are worth noting.

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<sup>13</sup>Regulators typically have access to better monitoring tools and resources than consumers.

<sup>14</sup>Because the behavioral type is a modeling device for reputation, only the payoffs of consumers and rational firms are included in the calculation of social welfare.

First, the sufficient condition identified in the proposition does not depend on the size of the fine. The recovery of commitment power is driven by the informational value of liability fines (revealing that a firm is a bad type). While higher fines increase the incentive for rational firms not to sell data, enabling firms to restore their commitment power across a broader range of  $q_r$ , the mere informational value of fines suffices if  $q_r$  exceeds  $(1 - q)/(2 - q)$ , without the help of direct monetary incentives. Also, the threshold  $(1 - q)/(2 - q)$  decreases in  $q$ , implying that the consumer's detection ability and the regulator's monitoring ability are substitutes.

Second, because this regulation can restore the commitment power and sustain the equilibrium of privacy protection, rational firms are not fined in equilibrium. Consequently, the amount of fine does not directly affect social welfare. The cost of this regulation, from a social welfare perspective, is the regulator's monitoring expense. Thus, the impact of the regulation on social welfare depends on the magnitude of the monitoring cost. If the monitoring cost is low, the regulation improves social welfare by sustaining the privacy protection equilibrium at a low cost. If the monitoring cost is high, the regulation reduces social welfare because monitoring does not directly generate consumer or firm surplus.

## 6.2 Limiting the Amount of Data A Firm Can Sell

Another potential regulatory intervention is limiting the amount of data a firm can sell. Some consumer information may be more sensitive than others, and its leakage can expose consumers to higher risks. The regulator may restrict transactions involving such sensitive information. In this extension, we consider a regulation that limits the amount of data a firm can sell from all the available information,  $\eta$ , to below a threshold,  $\bar{\eta}$ .<sup>15</sup> Despite reducing the potential benefit of selling data, this regulation does not prevent reputation failure.

**Proposition 8.** *There does not exist any MPE in which any rational firm could commit to*

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<sup>15</sup> An alternative approach is to cap the amount of data a firm can sell at  $\psi\eta$ , where  $\psi \in (0, 1)$  is a constant. The results and intuition remain unchanged under this alternative setup.

never selling data, even when  $\delta \rightarrow 1$ , if conditions (1), (2), and (3) hold.

The mechanism identified in Proposition 5 remains intact for the following reasons. A rational firm evaluates the trade-off between the benefits and costs of selling consumer data when considering whether to deviate from the privacy protection equilibrium. When the belief about the firm exceeds  $\hat{\mu}$ , this regulation does not affect the (reputation) cost of selling data or the benefit of doing so, as consumers reveal no information to the firm in this case.<sup>16</sup> Because there is a positive probability that the belief about a rational firm will exceed  $\hat{\mu}$  at some point, reputation failure, as described in the main model, persists. Fundamentally, this regulation does not transform the reputation cost of selling data from a temporary punishment into a persistent one.

## 7 Extensions

### 7.1 Ability to Identify the Identity of Data Leakage

A key mechanism in the main model is that reputation as a vehicle for commitment requires repeated interactions with some degree of monitoring. Establishing such a reputation for privacy requires traceability, which is lost when there are multiple firms because consumers never know the exact identity of a data breach. However, in reality, consumers may sometimes observe information about both evidence of data leakage and its source because of media or regulatory exposure. For example, in Facebook’s Cambridge Analytica data scandal, a British consulting firm collected personal data of many Facebook users without consent and used it for political advertising.<sup>17</sup> This incident received significant attention because of extensive media coverage, making Facebook’s role as the source of the data leakage widely known.

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<sup>16</sup> The regulation reduces the benefit of selling data when the belief about a firm is below  $\hat{\mu}$  because the consumer reveals a positive amount of information whereas the firm can only sell a portion of it.

<sup>17</sup> The coverage of this example is available at <https://www.businessinsider.com/cambridge-analytica-whistleblower-christopher-wylie-facebook-data-2019-10>.



Knowledge of the identity of data leakage does not affect the monopoly case, where there is no uncertainty about which firm sold the data. So, we focus on the duopoly case in this extension. To capture scenarios where a specific firm might be exposed by the media or regulator, we assume that conditional on detecting data sales (with probability  $q$  for each firm that sold data), a consumer can identify the exact identity of that firm with probability  $\phi$ . Because the media or regulator may not find out the identity of all the firms who sold data, we allow for the possibility that only one firm is identified even though both firms engaged in data sales.

**Proposition 9.** *Suppose there are two firms. There does not exist any MPE in which any rational firm could commit to never sell data, even when  $\delta \rightarrow 1$ , if conditions (1), (2), and (3) in Proposition 5 hold and if the probability of identifying the identity of data leakage,  $\phi$ , is low. In contrast, if  $\phi = 1$ , there exists a  $\hat{\delta} < 1$  such that, for any  $\delta > \hat{\delta}$ , there exists an MPE where a rational firm never sells consumer data. Both consumer welfare and social welfare improve relative to the main model.*

When the consumer can always identify the source of data leakage upon detecting data sales ( $\phi = 1$ ), the reputation failure results in the main model (Proposition 5) will break down. In such cases, a rational firm faces a high likelihood of persistent reputation costs, which strongly incentivizes it to commit to privacy protection. As a result, reputation consideration alone can serve as a commitment device, eliminating the need for additional regulatory interventions to sustain the equilibrium of privacy protection. In this case, the media or regulatory exposure improves both consumer welfare and social welfare.

In contrast, when the likelihood of identifying the source of data leakage is low (small  $\phi$ ), reputation failure results from the main model persist under the same set of conditions (plus small  $\phi$ , which is the new parameter in this extension) as in the main model. Though a rational firm loses its reputation permanently upon being identified as the source of data leakage, the low likelihood of identification means the punishment is insufficient to deter data sales. Most of the time, even if consumers detect data sales, they remain unaware

of the specific firm’s identity. This situation aligns with the duopoly case in the main model, where penalties for data sales are temporary. For example, even though the media may expose Facebook in the Cambridge Analytica data scandal, such media exposure is rare and insufficient to help establish long-term commitment power. Indeed, Meta is still under regulatory scrutiny for data sharing despite the scandal.<sup>18</sup> In these cases, additional regulations are necessary to sustain the equilibrium of privacy protection.

## 7.2 False Detection of Data Sales

The consumer has imperfect detection ability and receives a noisy signal  $s$  about whether the firm sold the data. In the main model, we account for the possibility of false negatives by allowing the signal to be  $n$  with some probability even if a firm sold the data. This reflects that a consumer may be unable to detect all the data sales. However, there can also be false positives - sometimes consumers may believe their data were sold when, in fact, they were not.<sup>19</sup> For example, a consumer receiving direct mail may assume that a food delivery company they interacted with sold their address, even if the mail originated from an advertiser targeting the entire neighborhood. This extension examines the impact of false detection on equilibrium outcomes. A key distinction between our main model and the previous literature is that in the bad reputation literature, a firm’s reputation may be harmed even if it acts optimally for consumers, whereas in our setting, a monopoly always improves its reputation by doing the right thing. Considering the possibility of false detection in this extension aligns our model more closely with the bad reputation literature.

In the presence of false detection, the benefits of not selling data diminish because the firm’s reputation may still be hurt by false-positive signals. Similarly, the costs of selling data decrease. As a result, compared to the main model, a rational firm has a smaller incentive to

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<sup>18</sup>The source is <https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/29/tech/meta-data-processing-europe-gdpr/index.html>. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this extension and providing related examples.

<sup>19</sup>In a different setting, Yang et al. (2024) examine the implications of false-positive alarms in disinformation detection, showing that false positives can lead to qualitatively new equilibrium outcomes. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this extension.

commit to data protection. Thus, false detection does not qualitatively alter the reputation failure results in the multi-firm case, so we focus on the monopoly case in this extension.

The only difference between this extension and the main model is that a consumer may falsely detect data sales with probability  $q' \in (0, q)$  when a firm does not sell the data, representing false-positive errors. The equilibrium depends on whether consumers recognize the possibility of false-positive signals.

**Proposition 10.** *Consider a monopoly.*

1. *Suppose consumers are unaware of the possibility of false-positive signals, and update their belief in the same way as in the main model (they think that at least one firm sold their data after observing signal  $y$ ). There exists  $\hat{\delta} < 1$  and  $\hat{q}' > 0$  such that there exists an MPE in which a rational firm never sells the data without being falsely detected if  $\delta \geq \hat{\delta}$  and  $q' \leq \hat{q}'$ .*
2. *Suppose consumers are aware of the possibility of false-positive signals and the likelihood of false detection, and update their belief accordingly (they know that signal  $y$  may be false-positive). There does not exist any MPE in which a rational firm could commit to never selling data without being falsely detected, even when  $\delta \rightarrow 1$ .*

When consumers are not aware of the possibility of false detection, any detection of data sales ( $s = y$ ), whether true or false, permanently damages the firm's reputation. In this case, the high cost of being caught selling data persists. The false detection rate  $q'$  introduces additional noise in monitoring. If this noise level is low, a sufficiently patient rational firm can still commit to privacy protection because of the mechanism identified in the monopoly case of the main model.

In contrast, when consumers are aware of the possibility of false detection, they recognize that  $s = y$  may be false-positive. Consequently, such signals do not permanently destroy a firm's reputation. Anticipating this, consumers penalize the firm less upon observing  $s = y$ . The penalty for selling data becomes temporary, and a firm's reputation can be restored over

time. This dynamic aligns the firm's incentives more closely with those in the multi-firm case of the main model. A rational firm loses its commitment power because of the higher incentive to deviate.

## 8 Conclusion

This paper studies whether reputation consideration of the firm can serve as a commitment device for privacy. We show that it depends on the market structure. For a patient enough monopoly, reputation enables it to commit to the Stackelberg action of not selling consumers' data. This is because when consumers observe data sales, they know that the monopoly sold it. So, the firm will never restore its reputation if it is caught selling data. The high and permanent reputation cost strongly incentivizes the monopoly to commit to privacy.

In contrast, reputation may fail to serve as a commitment device when there are multiple firms. The penalty for selling data is temporary when consumers do not know which firm sold the data. In addition, selling data imposes a negative externality on other firms, but each firm does not take the externality into account in equilibrium. We find conditions under which the incentive to deviate is so strong that duopolistic firms lose the ability to commit even if they are arbitrarily close to perfectly patient. Furthermore, the firm is penalized less for selling the data but not rewarded more for not doing so when the number of firms increases. Reputation cannot serve as a commitment device for privacy under any conditions when there are many firms. Reputation failure in the presence of many firms hurts all the firms.

We explore several regulatory interventions and extensions. Reputation failure in the presence of multiple firms persists when the regulator limits the amount of data a firm can sell or when consumers observe the exact identity of data leakage with a low probability because of media or regulatory exposure. In contrast, rational firms can restore their commitment

power when liability fines are imposed with sufficiently good regulator monitoring or when consumers always observe the exact identity of data leakage upon detecting data sales. In the presence of false detection, a rational firm's incentive to commit is reduced compared to the main model. Consequently, the reputation failure result in the multi-firm case persists even when we allow for false-positive signals. In the monopoly case, a sufficiently patient rational firm can still commit to privacy protection if the false detection rate is low and consumers are unaware of the possibility of false detection, whereas it loses the commitment power if consumers are aware of such a possibility. Comparing the welfare outcomes of the aforementioned interventions, a regulator can achieve desirable consumer and social welfare by imposing liability fines with regulatory monitoring, provided that the monitoring cost is low. However, if the monitoring expense is high, restricting the amount of data a firm can sell - combined with other measures that enhance consumers' ability to identify the source of data leakage - may yield better results.

There are a couple of limitations to the current work. Consumers can reveal an arbitrary amount of information in the product market. However, a firm sometimes restricts the communication space, in which case consumers can only choose from a menu of the amount of information to disclose. It will be interesting to study the optimal design of the menu and how much advantage a firm could gain by offering such a contract. Last but not least, the consumer's privacy loss from data sales is exogenous in this paper. Endogenizing the privacy cost in a game theoretic model can provide further insights. We leave these topics for future research.

## Appendix

*Proof of Proposition 1.* The consumer's expected ex-ante payoff by choosing to reveal  $\eta$  proportion of information is:

$$U_0(\eta) = \begin{cases} -\mu_s \eta u_b + \frac{v^2}{4(1-\eta)t}, & \text{if } \eta \leq 1 - \frac{v}{t} \\ -\mu_s \eta u_b + \frac{(1-\eta)t}{4}, & \text{if } \eta > 1 - \frac{v}{t} \end{cases}$$

$U_0(\eta)$  decreases in  $\eta$  for  $\eta > 1 - \frac{v}{t}$ , so the consumer will not reveal more than  $1 - \frac{v}{t}$  proportion of information. Consider  $\eta \in [0, 1 - \frac{v}{t}]$ .  $dU_0(\eta)/d\eta = -\mu_s u_b + \frac{v^2}{4t(1-\eta)^2}$ , which increases in  $\eta$ . So, the optimal  $\eta$  is either 0 or  $1 - \frac{v}{t}$ .  $U_0(1 - \frac{v}{t}) \geq U_0(0) \Leftrightarrow \mu_s \leq \hat{\mu}$ , where  $\hat{\mu} = \frac{v}{4u_b}$ .  $\square$

*Proof of Proposition 2.* By Bayes' rule,

$$\begin{aligned} P(\text{type} B | s = n) &= \frac{P(s = n | \text{type} B) P(\text{type} B)}{P(s = n | \text{type} B) P(\text{type} B) + P(s = n | \text{type} R) P(\text{type} R)} \\ &= \frac{(1-q)\mu_t}{(1-q)\mu_t + [1 - \sigma_{sell}^{f*}(\mu_t)q](1-\mu_t)}, \\ P(\text{type} B | s = y) &= \frac{P(s = y | \text{type} B) P(\text{type} B)}{P(s = y | \text{type} B) P(\text{type} B) + P(s = y | \text{type} R) P(\text{type} R)} \\ &= \frac{\mu_t}{\mu_t + \sigma_{sell}^{f*}(\mu_t)(1-\mu_t)}. \end{aligned}$$

$\square$

*Proof of Corollary 2.* Because the rational type does not sell the data, a signal  $s = y$  implies the firm is the behavioral type. So,  $\mu_{t+1} = 1$ . Now consider  $s = n$ . By Baye's rule,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}[\text{type } B | s = n] &= \frac{\mathbb{P}[s = n | \text{type } B] \mathbb{P}[\text{type } B]}{\mathbb{P}[s = n | \text{type } B] \mathbb{P}[\text{type } B] + \mathbb{P}[s = n | \text{type } R] \mathbb{P}[\text{type } R]} \\ &= \frac{(1-q)\mu_t}{(1-q)\mu_t + 1 \cdot (1-\mu_t)} = \frac{1-q}{1-q\mu_t} \mu_t. \end{aligned}$$

By induction, we have  $\mu_{t+1} = \frac{(1-q)\mu_t}{(1-q)\mu_t + 1 - \mu_t}$  after receiving signal  $n$  once. Suppose  $\mu_{t+k} =$

$\frac{(1-q)^k}{(1-q)^k \mu_t + 1 - \mu_t} \mu_t$  after receiving signal  $n$  for  $k$  consecutive periods. After receiving signal  $n$  for  $k+1$  consecutive periods, we have  $\mu_{t+k+1} = \frac{(1-q)\mu_{t+k}}{(1-q)\mu_{t+k} + 1 - \mu_{t+k}} = \frac{(1-q)^{k+1}}{(1-q)^{k+1} \mu_t + 1 - \mu_t} \mu_t$ . So, it shows that  $\mu_{t+k} = \frac{(1-q)^k}{(1-q)^k \mu_t + 1 - \mu_t} \mu_t$  after receiving signal  $n$  for  $k$  consecutive periods. One can see that  $\frac{(1-q)^k}{(1-q)^k \mu_t + 1 - \mu_t} \mu_t$  approaches 0 as  $k \rightarrow +\infty$ .  $\square$

*Proof of Proposition 3.* Let  $\hat{k} = \left\lceil \frac{\ln \frac{v(1-\mu_0)}{(4u_b-v)\mu_0}}{\ln(1-q)} \right\rceil$ . We first show that the consumer reveals  $\eta = 1 - v/t$  proportion of information after  $\hat{k}$  periods, if the firm never sells the data in equilibrium. By Corollary 2, the belief after not selling data for  $k$  consecutive periods is  $\mu_k = \frac{(1-q)^k}{(1-q)^k \mu_0 + 1 - \mu_0} \mu_0$ . By Proposition 1, consumer reveals  $\eta = 1 - v/t$  proportion of information if and only if  $\mu_k \leq \hat{\mu} \Leftrightarrow k \geq \frac{\ln \frac{v(1-\mu_0)}{(4u_b-v)\mu_0}}{\ln(1-q)}$ .

We now show that the rational firm has no incentive to deviate to selling data at any time. The game is continuous at infinity because of discounting. So, we can use the single-deviation property. Suppose the firm deviates once at period  $t$  when the belief is  $\mu_t$ . There are two cases.

1.  $\mu \leq \hat{\mu}$ . The value function of the equilibrium strategy (never sell data) is:

$$V(\mu_t) = (1 - \delta) \frac{v}{2} \frac{1}{1 - \delta} = \frac{v}{2}$$

The value function of deviating once at period  $t$  is (assuming the firm sells data when the belief is 1, which maximizes the payoff):

$$\tilde{V}(\mu_t) = (1 - \delta) \left[ \frac{v}{2} + D \left( 1 - \frac{v}{t} \right) + \delta \left( q^{\frac{v^2}{2t} + \frac{D(0)}{1 - \delta}} + (1 - q) \frac{v}{1 - \delta} \right) \right]$$

The rational firm will not deviate if  $V(\mu_t) > \tilde{V}(\mu_t) \Leftrightarrow \frac{\delta}{1 - \delta} > \frac{D(1 - \frac{v}{t})}{q(v/2 - v^2/2t - D(0))}$ . One can see that  $\exists \delta_1 \in (0, 1)$  s.t. the inequality holds for any  $\delta \geq \delta_1$ .

2.  $\mu > \hat{\mu}$ . The value function of the equilibrium strategy (never sell data) is:

$$V(\mu_t) = (1 - \delta) \left[ \sum_{k=0}^{\hat{k}-1} \delta^k \frac{v^2}{2t} + \sum_{k=\hat{k}}^{+\infty} \delta^k \frac{v}{2} \right]$$

The value function of deviating once at period  $t$  is (assuming the firm sells data when the belief is 1, which maximizes the payoff):

$$\tilde{V}(\mu_t) = (1 - \delta) \left[ \frac{v^2}{2t} + D(0) + \delta \left( q \frac{v^2 + D(0)}{1 - \delta} + (1 - q) \left[ \sum_{k=0}^{\hat{k}-2} \delta^k \frac{v^2}{2t} + \sum_{k=\hat{k}-1}^{+\infty} \delta^k \frac{v}{2} \right] \right) \right]$$

The rational firm will not deviate if  $V(\mu_t) > \tilde{V}(\mu_t) \Leftrightarrow \frac{\delta^{\hat{k}}}{(1-\delta)[1-(1-q)\delta]} > \frac{D(0)}{q(v/2 - v^2/2t)}$ . One can see that  $\exists \delta_2 \in (0, 1)$  s.t. the inequality holds for any  $\delta \geq \delta_2$ .

Let  $\hat{\delta} = \max\{\delta_1, \delta_2\}$ . One can see that  $\hat{\delta} < 1$  and for any  $\delta > \hat{\delta}$ , the firm never sells consumer data,  $\eta = 0$  in the first  $\hat{k}$  periods, and  $\eta = 1 - v/t$  after  $\hat{k}$  periods is an MPE.  $\square$

*Proof of Proposition 4.* By Baye's rule, for a given firm,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}[\text{type } B | s = n] &= \frac{\mathbb{P}[s = n | \text{type } B] \mathbb{P}[\text{type } B]}{\mathbb{P}[s = n | \text{type } B] \mathbb{P}[\text{type } B] + \mathbb{P}[s = n | \text{type } R] \mathbb{P}[\text{type } R]} \\ &= \frac{(1 - q)[1 \cdot (1 - \mu_t) + (1 - q)\mu_t]^{N-1} \mu_t}{(1 - q)[1 \cdot (1 - \mu_t) + (1 - q)\mu_t]^{N-1} \mu_t + 1 \cdot [1 \cdot (1 - \mu_t) + (1 - q)\mu_t]^{N-1} (1 - \mu_t)} \\ &= \frac{1 - q}{1 - q\mu_t} \mu_t, \text{ which does not depend on } N. \\ \mathbb{P}[\text{type } B | s = y] &= \frac{\mathbb{P}[s = y | \text{type } B] \mathbb{P}[\text{type } B]}{\mathbb{P}[s = y | \text{type } B] \mathbb{P}[\text{type } B] + \mathbb{P}[s = y | \text{type } R] \mathbb{P}[\text{type } R]} \\ &= \frac{[1 - (1 - q)[1 \cdot (1 - \mu_t) + (1 - q)\mu_t]^{N-1} \mu_t}{[1 - (1 - q)[1 \cdot (1 - \mu_t) + (1 - q)\mu_t]^{N-1} \mu_t + [1 - 1 \cdot [1 \cdot (1 - \mu_t) + (1 - q)\mu_t]^{N-1}] (1 - \mu_t)} \\ &= \frac{1 - (1 - q)(1 - q\mu_t)^{N-1}}{1 - (1 - q\mu_t)^N} \mu_t, \text{ which decreases in } N \text{ by checking the derivative.} \end{aligned}$$

$\square$

*Proof of Proposition 5.* Consider firm 1 without loss of generality. The updated belief after one signal is:

$$\begin{cases} \mu^y = \mathbb{P}(\text{firm 1 is bad type} | s = y, \text{ initial belief is } \mu) = \frac{1 - (1 - q)(1 - q\mu)}{1 - (1 - q\mu)^2} \mu \\ \mu^n = \mathbb{P}(\text{firm 1 is bad type} | s = n, \text{ initial belief is } \mu) = \frac{1 - q}{1 - q\mu} \mu \end{cases}$$

Both  $\mu^y$  and  $\mu^n$  increase in  $\mu$ .  $\mu^y \geq 1/2$ ,  $\forall \mu$ . Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which rational firms never sell the data. Then consumers have identical beliefs about both firms. Denote the corresponding value function by  $V(\cdot)$ . Consider a belief  $\mu > \hat{\mu}$ .  $V(\mu) = (1 - \delta) \frac{v^2}{2t} + \delta [q\mu V(\mu^y) + (1 - q\mu)V(\mu^n)]$ . The value function of deviating once in the current period is  $V_{dev}(\mu) = (1 - \delta) \left( \frac{v^2}{2t} + D(0) \right) + \delta [q[1 + (1 - q)\mu]V(\mu^y) + (1 - q)(1 - q\mu)V(\mu^n)]$ .



$$V_{dev}(\mu) - V(\mu) = (1 - \delta)D(0) - \delta [V(\mu^n) - V(\mu^y)] q(1 - q\mu). \quad (4)$$

Condition 3 ( $v/u_b < 2$ )  $\Rightarrow \hat{\mu} < 1/2$ .  $\mu^y \geq 1/2$ ,  $\forall \mu$  implies that consumer will reveal no information after one signal  $y$ , which gives the rational firm a stage equilibrium payoff of  $\frac{v^2}{2t}$ . If the signal is  $n$  and  $\mu^n \leq \hat{\mu}$ , rational firm gets a stage payoff of  $v/2$ ; If the signal is  $n$  and  $\mu^n > \hat{\mu}$ , rational firm gets a stage payoff of  $\frac{v^2}{2t}$ . So, we get an upper bound of  $V(\mu^n)$  by assuming that the belief is always no greater than  $\hat{\mu}$ :

$$V(\mu^n) \leq (1 - \delta) \left[ \frac{v}{2} + \sum_{k=1}^{+\infty} \delta^k [q\mu \frac{v^2}{2t} + (1 - q\mu) \frac{v}{2}] \right] = (1 - \delta) \frac{v}{2} + \delta [q\mu \frac{v^2}{2t} + (1 - q\mu) \frac{v}{2}]$$

Always selling consumer data gives a lower bound on the value function:

$$V(\mu^y) \geq (1 - \delta) \sum_{k=0}^{+\infty} \delta^k [\frac{v^2}{2t} + D(0)] = \frac{v^2}{2t} + D(0)$$

Hence,  $V(\mu^n) - V(\mu^y) \leq (1 - \delta) \frac{v}{2} + \delta [q\mu \frac{v^2}{2t} + (1 - q\mu) \frac{v}{2}] - [\frac{v^2}{2t} + D(0)]$ . Plug it back to 4,

$$\begin{aligned} & V_{dev}(\mu) - V(\mu) \\ & \geq (1 - \delta) [D(0) - \delta q(1 - q\mu) \frac{v}{2}] - \delta q(1 - q\mu) \left[ \delta [q\mu \frac{v^2}{2t} + (1 - q\mu) \frac{v}{2}] - [\frac{v^2}{2t} + D(0)] \right] \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

With a strictly positive probability, the signal will be  $y$  for  $k$  consecutive periods,  $\forall k$ . Given the prior belief  $\mu_0$ , denote the belief after  $k$  consecutive signal  $y$  by  $\mu_0^{y^k}$ . One can see that  $\mu_0^y \in (\mu_0, 1)$ ,  $\forall \mu_0 \in (0, 1)$ . So,  $\mu_0^{y^k}$  strictly increases in  $k$  and is bounded by 1. Thus,  $\{\mu_0^{y^k}\}_{k=1}^{+\infty}$  has a limit. Denote the limit by  $\mu_0^{y^{+\infty}}$ . We have  $(\mu_0^{y^{+\infty}})^y = \mu_0^{y^{+\infty}} \Rightarrow \mu_0^{y^{+\infty}} = 1 \Rightarrow \mu_0^{y^k}$  could be arbitrarily close to 1. So, the belief  $\mu$  could be arbitrarily close to 1 at some point with a strictly positive probability. If condition 1 holds ( $\Delta u < \overline{\Delta u}$ ), then  $(1 - q)(v/2 - v^2/2t) < D(0)$ . For large enough  $\mu$  and  $\delta = 1$ , we have  $\delta [q\mu \frac{v^2}{2t} + (1 - q\mu) \frac{v}{2}] - [\frac{v^2}{2t} + D(0)] < 0$ . Because

$\delta[q\mu\frac{v^2}{2t} + (1-q\mu)\frac{v}{2}] - [\frac{v^2}{2t} + D(0)]$  decreases in  $\delta$ ,  $\delta[q\mu\frac{v^2}{2t} + (1-q\mu)\frac{v}{2}] - [\frac{v^2}{2t} + D(0)] < 0$  for large enough  $\mu$  and any  $\delta$ . If condition [\(2\)](#) holds ( $(q(1-q)v/2 < D(0))$ ), for large enough  $\mu$  and any  $\delta$ , we have  $D(0) - \delta q(1-q\mu)\frac{v}{2} > 0$ . Together, we get that  $(1-\delta)[D(0) - \delta q(1-q\mu)\frac{v}{2}] - \delta q(1-q\mu) \left[ \delta[q\mu\frac{v^2}{2t} + (1-q\mu)\frac{v}{2}] - [\frac{v^2}{2t} + D(0)] \right] > 0$ , [\(5\)](#)  $V_{dev}(\mu) - V(\mu) > 0$ . Therefore, a rational firm will sell the data when the belief  $\mu$  is large enough. A contradiction.  $\square$

*Proof of Proposition [6](#).* Fix  $\delta \in (0, 1)$ . Suppose  $\forall N_\delta, \exists N \geq N_\delta$  s.t. there exists an MPE in which a rational firm (label it by firm 1 without loss of generality) does not sell the data at  $t = 0$ . Denote the value function of firm 1 by  $V_1(\cdot)$ . The prior belief is  $\vec{\mu}_0 = (\mu_0, \mu_0, \dots, \mu_0)$ . Denote the posterior belief upon observing signal  $y$  ( $n$ ) by  $\vec{\mu}^y$  ( $\vec{\mu}^n$ ) when the initial belief is  $\vec{\mu}$  and the equilibrium strategy is  $\sigma$ .

Suppose  $\mu_0 > \hat{\mu}$ .  $V_1(\vec{\mu}_0) = (1-\delta)\frac{v^2}{2t} + \delta [\mathbb{P}(s=y|\sigma^{f*})V_1(\vec{\mu}_0^y) + \mathbb{P}(s=n|\sigma^{f*})V_1(\vec{\mu}_0^n)]$ , where  $\mathbb{P}(s=n|\sigma^{f*}) \leq (1-q\mu_0)^{N-1}$  and  $\mathbb{P}(s=y|\sigma^{f*}) = 1 - \mathbb{P}(s=n|\sigma^{f*}) \geq 1 - (1-q\mu_0)^{N-1}$ . The upper bound of the probability of signal  $n$ ,  $\mathbb{P}(s=n|\sigma^{f*})$ , is obtained when no rational firm sells data under  $\sigma^{f*}$  given belief  $\vec{\mu}_0$ .

The value function of firm 1 if it deviates once in the first period (denote the strategy by  $\sigma^{f'}$ ) is  $V_{1,dev}(\vec{\mu}_0) = (1-\delta) \left( \frac{v^2}{2t} + D(0) \right) + \delta [\mathbb{P}(s=y|\sigma^{f'})V_1(\vec{\mu}_0^y) + \mathbb{P}(s=n|\sigma^{f'})V_1(\vec{\mu}_0^n)]$ , where  $\mathbb{P}(s=n|\sigma^{f'}) = (1-q)\mathbb{P}(s=n|\sigma^{f*})$  and  $\mathbb{P}(s=y|\sigma^{f'}) = 1 - \mathbb{P}(s=n|\sigma^{f'})$ . Therefore, we have  $V_{1,dev}(\mu_0) - V_1(\mu_0) = (1-\delta)D(0) - \delta [V_1(\mu_0^n) - V_1(\mu_0^y)] q\mathbb{P}(s=n|\sigma^{f*})$ . Because  $V_1(\cdot) \in [\frac{v^2}{2t}, \frac{v}{2} + D(1 - \frac{v}{t})]$ ,  $V_1(\mu_0^n) - V_1(\mu_0^y) \leq \frac{v}{2} + D(1 - \frac{v}{t}) - \frac{v^2}{2t}$ , which is a constant.  $\mathbb{P}(s=n|\sigma^{f*}) \leq (1-q\mu_0)^{N-1} \rightarrow 0$  ( $N \rightarrow +\infty$ ). Hence, given  $\delta, \exists N_\delta$  s.t.  $\forall N \geq N_\delta, V_{1,dev}(\mu_0) - V_1(\mu_0) > 0$ . But we assume that firm 1 does not sell the data at  $t = 0$ . A contradiction.

In sum, firms always sell data and consumers reveal nothing at  $t = 0$  in equilibrium. Anticipating that, the consumer's posterior belief about each firm's type is  $\mu_0$ . This repeats in every period. Therefore, for any  $\delta \in (0, 1), \exists N_\delta$  s.t.  $\forall N \geq N_\delta$ , firms always sell data and consumers reveal nothing in the unique MPE. Consumer's belief about the firm's type is always  $\mu_0$ .

Suppose  $\mu_0 \leq \hat{\mu}$ . The first period payoff will be  $\frac{v}{2}$  in equilibrium and  $\frac{v}{2} + D(1 - \frac{v}{t})$  if the

firm deviates. All the remaining proof is the same as above. □

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