

INVINCIBLE

THE GAMES OF SHUSAKU

Compiled, Edited & Translated
By JOHN POWER



KISEIDO PUBLISHING COMPANY

Published by
Kiseido Publishing Company
CPO Box 2126
Tokyo, Japan

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147 Haarlemmerdijk 147, 1013 KH Amsterdam, Holland
Tel. +31-20-624-1171; FAX +31-20-627-0885

Available in North America through:
Kiseido, 2255 - 29th St., Suite 4, Santa Monica, CA 90405;
Tel: 1-800-988-6463; FAX: 1-310-392-7598; e-mail: kiseido@crl.com
Home page: <http://www.labnet.or.jp/~kiseido>

First printing, February 1982
Second Printing, August 1996
Printed in Japan

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Preface

Shusaku has a unique position among the go players of history: for the past century there has been a firm consensus among go professionals that he is the greatest player of the historical period and the one whose games most repay serious study. In a recent poll, the results of which were published in the January 1982 issue of *Igo Club*, leading professionals and go writers were asked to name the top three players of the historical period (that is, up to and including the 21st Honinbo, Shusai, who died in 1940), and Shusaku easily took first place. (The other players in the top ten were, in order: Shuei, Dosaku, Shuwa, Jowa, Shuho, Shusai, Dochi, Ota Yuzo, and Mizutani Nujii.) Shusaku also took first place in a similar poll of *Igo Club* readers, so there is no discrepancy in his evaluation by amateur and professionals.

Polls aside, a more significant indication of the high regard that professional players have for Shusaku is the amount of time they devote to studying his games. There must be very few professionals indeed who have not gone through his *Complete Games*, and in fact this is invariably one of the first tasks assigned to insei or apprentice professionals. There is also the enduring popularity of the Shusaku-style fuseki, which, it is generally recognised, is one of the main foundations of modern fuseki theory. The inescapable conclusion is that studying Shusaku's games is essential for all players seriously interested in the game.

This book is an attempt to present as wide a selection as possible of Shusaku's games to the Western reader. The original inspiration for compiling it was the enjoyment I found in reading the commentaries by Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan which were published as supplements to *Igo Shincho* (the now-defunct magazine of the Kansai Ki-in) from January 1978 to April 1979. These commentaries, which impressed me with their clarity and insight, are meant to be the core of this book, but a large variety of other sources have been drawn upon to make the book comprehensive, and in addition a number of new commentaries — those by Sanno Hirotaka 9-dan — were commissioned specially for this book to complete the coverage of Shusaku's castle games. I wrote the background sections linking the games and also wrote the three introductory chapters.

I would like to express my gratitude to David Thayer, who generously gave an immense amount of time to the manuscript. I would also like to thank James Kerwin, James Davies, and William Pinckard for their invaluable help with proofreading. However, I claim full responsibility for any mistranslations, factual errors or stylistic inelegancies which remain.

John Power

Notes

1. As a rule players have been referred to by one name throughout to avoid confusion, though in fact go players in the Edo period (and even now) changed their names at different stages of their careers. In this book Shusaku is referred to as Shusaku throughout, although he did not take the name Shusaku until 1841. He is called Honinbo Shusaku after becoming the heir in 1848, for, although he did not live to succeed to the title, it was customarily extended to the heir as a courtesy. The sole exception to the 'one name' rule is the player who appears in this book as Kadono Tadazaemon, Mizutani Junsaku, and Inoue Shutetsu — he set a record for name-changing (and incidentally developed schizophrenia). At various stages in his career he was known as Todani Umetaro, Dowa, Kadono Tadazaemon, Mizutani Junsaku, Inoue Shutetsu, the 12th Inoue Inseki, and, in retirement, Setsuzan. Such extraordinary nomenclatural fickleness seemed to deserve recognition.
2. Dates have not been converted to the Gregorian calendar (strictly speaking, 'March', for example, should read 'third month' and so on). The actual discrepancy can vary from a few days to a few weeks. Occasionally, an additional, 'intercalary month' had to be inserted into the Japanese calendar to harmonise it with the solar year.
3. Most game records are presented from Shusaku's point of view, but no attempt at consistency has been made.

The Four Go Houses

Terms of office as head of the house are given in brackets.

Honinbo

1. Sansa, Meijin (1612 – 23)
2. Sanetsu 8-dan (1630 – 58)
3. Doetsu, unofficial Meijin (1658 – 77)
4. Dosaku, Meijin (1677 – 1702)
Doteki 7-dan (heir 1684 – 90)
Sakugen 7-dan (heir 1692 – 99)
5. Dochi, Meijin (1702 – 27)
6. Chihaku 6-dan (1727 – 33)
7. Shuhaku 6-dan (1733 – 41)
8. Hakugen 6-dan (1741 – 54)
9. Satsugen, Meijin (1754 – 88)
10. Retsugen 8-dan (1788 – 1808)
11. Genjo 8-dan (1809 – 27)
12. Jowa, Meijin (1827 – 39)
13. Josaku 7-dan (1839 – 47)
14. Shuwa 8-dan (1847 – 73)
Shusaku 7-dan (heir 1848 – 62)
15. Shuetsu 6-dan (1873 – 79)
16. Shugen 4-dan (1879 – 84)
17. Shuei 7-dan (1884 – 86)
18. Shuhuo 8-dan (1886)
19. Shuei, Meijin (1887 – 1907)
20. Shugen 6-dan (1907 – 08)
21. Shusai, Meijin (1908 – 40)

Yasui

1. Santetsu 8-dan (1612 – 44)
2. Sanchi, Meijin (1644 – 96)
Shunchi 6-dan (heir 1674 – 86)
3. Chitetsu 7-dan (1696 – 1700)
4. Senkaku 8-dan (1700 – 37)
Chisen 6-dan (heir 1727 – 28)
5. Shuntetsu Senkaku 8-dan (1737 – 75)
6. Sentetsu 7-dan (1775 – 80)
7. Senchi Senkaku 8-dan (1780 – 1814)
8. Chitoku Senchi 8-dan (1814 – 38)
9. Sanchi (Shuntetsu) 7-dan (1838 – 58)
10. Sanei 7-dan (1858 – 1903)

Holders of the Office of Meijin Godokoro

Meijin Godokoro

1. Sansa, 1st Honinbo
2. Nakamura Doseki, 1st Inoue
3. Sanchi, 2nd Yasui
4. Dosaku, 4th Honinbo
5. Dosetsu Inseki, 4th Inoue
6. Dochi, 5th Honinbo
7. Satsugen, 9th Honinbo
8. Jowa, 12th Honinbo

Period of office

- 1603 – 23
- 1623 – 30
- 1668 – 76
- 1677 – 1702
- 1710 – 19 (1708 became Meijin)
- 1721 – 27
- 1770 – 88 (1767 became Meijin)
- 1831 – 39

The office of Meijin godokoro was abolished with the fall of the Tokugawa government in 1868, but two players subsequently became Meijin. They were Shuei, 17th and 19th Honinbo, who was Meijin from 1906 to 1907, and Shusai, the 21st and last hereditary Honinbo, who was Meijin from 1914 to 1940.

Inoue

1. Nakamura Doseki, Meijin (1612 – 30)
2. Genkaku Inseki 7-dan (1630 – 73)
3. Dosa Inseki 7-dan (1673 – 92)
4. Dosetsu Inseki, Meijin (1692 – 1719)
5. Sakuun Inseki 8-dan (1719 – 34)
Yuseki 5-dan (heir 1720 – 26)
6. Shunseki Inseki 8-dan (1734 – 72)
7. Shuntatsu Inseki 7-dan (1772 – 92)
8. Intatsu Inseki 7-dan (1792 – 1805)
9. Shunsaku Inseki 7-dan (1805 – 10)
10. Insa Inseki 6-dan (1810 – 24)
11. Gennan Inseki 8-dan (1824 – 46)
12. Setsuzan Inseki 6-dan (1846 – 50)
13. Matsumoto Inseki 7-dan (1850 – 91)
14. Otsuka Inseki 8-dan (1891 – 1904)
15. Tabuchi Inseki 5-dan (1906 – 17)
16. Egeta Inseki 7-dan (1917 – 61)

Hayashi

1. Monnyusai 8-dan (1612 – ?)
2. Monnyu 6-dan (? – 1685)
3. Genetsu Monnyu 5-dan (1685 – 1706)
4. Bokunyu Monnyu 8-dan (1706 – 26)
5. Incho Monnyu 8-dan (1727 – 43)
6. Monri Monnyu 7-dan (1743 – 46)
7. Tenryu Monnyu 7-dan (1746 – 57)
8. Yugen Monnyu 7-dan (1757 – 89)
9. Monetsu Monnyu 7-dan (1789 – 1816)
10. Tetsugen Monnyu 6-dan (1816 – 19)
11. Gembu Monnyu 8-dan (1819 – 48)
12. Hakuei Monnyu 7-dan (1848 – 64)
Yubi 5-dan (heir 1856 – 62)
13. Shuei 5-dan (later Honinbo) (1864 – 84)

There were also three minor go houses: Sakaguchi (associated with Yasui), Hattori (Inoue), and Mizutani (Honinbo; note that Mizutani Nuiji was not a member).

Chronology

- 1578: Nikkai, the strongest go player of the day, had an audience with Oda Nobunaga.
- 1582: Nikkai played the 'triple ko' game with Kashio Rigen at Honnoji temple.
- 1588: Nikkai won a go competition organised by Toyotomi Hideyoshi and was awarded a stipend. Nikkai changed his name to Sansa and later founded the Honinbo school.
- 1600: Tokugawa Ieyasu won a decisive victory over his enemies at the Battle of Sekigahara.
- 1603: Tokugawa Ieyasu became shogun. Sansa was appointed as the first Meijin godokoro, a post which he held until his death in 1623.
- 1605: Ieyasu abdicated and retired to Sumpu Castle (in Shizuoka). Soon after, Sansa and Kashio Rigen played the first castle game in his presence.
- 1612: The Tokugawa government awarded stipends to the leading players. Four go schools – Honinbo, Yasui, Inoue and Hayashi – were founded.
- 1628: The castle games were transferred to Edo Castle and made an official annual ceremony.
- 1677 – 1702: The 4th Honinbo, Dosaku, the Saint of Go, held the office of Meijin godokoro.
- 1716: The 17 November was set as the date of the castle game ceremony.
- 1829: Birth of Shusaku on 5 May in Tonoura, In-no-shima; given name was Torajiro.
- 1831: Jowa, the 12th Honinbo, outmanoeuvred his main rival, Gennan Inseki, and became Meijin godokoro without fighting a sogo.
- 1834: Shusaku's aptitude for go discovered by Hashimoto Yoshubei, who became his patron.
- 1835: Shusaku played with Lord Asano of Mihara; received instruction from the Abbot Hoshin. Jowa defeated Akaboshi Intetsu on 19 July at the Matsudaira Go Party.
- 1837: Shusaku played Ito Showa in January; went to Edo to become a Honinbo disciple in November.
- 1838: Hayashi Gembu, a former ally of Jowa, challenged him to a sogo and revealed the details of his machinations to become Meijin godokoro (because Jowa failed to keep his promise to make Gembu 8-dan). The jisha-bugyo made several investigations.
- 1839: Jowa compelled to retire as Meijin godokoro on 30 November; the previous day he granted Shusaku a 1-dan diploma, one of his last official acts as Meijin godokoro.
- 1840: Shusaku made first visit home; was granted a stipend by Lord Asano.
In November Shuwa defeated Gennan in the first game of a supposed four-game sogo, so the latter withdrew his application for Meijin godokoro.
- 1841: Shusaku returned to Edo in August and the next month was given the name of Shusaku and promoted to 2-dan (16 September).
- 1842: Gennan lost to Shuwa in May and in the November castle game and finally gave up all hope of becoming Meijin godokoro. Shusaku promoted to 3-dan on 10 July.
- 1843: Shusaku promoted to 4-dan on 6 October; began using the Shusaku-style fuseki.
- 1844: Shusaku left Edo for second visit home in October, won three games out of four v. Ito Showa in Nagoya. In November Jowa's son, Kadono Tadazaemon (then Mizutani Shunsaku), became heir to Gennan, took the name of Inoue Shutetsu.
- 1846: Shusaku left home in April, played Nakagawa Shunsetsu on black in Osaka in May and won four straight; won three games against Gennan Inseki on black in July (including the 'ear-reddening' game on 21 – 25 July). Gennan later commented that he was already of 7-dan strength. Promoted to 5-dan in September; refused Honinbo request to become Shuwa's heir.
- 1847: The Asano clan waived its claim on Shusaku, so he agreed to become Shuwa's heir. In September Shuwa and Shusaku completed a series of seventeen games begun in October 1846.
Death of Honinbo Josaku on 18 August and of Jowa on 10 October.
- 1848: Shusaku officially became Honinbo heir on 22 November; had an audience with the shogun on 15 December. Married Jowa's daughter Hana. Promoted to 6-dan during 1848.
Ota Yuzo promoted to 7-dan. Gennan Inseki retired.

- 1849: Shusaku reached tagai-sen v. Ota Yuzo on 8 October (there is a theory that he was then promoted to 7-dan); played first two castle games on 17 November. Ito Showa promoted to 7-dan.
- 1850: Shusaku made third trip home from February to October. Shuwa promoted to 8-dan. 12th Inoue, Shutetsu (Kadono Tadazaemon), killed an Inoue disciple in a fit of insane jealousy, forced to retire. Matsumoto Kinshiro became the 13th Inoue.
- 1851: Shusaku played a nijubango (20-game match) with Sekiyama Sendaiu in Matsuyo, won 13 – 7.
- 1853: Shusaku began a sanjubango (30-game match) with Ota Yuzo on 27 January, forced him to senai-sen in the 17th game on 21 June; series suspended after Yuzo's jigo with white in the 23rd game on 29 November. Shusaku promoted to 7-dan.
- 1854: Party celebrating Shusaku's promotion to 7-dan held on 20 August. O-konomi go cancelled due to an earthquake on 4 November. Hayashi Gembu retired, awarded 8-dan.
- 1855: Large earthquake on 11 November caused the cancellation of the castle games.
- 1856: Death of Ota Yuzo at an inn in Echigo (Niigata) in April. Death of 12th Inoue, Shutetsu.
- 1857: Shusaku made his fourth and final visit home from January to September; played Mizutani Nuiji in April.
- 1858: Death of Yasui Sanchi on 8 July.
- 1859: Death of Gennan Inseki and Sekiyama Sendaiu. Shusaku lost a jubango with Ebizawa Kenzo (2 stones) 3–7. Shuwa applied for Meijin godokoro in December, but his application was shelved.
- 1861: Shuwa lost a crucial castle game to 13th Inoue, Matsumoto Inseki, which in effect put an end to his hopes of becoming Meijin godokoro.
Shusaku lost a jubango with Shuhō (black) 3–7–1 jigo; played his last two castle games.
- 1862: Death of Shusaku from cholera on 10 August. A fire at Edo Castle caused the cancellation of the castle game ceremony, though the actual games (shitauchi) had already been played.
- 1863: Shuwa resigned hope of making Shuhō his heir, made son Shuetsu heir in November. Castle games (shitauchi) played, but ceremony cancelled. Thereafter, no castle games at all.
- 1867: Ishigaya Kosaku had a memorial stone to Shusaku erected in his home province.
- 1868: Fall of the Tokugawa government, beginning of Meiji period.
- 1879: Founding of Hoensha, Shuhō first president.
- 1900: Publication of *Kogyoku Yoin*, a selection of one hundred of Shusaku's best games.
- 1904: Publication of *Zain Danso*, a history of Edo go which revealed details of Jowa's intrigues.

Statistics of Shusaku's Career

There are 388 games given in the *Complete Games of Shusaku*, but of these two are rengo (team games) and 38 are unfinished games, mainly being uchikake games which perhaps were never intended to be played to a finish. Many of the records of the remaining 348 games are incomplete, but the results are recorded and enough moves are given to make it clear who is winning. Of these 348 games, Shusaku won 228 (65.5%), lost 109 (31.3%) and drew 11 (3.2%). His year-by-year results are given below.

- 1840 – on three stones: 1 win; 1841 – on two stones: 5 wins (total 6–0)
- 1842 – on two stones: 12 wins – 5 losses; on black: 3 wins (total 15 – 5)
- 1843 – on two stones: 1 win; on black: 14–5–1 jigo; on white: 5–7 (20–12–1)
- 1844 – on black: 14–2–2 jigo; on white: 3–1(17–3–2)
- 1845 – on white: 2–1; giving two stones: 1 win (3 – 1)
- 1846 – on black: 18–5–1; on white: 3–1 (21–6–1)
- 1847 – on black: 18–5; on white: 4–2; giving four stones: 1 win (23–7)
- 1848 – on black: 5–1; on white: 9–2; giving two stones: 1–1; giving three: 5–4 (20–8)
- 1849 – on black: 10–2; on white: 2–2 (12–4)
- 1850 – on black: 4–1; on white: 7–3; giving two stones: 3 wins; giving three: 1 win (15–4)
- 1851 – on black: 4 wins; on white: 15–7; giving two stones: 2 wins; giving three: 1 loss (21–8)
- 1852 – on black: 3 wins; on white: 1–3 (4–3)
- 1853 – on black: 9–0–2 jigo; on white: 6–8–1 jigo; giving two stones: 5–5 (20–13–3)

- 1854 – on white: 6–1; giving two stones: 1 loss; giving five stones: 1 win (7–2)
 1855 – on black: 1 win 1856 – on white: 2–0–2 jigo; giving three stones: 1 loss (2–1–2)
 1857 – on black: 1 win; on white: 2–4; giving two stones: 2–7–1 jigo; giving three: 1 loss; giving four:
 2 losses (5–14–1) 1858 – on white: 1–1
 1859 – on black: 2 wins; on white: 3–1; giving two stones: 4–7 (9–8)
 1860 – on white: 1–2; giving three stones: 1 loss (1–3)
 1861 – on white: 5–6–1 jigo

Total: 228 wins – 109 losses – 11 jigo

Glossary

- aji*: potential, latent possibilities
ajikeshi: erasing or destroying the potential
amashi: a strategy for white in no-komi games in which he lets the opponent take good points but as compensation takes territory, aiming to ‘outlast’ the opponent
atome: heir
bango: match consisting of a set number of games
furikawari: swap, trade
gaike: a go player either not belonging to or not a direct disciple of one of the four main houses (literally ‘an outside house’)
godokoro: a player of Meijin rank appointed as head of the go world by the Tokugawa government
haya-go: a fast game of go
honte: the proper move (though it may sometimes appear slow)
iemoto: the head of a school
jisha-bugyo: the Commissioner for Shrines and Monasteries, who had jurisdiction over go (three commissioners were appointed at one time and served a month in office in rotation)
josen: black in all games – the handicap for a 2-dan difference
jozu: 7-dan (literally ‘skilful’)
jubango: a ten-game match
jun-Meijin: 8-dan (literally ‘quasi-Meijin’)
kadoban: a game which could lead to a change in handicap or the loss of a series (lit. ‘corner game’)
karami: attacking two groups simultaneously, a splitting attack
Kisei: Go Saint (Dosaku is known as the former Kisei and Shusaku as the latter Kisei)
Meiji: the period from 1868 to 1912
Meijin: 9-dan, the top player (lit. ‘master, expert’)
nijubango: a twenty-game series
oba: a large point in the fuseki or the endgame
o-konomi-go: an unscheduled castle game played at the personal request of the shogun
o-shiro-go: a castle game
- rengo*: a team game (the players on each team play in turns without consulting each other)
ryo: a gold coin, worth approx. \$70
sabaki: settling a group (by creating a flexible and resilient shape)
sanjubango: a thirty-game match
semeai: a capturing race, i.e. a fight to the death between two groups
semedori: being forced to add the extra stones necessary to remove a captured group from the board.
sen-ai-sen: black-black-white (the handicap for a 1-dan difference)
senban: playing on black (when the teai is tagai-sen)
sen-ni: alternating between black and two stones (the handicap for a four-dan difference)
senzensen: see sen-ai-sen
shinogi: saving a group under attack
shitauchi: the practice of playing the castle games before the date of the castle game ceremony
sogo: a challenge match (lit. ‘fighting go’)
tagai-sen: even – alternating black and white
tane-ishii: the pivotal stone(s)
teai: the conditions on which two players play each other, i.e. the handicap
tedomari: the last meaningful point in the fuseki or in the endgame
Tempo Shiketsu: the Tempo Era (1830 – 44) Top Four (Sakaguchi Sentoku, Ota Yuzo, Yasui Sanchi, Ito Showa)
tenuki: ignoring the opponent’s move and switching elsewhere
uchikake: suspending play during a game (it was White’s privilege to suspend play on his move)
uchikomu: 1. to invade; 2. to force an opponent to take a handicap (or force him to a higher handicap) by taking a lead of four games (six games at the beginning of the Edo period)
warikomi: wedging in between two enemy stones
wariuchi: an invasion which has room to extend in both directions

Part I

1. Go in the Edo Period

Introduction

Kuwahara Shusaku (1829 – 62) was the outstanding player in the golden age of classical go in Japan. His career was the climax of the development of Edo period go, while his fuseki theories laid the foundation of modern go. Playing for the honour of the Honinbo house, Shusaku set an unprecedented record of nineteen straight wins over a period of thirteen years in the annual castle games played in the presence of the shogun. Competing in an age of go geniuses, he was victorious in every important match he played and he firmly established his preeminence. His tragic death at the age of thirty-three, when he was in his prime as a player, was an enormous blow to the go world, but he left a legacy of games which have been an inspiration to succeeding generations. Even today, he remains perhaps the one player whose games are studied without fail by all serious students of the game.

Shusaku was the product of a unique system of professional go players which developed during the Edo period (1600 – 1868) and which led to a striking advance in the level of skill. Go had already been played in Japan for a thousand years (the exact date of its introduction into Japan is not clear, though it is safe to say that it was already known there by 500 A.D.), but it was thanks to the government patronage enjoyed by the game in the Edo period that Japan forged ahead of the other go-playing countries (principally China, where go was probably invented, and Korea), and the preeminence in go still enjoyed by Japan has its roots firmly planted in the progress made in the Edo period. Before looking in detail at Shusaku's period, it is worth reviewing the development of the system of government patronage from which he and his contemporaries derived so much benefit.

Meijin godokoro and castle go

Go did not become a genuinely popular game with a broad basis in the general populace until the twentieth century. Initially after its introduction into Japan it was played in court circles by the aristocracy and then gradually spread among the mediaeval warrior class and Buddhist clergy, these being the educated classes. There was presumably a gradual improvement in technique, but the most significant advance was that at some point in the feudal period, perhaps in the 14th or 15th century, the Japanese abandoned the traditional Chinese practice of placing two white and two black stones on the corner star-points before starting the game. This innovation, not adopted by the Chinese until this century, was the stimulus for the development of joseki and fuseki theory, whereas previously fighting ability was all that mattered, as the middle game started almost immediately.

It was a stroke of good luck for go that the three great warlords who successively carried forward the task of reunifying Japan in the late 16th century after a long period of civil war (known as the Period of the Country at War and generally dated 1482 – 1558)

were all enthusiastic go players and each gave generous patronage to the top go players of the day.

The first was Oda Nobunaga (1534 – 82), who sought out the strongest player and became his pupil. This was Nikkai (1559 – 1623), a Buddhist priest of the Nichiren sect who lived in a pagoda named ‘Honinbo’ in the Jakkoji temple in Kyoto. Nikkai later came to be known as ‘Honinbo’, and this name was adopted as the name of the go school he founded. When Nobunaga visited Kyoto in 1578, he summoned Nikkai for an audience and was so impressed with his skill (he took five stones from him in teaching games) that he called him ‘meijin’, meaning master player or expert, and this was apparently the origin of the use of the term in go. Nikkai established the tradition of the head of the Honinbo school becoming a Buddhist priest, and this practice was followed by the other schools. The Inoue school was also affiliated with the Nichiren sect, while the Yasui and Hayashi schools were affiliated with the Jodo sect. In theory, Nichiren sect priests (though not Jodo) were required to practice celibacy, but this rule does not seem to have been enforced very strictly.

In 1582 Nikkai played a famous game with his leading rival, Kashio Rigen, in the presence of Nobunaga at the Honnoji temple in Kyoto. A triple ko is said to have arisen in this game, leading to its suspension without a result. The night after the game, Nobunaga’s ally Akechi Mitsuhide (1526 – 82) suddenly rose in rebellion, surrounded the Honnoji temple with his troops and killed Nobunaga. Because of this, a triple ko was thereafter regarded as inauspicious.

As the 1st Honinbo, Nikkai changed his name to Sansa. Fortunately he found patrons in Nobunaga’s successors, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536 – 98), who promptly disposed of Akechi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542 – 1616), who founded the Tokugawa shogunate which ruled Japan for two and a half centuries (both took 5 stones from Sansa).

In 1588 Hideyoshi organised a large-scale competition in order to systematise the rankings of the go players of the time. Sansa won this competition, and Hideyoshi decreed that all other players should henceforth take black (josen) or a larger handicap against him. Hideyoshi also awarded Sansa an annual stipend, and this can be regarded as the beginning of the system of official patronage of go. In 1592 Sansa was also summoned to Kyoto to play a game in the presence of Emperor Goyozei (reigned 1586 – 1611).

Government patronage of go was placed on an organised basis in the 17th century, after the Tokugawa clan had defeated its enemies and securely established its hegemony over all Japan. The Tokugawas decided on Edo (the modern Tokyo) as the capital and it also became the centre of go activity. The Tokugawas took three decisive steps which ensured the prosperity of go. These were the awarding of stipends to the leading go players, the establishment of the office of godokoro, and the institution of the annual ceremony of the o-shiro-go (castle games) played in the presence of the shogun. In the government hierarchy go was placed under the supervision of the jisha-bugyo or Commissioners for Shrines and Monasteries, presumably because of the religious affiliations of the early go players. There were three commissioners, appointed from among the feudal aristocracy, and they alternated in office, serving a month at a time.

At the beginning of the 17th century, four go houses or schools were established.

These were the above-mentioned Honinbo, Inoue, Yasui and Hayashi schools, and subsequent Edo go history is the history of the rivalry among these schools to attain supremacy in the go world. In theory these schools are considered to have begun in 1612, the year that the Tokugawa government granted stipends to the leading players, though it probably took some time before each school was able to organise itself properly as a formal school of go players. There are many stories of individual rivalry in the Edo period, but the fiercest competition was reserved for the annual castle games, while the highest honour to which a go player could aspire was promotion to the rank of Meijin, which brought with it appointment by the government to the office of godokoro.

The godokoro, which could be translated as 'head of the government go office', was the top post in the go world. Its holder was the official go instructor to the shogun and also controlled all promotions and monopolised the issuing of diplomas. Once a player became the godokoro, he had to give up competitive play, except when he received special permission, since he was the shogun's teacher. He decided the pairings in the castle games and was also responsible for all ceremonies connected with go, such as games played in the presence of the Emperor in Kyoto or games with foreigners. Apparently a diploma issued by the godokoro could be used in place of the usual government document when passing through the numerous barrier gates which the government used to control movement throughout Japan.

The condition for appointment as godokoro was that one be recognised as the top player of the day, which meant being promoted to Meijin (the two are always bracketed together in Edo go history, but they were separate, with promotion to Meijin not always leading to immediate assumption of the office of godokoro). In the dan system invented in the late 17th century, Meijin was equivalent to 9-dan, but this cannot be compared to the modern ranking system, as there could only be one Meijin at a time. In prestige, being Meijin in the Edo period was equivalent to holding the modern Kisei, Meijin and Honinbo titles simultaneously and for life. During the Edo period there were only eight Meijins, for in periods when there was no clearly superior player (or when the rivals for the office stalemated each other) no one was promoted to this rank and as a consequence the office of godokoro was often left vacant. At such times promotions etc. were decided on by conference among the four heads of the go houses.

Only a truly great player could hope to become Meijin godokoro, and the office was vacant more often than it was filled (see the chart on page ix). In some cases, for example, Sansa and the 4th Honinbo, Dosaku (1645 – 1702), one player was so superior to his contemporaries that the rival go heads readily agreed to his promotion, but in other cases, with two candidates of comparable merit, the rivalry would be settled by a challenge match (*sogo*), with the prize being the coveted promotion to Meijin. The permission of the jisha-bugyo commissioner had to be obtained for these matches, and he would determine the conditions (on one occasion he directed that a sixty-game match be played). Six of these *sogo* were played during the Edo period, but only one (a more reasonable six-game match, which unfortunately ended in a tie) was completed, and only one had a clear-cut result (though uncompleted, the player who had fallen behind withdrew and his opponent promptly became Meijin godokoro).

The highlight of the go year was the annual o-shiro-go, or castle game ceremony, in which the four heads of the go houses and their heirs played in the presence of the shogun. This ceremony originated in the games played in the presence of Nobunaga,

Hideyoshi and Ieyasu and seems to have become established as an official government ceremony early in the 17th century. The first castle go game was played between Sansa and Kashio Rigen in the presence of Ieyasu at Sumpu Castle (in Shizuoka). The date is not known, but perhaps it was not long after 1605, the year that Ieyasu abdicated in favour of his son and retired to Sumpu Castle. From 1628 on the games were played at Edo Castle. At first the date was not fixed, but in 1716 the 8th shogun, Yoshimune, decreed that the games be played on the 17th November.

At first only eight players were eligible to play in the castle games: the four iemoto (heads of the go schools) and their officially recognised heirs. Later all players who reached 7-dan were allowed to participate, and later still this was extended to players of 5-dan and up who were specially recommended by one of the go heads.

The castle games were played under the supervision of the jisha-bugyo commissioner in the Go-Kokushoin chamber of Edo Castle, and the ceremony was carried out with great solemnity regardless of whether or not the shogun was actually present (when he was too busy or perhaps just not interested, his place was taken by senior councillors). When there was no Meijin godokoro, the go heads took it in turns to decide the pairings. If the shogun was in attendance, the games would be played to a conclusion; if he did not appear, the players would leave the yose unplayed and wait for his arrival before completing the games, and if he did not attend at all, the players would wait for the appearance of the councillors acting in his place, then finish the games. At first the games were actually played on the day of the ceremony, but in the 1660's some castle games which were part of a sogo between Yasui Sanchi and Honinbo Doetsu were not finished on the day and had to be completed at the residence of the jisha-bugyo commissioner. This led to the institution of the practice of *shitauchi*, in which the games would be played between the 11th and the 16th November, then simply replayed on the 17th at Edo Castle. To ensure that the results of these games were kept secret until the 17th, the players were kept in seclusion until that day. This, incidentally, is the source of the famous proverb about a go player arriving too late at the death-bed of his parent — once the *shitauchi* began, he was not allowed out for any reason.

In addition to the official games, the pairings for which were decided in advance, extra games might be played on the 17th at the direction of the shogun. Since the pairings were decided on the spot, according to the *preference* of the shogun, these games were known as o-konomi-go (konomi means preference) and presumably were relatively quick games, since they were played after the official castle games had been played through. The popularity of the o-konomi games was one good indication of how much active interest the government of the day was taking in go. Seven of Shusaku's nineteen castle games were o-konomi-go.

According to the records of the Tokugawa clan, sixty-seven players took part in the castle games during the Edo period and they played a total of 536 games. The record for an individual, forty-six games, is held by Honinbo Retsugen.

The formation of the four go schools is generally dated to 1612, when the government awarded stipends to the top players, but it was probably several decades after that before the schools became organised in the form in which they continued throughout the Edo period. Like many traditional Japanese arts, the go schools adopted the iemoto

system, in which the head of the school would adopt his most talented disciple into his family and make him his heir. In most cases the heir was not the actual son of the head of the school (the notable exception to this is Shuwa, three of whose sons became Honinbo, while there is also the case of Jowa, who took the son of the preceding Honinbo as his heir and sent his own son out to become the heir of a rival school). In theory, the heads of the schools were Buddhist priests, but, as mentioned earlier, the rule of celibacy was not much adhered to, and most go players, especially later in the Edo period, seem to have married and raised families. However, according to the practice established by Sansa and his contemporaries, the head of a school had to wear priestly garb and shave his head, and this also applied to players participating in the castle games.

The official sponsorship of go by the government and the growing popularity of the game among the ruling samurai class and the wealthy merchant class which flourished during the Edo period combined to provide a secure environment for the development of go. The four schools competed in discovering promising pupils and devoted great effort to study in an attempt to steal a march on their opponents. If one school developed a new variation on a joseki, it would keep it secret until the right occasion for springing it on a foe. One such unpleasant surprise was the taisha variation unveiled by Akaboshi Intetsu in his game against Jowa given later in this chapter. In addition to competition on the board, the schools would also compete in securing the patronage of powerful political figures. Wealthy merchants would also vie with each other in sponsoring go meetings at their homes. However, although go was closely associated with the ruling classes during the Edo period, go players themselves came from all levels of society. Chitoku, for example, was the son of a fisherman, while Shuhō was the son of an impoverished carpenter who, fortunately for him, lived next door to the Honinbo residence.

The history of go during the Edo period is the story of a continuing advance in technical skills. The 4th Honinbo, Dosaku, played a pioneering role in the development of the level of go with his major breakthrough in fuseki theory at the end of the 17th century. He is regarded as the precursor of modern go and is one of the two players known to go history as a go saint, the other being Shusaku.

During the one and a half centuries after Dosaku, go passed through periods of prosperity and periods of stagnation, but during the nineteenth century it entered its golden age, with the appearance of at least a dozen players worthy of being called geniuses. The nineteenth century also saw the most dramatic struggle for the office of Meijin godokoro. Some knowledge of this struggle is essential for an understanding of Shusaku's period.

The fight for Meijin godokoro: Jowa and Gennan Inseki

Five of the Meijin godokoros of the Edo period came from the Honinbo house, which seemed to have had the knack of discovering the go geniuses of the future when they were still children, but it still met with formidable opposition from the other go houses. The nineteenth century is remarkable for the bitter and protracted rivalry between the Honinbo and Inoue houses.

The two great players of the third and fourth decades of the nineteenth century

were Jowa (1787 – 1847), the 12th Honinbo, and Gennan Inseki (1798 – 1859), the 11th Inoue (Gennan is the name by which he is best known, though actually it is the name he took after retirement). These two staged a fight for Meijin godokoro which began on the go board but continued in the form of behind-the-scenes political manoeuvrings. After a series of plots and counter-plots, Jowa outwitted his opponent, but when his subterfuges were later exposed, he was forced to retire in humiliation. Even today the full story is not known, but in outline it is as follows.

Jowa, then 7-dan, succeeded Genjo as Honinbo in December 1827 and was promoted to 8-dan in January 1828. His main rival, Gennan, had become the head of the Inoue house in 1824 and was promoted to 7-dan in October 1827. The two had played a large number of games, but most of these were before Gennan became the Inoue heir (Gennan had originally become the heir of Hattori Inshuku (1761 – 1842) in 1810, but the latter had ceded him to the Inoue house in October 1819). The last completed game between the two was played in September 1822, with Gennan playing on sen-ai-sen. Although Gennan had won only one game out of four on that handicap, it was obvious that he was catching up with Jowa, so the latter must have preferred not to take the chance of spoiling his record.

Gennan anticipated that Jowa would sooner or later apply for Meijin godokoro, so he was anxious to become 8-dan in order to be able to compete for the office on an even footing. His adopted father, Hattori Inshuku 7-dan, went to see Jowa in November 1827 to ask for his approval (when there was no godokoro, a consensus of the go heads was necessary for promotions to the higher ranks). His argument was that if Jowa applied to become Meijin, Yasui Senchi (1776 – 1838, the 8th Yasui, better known as Chitoku), would be certain to oppose him. Hattori said that in this case he and Gennan would support Jowa, but Gennan would be in a better position to give help if he were 8-dan. Jowa pretended to agree to this proposal.

In February 1828 Inshuku went to see Yasui Senchi to ask for his approval for the promotion, but this was withheld, on the grounds that it was too soon after Gennan's promotion to 7-dan. Gennan and Inshuku had anticipated this refusal, and Inshuku promptly pulled out an application for a sogo between Gennan and Senchi. Gennan hoped to use this sogo as a springboard to challenge Jowa, but Senchi was disgusted with his deviousness and refused to co-sign the application.

Inshuku next went to get Jowa's signature on the application for promotion to 8-dan, but Jowa was evasive, commenting that he had thought the promotion was to come much later. Jowa was well aware of what Gennan was up to, and in any case he obtained confirmation, by bribing an Inoue disciple, that Gennan's ultimate aim was to challenge him.

Jowa decided that the time had come to start his own movement to win the office of Meijin godokoro. He enlisted Hayashi Gembi (1778 – 1861), the 11th Hayashi, as an ally, promising to promote him to 8-dan if he became Meijin godokoro (Gembi had been promoted to 7-dan at the same time as Gennan). Once again Senchi was disturbed when he heard what Jowa was about (Senchi had a nobler view of the go player's avocation – he felt that if a player were worthy of the rank of Meijin, Heaven would arrange for him to get it without his having to stoop to this kind of scheming), and Gennan seized his opportunity. He pointed out to Senchi that the only way to stop Jowa was by a sogo and that, as the only other 8-dan, Senchi was the logical opponent (though at fifty-two he was already past the usual retirement age for an Edo-period player). However, if he, Gennan, were promoted to 8-dan, he could fight Jowa. This argument convinced Senchi,

and as a result Gennan finally secured his promotion to 8-dan (presumably, as the elder statesman of the go world, Senchi's assent was sufficient for the jisha-bugyo).

On the 16th February 1828 there was a conference of the go heads at Senchi's house to discuss the question of Jowa's application for Meijin godokoro. As prearranged with Gennan, Senchi commented that he thought that it was premature and he urged Gennan to play a sogo with Jowa. However, Gennan remained silent, and Inshuku made the counter-suggestion that Senchi should play the sogo. Senchi, furious at being deceived, declared that he would fight Jowa. Permission for the sogo was granted later that month by the jisha-bugyo commissioner, but no decision was made on the date. In the meantime Gennan put in his application to play the survivor if either player died during the course of the sogo (not so far-fetched as it might seem, for some of the previous sogo were played at the rate of a game a year).

The dilatoriness of the jisha-bugyo in fixing the date for the sogo to begin is one of the many mysteries of this dispute. In April 1829, with the date still undecided, Jowa sent a document to Gennan promising to yield the post of Meijin godokoro to him after six years if he would support Jowa. Gennan agreed, and the two exchanged guarantees and also exchanged their sons as hostages. Gennan also agreed to pay Jowa two hundred ryo when he became Meijin godokoro. In the above guarantees actual names were not used, with the references being to Party A and Party B, but Gennan made the mistake of sending Jowa a separate signed memorandum in which he wrote that he supported Jowa's application. Gennan later became suspicious of Jowa's good faith, but it was too late, for the latter had already given the document to the jisha-bugyo. Gennan did all he could to raise objections to Jowa's application, and as a result the commissioner invited him to apply for a sogo. Jowa refused, on the basis of the above-mentioned memorandum, but Gennan persisted. The commissioner asked Senchi to arbitrate, and his decision was that Gennan and Jowa should play a sogo (on tagai-sen).

That was where matters stood when on the 16th March 1831 the go world was thunderstruck by the news that the jisha-bugyo had appointed Jowa as Meijin godokoro — without playing a sogo with either Senchi or Gennan. What had happened was that Hayashi Gembi had worked very effectively on Jowa's behalf. Gembi came from Mito and he had used his influence with the very powerful Mito branch of the Tokugawa clan (the Mito family was one of the sanke, the three families from among which the shogun could be chosen). Gembi had then presented a petition in January 1831 when a jisha-bugyo commissioner who was a relation of the Mito family was in office. Jowa thus finally achieved his ambition and proved that when it came to political intrigue he was more than a match for his rivals.

Gennan did not give up hope even after Jowa became Meijin godokoro. He and Senchi lodged frequent protests with the jisha-bugyo, and when these were unavailing he resorted to craftier measures. At his request an influential supporter of his, Lord Matsudaira, who was a councillor to the shogun, held a go meeting, the famous 'Matsudaira Go Party', to which all the top players were invited on the 19th July 1835. As godokoro, Jowa was not supposed to play, but he could not refuse a request by Lord Matsudaira. Gennan's original plan was to play Jowa himself, but his star pupil, Akaboshi Intetsu (1810 — 35), who had been promoted to 7-dan the year before by Jowa, had made such impressive progress that he decided to substitute him. Akaboshi was a genius and was considered a

potential Meijin in the future. If he defeated Jowa, Gennan intended to protest that he was not qualified to be Meijin if he could not beat a 7-dan. (If Gennan played Jowa, he would probably also play on black, though on the sen-ai-sen handicap rather than the josen handicap as in Akaboshi's case, so it would be all the more effective if a 7-dan rather than an 8-dan defeated the Meijin.)

Everything went according to plan, at least at first. Jowa made an overly aggressive move in the fuseki, and Akaboshi countered with a new taisha variation, developed in secret by the Inoue house. This gave Akaboshi an early advantage, but Jowa fought back desperately and in the middle game played three brilliant tesujis in a row. Moreover, as the game progressed (it took a week all told), Akaboshi's health, which was poor to begin with, began to deteriorate. Little by little, Jowa relentlessly ground down his lead and took control of the game. At the end of the game Akaboshi collapsed by the side of the board, vomiting blood. A month later he was dead from tuberculosis. Gennan's plan backfired completely, for the game was the supreme triumph of Jowa's playing career.

The eventual cause of Jowa's undoing came from a different quarter. From the outset Jowa of course had had no intention of honouring his promise to cede the Meijin godokoro office to Gennan after six years, but for some inexplicable reason he also refused to reward his main ally, Gembí, by promoting him to 8-dan, a promise which surely would not have cost him anything to keep. Gembí finally ran out of patience in 1838 and he not only revealed all the unsavoury details of Jowa's intrigues, but also challenged him to a twenty-game sogo. Coming on top of the repeated protests lodged by Senchi and Gennan (and a previous challenge to a sogo by Gembí in 1832), this prompted the jishabugyo to make several investigations of the whole affair, with the result that Jowa was compelled to retire in November 1839 (he retired as Honinbo at the same time).

The full story of this fight for Meijin godokoro did not come out until the publication of *Zain Danso*, a detailed history of Edo period go, in 1904. Until then Jowa had been bracketed with Dosaku as a Go Saint, but the revelation of his machiavellian intrigues damaged his reputation, and gradually his place in the pantheon was usurped by Shusaku (another factor in this was the publication of *Kogyoku Yoin*, a collection of one hundred of Shusaku's best games, in 1900). Nevertheless, Jowa's reputation as one of the strongest — perhaps even the strongest — player of the classical period is secure, and go fans can only regret that he did not choose to fight it out with Gennan on the go board.

Gennan wasted no time after Jowa retired, putting in his own application for Meijin godokoro in December 1839. The Honinbo house had anticipated this move and had prepared a defence in depth. Jowa's successor, Honinbo Josaku (1803 – 47), first lodged an objection, then while this was being considered also applied to have Shuwa (1820 – 73) recognised as his heir. Permission came through in July 1840; in November the government reached the decision that Gennan should play a sogo. Josaku, Gembí and Hakuei conferred, then announced that they had chosen Shuwa as the opponent (Josaku was not a great player and he knew his limitations; Shuwa had barely reached adulthood, but his genius was already apparent).

The sogo was to be for just four games, and the first began on the 29th November. After eight playing sessions Gennan saw himself defeated by four points, but he saw more than that. He was so dismayed by Shuwa's strength that he despaired of ever being

Jowa v. Akaboshi (1835)

White: Jowa, Meijin godokoro

Black: Akaboshi Intetsu 7-dan

Date: 19th, 21st, 24th, 27th July, 1835

246 moves. Black resigns.






Figure 1 (1 – 100)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Figure 1. White 28. A forceful move, typical of Jowa, but commentators past and present have agreed that it is unreasonable. White should press at 29 instead.

Black 33. The ‘secret move of the Inoue school’. If White plays 34 at 1 in Dia. 1, Black 4 works perfectly (if White 3 at ‘a’, the threat of Black 3 is annoying).

White 36. If at ‘a’, then Black 38; if instead at 1 in Dia. 2, then Black 2 and 4 give a more serious ko. With the hane at 39, Black takes the lead.

Black 63. Black should first make a pincer at ‘b’ (White ‘c’ – Black 63 would follow).

White 68, 70. Two brilliant tesujis which keep sente for White (he is able to omit a direct answer to 67). In view of the aji of White ‘d’, Black has to defend solidly




Figure 2 (101 – 170) 45, 48: ko; 49: connects; ko: 51, 54, 57, 60, 63, 66 with 69 and 71, so White is able to switch to 72.

White 80 is the third tesuji: it looks like bad shape, but it is a severe counter-attack.

White 96 looks unreasonable, and perhaps it is, but again it is the kind of forceful move favoured by Jowa.

Figure 2. The exchange to 6 is bad for Black, but if he played 7 at 11, he would still be ahead. With 8 and 10, White seizes the initiative.




Figure 3 (171 – 246)
ko: 104, 109, 112, 117, 120, 123;
125: connects; ko (at 129): 132, 143

able to beat him (Shuwa played on sen-ai-sen), so he gave up the series and withdrew his application.

This does not mean that Gennan gave up all hope of becoming Meijin godokoro, but Shuwa was to be the reef on which his ambitions foundered. In May 1842 the two played another game, which Shuwa won by six points (this game is given in Chapter Seven, appropriately entitled 'The Impenetrable Barrier', of *Appreciating Famous Games*); then they had their third and final encounter in the castle games in November 1842, with Shuwa winning this one by four points. Even Gennan's indomitable optimism wilted in the face of these setbacks and he finally resigned himself to ending his career as a mere 8-dan. The epic struggle over the Meijin godokoro office thus finally came to a conclusion. However, it continued to have its effects on subsequent go history. Jowa was the last Meijin godokoro of the Edo period, and it is often said that his unreasonableness prejudiced the chances of a subsequent Honinbo player – specifically Shuwa, who was the next strong contender for the office – of being appointed Meijin godokoro by the government.

There is a postscript to this struggle, one in which the 'spirit' of Gennan took its revenge on the Honinbo house. In 1861 Shuwa, who at the time was making an attempt to secure the office of Meijin godokoro, suffered a crucial defeat to the 13th Inoue, Matsumoto Inseki (1831 – 91), in a castle game. As a player Matsumoto was definitely not in Shuwa's class, but on this one occasion he excelled himself. Taking black, he made a reasonable start, but Shuwa was not worried at first; when he realised that he was not catching up as easily as he usually did, he began to exert himself, but Matsumoto played to the end without making a single mistake and secured victory by one point. His play was so far above his usual standards that an incredulous go world concluded that he must have been possessed by the spirit of Gennan. The exultant Matsumoto made several hundred copies of the game record and distributed them to his supporters and everyone else connected with the go world. Shuwa was forced to give up all hope of becoming Meijin godokoro, which must have been some consolation to Gennan's spirit. (Actually, even without this defeat it is unlikely that Shuwa would have been successful, for the times were too troubled for the government to give much attention to go matters.)

This was the background against which Shusaku pursued his career. Before going on to look at that career in detail, it might be of interest to survey the composition of the go world in this period.

According to a registry of go players published in early 1862 (the year of Shusaku's death), there were 440 dan-holders in Japan. At the top were two 8-dans, Shuwa and Hayashi Gembí (retired), followed by four 7-dans, who were Shusaku, Ito Showa, Sakaguchi Sentoku and Hayashi Monnyu (Ota Yuzo and Yasui Sanchi were already dead). Next came four 6-dans: Hayashi Yubi, Shuho, Miyashige Sakuzen and Inoue Matsumoto Inseki. The lower dans were as follows: 5-dan – 19, 4-dan – 16, 3-dan – 37, 2-dan – 65, 1-dan – 293. In theory, these figures mean that there were 440 players of professional level, which would make Edo go players as numerous as modern professionals, but in practice only rankings above about 2-dan have much credibility, since selling shodan diplomas was a source of income to the go schools. During his career, Shusaku played a total of forty-six different opponents, which might give a better idea of the number of serious go professionals.

Shuwa v. Gennan Inseki (1840)

White: Gennan Inseki 8-dan

Black: Honinbo Shuwa 7-dan

Date: 29th, 30th November, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, 10th, 12th (concluded about 8 a.m. on the 13th) December, 1840.

264 moves. Black wins by 4 points.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)

Shuwa's play in this game is not spectacular, but he succeeds in completely stifling Gennan's aggressive style. The latter must have got very frustrated, for every time he even began to formulate a




Figure 2 (101 – 200)

63: connects; 97: connects




Figure 3 (201 – 264) ko: 21, 24, 33, 38; 39: connects (at 16); 40: connects the ko. plan for attack, he found it already nipped in the bud by Shuwa, whose strategic insight must have seemed almost uncanny.

Shuwa v. Gennan Inseki (1842)

White: Gennan Inseki 8-dan

Black: Honinbo Shuwa 7-dan

Date: 17th, 18th, 19th November, 1842
261 moves. Black wins by 4 points.

(This o-konomi castle game was begun at Edo Castle on the 17th, then completed at the residence of the jisha-bugyo.)




Figure 1 (1 – 100)




Figure 2 (101 – 200)




Figure 3 (201 – 261)

This game followed a similar pattern to the previous one, with Shuwa skilfully containing Gennan's aggressive play. Suffering his third loss in a row against Shuwa finally convinced Gennan that he was not destined to become Meijin godokoro. It was left to a later head of the Inoue school to take revenge on Shuwa two years after Gennan's death.

Shuwa v. Inoue Matsumoto Inseki (1861)

White: Honinbo Shuwa 8-dan

Black: Inoue Matsumoto Inseki 6-dan

Date: 17th November, 1861. Played at Edo Castle. 210 moves. Black wins by 1 point.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)

Shuwa's leisurely start (letting his opponent get two shimaris) perhaps shows that he was over-confident. If so, he soon realised that Matsumoto was putting up more resistance than usual and began to exert himself in earnest, but Matsumoto just managed to fend him off.




Figure 2 (101 – 210) 110: connects

2. The Life of Shusaku

Shusaku was born on the 5th May, 1829, in the village of Tonoura on the small island of In-no-shima, located in the Inland Sea close to the port of Onomichi. This area was then part of the province of Bingo, which corresponds to the modern Hiroshima prefecture.

Shusaku was the second son of Kuwahara Wazo, a merchant dealing in marine and agricultural products, fertiliser and general merchandise. Wazo was actually a member of the Yasuda family of Mihara, a town on the mainland south of Onomichi, but when he married Kuwahara Kame, he was adopted into the Kuwahara family and made its heir. Shusaku's given name was Torajiro — he did not take the name of Shusaku until he was twelve — but to avoid confusion, he is referred to as Shusaku throughout this book. He had one elder brother and one younger sister.

Shusaku's go talent was discovered early and by the time he was six, he was already known throughout the province as a go prodigy. Various local stories about him have been preserved. His mother, Kame, had some elementary knowledge of go, and the fact that she played go while pregnant with Shusaku is said to have had an effect on his talent — prenatal education often figures in legends about famous figures in the Orient. When he was a baby, giving him go stones would always soothe him when he was crying. His father is said to have punished him once by putting him in a closet, only to be puzzled when he soon stopped crying. On opening the closet door, he found the child happily playing with some go stones on a go board stored there.

Shusaku probably learnt to play go at the age of four or five, being variously said to have been taught by his mother or by a rich merchant in Onomichi who later became his patron. The story of his encounter with the latter, Hashimoto Yoshubei, is preserved in detail.

On the 29th September, 1834, Shusaku's father took him to Onomichi in order to see some ritual sumo wrestling which was part of the autumn festival of the Ushitora Shrine in the centre of the town. First, he visited the shop of a business connection, Orihashi Gembei, and, while he was talking to a clerk in the shop, Shusaku disappeared. His father thought that he might have gone on ahead to the shrine, but when he went there to look for him, Shusaku was nowhere to be seen. On returning to the shop, he found that Shusaku had slipped inside the house and had been watching Orihashi play go with a visitor, Hashimoto Yoshubei. The latter was a well-known Onomichi merchant and was also the leading cultural figure of the town, being a poet and a man of learning. Since Shusaku refused to budge, his father had to go on to the festival by himself. Hashimoto was impressed by the intentness with which the child watched the game and tried a nine-stone handicap game with him. He was surprised by Shusaku's play, which was not like that of a beginner, so he played a couple more games. Each time there seemed to be some improvement in Shusaku's play. When his father returned, Orihashi and Hashimoto praised the child and encouraged Wazo to develop his talent.

At the beginning of 1835, Wazo took Shusaku with him when he went to Onomichi

shodan at the age of ten was not a unique achievement, it was still extremely uncommon. On arriving home, Shusaku immediately went to Mihara Castle to pay his respects to Lord Asano. The latter showed his approbation of Shusaku's progress by awarding him a stipend, the amount being expressed as 'five persons' rations', that is, an annual sum equivalent to the rice rations for five persons for a year. Needless to say, awarding a stipend to one so young was without precedent and shows in what high regard Lord Asano held Shusaku. Hayashi Yutaka, the go historian, theorises that the payment of this stipend indicates that Lord Asano considered Shusaku a retainer and that he probably expected Shusaku to become the go instructor to the Asano clan after completing his studies in Edo.

Shusaku remained at home for over a year and during this period he continued his general education under some prominent scholars residing in the district. He studied the Chinese classics, the core of a traditional education, under Sakai Kozan, a Confucian scholar attached to the Hiroshima Asano clan, and calligraphy under the well-known calligrapher Chikuun Dojin. In later life Shusaku was renowned for his superb calligraphy, the basis for which was laid in this period. The fact that he received personal tuition from the top scholars in the area was of course owing to the patronage of the Asano clan.

In August 1841 Shusaku finally left home to return to Edo to continue his go studies. On the way he dropped in at Osaka in mid-August and there played four games on two stones with Nakagawa Shunsetsu 5-dan. Nakagawa had been a retainer (hatamoto) of the shogun, but he was so fond of go that he ceded the stewardship of his house to his younger brother and devoted himself to studying go. He settled in Osaka and spent his life spreading go in the Kansai region. He was considered one of the strongest Kansai players, so Osaka go fans were surprised when Shusaku won all four games by resignation. However, Nakagawa carefully went over the game records afterwards and commented that he was far from sure that he could have beaten Shusaku even if the latter had just taken black without a handicap. Considering the difference in dan between the two, this was refreshing candour on Nakagawa's part.

Word reached Kyoto of what had happened and the top Kyoto player, Kawakita Fusatané 5-dan (whom Nakagawa had beaten in a match), sent for the game records. Like so many others, Kawakita found it difficult to credit that one so young could play so well. Even the emperor of the time, Ninko, who was a keen go player, heard about Shusaku and asked to see the game records. He expressed the wish that Shusaku might come to Kyoto to play Kawakita, but this never eventuated.

On the 16th September, shortly after arriving back in Edo, Shusaku was promoted to 2-dan by Honinbo Josaku. Before that, on the 11th, he was directed by Josaku to change his name. Josaku gave him the 'saku' character (meaning 'strategy') from his own name and the 'shu' character (meaning 'outstanding' or 'excellent') from Shuwa's, to form Shusaku. Incidentally, in contrast to his 1-dan ranking, Shusaku became a 'provisional 2-dan' (nidan-kaku). The reason was that when the post of godokoro was vacant, promotions had to be decided in consultation with the heads of the other go houses. Since it was not worth the trouble in the case of the lower dans, the head of the house would just award a provisional ranking on his own authority.

On the 10th July, 1842, less than ten months after becoming 2-dan, Shusaku was promoted to 3-dan (again a provisional ranking). The following year, on the 6th October, he was promoted to 4-dan, this time receiving an official ranking sanctioned by the other

go heads. There were eleven 4-dans at this time, and Shusaku was the youngest.

Except for 1840, most of which he had spent at home, Shusaku had been promoted regularly, a dan a year. Apart from his natural talent, the rapidity of Shusaku's progress owed much to the generosity of some top players who played long series of games with him. In 1842, for example, Shusaku played twenty games of which a record has survived and of these sixteen were with Ota Yuzo, then 6-dan and thirty-five years old. Since Yuzo was one of the leading players of the day, he must have been very impressed with the youngster's talent to give him so much of his time. In 1843 and 1844, Shusaku played a long series of games with a senior Honinbo disciple, Kadono Tadazaemon. Kadono, the eldest son of Jowa, was the player against whom Shusaku first tried out his famous 'Shusaku fuseki', in a game played on the 21st June, 1843 (given on page 381). Ota Yuzo and Kadono were the two players mainly responsible for schooling Shusaku during the early years of his apprenticeship. Apart from two 2-stone games in 1842 (Games Two and Three) and a game on black in February 1844 (which was a jigo), Shusaku did not play seriously with Shuwa until 1846, when the question arose of his becoming Shuwa's heir.

In October 1844, accompanied by a senior Honinbo disciple, Sanai Tokujiro 4-dan, Shusaku left Edo for his second visit home. On the way he stayed for nearly a month at Nagoya, the hometown of Ito Showa, and while there played four games on black with Showa, winning three of them. Since he also made stopovers in Kyoto and Osaka, he did not reach Tonoura until December.

In the New Year, Shusaku visited Mihara Castle for his customary audience with his daimyo patron. Lord Asano greeted the news of his promotion to 4-dan by increasing his stipend. The fact that Shusaku's visit home was even more prolonged than his previous visit, lasting for eighteen months, tends to support the theory that the Asano clan intended that he should become the clan go instructor in the future. Shusaku made regular visits to the castle to teach Lord Asano and his retainers and also continued his general education. He did have some opportunities to play serious go, for Sanai Tokujiro remained in the Hiroshima area for a while and two other Honinbo disciples, Katsuta Eisuke 4-dan and Kishimoto Saichiro 5-dan, also made visits. In May 1845 Shusaku returned a small part of his debt to his former teacher, the abbot Hoshin, by playing a teaching game with him. The teacher was now the pupil, taking two stones against Shusaku and losing.

In April 1846 Shusaku finally left Tonoura to return to Edo. On the way he played a game which has become a classic, one of the immortal games of go history.

In May Shusaku stopped off in Osaka, as on the way down. During May and early June he played four games on sen-ai-sen with Nakagawa Junsetsu 5-dan, whom he had defeated on two stones in 1841. This time also Shusaku won all four games, including one on white (given in Part Two). Nakagawa could not have been too surprised, considering his comment on the previous occasion, but he was even more impressed than before with Shusaku's talent.

Although these victories further enhanced Shusaku's reputation, they were not the highlight of his Osaka visit. Junsetsu was a disciple of Gennan Inseki, who had been living for a while in Osaka, though at this time he was away on a trip. The actual details are not known, but Junsetsu must have persuaded Shusaku to stay in Osaka until Gennan returned, on the understanding that some games would be arranged. The historic encounter

took place in July.

Gennan had given up all hope of becoming Meijin godokoro after his successive defeats by Shuwa in 1840 – 42 and, at forty-eight years of age, had reached a stage in life when go players in the Edo period started thinking about retirement. However, he was still the senior figure in the go world and was widely considered to be of Meijin strength, so it was a considerable privilege for Shusaku to be given an opportunity to play him.

Since Shusaku was only a 4-dan, he naturally took two stones in the first game, played on the 20th July (see Chapter Five), but after one day's play Gennan realised that two stones was not a viable handicap. Instead of finishing the game the next day, Gennan proposed that Shusaku simply take black, an unprecedented honour for a 4-dan against an 8-dan.

In the first game with Shusaku on black, played on the 21st July, Gennan caught Shusaku with a new variation of the taisha and secured an early advantage. Shusaku fought back strongly, but the position looked very promising for Gennan when play was suspended at the end of the first day. However, on the second day Shusaku played a brilliant move which took Gennan by surprise and reversed the flow of the game. This move, Black 127, is the most famous move in go history and is known as 'the ear-red-denning move of Shusaku', for reasons explained in Chapter Five. Eventually Shusaku managed to secure victory by three points. This was such an outstanding game that it is not only considered a masterpiece for the winner, Shusaku, but also one of the lifetime masterpieces of the loser, Gennan Inseki.

Gennan did no better in the remaining three games of the series. The second game was suspended after fifty-nine moves and left unfinished, but the third and fourth were both won by Shusaku. One more win and Shusaku would have been entitled to go to sen'ai-sen, that is, the handicap for a 7-dan against Gennan Inseki, but at this point the series was concluded. Shusaku's triumph of three wins on black to no losses was the first really outstanding achievement of his career. Probably Nakagawa Shunsetsu did not feel so bad about his own results when he saw what happened to his teacher.

Gennan retired in 1848, handing over the reins of the Inoue house to his heir Inoue Shutetsu, but in March 1855, four years before he died, there was one final game between the two (Game Sixty-Four). Shusaku, then 7-dan, again took black and he forced Gennan to resign after 219 moves, so Gennan never succeeded in besting Shusaku. Of course, this final game whilst in retirement must have been played solely out of curiosity, in order to see at first hand how much Shusaku had improved since their first encounter. For that matter, even the 1846 match would not have been so serious for Gennan, since nothing was at stake, in contrast to the match with Shuwa. That was why Gennan could afford to be magnanimous about the handicap. He was also generous in his assessment of his opponent. In February 1849, Gennan visited Onomichi, where he met Hashimoto Yoshubei and other local go players. When asked his opinion of Shusaku, Gennan replied that at the time of their match Shusaku was already 7-dan in strength and that there was no telling how strong he might become thereafter.

In September Shusaku arrived back in Edo to find a promotion to 5-dan waiting for him. The exact date of the promotion is not known, because as a rule no diplomas were issued for ranks above 4-dan. Presumably the lower-ranked players, who were by far the majority, might on occasion need some proof of their rank, but the higher-ranked players

would have been sufficiently well-known to make a diploma unnecessary.

Another, much greater honour was also awaiting Shusaku: he was requested to become the official heir to Shuwa. The current Honinbo, Josaku, was not in very good health, and it was probably thought advisable to secure the line of succession as early as possible. Jowa, Josaku and Shuwa conferred, but the decision was predetermined — the only conceivable candidate was Shusaku. To their surprise, Shusaku refused, the first time in the history of the Honinbo house that the honour was declined.

Shusaku had considerable strength of character for a seventeen year old and was resolute in his decision. He was keenly conscious of his obligations to the Asano clan, which after all was paying him a stipend, and to his other benefactors in Onomichi, and he knew that not only they but also his parents expected him to return home when he had completed his training in Edo. If he stayed in Edo, he would also be unable to fulfil his filial duty of looking after his parents in their old age.

The Honinbo house had to work indirectly to solve this problem. It requested Lord Wakizaka Awaji, then holding the post of jisha-bugyo, to mediate. He approached the main Hiroshima branch of the Asano clan, which in turn approached the Mihara Asano clan and persuaded it to relinquish its claim on Shusaku. When Shusaku was informed of this, he was finally able to accept the Honinbo offer with a clear conscience. At the same time it was decided that he should marry Jowa's daughter, Hana (his child by his second wife Seiko).

The whole process of securing Shusaku's consent took some time and probably was not completed until early 1847. In the meantime Shuwa had begun for the first time to take a serious interest in Shusaku's go. Previously the two had played surprisingly little — a mere three completed games in the eight years that Shusaku had been a Honinbo disciple. Shuwa promptly decided to make up for lost time, without waiting for Shusaku's agreement to become the heir, and between October 1846 and September 1847 they played a famous series of seventeen games (a full list of their games is given on page 36). At one point (July 1847) they played five games in three days. Shusaku took black throughout the series and played brilliantly, scoring thirteen wins to four losses. Moreover, he played his own 'Shusaku-style fuseki' in seven of the games — this must have been an ideal opportunity to test out his theories in practice. Since his decisive victory over Gennan, Shuwa was generally regarded as the top player of the day and he remained at the pinnacle of the go world until his death in 1873. Shusaku was the only player to do so well against him and he would have been entitled to change the handicap from josen to sen-ai-sen if he so wished, but that would have meant taking white against his teacher, and this Shusaku, a person of unusual modesty, obstinately refused to do. There is a story that when Shusaku was promoted to 7-dan, Shuwa tried to persuade him that playing a game on white would not be unsuitable in view of his rank, but Shusaku refused as resolutely as ever. This is a contrast to Shuhō, who when he reached 7-dan twice took white against Shuwa (he did not enjoy the experience, for he was crushed both times — in no-komi go the difference between playing with white and with black is much greater than might be imagined).

In February 1847 Shusaku played his only game with Jowa (Game Seventeen). The game, played at a party celebrating the promotion of a Honinbo disciple, was not a serious one and was not meant to be finished, but in the ninety-four moves played

Shusaku, taking two stones, convincingly demonstrated that not even a former Meijin could give him a handicap. One may regret that a game like this was not played out to a finish, but perhaps the status of someone like Jowa was too elevated for him to indulge in competitive play with a disciple. Fortunately for the student of go, Shuwa did not feel any such constraint when he became the head of the house – in addition to the games with Shusaku, he played fifty games with Shuho (whom he intended to make his heir after Shusaku's death).

Josaku died on the 18th August, 1847, whereupon Shuwa became the 14th Honinbo. On the 10th October Jowa also died. (There is some confusion about these dates, however, as the Honinbo family records give the 17th and 20th December respectively.) On the 16th September, 1848, Shuwa made a formal application to the government to have Shusaku recognised as his heir. Permission was granted on the 22nd November that year, just after the castle games. The timing might seem unfortunate, but actually this was fairly quick action for the Edo bureaucracy. On the 15th December, accompanied by Shuwa, Shusaku went to Edo Castle for an audience with the shogun, Tokugawa Ieyoshi. Shusaku also married Hana about this time, thus completing the change in his status. In addition, he was promoted to 6-dan during 1848, though just when is not known for certain. There are two theories, one that he was promoted in January (the theory adopted in the *Complete Games of Shusaku* and followed in this book), while the other is that it was not until after his audience with the shogun.

Gennan Inseki retired during 1848, so the era of the godokoro squabble finally came to an end. The 1850's were to be the age of Shusaku, and his performance in the castle games represented the climax of classical go. After his death the whole feudal structure was swept away.

On the 8th October, 1849, Shusaku reached tagai-sen (even) against Ota Yuzo (1807 – 56). This was an important milestone in his career, for throughout his life Yuzo was his greatest rival. Of the 388 games of Shusaku which survive, 82 are with Yuzo, many more than with any other opponent. Yuzo was a member of the group known popularly as the Tempo Top Four (after the Tempo era, which ran from 1830 to 1844), the other members of which were Yasui Sanchi, Ito Showa and Sakaguchi Sentoku. These players were rivals of Shuwa (who played an extraordinary 135 games with Yuzo), though generally bested by him. Ota Yuzo had early on discovered Shusaku's talent and he played a large number of games with him. At first these were probably just meant as teaching games, but they soon turned into a serious rivalry, though the two always remained good friends. Shusaku's results against Yuzo are the best gauge of his progress, for the latter played him constantly throughout the first decade or so of his career and constituted the most formidable barrier in the path of the all-conquering hero. Below is a summary of the changes in handicap between the two.

May 1842: Shusaku first played Yuzo, on two stones, just before his thirteenth birthday.

August 1842: Shusaku reached sen-ni (black/two stones), then proceeded to josen (all black).

September 1842: Shusaku forced back to sen-ni.

Early 1843: Shusaku reached josen again.

September 1843: Shusaku reached sen-ai-sen (BBW).

1844 – 45: no games survive.

December 1846: Shusaku began playing Yuzo on sen-ai-sen.

October 1849: Shusaku reached tagai-sen (even) after 21 games on sen-ai-sen.

June 1853: Shusaku forced Yuzo to sen-ai-sen, after 29 games on tagai-sen, in Game Seventeen of the thirty-game match, after which Yuzo played six games only on sen-ai-sen.

The fact that it took Shusaku twenty-one games to reach even after getting to sen-ai-sen is sufficient indication of how much trouble Yuzo gave him. From another point of view, of course, one can say that he was fortunate to find an opponent so worthy of his measure, for some of his best go was played against Yuzo. The latter was an extremely aggressive player, so every game was a severe test of Shusaku's skill.

There is a theory that Shusaku was promoted to 7-dan after reaching tagai-sen against Yuzo in 1849, and it is followed in the *Complete Games* but not in this book. The preponderance of the evidence is in favour of the other theory, which is that the promotion did not take place until after he forced Yuzo to sen-ai-sen in 1853. Once again we have no way of knowing for certain as an official diploma was not issued. However, there is a record that a party celebrating the promotion to 7-dan was held in August 1854, which makes the later date more plausible. In addition, the handicaps on which Shusaku played other players, especially in the castle games, prior to 1853 strongly suggest that he was still playing as a 6-dan (specifically, taking black in successive games against 7-dans in the castle games). Actually the Honinbo house was traditionally conservative in its promotions to ensure that its players had good records against the other schools.

In November 1849 Shusaku made his debut in the castle games, and the second, more public stage of his career began. Until then he had just been one, however brilliant, of a number of Honinbo pupils; from this point on he was playing for the honour of the Honinbo house. As its official heir, his games now assumed greater significance, especially those with players from other schools. Most important were the games played once a year at Edo Castle in the presence of the shogun — a player's performance in these was the real test of his merit.

Shusaku got off to a good start, with easy wins (both on black) against Yasui Sanchi in the official game and Sakaguchi Sentoku in the o-konomi game played at the direction of the shogun on the same day. These victories were so convincing that they must have increased his self-confidence considerably.

In February 1850 Shusaku left Edo for his third visit home to Tonoura. Since he was now the Honinbo heir, he was accompanied by a retinue consisting of Wada Ikkei 3-dan and other Honinbo disciples. On the way, he played Nakagawa Shunsetsu in Osaka for the third time; Shunsetsu lost three straight, taking black in two games and white in the third.

Shusaku arrived in Tonoura in late April and stayed there until October — he could not make as prolonged a visit as in the past, since he had to be back in Edo in November to play the castle games. During May Shusaku played four games with Kishimoto Saichiro 5-dan, a Honinbo disciple, in the Jikanji temple in Onomichi. These were public games, played before an audience of local go fans to commemorate his selection as the Honinbo heir. Kishimoto played on sen-ai-sen, taking white in the third game, but he lost all four. In July Shusaku also played his former teacher, Hoshin, who took two stones but lost by five points.

Shusaku's third castle game, in November 1850, was another easy win against Sakaguchi Sentoku – the difference in fuseki ability was just too great. However, his fourth game, an o-konomi game against Ito Showa, was the toughest of all his castle games. Ito Showa, taking white, got off to a very good start and maintained his lead through the middle game. Shusaku fought back desperately, setting up ko after ko to rescue a large group in trouble. Eventually he pulled off an upset victory by three points, but he had to work hard for it. The result was one of the most complex and absorbing games of his career.

The 1850's and the beginning of the 1860's, the period of Shusaku's maturity, were notable not only for his unblemished record in the castle games, but also for his 'bango', that is, matches consisting of a set number of games with one opponent. The most famous of these were his nijubango (twenty-game match) with Sekiyama Sendaiu, the number one 'amateur' player in Japan, in June 1851, his sanjubango (thirty-game match) with Ota Yuzo in 1853 and his jubango (ten-game match) with Murase Shuho (the 18th Honinbo) in 1861.

Sekiyama Sendaiu (1784 – 1859) was a samurai retainer of the Sanada clan of Matsushiro in the present-day Nagano prefecture. As a child he had studied under Honinbo Retsugen and in his forties he studied under Honinbo Genjo and Honinbo Jowa; he did not become a professional, so he remained a shodan all his life, but his actual strength probably reached about 5-dan. He is considered the strongest amateur player of the Edo period. Sekiyama performed his duties as a retainer to a feudal lord, but the ruling passion of his life was go; he not only played whenever he had a chance but also published a couple of books on go.

Sekiyama invited Shusaku to Matsushiro to play the nijubango, and it started the day that he arrived. It was played at the rate of a game a day, which probably makes it unique. Sekiyama played on josen (all black) and managed to win seven games, a very commendable performance for a man of sixty-seven against an opponent of twenty-two. Shusaku later commented that two of the games were masterpieces (he did not say which two), while for his part Sekiyama marvelled at the fact that Shusaku played a different fuseki in each game. It should be put on record, however, that there is a suspicion that the good-natured Shusaku made a present of the final game (Sekiyama won by one point).

Shusaku's second bango was a much more serious affair: his prestige as the top player of the day depended on the outcome.

One day at the end of 1852 a number of leading go players, including Yasui Sanchi, Ito Showa, Sakaguchi Sentoku and Hattori Seitetsu, were gathered together at a party held at the home of a wealthy go connoisseur, Akai Gorosaku. During the conversation the question arose of who was the strongest player of the time and agreement was soon reached that this could only be Shusaku. Since the above players had all suffered considerably at his hands, their conclusion was only natural. However, there was one dissenting opinion. Ota Yuzo, who was in attendance, refused to chime in with the majority and when pressed for his opinion would only mutter, 'I can't say'. Yuzo's response was understandable, considering his results against Shusaku, for at this time he was the only player able to hold his own against him. Since Shusaku reached tagai-sen in October 1849, the two had played six games and each had won two with black, the remaining two having been left unfinished. Yuzo's reaction aroused the interest of Akai Gorosaku who promptly decided to sponsor an extended match between the rivals.

The sanjubango between Yuzo and Shusaku is the most famous bango of the classical period and it represents a fitting climax to Edo period go. The match began on the 27th January, 1853, and Yuzo made a good start by winning the first game. However, by the time he won the 17th game in June, Shusaku had taken a lead of four games, thus forcing Yuzo to the handicap of sen-ai-sen (BBW). The crucial difference was that Shusaku won three games with white, while the best that Yuzo could do with white was to get one jigo. Shusaku continued to do well after the handicap was changed, winning three of the next five games (including two wins on white), but Yuzo rallied in the 23rd game and managed to secure a jigo playing with white. Yuzo was satisfied with this success and decided not to continue with the series. Shusaku himself commented that the 23rd game was probably Yuzo's lifetime masterpiece. As so often happened with Shusaku's losing opponents, Yuzo's reputation did not suffer because of defeat. On the contrary, he has been admired for his tenacity in holding tagai-sen for so long against Shusaku. It was no wonder that the latter considered him the strongest member of the Tempo Top Four.

Three years later, in 1856, Yuzo died while traveling in the Echigo (modern Niigata) region, and when he heard the news Shusaku was grief-stricken, lamenting that he had lost a precious rival.

After the sanjubango, the golden age of go gradually began drawing to a close. The appearance off Uraga Bay in 1853 of Commodore Perry's squadron of 'black ships' on a mission to open Japan up to trade with the West was the harbinger of the collapse of Japan's feudal structure. As the Tokugawa government entered its final decade, it became too preoccupied with the threats to its stability to give much thought to go. This can be seen in the decline of the castle games.

Shusaku's letters to his parents show that he was very worried about the castle games during the 1850's. In 1854, for the first time in his career, there was no o-konomi go, which was a great disappointment. The popularity of o-konomi go had always been a sign that go was flourishing, for these games were played at the express wish of the shogun when he attended the castle games.

Even worse, in 1855 there were no castle games at all, but this was due to an act of nature: in October there was a large earthquake which caused some damage to Edo Castle. However, even though the castle games were resumed in 1856, o-konomi go were only played in 1859 and 1861 and their scarcity was a source of considerable dissatisfaction to Shusaku. He was not to know that after his death the castle games disappeared altogether. On the 15th November, 1862, there was a fire in Edo Castle, so the ceremonial replaying of the castle games on the 17th was cancelled, although of course the actual games (the shitauchi) had already been played, beginning on the 11th. In 1863 also, the ceremony was cancelled after the shitauchi had taken place; thereafter, no castle games at all were played. The decade before the Meiji Restoration and the decade after saw go at its lowest ebb.

In January 1857 Shusaku left Edo for his fourth and final visit home. He was accompanied by Kadono Kamesaburo (1837 – 1903), the third son of Jowa, who, under the name of Nakagawa Kamesaburo, was to play an important role in the modernisation of the go world in the Meiji period, becoming the second president of the Hoensha. By coincidence, during this trip the two discovered a prodigy, Mizutani Nuiji (1846 – 84), who was later to become one of the leading players of the Hoensha. Mizutani lived on the Island of Oshima near the town of Imaharu in Shikoku, just across the Inland Sea from In-no-shima. His father, a doctor, brought him to Tonoura in mid-April to receive instruction from Shusaku. The latter obliged by playing two four-stone games with his

eleven year old opponent, but Mizutani won these so easily that he tried him out in a three-stone game. Mizutani again won easily, which so impressed Shusaku and Kamesaburo that they earnestly tried to persuade him to come to Edo and enter the Honinbo school. Unfortunately, his father would not permit this, on the grounds that the child's health was poor (the real reason was perhaps that he did not approve of playing go as a profession). Mizutani's debut was thus delayed, and it was not until 1880 that he finally went to Edo and joined the Hoensha at the invitation of its president, Shuhō. His three games with Shusaku are still remembered as model handicap games for black (all three are given in this book).

Shusaku returned to Edo in September and did not again leave the capital. Apart from the castle games, he did not play very much. As mentioned earlier, he was dissatisfied with the scarcity of o-konomi games, though he would have been much more upset if he had lived to see the castle games discontinued altogether (poor Shuhō just missed out – he shaved his head in preparation, only to see the castle games suspended). At least Shusaku did get the opportunity to extend his record to nineteen straight wins. From 1855 to 1861, a period which amounts to a third of his professional career, Shusaku played only sixty games, about one sixth of his lifetime total (referring here of course to surviving game records). That is sufficient indication that this was a relatively inactive period for Shusaku, which is unfortunate, since he was at his peak. Nearly all of his games now were with younger players, so from his point of view they were just teaching games. Among these, however, there were three interesting series which are worthy of note.

The first was with a Honinbo disciple, Kajikawa Noboru (1831 – 90), who was then 3-dan. Kajikawa, playing on two stones, won seven games in a row, with one jigo, then also won a game with just black. Needless to say, these were the best results that any player ever had against Shusaku. Kajikawa did not develop into a top player, only reaching 5-dan, but he did have his moment of glory.

The next series was played in 1859 with Ebizawa Kenzo (1842 – 1913), a disciple of the Yasui school. He later changed his name to Iwasaki Kenzo and became one of the leading players of the Meiji period, succeeding Nakagawa Kamesaburo as president of the Hoensha, but at this time he was an anonymous, poverty-stricken 3-dan. First of all, he played a jubango on two stones with Shusaku, gaining the excellent result of seven wins to three losses and so changing the handicap to sen-ni (alternating black and two stones). This was the end of his winning streak, however, for he lost all three games (two on black and one on two stones) played on the new handicap.

The third series is by far the most interesting to go history, for it was with the player whom Shusaku expected to become his heir. Murase Shuhō, like Ebizawa Kenzo, came from a very poor family, but he had one great stroke of luck: his father, a carpenter, lived next door to the Honinbo residence in Ueno, and so he was given every opportunity to develop his go talent. Shuhō was born in 1838 and he became shodan at the age of ten. He was the strongest Honinbo disciple after Shusaku and from the large number of games that they played with him, it seems clear that Shuhwa and Shusaku were grooming him as the heir to Shusaku. However, for some reason he incurred the enmity of Jowa's widow, who was a powerful figure in the Honinbo house, and after Shusaku's death, Shuhwa was compelled to pass over Shuhō in favour of his own son Shuetsu as the new heir. Shuhō later left the Honinbo house in disgust and spent a 'lost' decade travelling around the countryside before returning to Tokyo in 1879 to become the first president of the Hoensha. Shuhō was far and away the strongest player of the late nineteenth century, and

in 1886 a reconciliation was effected with the Honinbo house, and he became the 18th Honinbo. Unfortunately, he died three months later and only played one game as Honinbo.

Shuho first began playing Shusaku in 1850, progressed to two stones in 1853, then to black in 1854, but was not able to hold his own on that handicap until the end of the 1850's. In 1861 the two played a formal jubango, which was a great success for Shuho, for he scored six wins to three losses and one jigo. One more win and he could have changed the handicap to sen-ai-sen, but he was not to have the chance to play another game with Shusaku.

The jubango with Shuho was concluded on the 7th November. Later that month Iemochi, the 14th Tokugawa shogun, who was very fond of go, held both the ordinary o-shiro-go and the o-konomi games. Playing on white, Shusaku had easy wins against Hayashi Monnyu and Hayashi Yubi, and these were the last completed games he played.


On the 12th December Shusaku received the sad news from home that his mother had died. He was much upset by this and went on a hundred-day fast (a Buddhist service to pray for the repose of her soul). It is said that his health was adversely affected by his meagre vegetarian diet. Shusaku was further saddened to hear of the death of his benefactor Hashimoto Yoshubei on the 4th March, 1862.

A greater misfortune was to follow. In midsummer an epidemic of cholera (said to have been introduced into Japan by a foreign ship) broke out in Edo, and a number of Honinbo disciples caught the disease. Ignoring Shuwa's attempts to stop him, Shusaku devoted himself to nursing the patients and as a result became infected himself. The illness was aggravated by the fact that his health was still poor due to the effects of his fast earlier in the year. On the 3rd August he began to vomit blood; on the 9th there was a respite in his illness, which made everyone hopeful of a recovery, but the next day it worsened, and he died about one o'clock in the afternoon. (At the time his illness was thought to be measles — cholera was not yet known to Japanese medicine — but the detailed description of his symptoms which survives makes it certain that the culprit was cholera.)

Shuwa was as heart-broken as if he had lost one of his own children. In a letter to Shusaku's father, he wrote: '... When I think of what must be your grief, I spend my days with tears flowing down my face. Shusaku was truly a person of great natural ability, and his talent was known to everyone. That he was fit to become godokoro was recognised by the shogun (Iemochi) and all devotees of go. This premature parting makes me feel that I am dreaming.'


Thus ended the career of one of the greatest players of the classical period. In a sense, Shusaku was fortunate not to witness the depths to which organised go sank over the next two decades, but it is interesting to speculate on the difference it might have made to go history if he had lived on through the subsequent period of modernisation.

3. The Shusaku-Style Fuseki



Dia. 1: the basic pattern

The term ‘Shusaku-style fuseki’ refers to the 1–3–5 configuration in Dia. 1, with Black rotating through the komoku points in adjacent corners. This pattern was not invented by Shusaku, but he developed it systematically, refining it and adding his own variations, so the pattern has become synonymous with his name. The aim of the pattern is to simplify the game for Black by restricting White’s strategic options in the fuseki. In Shusaku’s hands this pattern became a formidable weapon for Black and it has retained popularity until the present day, though undergoing some modifications in komi go. In his brief career Shusaku’s complete mastery of the fuseki made him almost invincible with black. Time and time again, as the game commentaries will show, he had built up a winning position before the middle game had even begun. Occasionally this detracts from the drama of his games by making them too one-sided, but it is the reason why so many modern professionals consider him the ideal model for learning how to play with black. It is no wonder that, as the famous (though possibly apocryphal)




Dia. 2

story goes, when asked about his result in a game once, Shusaku simply replied: ‘I had black.’

Shusaku’s major theoretical achievement and the reason why his pattern has had such an important influence on the development of modern fuseki theory is that he developed an integrated whole-board strategy which took into account all of the opponent’s possible counters. The key to this pattern is the way in which it restricts White’s options, as mentioned above. To begin with, take White 4 in Dia. 1 – White virtually always makes this approach move and there is a good reason.

Dia. 2. If White occupies the empty corner with 1, Black will enclose the top right corner with 2. If then White 3, Black will play 4, this move being an ideal combination of a pincer and an extension. Permitting this is considered unfavourable for White. However, if White plays 3 at ‘a’ or ‘b’, Black will enclose the bottom right corner with 3. This would simplify the game, which is to Black’s advantage in a no-komi game.



Dia. 3

To return to Dia. 1, White often plays 6 next to prevent Black from enclosing this corner, whereupon Black makes the kosumi at 7. Instead of 6 –

Dia. 3. If White plays 1, enclosing the corner with 2 or 'a' is good for Black. If next White 3, Black 4 is the ideal pincer-extension combination.

Black 7 in Dia. 1 is Shusaku's famous kosumi. Shusaku was very proud of this move and is said to have boasted that however much go advanced in later ages, this kosumi would retain its value as long as go was played on a 19 x 19 board.


Black 7 is a solid, steady move. First of all, it prevents White from forcing Black into a low position by pressing at 7; next, it sets up three good continuations for Black: 'a', 'b' and 'c'. Black 'a' is the extension-cum-pincer, a move considered so desirable that White usually forestalls it by extending up the right side with his next move. Black 'b' forces White into a low position at the top while building thickness for Black. Black 'c' is a good pincer, an alternative to 'b' if Black wants to play more aggressively.

Black 7 is just a little slow, though that drawback is outweighed by its virtues in a no-komi game. It was often said that the aim of the kosumi was to set up a safe win by three points. Nowadays a player using the Shusaku pattern in a komi game


usually switches 7 to a pincer at 'd' to keep up the pressure on White. In the Edo period Black's aim was to play safely and solidly, relying on his lead from having the first move, while the onus was on White to create complications and get a fight going. In modern komi go the position is, if anything, reversed. With a 5½ point start, which Japanese professionals often refer to as a 'large komi', White is content to play a more leisurely game, while it is Black who feels the pressure on him to nullify White's initial advantage. Shusaku could not have foreseen the advent of komi go (in the Edo period komi was only used in rengo or team games), but that his confidence in his opening was not misplaced is demonstrated by the fact that top twentieth century players have continued to use the pattern to 7 in no-komi games.

There is not room here for a detailed discussion of all the variations of the Shusaku pattern, but the reader will find plenty of material for study in the games in this book. In particular, the counter-measures adopted by Shuwa and Gennan Inseki, two of the strongest opponents Shusaku faced, are instructive. Here we shall content ourselves with a brief survey of the origins of the pattern and its later development.


The 1–3–5 formation first appeared in



Dia. 4. Honinbo Sanetsu (white) v. Honinbo Doetsu (played between 1648 and 1657)




Dia. 5. Inoue Shunsaku Inseki (white) v. Hayashi Tetsugen Monnyu (1809 castle game)




Dia. 6. Jowa (white) v. Gennan Inseki (then Hattori Rittetsu) (1813)

a game in the mid-17th century (Dia. 4, page 29), but thereafter seems to have been forgotten until the 19th century, when it reappeared in the game given in Dia. 5. Note that the kosumi appears for the first time, though in a different corner. Four years later Gennan Inseki used it in a game against Jowa (Dia. 6), then in 1826 in a game against Yasui Senchi (Dia. 7). The first appearance of the exact pattern we know as the Shusaku pattern seems to have been in an 1835 game by the 13th Honinbo, Josaku (Dia. 8).

Shusaku first played the Shusaku-pattern in a game against Kadono Tadazaemon






Dia. 9. Maeda Nobuaki (white) v. Go Seigen (Autumn 1930 oteai, no komi)


Kogyoku Yoin (Tapped Jewel Reverberations), a collection of one hundred of Shusaku's best games, compiled by a disciple, Ishigaya Kosaku (1818 – 1906). One player who was strongly influenced by this book was Go Seigen, who studied it intensively in China before he came to Japan in 1928 at the age of fourteen. On seeing early game records of Go Seigen, Segoe Kensaku commented that he was a reincarnation of Shusaku, so strong was the similarity in their styles. Around 1930 Go Seigen played the pure Shusaku-style fuseki in quite a few of his games, Dia. 9 being one example. This was still three years before he and Kitani completely revolutionised fuseki theory with their New Fuseki. The important point is that, like all modern players, his fuseki was based upon a thorough study of Shusaku's fuseki.

There is not space here to discuss the counter-strategies worked out by modern players for white, but in passing it may be mentioned that one popular counter is the high approach move at 6 in Dia. 10. This game is of interest because Black plays the kosumi at 7 despite having to give a komi of 4½ points (Hashimoto won this game and defended his title).

A representative modern variation of



Dia. 10. Sakata Eio (white) v. Hashimoto Utaro, Honinbo (6th Honinbo title match, Game 7, 1951. Komi: 4½)




Dia. 11. Rin Meijin (white) v. Takagawa (7th Meijin, Game 1, 1968. Komi: 5)


the Shusaku pattern for Black is shown in Dia. 11. Instead of making the kosumi, Black plays a pincer at 7. The development up to 16 is conventional, but then Black attacks aggressively at 17 instead of defending at 19.

Dia. 12 (next page) shows another representative modern pattern, with White answering the pincer at 7 with a two-space jump. Two very popular modern josekis appear in the top right and left corners, though the game diverges from joseki with White 22.

Dia. 13 shows a modern variant of the Shusaku pattern, with Black playing 5 on



Dia. 12. Kitani Minoru (white) v. Sakata Eio (2nd Top Position title match, Game 1, 1957. No komi)




Dia. 13. Sakata (white) v. Rin (25th Honinbo title match, Game 2, 1970. Komi: 4½)


the star-point instead of on the komoku. Another variant, with 5 on the mokuhazushi point, is shown in Dia. 14.

The 1–3–5 pattern has never lost its popularity and has undergone endless experimentation in the past century. It seems unlikely that the possibilities of the pattern will ever be exhausted.

Finally, here is the latest example of the full-fledged Shusaku-style fuseki in an important game. Cho Chikun played the



Dia. 14. Hashimoto Utaro (white) v. Iwamoto Kaoru (3rd Honinbo title match, Game 6, 1945. Komi: 4½)



Dia. 15. Takagi Shoichi (white) v. Cho Chikun (Oteai, 21 April 1981. No komi)

1–3–5 pattern in two games of the 1981 Honinbo title match, but earlier in the year he also played Shusaku's kosumi in the oteai game which won him promotion to 9-dan (Dia. 15). As the second kosumi at 23 and the reinforcement at 43 show, his strategy was to play a very solid, profit-oriented game. Admittedly, Black 7 is not very common these days, but it seems justified to say that Shusaku's confidence in his fuseki theory was not misplaced.

4. Shusaku's Debut

Game One: Shusaku v. Ito Showa (1840)

The first game by Shusaku to survive is the following three-stone game against the senior Honinbo disciple, Ito Showa. Shusaku had already played Showa when the latter visited the Hashimoto family in Onomichi, and quite possibly it was he who arranged for Shusaku to enter the Honinbo school. The following game was played at a study group three and a half months after Shusaku became shodan. Since Ito Showa was 6-dan, Shusaku was presumably playing him on a handicap alternating between two and three stones. In this game Shusaku just manages to pull off a narrow win on three stones, but his style is still immature. The enormous surge in his strength comes over the next two years.

White: Ito Showa 6-dan

3 stones: Kuwahara Shusaku 1-dan

Date: 14th March, 1840

202 moves. Black wins by 4 points.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Figure 1 (1 - 50). A lack of severity

Black 2, 6. The ogeima was the standard response to White's approach move in handicap games in the Edo period. The one-space jump is rarely seen.

Black 20 to 26 just help White. This kind of mild play soon disappears completely from Shusaku's game.


Black 32. Black 34 would make better use of the star-point stone.

White 39. White is aiming at pushing through at 'a'. This is the first real test of Shusaku's strength.

Black 40. If at 43, White will counter with 'b', making White 'a' a serious threat.

Black 42 is the fighting answer to White 41. Instead —

Dia. 1. Capturing at 1 would be just what White wants, as he would be able to force with 2 and 4, then connect at 6. Black would have to defend against the cut at 9 with Black 7, White 8, Black 9, so White would get sente to make a good extension to 10.



Dia. 1




Figure 2 (51 – 100)
60: connects; 89: connects

Figure 2 (51 – 100). Black fights strongly.

The sequence to 62 seems to be inevitable. Shusaku's play has been quite a contrast to his faint-hearted play on the left side at the beginning.

White 63 is dubious, as White loses sente. White should play in at 66, making Black choose between connecting at 'a' and playing down at 63.

Black 68 is a good cut, enabling Black to seize the initiative. He handles the fight perfectly up to 94, but 96 is an overplay. Permitting White 99 is very painful.

Figure 3 (101 – 150). Black loses his key stones.

White 3. White's group does not have two eyes, but it is safe nonetheless. If Black tries to kill him with 1 to 5 in Dia. 2, White has a clever counter at 6. If Black persists with 7, White sets up a ko with 8. Black cannot afford to play this way because if he loses the ko, his whole group dies. Therefore, instead of 7 –

Dia. 3. Black would capture with 1. However, White cuts at 2, exploiting Black's shortage of liberties. Black can-






Figure 3 (101 – 150)
12: ko (at 4); ko (at 36): 39, 42, 45, 48



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

not give atari, so White is alive with 6.

If Black cannot capture White, then Black should have defended in the centre to prevent White 99.

Black 16. Black does not have time to connect at 19, as White 18 would endanger his group, but losing his pivotal cutting stones is a big setback.

White 35. White is getting a surprising amount of territory at the top, considering how weak his position there was originally. The game is now very close.

Figure 4 (151 – 202). White falls behind.

White 63 is necessary to defend against the threat of Black 63, White 'a', Black 'b'. White cannot connect his three stones,




Figure 4 (151 – 202)

ko: 54, 57, 60, 69, 72, 75, 78

84: connects

ko (at 86): 89, 92, 95, 98, 101

so White ‘c’, Black ‘d’ would follow. Black would not be able to play this sequence immediately, as ‘a’ and ‘c’ shorten the liberties of his own group to the right,

enabling White to capture him by giving atari at 73. However, Black would be able to make use of this threat, giving atari at ‘e’, for example, so White has little choice but to defend at 63. Taking gote here gives Black the chance to occupy the large point of 68, ensuring him of a small but definite lead.

Black 84. Connecting the ko shows that Black is certain of his win.

The game record ends at move 202, but the game is virtually finished anyway. White ‘f’ next is biggest (Black ‘g’, White ‘h’, Black ‘i’ would follow), after which White would switch to ‘j’ at the top.

Black wins by four points.

Considering that Shusaku was a mere child of eleven at the time of this game, he need not have been ashamed of the way he performed against a veteran player like Ito Showa. There is an undeniable mildness in his play, especially in his fuseki, but there is also ample evidence of his fighting strength.

Shusaku and Shuwa

During the period of Shusaku's apprenticeship, the leading player of the Honinbo school was Tsuchiya Shuwa (1820–73), who became the heir to Honinbo Josaku in 1840 and the 14th Honinbo in 1847. After he routed Gennan Inseki in their three games in 1840 and 1842, he also established himself as the top player of the time and he was unfortunate that historical circumstances denied him the chance to become Meijin godokoro. He was a player of genius who is greatly admired by many modern professionals for his light, flexible play and his development of the 'amashi' strategy.

Shusaku became Shuwa's heir in 1848, and, perhaps in preparation for this, the two played in 1846–47 a famous series of seventeen games which contains some of the best go of the period. Shusaku won the series 13–4, and his overall results against Shuwa were 17 wins, 6 losses, 1 jigo, three games uncompleted. These results of course gave Shusaku the right to change the handicap to sen-ai-sen, but he refused to do this because he did not want to take white against his teacher. This exceptional modesty, which has not been the rule in Japanese go, has not hurt Shusaku's reputation. All the same, some great games have been lost to go history because the two never clashed on even terms. Shusaku's results on black are no guarantee that he would have done as well with white. Below is a complete listing of all known games between the two, including the famous seventeen-game series.

- March 1842 – Shusaku (2 stones) lost by 12 points (Game Two in this book).
- March 1842 – Shusaku (2 stones) won by resignation (Game Three).
- 1st January, 1844 – play suspended after 68 moves (Shusaku black).
- 15th February, 1844 – jigo (Shusaku josen in this and all subsequent games).
(*The 17-game series*) 1. 14th October, 1846 – Shusaku won by 6 points (page 386).
- 2. 21st October, 1846 – Shusaku won by resignation (Game Sixteen).
- 3. 23rd October, 1846 – Shusaku won by 6 points (page 387).
- 4. 2nd November, 1846 – Shuwa won by 7 points.
- 5. 17th February, 1847 – Shusaku won by resignation (page 388).
- 6. 17th February, 1847 – Shusaku won by 4 points (page 389).
- 7. 11th July, 1847 – Shusaku won by 8 points (page 389).
- 8. 13th July, 1847 – Shusaku won by resignation (page 390).
- 9. 13th July, 1847 – Shusaku won by 1 point (Game Twenty).
- 10. 14th July, 1847 – Shuwa won by resignation.
- 11. 15th July, 1847 – Shuwa won by resignation.
- 12. 15th July, 1847 – Shusaku won by 9 points (page 390).
- 13. 2nd August, 1847 – Shusaku won by 7 points (page 391).
- 14. 8th August, 1847 – Shusaku won by resignation (page 392).
- 15. 3rd September, 1847 – Shusaku won by resignation (page 393).
- 16. 13th September, 1847 – Shuwa won by resignation.
- 17. 16th September, 1847 – Shusaku won by 7 points (page 395).
- 14th October, 1849 – Shusaku won by 9 points (page 401).
- 10th December 1850 – Shuwa won by 1 point (*Appreciating Famous Games*, p. 228).
- 1st January, 1851 – play suspended after 67 moves.
- 22nd October, 1851 – Shusaku won by 4 points (page 404).
- 28th October, 1851 & 22nd March, 1852 – Shusaku won by 3 points (Game Thirty-Two).
- 1st January, 1860 – play suspended after 43 moves.

Game Two: Shusaku v. Shuwa (1842)

White: Honinbo Shuwa 7-dan

2 stones: Kuwahara Shusaku 2-dan

Date: March, 1842

171 moves. White wins by 12 points.

Commentary by Kitani Minoru 9-dan




Figure 1 (1 – 26)

Figure 1 (1 – 26). An aggressive start

Black 8 is solid, but a pincer at 11 would be the modern style.

White 15. White does not play 21 because he does not want to give Black a chance to hane at 17.

White 23. White cannot permit Black 'a'.

Black 24. Black 'b' would be more solid but would give White an excellent move at 'c'.

Black 26 is aggressive. The safety-first move would be Black 'd'.

Figure 2 (27 – 51). White is untroubled.

Black 28 is an attempt to attack White on a large scale, but it gives White a good move at 29. Black 1 in Dia. 1 would not make it so easy for White; if White 'a', Black has a good answer at 'b'.

White 47 is necessary to prevent Black





Figure 2 (27 – 51)
37: connects



Dia. 1 Dia. 2 Dia. 3
from sealing White in in sente with the sequence in Dia. 2. After Black 5, White would have to add a stone to defend against Black 'a'.

Black 48. If Black plays in at 'a', he could pick up two stones but at the cost of weakening his own stones to the left. He therefore surrounds White with 48, but 49 ensures White of life.

White 51. White 1 etc. in Dia. 3 would only help Black to build up central influence.





Figure 3 (52 – 100)



Dia. 4


Figure 3 (52 – 100). White's successful invasion

Black 62. A reinforcement at 'a' at the top is necessary, but obviously Black feels that it would be too slow.


Black 66 is a sharp move. Black rejects the uninspired exchange Black 67–White 66.

White 67. Answering passively as in Dia. 4 would be just what Black wants. White gives up a stone but gets a useful forcing move at 71. Black also has to bear in mind the aji of White 'b'.

White 73 is a subtle move. White could cut with 1 in Dia. 5, but after Black 2 to 6, the five white stones at the bottom would be considerably weakened. White 73 makes the cut a serious threat, so Black has to defend by playing on a dame



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

point with 80.

White 81 is good style: this is the positive approach for settling the white group at the bottom.

Black 82 defends against the threat of White 'b', but since it gives White a good hane at 91, Black 97 would probably have been better.

Although White is under attack, he defends so skilfully that he comes under little pressure. First, White 85 induces the cut at 86, making White 89 sente and giving White a reserve eye at the bottom. Next, White 91 induces Black 92, setting up the continuation to 99. Black has to extend at 94, as an atari there by White would be unbearable. As will be seen later, White 97 is a useful forcing move.

Figure 4 (101 – 140). Shuwa's confidence

Black 12. Black cannot cut at 1 in Dia. 6, due to the Δ forcing moves. There is no point in Black's cutting at 25 either, as White simply lives by pulling back at 'a' (refer to 57 – 65 in Figure 5).

Black 16. Black's strategy here is dubious, as it only invites White to resist with 17. A more subtle approach and one which would not give White such a ready counter would be to attack with 1 and 3 in Dia. 7.

White 21. White is defying Black to start a ko, as he has plenty of ko threats (White 27, then 'b', for example). There seems to be little that Black can




Figure 4 (101 – 140)

do to stop White from settling his group. White is coasting along to a win.


Figure 5 (141 – 171). An authoritative win

White 51 is a fierce move. If Black wants to kill White, he has to stop him from getting two eyes by attacking with 1 to 5 in Dia. 8, but then White counters by starting a bloody ko with 6 and 8. White has a perfect ko threat at 'a', while if he won the ko by capturing at 'b', he would then threaten a severe attack on Black's centre stones by connecting at 'c'. Attacking with 1 etc. is therefore not a realistic option for Black.

White 53 maintains the threat of Dia. 8, but after Black 56, White must defend at 57.


Black 58. This kind of move shows that Shusaku is still a bit green, for he misses the chance to play the tesuji of 1 to 5 in Dia. 9, which might perhaps still have kept him in the game. The difference in territory becomes too great when White succeeds in sealing off the whole left side up to 71.

Shusaku showed no lack of fighting spirit in this game, but the masterly ease with which Shuwa parried his attacks and contained his aggressiveness is impressive.



Dia. 7

Dia. 9



Dia. 8




Figure 5 (141 – 171)

Shuwa was obviously in top form. In the next game, however, we see the disciple turn the tables.

Moves after 171 not recorded.

White wins by 12 points.

Game Three: Shusaku v. Shuwa (1842)

This is the only other two-stone handicap stone between Shusaku and Shuwa to survive and it dates from the same month as the previous game. It is not known which was played first, but in this game we see a much more formidable side of the young Shusaku.

White: Honinbo Shuwa 7-dan
2 stones: Kuwahara Shusaku 2-dan
Date: March, 1842
 148 moves. White resigns.
Commentary by Ishida Yoshio




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50). Black's solid start

White 7 etc. A popular joseki in this period. If White plays 17 at 19, then Black will block at 17, leading to the continuation White 'a', Black 22, White 'b'. With 20, Black could also give atari at 21, but he prefers to build thickness with 20 to 24. He then makes good use of his strength in this corner by attacking at 26, thus seizing the initiative.

Black builds yet more thickness with 30 to 38. This also keeps the game simple, which is to Black's advantage in a handicap game.

White 41. A light move, typical of Shuwa. Black replies with yet another solid move at 42. Starting a large-scale fight

with Black 'c'—White 'd'—Black 'e'—White 42 would be more aggressive.

White 45 is natural. If White plays the standard sequence of White 'f'—Black 50—White 46, Black will take the important point of 45.




Figure 2 (51 – 101)

Figure 2 (51 – 101). White's only chance

White 53 is too slow, as it gives Black the chance to cut with 54, then play the forcing sequence up to 66 before defending at 68. This result clearly puts Black in the lead — White should have played 53 at 'a'.

White 75 is an emergency measure — the game will be over if Black links up his two groups on the left.

Black 78 is correct shape.

Black 92 and White 93 are miai, but Black seems to have a certain win after 94. White's last hope is the cut with 95 etc., which gives him a ko.





Figure 3 (102 – 148)
ko: 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 28

Figure 3 (102 – 148). Complete victory

The virtue of Black's solid play in the beginning now becomes apparent, as White does not have the ko threats to win this ko. Even if he did, he could not kill Black. For example, if he connects the ko with 11, Black plays 'a', securing one eye and



Dia. 1

making miai of a second with 'b' or a move at the top. Black is content to give up the top right corner, finishing off the ko fight with 32.

White 35. If at 1 in Dia. 1, Black 2 is good enough, as Black is able to connect underneath up to 10. White of course profits in this result, but not nearly enough to worry Black. White therefore resists with 35, but since his stones are also weak, he is unable to prevent Black from rescuing his stones.

The game is over after Black 46: White is way behind in territory and he is weak in the centre. It's time to resign gracefully.

White resigns after Black 148.

Shusaku and Ota Yuzo

When Shusaku was still only a 2-dan, he had his first encounter with a player who was to play a crucial part in his subsequent career. This player, Ota Yuzo, was to be Shusaku's closest rival and the only opponent able to offer real resistance to him in his prime. Ota Yuzo's name would be closely associated with Shusaku just because of their thirty-game match, which was the climax of Shusaku's career and perhaps also the outstanding go event of the mid-19th century, but in addition he also played Shusaku more games than any other player.

Ota Yuzo (1807 – 56) was twenty-two years older than Shusaku and from a rather different background. He was born in a wealthy Edo merchant family and was brought up to appreciate the sophisticated pleasures of life in the capital. He became a disciple of the Yasui school and reached 6-dan in 1839. In 1848 he was promoted to 7-dan, which entitled him to play in the castle games, but he declined the privilege. A precondition for playing in the o-shiro-go was that one shave one's head and assume the garb of a Buddhist monk. Yuzo was a man about town and a connoisseur of worldly pleasures who was rather proud of his good looks and parting with his handsome head of hair was a sacrifice which he was not prepared to make. Although he did not play in the castle games, his reputation is secure. He was one of the Tempo Top Four and is considered one of the strongest 7-dans ever.

The first recorded game between the two was played on the 3rd May, 1842, two days before Shusaku's thirteenth birthday. By coincidence, the game was played in the residence of Akai Gorosaku, a wealthy, go-loving retainer of the shogun, who years later became the instigator of the famous thirty-game match. Ota Yuzo won this game, but he must have discerned the unusual potential of the youngster, for thereafter he gave generously of his time to Shusaku. In fact, of the twenty recorded games Shusaku played in 1842, sixteen were with Ota Yuzo and we know of seven other games from the same year which have not survived. Considering that Yuzo, then aged thirty-five and a 6-dan, was already recognised as one of the top players of the day, it was clearly quite a privilege for Shusaku to have so many games with him. What is even more remarkable, however, is the precocious skill displayed by Shusaku, as indicated by the results given below.

- Game 1 (3rd May, 1842). Shusaku (2 stones) lost by 8 points.
- Game 2 (8th July). Shusaku (2 stones) won by resignation (Game Four).
- Game 3 (12th July). Shusaku (2 stones) won by 16 points.
- Game 4 (15th July). Shusaku (2 stones) resigned.
- Game 5 (15th July). Shusaku (2 stones) won by 11 points.
- Game 6 (23rd July). Shusaku (2 stones) won by 16 points.
- Game 7 (27th July). Shusaku (2 stones) lost by 6 points.
- Game 8 (27th July). Shusaku (2 stones) won by resignation.
- Game 9 (2nd August). Shusaku (2 stones) – jigo (record does not survive).
- Game 10 (2nd August). Shusaku (2 stones) won by 11 points.
- Game 11 (7th August). Shusaku (2 stones) won by resignation (Game Five).

This gave Shusaku a record of 7 wins – 3 losses – 1 jigo and since he had taken a lead of four games, the handicap was changed to 'sen-ni' (alternation between black and two stones). After the handicap was changed, Shusaku continued to do well and immediately forced his way to the 'josen' (black in all games) handicap. Just for the record, their other games in 1842 are listed below.

- Game 12 (13th August). Shusaku (black) won by 5 points (Game Six).

Game 13 (17th August). Shusaku (2 stones) won by 7 points.

Game 14 (23rd August). Shusaku (black) won by resignation (given in Part Two).

Game 15 (23rd August). Shusaku (2 stones) won by 16 points.

Shusaku having won four in a row, the handicap changed to josen. Two games were played on the 1st September and one each on the 5th and the 13th, but none of the game records survive. Shusaku lost all four, so he went back to sen-ni.

Game 20 (14th September). Shusaku (2 stones) – only 38 moves preserved, result not known. Shusaku then won the next game on black and lost the following on two stones, but the game records do not survive.

Game 23 (7th, 13th Sept., 12th Dec.). Shusaku (2 stones) won by resignation.

The above results show that Shusaku had a fairly easy time of it on two stones (10 wins to 4 losses), while he was far from disgraced on black (3–4). In fact, but for that one bad spell in early September, he did astonishingly well, remembering that he was after all only thirteen. It is not until the appearance of Go Seigen this century that we find another teenager scoring so well against his seniors.

We will look at three of the most interesting of the above games – Shusaku's first win against Yuzo (game two), the kadoban game in which he won his way to sen-ni (game eleven) and his first win on black (game twelve). Since Yuzo was noted for his aggressive, large-scale style, the games are of much more than historical interest.

Game Four: Shusaku v. Ota Yuzo (1842)

White: Ota Yuzo 6-dan

2 stones: Kuwahara Shusaku 2-dan

Date: 8th July, 1842

194 moves. White resigns.

Commentary by Segoe Kensaku, hon. 9-dan




Figure 1 (1 – 49)

Figure 1 (1 – 49). Not a good start

White 1 would now be played in an

empty corner.

Black 6 was a very popular move in this period, but White 9 seems to be Yuzo's invention. It reappeared in the 1920's.

Black 10 has no effect on White. Black should play at 33 or 'a', especially since he already has a low position on the side with 8.

Black 32 is a good point, but reinforcing the weak stones at the top with Black 39 takes priority. White does not let the opportunity slip; after reinforcing with 33 to 37, he attacks at 39.

Black 40 seems to be an overplay. This move might be reasonable before White 39, but once White has played there, Black should play more conservatively, just attaching at 'b'. In the result to 48, Black lives in the corner, but at the cost of weakening his three stones in the middle. This way of playing is not recommended in a two-stone game.

White 49 seems to give White an iron grip on the three stones. Yuzo must have felt satisfied with his opening.




Figure 2 (50 – 100)
ko: 89, 92, 95, 98

Figure 2 (50 – 100). Keeping up the pressure

Black promptly sets about saving his stones with 50 etc. – probably he could not afford to give them up. Black is able to live, but at the cost of giving White central thickness. White also makes a diversionary attack, setting up a ko with 59 to 85. He has plenty of ko threats at the top.

Figure 3 (101 – 150). Initiative to Black

The result to 4 is satisfactory for White, so starting another ko with 5 and 7 seems uncalled for. A more leisurely move, such as saving the stones at the top with 41, would be good enough. Although White wins the ko, Black 12 and 14 destroy all White's centre influence and make the game simple for Black.

White 21. The usual move would be White 'a', but White must feel that this would have no impact on Black.

White 29. If omitted, Black might make an attempt to capture the whole group with Black 'b', White 49, Black 47, White 48, Black 'c'.

White 35. White does not follow the




Figure 3 (101 – 150)
ko: 11

usual joseki of White 'd'–Black 43–White 45 because he is planning to use this corner for ko threats when he starts the ko at 41. He gets his own way up to 45, as the top right corner is just too big for Black to entertain a ko.

Figure 4 (151 – 194). Punishing the overplay

White 63 is unreasonable: White has to




Figure 4 (151 – 194)

defend at 66 (or 64). Black 63–White 90 –Black 88 would follow and would give White a losing game, which is why he plays 63. However, this just hastens the end, for Black launches a severe attack with 68, leading to his splitting White into two with 86. In short, White 63 causes the sudden collapse of White's game. Perhaps Ota Yuzo did not anticipate that Shusaku would attack the weak points in his position with such skill and precision. Segoe's final comment is that it is hard to believe that this is the go of a thirteen year old.

White resigns after Black 194.

Game Five Shusaku v. Ota Yuzo(1842)

White: Ota Yuzo 6-dan

2 stones: Kuwahara Shusaku 3-dan

Date: 7th August, 1842

206 moves. White resigns.

(From commentaries by Segoe Kensaku 9-dan and Ishida Yoshio 9-dan)

Figure 1 (1 – 40). The honte

Black 10 would now be at 'a' to make use of the attacking potential of 4.




Figure 1 (1 – 40)

White 13. White could also take sente with White 'b', Black 'c', White 13, Black 'a', then press at 21. In that case Black would leave 4 for the time being and make an approach move at the top left.

White 19. White 20 is the honte, but White must feel that he has to play thinly in a two-stone game. He is relying on his peep at 21 to keep his group out of real trouble.

Black 22. If at 23, White will attach at 'd', leaving the aji of the hane at 'e' for later.




Figure 2 (41 – 63)

Figure 2 (41 – 63). Black's overplay

White 43 aims at the hane at 'a'.

Black 52 – 56. This sequence is an overplay, as the result to 63, with White blocking Black off from the centre, is bad. Two alternatives are suggested for Black. Ishida recommends omitting 52 to 56 altogether, jumping immediately to 'b' instead. That would make the threat of Black 56 more ominous for White. Segoe comments that once having played 52 and 54, Black should extend at 63 instead of 56 and aim at playing Black 'c' later. Either of these moves would have been an improvement on the way Black did play.




Figure 3 (64 – 100)

Figure 3 (64 – 100). Black's challenge


Black 66. If Black wanted to kill White, he would have to play at 'a' to stop him from getting two eyes, but he would lose the semeai after White 69, Black 78, White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 68, White 'e'. Black therefore has no choice about letting White live, which means that cutting with 56 to 60 in Figure 2 was not very meaningful. To add insult to injury, White also pushes into Black's bottom area with 71 etc.

Black 80. Black has to do something spectacular at the top to get back into the game.


White 83. White does not want to follow the usual joseki in Dia. 1, because Black 2 to 8 would help save Black's two isolated stones to the right.

Black 86. White could not seriously have expected to catch Black in the famous 'nineteen point trick play' shown in Dia. 2 (White gives Black nineteen points in the corner in exchange for game-winning central thickness). Black 86 and 88 are one way to avoid this trap, but Segoe suggests Dia. 3 as another possibility worth considering.

Black 90. This promises to be the decisive fight of the game.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2

19: connects



Dia. 3

White 93. Meant as a forcing move, but Black ignores it. Defending at 94 in the centre would have been the honte for White. Black's peep at 94 forces White into bad shape, while 96 makes good shape for Black.

Black 98. If at 'f', White gets peeps at 98 and 'g'.




Figure 4 (101 – 135)

Figure 4 (101 – 135). White launches his attack.

Black 2. If at 11, White 2 would force Black to live in gote, which would be pain-

ful. However, Black 2 gives White various sente moves against the corner, so he is able to attack with 3 and 5. When Black hanes at 8, White is untroubled because the sacrifice with 11 gives him a connection at the top.

White 21 – 25. Superb style. Black more or less secures a connection with 26 and 28, but White is left with a large capture at ‘a’.

White secures his own group at the bottom with 29, then renews his attack with 33 and 35.





Figure 5 (136 – 169)

47: connects

Figure 5 (136 – 169). Shusaku’s brilliancy

The sequence to 47 is forced. White succeeds in splitting Black into two and thus has two weak groups to attack. First he aims at the one on the side, extending to the side with 51 in the hope of reducing Black to one large eye. However, with 54 Black comes up with a truly brilliant tesuji to get this group out of trouble.


White 59. If at 1 in Dia. 4, Black intends to play a ko with 2 to 6. Since White also stands to lose quite a bit, this



Dia. 4

would be a serious ko for him, but Black has nearby ko threats, starting with ‘a’. If instead of 1, White descends at 2, then Black lives easily with Black 1, White ‘b’, Black ‘c’, White ‘d’, Black 5. In that case, capturing the two black stones with White ‘e’ would not be sente, which would make a big difference to the security of White’s group on the side. White is thus forced to conclude that continuing his attack on the side is hopeless, so he switches to the centre with 59.

Black 66 just barely manages to save the centre group. Realising this, White abandons his attack. If instead of 69 White plays at 1 in Dia. 5, Black picks up two eyes with 2 to 6. Black ‘a’ is sente, so White ‘b’ does not destroy the eye. Being forced to live like this, with the minimal eye-space, might be painful, but if this group lives, victory for Black is guaranteed.



Dia. 5





Figure 6 (170 – 206)




Dia. 6

Figure 6 (170 – 206). A spectacular finish

White 71. If at 1 in Dia. 6, Black counters by cutting with 2 and 4 and White has no continuation. If he persists in trying to kill Black with 5 etc., Black squelches him with the peep at 10. For that matter, Black could probably kill the white group on the side if he attacked it with 'a' instead of 10.

Black 78 is an interesting probe. If White answers at 'a', Black will force with 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e', then play Black 79, saving these stones in sente, for White would have to connect



Dia. 7

at 102 to save his group. That would be humiliating for White, so he makes the fighting answer at 79, even though it is full of bad aji.

White 81. If 1 etc. in Dia. 7, White has no answer to Black 6. The sequence from 82 in the figure is forced, but even though White lives on the side, Black has the excellent move of 92, so he is untroubled.

Black 106. A beautiful finish, making use of the probe at 78 played earlier. White is forced to resign. If he cuts at 'a', then after Black 'c', White 'b', Black delivers the coup de grace with the hanekomi of 'd'.

Shusaku played just a little awkwardly in the opening of this game — perhaps he was nervous because it was the kadoban — but he more than redeemed himself with the precocious brilliance of his play in the latter half, especially his skill at finding shinogi for groups in trouble. The highlight of this game was his resourcefulness under attack, but perhaps the most significant point was that in no way was his reading inferior to that of his opponent. He was clearly ready to dispense with the handicap.

White resigns after Black 206.

Game Six: Shusaku v. Ota Yuzo (1842)

Commentary by Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan

This was the first game that Shusaku played against Ota Yuzo after the handicap had been revised. As befitting a 3-dan versus a 6-dan, Shusaku now played on the handicap for a three dan difference, alternating between black and two stones. This is the non-handicap game in the set and it is also the earliest non-handicap game by Shusaku to survive. In contrast to the amicable atmosphere of the 'instruction' games on a handicap, Ota Yuzo must have felt determined to show the youngster that even games were a different matter. However, at this period Shusaku was improving month by month and in this game he put into effect an ambitious centre-oriented strategy backed up by profound analysis.

White: Ota Yuzo 6-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 3-dan

Date: 13th August, 1842

Played at the residence of Urakami Shojoro.
242 moves. Black wins by 5 points.

Figure 1 (1 – 23). An unusual fuseki

White 4. The komoku or 3–4 point enjoyed overwhelming popularity in this period, but Ota Yuzo's favourite move was the mokuhazushi or 5–3 point. In this game Shusaku tagged along with 5 – his famous fuseki based on the komoku was still in the future.

White 6. Entering the corner at 7 is




Figure 1 (1 – 23)

also possible, but this high move fits in with White's strategy with 2 and 4.


White 6–10. This pattern is seen time after time in 19th century go. The standard modern joseki is shown in Dia. 1 (White 7 can also be at 'a' or 'b').

When Black plays 11, the same joseki is repeated by White, thus creating a most unusual symmetrical position at the bottom.

Black 19. Essential to prevent White from getting the double wing formation by playing 'a'.

White 20. Also essential – Black 20 would be an excellent follow-up to Black 19.

Black 21 is a natural counterattack. Crawling with 1 etc. in Dia. 2 would not be completely out of the question, for the reason that White Δ is a narrow, three-space extension which would not make the most effective use of White's wall. However, this way of playing would show a sad lack of fighting spirit on Black's part.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2






Figure 2 (24 – 49)



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

7: takes


Figure 2 (24 – 49). Youthful brilliance

White 24 is an important tesuji. Extending to 1 in Dia. 3 is bad. After Black 2, White has no good continuation.

Black 25. Black does not play at 2 in Dia. 4 – this point is avoided by both sides. White would counter with the combination of 3 and 5. Black has to connect at 8, so White extends at 9, and the \blacktriangle stone ends up in an awkward position.

White 28 is a sharp move. White is looking for something more forceful than the conventional sequence of White 30, Black 32, White 37.

Dia. 5. White's aim is to exploit Black's shortage of liberties in the corner by pushing through and cutting with 1 and 3. Black cannot give atari at 'a', so he would be in trouble.



Dia. 5


Dia. 6

Dia. 6. If, however, Black defends with 1, White instantly switches to 2 and 4, as the exchange of White \triangle for Black 1 is a useful gain for him.


Black 29. A splendid move. The submissive answer in Dia. 6 is of course out of the question, but even so the only move that looks obvious here is attaching at 'a'. Miyamoto comments that he finds it hard to credit that a mere thirteen year old could come up with such a clever idea. Once one sees 29, one realises that it is the only move. White cannot resist.

Dia. 7. If White counters with 2 and 4, Black strikes at 5 and the two white stones cannot escape. If White 6, Black sets up a ladder with 7 to 13. White would therefore play 6 at 'a', but Black 'b' would set up a sure win.


Dia. 8. White 2 here is little better. Black counters with the same tesuji of 3 and while he does not capture White this time, the sequence to 11 gives White a heavy shape. If next White 'a', Black can resist with 'b', while White 'c' no longer




Dia. 7



Dia. 8 10: connects



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

works. This would be a nice result for Black.

Dia. 9. What about the hane at 1? Black 2 is now the vital point, forcing White into terrible shape with 3 to 7. White does not have the time to play White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'. He might as well surrender.

The conclusion is that White cannot attempt to move out into the centre, so the only move left is blocking at 30.

Black 31. Black's tesuji of 29 would go to waste if he connected at 1 in Dia. 10. When White extends at 2, cutting at 3 turns out badly, as White gets a ladder with 4 to 10.


The first major fight of the game comes to a close with 37. White has broken through into the left side while Black has built thickness.

White 38 is a good point. White is aiming at the aji of the cut at 'b' and also the three black stones to the right. Black responds with the resolute move of 39 at the top. He has decided to stake the game on the centre.

White 44 is the correct answer to Black's forcing move. White 'c' would give Black the threat of 'd' for later.

Black 45 is the follow-up to 39. The centre moyo is beginning to take shape. However, White bides his time, answering patiently at 46 and 48.

Dia. 11. Jumping to 1 instead of 48 might seem a good point, but this lets Black play 2, setting up the continuation at 'a'. Since Black can also play 'b',




Dia. 11

White's corner territory would be considerably reduced. White 48 in the figure is therefore correct.

Nonetheless, Black 49 is an excellent point. This also gives Black the threat of 'a' – without a stone at 49, he could not cut.


Dia. 12. If White ignores Black 1, Black cuts at 3. If White resists with 4, Black kills him with 5 and 7. White's counterattack with 8 to 12 is ineffective, as Black 1 is in just the right place to rescue Black's stones with 13. Without 1, White would capture Black by playing at 1 himself.

Dia. 13. Since White cannot connect at 3, he would have to answer at 2, but letting Black capture a stone in sente with 3 is painful. Black gets useful thickness and also has the aji of 'a' for later, so this would be a bad result for White.



Dia. 12

2: elsewhere



Dia. 13




Figure 3 (50 – 76)

Figure 3 (50 – 76). Moyo manoeuvres

White 50 and 52 are a necessary reinforcement, as we have seen. Black 53 may seem a slow move, but it is also necessary. If omitted –

Dia. 14. White will destroy Black's moyo with 1 to 5.


White 54 gives White a large follow-up with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', but Black has no choice about answering at 55.

Black 57 is another indication of Shusaku's genius and is the move which Miyamoto praised most in this game. Since White 56 aims at attaching at 'd', the conventional answer would be Black 'e', solidly blocking White's path. If White plays 'd' after 57, Black plans to turn at 'f' and construct a moyo based on the top right sector of the board.


White 58 is the correct answer to 57.

Dia. 15. If White answers 1 by pushing through at 2, Black is happy to defend with 3 to 7. Not only has White 'a' disappeared (because of Black 'b'), but White has also helped Black to surround the centre. This would be the worst way for White to play.

White 62 is a waiting move. White is



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

ahead in territory (assuming White 'a' and 'c' on the left), so the game will be decided by what happens to Black's moyo in the top right and the centre.

Black 63 is an all-out move. If Black simply plays at 'g' on the side, White will push into his moyo with 'h' and Black will not be able to win. The virtue of 63 is that it sets up good continuations at 'i', expanding the side moyo, and 'j', expanding the centre.

White 64. White must invade before Black defends the side with 'i'.

Black 67 gives White least help in settling his group. If Black hanes above or below 66, White would be able to settle himself with a counter hane or a crosscut.

White 72. White's group is just about settled. If Black 76, White would block at 'k', threatening White 'l'.

White 76. White is now completely alive: if Black 'm', White 'n'. Black seems to have let White live very easily, but there was nothing else he could do. He now has to get quite a lot of territory in the centre to be in the game. The way he sets about completing his centre moyo is most instructive.




Figure 4 (77 – 110)

Figure 4 (77 – 110). A life-and-death problem


Black 83 is a clever move. If White 90 next, Black intends to play a ko with 91, White 'a', Black 'b'. White could not hope to win this ko, so he is compelled to answer docilely at 86, though this helps Black to fix up his shape with 87. White 88 next is essential.

Back 93 forestalls moves such as White 'c'. When Black blocks off this side, White must come in at the top at 94.


Black 97. This frightening move is what Black was aiming at when he played 77. If White makes one mistake, his whole group will meet with destruction. Black of course hardly expects to pick up the group, but his sacrifice of 79, 89 and 97 is a crucial part of his centre moyo strategy. Before looking at White's answer –

Dia. 16. Black 1 looks as if it might be dangerous, but White counters with the throw-in at 6 (White 6 at 7 would give Black a ko with 9). If 7, White lives with 8 and 10. If Black 'a', White simply connects at 'b' and is safe.


White 98. This odd-looking move is the only way for White to live. Any reader who could pick this move would be up to pro-



Dia. 16



Dia. 17



Dia. 18

fessional standards at solving life-and-death problems. To look at the wrong answer –

Dia. 17. White 1 may look good enough, and if Black plays 2, it is good enough. White 3 is a good move, enabling White to live with the sequence to 11. However, Black will not be so generous.

Dia. 18. Black will answer 1 with 2 and 4, setting up a ko when he fills in the outside liberties with 6 and 8. In short, Black 2 is the vital point.

Black 99. Black leaves the white group for a while, but he is not finished with it yet. Black 99 is a good forcing move. If White answers it at 'd', he has no answer to Black 'e'.

White 102. If at 'f', Black gets a forcing move at 'g'.

White 106 – 110. White cannot come in any further than this.




Figure 5 (111 – 130)

Figure 5 (111 – 130). Unable to invade

White 14, 16. The follow-up to White 98 in the previous figure, these moves ensure White of unconditional life, though at the expense of letting Black squeeze with 11 to 15. Black 'a' and 'b' are also sente.


Black 21. It is tempting to block at 23, but that would be a fatal mistake.

Dia. 19. If Black 1, White strikes with 2 to 6. Black cannot play 7 at 8, as White 7 would be terrible, but after Black 7 White leads his stones out with 8 and 10.


White 22. Now that Black has played 21, he can block at 23, so one might wonder why White does not move into Black's moyo through the opening, but in fact White is completely helpless here.

Dia. 20. If White 1 and 3, Black first of all forces with 4 and 6, then cuts off the would-be invaders with the sequence to 16. This result is terrible for White, so –


Dia. 21. He might try just pushing in with 1. Black again forces before cutting, but White captures the cutting stone with 11. If Black tries to capture the whole group with 12, White has a clever move at 15. Black must defend against White 'a' with 16, so White lives neatly with




Dia. 19 9: connects



Dia. 20



Dia. 21




Dia. 22

17 to 21. Black can aim at a ko with 'b', but losing so much of his centre makes this result unfavourable for him. Therefore —


Dia. 22. When White captures at 1, Black will just pull back at 2. White has to defend against Black 'a' with 3, so Black gets sente to defend at 4, which is quite a large move. This result puts Black ahead in territory. In other words, while it is possible for White to push through at 1 in Dia. 21, he does not profit by it. That is why White contents himself with reinforcing at 22 in the figure.

Black 27. A calm, unhurried move. Black 'c' is also a good point, but Black is aiming next at 'd'.

White 30. If at 1 in Dia. 23, Black has a severe move at 6 on the right which secures a large territory there. Instead of 7 —



Dia. 23



Dia. 24

Dia. 24. If White resists with 1, Black 2 and 4 prevent him from connecting up.

Figure 6 (131 – 150). The losing move

White 32. To prevent Black 'a'.

Black 33. Black 34 would also be a good point, but 33 also has an effect on White's side group.

White 36 is dubious, being perhaps the losing move. Miyamoto recommends following Dia. 25.





Figure 6 (131 – 150)

Dia. 25. White 1 seems preferable to White 36 in the figure. Black will probably play 2 to 6 next. Answering 6 at 7 is bad, as the forced continuation to 20 gives White a bad game. White would therefore play 7 at 'a' and stake the game on the ko following Black 8, White 'b'. This would probably have given White a chance of winning.

After Black 47, capturing the centre stones with 49 and the side stones with Black 'b' are miai, but Black 'b' is only possible because of the 36–37 exchange. That is why White 36 was bad.



Dia. 25




Figure 7 (151 – 200)

ko: 67, 70, 73, 76, 79, 82, 85, 88, 91

Figure 7 (151 – 200). No ko threats

Black 61, 63. Black wants to wind up the game as quickly as possible. He has more ko threats than White, so the latter is forced to defend at 74, then once again at 92.

Figure 8 (201 – 242). A safe margin

The rest of the endgame is straightforward: the game was decided in Figure 6.




Figure 8 (201 – 242)

ko: 12, 15, 18, 21; 27: connects below 23

Shusaku ended up winning by a safe margin, but there were some anxious moments in the middle game when he was putting his centre strategy into effect. He must have been quite satisfied with his performance in his first game on black against Yuzo.

Black wins by 5 points.

Game Seven: Shusaku v. Yasui Sanchi (1843)

Commentary by Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan

This was the first game that Shusaku played against Yasui Sanchi (1810 – 58), who was recognised as one of the top players of the day, being a member of the quartet known as the Tempo Era (1830 – 44) Top Four. Sanchi had become the 9th head of the Yasui house in 1838 and was famous for his aggressive fighting style. He was a great rival of Shuwa, who considered him the toughest opponent of the Tempo Top Four. All in all, this must have been quite a testing game for Shusaku. It is interesting to see how he met the challenge of Sanchi's awesome fighting power.

White: Yasui Sanchi 7-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 3-dan

Date: 14th September, 1843; played at the residence of Akai Gorosaku
169 moves. Black wins by resignation.




Figure 1 (1 – 14)

Figure 1 (1 – 14). A peaceful start


White 6 ignores the fuseki dictum that one should play in an empty corner before extending along the side, but there is a good reason for Sanchi's move. If White plays 6 at 'a', Black will play 'b', which with the backing of 1 and 5 at the top becomes an ideal pincer. White plays 6 to frustrate Black's strategy.

White 8. The taisha, 'the move with a thousand variations', is a natural favourite

of aggressive players.

Black 9. When Black wants to avoid the complexities of the taisha, he can follow the joseki to 11, which was quite popular in the Edo period and which has survived in modern go. The point of Black 9 is that it makes miai of 11 and 'c'.

Dia. 1 shows the standard joseki. After



Dia. 1

Black 9, White can continue with 'a', 'b' or 'c', but whichever way he plays, his Δ stone promises to be useful in the subsequent fighting. That is why Shusaku decided to follow the peaceful variation.

All the same, White is satisfied with the result in the game, as White 6 ends up in a good position in relation to White's wall with 4, 8 and 10.

Black 13 is a very calm response to White 12. First of all, it forestalls moves such as White 'd' or 'e', while solidifying Black's position here also negates much of the influence of White 12 at the bottom. In addition, Black 13 creates the threat of a severe invasion by Black at 'f'. Strengthening oneself before attacking is an important principle – White would have much less trouble dealing with an invasion at 'f' if the black group at the bottom were weak.

White 14. A good point in itself, this move also defends indirectly against the

threat of Black 'f'. Defending directly at 'f' would be much too slow. Actually the aggressive Sanchi was probably hoping for Shusaku to start a fight by playing there.






Figure 2 (15 – 47)



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Figure 2 (15 – 47). The inevitable fight

White 16 is the severest pincer, but Black ignores it.

Dia. 2. Black 2 is the usual answer.
White 3 starts a fight here.

Dia. 3. If Black tries to settle his group immediately with 2 etc., White gets sente to make an excellent pincer at 'a' in the figure.

Black 17. Naturally either Dia. 2 or 3 would be satisfactory for Black, but he prefers not to let White dictate the pace of the game.

White 18 is a severe follow-up to 16, which is why Black does not usually ignore 16. However, Black contents himself with life on a small scale with 19 to 23. If the

ladder were favourable, Black could play in at 20 with 19, but here White answers with White 19, Black 'b', White 23, and Black cannot get a ladder with 22.

White 24. Connecting at 25 would make White very thick, but then Black would play around 'c', cancelling out White's thickness at the top. Black 17, solidly ensconced on the third line, would also negate White's influence in this direction, so White's thickness would not be of much use. White therefore extends to 24, challenging Black to start a fight by cutting at 25.

White 26. White could also follow Dia.
 4. The sequence to 9 is probable, though 9 could also be at 'a'. The choice between this way of playing and White 26 – 28 is just a matter of individual preference.


Black 33 is a good move which aims at attacking next at 'd' or 'e'. White has to defend at 34. Note that the black group in the corner is alive as it stands.

Dia. 5. Even if White reinforces at Δ , Black is still safe. If, for example, White attacks with 1, Black gets unconditional life with 2 and 4.


Dia. 6. If White 1, Black answers with 2 and 4. If White attacks at 'a' or 'b' next, Black plays 'c' and lives.

Another possibility for Black 33 which we should look at, then firmly reject, is pushing at 1 in Dia. 7.


Dia. 7. At this stage of the game Black 1 is bad. White is happy to strengthen his group by answering with 2 and 4, then




Dia. 4




Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

moving out with 6. This is the kind of blunt attack which only succeeds in helping the opponent. Of course, if you look ahead, you will find that Black does play this way later on, but the circumstances are then rather different.


Black 35. The natural move is Black 'f', leading Black's stones out to safety, but instead Black goes ahead with the invasion at 35 that he has been aiming at since he played 13 in Figure 1. Black intends to wait on the result of the fighting here before deciding how to play at the top left, an aggressive strategy which shows that the youthful Shusaku is not overawed by Sanchi's reputation for fighting skill.

White 36 is an important point concerning the balance of power. If omitted, a move by Black around 'g' would look good. Incidentally, a move such as White 'h', scrambling for connection along the side, would not occur to players of this class.


White 38 is another crucial point for maintaining pressure on the opponent. If at 1 in Dia. 8, the shoulder-hit of 2 would be perfect for Black. If White 3, the hane of 4 would make it easy for him to settle his group.

Black 39, 41. Reinforcing the thinness of Black's two-space jump before attacking at 43.

White 44. This is White's chance to peep, as Black cannot answer at 'i'.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10


Dia. 9. If Black 1, White counters strongly with 2 and 4, forcing the continuation to 15. The thickness White gets in the centre makes this a good result for him. (If Black 5 at 6, then White 5). Instead of 13 –

Dia. 10. If Black hanes at 1, White sets up a ladder with 2 to 10.


White 46. White cannot connect underneath with 1 in Dia. 11, as Black has the tesuji of 4. Capturing with 5 is bad as Black cuts off the main part of White's group with 6 and 8, but White 5 at 6, giving Black the atari at 'a', would also be bad.

Black 47. Black cannot block at 1 in Dia. 12.


Dia. 12. If Black 1, White counters with 2. If next Black 3, White plays 4 etc., setting up a useful atari at 10. This is bad for Black, so instead of 3 –




Dia. 11



Dia. 12
11: connects



Dia. 13



Dia. 14 17: connects

Dia. 13. He might try giving atari on the outside at 3, but that is also bad. If Black attacks with 5 and 7, White sacrifices two stones to set up a squeeze.

Dia. 14. And Black collapses after White 18 (capturing two white stones does not give him life).

Black thus has no alternative to 47. The above diagrams demonstrate that the sequence from 43 was forced.

Figure 3 (48 – 80). The fighting spreads.

Black 49. If at 50, White will play 'a', which Black does not want. He prepares to live on the side with 51 to 55, but first cuts White into two in sente with 57 to 61. Once he lives with 63, White also has to live.

White 64. If at 65, Black gets a ko with Black 'b', White 64, Black 'c'.

Black 67. Pulling out these stones threatens the white groups on both sides.

White 70 is essential. Black 70 would be perfect for Black.

White 74 is a probe: White is prepared to sacrifice his stones below. White could live with 1 to 5 in Dia. 15, but Black 6 would be sente, which would be painful for White. If White ignored 6, his whole group would be endangered by Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'. White would therefore be forced to answer Black 6 at 'c'.

Black 75 is the natural counter; answering White 74 directly would be too submissive.

Dia. 16. If Black blocks at 1, White forces with 2 before living with 4 to 8.






Figure 3 (48 – 80)



Dia. 15



Dia. 16

This result would be quite an improvement over Dia. 15, as White would have the threat of moving out at 'a'. However, defending at 'a' would be gote for Black, as White is already alive. It is important for Black to take sente so that he can go back and help his three isolated stones on the left in the figure.

The sequence to 80 is forced. White sacrifices four stones and in return is able to gouge out Black's corner. This seems to be a fair exchange. The crucial point for Black is that he gets the sente he wants so badly.






Figure 4 (81 – 100)



Dia. 17



Dia. 18

Figure 4 (81 – 100). Black reinforces.

White 84. A solid move, played as preparation for an attack on the black stones above, while also aiming at making further use of the aji of the four captured white stones. Actually White would like to attack the black stones on the left, but there is no convenient way to do so once Black has reinforced himself with 81 and 83. For example –

Dia. 17. If White attacks with 1 and 3, Black counters with 4 to 10 (if White 9 at 10, then Black 9). However –

Dia. 18. If White just extends at 1,

Black is happy to answer at 2 and 4, as strengthening himself here threatens White's group in the centre. In short, there is no profitable way for White to play here, which is why he switches to 84 at the top right.

White 86. Playing at 89 or 90 would only help Black.

Black 91. Usually one would be reluctant to play here, as 92 strengthens White, but this forcing move makes sense when Black continues immediately with 93 to 97.


White 96. Once again White has to check his natural impulse to counterattack. He would like to hane at 97 instead, but it would not be advisable.

Dia. 19. If White 1, the tesuji of 2 gives Black a sente cut at 6. He then makes good shape with 8, getting a nice result.

Dia. 20. The headstrong cut at 1 does not work well either. After 2 to 6, White is in more trouble than Black. Moreover –

Dia. 21. White is handicapped in any fighting here by the threat of Black 1 to 9, which deprive the group on the side of eye-shape.


White 98. White's aim when he played 84. Black's answer at 99 may look a little strange, but blocking at 100 instead would be dangerous.




Dia. 19

Dia. 20

Dia. 21



Dia. 22



Dia. 23

Dia. 22. If Black 1, White can prevent Black from getting two eyes with 2 to 10. Escaping through the centre right would not be easy, as White 'a' and 'b' are sente (explained later). However —

Dia. 23. Cutting at 1 does not work. White keeps Black short of liberties with 2 to 8.

Figure 5 (101 – 122). Both go wrong.

Black 1. The only move, whatever happens next.

White 2. If at 1 in Dia. 24, Black will






Figure 5 (101 – 122)



Dia. 24



Dia. 25

complicate the position by invading at 2. Black 'a', aiming at 'b', is semi-sente, so playing this way might prove to be troublesome for White. Losing the four stones at the top right will not matter for Black if he can make some use of them.


White 4 is sente, forcing Black to defend at 5.

Dia. 25. If Black captures three stones with 1, White plays 2, forcing Black 3, then sets up a ko with 4 to 8. Playing this ko would be unreasonable for Black. If White won it, he would also threaten to capture the black group below.


Black 9, meant as a forcing move, makes the game unnecessarily difficult for Black. Instead —

Dia. 26. Black should just play at 1. Note, however, that he must not answer White 2 at 3, as White traps some stones with 4 to 8.


Dia. 27. If Black answers on the inside at 3, there is no problem. If White 4, Black just defends at 5 and White can do nothing.




Dia. 26




Dia. 27



Dia. 28



Dia. 29



Dia. 30

16: ko; 18: connects

Dia. 28. If instead White tries 2 and 4, Black should give atari at 5. If 6, Black captures with 7 and White is handicapped by shortage of liberties.

Dia. 29. If White tries 4 and 6 here, connecting at 7 is important. If 8 and 10, Black 11 stops White in his tracks.

Black 11. Black cannot answer 10 at 'a', as the dame at 'b' has not been filled in. Black must be regretting the 'detour' he made with 9, for his group at the top is now exposed to danger. White is able to cut him off with 12 and 14.


White 18 is questionable. Instead –

Dia. 30. White should cut at 1. The continuation to 8 is forced, after which White plays 9 to prevent Black from getting an eye with Black 9, White 'a', Black 'b'. Black then sets up a ko with 10 to 16. White's best ko threat is 17, so an exchange follows with 18 and 19. This would give an even game.

Because White played 18, Black is able to attack his eye-shape with 21.


White 22. If at 'c', Black will of course play a ko with 'd'. White chose not to play this ko, but let's see what would happen if he did.

Dia. 31. If White starts the ko with 1 and 3, Black gets one ko threat at 4, but when he tries to use 10 as a ko




Dia. 31

ko: 6, 9




Dia. 32



Dia. 33

9: connects



Dia. 34

6: ko

threat, White has a good answer at 11. If Black cuts at 12, White counters with 13 and wins the capturing race after 19 by one move. Therefore, instead of 12 —

Dia. 32. Black has to take the ko with 1. Since he has no more ko threats, Black cannot answer 2, but must finish off the ko with 3. Black 5 is also necessary to eliminate the threat of White 'a'. White thus takes sente to play 8, getting a favourable result.

Dia. 33. If White impatiently plays 1 instead of 11 in Dia. 31, Black has a good answer at 2 (not at 6, as White 2 would revert to Dia. 31). The result to 10 would be good for Black.

To go back to the beginning, the correct way for Black to play is shown in Dia. 34.

Dia. 34. If White 1 and 3, Black 4 is a good, calm answer. The exchange to 9 follows, but Black would be satisfied with getting sente. That is why White did not start the ko with 1.

Figure 6 (123 – 134). Sanchi's miscalculation?

Black 33. Black ends up with more liberties in the semeai; Sanchi must have made an oversight in his reading. The position is now very difficult for White. Starting the semeai immediately is not a






Figure 6 (123 – 134)



Dia. 35



Dia. 36

ko: 7, 10, 13

good idea.

Dia. 35. If White starts the semeai, it ends up as an approach-move ko for White, which places him at a disadvantage. Note that if White omits 1, Black might get a double-ko with Black 1, White 'a', Black 'b'. Since this diagram is bad for White —

Dia. 36. He might try a different ko with 1 and 3 here. However, the result to 16 is again bad for him.

White 34. Since he does not have enough ko threats to do anything in the top right, White starts another fight, in the hope of

being able to create enough ko threats for him to follow either Dia. 35 or 36.




Figure 7 (135 – 169)

Figure 7 (135 – 169). All or nothing

Black only answers White twice on the left before defending cautiously at 39 against White 'a'. A couple of moves later he again switches back to the right, eliminating his last source of concern with 45. Black is confident that White will not be able to kill all of his large group on the centre left. Unfortunately for White, cutting at 'b' is not big enough, so he has to go for all or nothing.


Black 51, 53. A good combination which makes it very difficult for White.

White 62. If at 1 in Dia. 37, Black kills the group on the side with 2 to 6. Instead of 1 –

Dia. 38. Theoretically, White could live in sente with 1 to 5, but instead of defending at 'a', Black will switch to 6 and 8. Even if White plays 'a', Black can still get a ko with 'b'.

White 68. If at 1 in Dia. 39, Black plays 2 to 8, making miai of 'a' and 'b'. (White has to connect at 7: Black threatens to kill the corner with 'c'.)


After Black 69 –



Dia. 37

Dia. 38

Dia. 40. If White 1, Black connects underneath with 2 and 4, then connects at 6. White cannot kill him.



Dia. 39

Dia. 40

In this game the fight in the upper right was all-important and once it was decided, the game was wound up very quickly, since Sanchi had no real chance of catching the black group on the left. Although Shusaku made the position unnecessarily difficult for himself with his 'detour' at 109 in Figure 5, on the whole he showed that he was well able to match the vaunted fighting prowess of Sanchi.

White resigns after Black 169.

Game Eight: Shusaku v. Kadono Tadazaemon (1843)

Commentary by Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan

Kadono Tadazaemon (1820 – 56), the player against whom Shusaku first tried out the fuseki pattern for which he later became so famous, was the eldest son of Jowa and was the same age as Shuwa. At the time of this game, he was one of the senior Honinbo disciples and so acted as a mentor to the fourteen year old Shusaku. The two played quite a number of games during 1843 and in April Shusaku got to sen-ai-sen (black-black-white) against him. Thereafter he did badly, however, only getting two wins and one jigo in the next nine games, so he had to go back to the handicap of josen (all black). The game here, played on the day that Shusaku was promoted to 4-dan, was the first after the handicap had been adjusted down, so Shusaku must have been determined to redeem his honour. Apart from dan rank, the handicaps on which one played the top players were the most important gauge of progress. Incidentally, the game in which Shusaku unveiled his famous fuseki pattern (played on the 21st June and given in Part Two) was one of the two wins Shusaku picked up in the lean period mentioned above, thus making it a suitable augury of what was to come.

White: Kadono Tadazaemon 6-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 4-dan

Date: 6th October, 1843

259 moves. Black wins by 2 points.

Figure 1 (1 – 26). Popular josekis

White 6. Playing in the empty corner would be more usual, but Black would get an excellent pincer at ‘a’. White wants to see how Black answers at the top before






Figure 1 (1 – 26)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

deciding on his move in the empty corner.


Black 7. The joseki in Dia. 1, common in this period, would be just what White wants, as after 4 he would have an excellent continuation at ‘a’. Black therefore attaches at 7 in the figure, the most common but also the severest answer.

White 8. This move is almost never seen nowadays, though the sequence to 13 was a popular joseki in the Edo period. White is

satisfied with this result as he has removed the threat of a pincer at 'a' and has kept sente. However, following the standard version of the taisha joseki, shown in Dia. 2, would also be possible of course.

Black 15. The low move at 16 would not be good here, as White would force Black into a low position with the joseki in Dia. 3, making Black over-concentrated on the right side. The result in the diagram gives White an excellent position at the bottom.

White 22–26, played to forestall Black 'b', is more efficient than simply defending at 'c'.



Dia. 3

Figure 2 (27 – 38). Commencement of hostilities

Black 27. If the peaceful move at 'a', White would take the good point of 34, so Black plays all-out. However, his aggressiveness provokes White into counterattacking at 28.

White 30 is a fast-paced move. White rejects the sluggish sequence White 'b', Black 31, White 'c'.

White 34, ignoring Black's invasion, shows Kadono's strength. Playing 34 at 'd' would simply let Black make an excellent extension to 'e'.

Black 35 is the vital point for attacking White and it also virtually links up all Black's stones here, thus strengthening his position. However, Black could also consider 1 in Dia. 4.

Dia. 4. If Black 1, White would probably sacrifice his stone with 2 to 6 and aim at attacking the black group below. Black





Figure 2 (27 – 38)



Dia. 4

would be somewhat apprehensive about playing this way.

White 36. To prevent Black 'f'.

Black 37 is an interesting move. Going the other way with 'g' would be more solid, but Black hopes to provoke White into leading out his isolated stone.

White 38 shows excellent judgement. Moving out with 1 in Dia. 5 would be just what Black wants. White 1 and 3 make White heavy and give Black a good chance to attack with 2 and 4. White 38 offers some support to the stone on the left side while also aiming at building up White's moyo at the top with White 'h'.

Dia. 5





Figure 3 (39 – 68)

Figure 3 (39 – 68). Attacking the moyo


Black 39 is a very resolute move. Pushing along the fifth line is not usually recommended.

White 42. If omitted, to take the good point of 1 at the top in Dia. 6, for example, Black kills White with the combination of 2 and 4.

White 46. If White plays 2 in Dia. 7, Black builds an enormous moyo on the right with 3 and 5. Black 'a' is also sente, so it will not be easy for White to reduce this moyo. Black was probably expecting this result when he played 45 in the figure,



Dia. 6




Dia. 7


but White is not here to help him. He decides that the time has come to launch a challenge and so cuts through the bottom of the moyo with 46 to 50. The game has suddenly become very tense.

Resisting with 51 and 53 is natural. Black 51 at 52 is not good enough.

White 54. White 1 and 3 in Dia. 8 are bad because of Black 4 and 6. Note also that cutting at 54 before extending at 56 is correct.



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

Dia. 9. If White simply extends at 1, Black will play 2 and 4. However, the presence of a cutting stone at 'a' will make a difference if White later turns at 'b'.

White 58 is a good attacking move which Black is unable to resist. White is actually quite thick in the centre, as he can play White 'a' (forcing Black 'b') at any time, so Black has little choice but to answer submissively with 59 to 63. The result to 64 seems satisfactory for White, for he has split Black into two groups in the area where he had attempted to erect a large moyo. White's strategy in cutting with 50 has thus far been a success.

Figure 4 (69 – 100). Kadono's bold play

Black 69. An important point for either side. Black hopes to take compensation for his loss on the right side by attacking the white group at the bottom.

White 70. Simply extending at 'a' would be too mild. White 72 and 74 are essential, but with 73 and 75 Black is making himself thicker and thicker here.

White 76, guarding against Black 'b', is correct shape. White 79 next would secure




Figure 4 (69 – 100)


life.

Black 77 serves a dual purpose, reinforcing Black while threatening White.

White 78 is necessary. White could settle his group at the bottom with 1 and 3 in Dia. 10, but then Black would launch a severe attack at the top with 4 to 8. This would be too much for White to handle.

White 80 aims at White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e'. Nonetheless, Black vigorously attacks White's eye-space with 81 and 83.

White 84. This move, like White 38, shows that Kadono was a player of no mean calibre. He obviously concluded that



Dia. 10

simply dragging out his group at the bottom would have made him too heavy, so he tried something more ambitious. White 84 is the vital point and White's aim is to see how Black responds before deciding his own strategy.

Black 85. Permitting White to play here would give him too much thickness. Since fighting spirit makes 86 the only reply, Black 85 also creates a defect in White's shape.

Black 87. If White answers at 90, Black will cut to the right of 86.


White 88 is a courageous move. Black could capture the group at the bottom by cutting at 90, but then White would attack the black group at the top by playing White 'f'. The subsequent fighting would be extremely difficult, but since Black would not have definite eye-shape, it might prove very troublesome for him.

This group is bigger than the one at the bottom, so defending with 89 seems to be the wisest course, especially as that move also has some offensive value.

Black 91 is a crucial point: a play there by White would weaken the black groups on both sides. However, even after 91 White is left with the aji of a cut at 'e'.

White 92 and 94 are in a sense 'inducing moves': they provoke Black 95 etc., thus helping White to settle his group with 96 to 100.

Instead of 95, one obvious alternative would be to attack with 1 and 3 in Dia. 11, but that would give White a chance to use his sente moves of 4 and 6. The



Dia. 11

sequence to 14 is one likely continuation. After 14, Black is in more trouble than White.

White's group is out of danger after he plays 100. This means that the fight started by his cut at 50 is still proceeding satisfactorily for him.




Figure 5 (101 – 154)


Figure 5 (101 – 154). An astonishing manoeuvre


Black 1, 3. If left unplayed, White 30 would be sente against Black's bottom group.

Black 7 is of course mainly intended as a forcing move against the corner, but it has an additional function. In an emergency, it makes it possible for Black to counter White 1 and 3 in Dia. 12 with 4 and 6.

White 8. Blocking at 'a' would lose two points, as Black would be able to play 14 in sente.

Black 9 is nicely-timed. White would not answer this move if the black group





Dia. 15


question now is: can White connect at 33?

Dia. 14. If White 1, Black 2 is the vital point. If next White 3, Black 4 and 6 are the wrong answer, as they let White play 9 in sente. Black has to play 10 to stop White from getting two eyes, so White forces with 11 and 13, then attacks with 15. Black is in bad trouble, so instead of 4 –


Dia. 15. Black must hane on the inside at 4. After the sequence to 10, White 'a' is not sente, so White will play 11. However, Black is safe from attack with 12. White can thrash around with 13 etc., but if Black answers calmly up to 20, his struggles are of no avail.

White 32. It is thus clear that White has no choice but to flee with 32, abandoning the larger part of his group.

Black 37. If omitted, White gets a ko with 1 to 5 in Dia. 16, followed by a throw-in. Instead of 2 –



Dia. 16



Dia. 17

Dia. 17. If Black plays 2 here, White captures him with 3 to 7.

The exchange of groups is completed when White extends at 38. Black's brilliantly executed manoeuvre has secured him adequate compensation for the sacrifice of his group on the right, but the game has still not tilted either way. The struggle now enters its last and decisive stage.

Black 39, 41. Insurance against an attack by White on this group.


White 44 is correct shape. If Black 46, White will play a ko with 45.

Black 45–49. A nicely-timed sequence which creates a serious defect in White's shape. Black is probing to see how White will defend against the cut at 'c'.


White 50. If White ignores the threat, playing at 1 in Dia. 18, for example, Black makes a severe attack with 2 and 4. If White 5, Black counters with 6 to 10, making miai of connecting at 'a' and capturing the group below.

White 50 is a defiant move – simply connecting at 'c' would be safe but too slow. White plans to play a ko if Black cuts at 'c'.

White 54. The only move – White intended to play here when he made the hane at 52. Drawing back with 1 in Dia. 19 would make it too easy for Black to settle



Dia. 18



Dia. 19




Figure 6 (155 – 200)
 ko: 66, 69, 72, 75, 78, 81.

his group, as well as leave him with the threat of the cut at 'a'.

Figure 6 (155 – 200). A favourable ko

The sequence to 60 is forced. Another exchange is effected, with White taking the corner and Black the side.

Black 61. Black cannot connect at 62.


Dia. 20. If Black 1, White connects at 2 and Black loses the capturing race because of the throw-in at 6.

White 62. White has to fight the ko. If he connected at 63, Black would be able to connect at 62, so White would collapse. The explanation is not simple, however.

Dia. 21. If White 1, Black plays 2 and 4, then moves out with 6. White 7 is the strongest counter, but Black cuts at 8 in sente (if White 9 at 12, then Black 'a'), so Black plays 10 to 14 in sente, then attacks the stones on the side with 16. If White 17 and 19, Black has a good move at 20, so White collapses.

The ko is more important for White than for Black, so White soon has to give way with 76 and 82.

White 86 is a tesuji. If Black attacks with 90, White plays a ko with White 'a', Black 'b'. White has plenty of ko threats



Dia. 20

at the bottom, so Black could not start this ko immediately.

White 88. If at 89, Black 'c' has an adverse effect on the white group below.

White 92 is correct shape. If White 95 instead, Black 'd' becomes sente.

White 94 defends against Black 'e', thus bringing to an end the last fight of the game. Black seems to have made a small gain in the ko fight.

Figure 7 (201 – 259). A small lead

The game record after 259 has not been preserved. The position is very close, but Black has a slight lead. Against an opponent who played as well as Kadono did here, this was a very creditable win for Shusaku.

Black wins by 2 points.




Figure 7 (201 – 259)
 44: connects (right of 2)
 ko: 45, 50, 53, 56

Game Nine: Shusaku v. Kishimoto Saichiro (1843)

Although Shusaku was already performing very well against such top players as Ota Yuzo and Yasui Sanchi, his play still had many elements of immaturity. His most serious rivals at this time were probably the lesser-known players who were around his rank. One of his main opponents was a senior Honinbo disciple, Kishimoto Saichiro (1822 – 56), with whom he played eight games in 1843, winning five and losing three. Kishimoto had entered the Honinbo school as a disciple of Jowa, becoming shodan at the age of sixteen. He reached 6-dan in 1854, but his results in his later years were so outstanding that Shuwa awarded him a posthumous 7-dan diploma. For a while he also served as the head teacher of the Honinbo school. The game given below is one of the most interesting from the 1843 series with Shusaku.

*White: Kishimoto Saichiro 4-dan
Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 4-dan
Date: 16th November, 1843
237 moves. White wins by 1 point.
Commentary by Kubomatsu Katsukiyo 8-dan*





Figure 1 (1 – 27)


Figure 1 (1 – 27). An unusual variation

White 8. If White follows the joseki in Dia. 1, Black gets a good pincer at 6. If instead White connects at 1 in Dia. 2, he gets good moves at 3 and 5, but when Black attacks with 6, his three stones on the side become a little heavy.


Black 9 is the vital point. If Black extends at 1 in Dia. 3, White will play 2 to 6




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4


and Black 1 may end up being bad shape. (For another commentary on this joseki, see the 1847 Shuwa game.)

Black 11. Black 15–White 25–Black ‘a’ would be more peaceful.


Black 15. Black 1 in Dia. 4 would give White good forcing moves at 2 and 4.

White 16. White does not want to block at 17, because if Black answered at 16, his result would be a big improvement on Dia. 4.

White 20. Necessary to prevent Black from getting a ko with the sequence shown in Dia. 5 (next page). White 20 also attacks Black’s liberties, so the continuation to 27 is forced.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6




Figure 2 (28 – 45)

Figure 2 (28 – 45). Inducing moves

White 28 induces Black 29 so that White can play 30.

White 34. The star-point play is unusual in this period.

Black 35, 37. The natural flow. If Black simply jumped to 37, omitting 35, White would play at 'a'. Rather than permit that, it is clearly better for Black to make the 35–36 exchange.

Black 41. Another 'inducing' move: White 42 makes Black 43 natural.

White 44. Necessary because White is aiming at attacking with 1 and 3 in Dia. 6. Without a stone at 'a', this attack would be too reckless.

Black 45 defends against the threat of Dia. 6. For the first time Black gets a thick shape.





Figure 3 (46 – 76)



Dia. 7

Figure 3 (46 – 76). Centre thickness

Black 51. Not Black 'a'—White 57, which would help White to make good shape and leave Black with a cutting point.

White 54. Besides forcing 55, White is aiming at attacking with 1 and 3 in Dia. 7. Instead of defending, Black prefers to build up strength in the centre with 53 and 57, thus forcing White to flee for safety with 56 etc.

Black 61. Seeing that White promptly plays 62, Black should have exchanged Black 62 for White 'b' before switching to the corner, but he was understandably reluctant to make that exchange.

Black 65 defends against Dia. 7.

White 66 is a well-timed probe. If Black answers at 'c', White can live in the corner later on. However, if White made the 68–69 exchange before playing 66, he would not be able to live after Black 'c'. Timing is all-important.

White 70, 76. Both essential.




Figure 4 (77 – 100)





Figure 5 (101 – 140)



Dia. 8

Figure 4 (77 – 100). A successful invasion

White 78. Another move White was aiming at when he played 52 and 54 in Figure 3. The presence of these stones makes it difficult for Black to handle the invasion.

Black 85. If at 1 in Dia. 8, White will live easily, thanks to the probe he played earlier and to the fact that White 'a' is sente.


Black attacks desperately with 87 and 89, but he is unable to kill this group.

Figure 5 (101 – 140). Splitting attack

White 2, 4. Correct order: if White played 4 first, Black would ignore 2.

Black 9. This move and the sente capture with 5 and 7 are Black's compensation for the invasion at the top. Black is able to engineer a splitting attack on two weak white groups.

White 28–Black 29. A clever exchange, the effect of which becomes apparent after



Dia. 9

White 36 to 40 in the figure. Without this exchange, Black's capture at 6 in Dia. 9 would be sente.

Figure 6 (141 – 164). Discarding a group

White 52 induces Black 53, so that cap-




Figure 6 (141 – 164)

turing at 54 becomes natural.

Black 57. Since White has a sente move at 'a', forcing Black 'b', Black 57 is correct.

White 58, 60. White is preparing to discard this group, but he increases the sacrifice a little in order to make White 62 sente. This also sets up moves taking profit in sente at 'c' and 'd'.

White 64 is enough to make the game extremely close.




Figure 7 (165 – 200)

Figure 6 (165 – 200). A close game

Black 67. Defending against the sente moves mentioned earlier is now big.

Black 73 prevents White from cutting at 75 and is sente. If Black simply plays 73 at 75, then he loses sente with White 73, Black 77.

Black 79. If Black played 81 first, 79 might not be sente.

Black 85. Just in case White plays 'a' in order to force Black to add stones to remove the white group from the board, Black 85 provides for a reserve eye. So far White has not had a chance to play at 'a'. If, for example, he had played 70 there, Black would have played at the bottom, since White 'a' would not require






Figure 8 (201 – 237)

36, 37: connect ko



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

an immediate answer.

Figure 8 (201 – 237). A good win for Kishimoto

Black 13 gains a point compared to the sequence in Dia. 10.

White 14. If at 1 in Dia. 11, Black gets a seki with 2 and 4.

White probably owes his win in this game to the success of his invasion at the centre top, though the commentator does not specify a losing or a winning move. The soundness of his positional judgement in discarding his group on the left also played a big part. In later years Shusaku forced Kishimoto to the handicap of josen (black in all games), but at this stage he was still able to hold his own against his junior disciple.

White wins by 1 point.

Game Ten: Shusaku v. Mizutani Junsaku (1844)

Commentary by Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan

Mizutani Junsaku is the Kadono Tadazaemon we met with earlier. In February 1844 he had become the adopted heir of the Mizutani family, a minor go house which was closely associated with the Honinbos. Shusaku had a lot of trouble with Mizutani, being forced from sen-ai-sen back to josen in 1843 (see Game Eight), but in February and March, 1844, Shusaku managed to win four straight and progressed to sen-ai-sen again. The game below was his first on white after the change of handicap.

White: Kuwahara Shusaku 4-dan
Black: Mizutani Junsaku 6-dan
Date: 14th May, 1844
 269 moves. White wins by 1 point.




Figure 1 (1 - 19)

Figure 1 (1 - 19). Star-point plays


White 2. An opening move on the star-point was quite unusual in this period. Black follows suit with 5.

Black 7, the point of symmetry on the side, has to be played without delay.

White 8. White 'a' would also be a good move, but White chooses 8 because this symmetrical point would be good for both sides.

White 10. Now standard, but an innovative move in this period.

Black 11. Nowadays making the Black



Dia. 1

'b'—White 'c' exchange first would be automatic.

Black 13. Playing at 15 immediately, omitting 13, is generally considered correct, but Black had a reason for playing this way.

Dia. 1. After Black 15 in the figure, Black expects White to play at 1 next, as Black 1 would be a good move attacking the white stones to the right. Black then intends to extend to 2 on the left side, a move which has a good follow-up at 'a'. In other words, Black's strategy is to let White take the top and in exchange build up his left side position.

White 16. White is being contrary, since it is obvious what Black is up to. Despite 16, Black still prefers to build up his left side moyo with 17, so White is given time to defend at 18. The result is that White has been allowed to play both on the left side and at the top, which is not what

Black was hoping for in Dia. 1. Black is nonetheless satisfied, as he has a superb continuation at 19.




Figure 2 (20 – 57)

Figure 2 (20 – 57). Fighting back against the invader

Since Black is rapidly expanding his moyo, a reducing move might seem called for, but White is in no hurry. First of all, he invades at 20, the only weak point in Black's position.


Black 21 is an interesting counter to the invasion. To look at Black's options:

Dia. 2. Black 2, permitting White 3, is the worst answer.


Dia. 3. Descending at 2 is the usual move. When White plays 3, however, blocking at 4 is unreasonable, as White can make a troublesome cut with 5 and 7. Black does not have a good continuation after 9; if Black 'a', White easily escapes with 'b'. This is a bad result for Black.

Dia. 4. Black has to play at 4. If White now plays 5, Black gets a good result with 6 and 8. Therefore –


Dia. 5. White will play at 5 here, after which Black will probably continue with 6. Even if Black attacks with 'a', the best he can get is a ko after White 'b',




Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f'. This would not be an attractive result for Black, which is why he hanes at 21 in the figure.


White 22. White has a good reason for ignoring Black 21. If White blocks at 2 in Dia. 6, Black will connect at 3, setting up a severe cut at 7. This is good for Black, being quite an improvement on Dia. 5. Therefore –

Dia. 7. White will answer 1 at 2, as in the figure. If Black 3, White can now answer at 4, as White 6 makes miai of 'a' and 'b'.

Black plays 23, then hanes at 25 to avoid Dia. 7. The rather unusual exchange in this corner is a good example of the professional spirit of defiance, with each



Dia. 6




Dia. 7

side determined to prevent the opponent from having his own way.


White gets a nice hane at 26, but Black can block at 27, thanks to Black 25. The sequence in Dia. 7 is now invalid.

Dia. 8. If White 1, Black connects at 2, then answers the cut at 3 with 4. White 5 is essential, but then Black strikes a severe blow with 6. If White 'a' or 'b', Black captures two stones with 'c'.

White naturally cuts at 28, whereupon Black plays a sacrifice stone with 29, then forces with 31. His aim is the contact play of 33.



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

Dia. 9. Black cannot play 1 in the corner at this stage, as White counters with 2 to 6. However, White has to be careful in answering 33 in the figure, as Black is trying to exploit the aji of Black 1 in this diagram.


Black 35 creates the double threat of Black 38 and Black 41. White defends against these threats with 36 and 38. Black 37 at 38 would be big, but Black cannot permit White to capture 21 in sente.

White 40. White 41 would be bad — Black would hane at 'a'.


Black 41 is an interesting move. The usual idea would be to play 1 in Dia. 10, whereupon White would probably play 2 and 4. However, White might be satisfied with the atari at 2 and switch 4 to the bottom.

Black 43 is another unusual move, as the natural move here is the kosumi at 44. Black is playing a waiting game, storing up strength.

Dia. 11. If Black 1, White will seal



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

Black in with 2. In this position White 'a' will be sente, so Black is not definitely alive yet. Junsaku is the kind of player who prefers to secure his own positions first, then wait for a chance to strike at the opponent.

The fight at the top comes to a pause with 45. White has done fairly well at the top, but Black has a strong position and is aiming at White's weaknesses at 'b' and 'c'. He is also aiming at 'd', so all in all the game is even.

Black 47. Black 'e' is not good here.

White 50. White 'f' would be big, but since it does not give any prospect of attacking Black, it is a purely territorial move. White prefers to strengthen himself with 50 — he is aiming at White 'e'.


Black 53. An ideal move, combining attack and defence.

White 56. Perfect timing. Miyamoto 9-dan comments that it's hard to credit that a fifteen year old could have such a superb feel for the game.


Black 57. Answering White's probe is not easy.

Dia. 12. If Black 2, White 3 makes miai of 'a' and 'b'.

Dia. 13. If Black 2, White forces with



Dia. 12



Dia. 13

3, then parachutes in at 5. Because of his bad aji at 'a', it is very difficult for Black to find a way to deal with this invasion.





Figure 3 (58 – 80)



Dia. 14

Figure 3 (58 – 80). Corner aji


Black 59. Black's aim when he played 57 in Figure 2. For the moment White cannot do anything with his two stones.

Dia. 14. When Black is not strong in the vicinity, he may have to let White live with 1 to 4, but in this position, especially having played the ▲ stone, that would be a weak-kneed compromise.


White 60. White of course expected Black 59, his plan being to utilise the aji of White 'a' by invading at 60. Note that he cannot attempt to move out immediately with 'a'.

Dia. 15. If White 1, Black has a severe counter with 2 to 6 (for White 5 at 'a', see Dia. 17).


Dia. 16. If White 7, Black squeezes, then connects at 12. White lives, but Black is




Dia. 15



Dia. 16
11: connects



Dia. 17



Dia. 18

left with a hane at 'a' – if White 'b', he plays ko with 'c'. This result is bad for White.


Dia. 17. If White 5 here, Black squeezes with 6 to 12 –

Dia. 18. Then stops White from getting two eyes with 14 to 22.


Looking at the above result, it occurs to one that White would like to have a stone at 'a' in Dia. 18. That is why Black has no choice but to reinforce at 61. In short, White 60 made miai of 'a' and 62.

Black 63. Playing on the other side, at 1 in Dia. 19, would be a mistake. The sequence to 8 is forced and is clearly bad for Black.

White 72, creating a cutting point at 'b', is an important move. White 72 at



Dia. 19



Dia. 20

76, permitting Black 72 – White 74, would just strengthen Black.

White 78. Answering 77 at ‘c’ would be a bad mistake.

Dia. 20. If White 2, Black counters with 3, compelling White to capture with 4 and 6. Black can now push through with 7 and 9, causing considerable damage to White’s position. Note that the trick here is for Black to keep the ataris at ‘a’ and ‘b’ in reserve until they are needed.

White is thus forced to answer at 78 and he has no choice about 80 either, as a hane there by Black would be unbearable.




Figure 4 (81 – 112)


Figure 4 (81 – 112). Preparing to attack

Black 87. Black ‘a’ would have no effect on the white stones above.


White 88 is a subtle move which shows a very fine appreciation of the situation. After Black 89 –

Dia. 21. White can wait for a chance to atari at 1, setting up a sente hane at 3. Alternatively –

Dia. 22. White has a troublesome move at 1. Black of course captures White with 2 to 6, but in so doing fills in a lot of his own liberties. White is hoping for a chance to exploit this.



Dia. 21



Dia. 22

White 90 is a clever forcing move which utilises the aji of the trapped corner stones. White is able to reinforce his group in sente, thus letting him switch to the large point of 96. Black counters by launching an attack in the centre.

White 98. Good timing. If White answers at 100 first, Black will exchange ‘b’ for White ‘c’, after which 98 might not be sente.

Black 101. A severe attack which also aims at covering the weakness at ‘d’. White’s answer at 102 aims at the cut at ‘e’. Black 105 continues the attack while defending against that threat – both sides are busy here.


White 108 is good style. White 109 would give Black a perfect splitting attack at ‘f’. White must not let Black get a double attack going on his two unsettled groups.

White 110 is another subtle move which demonstrates Shusaku’s mastery of middle game fighting. Black must counter at 111, for pushing with Black ‘g’–White ‘h’–Black ‘i’–White ‘j’ would just help the white group below to escape.


White 112. The aim of 110 was to induce Black 111 in order to set up this move. Note that White must not block at 1 in *Dia. 23*.

Dia. 23 (next page). If White 1, Black 2 is a strong answer; if White 3, White is in trouble after Black 4, since the sequence White ‘a’–Black ‘b’–White ‘c’–Black ‘d’ does not give him two eyes

at the bottom. However, White 3 at 4, letting Black hane at 3, would also be terrible. White 1 is therefore bad.



Dia. 23



Dia. 24

Black 27. Black would hate to have to play on a dame point, so he defends the cutting point at 34 indirectly with 27.

White 28. Extending at 1 in Dia. 24 would be disastrous, as Black 2 captures the white group. If White resists with 3 etc., Black sets up an oi-otoshi up to 18. If White plays 9 at 10, Black counters with 'a', then after White 9 he throws in at 15.

Black 33. Necessary after White 32.

White 34. White is not trying to capture Black; rather, he hopes to settle his own group while Black is settling his.

Black 37. Not being able to capture at 38 – because of White's peep at 'c' – is painful.

White 44. White would like to be able to cut at 1 in Dia. 25, but Black escapes with 2 to 6, making miai of 'a' and 'b'. However, Black must defend with 45 after White 44.

White 48 is safe, though White might seem vulnerable to Black 1 in Dia. 26.

Dia. 26. If Black 1, White just cuts at 2; when Black cuts with 5 and 7, White connects at 8 in sente, thus living up to 12. The key is that this group can live by itself if White can eliminate in sente the threat of Black 'a'.

Figure 5 (113 – 150)

ko (at 21): 33, 46

Figure 5 (113 – 150). Unsettled groups

Black 13 to 17 are natural, but they create the position White hypothesised when he played 88 in Figure 4. If Black answers White 18 with the sequence in Dia. 22, White will be able to pull out his captured stone (112 in Figure 4). The sequence to 22 is forced, but Black must then capture with 23 instead of giving atari at 'a'. White is thus left with the option of making a large connection at 21. He does not do so immediately, because Black lives with 'b'. Depending on circumstances, White might prefer to play 'b' himself later on.





Figure 5 (113 – 150)


ko (at 21): 33, 46

Figure 6 (151 – 200). Black invades.

Black 55. Continuing with the *ko* is too



Dia. 25






Figure 7 (201 – 233)

Figure 7 (201 – 233). A close game

Black 11. If at 16, White kills the bottom group with White 12, Black 13, White 33.

White 16. At this point the game is very close, but White has just the slightest edge. The interest of this game was in the four successive fights, moving from the top right to the bottom left, to the centre, and finally to the top left. Perhaps




Figure 8 (234 – 269)

ko (at 53): 59, 62, 65;

67: connects; 69: takes 68

most instructive was the complex manoeuvring following White's invasion of the top right corner. For players of this calibre, there is no such thing as a joseki or a 'standard sequence'.

Figure 8 (234 – 269)

White wins by one point.

Game Eleven: Shusaku v. Ito Showa (1844)

This is the third game that we know of between Ito Showa and Shusaku. After the three-stone game in 1840 already given, Shusaku played one on two stones in January 1842, which he won. Then there was a two year gap until the present encounter, which gives an interesting glimpse of Shusaku's fighting strength.

White: Ito Showa 6-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 4-dan

10th October, 1844; played in Nagoya
81 moves. White resigns.




Figure 1 (1 – 40)

Figure 1 (1 – 40). Fuseki priorities

White 6. If at 'a', Black will play 9 or 6; if then White 'b', Black 'c' will be a perfect combination of pincer and extension.

Black 7 is Shusaku's famous kosumi. It elevates Black's corner position, while preventing White from doing anything; it also gives Black three points to aim at next: Black 'd', Black 29 and Black 33. In effect, it kills four birds with one stone.

White 22, an interesting variation on the standard taisha, makes miai of 23 and 24.

Black 25 is submissive, but playing 23 at 24, letting White attack at 23, is out of the question.

White 28. White 'e' is also possible, but 28 has more effect on Black 5.

Black 31, White 32. Neither side is in a




Figure 2 (41 – 81)

hurry to play at the bottom, as the presence of White 28 makes a move there worth little.


Figure 2 (41 – 81). Careless reading

White 58 is the losing move: it must be at 59. White probably expected Dia. 1, which gives him White 'a' to aim at for later (if Black 'b', one follow-up is White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e'). Note that the worst way to answer is Dia. 2, which gives White sente.


White overlooked Black 59, which relies on the tesuji of 81 to win the semeai.

White 62. If at 67, then Black 71.

White resigns after Black 81.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Game Twelve: Shusaku v. Ito Showa (1844) Commentary by Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan

This game was played immediately after the preceding game, which was something of a debacle for Ito Showa. By now he must have been beginning to have mixed feelings about this brilliant junior disciple. In fact, he never really learnt how to handle Shusaku and of the nineteen recorded games they played (four of them castle games and ironically the ones in which he caused Shusaku the most trouble) between 1840 and 1860, he was only able to win two (Shusaku won fourteen and three were left unfinished).

White: Ito Showa 6-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 4-dan

15th October, 1844; played in Nagoya
253 moves. Black wins by 2 points.





Figure 1 (1 – 28)


Figure 1 (1 – 28). Kaizen's Heavy Plastering

Black 7 at 9 would give the classic Shusaku pattern, but perhaps Shusaku wanted to vary his fuseki from the previous game. Since White plays 8, he is able to make his kosumi anyway.


White 10. The extension to 'a' is more common, but White 10 has its own virtues. It prevents Black from pressing at 10, it aims at pressing at 12, and it also builds up White's position at the top.




Dia. I




12: connects



Dia. 5



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Black 11. Black cannot permit White to play both 10 and 'a'.

White 12. If omitted, Black will attach at 1 in Dia. 1 in order to expand his right side position. Black would make good shape in sente with 3. Instead of 4 –

Dia. 2. If White pushes up at 1, Black cuts at 2 and the continuation to 13 is forced. Black then gets an excellent hané at 14, which is painful for White. Instead of 7 –


Dia. 3. Blocking at 1 is unreasonable, as Black sets up a ladder to 12. This gives us

the opportunity to look at an interesting trick play. When the ladder shown here does not work for Black, then instead of Black 6.

Dia. 4. He extends at 1, whereupon White plays 2 and 4.

Dia. 5. The sequence to 17 follows, then —

Dia. 6. The continuation to 47 is forced. White captures thirteen black stones, but Black gets enormous outside thickness. This magnificent sacrifice tactic is known as 'Kaizen's Heavy Plastering' and was worked out in the 1780's by a famous amateur player, Komatsu Kaizen.




Dia. 6.


White 14. White 15 at the top also looks good, but Black would play at 14, leaving White biased too much towards the top.

White 16 is the correct direction from which to attack. If White played instead at 26, Black would extend to 'b', from where he could take aim at the thinness of White's ogeima enclosure.

Black 17. The conventional continuation after 15 would be the peaceful extension to 1 in Dia. 7. However, Miyamoto hypothesises that White would continue with 2 to 6, settling his group at the top right, while also getting good shape at the top left. Black therefore prefers not to follow this diagram at this stage. Instead, he goes through with an attack he has been planning for the bottom right corner. Black presumably reasons that even if White



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

attacks at the top, the fact of having played even just one stone there will prove to be an asset.

White 18. White 1 in Dia. 8 is actually the standard answer and the moves to 4 form a set sequence; if White 5 next, Black would play 6 and 8. The sequence which appears in the game is similar, with the crucial difference that White 18 enables White to get much better potential eye-shape than in the diagram.

White 26. Just in time to prevent Black 'c'. However, Black ignores the attack, for he is concerned that if he answers with Black 'd', White 'e', Black 'f', White will beat him to the important point of 'g' at the bottom. For that reason he defends there with 27. Since this move also menaces White's stones to the right, White is compelled to reinforce them with 28. As long as this group is vulnerable to attack, White cannot do anything at the bottom.




Figure 2 (29 – 65)


Figure 2 (29 – 65). Handling weak groups

Black 29, which follows the proverb ‘answer the capping move with a knight’s move’ (*boshi ni keima*), is of course mandatory. If Black omits this move, he will promptly be given cause to regret it.


Dia. 9. White would make a severe contact play at 1. Black 4 and 6 are the strongest resistance, but after 12 –

Dia. 10. White captures Black in the sequence to 25. Black cannot get a ladder by cutting at ‘a’.


White 30 is a probe: White wants to see



Dia. 9



Dia. 10 20: connects



Dia. 11


how Black chooses to answer here before deciding how to reinforce his group on the right. His curiosity is not satisfied, however, for Black just ignores 30 and continues his attack. The feeble answer at 39 probably did not even pass through Shusaku’s mind.

Dia. 11. Black 1 would be just what White wants. He would promptly switch to 2 at the top, then if Black attacked at 3, he could utilise the Δ stone as a sacrifice in defending his group. The result shown here makes it clear just how submissive an answer Black 1 is. Miyamoto hypothesises the continuation to 14, which gives White a magnificent position.


White 34, 36. A preliminary step towards settling himself here before looking after the larger group with 40. Note that White 38 is correct style; it forces Black to play 39 because White 39 would give White such good shape.

Black 43. Jumping out to the centre is best. Black 1 in Dia. 12 is a common approach, but here it is not advisable, as it gives White excellent moves at 2 and 4, making Black heavy while building up White’s position on the left. Note that White 2 is an important move. Instead –


Dia. 13. If White starts with 1, Black has a tesuji placement at 2, which secures him a base at the top while eating



Dia. 12



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

away at White's area. Instead of 3 –

Dia. 14. If White 1, the sequence to 8 follows, but this capture is not worth much for White. In both Dias. 13 and 14, Black succeeds in fixing up his shape.

Black 45 is the only move – the ordinary move at 'a' would just give White an ideal move at 47 and make it a losing game for Black. Playing at 45 now follows the sound principle of invading one move before the opponent can complete the stockade around his territory.

Black 49. Connecting immediately at 57 would let White link up his groups with 'b'. Black succeeds in forestalling this with the combination of 49 and 51, followed by the tesuji cut of 53. White has little choice about his answer to this cut, so when Black does finally connect at 57, he can look forward to attacking the white stones he has isolated.


White 58. White decides to leave his stones on the left till later (if he played

'c' now, Black would attack at 'd'), hoping instead to engineer a counterattack with 58. If Black connects at 'e', White plans to attack with 'f', so Black attaches at 59 in order to settle himself. Note that if he played at 65 or 'd' to attack the white group on the left now, White would just ignore him and take the top with White 'e'.


Black 63 is a good move; connecting at 'g' would make Black heavy and would just invite an enemy attack at 'f'. Since this is White's sphere of influence, Black must play lightly.

White 64 offers support to the three stones above to the left and also reinforces against the threat of Black 'h'. If White used this move to defend at the top at 'i', Black would attack at 'd', since his group at the top should be able to look after itself once he has played 63.

Black 65. If at 1 in *Dia. 15*, White will answer with 2 and 4. Black could then start a ko by cutting at 'a', but if he lost this ko, White 'b' would endanger his whole group, so this fight is not one he could undertake lightly. For that matter, White could even answer by simply connecting at 2 in *Dia. 16*. Black thus decides to follow White's lead in leaving the top for the time being. From the two options he has for attacking White, he chooses the rock-solid magari at 65.



Dia. 15



Dia. 16





Figure 3 (66 – 100)



Dia. 17


Figure 3 (66 – 100). A necessary sacrifice

White 66. White rejects the hane at 1 in Dia. 17, as it just helps Black to gain momentum with 2 and 4. In the worst case, White might even come under a three-way attack after Black 6.

White 68. Making bad shape by connecting (to the left of 80) would be bad.

Black 77. Giving atari at 78, sacrificing two stones in order to attack the three white stones above, would be bad. After capturing with White 77, White would be able to lay waste to Black's corner.

White 80 is a good move, though sacrificing four stones might seem to give Black a lot of profit. White hopes to launch a severe attack on the four black stones above, which have been cut adrift from their allies. Instead of 80 –



Dia. 18

Dia. 18. If White captures with 1 and 3, he comes under severe attack from Black 4, since the capture in itself does not give him two eyes. The only way White can save his group is by making a sacrifice with 11 and 13 to set up the connection with 15. This makes Black thick and is bad for White. Contriving a double attack on Black with 80 to 86 in the figure offers much better prospects. In fact, White is able to turn the tables on Black and become the pursuer.

Black 87. If Black 'a', 'b' would be good for White.

White 90. White does not want to play the ko (with White 93), as Black would have too many ko threats.

White 100. Black will not answer at 'c', for making a bamboo joint at 'd' would take all the pressure off White.

Figure 4 (101 – 107). The only move

Black 1 leads to the climax of the game. Black's outside wall is full of holes, but White's position seems just as precarious.

White 6 may look risky, but it is the strongest move. However, it has to be backed up by a lot of reading.

Black 7. The strongest move. To look at the alternatives –

Dia. 19. If Black 1, White 2 becomes the





Figure 4 (101 – 107)




Dia. 19

vital point. If Black 3, White forces with 4, then hanes at 6. Black can get a ko with 7 and 9, but White has a perfect ko threat at 10. Black looks like losing one of his groups. Instead of 3 –


Dia. 20. If Black 1, White 4 and 6 make miai of connecting with ‘a’ and living with ‘b’. This would also be dangerous for Black, so Black 1 in Dia. 19 has to be ruled out.

Dia. 21. The next move to look at is Black 1, which fills in one of White’s liberties. This is a strong move, preventing White ‘a’. If White moves out with 2, a semeai cannot be avoided. After the tesuji of 13 –


Dia. 22. The sequence to 21 puts Black one move ahead in the race to capture.




Dia. 20



Dia. 21



Dia. 22




Dia. 23


8: throws in (below 1)
9: captures; 11: connects

Dia. 23. White 1 here does not help. Black cuts at 2, then plays the famous squeeze tesuji up to 12, again winning the race by one move.


In practice, however, things will not work out so well for Black, for White




Dia. 24



Dia. 25



Dia. 26



Dia. 27

will not follow Dia. 22 or 23. Instead, when Black attaches at 1 in Dia. 24, White will leave the top and attack the other black group with 2. Black would have considerable trouble saving this group. When one remembers that White 'a' is sente, since it would put White ahead in the fight shown in Dias. 21 and 22, then Black's prospects look very bleak. Moreover, White actually has some tricks available to him at the top not shown so far. For example –

Dia. 25. White could try 1 to 7 here. Or –

Dia. 26. White 1 is a crucial point. If Black answers at 2, White 3 becomes sente, so Black now loses the fight at the top, the sequence to 13 being one example. Black has to give atari at 8, so he loses his defence against White's hane at 13.

Dia. 27. The final move to check out is the simple extension to 1, but it fails because White easily picks up four stones with 2 to 10. If Black 5 at 6, White 5 would make miai of cutting at 10 and 'a'.





Figure 5 (107 – 130)




Dia. 28

Figure 5 (107 – 130). Both groups live.

The explanation of Black 7 has been rather long and complicated, but it should now be apparent that not only is it the fighting move, it is in fact the only move if Black wants to stay in the game.

White 8. If White plays at 1 in Dia. 28, Black connects at 2. If next White 3 and 5, Black plays 6 and gets a rather different result from that in Dia. 21, as this time White's outside wall is full of holes. White 8 is therefore forced.

Black 11 is essential: Black cannot capture the two white stones with 1 in Dia. 29, because letting White connect at 2 is bad. White makes shape with 4 and 6, then when Black cuts at 7, he counters with the sequence to 24. If Black tries to destroy



Dia. 29

his eye-shape with 25 etc., White 30 makes miai of connecting underneath with 'a' and making two eyes with 'b', so Black collapses.

White 18. A good move which makes miai of 21 and 22.

Black 19. Correct timing – if played later, White will not necessarily answer at 20.

The fight at the top is finally concluded with Black 27. Since each side has settled a group under attack, each probably considers the result satisfactory. As the endgame starts with 28, the position is very close.

White 30 is big: compare Black 'a'.

Figure 6 (131 – 155). The endgame begins.

White 32. White 37 would also be very big. Black would then play at 'a' and White would be unable to resist with 'b', which would be painful. That is presumably why White chooses to defend with 32. However, Black is able to save his stones on the left in sente with 33 to 37 before coming back to defend at 39. Note that White 34 is essential.

Dia. 30. Counterattacking with White 1 would be reckless: Black has no trouble refuting it with 2 and 4. If White 5, Black wins the fight with 6 and 8.

White 42, 44. A tesuji: Black has to let White take the corner profit.

White 50. White would not profit by cutting at 'c', as Black would peep at 'd', then give atari with 'e' etc.






Figure 6 (131 – 155)



Dia. 30



Dia. 31

Black 51 and 53 build thickness. White does not answer at 55 as it would be too submissive. Incidentally, if the reader is wondering why White does not hane at 'f' at the top, the answer, which has to do with White's shortage of liberties, is given in Dia. 31.

Dia. 31. White 1 might look big, but it backfires, as Black is able to play 2. White must cut at 3, but Black then sets up a ko with 4 to 8. White will have to capture at 9, letting Black take the corner stones with 10. This diagram explains why neither side is in a hurry to play at 'f' in the figure.





Figure 7 (156 – 200)



Dia. 32

Figure 7 (156 – 200). A slight lead

Black 57. If at 1 in Dia. 32, White plays 2 to 6. Black can win the semeai if he exchanges 7 for White 8, then plays 9 to 15, but the addition of White 8 means that White could now hane at 'a'.


White 60. If omitted, Black can play at 1 in Dia. 33.

Dia. 33. If White resists with 2, Black pulls out his stone with 3 to 9. Since he threatens to give atari at 'a' and to cut at 'b', White is in trouble. Therefore –


Dia. 34. White has to answer at 2, letting Black connect with 3.

Black 65 before 67 is the correct order. If the 67–68 exchange is made first, White will not answer 65 at 66.

Black 69. White 69 would be sente, as after Black 'a'—White 70, Black would have



Dia. 33



Dia. 34

to defend against White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'.

Black 71 and White 76 are more or less miai. The forcing moves from 77 to 81 become Black's privilege. The game is still close, but Black seems to be slightly ahead.

Figure 8 (201 – 253). Shusaku's fourth win in a row

Black 3 ensures a win for Black.




Figure 8 (201 – 253)
ko (at 13): 16, 51; 53: connects

This was a high level game in which neither player made a noticeable mistake. The climax was the clash in the top centre and it is a tribute to the strength of both players that this perilous fight ended in an even result. Shusaku's final winning margin was perhaps an early indication of how difficult it was going to be to defeat him when he held black.

Black wins by 2 points.

His loss in this and the previous game must actually have been quite an embar-

rassment to Ito Showa, for they were played in his home town of Nagoya. Shusaku had left Edo at the beginning of October in 1844 to make his second trip home to see his family and on the way he spent the best part of a month in Nagoya. Besides the two games we have seen, another two were played during his stay: one on the 18th, in which Showa salvaged some of his pride by winning, and one on the 29th, won by Shusaku. To be fair to Showa, we will take a look at his solitary win in the series (the fourth game is given in Part Two).

Game Thirteen: Shusaku v. Ito Showa (1844)

White: Ito Showa 6-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 4-dan

date: 18th October, 1844; played in Nagoya
142 moves. Black resigns.





Figure 1 (1 – 30)


Figure 1 (1 – 30). White plays lightly.

White 20 is aggressive. White could settle his stone on the right with the joseki to 7 in Dia. 1, but perhaps he does not want Black to play at 8.


White 22. White 1 in Dia. 2, giving Black the ideal attacking move at 2, would



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Dia. 3

obviously be too heavy. White creates some aji in the corner before jumping out lightly to 26. If White omits 22, Black can capture the white stone efficiently with 'a', while if he omits 24, Black can connect underneath with 'b'.

Black 27 is the vital point – a white stone there would immediately stabilise White, while 27 virtually captures the white stones. However, White does have the aji of 1 in Dia. 3 and the contact play at 'c' in the figure.


White 28 could also be at 'd'.

Black 29 is a solid, unhurried move.




Dia. 4


Perhaps it is too unhurried. Hashimoto Shoji suggests using Black's thickness in the bottom right to attack White with 1 and 3 in Dia. 4.




Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

moyo makes the game promising for White.

White 50. If White omits this move and jumps immediately to 52, Black can separate him with 1 and 3 in Dia. 8.

Black 57 aims at using the aji of 55 to reduce Black's moyo. If Black attempted to live at the top with 1 in Dia. 9, White might try to kill him with 2 etc.

Black 63, inviting White to play a ko, is a standard move for settling a group lightly. However, Black's ko threat at 71 changes the flow of the game, as White decides that the top is more important. With White 72 and 74, Black's group comes under severe pressure.




Figure 2 (31 – 74)


Figure 2 (31 – 74). A promising moyo

Black 33 keeps the position simple. Black 1 in Dia. 5 would lead to a difficult fight when White cuts at 6. Next –


Dia. 6. Black cannot play 7 because White counters with 8 to 16. If Black 17, White can play 18, as the ladder with Black 'a' and Black 'b' does not work. Therefore –

Dia. 7. Black would have to play 7, but although he could get some central influence with 9 and 11, his position would be overly biased to the bottom sector, while White would have a harmonious overall development.

White 44. An interesting move – this



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Figure 3 (75 – 100). Trouble for Black

White 78. If at 1 in Dia. 10, Black will push through and cut with 2 and 4. A seki would probably result at the top, but Black would have a cutting point at 'a'.

Black 87 is a tesuji. If White intercepts




Figure 3 (75 – 100)
ko: 90, 93, 98





Figure 4 (101 – 142)
ko: 4, 7



Dia. 11


with 1 in Dia. 11, he falls into a trap, as Black sets up a ladder with 2 to 10.

Figure 4 (101 – 142). A desperation measure

Black 9. Black has run out of ko threats, so in desperation he resorts to a large moyo strategy.

White 12 captures the whole group. Black 1 in Dia. 12 does not work, because the best that Black can do is to get a ko at the top, but since there is another ko at 'a', White cannot lose.

With 15 etc. Black swallows up the white group at the bottom, getting quite a large territory. Ironically, however, after this sequence his ko threat at ▲ becomes superfluous, as it is not needed to kill



Dia. 12

White. In effect, Black has wasted a move, so White's decision to ignore the ko threat has been vindicated.

The other source of dissatisfaction for Black is that White saves his stone on the right in sente with 30 and so gets to take the large point of 32 on the left side. This decides the game, as the difference between White 32 and Black 'a' would be enormous.

Black resigns after White 142.

(Adapted from commentaries by Hashimoto Shoji 9-dan and Iwamoto Kaoru 9-dan)

5. The Encounter with Gennan Inseki

The single event which did more than anything else to establish Shusaku's reputation was the encounter with Gennan Inseki in Osaka in July 1846. When Shusaku left Edo in October 1844 for his prolonged visit home, he was a fifteen year old 4-dan who had fought his way to black against such prominent players as Ota Yuzo 6-dan, Ito Showa 6-dan and Yasui Sanchi 6-dan and thus clearly had a promising future ahead of him. When he returned to Edo in late 1846, it was as the conqueror of the indomitable Gennan Inseki, the arch foe of the Honinbo house and the highest ranked active player.

Shusaku left his home town of Tonoura in April and arrived in Osaka in May. There he first of all played four games with Nakagawa Junsetsu 5-dan, whom he had beaten on two stones in 1841. Since Shusaku was now 4-dan, he played Junsetsu on sen-ai-sen this time, with the following results:

Game One (3rd, 4th May). Shusaku (black) won by 6 points.

Game Two (5th May, completed 5th June). Shusaku (black) won by resignation.

Game Three (9th, 10th May). Shusaku (white) won by resignation (given in Part Two).

Game Four (29th May). Shusaku (black) won by 7 points.

It is interesting to note that Junsetsu's reputation did not suffer as a result of these losses: it was recognized that it was not that Junsetsu was weak, but that Shusaku was just too strong.

Junsetsu was a disciple of Gennan Inseki, who was then living in Osaka, and perhaps it was he who arranged the match between them. The results are given below:

Game One (20th July). Shusaku took two stones; game suspended after 102 moves.




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

White: Gennan Inseki. 2 stones: Shusaku




Figure 2 (51 - 102)

Game suspended after 102 and left unfinished.

- Game Two (21st, 24th, 25th July). Shusaku (black) won by 3 points.
 Game Three (28th July). Shusaku took black; suspended after 59 moves.
 Game Four (29th, 30th July). Shusaku (black) won by resignation.
 Game Five (4th, 5th August). Shusaku (black) won by 2 points.

The first game is given on the previous page. After 102 moves it had become obvious that the position was hopeless for White, and Gennan suspended play with the comment that two stones was clearly the wrong handicap. Instead of finishing that game, he offered to start again the next day, with Shusaku just taking black. It was the established practice for the senior player to suspend play for the day when he chose, and though we might think that Gennan should have resigned instead of simply discontinuing the game, this perhaps was also his privilege (seeing that he did it again in the third game). Actually, however, letting Shusaku go immediately to black was an extremely generous gesture, considering not just the difference in their ranks but also Gennan's stature in the go world. With the retirement of Jowa, he had become the preeminent player of the day, and although his ambition to become Meijin godokoro had been frustrated by the Honinbo house, he was generally considered, by Jowa amongst others, as being equivalent to Meijin in strength. Gennan of course could not possibly have anticipated the outcome when he made this condescension to a lowly 4-dan.

Game Fourteen: Shusaku v. Gennan Inseki (1846)

Commentary by Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan

This game, Shusaku's first on black, is the famous 'ear-reddening' game. It is not only the most famous of Shusaku's career, but also one of the most famous in the history of Japanese go. Where indicated in the text, reference has been made to other commentaries besides Miyamoto's.

White: Gennan Inseki 8-dan (1798 – 1859)
Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 4-dan (age 17)
Date: 21st, 24th, 25th July, 1846
Played in Osaka
 325 moves. Black wins by 2 points.

Figure 1 (1 – 11). Gennan's favourite move

White 6 is a little unusual. The approach move at 8 is more common.

Black 7. Black 11 is also possible; if White 'a', Black makes a pincer at 'b'.

White 10. The taisha was Gennan's favourite move. He also played it in the






Figure 1 (1 – 11)

game against Shuwa given in Chapter One. Black 11. If Black followed the popular joseki in Dia. 1 (next page), White would be satisfied with extending to 5. This re-

sult would be superior to simply playing 10 in the figure at 'c'.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2





Figure 2 (12 – 30)

Figure 2 (12 – 30). Shusaku falls for the trick move.

White 20. A joseki variation which seems to have been developed by Gennan Inseki. White does not want to play the standard taisha joseki in Dia. 2, as Black 4 and 8 would link up with his stones at the top, thus preventing White from attacking him, while Black 6 would also combine nicely with Black's bottom left corner enclosure in the figure. Instead of 3 –




Dia. 3


Dia. 3. There is another trick move in which White attacks with 3 and 5. In this position, sacrificing three stones is the simplest answer for Black and the result to 15 would be satisfactory for him. (For a discussion of this joseki, see Ishida's *Dictionary of Basic Joseki*, Volume 2, page 230.)

Black 25 is a mistake. Nowadays, of course, this variation is in all the reference books (for a full discussion of this joseki and also the position from this game, see Ishida, Volume 2, pp. 254–259), but Shusaku was faced with it for the first time. Gennan must have felt that the game was his when he saw Black 25. Instead –

Dia. 4. The correct answer is Black 1, but note that this involves a ladder. White forces with 2 and 4, then attacks at 6, but Black can extend at 7. When White plays 8 and 10, Black saves himself by setting up a ladder with 11 to 15. Note that



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

White Δ is not a ladder block. Instead of 2 –

Dia. 5. Kitani Minoru and Ishida Yoshio comment that if Black made the correct answer at 1, White would continue with 2 to 6 here. The sequence to 14 would be forced, after which Black would move out to the left with the tesuji of 15 and 17. White cannot block at 'a' because of Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.

White 28, 30. A severe combination and the punishment for the mistake at 25.






Figure 3 (31 – 53)
ko : 43, 46, 49

Figure 3 (31 – 53). Black fights back.

After his mistake, Shusaku was in bad trouble and one further slip would have been disastrous. However, from this point on his play was flawless.



Dia. 6




Dia. 7

Black 31. The worst way for Black to play is shown in Dia. 6, which would represent a terrible loss. Dia. 7 is not much better, however. Black manages to live, but in gote, while White gets excellent outside thickness. The game would be over.


Black 31 is an important move, creating absolute ko threats at 41 and 47. Black then plays 33 and 35 to set up the ko. These moves offer the strongest resistance and are a standard technique for getting out of a tight spot.

White 36. A well-timed forcing move before starting the ko.

Black 41. The only move, though this ko threat loses points for Black. If he made the mistake of playing 1 in Dia. 8 as a ko threat, White would counter with the superb tesuji of 2 and 4. Black would collapse in the sequence to 8 in Dia. 9.



Dia. 8



Dia. 9


6: retakes

White 44. White has no ko threats. Since Black has one more at 47, he answers once at 45. However, he must ignore White 50 and finish off the ko with 51.


Black 53. A most interesting idea. Miyamoto comments that he would never find this kind of move by himself. The conventional idea here is shown in Dia. 10.

Dia. 10. (next page). If Black 1, White captures a stone with 2 and 4. Black then

forces with 5 and defends at 7 (or 'a'). This gives Black excellent shape, but the capture at 'b' will not be sente, as White will be alive after White 'c', Black 'd'.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11
4: elsewhere




Figure 4 (54 – 73)

Figure 4 (54 – 73). Favourable for White

After Black 59, circumstances are a little different from Dia. 10, as capturing with 1 and 3 in Dia. 11 is now sente for Black.

White 60. Since he loses sente anyway, White prefers to avoid Dia. 11. White 60 is a big move in itself and it also makes White 62 sente. With Black 63, the fight arising from Gennan's trick move finally comes to a conclusion. The result of this fight is favourable for White and already Black has lost the advantage of the first

move.

White 64. Defending against Black 'a'.


Black 65 prevents the four stones to the right from coming under attack. It also makes miai of an extension up the left side and the pincer at 67.

White 68. To prevent Black 'b' or 'c'.

Black 69 is natural; building influence with Black 'd' would be of little use here.

White 70, forestalling an attack by Black at 'e', is a good, calm move. It also offers some encouragement to the stone at the top.

Black 71 makes it difficult for White to move out with his stone at the top, while also aiming at the invasion at 'c'. Kitani comments that using 71 to attack at 1 in Dia. 12 would not worry White, as building up his moyo on the left with 2 to 8 would be satisfactory. Note that White 2 in this diagram would also be a good answer if Black played 71 at 'd' in the figure.



Dia. 12

White 72. A superb move which aims at attaching at 'f' and invading at 'g'. If Black defends against White 'f' with 1 in Dia. 13, White jumps into the side with 2. Black resists with 3 etc., but he loses the semeai after 18 by one move.

Black 73 starts a strong counterattack. Black 'h' would defend against the double threat of White 72, but Shusaku would not play such a spiritless move.

Figure 5 (74 – 100). Gennan's superb play

White 76. If a hane one point below, Black would of course cut at 76.






Figure 5 (74 – 100)



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

White 78. Letting Black push down at 78 would be unbearable. The point of the 73–77 combination is that if White plays 80 at 81, Black can now save himself with Black 80, White 82, Black ‘a’.

Black 81. Ishida comments that Black cannot resist with 1 in Dia. 14, as he would collapse when White counterattacks with 2 and 4.

White 82 creates excellent thickness which soon proves very useful.

Black 83. Defending at 96 would be solid but too slow. Black has to play more vigorously to have any chance of winning, which is why he forces with 83 to 87, then invades at 89. Incidentally, Black 89 was the last move of the first day’s play, which was held at the residence of Tsuji


Chujiro, a well-known go patron, in Tennoji, Osaka. It was the custom for play to be suspended on White’s move and he also had the privilege of choosing the time. The second day’s play was held at the residence of Gensai Ichiro and the third at the residence of Nakanoshima Kamiya, at a go meeting organised by Nakagawa Junsetsu.

White 90, exploiting the aji of 96, is a move White has been aiming at for some time.


Black plays 93 to stop White from getting an easy connection with White ‘b’, but next he has to connect on top at 95. Instead –

Dia. 15. If Black connects at 1, White plays 2 and 4, then cuts at 6. If Black 7, White hanes at 8 and Black cannot cut at ‘a’. Since Black collapses, he cannot answer 6 at 7. The sequence in this diagram was made possible by White’s thick move at 82 in the figure.


Dia. 16. Note that if White cuts at 4 before giving atari at 6, the liberty filled at 5 makes a difference, as Black can now counter with the combination of



Dia. 15



Dia. 16



Dia. 17

7 and 9. This time, if White plays 'a', Black can cut at 'b'. The order of moves is important. When White follows the correct order in Dia. 15 –

Dia. 17. If Black 5 instead of 5 in Dia. 15, White gives way at 6, then cuts at 8, threatening both 'a' and 'b'. Black could hardly play a ko with Black 7 at 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', because White would have too many ko threats at 'f'.

White 96. Since White has assured himself of life with 'b', he first of all makes some forcing moves. White 96 is a sacrifice which he exploits to the maximum.

Gennan Inseki's play in this figure has been superb. He has not made a single misstep in his response to Shusaku's challenge with 73 in Figure 4, so the latter is still fighting an uphill battle.

Figure 6 (101 – 125). A sente squeeze

White 4. A clever move which ensures White the sente squeeze to 10. If White simply played 4 at 5, then after Black 4, he would have to defend at 7, thus losing sente. If he omitted 7, then Black would cut with Black 6, White 7, Black 'a'.

White 14. If at 18, Black will play 17 at 'b', which would be sente and also help his stone to the left.

Black 19. If Black simply jumps to 21, White will force with 'c', Black 'd', White 'e'.

White 20. White 'e' would just give Black a good move at 'f'.

White 22 and Black 23 are miai. Ishida Yoshio comments that instead of 22,




Figure 6 (101 – 125)

he would prefer to play at 'g'; if then Black 'h', White could defend at 'i'.






Figure 7 (126 – 127)

Figure 7 (126 – 127). The ear-reddening move

White 26. Played to forestall Black 1 in Dia. 18, which would nicely link up Black's weak stones and also give him the sente continuation of 3 and 5 for later. White would lose the placement at 'a' at which he is aiming, so Black's corner



Dia. 18.2: elsewhere




Dia. 19

territory would be secure.


Before discussing Black 27, let us look at the alternatives. Kitani Minoru offers the following three diagrams.

Dia. 19. The instinctive response to White Δ would be to cut with 1 and 3. However, White would be satisfied with playing 2, as it fixes up his shape. That is, if Black plays 'a', White connects at 'b' and now Black 'c' will not be sente. White could then switch to 4 at the top, the largest territorial move, and wait for a suitable opportunity to escape with Δ . This result would probably leave Black feeling a little uneasy.

Dia. 20. White does not have to play 2 in the previous diagram, as he can also give way with 2 here, then block at 4. Cutting at 5 is bad shape and makes Black's stones heavy. Kitani hypothesises the continuation to 18, which would be perfect for White. Black's wall to 17 has no effect on the white stones to the right, while White's group at the bottom is alive as it stands. If Black 'a', White gives way with 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'. White could also



Dia. 20



Dia. 21

play 12 at 'e', aiming next to attack Black in the centre.

Dia. 21. Black 1 and 3, forestalling White 4 and 6 in Dia. 19, would be very big, but White's attack with 6 to 10 would punish Black for neglecting the centre. Black would not be able to face this fight with confidence.

As the above diagrams show, Black was faced with a very difficult position. Up to this point, Gennan must have been quite satisfied with the development of the game. However, Shusaku answered White 26 with a move of genius, a move which for its brilliance and profundity will be remembered as long as go is played.

Black 27 is the move which has made this game immortal. Nakagawa Junsetsu and a number of Gennan's other disciples, together with some local go fans, were following the progress of the game and analysing it in another room at Gensai Ichiro's residence. Not one of the go professionals doubted that Gennan was winning, but a doctor who had been watching the game commented that he thought Gennan would lose. When pressed to give his reason, he replied:

'I don't know much about go, but when Shusaku played 27, Gennan's ears flushed red. This is a sign that he had been upset. This move must have taken him by surprise.'

Black 27 is the central point for attack and defence. It lightly parries White's attack at 26, it offers assistance to the four black stones below, it expands Black's moyo at the top, it erases the influence of White's thickness to the right and finally it also aims at reducing White's territory on the left side. In short, the influence of Black 27 is radiated all over the board. It is the kind of move a player only makes once in a lifetime.

This is not to say, of course, that Black 27 immediately gives Black a lead, but in retrospect it can clearly be seen to be the turning point. From here on Black gradually wrests the initiative from White's hands and the whole flow of the game changes.

Figure 8 (128 – 160). An even game

White 28. Kitani comments that if White pushes up at 2 in Dia. 22, Black 3 would be just right for securing a connection. If White played 'a' instead of 2, reinforcing his group and preparing for an attack on the black group, Black would just ignore him and invade at 'b' on the left. Once Black has occupied the key point of 1, any attack by White on the stones below becomes too small in scale to worry





Figure 8 (128 – 160)




Dia. 22

about.


Black 31 is natural. Defending at 'a' would be petty: White would play at 33 and take the lead again.

White 36 is a superb move; it aims at attacking the black groups below and on the left, while also holding Black's moyo in check. This is the second brilliant move adjacent to the tengen.

Black 39 invites White 41, which would set up Black 'b'. White answers at 40, however, as he has his eye on Black's bottom left corner.



Dia. 23



Dia. 24

Black 41. The last move on the second day.

White 42. White 50 would also be an excellent move, but White has been aiming at 42 since he played 26 in Figure 7. In reply to 42 –

Dia. 23. If Black connects at 2, White takes profit with 3 and 5.


Dia. 24. If Black counterattacks with 4, White has the tesuji of 5. If Black 6, White plays 7 to 11, making miai of 'a' and 'b'. Note that Black 8 at 10 would be bad, as White would give atari at 8.

Black 43. Since Black has no good answer to 42, he counterattacks with 43. For his part, White does not want to answer 43 submissively at 'c', for if he later follows *Dia. 23*, 'c' will be superfluous, so he in turn counterattacks with 44. This leads to the third major clash of the game.


White 50. If White plays 1 in *Dia. 25*, Black plays 2, then cuts at 4. If White persists in his attack by answering Black 8 at 9, Black cuts with 10 and 12 and wins the semeai after 18. There are other variations, but cutting at 4 is the crucial move. Playing Black 2 at 5, attempting to live here, does not work, as after White 4–Black 'a', White cuts at 'b'. Just for reference, Kitani Minoru offers another variation in the following diagram.

Dia. 26. Black gives atari with 4 and 6, sacrificing his four stones on the right in return for capturing four white stones with 10 and 12. This exchange would be favourable for Black.

Black 55. White cannot cut at 'd' because of Black 'e', White 'f', Black 'g'.



Dia. 25




Dia. 26

White 56 looks strange, but this forcing move has to be played now. If Black gets a chance to play 'c' first, he would answer 56 at 'h' instead of 57.

White 58 is essential – imagine a black stone there.

White 60. White cannot cut at 1 in *Dia. 27* because of Black 2 to 6.



Dia. 27





Figure 9 (161 – 200)



Dia. 28

Figure 9 (161 – 200). Shusaku takes the lead.

Black 61 does not completely capture the two white stones — they still have a lot of aji, as we shall see later — but Black is also aiming at White's centre group. White has to reinforce with 62 and 64, so Black is able to defend with 63 and 65.


Black 63. Black 1 in Dia. 28 would be unreasonable. White plays 2 and 4, then if Black 5, captures the other stones with 6.

Reviewing the flow of the game since the 'ear-reddening' move, it seems clear that despite his preoccupation with the centre, White has achieved very little there. Whatever he does there, his shape remains thin and exposed to attack. Ishida Yoshio


sums it up as follows: 'It is interesting to compare the result to 65 in this figure with the result in Figure 6. There White exchanged the extension to 22 for Black's capture with 23 and 25. We now find that Black has captured that extension with 61, needless to say, a terrible loss for White. White's only gain is his connection on the side with 62 and 64, but in exchange Black has walled off the top centre with 63 and 65. Black has thus lost virtually nothing, so he must have upset White's lead.'

Black 67 is correct. If Black greedily connected at 1 in Dia. 29, White would get a ko with the sequence to 16. Instead of 11 —


Dia. 30. If Black 11 here, he loses the fight after 14 by one move.




Dia. 29



Dia. 30




Dia. 31



Dia. 32

Instead of Dia. 29, White could also set up the ko in Dia. 31, using the tesuji of 6 and 8. If Black 9 at 10, White plays 'a', so Black has to play at 9. Next, after White 10 —

Dia. 32. Black has to connect at 1, letting White get a ko with 2 to 10. This would be an approach move ko for White, but Black would have much more at stake.



Dia. 33

Black 81. Defending against White 'a'.

White 82 is a frightening move which forces Black to compromise with 83. Instead –

Dia. 33. If Black carelessly answers at 2, he falls into a trap. White forces with 3, threatening White 'a', then cuts at 5, exploiting Black's shortage of liberties. Black must forestall White 'b' with 6, but then White counters with 7 and 9. Black has no answer to White 11: if Black 'c', then White 'd'; if Black 'd', White takes the ko at 9.


White 84 is a thick move. If White connected at 85, Black would connect at 'a' and have the threat of 'b'.

White 86 is a sacrifice to set up White 90. Once again Black cannot intercept.

Dia. 34. If Black 2, White forces with 3 to 7, then hanes at 9. If Black 10, then White 11; if Black 'a', the ko with White 'b' would be unreasonable for Black, so he has to fill in a liberty with 12. However, White picks up the tail end of his group with 13 to 19, as Black does not have time to connect at 3.

Figure 10 (201 – 250). A safe lead

Black 5. Black does not need to play a ko with 6. His lead is small but irreversible.



Dia. 34




Figure 10 (201 – 250)
ko: 32, 37, 40, 43, 46, 49

Black 13, 15. Making this eye means that Black will not have to reinforce at the top later on (that is, against a cut at 'a').

White 36. If omitted, Black can play 'b' in sente, forcing White 'c' (without 'c', White would have no answer to Black 36). That would represent a gain of a good two points for Black, but Ishida considers that the game would have been closer if White had finished off the ko instead of 36.




Figure 11 (251 – 300)

ko: 55, 58, 61, 64, 67, 70, 73, 76, 79, 82, 85, 88, 91, 94, 97, 100

Figure 11 (251 – 300), Figure 12 (301 – 325)

Gennan Inseki's mortification at losing can perhaps be seen in the fact that he persisted for so long in a ko which he could not hope to win. It is easy to understand why he was upset, for the first half of this game was a masterpiece for him. His opening was brilliant and he seemed to be having everything his own way. However, that only makes Shusaku's determined effort to catch up all the more praiseworthy. Starting with Black 127, the second half of the game is a masterpiece for Shusaku. Between them, the two players created a classic.

Black wins by 2 points.

Four days after the conclusion of the above game, Gennan Inseki played the second game with Shusaku on black. The game, which is given on the right, was discontinued. As with their opening two-stone game, it is obvious that Shusaku had an easy win, so it is not surprising that Gennan did not feel like playing it out.




Figure 12 (301 – 325)

ko: 6, 9; 11: connects; 23: connects (right of 21); Black wins the ko and connects below 25.

White: Gennan Inseki

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku

Date: 28th July, 1846

Played at the residence of Tsuji Chujiro




Figure 1 (1 – 59)

Play suspended after 59 moves.

Game Fifteen: Shusaku v. Gennan Inseki (1846)

Commentary by Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan

This is the final game of the series between Gennan Inseki and Shusaku. After suffering his second loss in the fourth game (given in Part Two), this was Gennan's last chance to secure a win against this surprisingly formidable rival. Gennan obviously realised by now that Shusaku was no ordinary player — in later years he is supposed to have said that Shusaku at this time was already easily 7-dan in strength — but Gennan was noted for his indomitable self-confidence and he doubtless believed that if he really exerted himself, he was still more than a match for a seventeen year old, however precocious.

White: Gennan Inseki 8-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 4-dan

Date: 4th, 5th August, 1846

287 moves. Black wins by 2 points.





Figure 1 (1 – 21)


Figure 1 (1 – 21). Shusaku's flexibility

White 10 to 14 reduce the severity of an invasion by Black at 'a'. Simply defending with White 10 at 'b' would be too mild for Gennan.


White 16. Not yet a standard move in this period. The low move at 'c' would give Black an ideal pincer at 'd'. According to the conventional fuseki wisdom of the time, White 16 is inadvisable because in the josekis in Dias. 1 and 2, Black gets more



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Dia. 3

territory than White. The joseki in Dia. 3 (Black 5 is also played at 'a') is different, because White 6 becomes an effective extension. However, this joseki was not developed until the twentieth century.

Black 21. Not joseki, but the appropriate move here, since the bottom is the crucial area for both sides. Black 21 shows Shusaku's flexibility. Instead —


Dia. 4. Black 1, preventing White 'a', is big, but White would play all-out with 4. Following joseki would thus lead to Black's falling behind overall.

Dia. 5 (next page). The hane at 1 would




Dia. 4

also lead to White's taking the vital point of 10. Note that White 8 is a good move here, as if White followed joseki with White 8 at 'a', Black 9, White 'b', Black would get to play at the bottom first.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

bottom left, but although this would make White very thick, Black 2, in concert with the stone at the centre bottom (Black 21), would negate just about all of White's influence. White 1, therefore, is just what Black wants.

Black 39. A crucial move: Black of course is thinking of the cut at 'd'. Another possibility for 39 is pressing at 42.

Dia. 7. If Black presses at 1 and 3, White is satisfied to take territory with the joseki to 22. If Black then cuts at 23, White answers with 24 to 28, then caps at 30. Playing this way might not get Black enough territory.

White 40. White has to answer Black




Figure 2 (22 – 47)


37: connects

Figure 2 (22 – 47). Departing from joseki

Black 23. Black 29—White 23 would be too submissive.

White 30. When the ladder is favourable, White plays 'a', Black 22, White 33. However, when White plays the joseki to 36, making the White 'a'—Black 22 exchange is bad, the reason being that if White later plays 'b', the follow-up at 'c' loses its effectiveness.

White 38. A good move which illustrates Gennan's strength and his flexibility. White 1 in Dia. 6 completes the joseki in the



Dia. 7

aggressively; White 42 or 44 would not be good enough.




Figure 3 (48 – 70)

Figure 3 (48 – 70). Concerning the cut


White 48 is an unusual move: in the standard joseki, White makes the White 54 – Black 55 exchange first (as in the Jowa – Akaboshi Intetsu game given in Chapter One). Instead of 48 –

Dia. 8. If White follows the usual joseki with 1, the continuation to 9 is probable. Black might then build up thickness with 10 and 12, or alternatively he could make a severe invasion with 10 at ‘a’. Presumably Gennan wanted to avoid a result like this.


White 56 is a good move. If White connected at ‘a’, as in the Jowa – Intetsu game, then he would be forced to defend at 56 after Black jumped to 57, so he would fall a move behind. White wants sente to push up at 58.

White 60. Essential: once Black has played 59, a cut at 60 would make White very thin. For example –

Dia. 9. If White defends the top with 1, Black 2 would be severe. If the sequence to 8 follows, there would be quite a difference from Dia. 7 – specifically, the



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

presence of Black 49 and 59 in the figure, so White’s overall position would be much weaker. Black would have all the good moves; for example, attacking the groups at the bottom and on the left, or invading on the right. White 60 is therefore necessary, though it gives Black the chance to make a severe invasion at 61.

Black 63 is correct shape: pushing up at ‘b’ would be very bad. Since White is going to play 64 anyway, it is better for 63 to be separated from it. Even so, the position looks difficult for Black, as he has to let White split him into two with 66, something which is normally taboo. Black accepts it here because he is aiming at the attack with 67 and 69.





Figure 4 (71 – 100)




Dia. 10

Figure 4 (71 – 100). Gennan's tesuji

Black 71. Black is hoping for White 1 in Dia. 10. Black discards his two stones at the top, but in return captures two white stones with 4 and 6. This would be an excellent result for Black.

White 72. A superb tesuji. If Black 'a', White 77 becomes sente, so White would be able to capture the stones at the top with 74 while also preventing Black from cutting. Black is thus forced to answer at 73. The moves to 79 follow and there is a big difference from Dia. 10, as White is left with a large move at 'a', enabling him to capture four stones with 'b'. Since White is left with this additional profit and since he also takes sente, the overall position seems to be slightly favourable for him. In other words, Gennan has skilfully parried Shusaku's attack.




Dia. 11

Black 89 is a fierce move. Considering that the eye-shape of his group at the top right has been threatened by White 86, one might expect Black to defend peacefully at 1 in Dia. 11. Shusaku obviously concluded that the game would be too unfavourable for him if White were allowed to build up his moyo with 2. Defending with other moves, for example, Black 1 at 'a', would be no better.


White 90 is the natural counterattack. White 'c', letting Black connect underneath with 'd', is of course out of the question. White 90 at 99 would also be wrong, as it would give Black a perfect continuation at 'e'. White's lead is very, very small, so he cannot afford to ease the pressure for an instant.

White 94 is correct shape: attaching at 'f' or 'g' would only help Black.

Black 95 is aiming at the 1–3 combination in Dia. 12. If White 4, Black 5



Dia. 12



Dia. 13


and 7 cut off five white stones which would have trouble escaping through the centre. Instead of 4 –

Dia. 13. White 4 here is bad because of Black 5.


White therefore has no choice about defending at 98, though forcing first with 96 is well-timed.

White 100. The only move, though White collapses if Black can cut at 'c'.

Dia. 14. If Black 1, the moves to 4 are forced. Black has just two continuations: 'a' and 'b'.



Dia. 14




Dia. 15

this way.


Dia. 16. If Black tries 1 here, White lives with 2 to 6. If Black 7, White reinforces with 8, then seals Black in with 10. If Black attacks his eye-shape with 11 and 13 –

Dia. 17. White ensures himself of life with the double ko to 24. Black collapses, so instead of 15 –


Dia. 18. He might try capturing two stones with 1, but then White has the tesuji of 2. If 3 and 5, it's all over after 6, so instead of 3 –



Dia. 18




Dia. 16



Dia. 17

Dia. 15. If Black 1, White counters with the warikomi of 2, after which the sequence to 10 is inevitable. Since 'a' and 'b' are miai for White, Black cannot play



Dia. 19

Dia. 19. Black has to connect at 1, letting White connect at 2. If Black 5, White peeps at 6 and wins the semeai.

The conclusion is that at present

Black cannot cut at 'c'.

Figure 5 (101 – 128). A judicious exchange

Black 1 is the vital point. It may seem to be attacking the white group at the bottom, but more important is the fact that it invalidates all of White's sequences in Dias. 14 to 19. White now has to defend against the cut at 'a', so White 2, attacking the black group, is essential.

Black extends once at 3, then initiates an exchange of groups with 5. This strategy shows sound positional judgement, for if Black kept on trying to save his group at the top, White would keep the initiative and little by little would consolidate his lead. Although White captures more stones than Black, the exchange seems satisfactory when one remembers that the white group at the bottom was originally part of a white moyo.

Black 9. Connecting at 1 in Dia. 20 would be bad, as White would counter with 2 to 6.

White 12. White's aim is to split Black and to make some white territory in the centre. An alternative would be to reduce Black's bottom area with 'b'.

White 18 threatens White 'c'.





Figure 5 (101 – 128)



Dia. 20

White 20 is aiming at White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f'. Black responds with 21, which is a big move in itself and which also secures eye-shape for this group. Perhaps White should have exchanged White 21 for Black 'g' instead of playing 20, though that would have lost the threat of White 'd' etc.

White 22. The game will be decided by how well White does in the centre.

White 24 creates the threat of White 'h' after White 'd'—White 'f'.


White 26. Simply trying to surround the centre is not enough: Black would be able to reduce it sufficiently to win.

Black 27. Defending at 'i' would be peaceful, but this time Black is not confident that that would be enough to win. The first one to ease up will lose.

White 28. A severe move.

Figure 6 (129 – 160). Black plays safe.

Black 29. If Black resists with 2 and 4 in Dia. 22, White cuts at 5 and captures Black in the sequence to 11. There are other variations, but whatever happens, Black 2 is unreasonable. Black is thus forced to compromise with 29 and 31 in the figure.



Dia. 22




Figure 6 (129 – 160)
ko: 42





Figure 7 (161 – 200)
ko: 77, 80, 83, 86, 89, 92, 95, 98



Dia. 23

White 32 is a sacrifice to set up a squeeze in the centre.

White 36. White 1 in Dia. 23 does not work when Black answers at 2. White can cut with 3, but he loses the semeai after 6. With 36, White starts the ko he has been aiming at for some time.

White 40 forces Black to defend at 41, but Black is happy to play there anyway, as 41 prevents White from attaching at 'a' and also aims at pushing through at 'b'.

White 48 is a probe. If Black answers at 50, White is left with the aji of White 'c', Black 'd', White 54. Black answers cautiously with 49 to 59.

White 60. If at 'e', Black answers at 'f'.

Figure 7 (161 – 200). Ko fight
Black 71. Jumping in at 72 might be better.






Figure 8 (201 – 250)
ko: 4, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 31, 34, 37, 40, 43, 46, 49

Figure 8 (201 – 250). Not enough ko threats

White 8. White could capture Black with White 'a', Black 'b', White 9, but since



Dia. 24



Dia. 25

Black would be able to push through at 8, White would not gain anything.

Black 9 is necessary. If omitted –

Dia. 24. White can play 1. Black seems to be connected with 2, but after 3 and 5 –

Dia. 25. White has a clever cut at 7. White 11 makes miai of 'a' and 'b'.

The continuation after Black 9 seems inevitable, so perhaps it was at this point that Black secured the game. White starts the ko again, but he does not have enough ko threats. Eventually he has to give way with 50.

Figure 9 (251 – 287)

Black wins by 2 points.




Figure 9 (251 – 287)

This final win meant that Shusaku remained undefeated in the five-game series, although only three games were completed. Word promptly reached Edo of Shusaku's feat and this was the real beginning of his reputation. Poor Gennan Inseki had suffered yet another setback at the hands of the Honinbo house.

In March 1855, the two played one more game. Gennan had retired in 1849, so it was not a serious game – perhaps Gennan was just curious to see for himself how Shusaku had progressed. Shusaku, taking black, forced Gennan to resign after 219 moves (Game Sixty-Four). To the last, Gennan was unable to prevail against Shusaku.

6. Heir to the Honinbo House

When Shusaku returned to Edo, in late September 1846, he met with a warm welcome. First of all, he was promoted to 5-dan; secondly, he was requested to become the heir to Shuwa. The current Honinbo, Josaku, was in sickly health, and though his own heir, Shuwa, had already been decided, it was thought just as well to choose Shuwa's heir as well. Jowa, Josaku and Shuwa conferred and not surprisingly decided on Shusaku. However, as related in Chapter Two, Shusaku refused the honour because of his sense of obligation to his benefactors, especially the Lord of Mihara, from whom he was receiving a stipend. The Honinbo house did not give up, but set intermediaries to work to obtain the sanction of the Mihara clan. They were successful, so Shusaku finally accepted the offer, probably early in 1847. This was none too soon, for Josaku and Jowa died in quick succession, in August and October of that year. Shuwa became the 14th Honinbo on Josaku's death, and on the 22nd November, 1848, Shusaku was officially recognised by the government as Shuwa's heir. He played his first castle games in November of the following year.

Game Sixteen: Shusaku v. Shuwa (1846)

Between October 1846 and September 1847 Shusaku played seventeen games on black against Shuwa (the detailed results are given in the introduction to Game Two). Shuwa probably regarded it as a training series for his proposed heir; if so, he must have been more than satisfied with the results, for Shusaku performed brilliantly, winning thirteen of the seventeen games. Moreover, he played his newly-developed Shusaku fuseki pattern in many of them, so, in effect, he had the cooperation of the top player of the day, Shuwa, in perfecting it. The game below is the second of the series.

White: Honinbo Shuwa 7-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan

Date: 21st October, 1846

141 moves. White resigns.

Commentary by Kajiwara Takeo 9-dan

Figure 1 (1 – 11). A counter-pincer

Black 11. If at 'a', White intends to extend to 'b'. If instead Black plays 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', White would probably extend all the way to 'f'.




Figure 1 (1 – 11)





Figure 2 (12 - 40)




Dia. 1


Figure 2 (12 - 40). The alternatives for White 24

Black 13. Invading the instant White extends to 12 shows excellent timing. After the joseki to 21, the position of White 12 somehow seems a little inefficient, a little heavy. The modern approach would be to play 12 at 'a', which would be lighter and easier to look after.


When White has extended in the direction of 12 from the takamoku (5-4) stone, invading at the 3-3 point is correct. If Black played 13 at 1 in Dia. 1, White would press at 2, then counterattack with 4. After the standard joseki to 34, the six black stones on the left side (3-23) become heavy and will prove to be quite a burden on Black. For that reason, Black always invades at the 3-3 point




Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5


when White has extended down the side.

Black 19 is joseki. Black could capture a stone with 1 etc. in Dia. 2, but then he would be unable to resist White 8, so White would squeeze in sente, then extend to 14.


White 24. White could also press at 1 in Dia. 3, but after the sequence to 9, Black would erase White's moyo by attaching at 10. This way Black would take all the profit. Instead of 1 –

Dia. 4. The combination of 1 and 3 might seem more solid, but Black would probably switch lightly to 4. If White 5, Black blocks at 6; if White cuts at 7, Black counters with the tesuji of 8 etc., breaking through to the outside. This result would be bad for White. Instead of 5 –

Dia. 5. White could try the hane at 5, but Black would still have no trouble settling himself with 6 to 10. This result is also uninteresting for White. In-



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

stead of 7 –

Dia. 6. A final alternative worth considering is pushing along on top with 7. If Black 8, White can gouge out his base with the placement at 9. However, this does not secure a favourable result either, as Black takes the initiative with 12 and 14.

The conclusion is that sliding into the corner with 24 seems to be the most appropriate strategy here.

Black 27 is the solid kind of move typical of Shusaku. White 28 is a carefully worked out response; Black has to play 29 and 31 to prevent White from seizing the vital point of 31. White 32 is then obligatory to prevent Black from attacking at 36.

Figure 3 (41 – 85). Clash in the centre

Black 45. Black 1 in Dia. 7 is worth more territorially, but it leaves some bad aji. White 2, aiming at the aji of 'a', becomes a good move. Black 45 is the honte (proper move).

Black 55. Not at 'a', as White will take the lead into the centre with 'b'.

Black 57. The last large point: Black is leading.

Black 59 is the vital point for erasing the centre moyo; it also aims at attaching at 'c'.

White 60, 62. White is staking the game on this centre fight.

Black 65. The tesuji for sabaki in this shape. Connecting at 2 in Dia. 8 would make Black heavy and give White a good






Figure 3 (41 – 85)

81: ko



Dia. 8



Dia. 9.

continuation at 3.

Black 69 – 71. Another important sabaki tesuji – Black moves out faster than he would if he just played 71 at 72.

White 76. If White connects at 1 in Dia. 9, Black will connect at 2. White cannot cut at 3, as Black catches him in a geta. Fighting a ko with 80 is therefore correct. Note that Black cannot afford to answer White 76, as that would give White too many ko threats when the ko fight starts.

White 82. Shuwa commented that this move was bad. Black's ponnuki at 83 virtually settles the game.

Black 85. Shuwa: 'Black should exchange 'd' for White 'e' first.'




Figure 4 (86 – 113)





Figure 5 (114 – 141)



Dia. 10

Figure 4 (86 – 113). White's moyo is destroyed.

White 94. If White answers Black's second invasion with 1 in Dia. 10, Black has a tough move at 4. White can do nothing.

White 102. Being forced to connect like this is very painful for White. The continuation to 110 is inevitable. When Black forces with 111, then connects at 113, the game is over.


Figure 5 (114 – 141). A final test

White's moves in this figure are more or less perfunctory: he knows that he has no chance of winning. However, he does pose one last problem for Black with White 40, to which Black makes the correct answer at 41.


Dia. 11. If Black plays 41 at 1 here, White gets a second eye with 2 and 4.

White has no answer to Black 41.

Dia. 12. If White takes two stones



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

with 1, Black 2 prevents him from connecting.

This game was a solid win for Black: he was never in trouble.

White resigns after Black 141.

Game Seventeen: Shusaku v. Jowa (1847)

Although Shusaku entered the Honinbo school as a disciple of the 12th Honinbo, Jowa (then also Meijin godokoro), the only recorded game between the two was not played until 1847, eight years after Jowa had resigned from the post of Meijin godokoro and retired as Honinbo. The occasion of the game was a party celebrating the promotion of a Honinbo disciple named Toyooka to 3-dan. Since Jowa was a former Meijin, the correct handicap for Shusaku was two stones, but considering how well the latter was doing at this time against Shuwa just on black, it comes as no surprise to find that giving him two stones proved to be too much even for Jowa.

White: Jowa

2 stones: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan
Date: 13th February, 1847; played at the Kawachiya restaurant in Ryogoku, Edo
Play suspended after 94 moves.

Commentary by Fujisawa Hosai and Ishida Yoshio

satisfactory for White, as his stones are heavy, while Black has settled his stones on both sides. The redeeming feature for White is that he gets sente to play 17.

Black 18 and 20 have a modern feeling; Black's strategy is to expand his position at the bottom through attacking the weak white group to the right.

White 21. Just a little unreasonable, but this kind of forceful attack was Jowa's forte. Presumably he felt that aggression was called for in a handicap game.

Black 26 is more severe than jumping to 37. Black is not afraid of the cut.

White 27 – 31. These moves help Black to secure the bottom, but they are a necessary preparation for cutting with 35 and 37.

Black 38 is a superb, unhurried answer to the cut. Perhaps White should have given atari at 38 before playing 35 and 37.

Black 40. Black could also cut at 1 in Dia. 1, but White would squeeze with 2 to 8, then capture the black stone with 10.





Figure 1 (1 – 40)

Figure 1 (1 – 40). Jowa departs from joseki.

White 9 is most unusual, the standard joseki being White 'a', while pressing at 15 became popular in a later period. Perhaps Jowa lightheartedly departed from joseki because this was not a serious game. However, the result to 16 is not very



Dia. 1 9: connects

He would then have the threat of the ko with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'. Living simply with 40 is best.




Figure 2 (41 – 62)

Figure 2 (41 – 62). Shusaku's aggressive play

White 41. Capturing Black by playing at 50 would be safer, but Black would play 'a' and get too far ahead in territory.


Black 42 – 48. Black creates a cutting point in White's shape at 'b' and prepares to attack the white group at the bottom.

Black 50 is a strong move: Black is aiming at the cut at 52, but depending on White's answer, he is also prepared to sacrifice these stones if he can cut at 'b'.

White 51 is defensive: White could capture Black by playing at 57, but then cutting at 'b' would be just right for Black.

White 53–Black 54. A painful exchange for White, but necessary as it makes the difference of a liberty in the coming semeai.

Black 60 and 62 show that Black has completely read out the fight here. Black could compromise with 1 in Dia. 2, but



Dia. 2

that would let White live with 2 to 6. This result would be adequate for Black, but instead he wants to capture the whole white group.




Figure 3 (63 – 94)

77: ko

Figure 3 (63 – 94). The wrong handicap

White 67. White cannot block at 68 because of Black 71, White 'a', Black 70, White connects, Black 'b'. Black 66 and 68 do not increase Black's liberties, but they create a cutting point at 'c'.

After Black 72 the semeai is a ko, but since White has no ko threats, he attacks at 73 in order to create some. If he played at 'd', Black would capture at 74, then ignore any ko threat White made. As it is, Black ignores White 73 anyway.

When Black dissolves the ko with 78,

the game is over. After cutting at 80, Black has nearly a hundred points at the bottom. White goes for an enormous moyo at the top with 93, but he cannot hope to kill the invader at 94. Jowa was reputed to be the strongest fighter in the classical period, but it is obvious that

not even he could give Shusaku two stones. Jowa of course was well aware of this — he had been one of the first to appreciate Shusaku's talent — and this game was just played for amusement.

Play suspended after Black 94.

Game Eighteen: Shusaku v. Takegawa Yasaburo (1847)

Takegawa Yasaburo was a low-ranking retainer (gokenin) of the shogun who was also a go-player, having been a disciple of Jowa. Nothing is known about his go career except that he was promoted to 5-dan in 1849. He played a half dozen or so games with Shusaku in the late 1840's, his best effort being the following game.

White: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan
Black: Takegawa Yasaburo 4-dan
 Date: 28th February, 1847
 149 moves. White resigns.
Commentary by Kubomatsu Katsukiyo 8-dan




Figure 1 (1 – 32)

Figure 1 (1 – 32). *Aji in the corner*

White 8. White 'a' would complete the Shusaku-style fuseki pattern, but it would be too slow for White.

Black 17. Black settles his group im-


mediately so that he can be free to start a fight with 23.

White 22. If White made the high move at 'b', 'c' would become an excellent point for Black. When White plays 22, continuing on the right side (at 'd', for example) is not urgent for either side. The drawback of 22 is that Black can force with 'a', White 'e', Black 'f', White 'b'. The thickness created by this sequence would give Black valuable support in any attempt to reduce the white moyo at the top.


Black 25 looks like the only move, but actually Black could also descend at 26. White would get a ladder with 25, but Black could play a ladder-block at 'g'; if then White 'h', Black 'i', Black would be quite satisfied. Resisting Black 'g' with White 'i'—Black 'j'—White 'k'—Black 'h' might be unreasonable for White.

Permitting White 26 and 28 is painful for Black, as these moves strengthen the white moyo at the top and also leave Black with a weakness at 'l' after 31.


Dia. 1 (next page). If White 1, Black has to play 2; if White 3, Black can continue with 4 and 6, but when White plays in at 'a', Black will have to give up two



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

stones in order to secure life with 'b'. However, White might prefer to force with 'c' instead of playing 'a'. Instead of 4 –

Dia. 2. If Black 1, White 2; Black can play a ko with 3, but in the end he will probably have to play 5 to be sure of living, so White can capture two stones with 6. Alternatively, Black could play 3 at 5 immediately, giving up the two stones without resistance. Either way, the aji of this capture makes the white group below stronger than it looks.

Dia. 3. Black could also play 1, but White 2 would give a similar result to Dia. 2. If Black tried to save his two stones with 'a', his whole group would perish after White 'b'.

Figure 2 (33 – 100). Shusaku misses the vital point.

Black 37, forestalling White 'a', is well-timed. White has to reinforce at 38 and soon also finds it advisable to play 46 in order to prevent Black from attacking at the same point.

White 50. Essential – White cannot permit Black 84.

Black 53. More severe than 'b'.

White 54. Shusaku's comment: 'White 54 was very bad. White should have played at 71.' White 54 is correct shape, so Shusaku probably played there without thinking very deeply. However, the vital point for defending his group is 71. Black 55 is a splendid attacking move. It combines well with 53 and is evidence of Takegawa's talent.





Figure 2 (33 – 100)



Dia. 4

White 56. White 1 in Dia. 4 is unreasonable, as Black can cut with 2 and 4. White 56 to 60 are forced. Black secures his corner and gets a good continuation at 61, while 49 also turns out to be in just the right place. Black 55 has changed the flow of the game.

Black 73 is probably meant as a preliminary to peeping at 'c', but connecting at 75 would only make bad shape for White and let Black continue his attack with 'c'. White therefore decides on an exchange, but, needless to say, the result to 77 is excellent for Black.

Black 81. All Black has to do to win is to settle himself lightly on the right side.

Black 83. Preparation for 97 and 99.

Black 87. After Black 7 in Figure 3, it becomes clear that 87 is correct shape.

White 88 defends against Black 'd'.

Black 97 sets up a squeeze which solidifies Black's lead.





Figure 3 (101 – 149)

Figure 3 (101 – 149). White's last attack fails.

White 24. If at 25, Black will play at 24 and should be able to swallow up White 18 and 22. Black 25 is big, but White stakes everything on a final attack with 26.

Black 33. The exchange for 34, giving White the move at 36, might look harmful, but appearances are deceptive.

After Black 49, Black is not worried about White's cut at 'a', as he can counter



Dia. 5

with 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', threatening Black 'e' next. White would therefore have to play a ko with 'c' at 'f', but Black would have a lot of ko threats against the white group at the top left, while he would also have moves threatening to save his group, so White could not hope to win the ko.

Incidentally, if Black has not made the 33–34 exchange, we would get the ko in Dia. 5, but this would be more disagreeable for Black than the ko with White 'f' in the figure.

This game was decided by Shusaku's thoughtless move at 54 in Figure 2, but we must not take credit away from Takegawa. Although he is not very well-known, his skill in taking advantage of Shusaku's mistake shows that he was a player deserving of respect.

White resigns after Black 149.

Game Nineteen: Shusaku v. Yasui Sanchi (1847)

This is Shusaku's second game against Yasui Sanchi (1810 – 58), the 9th Yasui. Shusaku won their previous game (Game Seven), played in September 1843, but only after some very difficult and complicated fighting. This game is not quite as severe a test of Shusaku's middle game prowess.

White: Yasui Sanchi 7-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan

Date: 16th March, 1847

181 moves. White resigns.

Commentary by Fujisawa Shuko





Figure 1 (1 – 37)


Figure 1 (1 – 37). White makes a bad start.

Black 15. Black's strategy is to force White out into the centre and to move out at the same time himself.

White 18. White must peep before



Dia. 1



Dia. 2


Black plays 'a', because then Black would answer 18 at 'b'.

Black 23. If Black cuts with 1 and 3 in Dia. 1, White will push up with 4 to 10. Next, White threatens to hane at 'a' or to attack the four black stones above.

White 26. White might have found it easier to settle himself with 1 and 3 in Dia. 2. He would be left with a good move at 'a' for later.

When Black answers 28 at 29, White counters with 30, but this gives Black the chance to make a severe attack with 31 to 35. The result to 37 is excellent for Black, as he takes profit while preventing White from getting a base. Instead of 36 –

Dia. 3. White could take the corner with 1 to 5, but his stones below would be lost after Black 6.



Dia. 3




Figure 2 (38 – 78)

Figure 2 (38 – 78). White fights back.


Black 45. Exchanging Black 48 for White 'a' first would be a good idea. With that exchange made, Black 'b' would be a good continuation after Black 45, White 46.

White 56. White 63 would be a good, thick move, but Black would play at 59 and go ahead in territory.

White 62. If omitted, Black 'c' would threaten his eye-shape. Also, note that White must defend here before going through with the cut with 64 etc. Instead of 62 –

Dia. 4. If White cuts immediately, Black will not give up the two stones but will connect at 8. It turns out that White is surprisingly short of liberties, so the semeai after 18 is unfavourable for him. White could of course switch to defence by playing 11 at 'a', but in that case he would regret having strengthened Black by playing 1 and having weakened his own group at the bottom by playing 3 etc.

Black 63 makes Black thick, but fore-stalling the cut by descending at 68 would also be a good move. If then White 63, Black could escape with 'd' and look forward to attacking the white group to the right.



Dia. 4

Black 71. Saving the two stones by connecting at 72 would be bad; White would be grateful for the chance to secure a base on the side by capturing a stone with White 71 etc. Note that when White captures with 72, Black 59 is revealed to be an excellent forcing move.

Black 73 is a slack move: it has almost no effect on White. More severe would be attaching at 1 in Dia. 5. If White 2, Black could crosscut at 3; if then White 4, Black 5 would be severe.

When White fixes up his position with 74, he is right back in the game.

White 76 is the honte, but White 'e' would also be possible.

Figure 3 (79 – 110). White's overplay

Black 79 forestalls White 'a', Black 'b', White 79.




Figure 3 (79 – 110)

Black 81. Black 'c' would be bigger.

White 94 is an overplay; simply moving into the centre with White 97 would give a close game. This mistake, coming just as the middle game is winding up, makes it difficult for White to win.




Figure 4 (111 – 144)

Figure 4 (111 – 144). More mistakes

White 20 is too small: the game is lost for White when Black plays 21. Instead of 20 –


Dia. 6. White should crosscut at 1, then force with 3 and 5 before connecting at 7. This way the game would still be close.

White 32 only loses more points, as Black is able to live by capturing the white stone with 35.

White 44. An oversight? Black does not have to answer.

Figure 5 (145 – 181)

White resigns after Black 181.



Dia. 6




Figure 5 (145 – 181)

Game Twenty: Shusaku v. Shuwa (1847)

Commentary by Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan

This game was the ninth in the series of seventeen games that Shuwa and Shusaku played between October 1846 and September 1847. At this stage Shusaku was leading with seven wins to one loss, so normally the handicap would have been changed long before, but the modest Shusaku obstinately refused to take white against his teacher. This was of course a friendly series, but the ninth game stands out for the fierceness of the fighting. It is an intricate, innovative game in which the strong points of both Shusaku and Shuwa are shown to good advantage.

White: Honinbo Shuwa 7-dan
Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan
Date: 13th July, 1847
267 moves. Black wins by 1 point.

Figure 1 (1 – 13). Avoiding standard joseki

White 6. If at 'a', Black will play 'b'.

Black 7. One of the standard Shusaku patterns. This sets up Black 'c' next.

White 8. White 'd' is also possible.

Black 9. If Black follows the joseki in Dia. 1, White gets good shape on top with 6 to 12 (if White 6 at 7, Black plays 'a').

Black 11. Pulling back at 1 in Dias. 2 and 3 is also possible. White has two choices for his answer, but either way he







Figure 1 (1 – 13)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Dia. 3

will get central thickness (after Black 3 in Dia. 2, White can play 'a'). Black preferred to avoid this.

White 12 is aggressive – in the back of White's mind is the pressing move at 'b' in the top right corner.

Black 13 is the vital point. If Black extends at 1 in Dia. 4, White gets a good result on both sides with 2 and 4. Since in this result Black 'a' is sente, forcing White 'b', Black 1 should be at 'c'.



Dia. 4




Figure 2 (14 – 28)

Figure 2 (14 – 28). No compromise


White must prevent Black from playing at 14 by taking that point himself, so Black gets his chance to cut at 15. Connecting at 1 in Dia. 5 instead of 15 would be a quick way to lose the game. White would extend to 2, then gladly force with 4 and 6 if Black cut at 3. White 8 next would give White an excellent position and make pressing at 'a' in the figure a real threat.

White 18. White does not want to exchange White 19 for Black 'b', as that would sap the vitality of White Δ , which in turn would mean weakening the two white stones below.


Black 19 is natural when White omits to force here. White's aim with 20, however, is to use Δ to play forcing moves on this side.

Black has no choice about pushing through at 21 — he would dearly like to give atari at 22, but no good would come of it.


Dia. 6. If Black 1, Black has no satisfactory answer to White 2. Black 3 is obligatory, but then White gets another nice forcing move at 4. If Black omits 5, White plays White 'a', Black 'b', White 5.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

9: connects

Dia. 7. White also has the stylish move of 2 here. The result to 10 would be awful for Black.

For the above reasons, Black responds with 21. White now has to play 22.

Black 23 and 25 make miai of attacking at 26 at the bottom and striking at the vital point of 27.

White 26. It would be tempting to extend at 1 in Dia. 8, for this large-scale move would both mitigate the threat of Black 'a' and revive the threat of pressing at 'a' in the figure. However, this would give Black a good attacking move at 2 which would combine well with his bottom right corner enclosure.

White decides that defending his bottom group with 26 has greater priority, but that cedes the vital point of 27 to Black. This initiates a fierce clash which continues for over seventy moves. Black could also play 27 at 'c', but such a peaceful approach would have been out of character for the youthful Shusaku.

White 28. Shuwa matches Shusaku in fighting spirit — war has been declared. Timidly defending the cutting point with 'd' would only make bad shape.





Figure 3 (29 – 80)
ko: 47, 50, 57, 64, 77


Figure 3 (29 – 80). Ko struggle

Black 29 is natural. If Black defended at 1 in Dia. 9, he would be in for a difficult fight after the sequence to 6. Black 1 is a large point, but the centre is more important.

White 38. If White played at 52 to capture the three black stones, Black would counter with Black 53, White 54, Black 55, White 56, Black 40, forcing White to add a stone inside his captured area to live. That would be unbearable for White and in fact his whole strategy in the ko fight



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

which follows in the game is designed to avoid having to do so.

Black 43 is a probe to see whether White connects at 45 or captures at 44.

Dia. 10. If White plays at 1, Black forces with 2 and 4, then plays 6 in sente. If White omits 7, Black captures seven stones with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'. Permitting Black to play 6 in sente would be painful.

White 46. Connecting at 41, letting Black extend at 46, is of course out of the question.

White 52. Connecting at 41 would be solid but would have no effect on Black. Capturing three stones with 52 to 56 robs Black's bottom group of its eye-space.

White 58. White has no good way of reinforcing after Black 57, so he ignores it. So long as Black is under attack at the bottom, he will not have time to give atari at 'a'.

White 60 is such an excellent point that it raises the question of whether Black should have played there himself instead of taking the ko with 57. The exchange for 61 – outside for inside – is clearly favourable for White. Black 61 does not even make Black completely alive in the corner, though the complications of the ko fight prevent White from making a precipitate attempt to kill him.

Black 65. Since the focus of the game is the ko, living with a purely defensive move such as 78 would be too slow. Black hopes that attack will prove the best means of defence.

The moves to 75 are forced: Black succeeds in splitting White into two, though his corner group does not break through White's cordon. White could put the corner into ko (explained later), but at the moment he does not have enough ko threats.

White 76 and 80 are excellent points. Attacking White's centre group is out of the question after these moves, so it is time for Black to look after his corner.




Figure 4 (81 – 109)
84: connects the ko

Figure 4 (81 – 109). One fight ends ...

Permitting 81 means that White is determined to win the ko, that is, to ignore Black's ko threat, since 81 makes the ko too serious. This also fits in with Black's strategy, however, for he is able to pull out his corner group with 83 and 85. White was threatening to put the corner into ko with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', but fortunately for Black he was kept too busy to go through with this.

Two problems have been resolved — the ko at 82 and the status of Black's corner group — but the fight started by Black 27 in Figure 2 is not yet over, for White uses his sente to launch another attack with 86.

Black 87–97. Living like this, with White building a useful wall on the outside, is painful, but Black has no choice. The position is equal, so one could say that White has skilfully parried the severe attack launched by Black with 27. In fact, the game might even be more promising for White than for Black, in view of the fact that he succeeds in making the excellent pressing move at 98 which has been one of his main concerns since


early on in the game.

A white moyo suddenly materialises at the top with 98 to 102. Note that 102 is an important move, as it is the junction point of the white and black moyos. Playing 102 at 105, letting Black push up at 'd', would be bad.

Black 103 is a calm move which makes good shape. Playing 103 at 105 would let White attach at 103, depressing Black's position on the side.

White 104. White still does not play at the top — why?


Dia. 11. If White 1, Black would expand his right side moyo with 2 to 6. Finding an invasion point on the right would then be very difficult for White, whereas Black could aim at cutting at 'a' and also at moving into White's moyo from his own position on the top left. This result might be troublesome for White.



Dia. 11

Black 105. Essential — Black cannot waste time defending the side at 'e'.

White 108. Attacking 105 and 107 directly would not work well, so White plays this probe before deciding on his strategy. Instead of 108, the peaceful move White 'f' would also be possible (Black would play 108).



Dia. 12

Black 109. Black 1 in Dia. 12 would be bad. The result to 6 gives White good shape, while leaving Black with a lot of cutting points and the complication of the ko. For this reason Black counters with 109.





Figure 5 (110 – 153)



Dia. 13

Figure 5 (110 – 153). White goes for territory.


The sequence from 10 to 23 is forced. The only real possibility of variation comes at 16, when White could play at 1 in Dia. 13, letting Black capture with 4. Since this gives Black corner profit, White would have to capture the two black stones to the left as compensation, but that would be expecting too much. Instead, in the result to 23, White takes corner profit, while Black secures his invading group.

White 26. Not just a probe but also a reinforcement in anticipation of the fight to come on the right side.

Black 27. Black must defend against White 'a', but Black 39 would have no effect on White.

White 28. White 40 would permit Black 29.

White 32. A textbook tesuji which robs Black of his eye-shape. Black has no choice



Dia. 14

about answering at 33.

Dia. 14. Black 1 is bad as Black ends in gote with 3. This result is as if Black had played 3, then answered White 2 with 1.

Dia. 15. Black 1 is even worse, as White captures it with 2 and 4.

Black 35. Black concludes that he will not gain from a direct attack on White, so he makes a diversionary attack in the centre. For his part, White opts for safety first with 36, so Black is given a free hand, for one move anyway, in the centre.

White strengthens his centre group by playing one forcing move at 38, then continues with the territory-oriented strategy he has been following in this figure by defending the top left with 40. He must be confident that he can handle the inevitable attack.

Black 41. The vital point, threatening to cut at 43 and at 50.

Black 45. If Black cut at 50, White would just sacrifice two stones with White 49, Black 48, White 47, which would be an uninteresting result for Black.

White 46. The position is very difficult for White – this move is the only way for him to ride out the attack.

Black 47. Black cannot cut at 53 because of White 'b', but if he simply connects at 'b', White will gladly connect at 53. Black therefore forces with 47 and 49 before cutting with 51 and 53. Black has the tiger by the tail.






Figure 6 (154 – 200)



Dia. 16



Dia. 17

Figure 6 (154 – 200). The endgame begins.

Black 55. Black cannot block at 2 in Dia. 16 as White has a strong counter at 3. If Black 4, White cuts and captures with 5 to 11, since Black cannot give atari at 'a'. Playing 1 first is necessary. Instead –

Dia. 17. If White plays at 1 immediately, the sequence to 8 now works for Black.


White 56. If at 57, Black blocks at 58.

It now becomes clear that White is following a sacrifice strategy. Up to 62, he gives up seven stones while receiving five black stones in exchange. The result is a very close game. However, Black gets sente to begin the endgame.


White 72 induces Black 73, thus helping White to defend against Black 84 with 74.

Black 75 is correct. If Black blocks at 1 in Dia. 18, White keeps sente with 2 to 6, then switches to 8, so Black gains nothing. Even though White jumps into the corner with 76, he still has to add a stone at 86 to live.

Black 97. If at 'a', White extends at 'b' and cannot be caught.



Dia. 18



Dia. 19

White 98. Playing 1 and 3 in Dia. 19 looks tempting but is not profitable, as Black also expands his territory with 2 and 4.

Black 99. Better than answering 98 at 'b'. The endgame of these two players is above criticism.

At this point the game is extremely close.




Figure 7 (201 – 230)

Figure 7 (201 – 230). A small lead

White 6. White could also play at 13. Black 13 and 15 are very big and perhaps this was the turning point of the end-game.




Figure 8 (231 – 267)

67: ko; Black wins and connects the ko.

Black 27. Black now seems assured of victory.

Figure 8 (231 – 267)

Black wins by 1 point.

Game Twenty-One: Shusaku v. Yasui Sanchi (1847)

Commentary by Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan

This is Shusaku's fourth game against Yasui Sanchi. After the game played in March 1847 (Game Eighteen), the two played another game in September 1847 (given in Part Two), which was also won by Shusaku. Thus, Shusaku had still not dropped a game, an excellent performance against a player of Sanchi's stature.

White: Yasui Sanchi 7-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan

Date: 21st October, 1847

265 moves. White resigns.





Figure 1 (1 – 35)

Figure 1 (1 – 35). Joseki variations


Black 7 completes the classic Shusaku fuseki pattern. With 8, Sanchi extends one space less than Gennan Inseki in Game Fifteen.

Black 11 is a calm, unhurried move. If Black played 'a', aiming at the invasion at 'b', White would have room to extend to 'c', so he would promptly play a splitting move (*wariuchi*) at 'd'.


Black 13 is an important move: it secures Black's base and aims at the invasions at 'b' and 23. Defending against Black 'b' has greater priority, so White plays 14, his aim being to defend indirectly. Simply




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

5: connects

playing at 'e' would be too slow.

Black 15. Intercepting with 1 in Dia. 1 looks severe, but actually is not very good.

Dia. 1. With the joseki sequence to 6, White takes profit while settling his stones. White 6 is the key point, so –

Dia. 2. Black will block at 5, but then White plays 6, forcing Black 7. This sets up White 8, strengthening White's side area, not an interesting result for Black. However, playing Black 7 at 'a' would make 'b' just right for White.

Dia. 3. White has another option, for he can play 2 here, forcing Black 3, then hane at 4. White 6 makes miai of 'a' and 'b'.


Whatever happens, attaching at 1 in Dias. 1 to 3 does not lead to a good result for Black. Rather, it helps the

opponent, so Black wisely decides to defend with 15, after which the sequence to 20 is forced. Note that once the 14–15 exchange has been made, Black should not play 19 at 20.

Dia. 4. If Black 1, the sequence to 6 is forced. Black will probably continue with 7 and 9, but after White 10 the $\Delta \blacktriangle$ exchange becomes a terrible one for Black.

Black 21 is a carefully thought out move. Black would normally extend to ‘f’, setting up the two-space extension to ‘g’ next. In this position, however, White ‘h’ would be a good answer to Black ‘g’, so the latter move is not so attractive. For this reason Black goes a little further, to 21. Black is aiming next at moves such as the extension to ‘i’, building up his bottom area, and the invasion at 23 and also, depending on circumstances, capping at ‘h’.


Black 23. Attacking at 1 in Dia. 5 is also possible, but White might well ignore it and cap at 2. Even if Black continues his attack with 3, White can live in the corner with 4 to 8. Black builds thickness, but White 2 makes it meaningless.




Dia. 5

White 24. White ‘d’ at the bottom is also a good point, but it is not urgent. White does not want to permit Black ‘j’.


Black 25 is a meek move, but the hane at 1 in Dia. 6 would only help White to settle his group, the continuation to 10 being probable. If Black plays 7 at 10, White ‘a’, Black ‘b’, White 9, Black 8, White ‘c’ follow, but this result would not be to Black’s liking.




Dia. 6




Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Black 27. If omitted, White will strike at 1 in Dia. 7. If Black resists with 2 to 6, White gives atari with 7, then –

Dia. 8. Captures two stones with 9 to 17. Next, capturing Black’s corner group and escaping to the centre are miai for White.

White 28 (an atekomi) is a tesuji striking at Black’s weak point. Following the sequence in Dia. 9 would be unimaginative.

Black 29. Giving atari at 1 in Dia. 10 is of course pointless. Since Black has to connect at 3 anyway, he would just be giving White a free stone. Connecting immediately at 29 is best.

Black 35 might seem small, but it is the crucial point for a base for both sides. White 35 would pose a threat to Black’s eye-shape.





Figure 2 (36 – 60)



Dia. 11

Figure 2 (36 – 60). Concerning the cut


Black 39. Black cannot cut at 1 in Dia. 11. White moves out with 4 and 6, and if Black cuts with 7 and 9, White counters with the hane of 10. Black is short of liberties, so White wins the fight. (Note that White 'a' is sente.)

White 40 is an excellent point, expanding White's moyo while attacking Black. White is also seeking a chance to defend the cutting point at 'a' naturally.


Black 41 is correct shape. Jumping to 44 would be just what White wants, as peeping at 'b' would take care of his worries about 'a'. Black 41 aims both at 'a' and at pushing at 45.

Black 43. Cutting at 'a' is still refuted by White 'b'.


Dia. 12. If Black cuts at 1, White answers with 2 to 6, then connects at 8. Black will now be in for a tough fight.



Dia. 12



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

Note that Black cannot play 7 at 8 for the same reason as in Dia. 11.

Black 45. This time White will answer at 2 if Black cuts at 1 in Dia. 13. The continuation to 12 is forced. With his four stones floating in the centre, this fight would be unreasonable for Black.

Black 47 is still aiming at the cut at 'a'. The hane at 'c' instead looks tempting, but actually it is uninteresting, as White would deftly parry with 'd'.

White 48. Not the docile connection at 1 in Dia. 14, as Black would smartly fix up his shape with 2 and 4, aiming next at the invasion at 'a'. Black would also have the forcing move of 'b'.


Black 49, though forced, is a useful defensive move which gives Black a good follow-up at 55. However, White is satisfied with getting sente to defend at 50, a superb point which creates a nice framework at the top.

Black 51. If Black delays playing here, White will take the initiative with 'e', forcing Black to flee on dame points. Black 51 is thus essential; at the same time, it makes the cut at 'a' possible.


White 52. A clever indirect defence

against the cut. This move, which has to be backed up by a lot of analysis, is evidence of Sanchi's skill at infighting. The question is: what happens if Black cuts?


Dia. 15. White 2 is the wrong answer to 1. Black is able to squeeze with 3 to 9, a terrible setback for White. White 2 makes no use of the Δ stone.



Dia. 15



Dia. 16



Dia. 17


Dia. 16. What about connecting at 2? Black can connect at 5, leading to a ko up to 13. White has one ko threat at 'a', but Black also has one at 'b', so White collapses. This sequence also makes no use of White Δ .

Dia. 17. White's counter to the cut is to

sacrifice two stones with 2 to 6, then to attack Black on a large scale with 8 to 12. If Black 'a', White intends to play a ko with 'b', which is why he played the Δ stone. This result is bad for Black, as he comes under a one-sided attack.

Black 53 makes the cut at 'a' a threat again, so White has to defend with 54. If Black now cuts at 'a', White will play 'f'. If White omits 54 —

Dia. 18. The sequence to 10 is no longer effective, as Black can hane at 11, thanks to the Δ stone. This makes a big difference from Dia. 17, as White gets no attack as compensation for his sacrifice. This result would be very bad for White.



Dia. 18

The fighting focussed on the cutting point at 'a' has come to a pause, so the game enters the second round. Miyamoto considers the result to this point satisfactory for both sides.


White 56 looks small, but is the most urgent point on the board. White's group would become insecure if Black played here.

Black 57 forestalls White 'g'.

White 58 aims at the invasion at 'g', so Black defends at 59. Instead of 58 —

Dia. 19. The probe at 1 is often seen, but here it would be bad. Black would intercept at 2, then after

White lives in gote with 3 to 11, would switch to 'h' in the figure, an ideal point for expanding his moyo.



Dia. 19






Figure 3 (61 – 106)



Dia. 20




Dia. 21

Figure 3 (61 – 106). Centre clash


White 62 is an interesting though somewhat unusual probe. If Black answers at 1 in Dia. 20, White will continue with 2 and 4. The latter move serves three purposes: defending against the cut starting with Black 'a', expanding White's moyo, and attacking Black's centre group. Black therefore replies at 63, after which the sequence to 72 is forced. This result looks good for White, as he has taken quite a bit of territory in settling his group, but Black is also satisfied, for he gets sente to cap at 73. The latter is the vital point for reducing White's moyo.

White 76. If at 1 in Dia. 21, Black will lay waste to the top with 2 and 4.

Black 81. A good forcing move. If



Dia. 22




Dia. 23

omitted, White has a big move at 1 in Dia. 22. If Black then plays 2, White can capture him with 3. However, after the 81–82 exchange –

Dia. 23. Black can get a ko up to 7.

In order to kill the corner stones after 82, White must play at 'a'. From Black's point of view, this is much better than being captured by White 'b', so he switches to 83, satisfied with the 81–82 exchange.

White 84. White 1 in Dia. 24 is of course out of the question.



Dia. 24


White 88, 90. If omitted, the Black 97–99 combination will be very severe. White is also hoping for a chance to attack Black's centre group, but Black immediately reinforces with 91.

White 92. Surprisingly Black ignores this probe, although White 96 is quite large. Black instead builds thickness with 95 as preparation for an attack on White's group. Instead of 93 –


Dia. 25. If Black answers the probe at 1, White has the tesuji of 2. If Black 3, White connects underneath with 4 and 6. Instead of 3 –

Dia. 26. Black 3 here is no better, as Black 5 does not work. Therefore, instead of 1 –


Dia. 27. Black 1 here is the only move,




Dia. 25




Dia. 26



Dia. 28



Dia. 29




Dia. 27

but it lets White force with 2 to 6, after which he will turn at 8. This weakens the centre black group, while making White so strong that he is more or less impervious to attack. Obviously, this result did not appeal to Shusaku, who preferred to attack with 97 and 99 in the figure. The problem is that White goes ahead in territory with 96, so Black has to take a lot of profit with his attack to redress the balance.

Black 101, a forceful move, is the vital point for stopping White from getting eye-shape.

White 102. A difficult move for White. If he just wanted to escape, White 1 in Dia. 28 would do the trick, but at a cost.

Dia. 28. If White 1, Black pursues with 2 and 4. White has to defend against Black 'a' with 5, then against Black 'b' with 7, but then Black gets a favourable result by capturing two white stones with 8. (If White 5 at 'c', Black plays 8.) White has to find a way to save his group without giving Black territory.



Dia. 30

Black 103. The game would be over if Black could cut with 1 and 3 in Dia. 29.

Dia. 29. White forces with 4, then presses at 6, capturing the attacking stones up to 16. If Black 9 at 12 —

Dia. 30. If Black 1, White counters with 2 and 4. Cutting at 5 is the only move, but White is able to link up with the sequence to 14. Thus, Black cannot cut.

White 104 is an all-out move. If Black 'c', White connects at 'd', satisfied with creating cutting points in Black's shape.

Black 105 is a prudently-timed forcing move: Black is concerned that later on White might not answer.




Figure 4 (107 – 150)


Figure 4 (107 – 150). White settles his group.

Black 7. Black naturally counterattacks instead of giving atari at 8. After he cuts at 11, his continuation at 13 is bad shape but very effective. If White blocks at 'a', Black counters with 'b', White 'c', Black 18 and White cannot escape because Black 'd' would be sente. Pushing through at the bottom with 14 and 16 is therefore White's only option.

White 18 is necessary. White still cannot block at 'a' after Black 19 because of Black 'b', White 'c', Black 31; however, if White simply played 18 at 20, he would have trouble settling his group if Black played at 'a'.

After White 20, the sequence to 32 is forced. Black takes considerable profit in the centre, but White has depressed Black's bottom position while saving his group, so he is also satisfied. The play by both sides in this centre fight has been faultless and the result is a very close game. Sanchi is to be commended for his skill in parrying Shusaku's attack.

Black 33. Necessary to prevent White 'e'. White 34 next becomes the largest move.



Dia. 31

Black 41. Black is aiming at the clamp at 'f'. If he played there instead of 43, White would answer with White 48, Black 'g', White 43.

White 44 is much larger than it looks; White must resist the temptation to play at 45.

Dia. 31. White 1 is big as it is double sente, but Black would promptly attack at 2, keeping White down to one eye with 4 to 8. If White 9, Black's cut at 10 puts him on the spot. White could of course live with 'a', but he would suffer a lot of damage.




Figure 5 (151 – 200)

56: connects; ko: 94, 97, 100

Figure 5 (151 – 200). A ko

Black 63 is a tesuji answer to 62, but White's sacrifice at 64 prevents Black

from taking sente.

White 74 is necessary. If omitted, Black will play 74, White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', then switch to 'd' in the corner. Since Black 'e' or 'f' would be sente (threatening 'g'), Black would be able to live in the corner.

Black 85. The exchange for White 86 might seem questionable, as it leaves White with a ko, but if 85 is omitted, White will play 88, Black 89, White 86; if Black then defends at 90, White will have a big move at 'h'.

Black 89. The game is too close for Black to give way at 90. For the same reason, White starts a ko with 90 instead of connecting at 91.

Figure 6 (201 – 265). Not enough ko threats

White 44. White could of course kill Black by playing at 45, but he is running out of ko threats, so he captures at 44, thus transferring the ko struggle to the upper left corner. Since he does not have enough ko threats to win it, he has little choice but to resign.

This was an extremely difficult game, with two complicated fights in the centre. In the end, Black's greater thickness gave him the edge over White.

White resigns after Black 265.




Figure 6 (201 – 265)

ko: 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27, 30, 33,

36, 39, 42;

ko (at 45): 49, 52, 55, 58, 61, 64

Game Twenty-Two: Shusaku v. Ota Yuzo (1849)

Shusaku officially became the Honinbo heir on the 22nd November, 1848, and at about the same time he married Jowa's daughter, Hana, so his career seemed to be proceeding very smoothly. There was just one fly in the ointment. Although he had been promoted to 6-dan at the beginning of 1848, he was unable to win his way to even (tagai-sen) against Ota Yuzo, who was also a 6-dan. Handicaps between players were decided by their individual results against each other, not by their rank, and although he did well against just about everyone else, Shusaku could not score sufficient wins against Yuzo to change the handicap. Shusaku thus had to play him on sen-ai-sen (BBW), the handicap for a 1-dan difference, so in effect against Yuzo Shusaku was still only a 5-dan. That must have been a source of some embarrassment, though it was relieved when Yuzo was promoted to 7-dan at the end of 1848. Even so, catching up with Yuzo still remained Shusaku's main objective, but one not attained until October of 1849. The game given below and the next were two of the crucial wins which enabled Shusaku to draw even with this formidable opponent.

White: Ota Yuzo 7-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Date: 30th September, 1849 (begun at noon and finished at 5 a.m. the next day)

292 moves. Black wins by 1 point.

Commentary by Kitani Minoru 9-dan


Figure 1 (1 – 44). Taisha variation

Black 17. Black presumably avoids the usual joseki, that is, extending to 18, because of the presence of White 8. If White had played 8 at 10, Black would probably have played 17 at 18.

White 20. White 1 in Dia. 1 is also possible. If Black 2 and 4, White could next extend along the right side.

Black 25. If at 'a', White would probably play 'b'.

White 26. Permitting Black 29 is pain-



Dia. 1





Figure 1 (1 – 44)


21: takes; 23: connects

ful, so one is tempted to play 26 at 1 in Dia. 2. If next Black 'a', then White has a good continuation at 'b', while if Black makes the narrow move at 2, White can switch to 3 at the bottom. Black might invade at 4, but this fight will be feasible for White.

White 28. Since his position at the top



Dia. 2




Dia. 3


left is solid, White could also consider the extension to 'c', the idea being that an extension by Black to 'd' would not have much effect on him. Actually, however, Black might come up with the more severe move of 1 in Dia. 3.

Dia. 3. White has to answer with 2 and 4. Next, if he plays 6 at 13, Black will be happy to enclose the bottom with 'a', so White has to reduce it immediately with 6 to 12. Black would probably force with 13, then attack with 'b'.

Black 31. The modern approach would be to jump to 1 in Dia. 4. White would reduce the top with 2 and 4, aiming next at 'a'. Perhaps Black rejected 1 because the result of the fighting after White 2 was




Dia. 4



Dia. 5

9: connects




Dia. 6

unpredictable.


Black 33. The usual move is Black 1 in Dia. 5, but presumably Shusaku was not satisfied with the result after the standard sequence to 10. Black can aim at attacking at 'a', but pushing along at 'b' would be a good answer for White. Instead of 3 —

Dia. 6. Black 3 here is also possible. White would get a ladder with 4 and 6, but the ladder-block at 7 would give Black a reasonable result.

White 44. The meaning of this move is



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

not immediately clear. White need not be afraid of Black 1 in Dia. 7, as he can counter with 2 to 6. More likely, he was worried about Black 1 in Dia. 8.

Dia. 8. If White 2, Black plays 3 to 7; with 'a' and 'b' as miai, this group cannot be killed.






Figure 2 (45 – 75)

Figure 2 (45 – 75). Aiming at a double attack

Black 45 is perhaps questionable, as it has little effect on the strong white position to the left. It also does less than expected for Black's position at the top, as White has the superb invasion at 46. Instead of 45, expanding the bottom area with 'a' might have been better.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

White 50 is a tight move. Perhaps White is anticipating the thickness Black later builds here with 61 and 65, in which case the aim of 50 is to defend against the Black 'b'–Black 'c' combination.

Black 51. The modern approach would be simply to jump to 1 in Dia. 9. When White plays 2 and 4, Black still attacks at 5, but this fight will be tougher for White than in the game, because his left side position has not been strengthened.

Black 61. Black must have concluded that there was no point in continuing his attack with 1 in Dia. 10. White would probably keep the White 'a'–Black 'b' exchange in reserve, for he should be able to live by blocking at 4. This is an uninteresting result for Black, so he cuts at 61 in the hope of being able to contrive a splitting attack on the white group at the top and the one at the bottom.

White 72 is a very bold move. White must be confident that his group at the bottom can look after itself.

Figure 3 (76 – 100). Too aggressive

Black 81. If Black pushed through with 1 and 3 in Dia. 11, he would be able to pick up three stones after 8, but this






Figure 3 (76 – 100)



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

capture would be trivial.

Black 89 is perhaps too aggressive. This stubborn attempt to destroy White's eye-shape is questionable, for White not only lives but also lays waste to most of the top area in the process. Securing the top with 1 and 3 in Dia. 12 should be good enough for Black. White lives easily with

4, but Black should have enough territory to make a good game of it.

White 92 is good style. Black probably feels tempted to answer at 'a', but he defends cautiously at 93.





Figure 4 (101 – 135)

Figure 4 (101 – 135). White lays waste to the top.


Black 23. If Black exchanges 'a' for White 'b', White will not be able to play 100 in Figure 6, but since Black is still aiming at the eye-shape of White's group, he does not want to provoke White 'b'.

Black 33. If at 34, White will play 'c', aiming at the three stones to the right.

Black 35. If Black tries to kill White with 1 and 3 in Dia. 13, White has the tesuji placement at 4. If Black 5, White



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

6 is sente; if Black cuts at 7, White attaches at 8, setting up an oi-otoshi tesuji (i.e. White keeps giving atari) which captures the black stones. Instead of 3 –

Dia. 14. Black could also play at 1, which is more dangerous, but White still has the tesuji of 4. If Black plays ‘a’ after 8, White gets a ko with ‘b’.





Figure 5 (136 – 162)
45: ko; 51: connects (at 42)

Figure 5 (136 – 162). An oversight?

White 58 is a clever move which Black perhaps overlooked. Black could save his two stones with 1 in Dia. 15, but the continuation would be difficult. White would attack at 2, aiming at the cuts at ‘a’ and ‘b’.

Figure 6 (163 – 200). Another tesuji

White 88 is another tesuji. If Black



Dia. 15





Figure 6 (163 – 200)

plays 93 at 94, White counters with ‘a’.

Figure 7 (201 – 245). An important ko

White 14. Instead of playing for a ko, the placement at 1 in Dia. 16 might have been better. Black cannot intercept with 4 and 6 because of shortage of liberties, so instead he would have to let White connect along the edge. Playing this way might have led to a jigo.

White 18. The game is extremely close, so this ko will be decisive. If White



Dia. 16




Figure 7 (201 – 245)

ko: 22, 25, 28, 31, 34, 37, 40, 43

simply connected at 19 with 18, giving up 14 and 16, he would lose.




Figure 8 (246 – 292)

ko: 49, 52, 55; 85:ko (right of 80);
87: connects (at 80)

Figure 8 (246 – 292). A narrow win

Black 57. Black can afford to give up his three stones, as capturing with 57 and 59 ensures him of a win.

Black wins by 1 point.

Game Twenty-Three Shusaku v. Ota Yuzo (1849)

Shusaku's win in the previous game put him three wins ahead of Yuzo on sen-aisen, so this game became the kadoban to go to even.

White: Ota Yuzo 7-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Date: 8th October, 1849

289 moves. Black wins by 4 points.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshiro




Figure 1 (1 – 37)

Figure 1 (1 – 37). Focus on the top left

Black 13. As always, Shusaku tries to keep the game simple when he has black. If he used 13 to play in the bottom left corner, White would invade at 'a', thus complicating the game.

Black 17. If Black moves out immediately with 15, White will probably take all of the top.

White 20. If at 21, Black will invade at 'b'.

Black 31 is correct shape. Black could also peep at 36, but he is satisfied with the thickness he gets up to 37.





Figure 2 (38 – 70)


Figure 2 (38 – 70). A strong attack by Black

Black 41 is an interesting move. White 'a' in reply would be just what Black wants, as he would be able to force with Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e', Black 'f', White 'g', then jump to 'h'. If White simply played at 'b', Black would jump immediately to 'h'. White sees nothing to be gained by answering Black, so he switches to 42. His strategy is to use this attack to take territory at the bottom.

Black 63. Black hopes to drive White out into the centre; he might then get an opportunity to make a splitting attack on this group and the one on the left side. White counterattacks at 64 in order to prevent Black from deciding the flow of



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

the game.

Black 69 is a severe move. If White captures a stone with 1 and 3 in Dia. 1, he will be in trouble after Black 4. White 70 is therefore the vital point of this shape. However, if White wanted to settle this group quickly, he could also cut at 1 in Dia. 2, setting up a ponnuki with 5 and 7. Black 8 is a good extension, but White 9 settles the group.




Figure 3 (71 – 110)
ko: 86, 89; 91: connects

Figure 3 (71 – 110). Mistake in strategy

The result to 78 is perhaps just a little unsatisfactory for White, as his large group does not yet have definite eye-shape.

Black 105. If Black docilely connects, White can hane at 105 and connect in sente. The cutting point above 104 becomes the focus of the game.

White 106 is a mistake in strategy, as defending the two vulnerable stones on the side here is trivial. The really urgent point for White is descending at 107, since Black 107 makes excellent shape for Black. If White played 107, Black would probably answer at 106, but the continuation White 'a'– Black 'b'–White 'c'

would be excellent for White and would make the cut above 104 an immediate threat, so Black would have to connect there. Since White would also have a sente peep at 'd', Black 106 would not be big.




Figure 4 (111 – 152)
34: connects

Figure 4 (111 – 152). Invitation to cut

White 26 etc. In this figure White is trying hard to persuade Black that it is in his best interest to spend a move connecting at 52, but Black stubbornly remains unconvinced. White finally runs out of patience and cuts at 52, but in doing so, one cannot help feeling that he has been faced down by Black.

Figure 5 (153 – 200). An unprofitable cut

Once White has cut (at 52), his position is weakened, for he must now answer all forcing moves Black makes from the outside. Black skilfully exploits this weakness with 53 etc. and also opens up a hole in the bottom area with 67. White is unable to win the ko there and also has to submit passively with 86 and 88 when Black comes in from the top.

White 74. If at 1 in Dia. 3, Black cap-






Figure 5 (153 – 200)
ko: 76, 79; 83: connects



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

tures the key stones with 2 to 6.

White 86. If at 1 in Dia. 4, Black captures a stone with 2 and 4; if then White 5, Black 6 wins the semeai.

White's cut has not been a great success. Although he has captured the eight stones he went after, he has been forced to give way in every direction to do so; moreover, he will still have to complete




Figure 6 (201 – 250) 41: retakes

his capture by taking the black stones off the board (semedorri), which thus limits his gain. When Black switches to 91, he has a won game.

Figure 6 (201 – 250), Figure 7 (251 – 289). Black wins by 4 points.

The two games we have looked at make it clear just how hard Shusaku had to work to gain a victory over Ota Yuzo. Although Shusaku was regarded as almost invincible with black, it was only with considerable difficulty that he overcame Yuzo's resistance on white. It is no wonder that Shusaku considered Yuzo the strongest of the Tempo Best Four — he knew his real strength better than anyone else.

Nevertheless, the game above put Shusaku four wins ahead on sen-ai-sen, so at long last he was entitled to advance to tagai-sen. More than seven years had passed since Shusaku, then a twelve year old 2-dan, first played Yuzo on two stones and now, after more than forty games (probably over fifty if games not surviving are included), he had finally drawn even. No ordinary player could have held Shusaku down for so long.

In a word, Yuzo's go is dazzling. He




Figure 7 (251 – 289)

ko: 54, 57, 60, 63, 66, 69, 76; 86: connects (above 58); 87: *ko*; 89: connects *ko*

was possessed of formidable fighting strength, but this strength was not simple or straightforward. Compared to Yasui Sanchi, who was known for his fighting power, for example, Yuzo impresses one with his flexibility and his variation in pace. Consequently, he was very skilful at manipulating the opponent when he held white. When faced with Shusaku on black, he would contrive to upset the latter's usual steady rhythm and drag him into a chaotic, free-for-all fight. If one puts Shuwa in a special category, Yuzo was the ideal opponent for tempering Shusaku.

Incidentally, there is a theory (not followed in this book) that Shusaku was promoted to 7-dan after this success against Yuzo, in which case he was moving up the dan ladder with commendable speed. Since very few players progressed beyond 7-dan, this rank would have been equivalent to a modern 9-dan. The other theory, which for various reasons seems more plausible (see Chapter Two), is that the promotion did not come until 1853, when Shusaku forced Yuzo to sen-ai sen.

Game Twenty-Four: Shusaku v. Yasui Sanchi (1849)

Castle Game One

Shusaku's opponent in his first castle game was the head of the Yasui school, Yasui Sanchi. Shusaku had an excellent record against Sanchi, having scored five wins to two losses (one of these being with white). Sanchi was a very strong fighter, but his weak point was the fuseki. This is borne out by the game below.

White: Yasui Sanchi 7-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Date: 17th November, 1849

267 moves. Black wins by 11 points.

Commentary by Kato Shin 8-dan and Ishida Yoshio 9-dan





Figure 1 (1 – 30)

Figure 1 (1 – 30). An easy fuseki for Black

White 2. Later a favourite move of Shusai's.

White 14. Playing in the empty corner would be more usual.

White 20 aims at attacking the solitary black stone on the side, but it is unreasonable, as White still has to add a defensive move at the top, at 24. Instead of 20, following Dia. 1 would be more consistent with 16 and 18. If Black omitted 2, White would seal him in the corner by playing



Dia. 1

there himself.

Black 21. The kosumi one space to the right is also possible.


White 24. If White attacks at 'a' instead, Black lives easily with Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.

White 26 is heavy, because Black is strong here. Attacking at 1 in Dia. 2 seems preferable. The sequence to 5 works better in settling White's group.

Black 27 reinforces against the aji of White 'e', which became a threat when White strengthened himself with 24. However, simply jumping to 'a' or 29 would be the usual move here.

White 28. Inexplicable — since White has invested a move at 24, he must attack at 'a'. Black would probably switch to 30, taking a firm grip on the two white stones at the bottom, but at least this way White's play would be consistent.

Black 29. Considering that White has



Dia. 2

no komi, the game is already very easy for Black.




Figure 2 (31 – 100)

Figure 2 (31 – 100). An ineffective attack

White 32. If at 35, Black will take up position with 'a'.

White 34. If at 1 in Dia. 3, Black will exchange the side for the corner with the joseki to 8. If White next plays 'a', then Black 'b' and White 'c' will follow.

Black 37 – 43. Since he is ahead, Black wants to keep the game simple.


White 44. White should first press at 1 in Dia. 4. If Black 2 and 4, White could then extend to 5. Black would probably not start a fight with 2 at 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'.

White 46. Since Black 47 and 49 make the game too easy for Black, White should play 46 at 'b'. He should then be prepared to fight when Black invades at 'c'.


White 50. Cutting at 1 in Dia. 5 would be unreasonable. White's prospects in the fight after 4 would be poor.

Black 51. The most efficient move.


White 52 is a strange move. The usual way to attack is to attach at 54, then to reply with a hane if Black blocks above




Dia. 3




Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

or below.

Black 57 is a clever tesuji for settling Black's group. If White answers at 1 in Dia. 6, Black plays 2 in sente, then connects at 4. If instead White plays 1 in Dia. 7, Black 2 is sente, so once again Black is able to avoid trouble.

White cuts at 58 because he has nothing better to do, but Black easily lives with 59 to 63. White's attack with 52 has gained nothing.

Black 65. Black's corner is a little insecure, since White 'd' would be sente against the group above, so Black strengthens it by capturing two white stones. White is unable to resist.

Black 73, 75. Black wants to wind up the game as quickly as possible.

White 76. White has to invade, as Black's side is too big, but this is as far in as he can go. Answering peacefully with 77 and 79 is good enough for Black.

White's last hope is try to make some territory in the centre with 82 etc.

Black 99. If Black were behind, he might launch an attack on the white group at the centre bottom, but such violent measures are not necessary.




Figure 3 (101 – 150)




Figure 4 (151 – 200)
54: ko




Figure 5 (201 – 267)

42: ko; 44: connects at 39; 63: takes ko below 60; 67: connects at 60

Figure 3 (101 – 150)

Figure 4 (151 – 200)

Figure 5 (201 – 267)

Black wins by 11 points.

The rest of the game requires no comment — the outcome was decided in the fuseki. This was a bad game for Yasui Sanchi, for he was capable of playing much better. Although Shusaku had no trouble handling him, Shuwa considered him the strongest of the Tempo Top Four and with good reason. The two played 133 games, of which Shuwa won a majority (66 to 55, with 11 jigo and one unfinished), but Sanchi defeated Shuwa 6–3 in the all-important castle games.

Sanchi was not able to improve his record against Shusaku, losing the four remaining games they played to end up with an unimpressive lifetime record of two wins to ten losses, but, as we shall see, he did give Shusaku a very nasty scare in the latter's tenth castle game, played in 1853.

Game Twenty-Five: Shusaku v. Sakaguchi Sentoku(1849) Castle Game Two

Sakaguchi Sentoku (1803–67?) was the head of the Sakaguchi house, a minor house closely associated with the Yasuis. Sakaguchi was a disciple (there is also a theory that he was the son) of the 7th Yasui, Senchi Senkaku, who is popularly known as O-Senchi or Great Senchi. O-Senchi was originally from the Sakaguchi family and after he retired as Yasui head in 1814, he returned to his own house and devoted himself to the training of his heir, Sentoku. The latter was promoted to 7-dan in 1839 and was given special permission to play in the castle games (he was one of ten ‘outsiders’, that is, players not from the four main houses, given permission to do so during the Edo period). He played a total of thirty-two castle games and won exactly half of them.

Sentoku is best known as a member of the Tempo Top Four. He was not as spectacular as the other three (Ito Showa, Ota Yuzo and Yasui Sanchi), but he was a steady, solid player, and in games among the four he had the best winning percentage. He did particularly well against Yuzo and Showa, which is just a little surprising, considering that his reputation does not match theirs. Perhaps the difference was that he performed badly against Shuwa; he played eight castle games with him and was only able to win two. He also had the bad luck to run into Shusaku four times in the castle games. Their first encounter, given below, was an o-konomi game, which means that it was played after the official games at the request of the shogun, if they were honoured with his actual attendance on this occasion, or of one of the high officials overseeing the castle game ceremony. The popularity or otherwise of the o-konomi games was the best indication of how much active interest the higher levels of the Japanese government were taking in go.

White: Sakaguchi Sentoku 7-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Date: 17th, 18th November, 1849 (played at Edo Castle on the 17th and completed at the residence of the jisha-bugyo on the 18th)

131 moves. White resigns.

Commentary by Sanno Hirotaka 9-dan

Figure 1 (1 – 39). The losing move

Black 19 requires the ladder shown in Dia. 1 to be favourable. It is.

White 20. A new move, but not, unfortunately for Sentoku, one destined to become a joseki. The standard modern joseki is shown in Dia. 2.

White 22 lets Black make ideal shape, with a hane at the head of two stones. The comparison with the joseki in Dia. 2






Figure 1 (1 – 39)


now shows why White 20 is so bad: it has



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3


to be at 'a' to make 22 an atari (though if White does play 20 at 'a', Black of course plays 21 at 22).

White 26. The usual way to make shape is with White 1 and 3 in Dia. 3, but that would give Black a superb peep at 'a'. To avoid this, White reluctantly plays 26.


White 28 invites a forceful attack by Black: it is an over-extension which becomes the losing move. Black 29 gives one a glimpse of the power concealed beneath the smooth surface of Shusaku's go. His fuseki was so superior to that of players like Sentoku that he was able to win virtually without fighting, but when the opponent created a weakness in his position, he could be ruthless. Instead of 28 —

Dia. 4. White must make the solid one-space jump to 1. Black will defend at 2, after which 3 to 5 would give a leisurely game. Note that neither side is in a hurry to play in the upper left corner; the potential of this area is restricted by the solid position of the ▲ stone.


White 34. If White gives atari at 38 immediately, Black has two options.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 5. Black could sacrifice the stone; pushing through with 2 and 4 would be ample compensation.

Dia. 6. Black could save his stone with 2 and 4. However, when White connects at 5, it is difficult for Black to decide how to fix up his shape; if Black 'a', White would have an annoying peep at 'b' for later, but Black 'c' instead would make inferior shape to 37 in the figure. This option is the less attractive one, but it is still playable for Black.

White 38 is unnecessary, but White is concerned that later on Black might ignore him. That is —

Dia. 7. If White peeps at 1, Black might



Dia. 7 4: elsewhere

answer at 2, then tenuki after White 3; if next White 5, then Black 6 and vice versa.




Figure 2 (40 – 80)


Figure 2 (40 – 80). From bad to worse

White 40. The one-space jump is usual, but it would have too little effect on Black. White 40 sets up the knight's move at 42 and also aims at the contact play at 46, so it is not a bad move — it is just bad luck that White 46 does not work.


Black 45 makes the kind of shape professionals must dream about: it leads out Black's sole weak group while amply maintaining the pressure on White's two weak groups. Black seems to be heading for a comfortable win. He has taken the larger part of the bottom area almost incidentally in the course of his attack, while White still has no territory to speak of. White 20 was a joseki manqué, but the real blame for this parlous state of affairs lies with White 28.

White 46. White 50 instead would be safe but insipid. White's only chance is to start a fight.

White 48. The two-step hane is the instinctive fighting move, but here it is



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

welcomed by the opponent. The usual premise for this tactic is that when Black resists, as with 49 and 51 here, one must be able to start a fight by cutting with 1 in Dia. 8.

Dia. 8. If White 1, Black has an adequate counter with 2 and 4; 'squeezing' with 5 and 7 would just be a joke.


In retrospect, it is clear that White should have swallowed his pride with 48 and followed the simple sequence in Dia. 9.

Dia. 9. Playing the sequence to 5, phlegmatic though it is, would be preferable to permitting Black 51 in the figure. If Black played 4 at 'a', then that would be the right time to start a fight by cutting at 4.

White 56 is a strange move, neither attacking nor taking territory — one might call it the losing move if that honour had not already been claimed. Anything would be preferable to 56: White 66, White 'a', White 'b', take your choice.

White 60 is deceptive: it looks like the vital point, but in fact does little apart from helping Black to link up. White should defend the top with 'c' and think about attacking Black later on. For example, he could aim at the White 'd–e' combination.

White 64 is inconsistent with 60 and 62. White was probably confident that Black would answer the peep immediately, since the two stones below 71 look like pivotal stones (*tane-ishii*), so he must have been taken aback when Black switched to 65. Actually, this kind of flexibility is



Dia. 10

typical of Shusaku; when he's ahead, he'll jettison even supposedly key stones if they are a burden. Instead of 64 —

Dia. 10. White must invade immediately at 1. Black would probably answer at 2, then attach at 4; White ensures life with 5, after which 6 to 9 could be expected at the top. This result would at least give White some hope of getting back into the game.


Black 65 makes excellent shape: the game is over.

Black 67 is a declaration by Black that he has won; if the game were close, Black would make the shoulder-hit at 'f'. One can see how frustrating it must have been to play Shusaku — an overplay might give one a chance to stage an upset, but his positional judgement was so good that he always knew how hard he had to play.

White 70 is dubious; since White's top is still open, 70 does not make much territory. Instead —


Dia. 11. White should play more aggressively, making the shoulder-hit at 1. Black's counter at 2 should not worry White, as the top is not territory anyway. He can crawl twice, then switch back to the left side with 7 to 13. Black would not like this result. so —

Dia. 12. He would answer at 2, whereupon White could take territory with 3.



Dia. 11

This result is a dramatic improvement on the sequence to 80 in the figure.



Dia. 12




Figure 3 (81 – 131)

Figure 3 (81–131). A bad day for Sentoku

Black 81 is a little crude, but Black is trying to wind up the game as quickly as possible. More 'professional' would be playing 81 at 'a' in order to induce White 81, which would make Black 'b' natural. If White answered Black 'a' at 'c', Black could attach next at 97.

White 88. This invasion is unreasonable after Black 65, but White is probably just looking for a place to resign.

White 94. If at 95, Black plays at 94 and gains on the exchange.

White 108. A sacrifice to defend against Black 110, which would threaten Black 'd' next.

Black 131. Black 'e' is possible but

not necessary.

Sentoku finally resigned after Black 131. All in all, this was a game which he probably wanted to forget as quickly as possible.

White resigns after Black 131.

Game Twenty-Six: Shusaku v. Sakaguchi Sentoku (1850) Castle Game Three

Sentoku's ego must barely have had time to recover from the drubbing administered to him by Shusaku in the 1849 castle game when he ran into him again in the officially scheduled game the following year. Unfortunately, his ability to handle him had not improved in the meantime. The fact that Shusaku took black again (obviously the wrong handicap considering their relative strength) is an indication that Shusaku must still have been only a 6-dan. His opponents at least must have felt that a promotion was long overdue.

White: Sakaguchi Sentoku 7-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Date: 17th November, 1850

193 moves. Black wins by 8 points.

Adapted from a commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50). Territory on the side

Black 13. Shusaku was very fond of the three-space pincer. Here it works excellently, for after the exchange in the bottom right corner, Black stakes out a

superb position with 25. Segoe Kensaku comments that, in view of this, White should have played 12 at 13 to forestall Black's pincer.

Black 19. If at 28, White will invade at 'a', aiming next at 'b'. Black 19 and 21 are a device to take sente, so that Black can defend at 25.

Black 27. If at 30, White would play White 28–Black 29–White 'c' and would probably be able to use this attack to secure most of the bottom area as territory. Black does not mind letting White make two corner enclosures, because he is confident that, having played 25, he can get enough territory on the side to compensate.

White 44. Playing at 'd' would be ineffective, as Black would answer at 47. White 44 induces Black 45 etc., helping White to strengthen his corner.

Figure 2 (51 – 100). Black takes charge.

White 56. White 67 would complete the joseki on the left side, but Black would then link up his groups by jumping to 63. White has to play more aggressively if he is to make any impact on Black's territorial lead, so he attacks at 56 in






Figure 2 (51 – 100)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

order to keep Black's forces separated.

White 58. White is trying to cut in sente. Cutting with 1 in Dia. 1 would be easy, but Black would get sente to defend with 6, on top of making a ponnuki in the centre. In contrast, after White 58 to 62 –

Dia. 2. If Black answers at 1, White cuts in sente with 2. White 4 is not a ladder,

but Black has to defend against White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'.

Black decides that the wisest course is to sacrifice his two stones at the top. White has to add a stone at 66 to forestall Black 'a'—White 66—Black 'b', so Black gets sente to prevent White from linking up on the left side with 67. In the course of attacking these isolated stones, Black is able to reinforce his stones below, thus making the invasion at 77 feasible.

White 78 is dubious. White could contain the damage by answering 77 at 'c'. Black would be able to cut off a stone with the tesuji of Black 'd', White 'e', Black 'f', White 'g', Black 81, but he would lose sente, whereas in the game White has to take gote to defend at 86. After Black jumps to 95, the game is over.

Figure 3 (101 – 193). An unexciting game

The moves in this figure do not require any comment. Already there is nothing that White can do to close the gap. Though this game was not as humiliating for him as the previous one, Sentoku was never given a chance.

Moves after 193 not recorded. Black wins by 8 points.




Figure 3 (101 – 193)

Game Twenty-Seven: Shusaku v. Ito Showa (1850)

Castle Game Four

Although Showa was twenty-eight years older than Shusaku, he was not promoted to 7-dan until 1849, so he made his debut in the same year. He got off to just as good a start as Shusaku, winning his games against Yasui Sanchi and Hayashi Monnyu, taking white against the latter. He also played the same number of castle games as Shusaku, but his record was a less impressive nine wins to ten losses. He had the misfortune to be matched against Shusaku four times. His best performance was in their game below, which was an o-konomi game. This and the tenth game were the closest that Shusaku came to marring his castle go record.

White: Ito Showa 7-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Date: 17th, 18th November, 1850 (the game was not completed at Edo Castle on the 17th, so it was continued the next day at the residence of Lord Wakizaka Awaji, then the jisha-bugyo)

342 moves. Black wins by 3 points.


Adapted from commentaries by Kitani Minoru, Ishida Yoshio and Segoe Kensaku

Figure 1 (1 – 40). A dubious forcing move

White 6 would now be the high move at 'a'.

White 8 was one of Showa's favourite moves, but nowadays White would probably attach at 1 in Dia. 1. White settles his group in sente with 3 and 5 and aims next at invading at 'a'. Black 6 could also be at 'b'.

Black 9 is solid. If Black answered at 1 in Dia. 2, White would be able to make a pincer at 2, then attach at 4 to settle his group. Black 9 forestalls the pincer.



Dia. 1





Figure 1 (1 – 40)




Dia. 2


Black 11. This pressing move was played by rote in the Edo period, but here it is dubious, for White 12 weakens Black 7. Black should keep 11 in reserve and switch to 13 immediately.

Black 15 is reasonable, but instead –


Dia. 3. Black could also consider taking sente with the joseki to 5, then invading



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

the bottom right corner with 7.

White 30 shows excellent positional judgement. The joseki calls for White to play at 32, but here that would not be interesting because of Black's solid position at the top with 3 and 5.


Black 31. The standard continuation when White plays tenuki is shown in Dia. 4.

Dia. 4. Black can force with 1 etc., but he has to take gote with 7, so White would be able to switch to 'b' in the figure. The thickness built by 1 to 7 would be nullified by the Δ stone.

Dia. 5. If anything, Black 1 would be more interesting. White could hardly permit Black 'a', so he would answer at 2, after which Black could switch to the right side.

Black 31. Black 'b' is normal, but Black is still aiming at the white group above.

White 34. If omitted, Black would strike at the vital point of 'c'; if White 'd',



Dia. 6


then Black 'e', decreasing the effectiveness of White's bottom right corner enclosure.

Black 35 is the follow-up to 31, but Black's preoccupation with attacking this white group is leading him astray. Extending to 'f' is the most urgent point for Black. Alternatively —

Dia. 6. Black 1 is also a good point. Fighting spirit would call for White to answer at 2. Black 'a' next would provoke White 'b', weakening the black group below, so Black would probably take up position with 3.

White 36. A clever makeshift which takes care of the white group for the time being. If omitted, Black would separate White with 1 and 3 in Dia. 7. White 36 is sente, since it threatens to capture a stone with White 'a', then White 37 (after which Black would have to worry about an invasion at 'g').

White 38 completes a superb double-wing extension from the corner enclosure. Black naturally continues his attack with 39, but White ignores him to take



Dia. 7

another large point with 40, a move which also attacks the black group. Showa is playing brilliantly. Already Black's advantage from having the first move has slipped away.

Figure 2 (41 – 88). The first ko

White 44. White 'a' would have no effect on Black.

Black 45 gives White a good continuation at 62, but Black wants sente to invade at 47. If Black played 45 at 'b', then White would exchange 62 for Black 'c', then switch to the right. The sequence White 48 – Black 49 – White 'd' would make it hard for Black to invade.

White 52 is essential; if at 53, Black would attack at 'e'.


Black 53. Black does not have time to extend at 66. The contrast with the first three castle games, in which Shusaku was able to win with solid, safety-first moves, is striking. Here he is being tested to his limits.

White 58 is the vital point of this shape. White can afford to let Black connect underneath with 59, for he has another attack prepared with 66.

Black 65. If at 66, White would play the sente sequence in Dia. 8 and Black would fall behind in territory. Black is staking the game on his ability to ride out the storm.

White 66 is severe, but Black 67 is the best counter. Playing a ko with 68 is best for White; if instead he extended at 69, Black would easily escape with Black 68, White 73, Black 'f'. A ko fight is inevitable.

Black 87 is an interesting response to



Dia. 8





Figure 2 (41 – 88)
ko: 76, 79, 82, 85, 88



Dia. 9

White's ko threat at 86. Choosing between White 'g' and 'h' is difficult for White, so he ignores Black 87 and takes the ko. If White answered 87 at 'g', Black would connect underneath with 'i' and later would be able to live in the corner with the placement at 90 in Figure 3.

Dia. 9. If instead White connected at 1, Black would probably connect the ko with 2. Even though White can stop Black from connecting with 3, Black can secure his group by cutting with 4 and 6.

Figure 3 (89 – 110). Shusaku's courageous play

Black 89 to 93, letting the centre group take its chances in order to pick up corner profit, is a most resolute and courageous way of playing. Black must be confident





Figure 3 (89 – 110)

that he can save the centre group even after White 94.

White 102. Surrounding Black at a distance is best. Playing a hane at 103 would just help Black to make shape.

Black 107 sets up the second ko for the life of this group. Black cannot link up to the top and after 106 he cannot advance to the right either, so the time has come to seek independent life.

White 110. If White connects the ko with 1 in Dia. 10, Black would play 2 and 4. That would not make definite eye-shape, but Black would now have the threat of 'a', followed by 'b', so White would be in more danger than Black.



Dia. 10





Figure 4 (111 – 140)
ko:14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35, 38

Figure 4 (111 – 140). Shusaku's dauntless fighting spirit

Black 39 is another fearless move, in the spirit of Black 89. Once again Black is defying White to kill the centre group. Black 39 is necessary to give Black a chance of winning the game, but courage alone is not enough in making a move like this; it has to be backed up by exhaustive analysis.

White 40. Showa seems a little overawed by Shusaku's fighting spirit, for connecting the ko would be more aggressive.



Dia. 11

There is no way of knowing what Shusaku planned to do if White connected at 1 in Dia. 11, but Ishida Yoshiro hypothesises that he would have made an exchange of groups (furikawari) with Black 2 etc. The result to 13 would give an extremely close game – Ishida thinks that it might even be a jigo.




Figure 5 (141 – 200)

ko: 48, 51, 54, 57, 64, 67, 70, 73, 76, 79, 82, 85, 88, 91, 94

96: captures two stones (left of 43)

ko: 97, 100

Figure 5 (141 – 200). A favourable ko

White 58. White's being forced to connect here means that Black has won this ko for the third time.

Black 59. The exchange for White 60 is a minus for Black, but he is in no position to quibble. With 61 and 63, Black is getting closer and closer to a living shape. For the first time, it becomes a straight-out ko for life and the advantage of a large group is that it gives one ko threats for life all over the place. Showa has not made a mistake in the fighting – it is just that Shusaku's analysis has been more profound.

White 68, 74 etc. These ko threats are




Figure 6 (201 – 250)

ko: 28, 31, 34, 37, 40, 43, 46

48: ko (left of 3)

made possible by the 59–60 exchange.

Figure 6 (201 – 250). The game is decided.

White 4 is a compromise – White must feel that he is running out of ko threats. Black 5 is a clever response. If White resumes the ko, Black will be able to use 35 as a ko threat while also threatening to take away the eyes of the white group on the right by connecting at 6 (that is, later on, after also playing 13). White therefore has no choice about capturing at 6, but when Black jumps into the top with 7, it finally begins to seem possible that Black might stage an upset. White has to play 8 and 10, so 7 is sente.

Black 13. A makeshift reinforcement instead of securing definite eye-shape. Black is probably happy to play ko all day long if his opponent wants to.

White 24 provokes the final ko, but this one Black cannot win. In the end, he has to secure his eye-shape with 47 and 49. White captures four stones with 50, but the game has already been decided. Perhaps it was a question of who had the greater staying power during the long series of kos.




Figure 7 (251 – 300)

ko: 72, 75, 78, 81, 84, 89, 92, 95, 98

Figure 7 (251 – 300). Solid endgame

White 52. If at 54, Black will push through at 'a' and rescue his four stones.

White 56. White's aim is to force Black to add extra stones to take this group off the board (semedor).

Figure 8 (301 – 342). A classic

White 2. Permitting Black 3 is a loss, since Black has to add 9 and 15 anyway. However, since White wins the ko, it balances out. Actually, the play in the final two figures does not affect the outcome.

Black wins by 3 points.

This game is considered a classic and it ranks as a masterpiece for Showa as well as for Shusaku. It is the only castle game in which Shusaku was outplayed in the fuseki when he held black. Segoe Kensaku (1889 – 1972) relates that when he was a member of the Hoensha in his youth, he once discussed Shusaku with Iwasaki Kenzo (1842 – 1913), who appears later in this book as Ebizawa Kenzo, and that the latter commented that if you examine Shusaku's castle games carefully, you find that one of them was really a lost game for him. Segoe agrees that Shusaku




Figure 8 (301 – 342)

ko: 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 22; 24: connects; 34: ko; 39: connects; 42: connects

was certainly in considerable danger of losing. This compelled him to display his full strength, in contrast to his usual easy wins with black, and thus created a classic.

Ishida Yoshio sums up the game as follows:

'In many of Shusaku's games, this one being the best example, one finds that he uses kos to get out of difficult positions. This is also true of Go Seigen, that is, skill at fighting kos is an indication of go strength. The way that Shusaku persevered with ko after ko, fighting his way to final victory with a series of all-or-nothing moves, justifies one in calling this game one of his masterpieces. Moves like the cut at 39 in Figure 4 can only be played if one has a lot of confidence in one's analysis.'

'Showa lost what was a good game for him, but his exquisite play in the fuseki and his superb attacking play in the middle game harassed Shusaku throughout the game. Showa was a formidable player – he earned the admiration of the go world for his jigo with white against

Shuwa in 1841, lauded as “a feat worthy of a Meijin”. A classic cannot be created by one player. Shusaku’s masterpiece came into being because he was blessed with Showa as an opponent.’

For the record buffs, this is the longest game (by one move) in Shusaku’s *Complete Games*, but it falls far short of Showa’s personal record. In 1839, he

played a game with Yasui Sanchi which went to 405 moves, traditionally regarded as the record (it may have been broken in 1950 when a Yamabe – Hoshino game might have gone to 411 moves – since the game record was not made until a few days after the game, there are some doubts about its accuracy).

Showa v. Shuwa (1841)

The reader might like to see the Showa game against Shuwa referred to by Ishida. It became famous because of a joint critique by Jowa and Gennan Inseki, which follows: ‘In fuseki, order of moves and execution, Shuwa’s play in this game merits not one point of criticism. That Showa was yet able to make it jigo with white is the feat of a Meijin.’

The game is full of interesting moves, typical of Showa. In particular, moves such as 10, 38 and 42 in Figure 1 give the game an individual flavour. Hashimoto Shoji comments that the numerous light keimas remind him of the go of Iwamoto Kaoru.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)




Figure 2 (101 – 200)




Figure 3 (201 – 262)

61: connects (right of 57); 62: connects

The Nijubango with Sekiyama Sendaiu

The twenty-game series with Sekiyama Sendaiu (1784 – 1859) was the second longest match of Shusaku's career and, as an extended match between a professional and an amateur, it also has an unusual place in go history.

Sekiyama was considered the greatest amateur player of the Edo period and some would go so far as to say of all time. Certainly no modern amateur player can boast of comparable achievements.

Sekiyama's father was a retainer of Lord Sanada of the Matsushiro fief (in modern Nagano) and, as a member of the hereditary samurai class, Sekiyama was destined from birth to follow in his father's footsteps as a warrior. However, he was very fond of go as a child and in 1797 he went to Edo to study under Mizutani Takugen 6-dan, a Honinbo disciple. The following year he became a disciple of the 10th Honinbo, Retsugen (1750 – 1808). In 1801 he received a shodan diploma (that is, a professional shodan diploma, since diplomas for amateurs did not exist in the Edo period) and returned home. Word reached him that he was being criticised for neglecting his military vocation, so for the next seven years he swore off go completely and devoted himself to martial arts, receiving diplomas of proficiency in the bow, spear, sword and horsemanship, the sword apparently being his forte. Confident that now no one was entitled to criticise him, he returned to his first love, go.

In 1823, Sekiyama played a game with another famous amateur player, Nagasaka Inosuke, a samurai retainer known for his mastery of the spear, to determine the top amateur in Japan. The game was played from the 8th to the 10th June and the sword prevailed over the spear.

In 1826, Sekiyama returned to Edo and became a disciple of the 11th Honinbo, Genjo (1775 – 1832) and he also studied under Jowa. He reached 5-dan level, but as his profession was that of samurai, he remained a shodan all his life. He did request the Honinbo school for a 5-dan diploma, but Jowa hesitated to give it to him, since there was no precedent for promoting an amateur player directly from 1-dan to 5-dan. As a consolation prize, he offered Sekiyama a 3-dan diploma, but Sekiyama stood on his dignity and refused it. In effect, the Honinbo school recognised him as a 5-dan, because it let him play at the handicap for a 5-dan. It is said that Sekiyama actually considered himself a 7-dan.

In 1831, before leaving for home again, Sekiyama asked Jowa for a farewell game. He won it by one point, playing on two stones, and always referred to it as his lifetime masterpiece. His most substantial achievement, however, was his victory over the 12th Hayashi, Hakuei Monnyu (1805 – 64), in a seventeen-game series the two played in 1841 (Sekiyama scored eleven wins).

Sekiyama was also proficient as a man of letters. He published a collection of six hundred classic games with his own commentary, a work which enjoyed quite a good reputation during the Edo period (Ohira refers to it in Game Five of *Appreciating Famous Games*), and also put out a collection of two hundred of his own games.

Although living in Matsushiro, Sekiyama heard of Shusaku's growing reputation and he wrote a letter to Shuwa requesting him to arrange for Shusaku to come to Matsushiro to play a series with him. Perhaps to Sekiyama's surprise, Shusaku accepted the invitation and made the journey to Matsuyo. Such was Sekiyama's eagerness that he started the

series the day Shusaku arrived. Sekiyama played on black (josen) and the results are given below.

- Game 1 (3rd June, 1851). Shusaku won by resignation.
- Game 2 (4th June). Shusaku won by 4 points.
- Game 3 (5th June). Sekiyama won by resignation.
- Game 4 (6th June). Shusaku won by 6 points.
- Game 5 (7th June). Sekiyama won by resignation.
- Game 6 (7th, 8th June). Shusaku won by 4 points.
- Game 7 (9th June). Sekiyama won by 3 points.
- Game 8 (10th June). Sekiyama won by 2 points.
- Game 9 (11th June). Shusaku won by 3 points.
- Game 10 (12th June). Shusaku won by resignation.
- Game 11 (13th June). Shusaku won by 9 points.
- Game 12 (14th June). Shusaku won by 3 points.
- Game 13 (14th, 15th June). Shusaku won by resignation.
- Game 14 (15th, 16th June). Shusaku won by 5 points.
- Game 15 (17th June). Shusaku won by resignation.
- Game 16 (18th June). Sekiyama won by resignation.
- Game 17 (18th, 19th June). Sekiyama won by resignation.
- Game 18 (20th June). Shusaku won by resignation.
- Game 19 (21st, 22nd June). Shusaku won by resignation.
- Game 20 (23rd June). Sekiyama won by 1 point.

Shusaku of course won the series, but Sekiyama managed to pick up seven wins, a most commendable performance for a man of sixty-seven against an opponent of twenty-two. Shusaku had probably accepted Sekiyama's challenge in a light-hearted frame of mind, but all the same he could not have afforded the disgrace of losing to an amateur, so he must have played quite seriously, though perhaps not as seriously as in the later match against Ota Yuzo. The fact that the handicap was not changed when Shusaku took a lead of four games indicates that josen had been agreed on for the whole series. The pace at which it was played, a game a day, is an indication of Sekiyama's enthusiasm for go and also of Shusaku's generosity in accommodating his opponent. Not many modern professionals would undertake a series on such conditions.

After the final game, Sekiyama offered Shusaku a match fee of twenty *ryo*. Shusaku tried to refuse, on the grounds that it was too large a sum, but Sekiyama protested that it was money which he had saved solely for the purpose of inviting Shusaku to Matsushiro and that he would be offended if Shusaku did not accept it, so the latter gave way.

This might have seemed a suitable note on which to retire for Sekiyama, but his appetite for go was still not satisfied. In 1856, then seventy-two, he invited Murase Shuho to Matsuyo for a jubango, but whether because of his more advanced age or because Shuho was a sterner opponent, he was only able to secure one win and one *jigo*.

Games One, Two, Three and Nineteen from the Nijubango are presented below and Games Six, Fifteen, Seventeen and Twenty are given in Part Two.

Game Twenty-Eight: Shusaku v. Sekiyama (1851)

Nijubango, Game One

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Black: Sekiyama Sendai

Date: 3rd June, 1851

174 moves: Black resigns.

Adapted from a commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan




Figure 1 (1 – 62)

ko: 39, 42

Figure 1 (1 – 62). An early ko

Black 1, 3, 5. The mokuhazushi is favoured by aggressive players and was used by Sekiyama in every game of the series.

Black 11. A ladder-block so that Black can wedge in at 17. If the ladder favoured White, he would play 20 at 21.

White 14. White crawls one more space than usual.

Black 25. Played to prevent White from pressing at 25, but the exchange for 26 is now considered unfavourable for Black. Instead, he should extend to 'a'.

When Black pushes up at 29, the continuation to 37 is natural. White now starts the ko at the top. The ko is very large, but Black cannot ignore White 40,

as White would kill him with White 41, Black 53, White 'b'.

Black 43 is the best ko threat. Pushing through at 'c' on the right is the other obvious candidate; White would still ignore it, finishing the ko with 44, then when Black followed up with 'd', White would extend to 'e', making it very difficult for Black to find a reasonable continuation on the left side. Moreover, White would still be able to live in the bottom right corner, so all in all the result would be a favourable one for White.


White 46 is a slip by Shusaku and Sekiyama shrewdly takes advantage of it by attacking at 47. Simply extending to 'a' was correct for White. However, the aim of 46 becomes apparent when White attaches at 52.

Dia. 1. White is not interested in the simple endgame profit of 1 and 3. Rather –

Dia. 2. If Black answers White 1 at 2, then White is able to live with 3 to 9, in sente, moreover, which adds insult to injury.

Black 53 is the correct answer. Black seems to suffer a loss with White 54 and 56, but as compensation he is able to attack White's group with 57.

White 62. A necessary sacrifice to take sente.







Figure 2 (63 – 100)

Figure 2 (63 – 100). Shusaku's hallucination and Sekiyama's overplay

White 70 is incomprehensible – perhaps Shusaku hallucinated here. He may have intended to answer Black 71 with an atari at 'a' (if Black 75, then White 73 would be just right), in which case he overlooked the fact that Black would extend to 73. White has to change course with 72, but giving Black the free ponnuki at 75 is very generous.

White 82 is an exemplary reinforcement. Eliminating any sente moves Black might have against the group on the side offers considerable assistance, though indirect, to the centre group.

Black 87 is over-aggressive, inviting a severe counterattack at 88. Enclosing the top right corner with 'b' (in effect, a waiting move) would have given Black a



Dia. 3

promising game. The calm move of 82 and the over-hasty attacking move of 87 are perhaps an indication of the difference in calibre between these two players.

Black 89. If at 'c', White would strike at the vital point of 98.

Black 93. Black does not want to cut as in Dia. 3 and White 4 and 6 are the reason why.

White 100 sets up a placement at 'd'.




Figure 3 (101 – 135)

Figure 3 (101 – 135). A chance for Black

Black 1 is too impatient: connecting with Black 2 is the honte. White would force with 'a', then jump to 'b', so Black could then play 'c' and would get an even game. Cutting with 2 and 4 strengthens White and weakens Black. His irregular enclosure at 1 does not work well anyway, since he has to defend the corner with 7, letting White stake out a nice position with 6 and 8.

Black 11 is careless. Black should exchange 23 for White 19, then reinforce with Black 12; White would have to connect at 'd' (after making his forcing move at 'a'), so Black could then switch to 11.

Black has no effective answer to White's attack with 12 and 14. Black 15 is

the best that he can do, but White succeeds in cutting off a few stones and is able to dispense with connecting at 'd'. Black also ends in gote up to 23.

White 28. The difference between 28 and Black 'e' is nearly twenty points.

White 32. White should first force with 'f'; at this stage Black would have no choice but to answer at 'g' so White could then play 32. The mistake in timing gives Black a last chance to make a try for victory.




Figure 4 (136 – 174)
ko: 63, 66, 69, 72


Figure 4 (136 – 174). A bad ko for Black.

White 36 is too late after the 34–35 exchange in the previous figure. Capturing two stones with 40 at 45 would not be enough for White, so he fights back with 42.

The continuation to 53 is forced. If Black played 51 at 58, White would be able to link up by pushing through at 51.

The result is a ko, but Black has virtually no ko threats, while White has an unlimited number at the bottom.

White 74 is a good point at which to resign. If Black connected at 1 in Dia. 4, White would connect the ko, for Black



Dia. 4

cannot do anything on the left. If Black 3, White cuts at 4, then at 8 and wins the capturing race after 14.

Sekiyama's own comment on the game: 'Black played well, but he made an oversight; he lost because of White's many exquisite moves.'

Black resigns after White 174.

Game Twenty-Nine: Shusaku v. Sekiyama (1851) Nijubango, Game Two

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Black: Sekiyama Sendai

Date: 4th June, 1851

248 moves. White wins by 4 points.

Commentary by Fujisawa Shuko 9-dan
Figure 1 (1 – 23). Thickness for Black

White 12 would now be played at 18; if next Black 13, White would hane at 20,




Figure 1 (1 – 23)

then tenuki after Black 19.

The result to 21 seems equal. Black is slightly thicker, but White gets sente to play 22, thus countering Black's influence to the right.




Figure 2 (24 – 58)

55: connects

Figure 2 (24 – 58). Tesuji in the corner

White 24. White is afraid that if he plays at 25, his influence at the bottom will be weakened when Black presses at 24.

White 30. White cannot permit Black 'a'.


Black 31 is solid, but Black 'b' would also be a very good move.

Black 33. Black should play at 34. Black 33 is too close to Black's own thickness; after all, an extension to 'c' by White would hardly worry Black. White 34 and 36 are a nice combination.


White 38 is well-timed. If White just answered 37 at 'd', Black 'e' would considerably strengthen the top left.

Black 41, 43. Black's idea is to drive White out in the hope that he can make use of his contact play at 37. Instead of 41 –

Dia. 1. If Black 1, White would easily live while taking the corner profit, which



Dia. 1



Dia. 2


would be an unsatisfactory result for Black.

Black 47, however, is a mistake. Black must play at 52 to continue his attack on the white group. Black must have overlooked White's tesuji combination of 48 and 50. It is quite a setback for Black's original attacking strategy with 41 etc. when White lives in the corner up to 56. Capturing a white stone in gote with 57 is not sufficient compensation, so already the game seems promising for White.

White 58 is an easygoing move: White perhaps relaxed because of the gain he made in the top left corner. Black 59 and 61 in the next figure are severe, so White should have played 58 at 1 in Dia. 2 in order to forestall them. If Black 2, White could force with 3 and 5, thereby strengthening himself before playing 7. White would have the large move of 'a' for later.

Figure 3 (59 – 100). White consolidates his lead.

Black 69. Black should hane at 1 in Dia. 3. If White 2 etc., Black could squeeze with 7, then capture two stones by pushing through at 'a'. That would make



Dia. 3




Figure 3 (59 – 100)

ko: 80, 83, 86; 89: captures three stones

Black thick and would be far better than the sequence in the game, where White lives easily by pulling back at 70.

The result to 84, with White living in sente, makes his lead definite.

White 92. To prevent Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'. Perhaps Black should keep 91 in reserve, since it only provokes White into securing his eye-shape.

White 100. If White intercepted at 'd', Black would hane at 'e' and would be able to live in the corner.

Figure 4 (101 – 152). White reduces Black's centre.

Black 3 might look efficient, but it is a dubious move, since it gives White the aji of the cut at 18. Black 3 at 25 would have been more solid. White promptly exploits the bad aji with 4 and 8.

White 10 is correct style: giving atari to 9 would be wrong. The reason –

Dia. 4. If Black later plays 1, White 2 threatens to capture two stones with 'a'. Since 2 is sente, blocking at 1 would be illogical for White.

White 12. If Black 'a', White intends to answer at 'b'.






Figure 4 (101 – 152)

6: connects



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Black 15. Surrounding at 50 would not be enough to win.

Black 17 aims at cutting off a stone with 'c'.

Black 21. Black cannot cut with 1 and 3 in Dia. 5.

White 24 etc. Reducing the centre sets the seal on victory for White.

White 36. White should connect at 44, which would be better aji.




Figure 5 (153 – 200)

Figure 5 (153 – 200)

Figure 6 (201 – 248)

The final hundred moves do not require any comment: Black is unable to narrow the gap. Black's mistake in direction with




Figure 6 (201 – 248)

48: connects

33 in Figure 2 and his failure to notice White's tesuji at 48 made this game difficult for him.

White wins by 4 points.

Game Thirty: Shusaku v. Sekiyama (1851) Nijubango, Game Three

Sekiyama must have been a little worried by his bad start to the nijubango, losing two in a row, but he recovered in the third game. It is one of his lifetime masterpieces.

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Black: Sekiyama Sendai

Date: 5th June, 1851

169 moves. White resigns.

Commentary by Kubomatsu Katsukiyo 8-dan

Figure 1 (1 – 52). The mokuhazushi classic

Black 1 – White 4. Sekiyama was well-known for his predilection for the mokuhazushi, but playing two mokuhazushis is unusual for Shusaku.

Black 3 could of course be at 7. When 1 and 2 are on the same corner point, the






Figure 1 (1 – 52)

19: ko

21: connects



Dia. 1



3: at 33 in the figure

side making the first approach move is considered to have the advantage.

Black 5. Black 7 would still be good. Black's aim with 5 is to stake out a high position, but this irregular enclosure should not be taken as a model for imitation.

Black 7, rather than Black 24, is the logical approach move, as it makes use of Black's influence on the top right.

Black 15. Black plays the simple version of the taisha, though extending at 16 would also be playable because of Black's influence on the top right.


Black 23 makes nice balance on the left side. The usual joseki is 'a', but if White played 27 next, Black would have to defend around 'b', whereas if White plays 27 after 23, Black intends to ignore him.

Black 25. Black might as well advance as far as 'c', since that would give him a good follow-up at 'd'. Presumably Black was worried about the invasion shown in Dia. 1. However, this invasion is not very powerful. If instead White invaded at 'a' and Black blocked at 'b', it would obviously be preferable to have the wide extension at 1. In any case, even when Black plays conservatively at 25 in the figure, White can still invade at 'e'.

White 26 is a good point, but making a kosumi at 27 is more urgent. Pressing at 27 makes the position easy for Black.

Black 29. Black has a reason for not following the usual joseki shown in Dia. 2.

Dia. 2. If Black 1 and White 2, Black would not want to keep pushing with 4 etc., as that would give White too much



Dia. 3

territory at the bottom. However, if he switched to 33 in the figure, White would build thickness by pushing up with 4 to 8.

White 30. White avoids the hanekomi joseki in Dia. 3.

Dia. 3. The sequence to 7 gives Black too much thickness and leaves White with a thin position. The aji of White 'a' is not sufficient compensation.

The drawback of White 30 is that Black builds extra influence. Black 33 is a perfect follow-up.


Black 35. Correct shape – extending at 36 would be heavy. White must give atari at 36 to prevent Black from making a hane at 38. If White simply extended at 38, then gave atari at 36 later on, Black would give way at 48 instead of answering at 37.

White 40. If White came in a line further, to 'f', Black would cap at 'g'.

Black 45. Pushing once before defending creates an extra cutting point in White's shape.

White 48. This sacrifice indirectly reinforces the weak points in White's shape by making White 'h' sente.

White 52 aims at the sequence to 5 in Dia. 4. It thus relieves some of the pressure on White's weak point at 'a'.



Dia. 4 4: connects




Figure 2 (53 – 80)

Figure 2 (53 – 80). Sekiyama seizes the initiative.

Black 55. Black 61 is a good point, but would have too little effect on White, so Black plays more aggressively. His aim is to defend his weak point at 'a' in the corner in sente.


Black 57. A fighting move which leads to a surprising variation. Black could have pulled back peacefully at 1 in Dia. 5, but he did not want to permit White 2.

White 58. White has to do something. If he connected at 1 in Dia. 6, Black would be happy to play 2, as that would be an improvement on Dia. 5.


Black 59. Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 7 would be just what White wants, as he could spring the tesuji of 4 and 6 on Black.

White 62. The sacrifice is necessary. If White plays at 64 immediately, Black will follow Dia. 8 instead of connecting at 65.


Dia. 8. Without the 62–63 exchange in the figure, White does not have a good answer to the cut at 2. White 3 is strongest, but Black's cut at 6 enables him to connect underneath up to 10. If next White connects at 6, Black will play 'a' to prevent White from living in the corner.




Dia. 5




Dia. 6




Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

White 66. Shusai Meijin is said to have commented that White should attach at 67 instead. Since the result when Black plays 67 is bad for White, that idea is worth considering.

Dia. 9. The idea is probably to play 1 to 9. If Black blocks at 'a' instead of 2, then either 2 or 3 would be good for White.

Black 73. If at 'b', White gets an atari at 73. Black plays 73 because he does not have to worry about White's forcing move at 'c' unless he tries to play through the gap at 'd'. Black can be satisfied with the result to 73. White may have broken through the middle of Black's original corner enclosure, but Black has got good shape on both sides as compensation.

White 74. White strengthens himself before invading.

Black 77. Black 77 attempts to make 76 mochikomi, that is, to capture it without giving any compensation. That would be unbearable for White, so he naturally attacks with

78 and 80. When he played 76, he presumably expected Black 'e', in which case White could exchange 'f' for Black 'g', then also force with 'h', building thickness in the centre.

Black 79 is the only move. If Black 'i', taking profit with 'j' would be good for White, while he could also start a fight by crosscutting at 'k'.




Figure 3 (81 – 111)

Figure 3 (81 – 111). White lives, but ...


Black 89. If at 1 in Dia. 10, White easily gets eye-shape with 2 and 4. He might also be able to take the offensive from Black.

Black 91. Essential now to forestall White 'a'. The continuation to 100 is forced.

Black 103. Dia. 11 shows that attempting to kill White with 1 is unreasonable.

White secures his group up to 104, but he has not upset Black's lead. Black has cut at 99 and has also taken compensation in the corner with 103, which sets up the attack at 111.

Black 105 is aggressive. If White cuts at 109, Black plans to sacrifice four stones, then attack by cutting at 'c', after first forcing with 'b'.



Dia. 11

Black 107 is correctly timed, as at this stage White will answer at 108 in order to keep sente. Black can now capture a stone with Black 'd', White 'e', Black 'f', which might be helpful if White tried to attack his eye-shape in the corner with White 'g', Black 'h', White 'i'. If Black played 107 after 109, White might answer with White 'd', Black 108, White 'e'.

Figure 4 (112 – 169). Sekiyama's triumph

White 22. If at 26, White loses the threat of cutting at 'a'.

Black 63 shows that Black is confident of winning. He has a lead of around ten points.

Sekiyama: 'Black played well. This is a game I would not be ashamed to show to anyone.'

White resigns after Black 169.




Figure 4 (112 – 169)

Game Thirty-One: Shusaku v. Sekiyama (1851)

Nijubango, Game Nineteen

Commentary by Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Black: Sekiyama Sendai

Date: 21st, 22nd June, 1851

250 moves. Black resigns.






Figure 1 (1 – 34)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2


Figure 1 (1 – 34). Sekiyama's aggressive start

Black 7. Black is clearly in an aggressive mood. White has three ways to answer.


Dia. 1. If White 1, then Black blocks at 2; White 3 at 'a' is of course bad, so White will simply connect at 3, whereupon Black can make a pincer at 4.

Dia. 2. White 1 and 3 are more aggressive; Black can continue with 'a' or 'b'.


Dia. 3. Black 1 is the tesuji in this shape and the moves to 5 form a set sequence.




Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

12: connects

Dia. 4. If instead White tries to come out with 2 here, Black counters with the combination of 3 and 5. After White 8 (which could also be at 'a'), Black captures two stones with 9, a result which gives Black profit and White influence.

Dia. 5. Pressing at 1 is also a strong move. If White 2, Black blocks at 3; if White 4, Black plays 5 or 'a'.

Dia. 6. If White answers on the side with 2, Black squeezes with 3 to 11, then with 13 etc. forces White to crawl along the side.

In the game Shusaku chooses the most peaceful move, the simple extension at 8.


Black 9 is another severe move — Black 21 would be slack.

Black 11. Black 16, permitting White to play at 11, would be too mild.


White 12. If at 16, 26 would be just right for Black.

Black 15. If at 16, White would be glad to turn at 15. Black hopes to use 13 and 15 to set up a moyo at the top left.

White 16. If White plays 1 in Dia. 7, Black lives with 2 to 6. Capturing at 'a'



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

would now make White overconcentrated because of White 1, so this would be a painful result for White.

Black 17 and 19 are carefully-timed moves. If Black plays 19 first, that is, 1 in Dia. 8 –

Dia. 8. White will answer at 2, then counter with 4 when Black attaches at 3. Black will be in for a hard time after the sequence to 10.


Dia. 9. If White plays 2 when the Δ exchange has been made, Black can play the combination of 3 and 5. After the sequence to 11, White does not have a suitable move for defending the cutting point at 'a' (he would be reluctant simply to connect at 'a').

For the above reason White gives atari at 20 and so Black connects at 21. As we have seen, there was more to these moves than meets the eye.



Black 27. It would not be to Black's advantage to take the ko with 1 in Dia. 10. Black 1 would of course be sente, so Black could cut next at 3, but then White would capture the ko and ignore any threat Black made with 5. White 6 is sente, so starting this ko would be unreasonable for Black. Moreover, as explained later, Black 1 is aji-keshi.

White 28. Essential – a hane at 29 would be a bad mistake. If Black is allowed to play 'a' in sente, he can as a minimum start the ko in Dia. 10, while actually he would get the chance to make an even more dangerous attack.


Dia. 11. If White 1, Black forces with 2, then descends at 4. The continuation to 10 sets up a ko in which the life of the



Dia. 9

Dia. 10
4:ko; 5: ko threat

Dia. 11



Dia. 12

whole white group is at stake, in contrast to Dia. 10.

Black 33 is another of Sekiyama's irregular enclosures. Here it is a good move which works well with Black's left side moyo. Instead of 33 –

Dia. 12. Pushing through the centre with 1 is a large-scale move which looks tempting. However, after the natural continuation to 12 given here, Black might have reason to feel apprehensive, for while White gets fairly secure territory, Black's moyo is so vast that he has no real idea how much actual territory he will get out of it.

White 34. A thick move – though it looks slow, it is the only move.





Figure 2 (35 – 55)


Figure 2 (35 – 55). Invading the moyo

Black 35. Another unorthodox shimari, also played with an eye to the centre. If instead Black plays 1 in Dia. 13, White will play 2 and 4, then invade at 6. Once again Black would find that his moyo is too big, for he would have little chance of capturing White. He would thus get no compensation for permitting White 2 and 4.

White 38 is an excellent invasion point, though not one which readily occurs to one. Black seems to have little choice about answering at 39, though he would like to attack with 1 in Dia. 14.



Dia. 13




Dia. 14

Dia. 15

Dia. 14. If White were kind enough to answer at 2, Black 1 would work very well. Black 3 makes White heavy and sets up an ideal attack for Black. However, White is not on Black's side, so instead of 2 –

Dia. 15. He would play the combination of 2 and 4, a standard tactic for settling oneself. If Black 5, White gets a good result with 6 to 10. Therefore, instead of 5 –

Dia. 16. Black would give atari at 1 here. The continuation to 11 is forced, but then White's cut at 12 presents Black with quite a difficult problem. If Black plays 'a', then White's corner is alive as it stands, but if he captures at 'b', White gives atari at 'a' before living in the corner. This atari would leave Black with a lot of bad aji on the outside.



Dia. 16

White 42. Played to give White the aji of a cut at 'a'.

White 44 looks narrow but is preferable to the thin move at 48.

Black 45. Black 'b', letting White extend to 51, is of course too passive.

White 46. If Black answers at 53, White will play 'b' or 'c', aiming at the attachment at 50.

Black 47 is the fighting answer. The continuation to 55 is forced.





Figure 3 (56 – 80)



Dia. 17


Figure 3 (56 – 80). The crucial fight

Black 57 is an interesting twist. The usual move would be Black 1 in Dia. 17, but that would give White excellent moves at 2 and 4, after which he could safely switch to 6 on the right. Black would not be happy with this, so he plays 57 in an attempt to take sente.

White 62 is necessary – refer to Dia. 11.

Black 63 is an all-out move. Black seems to have gone in too deep, but he must have judged that simply extending down the side, at ‘a’, for example, was not enough. White naturally counterattacks at 64. The ensuing fight is the highlight of the game.

Dia. 18. The tame answer at 1 would suit Black fine, for he would have no trouble settling himself with 2 to 8. Black



Dia. 18

gains more in this result than White.

Dia. 19. Crawling at 1 is little different. Black once again easily settles himself inside White’s sphere of influence. White has to play more aggressively.


White 66 looks natural but is a severe move nonetheless, making sure Black does not get room for eye-space.

Black 67. Attaching at 70 is one standard way of settling oneself, but here it does not work well, due to the presence of White 66.


Dia. 20. If Black tries to settle himself with the 1–3 combination, White has a good answer at 4. If Black 5 and 7, the continuation to 24 is forced. Since ‘a’ and ‘b’ are miai for White, Black is captured. Instead of 15 –

Dia. 21. If Black blocks at 1, White cuts at 2. After White cuts at 10 and 12, Black collapses.


White 68 is a strong move. White 1 in Dia. 22 would only help Black to make



Dia. 20



Dia. 21



Dia. 22

good shape with 2 and 4.

White 78. The key point for stealing Black's eye-shape. Black 79 in reply is correct shape, making miai of 'b' and 'c'.





Figure 4 (81 – 114)

106: connects


Figure 4 (81 – 114). The cut backfires.

White 86. Cutting at 'a' would give Black a good move at 'b'.


Black 91. At the moment Black cannot save his stones at the bottom: if he connects at 103, White cuts at 'a' and vice versa. Black therefore attaches at 91 in the hope of engineering a squeeze at the bottom, while at the same time he also has an eye on the still insecure white group at the top left. White attempts to spoil Black's shape a little with 92 to 98 before attending to his group at the top. White 100 is a probe before reinforcing.



Dia. 23



Dia. 24



Dia. 25

If Black cuts at 'c', White will continue with 'd', Black 'e', White 'f'.

What happens if White cuts at 'a'?

Dia. 23. If White 1, Black will first give atari at 2. Surrendering these four stones would give Black a lot of thickness, so let's assume White connects at 3. After cutting with 4 and 6, Black answers White 7 with the tesuji of 8. If White 11 at 12, Black captures White by making a throw-in at 'a', so the moves to 14 are forced. Next –

Dia. 24. If White 15, Black forces with 16 and 18, then attacks the whole group with 20 and 22.

Dia. 25. Black plays 24 and 26, then if White persists in trying to kill Black by playing 27 and 29, Black gets a ko with 30 and 32. For White this result would be

equivalent to collapse.

Since cutting at 'a' is out of the question, White defends with 110, after first forcing with 104 to 108. It should be apparent now that even after 114 White cannot attempt to cut at 'a'. The overall result in the bottom part of the board is very satisfactory for Sekiyama — he has demonstrated considerable fighting prowess.





Figure 5 (115 – 150)

Figure 5 (115 – 150). Shusaku parries one attack and launches another.

Black 19 is an uncompromising move — Sekiyama seems to be spoiling for another fight and obviously considers connecting at 22 beneath his dignity. In attacking White with 19, his aim is to create an opportunity to give atari at 'a' during the course of the fight. Doing this immediately is not advisable.

Dia. 26. If Black plays 1 at this point, White will counter-atari with 2, enabling him to pick up six stones with 2 to 8. This capture is not only large in itself, it also makes it possible for White to cut at 'a'.

White defends once with 20, then captures a stone with 22 and 24. This ponnuki




Dia. 26

does more than set up the capture with White 31, for it also creates the threat of White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f'.

Black 25 prevents White from connecting underneath and also defends against the threat of White 'b'. In response, White decides that the simplest course is to discard his five stones, so he switches to 26 to 30. Shusaku has thus neatly parried the attack initiated by Black 19, but Sekiyama can be satisfied with his profit nonetheless.

Dia. 27. The game will be decided by how much territory Black gets at the top. White begins his attack with 36, the move he was aiming at when he played 100 in Figure 4.

Black 37. If Black cuts at 1 in Dia. 27, White 2 and Black 3 will follow. White will then invade at 4 and Black will be handicapped in the subsequent fighting by the aji of White 'a'. Black decides that cutting at 37 is preferable. After



Dia. 27

37, the moves to 43 are forced.

White 44. A good move which makes miai of 46 and 'g'. In reply, Black cuts at 45, exchanging the top for the side, then unexpectedly ignores 46 altogether, switching to the top right corner.




Figure 6 (151 – 200)

ko (at 54): 71, 74; 91: below 76
93: connects

Figure 6 (151 – 200). The decisive battle

White 52. A natural invasion once White has built thickness on the left.


Black 61. Necessary to prevent White 61.

White 66 looks after the white group, though it does not secure unconditional eye-shape. At this stage Black cannot attempt to kill White. Instead of 67 –


Dia. 28. If Black tries to kill White with 1, he can get a ko at 3, but when White counterattacks with 4 to 8, Black gets a lot of nasty aji on the outside. Expecting to capture White would be unreasonable.

White 68 is an efficient move which helps the beleaguered group on the right. Although Black takes the ko with 71, White can always rely on the sequence in *Dia. 29* to rescue his group.

Dia. 29. If White 1, Black cannot play 2



Dia. 28



Dia. 29

because of White 3 and 5.


Black 75. Black is looking for a chance to play 'a' in sente, thus making the ko on the right a serious threat.

Black 77. This crosscut is a clever move. Even though White seems safe with 80, Black is able to exploit the weaknesses in his wall with 81 etc. White has to connect at 84, rather than make a ponnuki at 'b', because he cannot permit Black to play at 84.

White 88. Necessary, as White would lose a semeai.

White 90. If White connected at 91, Black 90 would prove very troublesome. Before that, however, there is the problem of what would happen if Black played 89 at 90, that is, 1 in *Dia. 30*.

Dia. 30. If Black 1, answering with 2 and 4 is the safe way for White to play. If Black attacks his eye-shape with 5 and 7, White forces with 8, then lives with 10. This means that the black group in the top centre dies. Black could now start the ko by playing 'a', but since he also loses his eyes when White plays 'b', this would be too dangerous. Black therefore plays



Dia. 30

peacefully with 91 and 93 in the figure.

When the fight comes to an end with 93, White is seen to have taken a lead in territory. Although Sekiyama played aggressively and demonstrated impressive strength in the infighting, Shusaku's greater skill and overall grasp of the position enabled him to parry successfully the series of attacks launched by his opponent. The lightness of Shusaku's style is the most memorable feature of this game.

Figure 7 (201 – 250)
Black resigns after White 250.

Sekiyama did a little better in the first half of the nijubango – he won four of the first ten games and three of the second ten – but all in all he performed surprisingly well against Shusaku. Perhaps the most impressive aspect of the series was that Sekiyama played his own individualistic style of go throughout, giving free rein to his innate aggressiveness and indulging to the full his penchant for irregular shimaris. He in turn was impressed by Shusaku's originality. Sekiyama played mokuhazushi in every game, but each time Shusaku responded with a




Figure 7 (201 – 250)
49: at 31

different fuseki strategy. He must have enjoyed the series just as much as Sekiyama.

Finally, the reader might like to test his insight by making up his own mind whether or not Shusaku threw the final game (given in Part Two), which he lost by 1 point, as a present to Sekiyama.

Game Thirty-Two: Shusaku v. Shuwa (1851-52)

This is the final game of the twenty-seven played between Shusaku and Shuwa and it is a fitting conclusion to the series, for it is a masterpiece. Although won by Shusaku, the game is remembered as an outstanding example of Shuwa's 'amashi' strategy, which will be explained in the commentary. There is only one bad move in this game and that was played by 'accident'.

White: Honinbo Shuwa 8-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Date: 28th October, 1851 (to move 81);
22nd March, 1852

255 moves. Black wins by 3 points.

Commentary by Segoe Kensaku, with reference to a commentary by Sugiuchi Masao




Figure 1 (1 – 45)


Figure 1 (1 – 45). Shuwa's amashi

White 8, preventing Black 'a', was the most common counter to the Shusaku-style fuseki.


White 12. White 'b' would be the usual move, but Shuwa presumably felt that that would let Black dictate the pace of the game.

Black 13. Answering White 12 with 2 and 4 in Dia. 1 would be submissive.

White 12, 14 and 18 indicate that Shuwa is following a strategy of 'amashi', a term for which it is difficult to give a succinct



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

definition. The aim of 'amashi' is to outlast the opponent, to let him take good points, but to follow hard on his heels by taking profit. Shuwa refined 'amashi' to a very high level as a strategy for White in no-komi games. The natural tendency with 'amashi' is for the game to become a contest between Black's thickness and White's profit.

White 14. If White made a pincer at 37, Black would counter by playing at 14 himself, leading to a fighting game.


Black 17. Black expects 2 in Dia. 2, after which the sequence to 7 would be natural. Because of the distance of the Δ stone, there would be little pressure on the \blacktriangle stone.

White 18 illustrates the spirit of 'ama-


shi': White frustrates Black's attempts to control the flow of the game by going for territory instead of fighting. White does not mind giving Black the chance to press down on him with 19 and 27, for he is content to counter Black's influence by taking solid profit.

Black 25 is clearly a bad move, the only flaw in this game. According to Sugiuchi 9-dan, the continuation to 34 is inevitable, at which point —

Dia. 3. Black 1 and 3 are not sente — they are mere endgame moves.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4


Without the 25–26 exchange —

Dia. 4. Black 1 and 3 are sente. If White does not defend, Black can kill him with 5 and 7. Being able to play 3 in sente makes a big difference.


Why would Black play 25 then?

Dia. 5. If the $\Delta \blacktriangle$ exchange has been made, then it would be bad for White to answer Black 1 with 2 and 4, as Black captures with 5 and 7. Without the $\Delta \blacktriangle$ exchange —

Dia. 6. Black just breaks through into the top with 5. Even if he later captures two white stones, this result is not so bad for White, since he has not given Black that extra stone in *Dia. 5*. However, this result is still satisfactory for Black (White becomes over-concentrated on the left), so actually White will not follow either *Dia. 5* or *Dia. 6*. There is thus no justifi-



Dia. 5



Dia. 6


cation for 25 in the figure.

After the game Shusaku explained what went wrong. Black 25 was not played on the first day of the game, but when it was resumed five months later, Shusaku pushed through at 25 when he and Shuwa were replaying the moves made on the first day. As the game progressed, it gradually dawned on him that 25 should not be on the board, but by then it was too late to do anything about it.

White 32. Cutting at 1 in *Dia. 7* would be bad. If White led his stone out, he would get into an unfavourable fight, while letting Black capture the stone would make Black too thick. When White simply connects at 32, he can still aim at the cutting point.

Black 35. A key point for both sides. Strengthening this group indirectly defends the weak point at 'c'.

White 40, 42. Correct order. If White played 42 first, then after Black 43—White 40, Black would give atari at 44 instead of answering at 41.



Dia. 7





Figure 2 (46 – 66)



Dia. 8

Figure 2 (46 – 66). Settling a group


White 46. Defending at 47 would be solid but would have no effect whatsoever on Black. White hopes to expand his bottom area by attacking with 46.

Black 47 is very severe. Playing solidly at the start now proves its value in enabling Black to counterattack strongly. As an alternative to 47, Black could exchange 'a' for 'b', then switch to 'c' at the top.


White 48 is correct shape. If at 1 in Dia. 8, attaching at 4 would be just right for Black. He should be able to solidify his corner territory. If White 1 at 'a', Black plays 'b'.

Black 51. Bad shape but correct. Black 1 in Dia. 9 would make it easier for White to settle himself, for example, with 2 to 6.


Black 53 is best: it gives White least help in settling his stones, though he




Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

does get forcing moves on the outside at 54 etc. If Black plays 53 at 1 in Dia. 10, White lives on a large scale with 2 to 8.

White 54. White could of course live in the corner with the sequence shown in Dia. 11, but at the cost of giving Black thickness. Black 8 would stop the two white stones dead in their tracks.

Black 55. If at 2 in Dia. 12, White will cut at 3 and settle his group beautifully.

White 58 is the final tesuji for sabaki.

Black 61. One's first impulse is to hane at 1 in Dia. 13, but things become surprisingly awkward when White cuts at 2. White next makes good shape with 4 etc. Black can take territory at the bottom, but the position is complicated. If Black had first exchanged 'a' for White 'b', he

could link up by playing at 12, which is why he plays 61 in the figure.

White 62. White cannot answer 61 at 63, so the exchange to 66 is natural. The result is even and the whole sequence from 52 to 69 seems flawless.




Figure 3 (67 – 105)
ko: 99, 102

Figure 3 (67 – 105). Black plays solidly.


Black 69 is necessary. If omitted, White would get a nice attacking move at 1 in Dia. 14. If Black 2 at 'a', White would answer at 'b' and have the aji of White 'c'.

When White starts the second fight of the game by attacking at 70, Black tries to live as quickly as possible with 71 to 77. Black 71 creates good eye-potential – if Black jumped to 88 instead, White would immediately peep at 71.

White 72 defends against Black 'a'.

Black 77. If Black 97, White 98, Black 89, Black loses his eye-shape when White peeps at 'b'. Black's group is secure after 77.

Dia. 15. Even if White attacks with 1 and 3, Black can make an eye on the side and White cannot take away his eye in the centre. Black 'a' is sente.



Dia. 14

Dia. 15

White 78 is the most urgent point on the board, but apart from when he played 47, Black did not have a chance to play there. The game is developing evenly, with Black maintaining a slight lead.

Black 79 nips in the bud the threat of White 'c', followed by White 'd'.

White 80 is a key point for building influence and is preparation for the cut at 88. Black has to make the solid answer at 81.


Dia. 16. If Black hanes at 2, White strikes with 3 and 5, setting up a sente cut at 7. If Black 2 at 'a', White can still play 7.

White 88. White is staking his fortunes on the centre. Black forces with 91 before living.

White 98. If at 103, then Black 98, White 'e', Black 'f' and White would have to resign.

Black 103. The black group is now just about settled. Later Black can play at 'g', threatening either to connect to the left or to start the ko again.

White 104. The biggest point. Defending at 105 is advisable.



Dia. 16





Figure 4 (106 – 150)



Dia. 17

7: connects

Figure 4 (106 – 150). A judicious sacrifice

Black 7 is a good, well-balanced move. If White does not capture with 8, Black will escape with Black 8, White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.


White 10. When Black blocks off White's path to the centre with 9, he threatens next to attack with Black 43, White 46, Black 13. That would be severe, so White hanes at 10. Out of fighting spirit, Black ignores him, making a hane at 11 in the bottom right. The aim of 11 is similar to that of White 10: to prevent the opponent from squeezing one down to the minimum eye-shape. In Black's case, the attack he is concerned to forestall is shown in Dia. 17.

Dia. 17. Black just barely manages to get his two eyes in the corner, but losing the threat of blocking at 9 is painful.

Note that attempting to kill Black by playing 11 at 12 is unreasonable, since Black plays 11 and Black 'a' is sente. Even if he had the chance to play this sequence, however, White might keep it in reserve, for if he got enough ko threats, he might be able to play the ko at 8.

White 24 is a severe follow-up to White 18, but the fact that Black summarily discards his three stones with 29 etc. indicates that he has calculated that this way he has a safe winning margin. The rock-like solidity of Shusaku's play is impressive. Throughout the game he has only led by the narrowest margin, but for all the brilliance of his play, Shuwa has been unable to throw him off balance for an instant.

White 26 is an important forcing move. If White plays at 28 immediately, that is, at 1 in Dia. 18, Black might sacrifice his stones with the sequence to 10, gaining a superior result to that in the game.



Dia. 18

Figure 5 (151 – 200). Maintaining the territorial balance

White seems to profit considerably by reducing Black to a bare two eyes up to 65, but then he has to go back to defend at 66, so Black redresses the balance with the large move of 67. Every time one thinks that one side has seized an advantage, the other immediately recovers. The overall balance is never upset. The games between Shuwa and Shusaku often give one the impression of a stream of smoothly-flowing water. There is nothing unreasonable or impetuous, the development of their games is always smooth and




Figure 5 (151 – 200)
ko: 94, 97; 99: connects

harmonious. There is a similarity in their styles, especially in the profundity of their positional judgement. If one were to distinguish between them, one could say that Shuwa's style is more clear and limpid, Shusaku's has more depth and resonance.

Black 99 clinches a win for Black, but there was nothing that White could do. He could not afford to spend a move to connect at 91 before Black played 89, while playing 90 at 91, letting Black link up with 'a', would not help either.




Figure 6 (201 – 255)

Figure 6 (201 – 255). A masterpiece

Black 9, 13. Additional profit which accrues to Black from winning the ko. White survives the attack with the sacrifice tesuji of 16.

This game is justly considered a classic. Apart from the one dubious move at 25 in Figure 1 which insinuated itself into the game record, Black's play was faultless. At the same time Shuwa's play was also beyond criticism. The calm serenity of his 'amashi' style represents the height of refinement of classical go.

Black wins by 3 points.

Game Thirty-Three: Shusaku v. Ito Showa (1851-52)

In this game, begun just before the 1851 castle games, Ito Showa uses Shusaku's own fuseki pattern against him. It is interesting to see how Shusaku copes with the fuseki which he considered made Black invincible.

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Black: Ito Showa 7-dan

Date: 9th November, 1851; concluded on the 12th June, 1852

154 moves. Black resigns.

Commentary by Kajiwara Takeo 9-dan




Figure 1 (1 – 40)


Figure 1 (1 – 40). Inappropriate josekis

White 8. White 'a', preventing Black 11, is most common, but White 8 is also a large point. One cannot say which is better.


Black 9. Nowadays Black would extend to 11 immediately and aim at attacking at 10 or 'b' later.

Black 15. Jumping to 1 in Dia. 1 seems preferable. If White 2, Black connects at 3 and gets nice thickness. In the game White switches to 16, giving Black no suitable follow-up to 15. Black 17 feels just a little slack.


White 18. Another severe pincer. Black 19 is a joseki, but the result to 32 seems



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

favourable for White. Black could also have considered the kosumi at 1 in Dia. 2.


Dia. 2. If Black 1 to 5, White defends at 6 and is still satisfied with the result. Instead of 5 –

Dia. 3. The modern joseki of attaching at 5 would be interesting here. After the sequence to 13, White would probably play 14, but Black could be satisfied with 15 and 17.


Black 33. White is strong on the right side, so the lighter approach move at 'c' seems correct. If White 'd', Black 'e' would be perfect. Instead of 'd' –

Dia. 4. White would probably counter with a pincer at 2, in which case Black would have to switch to the corner with 3, leading to the exchange to 13.


White 34 is a severe pincer which makes good use of White's thickness at the top. Black seems to have no choice about answering at 35. If he attached at 1 in Dia. 5, the joseki to 14 would give White



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6


superb thickness which would fit in nicely with his moyo.

Black 39 is correct shape. Pushing up with 1 to 5 in Dia. 6 might seem to give Black greater thickness, but White 6 would affect the eye-shape of the group in the top right corner.


Figure 2 (41 – 100). Repercussions of the invasion

The sequence from Black 41 is the correct way to play in this position, in contrast to Dia. 6. The tesuji of 49 is a good continuation and gives Black a satisfactory result.

Black 55 is also a standard move: it applies pressure to White while building



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

up Black's centre moyo. The continuation to 64 is a joseki.

Black 65 is a severe invasion which starts the crucial fight of the middle game.

White 70 is a subtle probe. Black has to answer at 71 – if he pushed through at 1 in Dia. 7, White would seal him in with 2 and 4.

Black 73. If Black intercepted at 1 in Dia. 8, White would play 2, forcing Black 3, then force with 4 and 6 on the left. He would then reinforce at 8, satisfied with his corner profit. Black did not like this prospect, so he gave way with 73 in the figure.

The result to 80 seems a little favourable for White. Black's invasion at 65 has not caused him any significant damage.

White 80 forces Black to move out with 81 and 83. When Black intercepts with 85, White links up his groups with the light move of 86.

White 88 is a standard reducing move which sets up the shoulder-hit at 96. Black 89 is the most peaceful response, but when White continues with 90, Black decides that the time has come to attack.

White 96 is a clever move which induces Black to play 97 so that White can defend at 98.




Figure 2 (41 – 100)





Figure 3 (101 – 154)



Dia. 9


Figure 3 (101 – 154). White sacrifices his centre group.

White 2 is a tesuji for sabaki. Cutting at 4 would be dangerous for Black.

Dia. 9. If Black cuts at 1, White extends to 2; if Black 3, White forces once with 4, then jumps to 6. Black must defend at 7, so White is able to set up a ko with 8 to 14. This would be a terrible result for Black, so he simply turns at 3 in the figure.

In the sequence to 12, the side territory changes from black to white. Capturing the centre white stones is not sufficient compensation for Black, since White can make a big dent in the centre with 28 etc. White now has a comfortable win.

Black 49 is presumably just setting the scene for resignation, as Black cannot



Dia. 10

ignore White 48. After 54, Black has to throw in the towel.

Dia. 10. If Black 1, White gives atari at 2, then escapes with 4 and 6. Black has to lose something. If Black 1 at 4, White comes through at 'a'.

This game demonstrates that the Shusaku style fuseki cannot be played by rote. Ito Showa's subsequent play was not quite up to Shusaku's standards.

Black resigns after White 154.

Game Thirty-Four: Shusaku v. Hayashi Hakuei Monnyu (1851)

Castle Game Five

This is Shusaku's first game against Hakuei Monnyu (1805 – 64), the 12th head of the Hayashi school. Hakuei Monnyu was the adopted son of Hayashi Gembí and he made his debut in the castle game as a shodan in 1822, the year he was appointed the Hayashi heir. He was a very durable player and he played in the last castle game in 1863, so his career at the top lasted for forty-one years. He was promoted to 7-dan in 1848, at the same time as Ota Yuzo and Ito Showa, but it was generally considered that his dan had outstripped his actual strength and apparently he himself accepted this verdict. In 1831 he lost a series with Sekiyama Sendaiu 6–11. However, he was very good at haya-go and once played four games in one day with Shuwa, winning two of them (no mean feat, since Shuwa was also noted for his haya-go).

Hakuei Monnyu may not have been a great player, but he seems to have enjoyed life. He was a dissolute drinker and was renowned as one of the three most handsome men of the go world (the other two were Ota Yuzo and Takegawa Yasaburo). As a child he was so good-looking that a famous kabuki actor had wanted to adopt him as his heir.

White: Hayashi Hakuei Monnyu 7-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Date: 17th November, 1851

241 moves. Black wins by 7 points.


Commentary by Kajiwara Takeo, with reference to a commentary by Ishida Yoshio

Figure 1 (1 – 33). Avoiding complications


White 8. In this fuseki there is no reason not to enter at 9.

Black 13. Playing 1 and 3 in Dia. 1 is not advisable. White would press at 4, forcing Black into a low position at the bottom.

Black 19. Since White already has a stone at 6, following the standard joseki by extending at 20 might be a little dan-



Dia. 1




*Figure 1 (1 – 33)
23: ko*


gerous. For example, White might attack with 6 and 8 in Dia. 2 (next page).

White 26. Essential – if at 27, Black would make a pincer at 26.

Black 29. Black's aim is to settle his group quickly. Nowadays, White often



Dia. 2



Dia. 3


5: connects

counters by playing 32 at 1 in Dia. 3, but in this case 2 to 6 would give Black good outward influence. Instead of 5 –


Dia. 4. White can also cut at 1, but Black is still satisfied, as he can make a severe invasion at 6.

Figure 2 (34 – 67). Shusaku plays solidly.


White 34. A rigorous move which is the natural follow-up to the severe pincer at 28. White is following a consistent attacking strategy. If instead he followed



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

the usual joseki of 1 in Dia. 5, Black would secure his group by turning at 2. Black could then aim at attacking at 'a' later.

White 36 seems reasonable. White could also defend at 41, but presumably he does not want to let Black attack at 36.

Black 39 is a natural counterattack. White hoped for Black 1 in Dia. 6; he would then defend at 2 and aim at attacking at 'a' later.

Black 43 finishes off the fuseki. If White tries to cut off the corner group with 1 in Dia. 7, Black has prepared the tesuji of 2 to ensure connection.

White 44. This is the only place that White can try to start a fight, but Black answers solidly with 45 and 47.

White 48 is essential: if White played at 49 instead, Black 48 would be painful.

Black 49. Following the usual joseki with 1 in Dia. 8 would just set up a good move for White at 2. If Black cut at 3, White would secure his group with 4 to 12, while Black's thickness on the outside would be of little use.

White 52 may look strange, but it is an







Figure 2 (34 – 67)



Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

attempt to create some defects in Black's shape. If White simply blocks at 54, that is, at 1 in Dia. 9, Black would answer solidly with 2 and 4. That would leave no aji at all for White to aim at.

The continuation to 67 seems natural. Black is satisfied with securing a large territory at the bottom, while White's consolation is that he can capture two corner stones by pushing through at 'a'.





Figure 3 (68 – 105)
102: connects

Figure 3 (68 – 105). A well-calculated sacrifice

White 68, not White 80, is the vital point, but Black still answers with the sacrifice tesuji of 69. Black 80 instead would make Black heavy and would give White an excellent move at 73.

White 74, attacking on a large scale, is correct. Ishida comments that White 1 in Dia. 10 would be bad, as Black would be able to escape with 4 etc. White's pos-



Dia. 10


ition would fall to pieces after Black 10.

Black 77. Connecting at 78 or 79 would not give Black a very attractive shape, so he decides to sacrifice his five corner stones. He must have calculated that he could do well enough in the centre to win.


White 96. Like it or not, White has to accept Black's challenge to a fight in the centre.

Black 103. Pushing at 1 and 3 in Dia. 11 would only strengthen White.

White 104. If White counters with 2 and 4 in Dia. 12, he will be in trouble after Black 5 and 7.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12




Figure 4 (106 – 151)






Figure 5 (152 – 200)



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

Figure 4 (106 – 151). Black takes the initiative in the centre.

Black 9. By now it is obvious that Black's decision to sacrifice his corner stones was correct. He has already obtained sufficient compensation for the loss involved, thanks to his thickness in the centre.

Black 33 defends against the threat of a cut.

White 36. White does not have time to answer Black at 41.

Dia. 13. If White defends at 1, then Black will attack his centre group with 2 etc. The moves to 10 are sente; Black then plays 12 and White collapses. White 'a' is answered by Black 'b'.

The game is decided when Black blocks




Figure 6 (201 – 241)

7: connects; 23: connects
38: connects (right of 2)

at 41. Actually there was no point when White was really in it.

White 44. White decides to sacrifice his two stones on the side. Ishida comments that this decision is correct. If White saves the stones with 1 and 3 in Dia. 14, Black gets a large centre territory with 2 and 4.

Figure 5 (152 – 200), Figure 6 (201 – 241)

Kajiwara: ‘One cannot find any bad or questionable moves by White in this game, but he was completely overcome by Shusaku’s authoritative play with Black.’

Black wins by 7 points.

Ito Showa v. Inoue Matsumoto Inseki

The reader may be interested to see another game from the 1851 castle games, one which is considered a minor classic.

White: Ito Showa 7-dan

Black: Inoue Matsumoto Inseki 5-dan

17th November, 1851. White wins by 1 point.

Figure 1. Black 15 is an excellent move which leads to an interesting exchange on the side. Black gets a slightly superior result, but White gets sente. He is satisfied with the result to 40.

White 46. White 49 would be better.

White 64, 66. Slow but necessary. If Black got the chance to play 66, he would be able to expand his right side moyo by attacking White.

Black 75. A waiting move, but perhaps a little slow. Capturing 20 might be better.




Figure 1 (1 – 75)




Figure 2 (76 – 144)




Figure 3 (145 – 229)

129: *ko* (below 72). Black wins and connects the *ko*.

Figure 2. White has no answer to 85, so he attacks at 86. This leads to another interesting exchange. In fact, the fighting throughout this game is just a little out of the ordinary and makes it well worth playing through.

(Commentary by Hashimoto Shoji)

Game Thirty-Five: Shusaku v. Yasui Sanchi (1851)

Castle Game Six

White: Yasui Sanchi 7-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Date: 17th, 18th November, 1851

151 moves. White resigns.

Commentary by Sanno Hirotaka

(This o-konomi game was not completed at Edo Castle on the 17th, so it was continued at the residence of Lord Wakizaka Awaji, the jisha-bugyo commissioner, on the following day.)






Figure 1 (1 – 52)

Figure 1 (1 – 52). Immediate fighting


White 2. A typically aggressive start by Sanchi, skipping over the fuseki to plunge right into the middle game. Sanchi's weak point was the fuseki, so he perhaps felt it was just as well to dispense with the preliminaries and get a fight started right away. Although he did badly against Shusaku, his career record in the castle games was actually a respectable twenty-two wins to eighteen losses, with two jigo. That record would have been better if he had not run into a player so skilful at containing his aggression as Shusaku.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Black 13. The standard joseki nowadays is shown in Dia. 1.

White 20 is the wrong point in the corner. If White is going to play here at all, the correct move is either the star-point or the 3–3 point.

Dia. 2. The modern idea would be to take the 3–3 point with 1; if Black 2, White 3. Note that instead of 2 –

Dia. 3. Black 1 would be wrong, as White 4 would counteract the effect of Black's thickness to the right.

There is another alternative for White 20. Playing in the upper left corner is not urgent, so the best strategy might be to follow Dia. 4.

Dia. 4. Pressing at 1 forestalls Black 31 in the figure, while White 5 is the key

point in this area. Black 6 (which could also be at 'a') would make it hard for White to find a good move in the top left corner, but in any case switching to the bottom (for example, 'a' in the figure) is preferable.

White 22. White is developing in the wrong direction, towards Black's thickness, while Black takes the corner profit in sente. White gets very little in return — compare this result to Dia. 2.

Black 29, 31. Black is taking all the key points. Note that once Black plays 29, however, it is useless for White to play 30 at 31, since his follow-up has to be around 29.

Black 35. Usually considered bad style, but here the best move, for reasons explained later.


Dia. 5. Connecting solidly at 2 is correct style. The reason is that later Black can easily make eye-shape with 4 and 6 (and 'a' if he needs it). White will not play 5 at 6, because —

Dia. 6. Black can get a hanami-ko (one in which he has nothing to lose) with 1 to 7.


After 35 and 37, Black can put the corner into ko, but a different ko from that in Dia. 6.

Dia. 7. Black can set up the ko with 1 to 5, but this ko involves considerable risk for Black as well as for White and he has to have plenty of ko threats (the ko captures are omitted in the diagram). Black must connect at 9 once he has started the ko, so White can cut at 10, greatly increasing the scale of the fight.

In practice, as we see in the game, Black is not prepared to take the risk of starting the ko, but Dia. 7 shows why Black 35 was a good move. A later move by Black around any of the 'x' points in Dia. 7 would render the cut at 10 ineffective, thus enabling Black to start the ko. That means that an 'x' move will be sente for Black, which will be an asset in any fighting




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

3: elsewhere



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

in the centre.

White 40 is properly aggressive: White is so far behind that it is pointless going for territory.

Black 49 is sente against White's corner. If White ignores it, Black can now start the ko, as in Dia. 8. The cut at 10 is refuted by Black's two-step hane.

White 50. Exemplary timing — there should be a proverb, 'force before living'. Later on Black might ignore 50 or counter-attack with 'b'.

The first fight of the game comes to a conclusion when White defends at 52. Shusaku has shown that he can match Sanchi's aggression. Already he has set up an easy win.




Figure 2 (53 – 100)

Figure 2 (53 – 100). White falls further behind.

Black 53, the vital point, demonstrates that White's attack with 40 in Figure 1 has failed. White 54 is painfully submissive but unavoidable.


White 56 – Black 57. Soon shown to be a bad exchange for White. He should omit 56 and simply play White 58, Black 59, White 60, Black 'a'.

Black 61 is an extremely useful sacrifice: Black not only gets eye-shape in sente but is also able to push down at 69. White cannot cut at 'a' and the blame lies with White 56. After 69, the game is over.


Black 73. Black makes the safety-first move since he is ahead, but this would be too mild for komi-go. Nowadays Black would play at 'b' – White cannot do much.

Black 79. The only move – it is not necessary to enter the corner. White has to defend at 80, so Black can take up position with 85. Black 79 is so good that it raises doubts about White 76. In this game the side is more important than the centre, so White should play further to the left. White 1 in Dia. 9 might be best.

Dia. 9. If Black 2, White 3 would de-



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

velop in the direction White wants to go, whereas Black would have no good continuation in the corner. Black 'a' is too small, so attaching at 4 looks like the only reasonable move, but in this game White would make an exchange with 5 to 11.

Black 85 makes an ideal formation. The low move is correct, as Black 'c' would make it easier for White to play 'd'.


Black 87 is necessary. If omitted –

Dia. 10. White 1 is troublesome. If Black 2, White destroys his eye-shape here.


White 88 is not enough to win: White should not let Black rope off all the bottom area. Invading at 95 can be ruled out because White's centre group is unsettled. Likewise –

Dia. 11. Trying to reduce the bottom area with 1 would be dangerous. Black might answer once at 2, but then he would make a determined splitting attack with 4. If White 5, Black 6 menaces the centre group, while White is nowhere near getting eye-shape below.


Dia. 12. Invading at 1 is correct. Black will probably pull back at 2, since making a hane would help White to settle him-



Dia. 11



Dia. 12



Dia. 13

self. White 3 next is one possibility; if 4, White would be happy to play a ko with 5 to 9. The beauty of playing like this is that Black does not get much chance to make a double attack on the invaders and the centre group. In short, White gets a chance to settle his weak groups independently of each other. Instead of 2 –

Dia. 13. Black might pull back the other way, at 2, but White could then be satisfied with reducing lightly with 3, since, if Black 4, he is left with life in the corner with 5. Trying to kill White with 6 at ‘a’ would be unreasonable.

White 96. Not a very effective peep.

Figure 3 (101 – 151). An easy win

Black 1 ensures sente, so White’s peep has gained nothing.

Black 27. Black’s centre group is safe. If he wanted to try to kill it, White would first have to play ‘a’—Black ‘b’—White ‘c’, losing sente, so Black would be able to make a second eye with ‘d’; if next White ‘e’, then Black ‘f’—White ‘g’—Black ‘h’ would do the trick.

White 34 is a strange move, losing a point compared to the standard endgame sequence shown in Dia. 14. White 34 is only correct when White can kill the corner by playing 36 at 1 in Dia. 15, but Black







Figure 3 (101 – 151)



Dia. 14



Dia. 15



Dia. 16

can live with 2 to 6.

White is so far behind in territory that there is no point in continuing. The centre black group is still safe from attack, as demonstrated in Dia. 16. If White went all out to capture Black, he would end up losing some of his own stones.

White resigns after Black 151.

Game Thirty-Six: Shusaku v. Inoue Matsumoto Inseki (1852)
Castle Game Seven
Commentary by Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan

Inoue Matsumoto Inseki (1831 – 91) was the 13th head of the Inoue house. He was born as Matsumoto Kinshiro and originally studied with the Hayashi school, but in 1850 a crisis arose in the Inoue school and it was arranged for Matsumoto to become the heir. The crisis was caused by the 12th Inoue, Shutetsu, whom we have already met in this book under the names of Kadono Tadazaemon and Mizutani Shunsaku. Shutetsu seems to have been a schizophrenic; in an irrational fit of jealousy he killed an Inoue disciple whom he suspected of having had illicit relations with his wife. Since the disciple's family was on close terms with the Inoue house, the matter was dealt with without recourse to the authorities, but for a time there were fears that the Inoue house might not survive. However, Shutetsu was forced to retire and sent into seclusion in a country town, where he died in 1856, and Lord Kuze, then one of the jisha-bugyo commissioners, arranged for Matsumoto to become the Inoue heir.

Although not a great player, Matsumoto played an important part in the go history of this period. In 1859 he opposed Shuwa's application to become Meijin godokoro and he also scored an important victory over Shuwa on the go board. In 1861 he defeated Shuwa by one point with black in a castle game (given in Chapter One), a setback which was a fatal blow to Shuwa's ambitions.

The game below is the first of two castle games that Shusaku played with Inoue. It is also his first castle game with white. As in Game Thirty-Three, we find his opponent employing Shusaku's own patented fuseki pattern against him.

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Black: Inoue Matsumoto Inseki 5-dan

Date: 17th November, 1852

262 moves. White wins by 2 points.


Figure 1 (1 – 41). Inoue fails to take the initiative.

Black 15. Black avoids the complicated version of the taisha.

Black 23. A splendid strategy. The usual joseki is Black 'a', but Black plans to use the hane at 'b' next to stake out a really big moyo.


Black 25 is the standard joseki move of this period, but a good alternative would be to extend to 'c', aiming at the pincer at 'd' later.

Black 27, forestalling White 'e', is big, but Black 'c' would still be good; if then White 'e', Black could attack at 'd'. Miyamoto also proposed another strategy.



*Figure 1 (1 – 41)
 19: ko; 21: connects*

Dia. 1. Black 1 would be an excellent move for expanding the moyo at the top.



Dia. 1

If White 2, Black could play 3 to 7.

White 28 is a superb point. White 'f' next would be severe, so Black has to defend at 29.

White 30 prevents Black from taking the initiative. If White simply reinforced his stones at the bottom by extending to 'g', Black would be sure to make the hane at 'b'. The additional stone at 27 would make his moyo all the more impressive.

Black 33. Black could also omit this move, playing immediately at 35, but it is hard to say which is better.


White 36. A superb move which makes miai of 37 and 38. Instead of 36 —

Dia. 2. The usual concept would be to turn at 1, but Shusaku must have felt that that would make the game too simple. Black would answer with 2 and 4, which would weaken White's bottom position. Instead of 2, Black could also play Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'.


Black 37. A reinforcement is essential. Once White has played 36, the hane at 'b' is no longer appropriate.

White 38 is the follow-up to White 36; the relationship between these moves may not be immediately apparent, but actually all the moves from 30 on form part of a consistent, though very subtle strategy. It is in the play here that Shusaku takes a firm grip on the game. Instead of 38 —

Dia. 3. Trying to link up all his stones



Dia. 2




Dia. 3

with the shoulder-hit at 1 in not advisable. Black would secure a large corner territory with 2 to 6.


Black 39. When Black makes this natural counterattack, White's position seems to be in danger of falling to pieces, but White took this move into account when he played 38 and he has prepared a skilful strategy for sabaki. This counterattack gives Shusaku an opportunity to display his genius.

Black 41 is correct. Instead —


Dia. 4. If Black extends at 1, White plays 2 and 4 and Black cannot cut at 5. If he does (see over) —




Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Dia. 5. White counters with 6 to 10, then hits Black with the tesuji of 12. Capturing with Black 'a' is bad because of the White 'b'-White 'c' combination, so —

Dia. 6. Black would have to play at 1, but then White would develop nicely with 2 to 8. Black would be in for a difficult fight. Instead of 5 —

Dia. 7. Black 1 here invites disaster due to Black's shortage of liberties. Black cannot cut at 3, since White 4 sets up a ladder.

Figure 2 (42 – 57). Shusaku's brilliant sabaki

White 42 and Black 43 are natural. White still seems to be in trouble, as on the surface Black's splitting attack is proceeding smoothly, but White now






Figure 2 (42 – 57)



Dia. 8

unveils the tesuji for sabaki that he has up his sleeve. First, he jumps to 44, then makes the key move, the kosumi at 46. Shusaku was undoubtedly looking ahead to this move when he played 36. If instead he simply jumped to 'a', Black would jump out to 47 and White would have no suitable move for sealing in the black group to the left. The beauty of 46 is that it makes miai of 48 and 'b'. In this case the proverb, 'the one-space jump is never bad', does not apply.

Black 47. Leading out this group takes priority, though the other group looks just a little forlorn after White 46. Instead of



Dia. 9

47 —

Dia. 8. If Black 1, White would of course block at 2; if Black 3, the continuation to 14 can be hypothesised. Black comes under so much pressure that playing this way is not advisable.

Black 49 is an attempt to take compensation for ceding the superb point of 48 to White. Fortunately for Black, his group at the top left cannot be killed unconditionally.

Dia. 9. If he wants to try to kill the group, White has to play 1, but Black can get a ko with 2 to 8. That brings up the problem of ko threats. In any case, the white group on the right is bigger, so White has to take care of it first before he can even think of attacking Black. As it is, settling White's group is far from easy.


Black 51 is the vital point for attack. The subsequent exchange is the highlight of the game. Instead of 51 —

Dia. 10. Answering passively at 1 is bad; White lives comfortably with 2 to 6. Black's moves here hardly constitute an attack.


Black 53. The peaceful answer to 52 is correct. The temptation is to cut at 'c' instead, as that would appear to be the natural follow-up to 51, but —

Dia. 11. If Black cuts at 1, White resists with 2 to 6, then when Black makes the eye-stealing move at 7, White ripostes with 8. If Black 9, White escapes into the centre with 10 and 12. Instead of 9 —


Dia. 12. If Black intercepts at 2, White counters with 3 and 5, making miai



Dia. 10



Dia. 11




Dia. 12

of 'a' and 'b'.

To go back to the start —

Dia. 13. Black can also cut at 3 (instead of extending at 5); White connects at 4, whereupon 5 is mandatory. White then lays waste to Black's area at the top with 6 to 12. Black not only fails to kill White but also loses a lot of territory. Even the captured white stones on the outside retain a lot of ominous aji.

The conclusion is that Black has no choice about 53. White then moves out briskly with 54 and 56, keeping the hane at 'd' in reserve, as he wants first to probe Black's intentions. Black extends peacefully at 57, but what happens if he gives atari instead?



Dia. 13




Figure 3 (57 – 102)

Figure 3 (57 – 102). Both groups live.

The question is, what would happen if Black gave atari at 66 instead of 57? The answer is complicated.


Dia. 14. If Black 1, White will make a diagonal connection at 2. If Black blocks the way out with 5, White plays 6 and 8, threatening to get eye-shape with 'a'. If Black persists with 9, White lives with 10 and 12. Black does not like this result, so instead of 11 –

Dia. 15. He might keep on trying to take away White's eye-shape with 2, though that permits White to cut with 3 and 5. If Black gives way with 10 when White pushes through, then on the contrary Black is the one in danger of being captured after White 13. Therefore, instead of 10 –


Dia. 16. Black might try blocking at 1, but then White gets a dream ladder with the sequence to 16. Black's group to the left would also drop off in the process.

One gets an idea of just how much analysis went into the sequence up to 57. Wisdom dictates that Black not make a precipitate attack here.


White 60 is the vital point, but forcing with 58 first is important, as Black 58




Dia. 14



Dia. 15



Dia. 16 13: connects



Dia. 17

would eliminate all the aji in the position. Note also that White must not be in a hurry to play at 61.

Dia. 17. If White plays 1 immediately, Black forces with 2, then cuts at 4 in sente. White can live, but this result is bad for him. If Black plays 6 at 8 in an attempt to capture the whole group, White picks up two stones with White 'a', Black 6, White 'b'.

Black 61. Black must not let White take this point on top of playing 60. Note that if Black cut at 85 instead of 61, he would have no answer to White 64 (thanks to White 58).

White 62 to 66 secure life: White has played brilliantly in settling his group.


However, Black has kept sente throughout his attack, so he can now go back to attend to his other group with 67 and 69. The fight started by White 30 in Figure 1 has finally come to a conclusion. White gets sente to play at 70 and the game is extremely close.

Black 71. The light reducing move is correct. Invading at 'a' would be reckless with so much white thickness above.


Black 73. The only move: this is the vital point for attacking the ogeima enclosure and aims next at attaching at 'b'.

White 74 is natural. The alternatives given below are both bad for White.

Dia. 18. If White attacks at 2, Black takes the corner with 3 to 9. Instead of 4 –



Dia. 18



Dia. 19 15: ko

Dia. 19. If White blocks at 1, Black has the tesuji of 2. After the sequence to 16, the cut off white stone cannot escape.


White 76 is a thick move. Descending at 86 also looks good, but Black would have a strong counter.

Dia. 20. If White 1, Black strikes at 2. If 3, the crosscut at 4 is troublesome; if White 'a', Black 'b', while if White plays 'a' at 'c', then Black plays 'd'. Instead of 3 –


Dia. 21. If White pushes up at 1, Black has the familiar tesuji of 2 to 6. If next White 'a', Black captures three stones with the 'b-f' sequence.

Black 79 aims at a ko with Black 'c', White 'd', Black 84.


Black 85 is undeniably big, but White 86 is also a superb point. Black could




Dia. 20



Dia. 21



Dia. 22



Dia. 23

have considered playing Black 86, White 'e', Black 'f'.

White 88 looks submissive, but this is a time for patience. If White countered with 88 at 'g', Black 'h' would be troublesome.

Black 89 is an all-out move – White must answer at 90. Instead –

Dia. 22. White 2 is just what Black wants. Black 3 takes a large corner.

Dia. 23. If Black starts with 1, White 2 of course becomes a good point.

The sequence to 98 can be seen as the natural product of fighting spirit. Instead of defending, each side spoils the other's territory.

Black 99, 101. Black may look as if he is trying to build a moyo, but his aims are mainly defensive. His position is thin and White can take away his eye-shape with 'i', so he has to strengthen himself.

White 102 is essential – if omitted, Black 102 would transform the centre into black territory.





Figure 4 (103 – 150)



Dia. 24

Figure 4 (103 – 150). The endgame begins.

Black 5. Black cannot rescue his stone.

Dia. 24. If Black 1, White will give atari at 2, then play the tsukekoshi tesuji of 4, enabling him to capture four stones with 6 and 8.

White 8 is a probe: if Black answers at 10, White will peep at 'a'. Black of course refuses to play so submissively, but when White plays 10, he must give atari at 11 to stop White from getting a bonus forcing move at 13.

White 14. White makes a forcing move before living. If Black omits 15, White will exchange 15 for Black 'b', then wedge in at 'c'.

White 18. Yet another forcing move before living. Connecting underneath by

playing 18 at 'a' would make White's position thin.

White 20. White is now completely alive. If Black 'd', White lives with 'e', Black 'f', White 'g'.

Black 23. The exchange for 24 is a minus for Black, but he is able to defend his weak point at 'h' in sente.


Black 25 is a tesuji; playing 26 instead, letting White play 25, would be bad.

White 32. White would normally capture at 42, but in this position building thickness with 32 is better.


Black 33 is a big move – the game is now very close.

White 34. Blocking Black's path with 'i' also looks big, but 34 is bigger.

White 36 prevents Black from making a solid capture at 'j', but Black can still aim at a ko with Black 'k', White 'l', Black 'j'.



Dia. 25



Dia. 26

White 40. If White blocks at 1 in Dia. 25, Black cuts him off with 2 and 4.

White 44 is the honte (proper move) in response to Black 43. White 46, which sets up a peep at 'm', prevents Black from getting territory here.

White 50 is a tesuji. If White simply connected at 'n', Black would play 50.

Figure 5 (151 – 200). A close game

White 72. White wants to keep sente. If White intercepts at 1 in Dia. 26, Black can play 2 to 6 in sente. White has to




Figure 5 (151 – 200)
60: ko (at 52); 62: ko (left of 51);
63: ko (at 57)

add a stone after Black 6 to defend against the threat of a ko with Black 'a'.

Black 75. If Black takes the ko (at 51), White will play at 'a'.

White 90. Black 'b' becomes a threat once the dame at 89 is filled.

Figure 6 (201 – 262). A fine game for Shusaku

There is nothing further to comment on




Figure 6 (201 – 262)
62: connects (below 14)
White wins and connects the ko.

in the endgame. Inoue did not make any bad moves in this game, but still he was outplayed by Shusaku, who seemed to work his way imperceptibly into the lead. The key factor was his skill at settling his groups, as demonstrated in the fighting at the top. This game can be considered a masterpiece for white.

White wins by 2 points.

Game Thirty-Seven: Shusaku v. Ito Showa (1852)

Castle Game Eight

White: Ito Showa 7-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Date: 17th, 18th November, 1852

195 moves. Black wins by 6 points.

Commentary by Fujisawa Shuko

(This o-konomi game was not finished on the first day at Edo Castle, so it was concluded at the residence of Lord Ando of Nagato.)




Figure 1 (1 – 48)


Figure 1 (1 – 48). Solid play

White 6 would now be played at 'a'.

Black 15. Black does not want to counterattack with 'b', because White can press at 'c' in sente and also has the attack at 'd' in the top left. Black prefers to play solidly with 15 and 17.

Black 21 and 23 help White to solidify his position, but since Black's own position in the top left is solid, that does not matter. Instead of 21, Black could have followed Dia. 1.

Dia. 1. If Black 1, White will probably attach at 2. Black makes a pincer at 5, then moves out at 7; later he can aim at



Dia. 1

the hane at 'a'. If White plays 2 at 5, Black seals him in at the top with 3.


Black 27. Black 1 in Dia. 2 would be dubious. Black could play 3 in sente, but then he would have to take gote to defend against White 'a'.

Black 35. Black could also make the 37 – 38 exchange first, then make a high approach move at 'e'.


White 40 is natural. If White played at 'f' instead, Black would jump to 'g', securing a connection to his other stones. That would give Black superior overall thickness. White 40 makes White thick and looks ahead to the threat of White 'h'.

White 48 is solid. White could also consider attacking Black on a large scale with 1 and 3 in Dia. 3. If Black played 2 at 'a', White would still jump to 3. Incidentally, if White defends the corner later, 'b' would be the move.

Dia. 4. If instead Black plays 2 here, White would play 3 to 7, after which White 1 would be right at the vital point.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4






Figure 2 (49 – 100)



Dia. 5
8 at 3




Dia. 6


Figure 2 (49 – 100). More thickness

Black 49 and 51 build nice thickness which affects both the bottom left and top left corner positions. Note that making the peep first is the correct order of moves. If Black played 51 first, White's stones would become lighter, so he would probably not answer a subsequent peep at 49 by defending. For example, he might attach at 94 instead.

Black 55 – 65. This sequence is somewhat crude, though Black does succeed in poking his head out. The usual move would be Black 1 in Dia. 5. If White tries to intercept with 2, Black connects with 3 to 9. Perhaps Black disliked the prospect of White 2 in Dia. 6, as Black's shape remains a little thin after 3. In the figure, Black also gets the peep at 97.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8


Black 71 is the key point overall. White 72 defends against Black 'a', but perhaps he should have pushed down at 73 first, as Black 73 builds superb thickness.

White 76 is an excellent point. If White played at 1 in Dia. 7, Black would be satisfied with taking profit with 2 and 4, since White would be left with inferior shape at the bottom. Instead of 3 –

Dia. 8. If White blocks at 3, Black first plays 4, forcing White 5 to prevent the cut, then he lives in the corner with 6 and 8. If White tries to kill him with 'a', Black counters with 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.

Black 79. Because of the excellent position of White 76, Black is not satisfied with just taking profit with Black 80. Instead he builds more thickness up to 87.

White 92. White sees no point in answering Black 91 at 1 in Dia. 9, as Black will just keep on pushing and will still have the threat of Black 'a'.



Dia. 9




Figure 3 (101 – 148)





Figure 4 (149 – 195)



Dia. 10

Figure 3 (101 – 148). A solid lead

White 6. If at 1 in Dia. 10, White would have to lose one of his groups after Black 2 to 6. However, capturing a stone with 7 and 19 in the figure is large. Black already has a safe lead.

White 36 is large — Black 48 would not only reduce White's territory but also affect his eye-shape.

Figure 4 (149 – 195). A victory for Black's thickness

White 78. If omitted, Black can play 'a' in sente, threatening to put the white group to the left into ko, then cut at 78.

White made a reasonable start in this game, but Black built superior thickness in the middle game, especially after his invasion at 43, and this thickness set up a relatively easy win for him. Shusaku's second castle game against Showa was quite a contrast to his first.

*Moves after 195 not recorded.
Black wins by 6 points.*

7. The Sanjubango with Ota Yuzo

Shusaku's greatest achievement was his flawless record in the castle games, but the real climax of his career was the thirty-game match (sanjubango) with Ota Yuzo in 1853. Aged twenty-three, Shusaku was approaching his peak; he had already scored eight of those wins in the castle games and had also bested all the top players of the day in individual encounters. The only player to hold his own against Shusaku was Ota Yuzo, twenty-two years his senior. The two had already played more than fifty games, starting with two-stone handicap games when Shusaku was still a child, and it was not until 1849 that Shusaku had finally reached even. The games played since then had been split fifty-fifty, so not surprisingly Yuzo was unable to concur in the popular opinion that Shusaku was the top player of the day.

The question of preeminence between these two players was decided once and for all in their 1853 sanjubango. The circumstances leading to the holding of this match have already been described in Chapter Two. Below are the results.

- Game One (27th January, 1853). Yuzo (black) won by resignation.
 - Game Two (2nd February). Shusaku (black) won by resignation.
 - Game Three (5th February). Shusaku (white) won by 2 points.
 - Game Four (15th February). Shusaku (black) won by resignation.
 - Game Five (22nd, 23rd February). Yuzo (black) won by 2 points.
 - Game Six (25th February). Yuzo (white) – result jigo
 - Game Seven (3rd, 4th March). Yuzo (black) won by resignation.
 - Game Eight (7th March). Shusaku (black) won by resignation.
 - Game Nine (13th, 15th March). Yuzo (black) won by 2 points.
 - Game Ten (25th March). Shusaku (black) won by 11 points.
 - Game Eleven (3rd, 8th April). Yuzo (black) won by 12 points.
 - Game Twelve (5th, 25th April). Shusaku (black) won by 13 points.
 - Game Thirteen (7th, 13th April). Shusaku (white) won by 5 points. (This game was played during the recess in the twelfth game.)
 - Game Fourteen (15th May). Shusaku (black) won by resignation.
 - Game Fifteen (23rd May). Yuzo (black) won by resignation.
 - Game Sixteen (25th May, 3rd June). Shusaku (black) won by resignation.
 - Game Seventeen (5th, 15th, 21st June). Shusaku (white) won by 3 points. With this win Shusaku took a four game lead (ten-six) and so forced Yuzo to the handicap of sen-ai-sen (BBW)
 - Game Eighteen (23rd June). Shusaku (white) won by 5 points.
 - Game Nineteen (3rd July). Yuzo (black) won by resignation.
 - Game Twenty (5th July). Shusaku (black) won by resignation.
 - Game Twenty-One (15th July, 28th October). Shusaku (white) – result jigo
 - Game Twenty-Two (3rd, 25th October). Shusaku (white) won by 1 point.
 - Game Twenty-Three (5th, 28th November). Yuzo (white) – result jigo
- At this point the series was discontinued. It is presumed that Yuzo, satisfied with the achievement of scoring a jigo with white, declined to complete it.

Game Thirty-Eight: Sanjubango, Game One

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Black: Ota Yuzo 7-dan

Date: 27th January, 1853

197 moves. White resigns.

Commentary by Kajiwara Takeo, with reference to commentaries by Hashimoto Shoji and Go Seigen




Figure 1 (1 – 36)

Figure 1 (1 – 36). Four corner enclosures


Black 5. An interesting strategy. Since White 4 is low, White will be reluctant to approach at 7, as Black could force him into a low position by pressing at 'a'.

White 6. Perhaps a sign of Shusaku's confidence — permitting Black to make two shimaris has traditionally been considered bad for White.


White 14. A thick move which combines well with both of White's corner enclosures. An alternative for 14 is White 'b'.

Black 15. If Black delays playing here, White will make ideal shape at the top by playing at 20. Black could also reduce the moyo by capping at 20 instead of 15.


Dia. 1. If White 2, the continuation to 7 would be reasonable. Instead —




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3 10: connects




Dia. 4

Dia. 2. If White 2, Black could make a probe at 3, then attach at 5. This variation looks interesting.


Dia. 3. Quite possibly White intends to answer Black 1 with the knight's move at 2, since that would combine well with his strong position on the left side with the Δ stone. If Black attached next at 3, the continuation to 12 would make his stones heavy. This result is not very attractive for Black, which may be why he played at 15 in the figure.

White 16 is the standard answer. White 1 in Dia. 4 would let Black force White into a low position. After 6, Black would have good continuations at 'a' and 'b'.


White 20. Another one-space jump — White is following an interesting strategy. If



Dia. 5



Dia. 6




Dia. 7

he made the ordinary move at 1 in Dia. 5, Black would have a good continuation at 2. If White 3, the sequence to 8 would give Black excellent thickness. This result is not good for White, so instead of 5 –

Dia. 6. He might challenge Black to a fight by extending sideways at 5. However, Black breaks into the corner with 6 to 12, then when White hanes at 13, he makes shape with the stylish contact play at 14. This would also be a disappointing result for White.

Another standard move for White 20 is the knight's move along the edge at 1 in Dia. 7. Hashimoto Shoji comments that Black would probably seize the opportunity to force with 2 etc., flattening out White's position at the top. White would not like this result either.

Black 21 is a very solid move. If instead






Figure 2 (37 – 90)

ko: 63, 66, 69, 72; 87: connects

Figure 2 (37 – 90). White's moyo disappears.

Black 37. If at 41, White would break through with White 'a', Black 40, White 'b'.

White 38 is a tesuji; if Black answers at 45, White will play 'a' and slip through Black's net. Black 39 is a tough response, but Hashimoto comments that it is dangerous, as White could cut with 1 in Dia. 11.


Dia. 11. At this point Black would not be troubled, as after 1 to 5 he could counter with 6, forcing White 7. After Black 8 to 12, White might regret having started this fight. Nonetheless, the threat of the cut is a real one, so Black reinforces at the first opportunity, which is 45 in the figure.

Black 47 is correct shape, making it easy for Black to get eye-shape with 51.


Black 53. If Black sacrificed two stones by playing 64 instead, White would probably invade Black's bottom moyo less deeply, at 92 in Figure 3, instead of 54.

Black 55 is the vital point for attack; White has to resort to a ko to live.


Black 67, 73. Black's main concern is to




Dia. 11




Dia. 12



Dia. 13



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

play light ko threats which will not lose him any points. Since Black has unlimited ko threats here, White decides to finish off the ko with 74. However, his moyo goes up in smoke when Black plays 75. Black seems to have a slight lead.

White 76. White 1 in Dia. 12 is out of the question, as Black gets excellent thickness with the ponnuki at 4. Hashimoto comments that the solid connection at 1 in Dia. 13 is a realistic alternative.

Dia. 13. If White 1, Black will play 2 and 4, then switch elsewhere. White 1 is stronger as far as the top is concerned, but White 76 in the figure gives White better access to the centre. Instead of 4 in the diagram –

Dia. 14. Black cannot hane at 4 here, as White 5 cuts him off. If Black 6, the result to 11 is terrible.

White 82. If White attempts to squeeze on a larger scale with 1 in Dia. 15, Black will parry with 2 and 4, leaving White with

bad aji at 'a' This result would be bad for White.

The sequence to 90 is forced. White has survived the attack, but White 90 is a bit of a makeshift move and has some bad aji.




Figure 3 (91 – 106)

Figure 3 (91 – 106). Black goes all-out.


Black 91 is the strongest counter to White's reducing move. Black could also simply enclose the bottom area with 1 in Dia. 16, but that would let White build thickness with 2 to 8. Black 1 fails to make use of Black's strength in this part of the board.

White 92. Not at 1 in Dia. 17, as Black would make him heavy with 2 and 4, then connect solidly at 6. White would be in for a tough fight.


Black 93 is the severest continuation. If White answers at 1 in Dia. 18, Black will make him heavy with 2, then connect at 4. As in Dia. 17, White would be in trouble. White 94 and 96, lightly discarding 92, are correct.

Black 97. The strongest move. If Black blocked to the left of 94, White would get a ladder with White 'a'.


White 98. White could live at the bot-




Dia. 16




Dia. 17



Dia. 18



Dia. 19




Dia. 20

tom with 1 to 7 in Dia. 19, but Black would capture the stones on top with 8. That would be too big, so White attaches at 98 in the figure.

Black 99 is forced. Countering with 1 in Dia. 20 would fall into a trap, as White would continue with 2 to 6.

Black 103. The correct move in the corner is of course descending at 104, but Black is afraid that if he plays there, White will play 2 to 6 in Dia. 21 (next page). It is worth preventing that, even at the cost of giving White the atari at

104. Even when White reinforces with
106, the status of his group is still not
settled.



Dia. 21





Figure 4 (107–132)
ko: 17, 20, 23

Figure 4 (107 – 132). A large exchange
 Black 7 is a very severe invasion. Defending with 8 is natural, as Black would take all the corner profit if allowed to peep at 29.


Black 9 enables Black to set up a ko with 11 and 13. Eventually Black's aim in the ensuing fight is to cut at 'a'. He can be confident, because he has plenty of ko threats against White's weak group in the bottom right corner.

Black 17. Black takes the ko, but what would happen if he continued attacking the white group? Hashimoto offers the following explanation.


Dia. 22. Black 1 to 5 seem obvious; next, if Black 7, White gets a ladder up to 14, so—




Dia. 22



Dia. 23



Dia. 24



Dia. 25

Dia. 23. Black might try descending at 7 here. The sequence to 12 will follow, but after Black 13 it is difficult to know what will happen. Instead of 2 –

Dia. 24. White might block at 2, leading to the sequence to 8. Once again, it is unclear what would happen.


White 18 secures definite life: White must feel that he cannot fight the ko arising from Black 'a' if he has to look after a weak group at the same time. However, Black declines to start the ko.

White 24. If at 25, Black would probably cut at 'a', as he has plenty of ko threats, starting with 33 in the next figure. The aim of White 24 is to create ko threats in this corner.


Black 25 is intended as a forcing move. Dia. 25 shows that Black can only play this move when he has taken the ko.

Dia. 25. If Black played 2 after White 1, White would counter with 3 to 7.

White 26. If at 1 in Dia. 26, Black would probably connect at 26 in the figure. If then White 3, Black would have an extra ko threat at 4. White must feel that playing this way would be submissive.



Dia. 26



Dia. 27

2: at 26 in Fig. 4

The exchange to 31 seems natural, but Black's lead has become more definite.





Figure 5 (133 – 197)

ko (left of 45): 48; ko (at 40): 85, 90, 93; 95: connects (at 40)

Figure 5 (133 – 197). White goes out fighting.

The sequence to 39 completes the exchange of territory involved in the ko: Black cuts off some loose white stones with 33 and 35, White makes completely sure of his capture at the top with 38, Black takes a firm grip on the two white stones with 39. The last move is a sente gote move — it looks like gote, but since Black is aiming at cutting at 87, White has to take the ko with 40.

White 42 is an all-out move which at-



Dia. 28

7: connects

tempts to make use of the two captured white stones. It leads to another ko, since fighting spirit dictates that Black answer at 43, but White cannot afford to slacken off here. Incidentally, the hane at 1 in Dia. 27 would be a big mistake, as White would have no answer to Black's placement at 2.

Black 49. Black considers this sufficient compensation for the ko.

Black 53. The most profitable move; a hane at 'a' instead would only provoke White 57.

White 80. White is behind, so he makes one last try for victory, but Black answers coolly with 81.

Dia. 28. If Black connects at 1, White stages an upset with the sequence to 18.

With 83, Black's stones on the side come back to life. This time White cannot win the ko. When Black plays 97, White's whole group is reduced to one large eye.

This was a great fighting game to start off the series. Yuzo masterfully fought his way to victory through the long series of ko fights.

White resigns after Black 197.

Game Thirty-Nine: Sanjubango, Game Two

White: Ota Yuzo 7-dan
 Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan
 Date: 2nd February, 1853
 139 moves. White resigns.
 Commentary by Go Seigen




Figure 1 (1 – 50).


Figure 1 (1 – 50). A dubious fuseki move?

As in the first game, White allows Black to make two corner enclosures. White 6 would usually be an approach move in the top right corner.


White 8 is an interesting move which is ahead of its time. Until the New Fuseki period of the 1930's, White 8 was usually played at 'a' or 'b'. Note that if White played 8 at 9, Black would get a nice position by playing at 8 or 'a'.

Black 9 is the right approach move. If Black plays at 10, White will make a pincer at 'c', which would work well with his high position with 4, 6 and 8.


White 14. Dia. 1 shows the standard joseki. It is hard to say whether White 1 there or White 14 is better. However, I think that perhaps White should have attacked at 'd' in order to make maximum use of his stone at 8 on the side.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 2. If Black counters with 2, the sequence to 11 would follow. White should be able to handle this fight.

Dia. 3. If instead Black 2, White counters with 3 and 5 and has no problems.

Since White played the unimaginative move of 14, Black took the key point of 15, immediately settling his group. White 14 thus seems to be dubious move.


White 18 is an emergency measure. If White makes the standard extension at 'e', Black will play at 'f', eating away at White's right side territory. If White simply plays at 'g' or 20 with 18, Black will promptly attack at 34 at the top, forcing the favourable exchange White 'h' – Black 'i'.

White 30. A probe to see whether Black answers at 31 or 39 or 'j'. When Black counters with 31, the sequence to 40 is an interesting way of settling White's group.

Black 43 is essential, as White threatens to solidify his side area with 1 and 3 in Dia. 4. White has to answer at 44 to prevent Black from attaching there.

Black 47 – White 48. This exchange is

a necessary evil for Black. If he plays at 49 immediately, that is, at 1 in Dia. 5, White will counter with 2 to 6. Black 47 defends against this threat.



Dia. 5




Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Figure 2 (51 – 100). White's overplay

White 56. White 'a' might appear to be sente, but Black would extend at 'b' and would have the aji of a placement at 'c' to aim at.

White 62. If White 'd' were enough to make the game close, White would of course play there, but he has not made any impression on Black's lead from having the first move. White has to start a fight.

Black 71 is the last large point (oba). White obstinately invades at 72, but

this is probably a bit of an overplay. White is going to be hard-put to look after both 62 and 72 once Black intercepts with 73. Consequently, White should have played 72 at 73; if Black defended at 72, White could attack the black stone on the side with a pincer at 'd', while if Black defended on the side at 'd' or 'e', White could then play 72, bearing down hard on the black stones at the bottom. I think that this strategy, making miai of 72 and 'd', would have been far better than what White actually played.

Black 83. The diagonal connection at 91 seems superior, as it would prevent White from pushing through and cutting with 88 and 90.

Black 97. If at 98, White would settle his group with White 'f', Black 97, White 'g'.




Figure 3 (101 – 139)

Figure 3 (101 – 139). White slips up.

White 4 is the losing move. White should attach at 8; if then Black 4, White could play 10 and should still be in the game. Perhaps White overlooked Black 5, which threatens to capture something with a throw-in at 6. After 4, White perhaps expected Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c',

White 'd', Black 'e', after which he could have switched to 8.

White 8. Extending at 9 would be unreasonable – Black would extend at 'f' and White would have two weak groups to look after, clearly too much of a burden.

Black 9. This capture is very upsetting,

since White has made a complete gift of the extra stone at 4.

White 12. White rallies himself for one final challenge, but Black answers solidly and cautiously. White is unable to find a chink in his armour.

White resigns after Black 139.

Game Forty: Sanjubango, Game Three

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Black: Ota Yuzo 7-dan

Date: 5th February, 1853

244 moves. White wins by 2 points.

Commentary by Go Seigen, with reference to commentaries by Kato Shin 8-dan and Ishida Yoshio





Figure 1 (1 – 53)


Figure 1 (1 – 53). Shusaku slips up in the fuseki.

White 12 is the last important fuseki point. Playing 12 at 14, aiming at the invasion at 'a', would also be a respectable strategy, but White 12 has absolute priority.


Black 13 cannot be postponed or White will play 14, setting up the continuation Black 'b', White 18.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3




Dia. 4


White 14. White avoids the josekis in Dias. 1 and 2, as Black's moves would make ideal balance with his stones at the top.

White 20. This move was criticised by Honinbo Shuwa. Shuwa: 'White 20 is bad. White should push up with 1 and 3 in Dia. 3, then jump out to 5. The result in the figure is bad for White.'

Black 21 is an interesting move – White does not have an effective answer.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

White 22. Kato Shin comments that if White played at 1 in Dia. 4, the continuation to 6 would make him heavy. Once having played 20, White has to continue with 22.

White 24. (Kato) If White connects at 1 in Dia. 5, Black will cut at 2. After 5, White would be in trouble. Black could simply connect at 'a' or he could play at 'b' and squeeze. If Black gets the chance to descend at 'c', the corner will be unconditionally dead.

Black 25. Blocking at 1 in Dia. 6 is not advisable. If White played 2 and 4, then Black played 5, Black would have fallen a move behind. Note that if Black played 3 at 'a', White would be able to connect at 'b'. Resisting White 24 is pointless.


White 26. Gote but necessary — permitting Black to connect underneath would be unbearable.

White 30 is properly cautious. If White extended at 'c', Black would be able to attack his eye-shape by extending at 42.

Black 31 concludes the exchange in this corner. The result is unfavourable for White, but after White 20 his moves were forced. It is very unusual for Shusaku to slip up in the fuseki like this.

White 32. To forestall the invasion at 'd'.

Black 33. This time Yuzo goes wrong. Shuwa: 'Black's strategy with 33 to 39 was bad. Because of these moves, the game became close.' Black 33 etc. make Black thick, but they give White actual profit



Dia. 7


which compensates for the profit Black took at the bottom left. Shuwa does not say how Black should have played, but Ishida suggests following Dia. 7.

Dia. 7. Black should simply play at 1, sealing White in. White will defend at 2, so next Black can extend to 3 at the top. If White 4, Black can reduce his moyo with 5 and would have a promising game.

Black 43. Ishida comments that perhaps Black should have played 45 first, as then White would have answered at 'd'. Playing 43 first gives White the chance to surround the bottom area on a large scale with 44 to 48.

Black 49 shows that Black is treating his three stones 43 to 47 as light forcing moves. If White played 50 at 'e', Black would probably be satisfied to play at 'f'.

Black 53 is the vital point. If Black just turned at 1 in Dia. 8, White would make good, light shape with 2 and 4.



Dia. 8






Figure 2 (54 – 100)



Dia. 9



Dia. 10


Figure 2 (54 – 100). Uncompromising play by both

Black 55 is good aji, but it feels just a little slack. Attacking White with 1 etc. in Dia. 9 would be more interesting. Letting White settle himself so easily with 56 and 58 in the figure is unsatisfactory for Black.


White 58. White is prepared to pay a small sacrifice in exchange for stabilising his group. Kato Shin comments that if White counters with 1 in Dia. 10, Black would build thickness with 2 to 8, which would be disturbing for White.

White 60, forestalling Black 'a', is big. White realises that Black will attack at 61, but he is prepared to fight.

Black 61. Black could expand his moyo by playing at 88, but White would move out with a move around 78 and Black would not be able to make much territory.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

For that reason, Black attacks at 61; if White defends at 64, Black 88 will then be just right.

White 66. White 68, permitting Black to connect underneath at 66, would not be interesting.

Black 67 and 69 are tight moves, forcing White to move out into the centre and making a fight there inevitable. Ishida comments that instead of 67, Black could also have played the more usual move of 1 in Dia. 11. White would counter by squeezing with 2 to 8, then he would secure his eye-shape with 10. Black 11 next would be a good point. Taking away White's base with 67 and 69 in the figure is a more aggressive way of playing.

Black 73 – White 74. A good exchange for Black, forcing White to make bad shape and making it harder for him to get eye-shape.

Black 77. Following Dia. 12 would also be feasible for Black. It is hard to choose between the sequence there and that in the figure.

Black 89. If at 90, White would play 89. Ishida thinks that 89 is a bit of an overplay and instead advocates defending Black's territory with Black 100.

Black 91. The exchange for 92 seems to be a minus for Black. He should have attached at 93 immediately. White is left with the aji of moving out at 'b'.

White 100 makes the game very close.




Figure 3 (101 – 150)


Figure 3 (101 – 150). The losing move

White 8 is big in itself and also aims at the above-mentioned threat above 45. If White omits 8, Black will be able to connect at 1 in Dia. 13 in sente, forcing White to scramble for life with 2 to 6.


Black 11 is a good, calm answer to White 10; it not only captures three stones but also strengthens Black's centre group. Blocking at 'a' would show poor fighting spirit.

Black 13. Since Black would have to answer a move by White at 'b', Black 13 is worth eight points in reverse sente. The drawback is that White 14 lays waste to the centre.

Black 29 is the losing move. Shuwa's comment: 'Black 29 is bad. If Black had played elsewhere, he might have won by



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

a small margin.'

Black's aim with 29 is, of course, to apply pressure to the white group, but it backfires, for White has no trouble settling his group with 30 to 36. Shuwa did not say where Black should have played, but Ishida thinks that the correct way to attack the white group is to start with the peep at 1 in Dia. 14.

Dia. 14. If White answers Black 1 by connecting at 'a', Black 'b' would place his group in serious danger, so White 2 is the only move. Black 3 is a good continuation, forcing White to crawl ignominiously along the second line to save his group. Next, Black could force with 11 and 13, then switch to 15, taking a small lead. White's shape is very thin, since Black can

still atari at 'c' or instead attack with Black 'a', White captures, Black 'd'. Note that in contrast to this diagram, capturing a stone at 'c' in the figure is not sente after White 36.




Figure 4 (151 – 200)
ko: 93, 96, 99

Figure 4 (151 – 200). Another mistake

Black 51 is wrong, since Black has to add another move, at 55, almost immediately. According to Ishida, Black would still have a chance if he played 51 at 'a'; White would still play 52 and 54 next, but Black would have time to defend at 56 and the game would still be very close.

Figure 5 (201 – 244). Shusaku's first breakthrough

White 16 is a clever answer to 15: not only does Black's attack with 17 fail when White makes an eye with 18, but on top of that White only has to add one more stone here later. The result is that Black 15 is transformed into a bad move. Instead of 15 –

Dia. 15. Ishida comments that Black 1 here is the correct yose. Eventually the sequence to 8 will follow and since Black





Figure 5 (201 – 244)
White wins and connects the ko.



Dia. 15

is left with a ko and White loses the atari at 'a', this result would gain Black half a point over the result in the figure. That would not affect the result, but the play here is a good example of Shusaku's technical brilliance and his attention to detail.

This game was the first breakthrough of the series for Shusaku. In a bango it was essential to win one's games with black – like holding one's service in tennis – so this loss immediately placed a considerable burden on Yuzo.

White wins by 2 points.

Game Forty-One: Sanjubango, Game Four

White: Ota Yuzo 7-dan
Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan
Date: 15th February, 1853
 167 moves. White resigns.
Commentary by Go Seigen




Figure 1 (1 – 34)

Figure 1 (1 – 34). Yuzo's new move

White 2. Playing komoku on the same line as Black 1 is solid. White 2 at 3 would be more common.


Black 3. If at 6, White 'a' next would be usual.

Black 5. Not at 'b' because of the location of White 4. If 4 were at 'c', Black would probably play 'b'.


White 6. White 'd' was more common in this period, but that would give Black the ideal pincer-extension at 'e' (White 'f' – Black 'g' being the standard continuation).

Black 7. The top is important, so this pincer is natural. If Black followed either Dia. 1 or Dia. 2, White would succeed in making an extension at the top.


White 8, 10. A very unusual combination, almost never seen today. The usual move for 8 would be one of the contact plays in Dias. 3 and 4.




Dia. 1




Dia. 2




Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Black 11 is the only move: Black must play lightly. Pushing at 'h' would be heavy and would make White 12 work even better than it does in the game.


White 14. Correct timing – White should invade to break up Black's moyo at the top before pushing with 18 and 20. Actually, White is reluctant to play the latter moves and he first wants to see Black's response to 14 before going ahead.

White 24 was a new move. The ordinary josekis in Dias. 5 and 6 would not be very interesting for White here.

Black 25. The joseki in Dia. 7 (next page) is considered a straightforward one for Black, but giving White a ponnu is a source of dissatisfaction.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8




Figure 2 (35 – 100)

Figure 2 (35 – 100). Yuzo's mistake in strategy

Black 35, 37. Important timing. If Black omitted 35 and extended immediately at 37, White would put Black on the spot by extending at 35. Note, however, that Black must not play 35 when White 24 (in Fig. 1) is the small knight's move at 47.

White 44. If omitted, Black easily kills White with 1 and 3 in Dia. 8, but White could push one more time at 'a'.

White 50. This move is a joseki, locally speaking, but here it is lacking in subtlety. Black is instantly able to settle his group by cutting at 51, so White can no longer look forward to attacking it. I think that White should play 50 at 54; that would put the emphasis on attacking the black group, since it would prevent Black from

getting eye-shape by cutting. Black still has a weak, floating group at the top, so if White could work out a way of engineering a double attack (karami) on the two groups, the game would be quite promising for him. In contrast, the position is clearly unfavourable for White when Black settles his group with 51 to 55.

White 56 is a severe move, far superior to the simple knight's move at 59. However, omitting to play a probe at 63 first was a bad oversight by White. It is hard to say whether Black would simply connect at 69 or whether he would jump to 89, but it is obvious that a move by White at 63 would have destroyed Black's eye-shape. Permitting Black 63 was inexcusable.

White 64. I think that White should play immediately at 96. If Black answered 64 at 69, that would make 64 a nice forcing move, but there is no need for Black to be in any hurry to answer 64. When White plays 68, it is time enough to connect at 69; if instead White cut at 69, Black could play 68, so his group would be in no danger of being captured. All White has accomplished with his peep is to give Black the opportunity to force at 65, then to intercept with 67.

The continuation to 75 makes Black's lead all the more pronounced. Note that White must resist the temptation to block at 73 with 72, as Black would consolidate a large corner territory by extending at 72.

White goes through the motions of attacking the black group at the top with 82, but with the tesuji of 85 up his sleeve, Black is untroubled.

Figure 3 (101 – 167). A fighting finish

Black 1 is well-timed. If White answers at 4, Black plans to make a forcing move at 13.

Black 19. A safety-first move? Black

could instead make a severe attack on the white group by throwing in at 'a', then connecting at 20.

White 50. Since connecting at 51 is not enough to win, White decides to go out fighting.

White resigns after Black 167.

Go Seigen's summing up: 'The main factors in White's loss in this game were his failure to play 50 at 54 in Figure 2 and his missing the chance to extend at 63 with 56 in the same figure.'

There are also some brief comments by Shuwa on the fuseki: 'White 8, 10 and 12 in response to Black 7 lost points for White. Black 25 and the subsequent hane at 35 were interesting. Black's result in this corner was slightly superior.'




Figure 3 (101 – 167)

Game Forty-Two: Sanjubango, Game Five

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Black: Ota Yuzo 7-dan

Date: 22nd (to move 37), 23rd February, 1853

244 moves. Black wins by 2 points.

Commentary by Go Seigen

Figure 1 (1 – 50). An unsatisfactory attack

White 8. Defending at 15 would be the standard move. If Black 7 were the knight's move at 'a', then White 'b' would make good balance with 6. White probably thought for quite a bit before he played 8. He must have decided then to switch to 10 if Black invaded immediately at 9.

White 10. Shuwa: 'White should exchange White 'c' for Black 'd' before playing 10.'

Black 27. A large-scale move, typical of Yuzo.

Black 31. Black should first peep at 'e', forcing White 'f'. Once White has played 32, he will not answer 'e' at 'f' but at 48; if Black then cuts at 'f', White would settle himself lightly by attaching at 'g'. Attack-




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

ing with 33 is not interesting, as White can attach at 42.

Black 35. Black 45, sealing White in and forestalling White 42, seems to be the honte (proper move). That would not only exert pressure on the white group at the top, but would also give Black an excellent follow-up at 'h' for expanding his

moyo.

Black 41. Back 45 would still be better. When White attaches at 42, his prospects seem better than Black's.





Figure 2 (51 – 100)



Dia. 1

Figure 2 (51 – 100). Clash in the centre

White 54. If White pushes through at 1 in Dia. 1, Black has no trouble escaping after 8. White 54 is aiming at this attack, so Black defends with 55.

White 56 – 68. A brilliant sequence for securing connection. It was because he had read this out that Shusaku was able to make the leisurely move at 54 in the centre. Since he had no hope of cutting White off, Yuzo had to content himself with taking sente profit with 63 and 65.

White 76 is not urgent: Black cleverly seizes the opportunity to link up with 77 and 79. White should have held 76 in

reserve, playing at 84 instead. That would threaten Black 69 and 71 while also solidifying White's bottom left area; it would also keep open the option of intercepting with White 81.

Black 85 is the climax of the game. It starts some extremely difficult fighting.

White 88, 90. White is aiming at the centre group.

White 98. White could link up with White 'a', Black 'b', White 99, Black 98, White 'c', but he would be most reluctant to make the peep at 'a'.





Figure 3 (101 – 150)



Dia. 2

Figure 3 (101 – 150). Missed opportunities


White 2. White misses a chance to take the lead. Instead of 2, he should block at 1 in Dia. 2. Black would play 2 and 4,

then defend at 6, but White 7 would make it very difficult for Black to get much territory in the centre.

White 18. White should invade at 'a', challenging Black to a final fight. Black must have been relieved at getting the chance to defend at 21.

Black 33 is correct. If Black connects at 1 in Dia. 3, White will attack with 2 etc. If Black connects at 7, White can kill him with 8 to 12. Black can of course live by playing 7 at 12, but the loss incurred by letting White cut at 7 would be greater than that suffered in the figure.

White 48. It may make bad shape, but taking sente with White 49 is preferable. When Black keeps sente by squeezing, then switches to 57 in the next figure, the game tilts in his favour.



Dia. 3

Figure 4 (151 – 200)

Black 67. Black is now certain of victory.

Figure 5 (201 – 244)

After striking at Black's weak point with 42 in Figure 1, White played superbly and the game seemed promising for him, especially when he launched his fierce attack with 86 and 90 in Figure 2. However, White 2 in Figure 3 was a mistake in direction and at one blow his prospects were damaged when Black played out at 3. White missed his last chance to try for victory when he failed to invade at 'a' in Figure 3 with 18.

Black wins by 2 points.




Figure 4 (151 – 200)

54: connects




Figure 5 (201 – 244)

43: connects (above 39)

Game Forty-Three: Sanjubango, Game Six

White: Ota Yuzo 7-dan
Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan
Date: 25th February, 1853
265 moves. Jigo

*Commentary by Go Seigen, with reference
to a commentary by Fujisawa Shuko*




Figure 1 (1 – 40)


Figure 1 (1 – 40). A fighting start

White 2 and 4 make the same shape as Black. Examples of this are extremely rare. The players were trying out all kinds of strategies in this series and that led to the appearance of some unusual fusekis. In more recent times, this pattern has been played by Kitani Minoru.


White 6. As in the second game, Yuzo let Black make two corner enclosures. This is an unorthodox strategy, but Yuzo seems to have had absolute confidence in it.

White 8. The largest point on the board.
If White played at 10, Black would play
at 8.

Black 9. If at 'a', White will obviously make a pincer at 9. Black prefers not to fall in with White's plans. Black 11 is an ideal extension on the side, so Black can afford to let White enclose the corner.



DIA, I



Dia. 2

White 18. This is a good opportunity for White to start a fight. If White made an extension around 34, Black would jump to 'b', simplifying the game.


Black 19. If at 1 in Dia. 1, the sequence to 11 will follow. White can now make a severe invasion at 'a', so Black is dissatisfied.

Black 21 is solid. Shuko comments that if Black blocked at 1 in Dia. 2, White would be able to complicate the position with 2 to 8. Both sides have weak groups, so this result would not be bad for Black, but he decided to play cautiously.


Black 31 is a tesuji. If Black descended at 32, White might start a fight by pushing up at 'c'. Aiming at starting a ko fight with 'd' after descending at 32 would not be realistic for Black.

Although White lives in the corner, the result to 33 is not unfavourable for Black. He has taken some compensation with 21 and has built thickness.


Black 35. Black 1 in Dia. 3 would be more peaceful; if White 2, Black could play at 3 or 'a', expanding his bottom territory while attacking the white stones on the



Dia. 3



Dia. 4




Dia. 5


side.

White 36 and 38 offer the strongest resistance to Black's invasion. If White played 36 at 1 in Dia. 4, Black would attach at 2 and live in the corner. This result would be unsatisfactory for White, as White 1 would capture the black stone on too small a scale. However, if Black played the same corner sequence after 36 and 38 in the figure, giving the position in Dia. 5, White would then be satisfied to continue with 1 to 5, since he would be able to surround the solitary black stone on a much larger scale.

Black 39. Black is hoping for the sequence to 13 in Dia. 6, but Yuzo of course refuses to answer in such docile fashion.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Figure 2 (41 – 100). Black wins the ko.

White 44. A strong move – White is determined to keep the black stones separated. If Black answers at 53, White will push up at 47.

White 54. Giving atari at 55 would be bad, as Black would counter with 67.

White 60. Fighting spirit demands that




Figure 2 (41 – 100)

ko: 64, 69, 72; 73: connects (at 46)

75: ko

White accept the challenge instead of simply connecting at 61.

Black 67. Taking the ko instead looks feasible; if White captured at 68, Black would be happy to capture at 77, while if White made a ko threat instead, Black would have gained a ko threat.

Black 77. Since he has one more ko threat, at 'a', one would think that Black could answer White's ko threat at 76 by blocking at 78. When White pushes through at 78, the position here becomes promising for him.

Black 81. Possible because the ladder favours Black. Simply extending to 96 would be dangerous, as White would push through at 89, threatening to capture the four black stones at the top.

Black 91, taking away White's base, is the vital point. Attacking at 1 in Dia. 7 would accomplish nothing, as White would settle his group with 2 to 6.

Black 95. Black blithely discards four stones, but defending at 96 would be a big move, especially as Black could then aim at White's weak point at 'b'. If Black did connect at 96, White would exchange

'c' for Black 'd', thus defending against Black 'e' in sente, then switch elsewhere.




Figure 3 (101 – 150)

Figure 3 (101 – 150). A questionable move in the corner


White plays a skilful forcing sequence at the bottom with 2 to 10: it is essential for him to keep sente in order to play at 14, the last large point, before Black gets a chance to reduce the moyo with a move at 20.

White 18. If at 1 in Dia. 8, Black will force with 2 and 4. If White plays 3 at 4, Black lives with 5.


Black 19, 21. Black goes wrong in this corner. Shuko comments that he should continue after White 18 by playing the diagonal move tesuji of 1 in Dia. 9. The moves to 6 would be forced, after which Black could turn at 7. He would have a ko in the corner and the aji of the peep at 'a'.

White 22. The only move. If at 1 in Dia. 10, Black will force with 2, then strike at 4. White 22 makes a clean capture.


White 32. If White is greedy and plays at 1 in Dia. 11, Black will counter with




Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

the sequence to 12.

White 44 is a clever cut, the full effect of which becomes apparent later. Black probably expected White to extend at 49, but White decides to play a ko here. White 44 creates ko threats.

Black 47. Black could safely capture 46 by giving atari on the outside at 48, but that would reduce his liberties even more than in the figure. White's aim is to exploit this shortage of liberties, so Black plays 47 in order to give him as little help as possible.

Figure 4 (151 – 200). A cleverly-managed ko

White 58. White is able to fight this ko because of the ko threats created by 44 in the previous figure.

White 64 is a good move. Playing at 76, permitting Black 64, would be bad.

Black 75 is big, but descending at 90 would also be a big move. Black could next aim at cutting at 88.

White 96. If omitted, Black will peep at 96, then jump in at 'a'.

Figure 5 (201 – 265). A masterpiece for Yuzo

The moves in this figure do not seem to




Figure 4 (151 – 200)
ko: 62, 67; 69: connects; ko: 70, 85

affect the outcome. The game was decided by the ko in Figure 4. I think that one would be justified in calling this game a masterpiece for Ota Yuzo. His play was sharp and imaginative and did not show




Figure 5 (201 – 265)
42: at 27; 64: at 25; 65: at 48

any sign that his self-confidence had suffered from the early lead that Shusaku had taken in the series.

Result a jigo.

Game Forty-Four: Sanjubango, Game Seven

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan
Black: Ota Yuzo 7-dan
Date: 3rd (to move 79), 4th March, 1853
187 moves. White resigns.
Commentary by Go Seigen, with reference to a commentary by Fujisawa Shuko

Figure 1 (1 – 15). Yuzo's komoku

Black 1. One does not often see Yuzo play on the komoku point – his name is virtually synonymous with the mokuhazushi.

Black 5 is a little unusual. Yuzo probably did not consider playing his opponent's favourite fuseki pattern with 'a'.

White 10. The standard move is White 'b', which sets up a two-space extension in both directions. In this game White presumably plans to switch to 11 if Black plays 'c'. Transposed, that result would




Figure 1 (1 – 15)
be the same as if White had played 10 at 11, Black extended to 'c', then White in-

vaded at 10. Since the natural move for Black on the side when White plays 11 is Black 'b' rather than 'c', White would be satisfied. Black plays 11 to foil this strategy. There is some rather subtle give-and-take beneath the surface of this fuseki.




Figure 2 (16 – 78)

Figure 2 (16 – 78). Black launches a large-scale attack.


White 16. If White answers Black's pincer at the top right by moving out at 17, Black would probably make the all-out pincer at 'a'.

Black 21. Black 22 is also possible. White would answer at 21 and aim at peeping at 24. Perhaps Black did not like that prospect.

White 22. If at 1 in Dia. 1, Black would be able to settle himself with the 2 – 4 crosscut combination, which we have already seen. Alternatively, he could live in the corner as in Dia. 2.

Black 23. Both sides had the option of linking up with the second line contact play, but Black is the one who takes the plunge. The result to 26 is even.

Black 29. The sequence which follows is a joseki.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

White 30. White 56, permitting Black 30, would be bad.

Black 35. If at 36, White will spoil Black's shape by peeping at 35.

White 36 is the vital point. If Black played here, he would immediately settle his group.

Black 37. Black is aiming at 41, but since this is a no-komi game, White does not have the time to make a reinforcement.


Black 39 is a good move. If White defends at 41, Black will continue his attack with Black 40.

White 56 is a very profound move: it indirectly helps the white group to the right by attacking the eye-shape of Black's group. If Black answers at 'b', White will jump to 'c', stabilising this group. If Black then attacks the other group with 61, White will make use of his sente move at 64 to seek eye-shape at the bottom. White 56 is more interesting than fleeing through the centre with White 'd'.

Black builds thickness with 57 and 59, then makes the expected attack with 61. White's continuation to 70 is natural, but White 72 is a bad mistake, for White has no follow-up when Black blocks at 73. White 72 not only loses points but also weakens White's group. Without the 72 – 73 exchange, White would be able to get a second eye after the capture with 78 by playing at 1 in Dia. 3.


Dia. 3. If Black tries to take away White's eye by playing 2, White would stop Black from getting two eyes with 3 and 5. White would win a semeai between these two groups.

White's careless move at 72 makes life




Dia. 3

tougher for White's group, because without it making an eye in the centre and making one on the side with 1 in Dia. 3 would be miai, in which case White would not have to worry about this group any more. However, it is not in immediate danger, for Black is too weak himself in the centre to make an all-out attack at this stage.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

so Black would be left with the option of capturing three stones later on.

White 86 is a resolute move, risking death. White refuses to follow Dia. 5, because giving Black those three stones would be unbearable. White is prepared to play a ko if Black starts it with Black 90, White 'a', Black 'b'.

Black 87. Black is preparing for the ko fight. His aim is to create ko threats against White's group on the side.

White 90. White has to waste a move defending here. That is his punishment for his slip with 72 in Figure 2.

Black 97 and 99 are safety-first moves. If Black intercepted with 1 in Dia. 6 instead of 99, White would secure life with 2. He would then be able to aim at pushing through and cutting with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'.

White 108 – 114. These moves help to create a resilient shape.





Figure 3 (79 – 115)

Figure 3 (79 – 115). The threat of the ko

Black 79. Black cannot kill the group at the bottom. For example –

Dia. 4. If Black 1, White 2 is sente, so White can get an eye with 4 to 8. If Black plays 5 at 6, White plays 5 and can get an eye, because White 'a' will be sente. Since he cannot capture White, instead of 3 here –

Dia. 5. Black 3 would be better. White would be forced to answer Black 5 at 6,



Dia. 6

Figure 4 (116 – 187). Black finishes White off with a ko.

White 20. If at 21, Black will attach at 42; if then White 28, Black will play 22 and take a large centre, while if White connects at 22, Black will play at 28 (in effect, 22 and 28 would be miai).

White 24 etc. White realises that Black will be able to put the bottom left corner into ko. He prefers to go out with his colours flying. The outcome of this game was decided back when he played 72 in Figure 2.

White 70 is forced, as Black still has any number of ko threats. Even though White lives in the corner, Black 69 to 73 give Black ample compensation for the three stones (19 etc.) that he sacrificed in order to set up the ko. Black has also gained by playing the successive moves of 55 and 57 at the top. Normally, White would have answered 55 at 57, but he did not have the time.

This was an excellent game for Yuzo –




Figure 4 (116 – 187)

37: connects at 32; ko: 50, 53, 56, 59, 62, 65, 68

his jigo with White in the previous game must have revived his spirits. The series was now level three-all.

White resigns after Black 187.

Game Forty-Five: Sanjubango, Game Eight

The following game is the shortest of the series and one of the most spectacular. Ohira Shuzo describes it as ‘a wonderful example of a well-played splitting attack.’ Early in the game Black separates White into three weak groups and thereafter is in complete command. Shuwa describes Shusaku’s play in one word: ‘brilliant’.

White: Ota Yuzo 7-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Date: 7th March, 1853

123 moves. White resigns.

Commentary by Go Seigen, with reference to a commentary by Sato Sunao 9-dan

Figure 1 (1 – 41). Yuzo’s failure in the fuseki

The fuseki to 7 is the same as in the




Figure 1 (1 – 41)

34: connects

second game. This is the third time in the series that Yuzo has permitted Shusaku to make two corner enclosures with black.

White 8. In the second game Yuzo played on the star-point above 11. Both are excellent moves. However, 8 could also be the more leisurely move at 'a'.

White 12. If White encloses the corner with 13 or 23, Black would make a splitting move (*wariuchi*) at 'b'. That would simplify the game, which would not be to White's liking.

Black 13 – 17. The speed with which Shusaku develops is striking – his stones seem to move faster around the board. Sato: 'Black's fuseki is flawless. At this early stage the game has already become difficult for White.'


White 16. Go Seigen: 'White 16 is Yuzo's first slip-up in the fuseki. White should simply have extended to 17. If White wants to reduce the effectiveness of Black 13, he has to attack it on a large scale. When Black extends to 17, he has succeeded in simplifying the game.'

White 18. There is a divergence in opinion on this move.


Sato: 'White 18 is a reasonable guess. Capturing Black 13 by playing White 23 is the honte, but that would lead to White's falling even further behind. White 18 to 22 is a standard sequence for reducing a moyo.'

Go Seigen: 'White 18 is not interesting. Once White has attached at 16, he must make the hane at 23, which is the honte. Black would probably build up the top area with 'c'. That would leave both players somewhat biased towards one part of the board, but that cannot be helped. When Black takes sente with 21 and switches to 23, White's fuseki strategy has clearly failed.'

Black 25. The timing of 25 and 27 is important. If Black first exchanged 27 for White 'd', then attached at 25, White might pull back at 'e' instead of 26.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

White 26. If at 1 in Dia. 1, Black will thrust in at 2 instead of pushing up at 'a'. Alternatively, Black could play lightly at 'b' instead of 2.


White 28 is a good move. If White extends at 1 in Dia. 2, Black will play 2; if White 3, White has no answer to Black 4.

Black 29. Not the leaden-footed extension at 30. The moves to 33 are a standard sabaki sequence for moving out quickly.


White 34. Sato: 'Connecting at 34 seems to have been too placid. Because of this move, White fell further behind. Black was given a free hand to do what he liked and the game became an arduous struggle for White. I think that the direct cause of this is White 34. I would prefer to give atari at 'f'. Black would take the ko, but then White could start a fight by attaching at 'g'. The latter move may seem a little unreasonable, but White has to play adventurously to try to overcome Black's lead. Black 35 is perfect – it is hard for White to win once he lets Black take this point.'

White 36. Go Seigen calls this the losing move. Invading at 36 is clearly unreasonable when White has one weak group at the top and another on the right. Yuzo must have lost his composure after his failure at the bottom. Instead of 36, White should make the shallow reducing move at 'h'. The sequence to 7 in Dia. 3 (next page) would follow.

Black moves out deliberately with 37 and 39, then occupies the key point of 41. This move, which was praised by Shuwa, initiates a deadly three-way attack.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4




Figure 2 (42 – 60)

Figure 2 (42 – 60). A fierce attack


Black 43. Possible because the ladder is favourable.

White 46 is stubborn. White should settle his group lightly with the sequence in Dia. 4.


The sequence to 54 is forced. White captures a stone, but he is dissatisfied with his bad shape with 42. Ideally, this stone should be at 'a'.

White 56. White should first force with 1 in Dia. 5. If Black 2, White can link up with 3 and 5. The virtue of White 1 is that it prevents Black from separating White with 'a'.


White 56. White should first force with 1 in Dia. 5. If Black 2, White can link up with 3 and 5. The virtue of White 1 is that it prevents Black from separating White with 'a'.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

White 58. If at 'b', Black 'c' works. Black 59 is a savage move which keeps the enemy forces divided. Sato offers the sequences in Dias. 6 and 7 to demon-

strate that White has no direct answer to Black 59.

Dia. 6. If White 1, Black plays the sequence to 8. White cannot start a ko with 'a', because Black would ignore any ko threat he made.

Dia. 7. The hane at 1 does not work any better. White has no continuation after 6.

White 60 is a desperation measure. Black of course will not answer at 'd' once he has played 59.




Figure 3 (61 – 100)


Figure 3 (61 – 100). Shusaku's remorseless play

Black 65 defends against the threat of White 'a'.


White 68. An attempt to get something approaching eye-shape. Sato comments that White could get a ko by playing 68 at 1 in Dia. 8, but he could not hope to win this ko. Black would have plenty of ko threats against his group on the left side. Note that even playing Black 2 in the diagram at 7 would be good enough for Black.

Black 69 disposes of the aji of 'b'.

Black 71 nips in the bud any idea White has of counterattacking at 'c'.



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

Black 73. Black strengthens himself before continuing the attack. This gives White a free move, but to look after both his groups he would need more than one move.

White 74 is a tenacious move, aiming at starting a ko with White 95. Black fearlessly continues his attack with 75 and 77, however. Defending with Black 82 would be cowardly, since at this stage White does not have the ko threats to start the ko.

White 78. White is hoping for Black 1 in Dia. 9, which would let him link up with 2 to 6. He must have been disappointed with Black 79.

White 86. White is out, but where is he going?

Black 91 is another painful blow for White. If he connected at 'd', he would have no answer to Black 92.

White 94 creates potential for ko threats, so Black decides that the time has come to defend at 95. Shuwa comments that the way in which Shusaku eliminates the threat of the ko here is very instructive.





Figure 4 (101 – 123)

Figure 4 (101 – 123). Black completes the kill.

Black 17. The only move. If Black plays elsewhere, White will either be able to cut or to live. For example, if Black plays at 'a', White will play 18, threatening to cut above and below. If instead Black plays at 18, White lives by playing at 'a'.

White 22 is an attempt to live without adversely affecting the white group to the right. White could live by playing 22 at 'b', but after Black 'c' and White 'd', Black 'e' would be sente, so Black would be able to attach at 'f'.



Dia. 10


Black 23 delivers the coup de grace – all White can do is to choose which of his groups shall die. Instead of 23 –

Dia. 10. If Black played at 1, White would be able to get his second eye for this group in sente. He would then be able to make one eye in sente for the other group with 8, so he would at least have an outside chance of getting a second eye for this group also.

White is helpless after 23. He could secure life for the group on the right with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 11*, but Black would then be able to play 4, killing the other group.

This was probably the most one-sided game of the series. Because of his slack play in the fuseki, Yuzo was forced to make some unreasonable moves to try to catch up, but they had the opposite effect. Things only went from bad to worse.

White resigns after Black 123.



Dia. 11

Game Forty-Six: Sanjubango, Game Nine

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Black: Ota Yuzo 7-dan

Date: 13th (to move 91), 15th March, 1853

279 moves. Black wins by 2 points.

Commentary by Go Seigen, with reference to a commentary by Fujisawa Shuko




Figure 1 (1 – 50)


Figure 1 (1 – 50). A quiet start

Black 11. If at 13, White would push up at 11 and the space between his wall and White 6 would be very efficient. Black attaches at 11 in order to make that space as narrow as possible.


White 16. White 'a', starting a fight in the top left, would also be possible.

White 18. If Black presses at 'b', White intends to fight back with White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e'. White 18 is certainly an oba, but permitting Black 19 is painful. There would have been nothing wrong with exchanging White 19 for Black 'f', for even after the latter move, White would still have the tesuji placement at 'g' in the corner and he could also play 50.

Black 27 is a good move. White 28 is the last oba, but attacking Black with 1



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

and 3 in Dia. 1 might have been better. The idea is to use this attack to make territory at the bottom. Note that attaching at 2 with 1 would not be appropriate; since White has a strong position on the left side, he should drive Black out into the centre.

Black 29 is a good move. White already has a solid position here, so strengthening him further with this contact play does not matter.


White 30. The hane is natural, as White 'h' would be too submissive. If instead White hanes at 1 in Dia. 2, Black can settle himself with the crosscut; if White 3, Black will press at 4 and aim at using the atari at 'a' to fix up his shape.

White 32. If at 'i', Black will press at 'b'.


Black 33. A light move, typical of Yuzo. If White answers at 'j', Black will block at 'i', after which White would hate to have to connect at 'k'.

Black 35 is a severe invasion, with an excellent follow-up at 37. White has little choice about jumping out to 36.

Black 49 is correct. Attaching at 1 in



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dias. 3 and 4 is not interesting. In Dia. 3, White cuts off the corner area, while if he just chooses to live peacefully, as in Dia. 4, Black's outside wall is useless, since White is strong in the centre.

White 50. This seems to be the right time to do something about the top.




Figure 2 (51 – 100)


Figure 2 (51 – 100). The first fight

Black 51 is questionable – Black should have played immediately at 53. Black undoubtedly expected White to connect at 'a', but White 52 is a good answer. White's continuation with 54 and 56 suddenly tilts the balance of power at the bottom in White's favour and puts him right in the game.


Black 59 is very big. White would have liked to be able to play 58 at 'b', but Black 58 would be an even better point than Black 59.

White 62. White 'c' would provoke Black 'd', which would threaten the four white stones to the left. Black would also have a lot of aji in the corner, so reinforcing with 62 etc. seems best.

Black 67. Black 69, the honte, would be more peaceful but perhaps a little slack. Since White has caught up with Black,



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

thanks to the ill-conceived peep at 51, Black has to play all-out.

White 68 is the vital point. If White answers 67 at 72, Black will push up at 'e'.

Black 69. If Black 'e', then White 'f' is hard to handle. Shuko comments that attaching at 1 in Dia. 5 would be bad.

Dia. 5. Black can take the side territory with 1 to 5, but White builds useful thickness with 2 and 4 and also takes sente. Instead of 2 –

Dia. 6. The hane at 2 is not very good. White can capture two stones with 4 to 8, but this time Black gets central thickness.

White 70 keeps Black separated and starts a difficult fight.

White 72. Not White 'c', as that would provoke Black 'd'.

Black 73–White 74. A good exchange for Black, as it makes White heavy and to some extent limits his freedom of action.

White 86. Cutting first at 88 is not good. Black would answer with 90, then play at 'h' if White extended at 'g'.

Black 91 helps to connect the black groups and also threatens the white group below. Reinforcing with 92 and 94 is advisable.

White 98. White is aiming at separating Black by attaching above 77.

White 100 is big, because it defends against the placement at 'i'.

Figure 3 (101 – 136). Unsettled groups

White 2. White cannot answer at 1 in Dia. 7 because of Black 2 and 4. Black






Figure 3 (101 – 136)



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

is therefore able to make an eye at the bottom with 3 in the figure and this may prove useful later on.

Black 9. If omitted, White has the threat of 1 in Dia. 8.

Dia. 8. If Black answers at 2, White 3 creates the double threat of cutting at 'a' and at 5. Black would have to let White cut at 5, since these two stones are smaller. However, Black can defend against White 'a' with 4, which gives him the sente continuation of 6 and 8 and considerably diminishes the value of White 5.

White 12. Black 20 would be severe now that White has lost the option of capturing two stones with 5 in Dia. 8.

White 18 gives White the atari at 26;

simply extending at 20 would be slack.

Black 21. Better than extending at 26. The black group below can get life by playing 27, so linking up is not necessary. Black 21 is more profitable, because it sets up a connection along the edge.

Black 31. A precaution in case White tries to cut with 36.





Figure 4 (137 – 168)



Dia. 9

Figure 4 (137 – 168). A close game

White 40. If White tries to kill Black with 1 in Dia. 9, Black counterattacks with 2 etc. and captures four of his assailants.

Black 57. Black's lead would have been more definite if he had first played Black 60, White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'. White 60 makes the game close.

Black 61 is a clever tesuji. If White plays 64 at 67, he loses the cut at 'd'.

Black 67. For the time being, this is enough to defend against the cut at 'd'.




Figure 5 (169 – 200)

ko: 77, 80, 83, 86, 89, 92, 95, 98

Figure 5 (169 – 200). White's ko challenge

Since he is a little behind, White starts a ko by cutting at 76. The burden of this ko is much heavier on White than on Black, for if the latter plays 'a', the ko will become a serious one, involving the life of White's group. White decides that he has to take the risk.

White 88. If White ignores 87, Black can make a placement at 'b'. If White played 88 at 'c', Black could still play at 'b'.

White 96 is worth about six points in sente. Since the ko is also worth about six points, it might have been safer for Black to play 75 at 96.

Figure 6 (201 – 240). Black wins the ko.

White does not have enough ko threats, so he finally has to give way with 36. When Black connects at 37, he has a small but definite lead.

Figure 7 (241 – 279). Yuzo evens the series again.

White 42 is a good move. This is worth one point more than blocking at 70.

Black made a good start in this game,




Figure 6 (201 – 240)

ko: 6, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35;
37: connects




Figure 7 (241 – 279)

but his slack move at 51 in Figure 2 gave White a chance to counterattack. Black then had a difficult time of it, but perhaps his skilful play in settling his weak stones at the top in Figure 4 made the difference. The feature of this game was the aggressive fighting attitude of both players.

Black wins by 2 points.

Game Forty-Seven: Sanjubango, Game Ten

White: Ota Yuzo 7-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Date: 25th March, 1853

225 moves. Black wins by 11 points.

Commentary by Go Seigen, with reference to a commentary by Fujisawa Shuko




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50). Yuzo shows his originality in the fuseki.

Black 5 is one of Shusaku's favourite moves. Nowadays, Black would probably play 5 at 'a'.

Black 9. The high pincer at 14, which would prevent White from capping at 10, would also be possible. In this position, I agree with White's strategy with 10. White 'b' would be sente against Black's right side position and White can press down on Black's position on the left with 'c', factors which White has taken into account in playing 10.


Black 11. Moving out with 'd' is not interesting — White would jump to 'b'. Black plays solidly with 11 and the result to 14 seems even.

White 16. Commonplace nowadays, but unusual in the Edo period. This is the

only star-point play in an empty corner in the sanjubango.

White 18, White 20. Yuzo is taking a lot of trouble with his fuseki, avoiding the stereotyped patterns of the period.

Black 21 – 31. A joseki. In particular, note that White 22 is correct. Shuko comments that Black follows this joseki when he feels that the standard Edo period joseki in Dia. 1 is inappropriate. Black does not want White to take the corner profit with 4 and 6 in the diagram.



Dia. 1

White 26 is correct shape. Extending at 30 instead is too stodgy (Black blocks at 28).

White 32. The usual moves would be extending to 'e' or jumping to 34, but since White has a solid position at the bottom, making the all-out extension to 32 is more severe.

White 34. White has no suitable answer to Black's shoulder-hit; if White 'f', jumping to 37 would be an excellent continuation for Black, while if White 'g', Black would probably switch to 35 instead of answering at 'h'. Neither way of playing is attractive for White.

Black 41 makes more flexible shape than connecting solidly on the third line.

Black 45. That kosumi again — extending at 'a' would have no effect on the corner: White would be happy to block between 16 and 46.

Black 47. Attaching at 49 is also possible — in this position we would get the same result with just the order of moves changed. Note that pushing at 'i' with 47 would just help White to solidify his side territory with 'j'.




Figure 2 (51 – 85)

Figure 2 (51 – 85). White's inconsistent play

White 52 is an important forcing move. If Black got the chance to descend at 52 first, White 57 would not be sente against the corner.

White 54. Shuko: 'White could also cut at 'a', but after Black lived with 57 and 59, White would have to reinforce at 55 or he would have bad aji. In the game White takes sente.'


Black 57, 59. Black's strategy is to stabilise this group first and aim at attacking White later on. Note that attacking at the top at 'b' would be small – Black is more interested in invading at 'c' or attacking at 'd'.

White 60. White hopes to cover his weakness at 'c' by attacking the base of Black's group.


White 64. Go Seigen: 'I think that 64 is inconsistent with White 60 and 62 and White's earlier move at 32. White 64 of course guards against the threat of Black 'c' or 'd', but here one wants to hane at 69, leading to Black 66, White 65. If Black then invaded at 'c', White could resist strongly with White 'e', Black 'd', White 'f'. Depending on circumstances,

White could consider sacrificing his group at the top, taking Black's bottom left group in exchange. White would lose nothing on such a trade. With 64, White should have continued in the spirit of 60 and 62.'


Black 65 is a natural counterattack. Shuko: 'If Black answered submissively at 1 in Dia. 2, White would throw in a cut at 2; if Black 3, White would capture at 4 and Black would be over-concentrated. The best Black can do now is to extend at 5, so he is dissatisfied. If he blocked at 6 instead of 5, he would lose the stone when White cut at 5. If Black played 3 at 'a', White would take profit at the bottom with White 'b', Black 3, White 'c'.'




Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Black 69. If Black connects at 73 instead, White will cut at 70, followed by extending at 74, and Black will be in trouble.

Black 77. Black could also play a ko with the sequence in Dia. 3.

White 80. White has to keep Black short of liberties. If he simply plays at 1 in Dia. 4, he collapses when Black plays at 2. If White 3, Black pulls back at 4.

White 80 makes a difference, as shown

in Dia. 5. White's cut at 3 is now a real threat and after the sequence to 11 he is certain of catching one of the black groups.

White suffers considerable damage in the sequence from 65 to 85. He can capture the four black stones in the bottom left corner, but Black has devastated his bottom territory. One does not feel that Black comes out behind in this exchange.





Figure 3 (86 – 127)

Figure 3 (86 – 127). White lets Black take too much profit.

White 86. As well as reducing Black's moyo, 86 aims at defending a weakness in White's position. It sets up a ladder if Black cuts at 120.

Go Seigen: 'I agree with White's strategy with 86, but building influence in gote with the continuation to 92 is dubious. I think that White should have been satisfied with the one move at 86, switching back immediately to 96. Making life for this group would have been worth a lot of points, for it would have completed the capture of the four black stones on the side. Black takes considerable profit when he lives with four points of territory up to 99 and at the same time creates a weak-



Dia. 6

ness in White's position above 94. White is also short of liberties.'

White 100, 102. Building influence in the centre is the only option left for White. Note that Black 101 is necessary to forestall the nidanbane of White 110 and White 'a'.

White 102. Shuko: 'White could also attack the black group at the top with 1 in Dia. 6, but he would have little prospect of success. After 2 to 5, Black would hane at 6, then give atari at 8 and he should have little trouble living. If White descended at 8 instead of 5, Black would hane at 6, making miai of the hane at 7 and the connection at 5.'

White 104, 108. Important timing – if White played 108 first, Black would connect at 110.

White 112 is a big move, but connecting at 115, making White thick, would also be good. In that case, White would later be able to block at 'b' in sente, thus gaining some endgame leverage against Black's bottom right corner.

White 118. If White extended at 125, Black would play 'c', taking aim at the weak point at 'd'. White could hardly hope to turn this area into territory.

Black 119. Black makes the cut now, because he is worried that later on White might just discard two stones by answering at 124.

White 122. Attempting to capture Black by playing at 125 would be unreasonable, considering that Black would also have the threat of extending at 124.

Black 127 is good enough. If Black makes absolutely certain of life for this

group, he does not have to worry about White's centre moyo, for he already has a comfortable lead in territory.






Figure 4 (128 – 175)



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Figure 4 (128 – 175). The diminishing centre

Black 29 is correct. Shuko: 'If Black hanes at 1 in Dia. 7, White counters by cutting at 2; if Black 3, White continues with 4 to 10 and cannot be killed unconditionally. Instead of 3 –

'Dia. 8. If Black plays at 3 here, White breaks out into the open with 4 and 6.'

White 36 is a desperate attempt to take a large centre, but unfortunately there are too many gaps in White's moyo.

Figure 5 (176 – 225). A solid win for Shusaku

In this game Black started out playing




Figure 5 (176 – 225)

ko: 80, 89

113: connects (below 91)

very solidly and he kept a tight grip on his initial lead. White launched his challenge with 64 in Figure 2, but this was a mistake in strategy. Black responded with a well-judged sacrifice and built up a safe lead. All the same, White might have had a chance if he had secured the capture of Black's discarded stones with 88 in Figure 3. Once Black lived in the bottom left corner, the territorial balance was completely destroyed.

Black wins by 11 points.

Game Forty-Eight: Sanjubango, Game Eleven

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Black: Ota Yuzo 7-dan

Date: 3rd (to move 67), 8th April, 1853.

254 moves. Black wins by 12 points.

Commentary by Go Seigen, with reference to a commentary by Fujisawa Shuko




Figure 1 (1 – 35)

Figure 1 (1 – 35). Corner aji

White 6. This time Shusaku lets Yuzo make two shimaris. If White played 6 at 7, Black would play at 'a'.


Black 11. Black 13 would also be a good point. If Black did play there, White would extend to 'b' – not to 11, because that would give Black a good move at 'c'.

White 12. It is essential to invade before Black jumps to 13.


Black 13. If at 'd', White would answer at 'e'. Black 'd' would have little effect on White's position at the bottom, so 13 is correct.

Black 15, White 16. Both key points.


White 20. White probably took considerable pains over this move. If White is going to do anything at the top, White 20 is the correct move. Extending to 25 or 'f' is not appropriate, the reason being




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

that White cannot hope to make an invasion in the top right. However, from the point of view of the overall position, I think that White should extend to 32. If Black then played at 26, White could defend at 'g'. Even after White plays 22 to 26, Black can still play the very effective combination of 27 and 29.

White 28. If at 1 in Dia. 1, White has no good answer to Black 2; if White 3, Black can later live with 4. Instead of 3 –

Dia. 2. If White 3 here, Black can connect underneath with 4 and 6. Instead of 2 –

Dia. 3. Black could also make a counter-hane at 2; if 3, Black could give atari at 4. Yet another possibility is to crosscut at 'a' with 2.

Black would not necessarily play any of the moves shown above immediately, but would wait for the right time. Leaving all that aji in the corner would make White apprehensive, so the solid answer at 28 is correct.

Black 31 is an interesting idea. Black 1 in Dia. 4 would just help the opponent, for White 2 makes excellent shape.

Black 35 is a severe move. White probably expected the simple connection, following which he would have jumped to 'h'.




Figure 2 (36 – 75)

Figure 2 (36 – 75). White helps Black to build thickness.

White 36. There is a problem with the timing of this move – I feel that it may be a little premature. It would be better to play immediately at 38.

White 44. defends the cutting point at 74 and also restrains Black from doing anything with his stone in the corner.

Black 45. A key point affecting every part of the board. A white play here would at one blow weaken the black groups on both the left and right sides. When Black plays 45, the three white stones above begin to look frail, while White's group on the left side is also affected.

White 46. If White leaves 36 as it is, Black can capture it by adding a stone and that would transform 36 into a bad move (it loses the aji of a contact play at 37). Helping 36 before it is too late is natural, but 46 gives Black the chance to build a strong wall with 47 to 57. Considering that White has to look after the weak group above, the result at the bottom cannot be called a success for him.

White 60, 62. An aggressive counter to the peep. Connecting at 'a' would make White heavy and give Black a good follow-

up attack at 'b'.

White 68 is the preliminary to attaching at 72, but it seems a little questionable. It would have been better to secure a base by pushing down at 'c' and capturing a stone. That would not only settle White's group but also take away Black's base. That would give White a more promising position.




Figure 3 (76 – 120)

Figure 3 (76 – 120). Dismal prospects


Black 77. When Black makes this cut, the likelihood of defeat for White becomes stronger and stronger.

White 80. White 'a' might not be sente, as Black might just cut at 'b' instead of connecting.

Black 81. This extension puts Black well in front.

White 82, ensuring the connection, is big. White's plan is to stabilise his group and aim at attacking the centre black group. If omitted, there is always the threat of Black 1 etc. in Dia. 5.

Black 87 is very big: it makes certain of eye-shape for Black's group and also sets up the clamp at 'c'. Even though White plays 88 and 92 to prevent the black group on the centre right from



Dia. 5

linking up to the bottom, Black is in no danger, because he has 93 in reserve.

Black 99. A solid move which destroys the aji of White 'd' and also aims at cutting at 'e'.

Black 103, 105. Black continues his attack while also expanding his area at the bottom. The game is running very smoothly for him.

Figure 4 (121 – 160). A safe lead

Black 23. If Black connects at 24, White will play at 'a'.

Black 51 sets the final seal on victory.

Figure 5 (161 – 200)

Figure 6 (201 – 254)

Shusaku never really had a chance in this game. His initial strategy of making




Figure 4 (121 – 160)




Figure 5 (161 – 200)




Figure 6 (201 – 254)

White wins and connects the ko below 52.

the shoulder-hit at 20 in Figure 1 let Black take too much territory at the outset and his mistake in timing with 36 in Figure 2 handicapped him even further. From first to last Yuzo was in command of the game. For the third time he caught up with Shusaku and evened the series.

Black wins by 12 points.

Game Forty-Nine: Sanjubango, Game Twelve

White: Ota Yuzo 7-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Date: 5th (to move 57), 25th April, 1853.

226 moves. Black wins by 13 points.

Commentary by Go Seigen




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50). A dubious strategy


White 6. Once again Yuzo lets Shusaku make two corner enclosures. This series could easily give one the erroneous impression that this strategy was the rule rather than the exception.

White 10. If at 'a', Black will not jump to 'b' but will extend to 'c'. Presumably Yuzo wanted to avoid this.


White 12. Yuzo declines to enclose the corner.

White 14. White could also play a pincer at 1 (or, nowadays, a high pincer at 'a') in Dia. 1. If Black pressed at 2, crawling at 'b' would make White's position on the left side too low, so he would fight back with 3 and 5. A modern joseki when White makes the pincer is shown in Dia. 2.


Black 15. Black could also extend to 16, the idea being to make shape with 31 if



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

White answered at 22. If instead White invaded at 15, Black could extend to 'd'. In the game, Black is reluctant to answer 16 at 29, because the space between 13 and 15 is too narrow.

White 20. I think that White 1 in Dia. 3 would be more interesting. If Black 2, White answers at 3, as in the game. Black would then be able to attach at 4 in the corner, but White could counter with 5 and 7. He could take the ko once with 9, but later would pull back at 'a'. This would give a more complicated position than in the game.


White 22 is more severe than answering at 'e', since 22 gives White the follow-up of the peep at 'f'.

Black 27, 29. A tesuji combination – Black 29 at 'g' would be vulgar style.


White 38. Connecting at 1 in Dia. 4 would make White thick. Black would cut at 2, whereupon White would sacrifice two stones with 3. White presumably played 38 in the figure because he wanted to play the ladder-break at 42, but the drawback of this strategy is that Black gets a superb extension to 47.

White 48 is questionable: this may be a large point, but when Black jumps to 49, it becomes very difficult for White to attack the top left corner position.


Therefore, instead of 48, White should have attached at 'h', forcing Black to answer at 'i' or 'j'; White could then have switched to 49, an important move which would have reduced Black's moyo while also relieving the pressure on White's group.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

with 63, the correct move in the corner is not attaching at 58 but peeping at 59.

White 64 is correct. Connecting underneath with 1 and 3 in Dia. 5 would be a mistake, as Black would counter with 4 and 6.

White 66. White's aim is to set up a peep at 'c'.

White 70. If White defers this move, Black might attack with Black 70, White 'd', Black 'e'.

White 74. If at 1 in Dia. 6, Black can attack with 2 to 6.

Black 87. Because of White 66, Black cannot hane at 1 in Dia. 7, for after White 2 and Black 3, White has a very effective peep at 4. If Black 5, White gets a ko in the corner with 6 and 8.

Black 87 is a good move which threatens White's eye-shape. White has to defend at 92 to prevent Black from making a placement there. White first strengthens his other group with 88, but Black continues his attack with 89, at the same time moving into White's left side moyo. Shusaku's extremely rational play here is worthy of admiration.

Black 93. A useful cut which shows a laudable attention to detail on Shusaku's part. If Black made the cut at 93 after White had made the hanetsugi of 'f-g'

(168–170 in Figure 3), White would answer at 'h' instead of at 94. The virtue of cutting at 93 now is that it sets up the 'i-j' combination for Black.

Black 95 is very big and also gives Black good aji.




Figure 2 (51 – 100)


Figure 2 (51 – 100). Black maintains his lead.

Black 51 is a superb attacking move which keeps White's two weak groups separated. White must be regretting having taken gote with 48 in Figure 1.

White 54 and Black 57 are miai.

White 56. Falling back to 76 would leave White with bad aji; for example, if Black later got a stone around 'a', Black 'b' would become a serious threat.

White 58–Black 59. I think that to some degree this exchange is ajikeshi for White. Simply playing the 60–62 combination would be more subtle. Once Black defends



Dia. 7




Figure 3 (101 – 170)

3: connects

Black's lead is becoming more and more apparent.

Figure 3 (101 – 170). An easy win

Black 1. Not at 2, because after White 1, Black 63, White 'a' would be sente, so White would be able to get an eye here, taking the pressure off his group. It is




Figure 4 (171 – 226)

more profitable for Black to keep the white group eyeless, for by chasing it out into the centre, he is able to move into White's moyo with 5 and 7. After the continuation to 15, the game is decided.

Figure 4 (171 – 226)

Black wins by 13 points.

Game Fifty: Sanjubango, Game Thirteen

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan


Black: Ota Yuzo 7-dan


Date: 7th (to move 59), 13th April, 1853.
270 moves. White wins by 5 points.

Commentary by Go Seigen, with reference to a commentary by Fujisawa Shuko


Figure 1 (1 – 52). A poor fuseki for Yuzo

Black 7. Black chooses the simple version of the taisha, but there is no reason for him to avoid the usual joseki with Black 'a', especially since he has the solid shimari of 1 and 3 in the top right. The sequence to 10 is a joseki, but White gains efficiency by having 8 located where it is rather than at 'b'. Also, White 10 is the key strategic point at the top, so this result is slightly favourable for





Dia. 1



Dia. 2

White.


Black 17. I think that moving out on the right with 1 in Dia. 1 would be better. Even if White extends to 4 or 'a' after 2, that has no effect on Black because of the lowness of his top right corner shimari.

Black 19. Black should first force with Black 20, White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e', then extend to 19. White 20 is a good move which sets up a superb extension to 'f'. Permitting that would be unbearable, so Black reinforces at 21, but White 22 is also an excellent move.


Black 23. Crawling at 'g' or jumping to 28 would be submissive, so Black prefers to live in the corner. The sequence to 33 is a joseki. Black is forced into a low position, but that cannot be helped.

White 34 gives White a good fuseki. Note that this reinforcement is advisable once Black has played 19, for strengthening his group makes it easier for Black to invade at the top. If, for example, White played 34 at 'h' on the right side, Black would probably invade immediately at 'i' or 'j'.

White 36. Shuko: 'This invasion determines the course of the game. A good alternative strategy for White is shown in Dia. 2. The difference is that this strategy prepares for a long, drawn-out game, whereas 36 in the figure attempts to



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

settle the issue immediately.'

Black 41 is a bad move which lets White cut off two black stones. Black should simply descend at 44, which would defend the cutting point at 45 and also aim at attaching at 41. Shuko suggests making the knight's move at 1 in Dia. 3 instead of 41.

Dia. 3. If Black 1, White would make the cut at 2, then move out with 4 and 8. Black 9 would continue the attack and also reduce White's moyo. Instead of 6 –

Dia. 4. If White 6 here, Black connects underneath with 7 (White 'a' is refuted by Black 'b'). This would be even better for Black than Dia. 3.

White 42, 44. The original game record gives these moves in reverse order, but Go Seigen and Shuko assume that that is a mistake in the record, since playing 42 at 44 would let Black play 43 at 42.

The sequence from 42 to 50 is forced. The result is a dismal one for Black, for the invading white group has become surprisingly strong and two of the attacking stones have been stranded, clinging forlornly to White's wall. Black 41 is the sort of mistake that gives a game away.

Black 51 is a good move – now that

White has become so strong here, Black has to play lightly.




Figure 2 (53 – 100)

Figure 2 (53 – 100). Yuzo shows his real strength.

Black 65. Linking up the two black groups with Black 66 is the honte, but considering that Black has already fallen behind, Black 66 would probably be a slack move. Black 65 is undeniably a good point, even though it lets White split Black into two with 66. White of course would not dream of answering submissively at 'a'.

White 72 is correct. If White played one space below 72 instead, Black would be able to cut at 72 and White would have bad aji because of his shortage of liberties.

Black 73 and 79 are aiming at the peep at 85. White does not defend at the top, but makes a severe attack at 80. Shusaku's sixth sense has alerted him that Black is thinking of making a moyo in the centre, so he nips that scheme in the bud with 80 to 84.


White 86. Connecting at 98 would be dangerous, as Black would exchange 87 for 88, then play 89.

White 94 is necessary to prevent Black


from getting a ko with 1 to 5 in Dia. 5.

Black 95 is an excellent move. White is forced to answer at 96, so Black turns the left side into territory with 97. Capturing two stones by playing 95 at 98 would also be a big move and would give Black good aji, but then White would play somewhere around 'b', turning the left side into a white moyo. Playing 95 and 97 is the correct strategy. Yuzo's play in this figure has been quite a contrast to his poor performance in the fuseki.

Black 99 gives Black very good aji. Black first strengthens his own stones and aims secretly at moves such as 'c', pulling out Black 65, and 'd', stirring up trouble inside White's territory.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Figure 3 (101 – 162). Black temporarily takes the lead.

White 4 is necessary to fix up White's bad aji here. If omitted, Black might play at 'a' or he might follow Dia. 6.

Dia. 6. Black exchanges 1 for White 2, then attaches at 3. If White resists with 4 and 6, Black can cut at 7. White would be in trouble.

Black 5 is the other move Black was aiming at when he played 99 in Figure 2. Black has to invade here to overtake





Figure 3 (101 – 162)

ko: 43, 46



Dia. 7

White's lead in territory. However, Black should first have played at 39; when White answers at 40, Black could switch to 5. At present Black has a lot of threats around 5, so White would be forced to reinforce at 'b'. Later on, when Black does start the ko at the top, the position is different – White has plenty of ko threats, so it is not so easy for Black to force White to add that extra stone inside his territory.

White 6. If at 1 in Dia. 7, Black attaches at 2; if White 3, Black crosscuts at 4 and things will not go well for White. For example, if White plays 5, getting a pon-nuki with 6 and 8 would be ample compensation for giving up two stones.

White 10. Shuko: 'This move is very difficult. The problem is whether White could capture Black by playing at 15.'

Shusaku must have decided that that would be hoping for too much.'

The result to 17 is a great success for Black and more than makes up for the damage he suffered at the top. In fact, Black has taken the lead.

Black 25 is a little greedy: Black should simply connect at 50, which would be sufficient to give him a win. Black 25 is not as big as it looks, for if White cuts at 50, he can block at 41, then play 'c', both in sente, after which he would be able to invade at 'd'. That means that Black 25 is surprisingly small.

White 28. Blocking at 31 would be unreasonable – Black would counter with 'e', White 'f', Black 'g', White 'h', Black 29.

Black 37. If omitted, White will cut with 'i', Black 'j', White 'k'.


Black 41. Connecting at 50 is the correct move.

Black 47. Black 'l' is bigger.

Black 49 is the losing move: it is too greedy. The only move for Black is connecting at 50, a move which would give Black good aji and should also keep him in the lead. When White cuts at 50, Black's position at the bottom is greatly weakened. Even though Black defends at 51, White makes the placement at 52, leading up to his tesuji at 60, which threatens the black groups on both sides.


Black 61. If Black saves the group on the left by playing at 1 in Dia. 8, White will kill the group on the right with the sequence to 10.

Black has to let White start a ko with 62. This is a great pity after all the effort that it took him to get back into the game. His failure to realise the crucial



Dia. 8

importance of connecting at 50 has proved to be very costly.




*Figure 4 (163 – 200). White does not have to win the ko.
67: connects 63 and 65; 74: ko*

Figure 4 (163 – 200). White does not have to win the ko.

White 66. White has any number of ko threats, starting with 'a' and 'b', but he calculates that capturing two stones in sente with 68 is enough. Moreover, if White does not play 66, Black might get a two-step ko. Black takes gote with 69, so White switches to the large point of 70 and is satisfied.

Black 73. The game is clearly lost:



*Figure 5 (201 – 270). The crucial breakthrough
63: connects (at 28)*

Black cannot hope to win this ko. When White captures at 76, he is certain of a win.

Figure 5 (201 – 270). The crucial breakthrough

In retrospect, this game can be seen as an important turning point in the series. Shusaku's win on white came after six successive wins by black and it changed the course of the series. Yuzo missed his chance to draw even and was not to get another.

White wins by 5 points.

Game Fifty-One: Sanjubango, Game Fourteen

White: Ota Yuzo 7-dan
 Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan
 Date: 15th May, 1853
 133 moves. White resigns.
 Commentary by Go Seigen




Figure 1 (1 – 30)

Having just lost his second game on black, Yuzo had to make up for it by winning one on white himself. However, this game was a failure for him: he was too greedy in the fuseki, was subjected to an all-out assault by Black and was mercilessly destroyed.


Figure 1 (1 – 30). A premature invasion

Yet again Yuzo lets Shusaku make two corner enclosures – his faith in this strategy seems as strong as ever.


White 4. One strategy that has been popular in the twentieth century is to play 4 at 'a'; if Black answers at 'b', White switches to the empty corner, satisfied with having prevented Black from making a shimari.

Black 9. Black 'c' is also possible; White 'd' and Black 'e' would follow.

White 10. If at 'f', Black will extend to



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

21. Because the White 2–White 8 shimari is low, it would then be easier for Black to move out into the centre, in contrast to the position if Black had played 9 at 'c', followed by White 'd'–Black 'e'. This consideration presumably influenced Black's decision to play 9.

White 12. White 'f' is also possible.


White 16 is necessary. If White makes the pincer at 18 immediately, Black will take away his base with 2 to 8 in Dia. 1. Instead of 5 –

Dia. 2. Blocking at 5 is unreasonable, as Black counters with 8 and 10.

White 22. I think that this invasion is premature, that White is being greedy. Instead of invading, I think that it would be preferable to play at 'g', strengthening White 10 and 12.

White 28 gives White a flexible shape. If White moved out with 1 in Dia. 3 instead, Black would force him to make bad shape with 3, then atari at 4, making White heavy.

Black 29. If at 'h', White will challenge Black to a ko by cutting at 30. White has a ko threat at 'i' and even just playing at 'j' would be good enough. Black would suffer enormous damage if he lost



Dia. 3

this ko, since his group would lose its base, while White would not have very much at stake. Black is understandably reluctant to play 'h'.





Figure 2 (31 – 76)



Dia. 4

Figure 2 (31 – 76). Harried and harassed

White secures his invading group with 32, but his other group comes under severe pressure when Black plays 33. Moreover, White makes a serious mistake in direction when Black caps at 35. White 36 is not urgent, because even if Black ataris at 38, White can either live with 'a' or escape to the centre with 'b'. Instead of 36, White should have reinforced the other group with 46.

White counterattacks with 40, but that only makes the situation all the more tense. Black uses his attack to build thickness in the centre up to 55. From White's point of view, the position loses

all its subtlety. Instead of 40 –

Dia. 4. I think that White should answer docilely with 1 to 5, then wait to see what Black does next. The position would be very difficult for White, but at least he would have some interesting moves to aim at – for example, the contact plays at 'a' and 'b'. White would clearly still be in for a hard time, but I think that this would be preferable to the unsatisfying sequence in the figure, which leaves White with no potential at all for counter-attack.

White 46. Giving Black the ponnuki is painful, but White has no choice.

White 56. If omitted, then Black 'c', White 56, Black 'd'.

Black 63 is correct shape. Black 'e' would be wrong, considering that Black has the peep at 'f'.


White 64 helps Black, but it is a necessary preparation for playing 68.

Black 69. If Black adds a move to secure the left side, White will play at 69 and stake the game on an all-out attack on the isolated black group.


White 74. If at 'g', White could get definite eye-shape with 'h' after Black 75, but then Black 'i' would not only be sente against the white group above, but would also threaten to lay waste to White's corner. In any case, White 74 and 76 take more points.

Figure 2 (77 – 100). Provisionally alive

White 78. White does not yet have



Dia. 5



Dia. 6




Figure 3 (77 – 100)

proper eye-shape, as Black can attack with 1 and 3 in Dia. 5.

Dia. 5. White cannot get two eyes after Black 3, but for the time being his group is safe, as he can escape through the centre with 4 to 12.

Black 79 is a good move. It might look as if Black can only go in as far as 'a', but 79 is quite safe.

Dia. 6. If White attacks with 1 etc., Black is untroubled. Initially, he can answer White's forcing move with 2, then when White plays 3, he can take up position with 4 and 6. White has no chance of killing him. If White plays 1 at 6, Black jumps to 'a', while if White pushes up at 'b' instead, Black jumps the other way, to 'c'.

Figure 4 (101 – 133). Disaster strikes.

White 2. White regrets having to play this move, but if omitted, Black's cut with 'a'—White 'b'—Black 2 would be severe.

Black 25. If Black connects at 1 in Dia. 7, White would be able to save his centre group with 2 to 6. Note, however, that this sequence is invalidated if Black gets a stone at 3. When Black launches his






Figure 4 (101 – 133)



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

attack with 25 in the figure, White unfortunately has to choose which of his groups — the one on the side or the one in the centre — will die. White 32 is easily refuted by Black 33, but White 'c' no longer works as well as it did in Dia. 5.

Dia. 8. White cannot force his way out,

but he can cut off the black group on the side. Up to 21, it looks like a semeai, but Black has the tesuji of 22, so he is able to live in sente (White has to play for life with 25, as he would lose a semeai). When White plays 27, Black connects at 28 and kills the centre white group. Actually, if Black kills the centre group, it does not

really matter what happens to his side group.

After his mistaken invasion at the beginning of this game, White was subjected to repeated harassment by Black. Inevitably the point came when he cracked under the pressure.

White resigns after Black 133.

Game Fifty-Two: Sanjubango, Game Fifteen

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Black: Ota Yuzo 7-dan

Date: 23rd May, 1853

223 moves. White resigns.

Commentary by Go Seigen




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

This game was Yuzo's first kadoban of the series. If he lost, he would be forced to suffer the indignity of taking sen'ai-sen against his youthful rival. Yuzo played with great determination and produced one of his better games of the series.

Figure 1 (1 - 50). White attempts to seal Black in.

White 14. If at 'a', Black will probably extend to 'b' or 'c'. White's strategy with

14 is to force Black to answer at the top and to aim at invading at 'b' later on.

White 20. If at 'd', Black will move out at the top by jumping to 27. White wants to blockade him with 22, but he first has to exchange 20 for 21 to defend against the threat of Black 'e'.


White 24. White seems to have little choice, as the hane in Dia. 1 does not work well.

Dia. 1. If Black 2, White must defend at 3, but Black will then cut with 4 and 6. If White 7, Black can attack the corner group with 8 etc. If White persists with the semeai by connecting at 17, Black makes the placement at 18 and easily wins the fight.

Black 33 and White 34 are miai. Defending the cutting point at 35 instead of invading at 34 would be much too mild for White in a no-komi game. With 34, White obtains his original object in playing 14.

White 40. Necessary to prevent Black from fixing up his shape with 'f'.

White 48 is questionable. Black 49 is a



Dia. 1

very useful move for Black, for it offers assistance to both the centre (35 etc.) and the side (19 etc.) groups. I think that White should have kept the black groups separated by playing 48 at 49. Of course, Black would then play at 48, but if White answered patiently at 'g', there would be no problem.






Figure 2 (51 – 100)



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Figure 2 (51 – 100). White falls behind.

Black 53. Black could also capture a stone with 1 and 3 in Dia. 2, but White would push up with 6, complicating the position. Making an exchange with 53 etc. is preferable. Although Black loses a few points, it is worth it to stabilise the centre black group, for he can next attack the white group to the left. This exchange is definitely not unfavourable for Black.


Black 61 is a clever probe. If White answers at 2 in Dia. 3, Black will play at 3, aiming at the gap at 'a'. If White patches it up, Black will be able to live with Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'. For this reason, White plays 62 in the figure, but that leaves Black with the clever yose tesuji that we see in Figure 4. Perhaps Black had already read out that tesuji when he played 53.

Black launches his attack with 65 and 67. If White connects at 88 with 68, then Black will continue his attack with 2 to 6 in Dia. 4, keeping the white groups separated.


White 70 is a thick move which dissolves the bad aji at 'a', but it is somewhat lacking in substance and seems to cause White to fall behind. I would prefer to play at 'b', a move which takes territory while attacking.

White 98. White's group is in no danger even if White omits this move, but White does not want to let Black build thickness with 1 and 3 in Dia. 5. Living on a small scale with 6 would be painful. An additional virtue of 98 is that White can aim at the White 'c'–Black 'd'–White 'e' sequence in the figure.

Black 99. Playing first in this corner ensures a lead for Black.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5
5: recaptures




Figure 3 (101 – 160)
6: connects (below 4)

Figure 3 (101 – 160). The fighting spreads.

White 2. White 3, letting Black settle himself immediately with 2, would not be interesting.

Black 11. An interesting tesuji, possible because Black 17 is sente against the corner. Black's aim is to make White heavy with 12.

White 36. White is aiming at the hane at 50. Playing 36 at 'a' would accomplish nothing for White, while helping Black to strengthen himself with Black 39, White 'b', Black 'c'.

White 38. It hurts to have to answer Black 37, but White will have extremely bad aji if he omits 38. Later on, when Black gets a stone at 47, he will be able to aim at attacking with Black 'd', White 'e', Black 38. Defending patiently with 38 is necessary, all the more so in view of the fact that White 30 is aiming at the cut at 'f'.

White captures nine stones with 54, but he does not profit by it. He has already invested capital at 36 and at 98 in Figure 2, while as a result of his making the capture his bottom group is subjected to attack. On top of that, his bottom right





Figure 4 (161 – 223)
ko: 76, 79, 82, 85; 89: connects (at 86)
ko: 90, 93; 96: captures (at 74)
101: connects (at 72)



Dia. 6
corner group also gets into trouble.
Figure 4 (161 – 223). Yuzo survives the kadoban.

White 72. White cannot attempt to capture Black by playing 1 and 3 in Dia. 6. White can prevent Black from linking up by sacrificing three stones with 5 to 11, but this capture would be enough to put Black ahead in the semeai with the white group to the left. Both Yuzo and Shusaku are reading with great precision here.

Black again makes a well-calculated sacrifice with 95, taking the corner in exchange for his centre stones. He then sets the seal on his victory with his yose tesuji of 97 and 99.

White resigns after Black 223.

Game Fifty-Three: Sanjubango, Game Sixteen

White: Ota Yuzo 7-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Date: 25th May (to move 81), 3rd June, 1853

159 moves. White resigns.

Commentary by Go Seigen




Figure 1 (1 – 51)


Figure 1 (1 – 51). An overplay

Black 1, 3, 5. Surprisingly, this is the first appearance in the series of the Shusaku-style fuseki.


White 14. Playing tenuki here in order to enclose the top left corner with 'a' would also be feasible.

Black 17, 19. These moves give Black a reasonable position, but all the same White does not mind being forced into a low position at the top. The reason is that Black's influence at the top is not so formidable when he does not have extensions down the right and left sides around 8 and 'b'. Since White already has stones at 8 and 16, he is able to contain Black's influence.

Black 23. Black 'c' is also possible, but Black has a reason for holding back at 23. He is anticipating the 24–25 exchange, and if White continues with 26



Dia. 1




Dia. 2


at 1 in Dia. 1, he plans to counter with 2 to 6. If instead White pressed at 1 in Dia. 2, he would be happy to crawl with 2 and 4.

White 26. I think that jumping to 'd' would be more interesting. If Black answered at 'e', White could run into the corner at 'f'. The advantage of this strategy would be that White could next aim at making the very severe invasion at 'g'. Because White played at 26, Black is able to seize the opportunity to force with 27 to 33, then to attach at 35. By keeping on the attack, he skilfully checks White from making the invasion.

White 38. One cannot help feeling that this move is an overplay. White hopes for Black to connect and presumably plans to play 'h' next, but when Black counter-attacks at 39, White has no good answer. To justify his move at 38, White would have to be able to block at 1 in Dia. 3, but the fight when Black cuts with 2 and 4 is clearly unreasonable for White. He therefore has to change course with 40, but that means that the 38–39 exchange becomes a bad one for White.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

He should have omitted 38 and played immediately at 40 or played at 'd' at the bottom.

Black 47 is a skilful sacrifice. If Black simply played at 51, White would have the 2–4 combination in Dia. 4.




Figure 2 (52 – 100)
70: ko

Figure 2 (52 – 100). Black goes for thickness rather than profit.


Black 55 is a powerful challenge. Black is quite unafraid of the threat of a ko at 'a', since White does not have good ko threats.

Black 61, 63. Correct style.


Black 65. If Black attempts to capture White with 1 in Dia. 5, White slips out with 2 and 4. If Black falls back to 3 in Dia. 6, White has the warikomi at 4, so Black would have to fight the ko at 'a'.

White 72 is a well-timed move. If White captured at 74 immediately, Black would be able to capture the three white stones with 75. The 72–73 exchange, preventing that, is a very effective one for White.

White 84. Since White captures three black stones, the ko fight might look



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

like a success for him, but that is far from being the case. The wall Black has built with 71 to 79 seriously weakens the white group above and places an invisible burden on White.

White 90. If omitted, White is unable to move out with 'b' (28 in Figure 3) or 'c', since Black 'd' would be sente. However, the weakness of White's position is apparent in the fact that the addition of a stone at 90 does not in itself completely settle the white group.

White 92. More urgent than extending to 'e'.

White 100. It would be safer to play White 'f', Black 'g', White 'h', but that would not be enough to win.

Figure 3 (101 – 159). Another kadoban

Black 3–13. An exquisite sequence




Figure 3 (101 – 159)
57: left of 56

for Black. If White omits 14, Black will play 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'.

Black 15 is a good, light move, far superior to the diagonal connection at 'd'.

White 16. White has to secure his base if he wants to fight in the centre.

White 34. If White cuts at 1 in Dia. 7, Black counters with 2 and 4, then captures White with the tesuji of 6 and 8. If White plays 7 at 'a', Black cuts at 8. Either way, Black gets a ladder.


Black 45. By now Black is well ahead.

White 52. White should connect at 59.


White 54 is necessary once Black isolates the group with 53, since Black is threatening to destroy White's eye-shape with 1 and 3 in Dia. 8 (the addition of a stone at 'a' means that White can get his eyes by playing 2 at 'b').

The game is over when Black puts the group at the bottom into ko with 55 etc. If White had played 52 at 59, making miai of 58 and 52, the game would at least have been countable.

For Ota Yuzo, the task of winning with



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

white against Shusaku was beyond his powers. Once again he was faced with a kadoban.

White resigns after Black 159.

Game Fifty-Four: Sanjubango, Game Seventeen

The game below is considered one of the classics of the Edo period and it is probably the second most famous game — after the ‘ear-reddening’ game — that Shusaku played. It is a favourite ‘anthology piece’ in Japan and in particular it is remembered for Shusaku’s innovative play in the fuseki. In this game Shusaku finally forced his leading rival to the handicap of sen-ai-sen, so it could justly be regarded as the climax of his career. Once Shusaku vanquished Yuzo, he was left with no serious rivals to challenge his supremacy.

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Black: Ota Yuzo 7-dan

Date: 5th (to move 21), 15th (to move 86),
21st June, 1853

228 moves. White wins by 3 points.

*Commentary by Go Seigen, with reference
to commentaries by Ishida Yoshio,
Takagawa Shukaku and Fujisawa Hosai*




Figure 1 (1 – 40)

Figure 1 (1 – 40). Shusaku’s new joseki

White 10, 12, 14. A pioneering strategy, invented by Shusaku in this game. In a letter to his father in Tonoura, Shusaku wrote as follows: ‘When Black plays 9, the standard answers for White are White 11 or White ‘a’. White 10, 12 and 14 are a new strategy. I spent six hours working out this combination.’

Black 9 itself seems to have been a

relatively new move and there was considerable experimentation with it in the 1840’s and 1850’s (a number of variations appear in this book). Shusaku’s contribution, the 10–12 combination, is one of the few patterns to survive as a standard modern joseki.


Black 13. One modern joseki move is 13 at 15, while another, developed by the Kitani school, is 13 at 18. For a full discussion of this joseki, see Ishida’s *Dictionary of Basic Joseki*, Volume 2, pp. 160–170.

White 14. The only move. Nowadays, this move would be obvious, but for Shusaku’s time it was a novel concept.


White 18. A good forcing move before defending the corner.

White 22 is a superb move which forces Black into a low position on the side. Yuzo should not have let Shusaku play there, but seeing it was the first time that he or any go player was confronted with this position, one cannot criticise him too harshly. The standard modern joseki for Black 21 is shown in Dia. 1.

Dia. 1. Black 1 is a sacrifice tesuji. To capture it, White has to sacrifice a



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

stone himself with 2. Note that playing 3 at 6, letting White capture at 5, would not be good. For Black, the point of playing this sequence is that —

Dia. 2. Pressing at 1 no longer works for White. Since Black's group is alive, he can counterattack with 2 and 4. Note, however, that if White omits 1, Black can seal him in with Black 3.

Black 21 was the last move played on the first day. The unusually slow pace of this game is an indication of how seriously both players were taking it. Although there were no time limits in the Edo period, the vast majority of games were finished in one day. In this case Shusaku was taking most of the time, if one can take literally his reference to spending six hours on his new joseki. In his maturity, Shusaku seems to have become a slow and deliberate player, although as a boy he was noted for the extreme rapidity of his play.


Black 23 is painfully submissive. Taka-gawa comments that even now, after White 22, he would prefer to make the placement at 1 in Dia. 3.

Dia. 3. Having played 22 in the figure, White would probably connect at 6. However, he would have to take gote with 8, so Black would be able to switch to 9.


When White plays 24, the only thing left for Black to do is to attack White with 25, but the result to 30 is not very gratifying for him. White settles his group comfortably, while Black's position is noticeable for its thinness.

Black 27 aims at cutting White into two by playing in at 'b', but this move does not work immediately. According to Fujisawa Hosai —


Dia. 4. If Black cuts with 1 and 3, White can counter with the sequence to 8, capturing Black. However, if White at a later stage of the game loses the ladder at 'a', then Black will be able to go ahead with this sequence.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

White 34 shows natural fighting spirit. If White answered at 1 in Dia. 5, he would be forced to crawl along the second line with 3 and 5, which would be humiliating.

Black 37. It is painful to have to play this move, for it helps White to strengthen his group, but Black has to reinforce his corner. If he omits 37 —

Dia. 6. White threatens to attach at 1. If Black resists with 2, the sequence to 15 will follow. Black suffers considerable damage, though he does get some compensation, in that White's centre top group is weakened by 6. Instead of 2 —

Dia. 7. Black could give way with 2, though that would let White push his way into the corner with 3 and 5. Black would have to defend at 8 in gote.




Figure 2 (41 – 88)

Figure 2 (41 – 88). Winning peacefully


Black 41. Connecting at 43 would be safer, but White would later be able to play White 41 – Black ‘a’ – White ‘b’ in sente (threatening White ‘c’ next). That would not only reduce Black’s corner but also secure White’s group, so it is understandable why Black takes a chance with 41.

White 44, 46. Exquisite timing – it would make a big difference if White played 46 before 44. According to Takagawa –


Dia. 8. If White plays 1 before 3, then Black will counter by cutting at 4. White cannot save his stone with 5 etc., because Black wins the semeai after 14.

Dia. 9. If White plays 1 first, Black cannot cut at 2. After the same sequence to 10 in the corner, White cuts with 11 and 13 and is able to set up a favourable ko. White has a local ko threat at 23, so Black cannot hope to win the ko.


Black has no choice about answering White 44 at 45, but thanks to this forcing move, White is able to force Black to answer 46 at 47. If Black blocked at 1 in Dia. 10, White would connect at 2, making




Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11


miae of ‘a’ and ‘b’.

White 48. A solid move which eliminates the aji of Dia. 4. Without 48, a move by Black around ‘d’ in the figure would be very effective. White 48 enables White to take the initiative in the centre.

Black 49. Black adds yet another reinforcement. Taking the oba of ‘d’ at the bottom seems more urgent, but according to Ishida, Black is worried about the aji shown in Dia. 11.

Dia. 11. If White manages to seal Black in with ‘a’ and ‘b’, he can play 1 and 3 in the corner, forcing Black to add a lot of stones to take White off the board (semedoris). Depending on the liberties, Black might even have to worry about a semeai, since White would have one eye in the corner.

White 50 is certainly a big point, but White could also consider jumping out to ‘e’, splitting Black into two groups. Since White has reinforced himself with 48, he should have the edge over Black in any fighting. A further advantage of attacking with ‘e’ is that it would give White a chance to strengthen his group at the top. When Black plays 51, White has some bad aji.



Dia. 12

Dia. 12. Black can invade at 1 and live with the sequence to 11. White can save his group with the sequence White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e', linking up to the top left corner. However, the sequence shown here is just one of many possibilities and Black might well have a more dangerous attack. Since the overall position is developing nicely for White, it would have been a good idea for him to eliminate this unpleasant aji.


White 52. The high move at 53 would make better balance. All the same, 52 is an important oba and it clearly gives White the lead.

Black 57. Black attacks fiercely in an attempt to catch up. Black 57 is the direct method for reducing the side. The alternatives are to attach at 69 (White would answer at 60) or to make the shoulder-hit at 58 (White would crawl at 57), but neither seems to work as well as 57.


Black 67, 69. Black wants to live independently on the side. If Black moved out with 1 in Dia. 13, White 2 and 4 would weaken his two stones at the bottom.

White 72. A move that only Shusaku would play. Anyone else would accept the invitation to the ko in Dia. 14, though Black 4 would complicate the position. Shusaku must have assessed the overall position and concluded that he did not need to play the ko to win. To be able to play like this, one would have to have Shusaku's superb positional judgement. He preferred to win peacefully when he could, because starting a fight often gives the opponent unexpected chances to get back into the game.


White 80. Keeping sente to play this




Dia. 13



Dia. 14



Dia. 15



Dia. 16

move was the objective of White's strategy with 72. Note that once again White passes up the attacking move, which in this case would be White 'f'.

White 88 is a declaration of victory by Shusaku. White's natural continuation at the bottom would be attacking Black with White 'g', but apparently that is not necessary. Shusaku's judgement is that eliminating the bad aji at the top is sufficient. In addition to the sequence given by Go Seigen in Dia. 12, Takagawa offers the following two diagrams as commentary on White's bad aji.

Dia. 15. Black can make the placement at 1. Intercepting with 2 is dangerous, as Black plays 3 and 5, then cuts with 7. Therefore –

Dia. 16. White would have to compromise by blocking at 2. Black is able to take some ten points in endgame profit, but the main thing is that White can live up to 10.

The conclusion is that White 88 is not

essential, but playing it keeps White ahead in territory. The only remaining problem is what will happen in the centre.




Figure 3 (89 – 135)


Figure 3 (89 – 135). Shusaku's solid yose

Black 91, 97. Black's only hope is to go for a large centre, but White reduces it with 98 etc., then invades the left side with 104, so Black does not make up any leeway.


White 110 makes miai of invading the corner and capturing four stones by pushing through at 'a'. Ishida comments that Black 111 is the correct answer. If Black defended his four stones by blocking at 115 in the figure, White would reduce the corner to the minimum eye-shape with 1 to 5 in Dia. 17. This sequence would be worth ten points in sente for White, while capturing the black stones with 'a' in the figure would be gote.

White 112, 114. White is taking no chances: capturing the black stone makes him very solid. The position on the left is complicated, but White is doing his best to simplify it.

White 126. If White plays 1 in Dia. 18, Black will answer with 2 and 4, creating the double threat of 'a' and 'b'.



Dia. 17



Dia. 18




Figure 4 (136 – 200)




Figure 5 (201 – 228)
27: connects (above 3)

Figure 4 (136 – 200)

Black 47 is worth more than blocking at 49.

Figure 5 (201 – 228)

Yuzo made no mistakes in the endgame and in fact he probably caught up a little, since Shusaku played so conservatively, but the game did after all seem to have been decided when White blocked at 88 in Figure 2. The game was a masterpiece for Shusaku, but Yuzo must have been rather disappointed with his play. Shusaku gave him no chance to make use of his fighting strength.

Shusaku wrote regularly to his parents, informing them of the results of important games. He described the present game as follows in a letter to his father.

'When Black played 87 (in Figure 2), I realised that White already had more territory and I played safe with 88. With this win I took a four-game lead. It is a

game that I am proud of.'

There is also a brief but interesting comment by Shuwa on the new variation in Figure 1, to the effect that Black should have played 21 at 1 in Dia. 1. One cannot help wondering if Shuwa anticipated the modern joseki.

White wins by 3 points.

With this win Shusaku went to a lead of ten games to six, with one jigo, and forced Yuzo to the handicap of sen-ai-sen. That must have been quite a blow to Yuzo's pride, since he had considered himself the only player capable of standing up to the redoubtable Honinbo heir. His play in the next couple of games shows that it took him a while to regain his equilibrium.

Game Fifty-Five: Sanjubango, Game Eighteen

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Black: Ota Yuzo 7-dan

Date: 23rd June, 1853

254 moves. White wins by 5 points.


Commentary by Go Seigen

(Note: Shusaku is given as 7-dan, though we do not know if the promotion took place immediately after his win in the seventeenth game.)

Figure 1 (1 – 40). A splitting attack

The fuseki up to 21 is conventional – there is nothing to comment on.

White 22. White could also play the joseki in Dia. 1. If Black 4, the sequence to 16 might follow. With 16, Black could



Dia. 1




Figure 1 (1 – 40)

also cut at 'a' or he could take sente by pushing at 'b', then switch to 'c'.

Black 35 is a good point, but I would prefer to jump to 'a'. White makes a very severe shoulder-hit at 36 and splits Black into two up to 40.






Figure 2 (41 – 100)



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Figure 2 (41 – 100). Black fails to simplify.

White 42 may look like bad shape, but it is the most severe move. If White jumped to 1 in Dia. 2, Black would be able to connect underneath with 2 to 6.

White 50. A standard probe in this shape.

Black 53. I think that Black should fight by extending at 56. White builds thickness by capturing at 56, while if Black played there, he would have good follow-up moves such as 'a' and 'b' to aim at. Since Black takes profit with 57, however, he does not fall behind yet.

Black 63 is a severe invasion, but 68 is a clever answer. If White played at 1 in Dia. 3, Black would strike with the 2–4 combination. In the game White gets out of trouble by linking up with 70 and 72.

Black 75. Black is overdoing things with this invasion. I think that descending at 83 would be a more cool-headed approach. That would prevent White from invading at 99 and would also aim at attacking the white group with Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e'. Black is doing reasonably in territory, so the important thing here is to determine the right direction for attack and defence. Black must avoid complicating the position.

Black 97. Black should connect at 100. If White then played at 'f', Black could answer at 'g', simply discarding his four stones on the side. When White plays 98, Black's group loses its base. This is a harbinger of defeat for Black.





Figure 3 (101 – 150)

Figure 3 (101 – 150). Yuzo's erratic play

Black 1. Black should fight the ko with Black 4, White 3, Black 'a'. Letting White make an unconditional capture with 2 and 4 is much too big. Black seems to be playing somewhat erratically. Hanging on to those four stones with 97 in Figure 2 has made the game go wrong for Black. With 97, 1, 5 and 7, Black invests four stones in the centre, but gains nothing, while White takes all the corner profit up to



Dia. 4

4. Black suffers a terrible loss in this trade. Moreover, with Black playing in the centre like this, White's ponnuki on the left (56 in Figure 2) only shines all the more brilliantly. By this stage, the game has already become unfavourable for Black.

Black 13. If at 1 in Dia. 4, White will play 2 to 6 and take aim at the group at the bottom. This group would in fact be placed in considerable danger, but all the same I think that Black's last chance of making a game of it is to play at 1 and let the bottom group take its chances. Black falls behind in territory when White captures an extra four stones with 16.


Black 27 – White 32. This seems to be an even exchange.

Black 35. If Black answers the peep with 1 in Dia. 5, White will counter with a peep on the outside at 2, then push through with 4. If Black 5, White plays 6 and 8.

White 42 is big. When White continues by cutting at 48, the game is decided.

Figure 4 (151 – 200)

Figure 5 (201 – 254)



Dia. 5




Figure 4 (151 – 200)

86: connects; 98: ko (above 69)




Figure 5 (201 – 254)

ko: 4, 7, 10; 54: connects the ko

Yuzo's play in this game was not up to his usual standards. When a player is defeated in a bango, a gap opens up between them which is wider than the real disparity in their strength. Black's position for a large part of this game was not unfavourable, but he seemed to be suffering from a kind of fretful impatience. In the end, it was Black who defeated himself.

White wins by 5 points.

Game Fifty-Six: Sanjubango, Game Nineteen

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Black: Ota Yuzo 7-dan

Date: 3rd July, 1853

165 moves. White resigns.

Commentary by Go Seigen





Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50). Using thickness

Black 15. Enclosing the corner is of course worth spending a move on, but I think that making a pincer at 16 or 'a' would be more powerful. Attacking White 6 with such a pincer would make effective use of Black's thickness at the top. White 16, a combination of an extension and a pincer, is an extremely good point. Black 15 is not so urgent, since White would be reluctant to play there himself. If he did, Black would be able to force him into a low position with Black 31, White 30, Black 36, White 'b', after which Black could do the same at the top by pressing at 22.

Black 25 is a good move. If White ignores it, Black can attack at 'c'.


White 28 prevents Black from running into the corner with 'd'. Black does not answer at 'e', because that would make 28 a forcing move.



Dia. 1

2: elsewhere

8: connects



Dia. 2

White 30. White intended to play here when he invaded at 24. The continuation to 42 seems reasonable: Black is satisfied with his thickness up to 39, while White is satisfied with having the cut at 'f' for later. Note that Black would fall behind if he played 43 at 'g', since White would not have to answer it.

Dia. 1. If Black 1, White will tenuki; if Black then attacks at 3, White can get two eyes with 4 to 8.

Black 43 is a violent move. Black could live with the usual joseki of 1 and 3 in Dia. 2, but he hopes to make use of his thickness at the top by starting a fight with 43 to 47.

Figure 2 (51 – 100). The losing move

Black 51 is the vital point for attack and defence: it guards against White 64 – Black 79 – White 77, and it aims at attaching at 63.

White 54 was probably played by instinct – at first sight, it looks like a good move, as it is a standard shape – but it turned out to be the losing move. White 54 strives for efficiency, but it stretches too far and when Black counter-attacks at 63, the game immediately becomes lost for White. Instead of 54, White should defend cautiously at 'a'. White 'a' might look slow, but if one takes a careful look at the board, one can see that it would be enough to give White a reasonable chance of winning. White






Figure 2 (51 – 100)

62: connects



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

has territory in various places, but Black has only the bottom area and White still has the cut at 80.

Black 57 etc. Black strengthens this group preparatory to attaching at 63. White has no answer to the latter move. Instead of 64 –

Dia. 3. Intercepting with 1 is unreasonable. The fight after the sequence to 8, with Black having the additional threat of 'a', would be too tough for White.

Black 65. If Black answered 64 at 79,

his tesuji of 63 would go to waste.


Dia. 4. If Black 1, White forces with 2 and 4, enabling him to set up a geta with 10 to 14.

Black 65 is a tesuji. After White plays 64 and 66, it is clearly more efficient to have a stone at 65 than at 'b'.

White can live by playing 68, but Black 75 is sente, so later on Black will be able to attack the white group on the left side. When Black plays 77, the white group here also loses its stability. Black's violent blow at 63 has caused White's position to disintegrate.

White 80. Offence is the best means of defence. If White simply tried to save his group, he would come under a one-sided attack. White 80 is a do-or-die move.

White 88 leads to an exchange of the corner for the centre. However, the game is clearly lost for White when Black gets sente to connect at 93, so he should have played 88 at 91, regardless of the prospects for success. That would start a fight, as in *Dia. 5*. White might have a tough time in this fight, but at least playing this way would be more consistent with the spirit of White 80.



Dia. 5

Dia. 5. White 94. If White makes two eyes in the corner by playing at 95, Black will play at 97 and should be able to use his attack to make an enormous territory in the centre. White prefers to move towards the centre with 94, but in any case the position is hopeless when Black kills the corner group with 95. White was in a no-win position – whatever he did would have been wrong.





Figure 3 (101 – 165)

Figure 3 (101 – 165). A hopeless cause

White 24. If White cut at 'a', Black would live with 29.

White plays quite skilfully in the centre, but there is no point in continuing after Black 65. If White connected at 'b', Black



Dia. 6

would connect at 'a' and would have a big lead in territory, since White's three stones (10, 12 and 14) cannot escape.

Dia. 6. If White tries to save his stones with 1 etc., Black captures them by connecting at 6.

In this game Shusaku made an uncharacteristic slip early in the middle game and thereafter had no chance of getting back into the game. This easy win for Yuzo must have gone a long way towards restoring his confidence.

White resigns after Black 165.

Game Fifty-Seven: Sanjubango, Game Twenty

White: Ota Yuzo 7-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Date: 5th July, 1853

171 moves. White resigns.

Commentary by Go Seigen, with reference to a commentary by Ishida Yoshio

Figure 1 (1 – 57). Subtle fuseki strategy

White 6. This shoulder-hit is not played often nowadays, but in light of the location of 2, it seems a reasonable strategy. This move seems to have been popular in the late Edo period; Shuwa, for example, often played the joseki in Dia. 1. Note that White 6 and 8 in the figure are only played when White has a stone in the bottom right corner. If Black had a stone there, 6 and 8 would just help him to build territory.







Figure 1 (1 – 57)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2






Figure 2 (58 – 100)


Figure 2 (58 – 100). Shusaku welcomes the fight.

White 58. A do-or-die move. Ishida comments that the usual move would be defending the corner with 1 in Dia. 6, but that would let Black make a severe attack with 2 to 6. Black would be able to take control of the game. Go Seigen gives a different interpretation. He thinks that White 58 was premature, implying that letting Black start a fight with 59 is not desirable for White. He recommends playing a more leisurely game by reinforcing at 'a'.


White 62. An emergency measure. This cut shows tremendous fighting spirit, though Yuzo probably realises that it is unreasonable. He hopes to catch up by using brute force.

Black 63 aims at exploiting White's shortage of liberties. As always with black, Shusaku tries to keep the position simple.

White 66 is essential. The continuation to 72 is forced, whereupon Black makes a severe cut at 73. If Black extended at 76, White would just keep on crawling along the side. That would not be bad for Black, but it would be commonplace. If



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Black later gets a stone at 77, he plans to hane at 'b', which is why he keeps 76 in reserve.


White 74 is necessary to fix up White's shape. Black extends at 75, surrounding the white group at the top and making the situation more and more tense. Note that by attacking White, Black indirectly defends his two stones at the top. This fight is just what Black wants, for it helps him to wind up the game.

Black 83. Capturing the stone stabilises Black's group and makes the game easy for him. The question is could White have omitted defending at 78 in order to save 66. Ishida says no.


Dia. 7. If White 1 and 3, Black seals White in with 4. White 5 is correct shape, but White does not have room to make two eyes after 8. White could live by playing 7 at 'a', but that would let Black capture the pivotal stones.

White 88 is a turning point. White should omit this move in favour of defending the bottom right corner with 98. White has taken some territory on the right side, so the game would still be close.


White 94. The bottom right corner is still more urgent. To maintain territorial balance, White should play 1 to 7 in Dia. 8 to secure the corner. Ishida makes an alternative suggestion, which is to defend the corner solidly with 1 in




Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

Dia. 9, aiming next at the White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c' sequence.

White 96. Challenging Black to a ko with 1 to 7 in Dia. 10 seems preferable.

White 98. Ishida comments that White 1 in Dia. 11 would not be good enough. Black would sacrifice two stones in order to get forcing moves on the outside. This would give him a win.


White 98, 100. White's final resistance.

Figure 3 (101 – 141). A decisive tesuji


Black 1. This brilliant tesuji is decisive — White has no counter. Ishida comments that if White plays 2 at 1 in Dia. 12, Black will connect underneath with 4 and 6. White has no choice but to play 2 and 4 in the figure, though that lets Black take considerable corner profit with 3 and 5. If Black had played 1 at 1 in Dia. 13, White would get the atari at 6, so Black 'a' would not set up a connection.

Black 9. This group also lives, thanks to Black 1. Black is not afraid of White 1 in Dia. 14.

Dia. 14. Black answers White 1 by cut-



Dia. 12



Dia. 13





Figure 3 (101 – 141)




Dia. 14

ting with 2 and 4, then blocking at 6; after 7 to 11, White will be able to capture the three black stones in a ladder because he can play 'a' in sente, but in the meantime Black will play 'b', then live in sente with 'c'. With this group alive and having taken four corners, Black cannot lose.


White 24. In the original game record, 24 is given one space to the right, but that is obviously a mistake, since Black would later be able to cut at 'a' with 41.

White 26. If at 1 in Dia. 15, Black will extend at 2. White can




Dia. 15

capture a stone with 3 and 5, but that is not worth much, since Black's area was open at the side anyway. With 6, Black captures the white stone — if White 'a', then Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.



Dia. 16



Dia. 17

Figure 4 (142 – 171). Unable to win with white

White 42. Ishida comments that if White connects at 1 in Dia. 16, he loses the semeai after Black 2 to 8.

When Black plays the probe at 49, White responds by challenging him to a ko, but




Figure 4 (142 – 171)

he does not have the ko threats. Yuzo was probably just looking for a suitable place to resign.

White cannot kill the black group at the bottom left. If White plays at 1 in Dia. 17, Black counters with 2 to 6.

This game, Yuzo's first on white after the change of handicap, illustrated his main problem throughout the series: coping with Shusaku on black was beyond his ability.

White resigns after Black 171.

Game Fifty-Eight: Sanjubango, Game Twenty-One

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Black: Ota Yuzo 7-dan

Date: 15th July (to move 43), 28th October, 1853

341 moves. Jigo.

Commentary by Go Seigen





Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50). A bad overplay


White 14. If White enclosed the corner with 'a', Black 14 would be an excellent extension from Black's corner enclosure.

White 16. If White plays 1 in Dia. 1, Black intends to fix up his shape with 2 to 6. However, I think that White 5 here is bad. Instead –

Dia. 2. Playing for a trade with 5 is better. When White captures the two black stones up to 13, Black can no longer aim at attacking at 'a'. However, White can aim at blocking at 'b', a move which makes miai of connecting underneath with 'c' and invading the corner at 'd'. These factors would make the exchange acceptable for White. He presumably counterattacked with 16 in the figure to avoid Dia. 1, but answering at 35 would have been alright if White then followed Dia. 2.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

9: connects

White 22 defends against the threat of Black 'b'. Usually White 'c' is the correct shape for that purpose, but 22 also aims at attacking Black by extending at 27.


White 24. Necessary, as Black 23 revives the threat of Black 'b'.

White 26. White would like to play at 27, but Black would probably ignore him and press at 26. Having to crawl at 'd' would be painful for White in view of the location of White 14 and Black 23. White 26 is also necessary.

Black 27 is the key point. White 27 would now be severe, so Black must not put off defending any longer.

Black 31 simplifies the position for Black, but Black 33 in response to White's invasion is a terrible overplay. Black should play simply, taking sente with 1 to 5 in Dia. 3, then switch to 'e' or 'f' in the figure. Either move would give Black a satisfactory position. In the sequence to 42, Black's base is destroyed and the game becomes promising for White.

Black 43. Securing the capture of the four white stones with 'g' is not very important, since the black



Dia. 3

group above is already quite strong. With 43 etc., Yuzo does his best to recover from his setback and from here on we see his real strength. The cut at 47 is very severe.




Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Figure 2 (51 – 100). Black gets back into the game.

White 56. If at 57, Black will make a diagonal connection at 62, after which White will have to add a stone at 'a'. Black would then capture the white group above with 58. The aim of 56 is to take sente so that White can play 58.

In the violent clash which follows, both sides play with precision. Black fights very strongly and by the time he plays 99, he has caught up with White.

Figure 2 (101 – 150). A dubious tenuki

Black 1. Black could also stop White from linking up by playing 'a', but that would be a frightening step for Black to take. The reason that it is frightening is that it would provoke White to attack at 6 or at 2. If Black could kill White, well and good, but if he failed to, the game would be lost, because White would destroy Black's territory in the process of living,






Figure 3 (101 – 150)



Dia. 4



Dia. 5


in addition to which Black 'a' would become a wasted move. A more discreet policy is to prepare indirectly for an attack on White by playing 1. Black would be happy to see White spend a move on connecting with 'b'.

White 2. White is unwilling to follow orders: he hopes to reduce Black's moyo while securing eye-shape.

Black 3 seems dubious to me. What is wrong with answering White 2 at 'c'? White would have to connect with 'b', so it would not be too late then to play 3. With 4 to 6, White takes a lot of profit while living and is also able to economise on the move at 'b'.

Black 9 aims at the warikomi at 'd'.

White 28 defends in sente against Black's fierce cut with 1 and 3 in Dia. 4.



Dia. 6

Black 29. If omitted, White plays 1 and 3 in Dia. 5. Black has to play 4, so White puts the large group into ko with 5 to 11.

Note that White 28 does not completely eliminate the threat of the cut. Black can play 1 to 7 in Dia. 6, but at present his own position is still too weak for him to go through with this cut.


Black 49. The hanetsugi of 'e-f' would also be big, but without 49 Black would feel very apprehensive about the bad aji of his territory at the top. Black 49 seems to be the honte.

Figure 4 (151 – 200). Clever moves by Black


Black 51 is a clever move. If White intercepts with 1 in Dia. 7, Black will sacrifice two stones with 4, enabling him to connect underneath with 6 and 8 and also to make an eye in the corner.

Black 63, another clever move, gives Black good aji in relation to the centre. Black can capture a stone in sente with 69 and 71, which is what makes 63 possible.

Black 73. If omitted, White can attach



Dia. 7



Dia. 8





Figure 4 (151 – 200)

at 1 in Dia. 8; if Black 2, White lives with 3 and 5.

White 90. White 1 in Dia. 9 might seem more profitable, but it would give White bad aji. Black would first of all play 2 and 4 as a probe; if White 5, Black would play 6, then descend at 8, aiming at the aji of the contact play at 'a'.

Black 93 is big, as it forestalls White 'a'.



Dia. 9

Figure 5 (201 – 250). Dead even

White 8 and Black 11 are miai – one cannot say which is bigger.

White 12. Playing at 1 in Dia. 10 would also be big. White 3 and 5 are sente, for if Black plays elsewhere, White can cut at 7. White has the choice of playing for a ko with 13 and 15 here or –

Dia. 11. Playing for a seki with 13 to 17.






Figure 5 (201 – 250)



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

5: connects

6: elsewhere

Once Black plays 21, a jigo seems unavoidable.

Figure 6 (251 – 300)

Figure 7 (301 – 341)

This game started out with a reasonable fuseki for Yuzo, but one overplay caused him terrible damage, transforming black territory into white. Yuzo only really began to play like his usual self after Shusaku had taken the lead and his impressive comeback in the latter part of the game deserves the highest praise. I think that this is one of the masterpieces of the series.

Result a jigo.




Figure 6 (251 – 300)

54: ko; ko (at 58): 61, 64, 67, 72, 75, 78;
79: ko (at 51); ko (at 58): 81, 84, 87, 92,
95, 98




Figure 7 (301 – 341)

ko (at 1): 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 22, 25, 28,
31, 34, 41. Black wins and connects the ko

Game Fifty-Nine: Sanjubango, Game Twenty-Two

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Black: Ota Yuzo 7-dan

Date: 3rd, 25th October, 1853

175 moves. White wins by 1 point.

Commentary by Go Seigen




Figure 1 (1 – 40)


Figure 1 (1 – 40). White builds thickness.

Black 17. Still a novel move in this period. The joseki in Dia. 1, in which Black pushes down with 1 to 5, then extends at 7, was played, but Black 17 was very unusual.


White 18. Giving atari at 20 immediately became a joseki in the Meiji period (1868–1912). Despite the difference in order, we get the same result.

Black 31. I have my doubts about this move. Black should have simply extended to 33, omitting 31. Once he makes the 31–32 exchange, he should jump to ‘a’. After the continuation to 39, 31 becomes a bad move – it should be at ‘b’ or ‘c’, considering that Black ‘d’ will be sente. Because of Black 31 and 33, the white group at the top and the one in the centre both become thick.

White 40. If at ‘f’, ‘e’ would become a



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Figure 2 (41 – 65)

superb extension for Black, so White’s strategy with 40 seems reasonable.

Figure 2 (41 – 65). Black weakens himself.

Black 41. Since Black has a low position at the top, the high approach move is correct.

Black 45, 47 and 49 might look like a good attack, but actually these moves accomplish little. Black’s area is open at the side at ‘a’, while the centre white group can easily settle itself with the sequence in Dia. 2. The main result of Black’s attack is that his unsettled group at the top becomes even more insecure. Already the game has become difficult for Black.

Black 53. Another bad move and one which comes at a critical juncture of the

game. Black should extend to 'b' instead. His centre group is still weak, so giving White the chance to press down at 54 is bad. That makes the centre group all the weaker and damages Black's position.

Black 63. A necessary reinforcement after White 62.




Figure 3 (66 – 100)

Figure 3 (66 – 100). White develops nicely.


White 66 is a good move, building thickness while aiming at the cut at 'a'.

White 72 is another good move. If White played 'b', Black 98, White 97, Black would get a good follow-up at 94.

White 78 is a good point. If omitted, Black would link up his groups by playing 'c', which would ease the pressure on him. White 78 aims at cutting at 'a' and at attacking Black with 80. The latter move sets up the cut with 88 and 90.

White 92 is an excellent point, but Black never got a chance to play there. The threat of the cut at 'a' now becomes more ominous. One possibility is shown in Dia. 3, in which White sacrifices three stones in order to set up an attack on the black group above.

White 98 is a probe. If Black connects



Dia. 3

at 'b', White will switch elsewhere, satisfied with his forcing move. Fighting spirit leads Black to answer at 99. If White cuts at 'b', Black plans to use the cut at 'd' to live independently at the bottom.





Figure 4 (101 – 130)


14: connects

Figure 4 (101 – 130). A close game
Black 7 defends against the cut at 'a'.

Black 13. Black lives in sente, so he is able to switch to 15. At this stage the game is so close that it could go either way. Black 17 is a good move, inducing White 18 so that Black can secure



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

his group by capturing with 19 and 21.

Black 23. The only move – if Black ‘b’, his heart would stop when White played ‘c’. Black 23 is a tesuji worth remembering.

White 24. A good move – White ‘d’ would create bad aji, as it would give Black peeps at ‘e’ and ‘f’.

Black 27. This surprise attack shows that Black is prepared to sacrifice the four stones at the centre bottom.

Figure 5 (131 – 175). An incomplete record

Black 49. If at 1 in Dia. 4, White would force with 2 and 4, so Black would not profit.

Black 51. This is the most difficult point of the game – starting a fight with 1 and 3 in Dia. 5 also seems possible.

The game record only goes up to 175. I tried finishing off the yose and by coincidence got the same result, a one point win for White. I also tried the yose when Black follows Dia. 5 and this time got a win for Black by one point. These were just experiments and naturally I cannot assert that White has a definite win by one point or that Black would have won by one point if he had followed Dia. 5. The




Figure 3 (131 – 175)

only thing that one can say for certain is that the yose after 175 must have been very difficult.

Yuzo did not do very well in the fuseki, but he showed more spirit later on and recovered sufficiently to make the game interesting. Falling short by such a narrow margin at the end must have been painful.

*Moves after Black 175 not recorded.
White wins by 1 point.*

This was Shusaku's third win since the change of handicap and his second with white — he was doing just as well giving Yuzo sen-ai-sen as he did on even. The tide had turned against Yuzo and with only one win in the last five games, he could have been forgiven if he was beginning to feel a little desperate. Somehow he had to check Shusaku's momentum.

Game Sixty: Sanjubango, Game Twenty-Three

The final game of the series is another well-known classic. It has traditionally been regarded as Ota Yuzo's lifetime masterpiece and, like the seventeenth game, it is a favourite anthology piece. It is the game in which Ota Yuzo redeemed his honour.

White: Ota Yuzo 7-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Date: 5th (to move 41), 28th November, 1853 (the game was played all night and finished at 6 a.m. on the 29th).

273 moves. Jigo.

Commentary by Go Seigen, with reference to commentaries by Hashimoto Shoji, Kubomatsu Katsukiyo and Ishida Yoshio




Figure 1 (1 - 41)


Figure 1 (1 - 41). Early fighting

Black 5. Nowadays, Black 15 would be usual, but that is not to say that Black 5 is bad.


White 6. A splendid but unusual strategy. White A instead is occasionally seen in modern go.

Black 7. Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 1 are also possible. (Kubomatsu comments that White would probably continue by building thickness with 4 to 8.)


Black 13 is questionable – it seems to




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

me to be a little slack. This move guards against the cut with 1 to 5 in Dia. 2, but it is too solid. Jumping to 1 in Dia. 3 would be more interesting. If White still made the cut, Black could counter with 7 to 11, a sequence which would give him a decidedly favourable result.

White 14. White is satisfied with his shape in this corner. Note that if 14 is omitted, Black will seal him in with 'a'.

Black 15. The extension to 'b' would be too heavy, considering that Black can attack the group above with 17 and 19.

White 16. An unusual invasion, but called for here. Playing at 'c' is not interesting when Black already has the extension at 5, as Black would easily be able to settle himself on the side. White 16 is the fighting move. The players forego the rest of the fuseki and move right into

the middle game.

Black 17. The only move – if at ‘c’, White ‘d’ would be very severe. The continuation to 23 is natural. In this position the one-space jump is the best and the simplest move. With 21, Black could also enclose the corner at ‘c’, but he prefers to continue his attack.

White 24. Hashimoto comments that the modern move would be the high approach move at 1 in Dia. 4. The difference is that the low move at 24 makes it easier for Black to put White on the defensive. Black 25, ‘Shusaku’s kosumi’, is perfect here.


White 26. Answering at ‘e’ would be too passive.

Black 29 is an *oba*, but I think that playing at 30, making the ‘pillbox’ shape, would be more appropriate. (Note: the ‘pillbox’ or ‘tochika’ shape is a twentieth century invention.) If White then played ‘f’, Black could attack the three white stones by capping at ‘g’. The latter move becomes very severe when Black’s corner is secure.


White 30. Hashimoto comments that playing at 1 in Dia. 5 would also be quite a good move, but White might be just a little dissatisfied with letting Black play 4. Note that Black aims at peeping at ‘a’ later on, while White aims at invading at ‘b’. The aim of 30 in the figure is to take territory rather than to build up influence.

Black 31. The correct response, according to Hashimoto. Black 1 in Dia. 6, letting White take the corner, might be dangerous.


White 34. Hashimoto comments that this move plays a large part in determining the flow of the game. White could also consider reducing the right side moyo with ‘h’, but if he plays on the right, he is bound to come under attack. White 34 keeps up the pressure on the black group; White’s strategy is to wait to see what




Dia. 5




Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9


5: throws in

happens here before deciding on his later development.

Black 35. (Hashimoto) Blocking on the inside is correct. If Black played at 1 in Dia. 7, the continuation to 8 would be bad for him. Instead of 7 –

Dia. 8. Black could also hane at 1, but he still gets a bad result.

White 40 helps Black to strengthen himself, but if omitted, Black can aim at attacking with 1 and 3 in Dia. 9. Hashimoto comments that White’s strongest counter is White 4 in Dia. 10, but White loses the semeai after 13. Black may be left with cutting points at ‘a’ and ‘b’, but the profit he takes at the bottom would be more than ample compensation.



Dia. 10




Figure 2 (42 – 70)

Figure 2 (42 – 70). A running fight


Black 43. If at 44, White probably intended to secure a base with 'a'. Hashimoto gives an interesting explanation of why Black refused to answer docilely at 44. Black has the option of attacking White with 1 etc. in Dia. 11; if we assume that White answers with 2 to 6 (in actual play he would probably look for some more aggressive counter), then the exchange would be very bad for Black, because in effect he would have answered a peep at a bamboo joint.

White 44. If at 1 in Dia. 12, Black will connect in sente with 2 and 4. After 44, the continuation to 49 is inevitable.


White 50 and 54 may look slow, but they prepare the way for forcing with 60, then jumping to 62, so they are splendid moves. According to Hashimoto, instead of 50 –

Dia. 13. The usual idea would be to jump to 1, but in this position Black would peep at 2, then attack with 4 to 8, which would be painful for White. White could play 7 at 8, but then his position at the bottom would suffer.


Black 51 and 53 strengthen Black's weak point at 'b' and also take aim at White's weak point at 'c'.




Dia. 11



Dia. 12



Dia. 13




Dia. 14

White 54 defends against the Black 'd' – Black 'c' combination.

Black 57 is a probe. If White answers at 'e', Black will push at 59. White would have to reinforce his centre group, so Black would get an atari at 'f'.

White 62 is an important strategic point: White leads out his weak group and aims at attacking the black groups above and below; at the same time he holds in check the potential of Black's right side moyo. If White omits 62, Black will build up his moyo by attacking with 1 and 3



Dia. 15

in Dia. 14. If Black answers 62 at 70 in the figure, White can make a superb kosumi at 'g'.

White 66 is the only move. The game is now very close – the fuseki has been a success for White. Black answers patiently with 67 and 69. Hashimoto comments that counterattacking with 1 in Dia. 15 would be risky for Black.

Dia. 15. If Black 1, White will answer with 2 and 4. Black would have to capture the group to the left to compensate for his loss on the side, but he could not be confident of success.

Figure 3 (71 – 100). Patience is not always a virtue.

Black 73–77. A joseki for when the ladder in Dia. 16 is unfavourable.

White 80. A good, thick move which helps cover White's thinness in the centre. White is not tempted to play 80 at 81, since the high position of his stone to the left (White 6) means that he cannot make territory at the top. Black would also be able to attack with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'.

White 84 and 86 further reinforce White's centre position. Again Black answers very patiently. Hashimoto comments that he would prefer to counter-attack with 1 in Dia. 17. White can separate Black with the tesuji of 6, but this fight would not be unreasonable for Black. Judging from Shusaku's play at this stage of the game, he must have been under the impression that he was leading.







Figure 3 (71 – 100)



Dia. 16



Dia. 17


Dia. 18

White 88. (Ishida) White would like to block at 1 in Dia. 18, but permitting Black 2 and 4 would be unbearable.

White 90, 92. White could also omit these moves and play immediately at 94, that is, at 1 in Dia. 19.

Dia. 19 (next page): If White 1, the sequence to 6 would follow. This would stabilise Black's group, but that does not matter.

White 90 and 92 prevent Black from making eye-shape with the hane at 92, which indicates that White must be planning to attack the group by descending




Dia. 19

at 'd'. However, Black can make an extra eye with Black 'e', White 'f', Black 'g', so White cannot realistically hope to capture him.

White 96. Intercepting with 1 in Dia. 20 would be just what Black wants. Black would get good forcing moves with 2 and 4.

White 98, 100. White responds aggressively to Black's attempted forcing moves.



Dia. 20






Figure 4 (101 – 150)
7: connects the ko


Figure 4 (101 – 150). Precision yose
White 6 urges Black to connect at 7.




Dia. 21



Dia. 22



Dia. 23



Dia. 24

Black cannot cut at 8 instead, as White would be left with the cut at 9. The sequence to 9 seems best.

Black 11, 13. Black 'a' is no longer sente, so Black has to prepare an extra eye here. After 13, descending at 37 makes miai of 'b' and 38.


White 16 and 18 make the game extremely close.

White 20 is forced, even though it lets Black drive a wedge into the centre. If instead White plays at 1 in Dia. 21, Black will start a ko by cutting with 2 and 4. Eventually, White will have to connect at 'a' and Black will exchange 'b' for White 'c'. Next Black will have the threat of the placement at 'd', that is –

Dia. 22. Black threatens to set up a ko in the corner after the sequence to 9.

White 26. White regrets the necessity to play this move, but it enables him to answer Black 1 in Dia. 23 at 2.

White 28. White has held this capture in reserve until now in case he wanted to play 1 in Dia. 24 instead. White 1 would threaten to take away Black's eye-shape with White 'a', but once Black plays 25 in the figure, setting up a connection through the centre for the black group above, this threat loses its force.




Dia. 25

Black 33. If at 1 in Dia. 25, White would play 2 to 6, after which he could aim at starting a ko with 'a'. Both players are taking great care with the yose.

White 38. It might look as if White is needlessly sacrificing an extra two stones, since he cannot connect at 41 after Black 43, but by playing this way White 68 in the next figure becomes sente.

White 44. A useful reinforcement. Hashimoto comments that without this move, White would have to worry about his thinness in the centre. For example, Black might attack with 1 and 3 in Dia. 26.



Dia. 26

Figure 5 (151 – 200). Yuzo's ko challenge

Black 53. If at 'a', White would probably play at 55, which is the last large point. Black 53 threatens the centre white group, so Black is able to keep sente.

White 56, 58. With Black having played 55, White must feel that connecting at 59 would leave him a little behind. He is relying on his wealth of ko threats in playing 58.

Black 77 is a subtle move: it is not a ko threat and in fact Black has given up hope of winning the ko, but if he plays elsewhere, White might omit 78 and play at 92 instead. If Black then lost the




Figure 5 (151 – 200)

ko: 64, 67, 70, 73, 76

ko fight, he would suffer considerable damage. Black 77, by eliminating any ko threats White might have against this black group, restrains White from going ahead with 78 at 92.

Figure 6 (201 – 220). A slip by Black?

Black 1 and White 2 are miai.

Hashimoto comments that he has some doubts about Black 3. Instead –

Dia. 26 (next page). He would prefer






Figure 6 (201 – 220)



Dia. 27



Dia. 28

to attach at 1; if White 2, Black plays 3 and White cannot cut. This represents a slight gain over the result in the game. Instead of 2 –

Dia. 28. If White 2, Black plays 3 and still seems to gain a little over the game.

Figure 7 (221 – 273). Yuzo's lifetime masterpiece

Black 21. (Hashimoto) If omitted, White has the clever yose sequence shown in Dia. 29.

White 22. Cutting at 'a' might be worth a little more.

Black 25 is correct. If Black played at 47, White would play 30, Black 31, White 'b', forcing Black to make two eyes. White 'c' would also become sente. Black 25 avoids giving White more forcing moves.

White 34. If to the right of 37, Black will throw in at 37.

White 40 is worth three points in gote. Note that Black would not gain anything by blocking above 40.

White 48 is correct – in effect, it makes miai of White 59 and White 60.

Black 67 is correct – Black would not gain by playing at 68.

Result a jigo.

The key to Yuzo's success in securing a jigo was his clever play in the centre. His stones there were weak throughout the game, but his skilful parrying prevented Black from landing a knockout punch. The 23rd game was crucial for Yuzo, since he





Figure 7 (221 – 273)
72: connects (right of 38)



Dia. 29

had already fallen two games behind on sen-ai-sen, but he rose to the occasion. Even Shusaku was full of admiration for his play; he is said to have commented that the game was 'probably Ota Yuzo's lifetime masterpiece'.

At this point the sanjubango was discontinued. The exact reason is not known, but the general assumption is that Yuzo preferred to end on a note of triumph, with his jigo on white. Perhaps he did not think that he had any real chance of fighting his way back to tagai-sen, for he had been unable to win a game with white since Shusaku reached tagai-sen in 1849. Nevertheless, his achievement in maintaining tagai-sen for so long against Shusaku has made his place in go history secure. Their sanjubango is immortal.

8. Unvanquished

After defeating Yuzo in the sanjubango, all that remained for Shusaku was to extend his undefeated record in the annual castle games and to wait for his turn as head of the Honinbo house. At the age of twenty-four Shusaku had already reached his peak, and apart from Shuwa, with whom he did not compete, there was no one who could have dreamed of challenging his supremacy. As 7-dan, Shusaku was outranked only by Shuwa and during the final decade of his life he was the one taking white in most of his games. If he is the best player to study for learning how to play with black, his later years also provide us with many model games for playing with white, not to mention some fascinating handicap games. Shusaku now found himself in the unaccustomed position, as the future head of the school, of training the next generation of players. He gave generously of his time to Murase Shuho, who was nine years his junior and who was to become the leading player of the late nineteenth century. He also played a handicap series with Ebizawa Kenzo, who was to play a key role in the modernisation of the go world in the Meiji period, and he also made his own discovery, the prodigy Mizutani Nuiji, who was born on an island in the Inland Sea near Shusaku's own birthplace.

During the politically unsettled final years of the Tokugawa shogunate, the prosperity of go declined, with the castle games being finally abandoned in the 1860's, but Shusaku did not live to see that evil day.

Game Sixty-One: Shusaku v. Sakaguchi Sentoku (1853) Castle Game Nine

White: Sakaguchi Sentoku 7-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Date: 17th November, 1853

121 moves. White resigns.

Commentary by Sanno Hirotaka

Figure 1 (1 – 15). A dead joseki

White 8–12. A dead joseki, though popular in the Edo period. White 6 ends up as very bad shape, peeping at a bamboo joint. It has little aji either, so White has virtually wasted a move. It would be better located at 'a', as White could then aim at 'b' later.

White 14 must be at 'c' (the Edo period move – playing on the star-point would be the modern style) in order to counteract




Figure 1 (1 – 15)

the influence of Black 5. If then Black 'd', White 'e' would be good.

Black 15. The fuseki is a success for Black. With his wasted move at 6, it is very difficult for White to win.




Figure 2 (16 – 50)

Figure 2 (16 – 50). Shusaku builds up a solid lead.

White 16 is not a threat to Black, as his group to the left is too strong. An approach move in the bottom left corner might be preferable.


Black 19 is unusual: Black 'a' is the standard extension from Black's shimari with 17, while 19 would be appropriate with a 'b-c' shimari.

White 20 is a good extension, but Black 21 nicely simplifies the game, so perhaps White should have invaded at 'd'.

Black 21. In this position 21 is better than jumping to 'e'. White's position to the right is solid, so Black cannot hope to attack it immediately, while with 'e' Black's moyo would be so wide that it would be easy for White to reduce it.

White 22. Note that neither side is in a hurry to play on the right side, since Black 19 limits the potential there.

Up to 25 we get Shusaku's favourite



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

fuseki development: Black has both territory and thickness.

Black 27. Strengthening Black here weakens the white group below.

White 32 only provokes Black 33 and 35. Instead, White should force with 1 to 7 in Dia. 1.


Black 33 is solid, but it also helps White to strengthen himself. Shusaku was quite happy to play aji-keshi moves like 33 if he calculated that they kept him securely in the lead. As for the aji referred to here –

Dia. 2. If Black omitted 'a', he could aim at attacking later with Black 1 and 3, which at the right time might be a very effective attack. The drawback is that omitting 'a' leaves Black with a weak point at 'b'. When playing with Black, Shusaku liked to make his positions as solid as possible; nowadays, since Black has to give a komi, he cannot afford to play so tightly.


Black 35, 37, 39. These three moves wind up the game. White is only a little behind, but with Black's positions all rock-solid, how can he catch up? It is no wonder that Shusaku had supreme confidence in his ability to win with black.

Be that as it may, White should at least try to make a game of it, and White 40 is not the way to go about it. White should strike at Black's sole weak point.

Dia. 3. White should invade at 1. Black would probably feel inclined to answer at 2, so White could attach at 3. There might be a difficult fight, but White should be able to settle himself.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4


Dia. 4. Black could also answer with the simple sequence to 6. Note that White should not play 'a' next, as Black would get superb shape with 'b-c'.

White 42 and 44 reduce Black's moyo, while defending against an invasion by Black at 'f'.

Black 45. Now it is too late for White to invade. White 40 accomplished nothing, while 46 poses no serious threat to Black. The best that White can do is to capture a stone with 50.

Dia. 5. White cannot play 1 to 7, because Black 8 is sente against the corner. If White 9, Black kills the corner with 10 to 14. If White cannot play 1 to 9, then White 46 in the figure is meaningless.

White 50 is necessary to prevent Black from playing a ko with Black 'g', White 50, Black 'h'. Since Black's positions are more solid than White's, he would have more ko threats.



Dia. 5

Figure 3 (51 – 100). White offers only token resistance.

Black 63 is a nice move which serves




Figure 3 (51 – 100)

the dual purpose of helping 59 and 61 and attacking the white group to the left. White is compelled to defend at 64, so Black gets sente to defend at 65. That is quite a bonus for Black, since normally a moyo-reducing operation like 59–61 would end in gote. Since he is behind anyway, it might have been an idea for White to consider playing White 'a' – Black 'b' – White 'c' instead of 64.

Black 69 might look small, but it is quite important, since it prevents White from settling his group in sente with the hane at 'd'.

White 74. White's last chance is to attack the two black stones to the right, but Black has no trouble whatsoever in saving his stones. White's problem is that he cannot get a splitting attack.

White 86. White probably considered this move a distasteful necessity. If White extended at 'e', Black would be able to play 'f' in sente, threatening to cut off three white stones. Even so, the natural move at 'e' is superior to 86, for Black later makes a big dent in White's territory with 3 and 5 in the next figure.

White 88. Preventing Black 88, White 'g', Black 'h', etc.




Figure 4 (101 – 121)
13: connects

Figure 4 (101 – 121). A model game for Black

This game was decided in the fuseki by the play in the top and bottom left corners. White played a little negatively, letting Black occupy all the key strategic points. Once Black got safely ahead, he played very solidly and tightly, denying White any opportunity to make an effective attack. White did launch a challenge with 74 in Figure 3, but he never had Black in trouble. Black's thickness on the left side made it easy for him to save his group on the right. This was a flawless game for Black, but White's play should not be taken as a model.

White resigns after Black 121.

Game Sixty-Two: Shusaku v. Yasui Sanchi (1853) Castle Game Ten

Shusaku's fourth castle game, against Ito Showa, is generally considered his toughest castle game, but actually he got into just as much trouble in this o-konomi game. It was not as epic a struggle as the fourth game, but Shusaku was in even greater danger of spoiling his record. Shusaku had scored easy wins against Sanchi with black in the first and sixth castle games, but he found taking white a different proposition. If Sanchi had not made a slip in the endgame, he would have won the game.

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Black: Yasui Sanchi 7-dan

Date: 17th, 18th November, 1853


224 moves. White wins by 1 point.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio, with reference to commentaries by Kajiwara and Segoe

Figure 1 (1 – 40). Manoeuvring for sente

Black 7, 11. The high approach move was popular in the Edo period, but Sanchi seems to have been particularly fond of it.

White 16. White does not want to play



Dia. 1

the standard taisha joseki in Dia. 1. After the sequence to 15, Black would have a good attacking move at 16. White would be






Figure 1 (1 – 40)



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

dissatisfied, because he would have to move towards the ▲ stones. White also avoids the other popular joseki shown in Dia. 2, because he hopes to take sente.

Black 19. An interesting move — Black is trying to keep sente. If he plays the usual joseki, shown in Dia. 3, White will invade around 6 instead of continuing on the side at 'a'.

White 22 makes miai of 23 and 24.

Black 25, forestalling White 'a', is a big move, but Black 32 would also be a good point.

Black 37. Ishida: 'I would prefer to play at 'b', aiming next at blocking at 'c'. If White played 'c', answering at 'd' would be satisfactory; if instead White invaded at 'e', I would still block at 'c', since I would welcome this fight.'

White 38. White's moyo is not as large as Black's, so he has to start a fight.

White 40. If at 'f', Black would be happy to jump out to 'g'. In this position, White 40, which aims at attaching at 'h', is correct shape.




Figure 2 (41 – 84)

Focus on the centre

Black 45 shows that Black intends to emphasise the centre. Black 47 is a good continuation — Sanchi is playing very strongly.

White 54, which maintains the territorial balance, is a good move. White's group at the top is still weak, but he cannot let Black's centre moyo get out of control.

White 64 indirectly helps the group in the centre by threatening the base of Black's corner group. However, Black 65 is sente, so Black can link up at any time by playing 'a'.

Black 67 is a thick move, but Kajiwara comments that he would prefer to block at 72. In that case, White would probably play at 'b'.

Black 75. Black's aim is not to make territory in the centre but to attack. White reinforces in a makeshift fashion with 76 to 80, then switches to 82. Sege comments that he would prefer to de-

fend at 84, since Black starts a severe attack with 83.





Figure 3 (85 – 120)



Dia. 4

Figure 3 (85 – 120). Sanchi's first mistake

The continuation to 97 seems inevitable — White cannot stop Black from breaking through the middle. Black next captures a stone in sente up to 105, so his attack has succeeded. When he switches to 111 at the bottom, he has a small lead. Note that Black cannot play 107 at 108 because of White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'.

Black 113 and 115 are too small. The most urgent endgame point is the Black 1–3 combination in Dia. 4. That would make miai of Black 'a' and Black 118 in the figure, both worth about twelve points. Even if White cut at 4, Black would not

need to worry, since cutting at 9 would be sente.

White 120 is very big. However, Black still has a lead.






Figure 4 (121 – 160)

38: connects



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Figure 4 (121 – 160). Sanchi surrenders the lead.

Black 23 is a good move, but 25 is bad — it gives the lead to Shusaku. Sanchi must have overlooked the fact that he could have made a nidanbane at 26.

Dia. 5. If White answers Black 1 by capturing with 2 and 4, he collapses when

Black counters with 5 to 9. Instead of 2 –

Dia. 6. The cut at 2 is more frightening, but Black has the hanekomi of 7 to save his stones. If White connects at 'a' after 9, Black can live by attaching at 'b'.

The above diagrams show that White has no counter to Black's nidanbane. Black could thus have broken up White's right side territory, and that would have secured him victory. As it is, White 26 upsets Black's lead.

Figure 5 (161 – 200). No chance to make a comeback

After Sanchi's mistake with 25 in the previous figure, both sides are playing flawless yose, but that means that Sanchi is not given any chance to reverse the lead. That one slack move decided the game.


Black 69. If at 1 in *Dia. 7*, White forces with 2 to 6, then captures two stones with the kosumi at 8. The exchange to 71 in the figure is therefore natural, and the result seems even.

White 84. The last large point.

Figure 6 (201 – 224). An upsetting game for Sanchi


Black 5 and 7 are good moves. If instead Black blocked at 1 in *Dia. 8*, White would get a ko with 2 to 6.

Losing this game must have made Sanchi very unhappy, considering that in effect he defeated himself. This was his third loss in the castle games and his most galling contribution to Shusaku's un-



Dia. 7

5: connects



Dia. 8




Figure 5 (161 – 200)

88: connects (at 85)




Figure 6 (201 – 224)

feated record.

White wins by 1 point.

Game Sixty-Three: Shusaku v. Inoue Matsumoto Inseki (1854)

Castle Game Eleven

This is Shusaku's second castle game against the 13th head of the Inoue school. Like the first (Game Thirty-Six), it is a masterpiece for Shusaku.

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Black: Inoue Matsumoto Inseki 5-dan

Date: 17th November, 1854

130 moves. Black resigns.

Commentary by Sanno Hirotaka




Figure 1 (1 – 42)
ko: 25, 28, 31

Figure 1 (1 – 42). The disparity in fuseki skill

White 6. A move Shusaku often played with white. The strategy behind 6 is interesting. If White simply played at 'a', Black would play at 'b', which would be the ideal extension from the 3–5 formation and which would also have a good follow-up at 'c'. However, when White plays 6, Black 'b' becomes less attractive, as there is not room to make a two-space extension. White 6 thus limits to some degree the potential of the 3–5 shimari.


Black 7. Black does not feel inclined to

make an extension up the left side. If he were to do so, the move would be 'd', provided that it made miai of 'e' and a good point elsewhere (White would probably answer Black 'd' at 'f' after which Black could switch to the miai point).

Black 11 is not so good once White has extended to 10, for 10 limits the potential influence of Black's thickness with 1–9–11. The modern style would be to make a pincer at 'g' instead of 11. All the same, when Shusaku plays the pressing move at 11, one feels that he has completely analysed the theoretical basis for the move, but other players do not inspire the same confidence. One just gets the impression that they are imitating Shusaku.

Black 13. Black is overdoing his kosumi: 14 is just too good a point for White. Instead of 13 –


Dia. 1. Black should use his thickness at the top to attack at 1; if White 2, Black 3. White 4 next is the vital point, and when Black jumps out to 5, White will attach at 6. Black can now extend to 7 at the bottom. The virtue of Black 1 is that it enables Black to make an ideal formation at the bottom.




Dia. 1

Black 15. Invading at 1 in Dia. 2 would be better.

Dia. 2. If Black 1, the sequence to 10 is probable. Note that linking up with 10 is correct for White – if he moved out with 'a' instead, Black would play 'b', keeping White split up and open to attack. After 10,



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Black can aim at starting a ko later with Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', etc.

Black 17 starts the first fight of the game. The continuation to 32 is perfect and will repay close study.

White 18. White must hane on top. White 1 in Dia. 3 is bad; White has no move after Black 4.

White 20. Shusaku would be drummed out of the Honinbo school if he played at 1 in Dia. 4. Instead of 20 —


Dia. 5. If White 1, giving atari at 2 is important: one must make the opponent heavy when attacking. Black can now cut off two white stones with 4 to 8. The timing of 2 is crucial.

Dia. 6. If Black connects at 2 first, then White will not answer 4 at 6. Black's ponnuki with 6 is not worth the proverbial thirty points, since his thickness at the bottom is nullified by the Δ stone, while his thickness at the top would also be useless. When Black starts with the atari, as in Dia. 5, White has no choice about answering. A very important principle is involved here.


Black 27. The professional touch — connecting at 22 would make Black heavy (White would connect at 32). Black 27 induces White 28, which makes Black 29 natural.

White 30. Connecting at 17 would give White bad shape (Black would connect to the left of 19).


Black 33. Unfortunately Black fails to maintain the high standard of his play so far in this fight. The hane at 33 was probably instinctive, but it is bad; Black




Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7


should simply defend at 35.

Dia. 7. If Black 1, White can force with 2 to 6, then block at 8, but Black can hane at 9, so he is satisfied. This is an improvement on the result in the game.


To look at the demerits of 33: firstly, 34 is a plus for White; secondly, Black has no time to play the natural continuation, a diagonal connection at 42; thirdly, Black cannot even patch things up after White 40 by giving atari at 42 and squeezing.

Black 37. If Black could now reinforce at 42, the hane at 33 would make sense, but —

Dia. 8. If Black 1, White 2 and 4 look grim. Black could not hope to win the ko after 5.



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

Black 41. The squeeze in Dia. 9 is worthless; after Black 1 and 3, either 'a' or 'b' would be more than good enough for White.




Figure 2 (43 – 74)
ko: 59, 62

Figure 2 (43 – 74). Already a won game

White 46. Already the outcome has been decided. Even with white, it takes Shusaku less than fifty moves to set up a won game.


Black 47 is the only move. Attacking with 1 in Dia. 10 would only help White to move out with 2 and 4. Black 1 at 2 would be even worse, giving White the good combination of 'a' and 'b'.

White 48. If at 67, Black 'a' would now be correct — the presence of Black 47 makes the difference.

White 74 is the kind of mid-air move that was Shusaku's forte. To begin with, 74 acts as a ladder-block if Black cuts at 'b', but it does much more than that, for it radiates influence in all directions.

Figure 3 (75 – 100). A lack of aggression

Black 75 is an unsatisfactory response to White 74 in the previous figure, for it is immediately smothered by White 76.



Dia. 10





Figure 3 (75 – 100)


If Black would like to give himself even an outside chance of winning, he has to play more aggressively. For example —

Dia. 11. Black 1 is an attempt to exploit the aji of the cut at 'a'. White can push down once at 2, maintaining the ladder, but then he must defend at 4. Black 5 is forced, so White can jump out at 6. (If Black played 1 at 'b', White would still play 2, and 'b' would not be a ladder-block.) This would be a more positive approach for Black, though one would have to confess that even this way White would not be seriously troubled.

Black 77. Perhaps Black's last chance to make a game of it. There is a proverb for this occasion and Black should follow it.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

Dia. 12. If Black plays 1, cutting across the knight's move, he can at least separate White. He might be able to pull off something in the fight after 9.

White 78 is correct shape and deprives Black of further sente moves here. If White played 78 at 'a', Black could push through at 'b'.

White 80. White 'c' would give Black a placement at 80.

Black 81 and 83 are inconsistent. When Black plays 81, he usually continues with 3 to 7 in Dia. 13, though that would not be enough in this game. When White plays 84, Black 81 turns into a wasted stone, which is the reason why the 81–83 combination is illogical. Black's subsequent moves to 95 are correct, but capturing 81 has given White a favourable result.

White 100 makes Black 75 look silly: not only has it accomplished nothing for Black but now it has even become a burden, for Black has to worry about the threat of White 'd'.

Figure 4 (101–130). Too easy for Shusaku

White 14 forestalls Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'.

White 16 is the kind of move that de-





Figure 4 (101–130)



Dia. 14

stroys one's fighting spirit. Black could accept White 'd' or 'e' – they would be quite reasonable moves – but White 16? Black must feel that he is being toyed with.

Black 19 is of course too late, but actually Black is looking for a quick exit from an embarrassing situation.

White 30 gives Black his cue. Just for the record, Dia. 14 shows the final, unplayed tesuji. (If Black 1 at 2, then White 1.)

This game was decided in the fuseki. Black started out by playing too tightly, then he committed that fatal indiscretion with the hane at 33 in Figure 1.

Black resigns after White 130.

This year Shusaku only played one castle game, for there were no o-konomi games. In 1855, due to an earthquake in October which damaged Edo castle, there were no castle games at all.

Game Sixty-Four: Shusaku v. Gennan Inseki (1855)

Gennan Inseki retired in 1848, but in 1855 he played one final game with Shusaku, perhaps in order to gauge for himself the latter's progress since their famous series in 1846.

White: Gennan Inseki 8-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Played at the residence of Mimura Kiyozaemon on the 6th, 8th, 10th, 11th March and concluded on the 19th April.

219 moves. White resigns.

Commentary by Miyashita Shuyo 9-dan





Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50). A fighting start


Black 3 is the direct approach. Black could also play 3 at 'a'; if White 'b', Black 3 would be a combination of a pincer and an extension.

Black 11 is essential. If Black hanes at 1 in Dia. 1, White will strengthen himself with 2, making White 'a' a threat. If Black defends at 3, White 4 will be troublesome.

Black 27. If Black connects at 1 in Dia. 2, White hanes at 2. The continuation is forced, but the result, with White cutting



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

at 16, is bad for Black. Playing 2 at 'a' would also be good enough for White, since Black would obliged to take gote by defending at 4 after Black 'b' – White 'c'.

White 32 takes into account Black's influence in the top right. If Black plays 48 next, White will extend to 'c' to counter that influence.

Black 39 is a superb point. When White played 38, he was hoping for Black 43 – White 44 – Black 45, after which he planned to extend to 39 in order to counteract Black's influence at the top right. Since Black 39 works so well, White perhaps should have played 38 at 'd'.

White 42 is a little slack. White should make the more severe move at 'b'; if Black still switched to 43, White would be able to get excellent shape with 'e'.

White 46. Perhaps natural momentum after 42, but White 48 is more urgent.

Black 47 kills three birds with one stone: it attacks the three white stones to the left, offers some assistance to the black stones further up the left side, and also sets up a good continuation at 49. If Black played 48 instead of 47, White would be happy to extend to 'c'.

Black 49. It is hard to choose between this move and Black 'c'.

Figure 2 (51 – 100). White sacrifices his centre stones.

Black 51. A sharp invasion which makes good use of Black's thickness above.




Figure 2 (51 – 100)

White 54 – Black 55. An interesting exchange which gives White various sente moves here. One example is White ‘a’; if Black ignored it, White could get a ko with White 94, Black 95, White ‘b’, Black ‘c’, White ‘d’.

White 70 begins to create eye-shape. Connecting at 71 would be safe, but Black would play a forcing move at 70, then pursue White with 79. By attacking this group, Black would probably be able to build up his moyo at the bottom.

Black 71, 73. More severe than blocking at ‘e’ – White has to link up with 76.

White 80. Escaping into the centre would be what Black wants.

Black 81. Resisting with Black 82 would help White in the centre fight: White would counter with ‘f’. Black 81 is an attempt to simplify the game.

Black creates an enormous moyo with 87, but White moves into it very skilfully with 88 etc. White makes a considerable gain with his ladder block at 98.

Figure 3 (101 – 150). Attacking in vain

Black 5. Despite White’s success at the top left, this move maintains Black’s lead.

White 8, 10. White would prefer to leave




Figure 3 (101 – 150)

ko: 43, 46, 49




Figure 4 (151 – 219)

55, 60: ko; 69: ko (at 51); ko (at 74); 97, 100, 105, 108, 111, 119: connects at 74

moves such as these unplayed, but he is concerned about his eye-shape.

Black 19–23. Black is playing solidly, since he has a lead. White attacks strongly in this figure and the next and does manage to complicate the game with two ko fights, but he is unable to obtain an advantage.

Figure 4 (151 – 219). A victory for thickness

Gennan Inseki continued fighting as long as there was something to fight about, but Shusaku did not make a single misstep. The thickness that Shusaku built up at the

top right at the beginning served him well throughout the game, enabling him to keep on the attack. His victory was even more convincing than the more famous games played nearly a decade earlier.

White resigns after Black 219.

Game Sixty-Five: Shusaku v. Shuho (1856)

Shuho, who was to become the 18th Honinbo in 1886, was born in 1838, the son of a carpenter. His family was very poor, but he had the good fortune to live next door to the Honinbo residence at Kurumazaka in Ueno. He became a Honinbo disciple at the age of seven and studied under Honinbos Josaku and Shuwa. He became a shodan in 1848, but did not become a live-in disciple until 1851. By 1861 he had reached 6-dan and was recognised as the strongest Honinbo disciple after Shusaku. When the latter died in 1862, Shuwa wanted to make Shuho his heir, but for some reason Jowa's widow, who seems to have had considerable influence in the Honinbo house, objected strongly, so Shuwa was compelled to pass over Shuho in favour of his son, Shuetsu, then only thirteen and a 3-dan. Some years later Shuho left the Honinbo house and spent a decade traveling in the country. In 1879 he was called back to Tokyo to become the head of the newly-formed Hoensha, a group of players which played an important role in reviving the popularity of go. During the 1880's the Hoensha was the most influential body in the go world and even put the Honinbo school in the shade. However, in 1886 a reconciliation was effected between Shuho and Shuei, the 17th Honinbo. Shuei (the second son of Shuwa) promoted Shuho to 8-dan and let him become the 18th Honinbo. Unfortunately, Shuho died a bare three months after achieving what had been his lifelong ambition.

In the final decade of his life, Shuho stood head and shoulders above his contemporaries. Apart from the fact that he is a bridge between Edo go and modern go, his games are of special interest because of his magnificent attacking style.

This is the twentieth surviving game between Shusaku and Shuho. The first was a three-stone game in December 1850 which Shuho lost. He also lost a two-stone game in the same month, but won the next, a three-stone game in 1851. In 1853 he played ten two-stone games, of which he won half. In October 1854 we find him playing on josen (obviously a number of games have been lost), but he did badly, only winning one out of five. Then there was a break until late 1856, by which time Shuho seems to have improved sufficiently to hold his own on black. The two played a game in October, which was a jigo, and that was followed by the present game, another jigo. To complete the record, Shuho played another eight games over the next four years, of which he only lost two (there must have been other games which have not survived, otherwise he would have gone to sen-ai-sen). The culmination of their series then came with their famous jubango in 1861. That was the last serious match of Shusaku's life and will be described in detail later in this book.

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Black: Murase Shuho 5-dan

Date: 1st November, 1856

257 moves. Jigo

Adapted from a joint commentary by
Ohira Shuzo 9-dan and Haruyama Isamu
8-dan




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50). Testing Shuho's strength

Black 1, 3. A rarely-seen formation.

Black 11. If at 12, White would play 26, an exchange which would not be very interesting for Black. However, the extension to 11 seems a little narrow, considering that 13 is sente.

Black 17 is a strong, aggressive move. The continuation to 30 seems natural.

Black 31. Black could keep this move in reserve; Black 'a', aiming at Black 32, would then be sente.

Black 33 not only seems unnecessary, but is also bad style. The proverb tells us not to push into the keima formation.

White 36. The only move – if White played at 37, Black would take away his base with 'b'.

White 38 and Black 39 are miai.

White 46 is an unusually aggressive move for Shusaku. Perhaps he wanted to

find out how well Shuho could handle himself in a fight.

Black 49. Black is aiming at the cut at 55 in the next figure, but 49 does take the pressure off White in the centre, for White is able to take sente with 50, then extend at 52.






Figure 2 (51 – 80)

71: connects



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Figure 2 (51 – 80). An oversight and a change in course

When Black cuts at 55, the continuation to 72 is forced. However, Black 73 is a questionable move, as the exchange for 74 is bad for Black. Ohira surmises that Shuho probably intended to continue with 75 at 1 in Dia. 1, but that he changed his mind because he realised that White could have counterattacked at 2.

Dia. 1. If Black 1, White might make an attempt to capture Black with 2. If 3, White plays 4 and 6, then extends his lib-

erties in the corner with 8.

Dia. 2. Black would have to play 9 to 15, but he would lose the semeai after 18 by one move.

Black 75, sacrificing the key stones, is a bold change in course, but it seems to be a wise one. Black could lead his two stones out with Black 78, but that would make him heavy.




Figure 3 (81 – 100)

Figure 3 (81 – 100). A resolute sacrifice strategy

Black 81, 83. Pushing straight up the board like this is a bold way of playing typical of Shuhō. His fondness for thickness is apparent in all his games.

Black builds a very impressive wall up to 99, but at the cost of giving White a lot of territory. The question now is how much use he can make of his thickness. Ohira comments that the game is evenly balanced.

White 100 is the correct invasion point. If he played one line lower, at 1 in Dia. 3, Black would attack from the top, at 2, as that would give him quite a wide territory. If White 3, Black would attack with 4 and 6, and the white group would have trouble getting eyes.






Figure 4 (101 – 150)

ko: 38, 41, 44, 47



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Figure 4 (101 – 150). Settling a group

Black 1 is essential. Black 7 instead would be too narrow, while White would have more room below to settle himself (he would extend to 28) than in Dia. 3.

White 2. One might think that White would be able to get life quickly by extending to 1 in Dia. 4, but actually that would be very dangerous. Thanks to his outside thickness, Black would be able to attack at 2. After 3 to 7, Black would play 8, and the white group would be past helping.

Black 3. Black is hoping to set up a



Dia. 5

splitting attack. If he jumped to 8 instead, White 36 would now be good enough to settle the group.

Black 11, 13. Black is trying hard to keep White separated. Letting White connect at 14 hurts Black 1, but Black seeks compensation with 15.

White 30. White has to defend against Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 5, but he must feel that descending at 'a' would be too slow.

Black 37. Black is staking the game on this ko fight. White does not have enough ko threats, so he has to give way at 48, then at 56 in Figure 5.

Figure 5 (151 – 200). An exchange

Black 59, 61. Capturing this group seems to be a little bigger than the ko.

Black 65. Black 'a' seems to be bigger; White cannot play 66, as he would lose the ko after Black 67, so White 'b' and Black 66 would follow. Black perhaps missed a chance to win here.

White 92. White misses the chance to make a large monkey jump to 'c'. Black could hardly permit White 'd' by connecting at 92. Once Black plays 93, a jigo seems unavoidable.

Figure 5 (151 – 200). An exchange

Ohira: 'Judging by this game, Shuhō is not yet a match for Shusaku, but he attacked well and played his own style of go. He did very well for an eighteen year old.'

Result a jigo




Figure 5 (151 – 200)

ko: 55, 60; 62: connects

ko (at 63): 71, 74, 77, 80, 83, 86, 89




Figure 6 (201 – 257)

48: connects (below 10)

Game Sixty-Six: Shusaku v. Ito Showa (1856)

Castle Game Twelve

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Black: Ito Showa 7-dan

Date: 17th November, 1856

154 moves. Black resigns.

Commentary by Sato Sunao, with reference to commentaries by Ishida Yoshio and Segoe Kensaku




Figure 1 (1 – 46)

Figure 1 (1 – 46). Variation on a classic

The moves up to 23 are the same as the Jowa-Intetsu game in Chapter One, with the exception of 4, which Jowa played at 'a'. Jowa reversed the order of 24 and 26, then played 28 at 'b', but 28 here is the standard move. Another possibility for 28 is pressing at 31.



Black 31 is correct shape.

White 32 induces Black 33 so that White can play 34 to make sure of his connection. If White played 34 at 'c', Black would make good shape with 'd'. Even so, Sato thinks that 34 is a little loose and would prefer to exchange White 'c' for Black 'd', then either attach at 'e' or jump to 'f'.

Black 37. The low approach move at 38 is not attractive here, as White would be

able to press down on Black with 37 and 'g'. Alternatively, Ishida suggests that White would be able to make a severe attack with 2 and 4 in Dia. 1. In view of that, he suggests omitting 37 and 39 altogether, simply extending to 41 instead. If then White 38, Black could extend to 'h'.

White 44. Making this light reducing move indicates that White feels that he is doing well enough in territory to make a deep invasion unnecessary. White 44 is more appropriate than White 'i', because Black would answer the latter at 44, which would work well with the wide extension to 43.



Dia. 2

Figure 2 (47 – 80). White defies Black to kill his group.

Black 47 is a slack move — White 48 makes the game difficult for Black. Sato and Segoe advocate playing the forcing sequence in Dia. 2. (Note that if White plays 2 at 4, Black jumps immediately to 5.) If Black strengthened himself in the bottom right like this, White might not get the chance to invade at 52.

According to Ishida, the conventional move for 47 would be jumping to 78, but here turning at 'a' would then be very good for White, so instead he recommends following Dia. 3.





Figure 2 (47 – 80)



Dia. 3

Dia. 3. If Black 1, White would move out with 2 and 4, which would make Black 5 natural. Whether Black follows Dia. 2 or 3, the bottom is the important area.

White 52 is a resolute move — White must be confident that his two stones at the bottom will not be captured. Black accepts the challenge with 53.

White 60 shows how confident White is: even after Black has played 59, he is prepared to let Black strengthen himself further with 61.

Black 63. Black is hoping for a chance to pull out his stone with ‘b’ later on, but answering with 64 at ‘c’ would be cowardly. One will have to wait to see what happens before one can evaluate the merits of the 63 — 64 exchange.

Black 65 defends against the threat of


White 67. However, the white group is almost settled after 68 and 70, so perhaps Black could have considered playing 65 at ‘d’.

Shusaku’s decision to take profit on the left side at the risk of exposing his stones at the bottom to attack has been proven correct. Black’s last hope is to attack White’s only remaining weak group, and 71 is the correct way to go about it. Sato comments that this kind of boshi, making a frontal assault on the opponent, was a favourite move of Jowa’s.

White 76 is an interesting move; White has already taken plenty of profit, so he can afford to sacrifice the stones above.

Black 77 is the natural continuation after Black 75 — Black does not have a direct answer to 76. Ishida comments that making a hane at 1 in Dia. 4 would not work well.

Dia. 4. White 2 is a good counter to Black 1. Black 3 and 5 are the strongest moves, but White has a refutation in the cut at 8. White ‘a’ is sente, so White captures three stones with 12.



Dia. 4

White 78 and 80 are severe — this cut leads to the final, decisive fight of the game. White’s sacrifice in the centre has served its purpose by enabling him to keep the initiative. If he had answered 75 at ‘e’, Black would have been able to take




Figure 3 (81 – 104)





Figure 4 (105 – 128)



Dia. 5

control of the game.


Figure 3 (81 – 104). A confused fight

Black 85. Black intends to play a ko with 'a' if White gives atari here.

Black 91. A natural counterattack – Black cannot answer docilely at 92.

White 98. Ishida comments that this move is essential. If White connected at 1 in Dia. 5, Black would play 2, and though White would be safe with 3, he would have to add a stone after Black 4, so Black would be able to switch to 6 and would take the lead. The virtue of 98 in the figure is that it creates a reserve eye at 'b', so White lives in sente, since Black has to play 99.

White 104. White cannot connect at 'c' because of Black 'd', but White does have the threat of 'e', so Black's connection is not yet completely secure. White 98 was



Dia. 6


quite an effective move.

Figure 4 (105 – 128). Caution required

Black 5. The focus of the fight is finally becoming clear: the game is shaping up into a semeai between the black and white groups on the right side.

White 12 is an ironic answer to Black 11. Black might be tempted to play 13 at 1 in Dia. 6, but that would be a fatal mistake.

Dia. 6. Black 1 looks more helpful in the fight on the side, but White would promptly cut with 2 and 4. If Black 5, White forces with 6 etc., and Black collapses after the continuation to 14. It now becomes apparent that if Black had a stone at 'a', he would be able to answer 14 with Black 'b'. Note that if White



Dia. 7

plays 14 at 'c', a ko will follow after Black 14, White 6, Black connects five stones, but this ko would not be favourable for White.

Black 17. Forced after White 16.

White 18 threatens White 'a'. White has handled this fight perfectly — when he captures with 20, the semeai looks good for him.

White 28. Bad shape, but necessary. If at 1 in Dia. 7, Black would have the sparkling tesuji of 2 and 4.

Figure 5 (129 – 154). The final showdown

Black 29. Black does not have time to connect at 30, but White's sente cut there is painful.

White 32 is the vital point. By this stage both players were probably well aware of how the fight would turn out.

Black 51. Ishida comments that continuing the semeai is pointless. Black would have to play 1 to 5 in Dia. 8, but since he can only get an approach-move ko, this would be hopeless.

White 52. Securing his capture is enough — White can afford to give up his group at the bottom. After 52, Black does not even have an approach-move ko.

Dia. 9. If Black 1, White plays 2 to 6. With a double ko, White cannot lose.

The large-scale life-and-death struggle in this game makes it stand out among Shu-






Figure 5 (129 – 154)



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

saku's castle games. It gives us a fascinating glimpse of the formidable fighting prowess usually concealed beneath the smooth-flowing surface of his games.

Segoe's summing-up: 'Both White's fusenki and his fighting were flawless. I think that this game is a masterpiece.'

Black resigns after White 154.

Game Sixty-Seven: Shusaku v. Mizutani Nuiji (1857)

In January 1857 Shusaku left Edo for his fourth and final visit home. He was accompanied by his brother-in-law, Nakagawa (then Kadono) Kamesaburo (1837 – 1903), the second son of Jowa, who became well-known in the Meiji period as the founder of the Hoensha. After the usual stopovers in Nagoya, Ise and Osaka, Shusaku arrived in Tonoura in early April. In the same month he made his own discovery of a go prodigy who was almost as talented as Shusaku but who was not similarly favoured by destiny.

In the middle of April, an eleven year old boy was brought by his father to Tonoura to have some instruction games with Shusaku. The latter played him two four-stone games and was soundly beaten, so he reduced the handicap to three stones, but did no better. These games are considered model handicap games and the first is given here (the other two are given in Part Two).

The prodigy was Mizutani Nuiji (1846 – 84), who lived on the Inland Sea island of Mukuna, near the town of Imaharu in Shikoku. Shusaku and Nakagawa wanted to take Mizutani back to Edo to enter the Honinbo school, but his father, a doctor, refused permission, presumably because he did not consider go a suitable profession for his son. As a result, Mizutani remained in Shikoku for most of his life and had to study by himself, since he had already outstripped local rivals before he was ten. Despite having no teacher, he reached 3-dan.

It was not until 1880 that Mizutani, after repeated invitations from Shuhō, finally went to Tokyo to join the Hoensha. He soon became one of the stars of the new group and within two years earned promotion to 6-dan. He was the only player able to hold his own against Shuhō in his prime, keeping on sen-ai-sen while everyone else was forced to josen or lower. In 1884 Shuhō wanted to promote him to 7-dan, but another Hoensha player, Takahashi Kinesaburo 5-dan, objected, so the two played one of the rare challenge matches of the Meiji period. Mizutani won the match 6-4, but to answer Takahashi's objection he would have had to force him from sen-ai-sen to josen, which would have required a lead of four games. Mizutani made a good start, but did badly in the latter part of the match. That was not surprising, for he was mortally ill with tuberculosis. He collapsed and died on the 28th November, twelve days after the conclusion of the match. The following year Shuhō awarded him a posthumous 7-dan diploma.

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

4 stones: Mizutani Nuiji

Date: 18th April, 1857

134 moves. White resigns.

Adapted from a commentary by Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan

Figure 1 (1 – 50). Fighting on equal terms

Black 4 is a little small – Black 'a' would be better.

White 7 anticipates an invasion by Black at 'b' and prevents him from connecting

underneath with 'c'.

Black 12 helps White. He should defend at 36 or invade at 'd'

White 17 is an interesting twist. If Black answers at 1 in Dia. 1, White can aim at a ko with 2 to 6 later on. The 17–19 combination is a gain for White compared to the usual move of 17 at 28.

Black 20 is a severe move. From here on Black challenges White to a fight on even terms.

White 23. Playing safe with 23 at 26 would not befit White in a handicap game.




Figure 1 (1 – 50)






Figure 2 (51 – 84)

71: ko



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Black 28 is a good move which makes the continuation to 37 forced.

Black 38. Black could also play safe with Black 44, White 'e', Black 38.


White 43 is the vital point for eye-shape for both sides. Black 44 tides over the problem of the peep for the time being.

White 47. If at 1 in Dia. 2, the sequence to 8 follows, and the white group at the bottom left will come under severe attack.


Figure 2 (51 – 84). White is forced on the defensive.

White 53, 55. If omitted, Black will kill White with 1 to 7 in Dia. 3. White plays 53 before living to create aji in the corner.


Black 56 demonstrates the precision of Mizutani's reading, for it is in just the right place to refute White 1 etc. in Dia.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4
12: connects



Dia. 5

4. It also aims at invading at 'a'.

White 73. White would like to play 77, Black 78, White 74, but Black has a counter. Instead of connecting at 78, he would give atari at 2 in Dia. 5, forcing White to make a detour with 3 and 5 and gaining the time to connect at 4 and 6. Mizutani's boldness in making the cut at 70 showed that he knew this tesuji.

White 75 is a tesuji. Pushing at 76

would just help Black to build a large side territory.

Black 84. Black 'b' would be better aji.





Figure 3 (85 – 134)



Dia. 6

5: connects

Figure 3 (85 – 134). A crushing win

Black 92. Black could kill White by attacking at 'a', but White would be able to make territory in the centre by squeezing on the outside. Black prefers to attack with 92, even at the cost of letting White live in the corner.

Black 100. If at 'b', White will squeeze with 100 and 'c', then attack the black group with 102.

White 103. If at 1 in Dia. 6, Black counters with 2 etc., living in sente.

White 105 enables the group in the

corner to live, but Black takes compensation by attacking in the centre.

Black 108. A hane left of 107 would give White a chance to create complications with a counter-hane at 'd'. Black 108 and 110 are the safe way of winding up the game.

White manages to pull out his centre group up to 115, but Black promptly turns his attention to the other group with 116 etc. Black 134 is a good point at which to resign. White can live with White 'e', Black 'f', White 'g', but he would be about thirty-five points behind (assuming that Black can invade at 'h' and 'i'), and would have no weak black groups to attack.

The most impressive thing about this game was Mizutani's fierce fighting spirit. He met every challenge without flinching—clearly he was not overawed by his opponent.

White resigns after Black 134.

Game Sixty-Eight: Shusaku v. Yasui Sanchi (1857)

Castle Game Thirteen

White: Yasui Sanchi 7-dan
Black: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan
Date: 17th November, 1857
141 moves. White resigns.
Commentary by Sanno Hirotaka




Figure 1 (1 – 25)

Figure 1 (1 – 25). A very solid beginning


Black 3. An excellent point – if White 5 next, Black ‘a’ becomes the ideal combination of pincer and extension.

Black 5. Black ‘a’ would also be good.

White 6. If omitted, Black 21 (or nowadays ‘b’) would be very effective.

White 8. Sanchi was fond of the high move, but there is no reason here not to come in low at 9. The taisha would not worry White, since Black does not have influence to the left, while the pincer at 2 in Dia. 1 would not worry him either, since he could press down on Black with 7.

White 12 is bad – it is just the kind of move that does not work against Shusaku. Also, if White is not going to continue on the right side, it would be better not to play 8 and 10 at all.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Instead of 12 –


Dia. 2. The pincer at 1 would be more interesting (the joseki move is ‘a’, but that would have too little effect on Black). If Black 2, White 3 would make a nice formation.

Black 13 is very solid – extending to ‘c’ would be more usual. The solid position of ‘c’ on the third line would make White 14 or ‘d’ uninteresting.


White 14. Essential – Black ‘d’ would be a superb follow-up to 13.

Black 15. A leisurely, solid move which aims at invading at ‘e’. If omitted, Sanchi might have played at ‘f’, creating the kind of large-scale position that was his forte. Shusaku was expert at preventing his opponents from controlling the flow of the game.


Black 17, another rock-solid move, looks a little narrow, but Black is aiming at the invasions at ‘e’ and 21. However, Black could invade immediately at 1 in Dia. 3 (next page). If White led out his two stones at the bottom after Black 3, he would only be helping Black to take territory.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Black 23. Black should not really let White extend to 24, as that weakens Black's stones on the side. Correct style is to make the hane at 1 in Dia. 4 before jumping out to 3. Even after 25, Black is left with a weak point at 'g'.

Figure 2 (26 – 61). An easy invasion

Black 27 looks amateurish. Normally the only move one would consider here would be Black 'a'; White would play 33, so Black could attack next with 'b' or 'c'. Shusaku must have felt that those moves would not have been forceful enough. After 27, pushing at 'b' or attacking at 'd' would have more impact on White.

White 30. White refrains from playing 31, because he is aiming at attacking with 1 to 5 in Dia. 5. The existence of aji like that is the reason why Black should not have permitted White 24.

White 38. If at 1 in Dia. 6, White will be left with a weak point at 2; if 1 at 'a', Black will have the threat of 3.

Black 39 is another solid move. It is not really necessary, but it does defend against the threat of White 1 in Dia. 7. Blocking at 4 would be submissive, but if Black 2, White would cut off the centre group with 3 to 7. Later on that might be a problem.






Figure 2 (26 – 61)



Dia. 6



Dia. 7


Black 45. The largest point.

White 46 is in itself a good, flexible move which guarantees life-shape for the group here, but it throws away White's last chance to make a game of it territorially. White has only one large potential territory, so he should secure it with White 'e'. He might be worried about Black 1 in Dia. 8, but he should be able to ride out the attack with 2 to 10.


Black 47. The game is over if White cannot kill this stone, but with an enemy stone in position at 45, White's prospects are bleak. Note that 47 is the correct invasion point. Instead –

Dia. 9. If Black 1, Black would be able to live, but White 2 would secure a lot of territory on the side.


White 48. The usual answer is White




Dia. 8 9: connects



Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

1 in Dia. 10, but here Black 2 creates some worrying aji. For example –

Dia. 11. If White does not defend, Black 1 will be troublesome. The sequence to 9 is forced. White thus prefers to play solidly with 48 and 50 in the figure.

Black 53. Black 58, aiming next at 56, would be usual and would give White less aji to play around with, but presumably Black is satisfied with his atari at 55, which forces White into bad shape. However, Black has to be prepared to sacrifice a stone if White cuts above or below 53.

Up to 57, Black has no trouble living in the corner. The success of this invasion decides the game, for White now has almost no territory to speak of.

Figure 3 (62 – 100). No target for attack

White 78. Trying to kill Black with 1 in Dia. 12 is pointless – the best White can do is to get a seki. However, Black 8 affects the eye-shape of White's own group, so Black 'a' might become a threat.

Figure 4 (101 – 141). Sanchi's aggression smothered

White's final attack is ineffectual – it is too late in the game to hope to pull




Figure 3 (62 – 100)





Figure 4 (101 – 141)

32: connects

off something.

Shusaku took his revenge for the hard time Sanchi gave him in his tenth castle game. His solid style with black must have been very frustrating for Sanchi.



Dia. 12

White resigns after Black 141.

Game Sixty-Nine: Shusaku v. Shuhō (1857)

Commentary by Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Black: Murase Shuhō 5-dan

Date: 22nd December, 1857

174 moves. Black resigns.





Figure 1 (1 – 41)

Figure 1 (1 – 41). A surprise attack


White 6. An approach move at 12 would be usual, as giving Black a chance to make two shimaris goes against the conventional fuseki theory of this period. However, since this is an 'in-house' game, with a junior disciple, Shusaku is playing in a relaxed fashion. Perhaps this is an experiment, letting his opponent get an adequate fuseki.

Black 7. Nowadays Shuhō is remembered for his aggressiveness and here we see an early sign of it. He is too stubborn to play the way his opponent dictates.

White 12. White 1 in Dia. 1 is an excellent move, but if White attacked at 3 after Black 2, 4 and 6 would work perfectly for Black. This would not be an



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

interesting result for White.


Black 13. A leisurely move which makes miai of 23 and 'a'. The usual move at the top when White has tenukied is attaching at 'b', but White has a counter prepared.

Dia. 2. If Black 1, White takes sente with 2 to 6, then presses at 8. If the large-scale joseki to 27 follows, White has an excellent continuation at 28. This result is bad for Black, as his thickness up to 27 overlaps with his influence at the top.


White 14. Dia. 2 would not be so good for White now, so 14 is mandatory. That in turn makes defending at 15 necessary for Black.

Black 17. The other possibility is the sequence shown in Dia. 3. The moves to 14 are a joseki, but in this position it does not appeal to Black.

Black 19 is not joseki, but here it is a good move, the aim being to take sente and switch to the oba of 21. If White blocks at 'c', Black has a good answer at 'd'. The latter move takes territory, while White 'c' would have no effect on



Dia. 3



9: connects

Black's solid position at 15. Instead of 19 —

Dia. 4. If Black follows the usual joseki with 1, White takes sente with 2 to 8, then plays 10 and 12. Following joseki blindly can lead to an unfavourable result.

White 20. White cannot permit Black 20.


White 22. White 40, provoking Black 'a', would be bad.

The game seems to be developing leisurely with 24, when Black suddenly launches a severe attack on the corner with 25. Black 'e' instead (White would play 'f') would be more peaceful.


Black 27. This crosscut brings up the question of the ladder.

Dia. 5. If White 1, Black blocks at 2; White 3 and 5 next do not work, since the ladder is unfavourable, so instead of 3 —


Dia. 6. Attaching at 3 here is the only move. However, the simple continuation to




Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

12 would give Black a favourable result. If White 'a' next, Black plays 'b' and vice versa.

The conclusion is that White 1 in Dias. 5 and 6 is bad, so White counterattacks with 28 and 30. He is prepared to give up the side in return for an attack on the two black stones at the bottom. The move to 34 are forced. The result can be regarded as a success for Black, for he has broken through White's corner enclosure.

White 36. If at 1 in Dia. 7, Black will be happy to secure the side with 2 to 6. The three isolated black stones would still be able to escape. If White plays 1 at 'a', turning at 2 is good enough for Black. The direct approach does not work for White, so taking away Black's base with 36 and 38 is correct. Note that instead of 38 —

Dia. 8. Cutting at 1 would be bad. Black would sacrifice two stones, then block at 4. Black can force with Black 'a' — White 'b', so White cannot push up at 'c'.

Black 39. If at 40, White plays 'g'.

Black 41. Defending at 'g' would be safer; if White 'h', Black could then attach at 41, aiming next at 'i'. Black

41 is an attempt to gain efficiency, but the drawback is that Black becomes thin. Striking the right balance between efficiency and thinness is difficult.




Figure 2 (42 – 70)


Figure 2 (42 – 70). White takes the oba.

The sequence to 45 is forced. Black has played all-out and he seems to have done well. However, he has left a weakness in his position, and it is from this point on that Shusaku shows his strength. The determined attack that he launches with 46 leads to the climax of the game. Instead of 46 –


Dia. 9. White decides against trying to separate Black immediately with 1, as he has a good, light answer at 2. If next White 3, Black gets good shape with 4.

Black 47 and 49 give Black profit at the top, which is why it required courage for White to play 46. He hopes to use his thickness to get compensation at the bottom, and the tesuji of 52 is the first step. Note that once White has played 46 to 50, 52, rather than 54, becomes the vital point.


White 56. White 1 in *Dia. 10* is also possible. Black cannot capture White, but he can make him heavy with 4 and 6, then




Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

11: connects

link up with his other group with 8. This result, with the white group liable to come under attack, is not satisfactory.

Black 57. Black has little choice but to answer docilely. If he tries to capture White with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 11*, White squeezes with 4 to 10, then connects at 12. This seriously weakens the black group on the left.

Black 59. If omitted, White can play 'a'.

White 60. The honte is White 'b', but if White played there, Black would immediately switch to 'c' at the top and take the lead in territory. White could then play 60, but he might not gain enough from this attack to compensate for giving Black the oba at the top. White therefore attacks immediately at 60 to make sure of keeping sente.

Black 61. If omitted, White 'd' would be severe.

White 64 is the vital point. If White plays at 1 in *Dia. 12*, Black not only captures a stone with 2 to 8, but also gets a peep at 'a'.

Black 69. If at 'e', White would ex-

change 'f' for Black 'g', then connect at 'h'. Black would have to worry about his cutting point at 'i'.




Figure 3 (71 – 100)

Figure 3 (71 – 100). A peaceful continuation

White 72 is a superbly-timed forcing move which comes in handy later. Black cannot ignore it.


Dia. 13. If Black continues his attack with 2, White will invade the corner with 3. The exchange to 7 will follow, but it is clearly unfavourable for Black.

White 74 is another excellent move. It not only strengthens White's weak group, but also aims at reducing Black's moyo with a contact play at 81 and also at enlarging White's moyo with 'a'. Note that White has an answer to Black 'b'.


Dia. 14. If Black 1, White sacrifices his stones, squeezing with 4 to 10. He then takes up position with 12 and 14, aiming next at 'a'. Black gains nothing from his capture.

Black 75, 77. Black is still aiming at the centre white group, but first he builds up strength.


White 80. A cautious move which makes use of the earlier forcing move at 72.



Dia. 13



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

If White played immediately at 82, Black would be able to play 2 to 8 in Dia. 15, a sequence which does not work if the White 'a'–Black 'b' exchange has been made.

The continuation after White 82 is natural. Black builds thickness in the centre, while White secures territory. White keeps sente and switches to 90. Once again, no criticism can be made of the continuation.

Black 97 is the honte. If Black connected at 'c', White would push at 98 and aim at cutting later with White 97, Black 'd', White 'e'. Securing definite eye-shape with 97 is the wisest course.





Figure 4 (101 – 130)



Dia. 16

Figure 4 (101 – 130). Trouble in the centre


White 6, 8. Worth about twenty points, if one takes into account the aji of 20. At this point the game is very close.

Black 15. A good move which aims at the 21–23 combination.


Black 21. Black cannot play 1 in Dia. 16 as he cannot get a ladder after 4. Black therefore leaves the side and switches to the centre. Black 21 and 23 take advantage of White's thinness there.

White 24. White has to play vigorously. If he simply extends at 1 in Dia. 17, he has no answer to Black 2. White 3 is countered by 4 and 6. If White 3 at 'a', Black still cuts by attaching at 6.

Black 25 to White 28 are forced. Black then makes a very severe cut at 29 and White seems to be in trouble — if White 'a', Black gets a double atari at 'b'. The game has reached a crucial point —



Dia. 17



Dia. 18

White's next move will make or break him.

Dia. 18. If White 1, Black connects at 2. White can save the stones on the right with 3, but Black captures his centre stones with 4 and 6.

White 30 is the only move. If Black now tries to cut as in Dia. 18, White can block at 'a' there and save his stones. The problem is what happens to his group on the right.

Figure 5 (131 – 174). White wins the ko.

White 32. If at 34, Black will build a large territory with Black 33, White 35, Black 'a'.

Black 33. Capturing at 34, letting White play 42, would be too small — Black has to play more aggressively.

White 34. If White connects the ko, Black again gets a large territory with 42. White has to match Black's aggression.





Figure 5 (131 – 174)
ko: 37, 40


The ko threat at 38 makes the difference: this is the only threat that White has, but Black has no threat affecting the survival of a group.

Black 41. If at 1 in Dia. 19, White plays 2 and 4; if Black then connects the ko, White plays 'a'. Black takes profit in the corner with 41 and 43, but White gets thickness in the centre and maintains a small lead. Thereafter, Black gets no chance to upset that lead.

Black 73. Connecting at 74 would be safe, but Black is looking for a place to resign. The black group is trapped after



Dia. 19



Dia. 20

White 74.

Dia. 20. If Black 1, White plays 2 to 6, making miai of 'a' and 'b'.

Black resigns after White 174.

Game Seventy: Shusaku v. Sakaguchi Sentoku (1858)
Castle Game Fourteen
Commentary by Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan

This was Sentoku's fourth encounter with Shusaku in the castle games and his fourth loss, but it was by far his best performance, featuring some innovative play in the fuseki.

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Black: Sakaguchi Sentoku 7-dan

Date: 17th November, 1858

231 moves. White wins by 3 points.





Figure 1 (1 – 25)

Figure 1 (1 – 25). An original fuseki

White 6. The mukai-komoku (3–4 point stones facing each other) formation was unusual in this period, though Shusaku often played it with white. It became very popular in the twentieth century.

Black 7. A standard Edo period move, to which the reader must be accustomed by now. However, Sentoku followed up with a new strategy designed to make the most effective use of the pressing move.

Black 9 aims at forcing White into a low position by pressing at 15. White is



Dia. 1

of course aware of that, but he still switches to the enclosure at 10. If White played 15, Black would play 'a', a move White wants to prevent.

Black 11. A move which is ahead of its time: the concept behind it is similar to the modern Chinese-style fuseki. This becomes clearer if one removes the 4–5 and 7–8 exchanges; the only difference is that Black 1 is not on the star-point. In a sense, Sentoku's pattern could even be considered an improvement on the Chinese-style fuseki, since he has greater thickness.

White 12. Essential, as 'b' would be a superb point for Black.

Black 13. Pressing at 15 would be the usual move, but Black is striving for greater efficiency. In this position, White will not counterattack with 1 in Dia. 1.

Dia. 1. If White 1, the standard taisha joseki to 9 would follow. If Black plays the simplest version of the joseki with 10, the moves to 18 would probably follow. White would now have a hard time finding a good continuation. Black 'a' would be severe, so forestalling it with

example —

Dia. 3. The peaceful move of 1 would be the standard extension on the right side. Black could also make the high move at 'a'; capping at 'b' would be an excellent follow-up, so White would play at 'b' himself, whereupon Black 'c' would stake out a nice position.


Dia. 4. The checking extension (tsume) of 1 is another good point. An alternative is Black 'a', aiming at capping next at 'b'; White would prevent that by jumping to 'b', whereupon Black could cap at 'c'. Yet another alternative to 1 is Black 'd', which would make the best balance on the left side. Black's follow-up would be converting the left side into territory with 'e'. Miyamoto comments that this is the strategy which he prefers.

White 22 forestalls Black 'c', which would make a nice formation on the side. If White plays 22 at 'd', Black will obviously cap at 'e'. White prefers to start a fight by invading.


White 24 is correct shape: White must play lightly inside Black's sphere of influence. Instead of 24 —

Dia. 5. Pushing up at 1 would be heavy. Black would counter with the nidanbane of 2 and 4, then strike at the vital point of 6, destroying White's shape. Black also has a sente move at 'a', so White would be in for a hard fight.


Black 25 is the key point. If White got a chance to play at 25, he would at once become immune to attack, while Black's group would lose its base and become



Dia. 2




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

White 'a' would be solid, but in practice White would find that much too slow. For this reason, White avoids the taisha altogether, simply attaching at 14 in the figure. If Black had played at 1 in Dia. 2 instead of 13, White would have played 2 and 4. In the figure White has been forced to crawl an extra space along the third line, which makes the result to 18 a little painful for him. His consolation is the nice location of 10 at the top.


Black 19 is an excellent enclosure, but there are other good points for Black. For




Dia. 5




Dia. 6




Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

weakened. Instead of 25 –

Dia. 6. (previous page). Black 1 is also a vital point for attack. White 2 is the worst response and leads to the same result as in Dia. 5.

Dia. 7. White might try dodging to 2, but Black can make a severe attack with 3. After the continuation to 11, the position is out of White's control. This is no good, so instead of 2 –

Dia. 8. White might try extending at 2, but after Black 3 and 5, he is in trouble again. (If White 'a', the position reverts to Dia. 7 with Black 'b'.)

Dia. 9. White's counter is the kosumi at 2. If Black 3 and 5, White makes good shape with 6 and 8. Instead of 5 –

Dia. 10. If Black 1 etc., White cuts at 6; if Black 'a', White captures three stones with 'b'.

The conclusion is that Black 25 is the best attacking move.

Figure 2 (26 – 69). Invasion and counter-invasion

White 26. The question arises here of what would happen if White played at 'a'.






Figure 2 (26 – 69)



Dia. 11




Dia. 12


Dia. 11. If White 1, Black 2 is bad, as White gets central thickness with 3. Black 2 is now peeping at a bamboo joint.

Dia. 12. The ogeima of Black 2 is the correct answer. If White 3, Black answers with 4 to 8, leisurely preparing to make an attack on White. Black has the sente move of 'a' up his sleeve. During the course of the battle Black would probably get a chance to expand his moyo with 'b' or 'c'. Note that because Black 'd' is sente, White cannot attempt to move through the gap here.

Black 29. If at 'b', White could attach at 'c'.



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

White 30. When White jumps out here, he gets a chance to catch his breath. It is too soon, however, to tell if his invasion has been a success: that will depend on whether or not this group comes under a severe attack later on.

Black 33 is the vital point for attacking the ogeima enclosure, but instead —


Dia. 13. Miyamoto comments that he would prefer to continue the attack with 1. White would probably answer at 2, but the continuation to 9 would be reasonable for Black. This attack would keep up the pressure on the invading group and White might find settling it far from easy.

White 34, a waiting move, is a flexible response to Black 33. Instead –

Dia. 14. Attacking with 1 is pointless, as Black will be happy to discard his stone and take the corner instead. After the sequence to 8, it becomes obvious that 1 would be better located at 'a'.

Black 35, which aims at 'd' and 'e', is aggressive. Black naturally does not want to switch immediately to the corner after White 34.

White 36. Superb timing. White intends to use this stone as a sacrifice to create forcing moves on the outside. Black has to go along with him with 39, for extending at 40 instead would give White an easy life in the corner. Having obtained his forcing move at 40, White puts the second stage of his plan into effect by attaching at 42. The continuation to 47 is forced and White succeeds in eliminating Black's connection at 'e'. Note that if Black played



Dia. 15

43 at 44, the continuation White 'f' – Black 46 – White 'g' would weaken the two black stones to the right.

White 52. An important point, threatening the black groups on both sides. Black reinforces with 53 and 55, setting up the contact play at 'h', then attacks at 57 in an attempt to wrest the overall initiative from White's hands.

White 58 follows the proverb, 'attach to settle a group'. Instead –

Dia. 15. White 1 would be bad. Black would make a severe attack with 2, forcing White 3, then press White hard with 4. If next White 'a', then Black 'b'; if instead White 'b', Black would cut at 'a' (he has a sente move at 'c').

Black 59. Sentoku has been playing conservatively so far, building up his strength, but now he turns to attack. Black 59 at 62 would just help White to make good shape with 61. In this case the proverb, 'answer the contact play with a hane', does not apply.

The continuation to 67 is forced. White loses two stones, but he has pulled out his group and has sente to attack at 68. Black might seem to have profited from his attack, but actually the game is very close.

Black 69. If omitted, White 'i' is severe; if Black 'j', White continues with 'k', taking territory while attacking.




Figure 3 (70 – 100)

Figure 3 (70 – 100). Forcing moves – when and when not to play them

White 74. Not at 'a', because of Black 75, White 'b', Black 'c'.

White 78 is an important point and has a big follow-up at 91. Imagine the difference if Black played at 78.


Black 81 builds nice thickness, but 82 seems to put White a little in the lead, so invading at 'd', after first forcing with Black 'e' – White 'f', seems preferable to 81. The continuation would be very difficult for Black, since White could aim at attacking the four black stones at the top or at exploiting Black's weakness at 81, but the position would not be easy for White either.

Black 85 is a big move, but Black could have made the 'e-f' exchange first.


Dia. 16. If the $\blacktriangle \triangle$ exchange has been made, Black does not have to worry about White 1, as 2 stops him from getting much territory at the bottom. If White 3, Black cuts with 4 and 6, so instead of 3 –

Dia. 17. White has to play at 1, but that gives Black the squeeze on the outside with 2 to 12.


White 90 is a calm move. White could



Dia. 16



Dia. 17



Dia. 18

move into Black's side territory with 1 to 5 in Dia. 18, but that would leave him with a weakness at 'a'. Black would switch to 6 anyway, so White would not profit much. Another factor is that the moment Black plays 91, White can play the 92–94 combination in sente.

Black 99. Black is hoping for a chance to attack White with the sequence in Dia. 19.

Figure 4 (101 – 155). A subtle threat

Black 3 looks an ordinary move, but secretly Black is aiming at attacking the white group below. If White neglects to





Figure 4 (101 – 155)

24: ko



Dia. 19

reinforce at 4 –

Dia. 19. Black will cut White into two with the sequence to 11, which he has been aiming at since he played 99 in the previous figure. Black ▲, by strengthening the black group, makes it difficult for White to link up with his other groups through the centre. When White already has a stone in place at 'a' (4 in the figure), Black's cut is not so much of a threat.

White 6, 8. If White played 8 first, Black might not answer 6 at 7.

White 26 and 28 defend indirectly against the cut in Dia. 19.

Black 37 again aims at Dia. 19. White 38 is an efficient way of defending against




Figure 5 (156 – 231)

118: ko; 128: connects

the cut.

Black 47. The last large point.

Figure 5 (156 – 231). A good performance by Sentoku

This was probably Shusaku's toughest castle game after the fourth and the tenth. Sentoku played well, especially in the fuseki, but he lacked the ability to land a decisive punch in the middle game. Shusaku played steadily, without starting any spectacular fights, and was content to overhaul his opponent little by little.

White wins by 3 points.

Game Seventy-One: Shusaku v. Ebizawa Kenzo (1859)

Ebizawa Kenzo (1842 – 1913), who is better known as Iwasaki Kenzo, was one of the leading players of the Meiji period, but as a child he had to overcome the handicap of a poverty-stricken background before he could make his way as a professional player. His family was so poor that he was put out for adoption, and when his adoptive parent died, he was compelled to become apprenticed to a greengrocer in Edo. Fortunately, his ability at go attracted the attention of a wealthy Yasui disciple, Yoshizawa Bunzo 2-dan, who became his patron and arranged for him to enter the Yasui school. He became shodan in 1857.

In 1859, when he was 3-dan, he visited Shusaku and asked for instruction. He had managed to save five ryo, which he offered to Shusaku as the game fee, but the latter, who had been impressed with his enthusiasm, was very reluctant to take the money. Ebizawa finally prevailed upon him with the argument that it would create a bad precedent if he took no payment. The two played a two-stone handicap jubango, which Ebizawa won 7–3. He then played three games (one on two stones and two on black) on the revised handicap of sen-ni, but lost all three.

Ebizawa was promoted to 5-dan in 1862 and developed into one of the leading players of the Yasui school. After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, however, when go players lost their government subsidies and had great trouble earning a living, he gave up professional go and for the next twenty-five years worked as a bureaucrat. During this period he became the heir to the Iwasaki family and changed his name. In 1887 he received a 6-dan diploma from the Hoensha and in 1892 he resigned his government post to become vice-president of the Hoensha. In 1899 he became its third president, succeeding Nakagawa Kamesaburo, and was promoted to 8-dan. He retired in 1912.

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

2 stones: Ebizawa Kenzo 3-dan

Date: 12th March, 1859 (Jubango Game 2)

137 moves. White wins by 3 points.

Commentary by Segoe Kensaku

Figure 1 (1 – 54). Black's deep invasion

Black 12. Better omitted when White has such a wide position at the bottom.

Black 18. A good move, but Black could also exchange 'a' for White 'b', then invade at 24.

Black 22. The less risky move at 24 would probably be good enough.

White 29 is unusual – 'c' is standard.

Black 46. Possible because Black 54 is sente (it threatens Black 'd', White 'e', Black 'f', White 'g', Black 'h', etc.).

Figure 2 (55 – 137). An abortive invasion

Black 62. Black 65, letting White con-




Figure 1 (1 – 54)

nect at 62, would be bad. White settles his group very cleverly up to 69.

Black 72. Black should first play 74,




Figure 2 (55 – 137)

forcing White to connect at 'a'. White's attack from 73 to 99 is very skilful and will repay study.

Black 104. If at 'b', White will live in the corner.

Black 116. The kosumi at 120 is better.

Black 120. Black would like to play at 121, but after White 'c', Black 120, White 'd', Black 'e', White would play at 'f', and the centre black group would be in trouble. Losing two stones up to 127 is bad for Black, but the game is not lost yet. Actually, Black could play 'e' in the sequence given above at 'f', but he perhaps feels that he can afford to give up two stones if he keeps sente.

The problem is what he did with his sente — Black 128 is the losing move. This stone is lost outright when White counters with 129 to 133, but Black 132 cannot be omitted, since White 'g' would kill the group. Black could have made better use of the aji in the corner by attaching at 'h'; that way he would still have had a chance.

Shusaku's calm and deliberate play in this game was very impressive.

Moves after 137 not recorded. White wins by 3 points.

Game Seventy-Two: Shusaku v. Ebizawa

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

2 stones: Ebizawa Kenzo 3-dan

Date: 1st May, 1859 (Jubango Game 7)

111 moves. Black resigns.

Commentary by Segoe Kensaku






Figure 1 (1 – 50)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Figure 1 (1 – 50). An unfavourable exchange

Black 10. Black should play at 18; if White answered at 'a', Black could then play at 10.

Black 12. The exchange for 13 is now considered bad for Black. Black cannot follow Dia. 1, because he cannot get a ladder with 'a' after 1 to 4, so he should hane at 1 in Dia. 2. If White cuts at 2, the joseki to 15 gives an even result, which is more than he gets in the game.

Black 14. Black 18 is still better.

Black 28. Black 'b' would be better.

Black 30. I would prefer to press at 'c'; the group at the top is safe enough.

Game Seventy-Three: Shusaku v. Ebizawa




Figure 2 (51 – 111)

Figure 2 (51 – 111). Destruction of a moyo

Black 72 is large-scale, but Black cannot expect to take all this territory; playing at 'a' would be better.


White 73 aims at cutting at 'b'.

Black 74. I would prefer to play at 'c'.


Black 86. Perhaps the losing move; Black should block at 92, since he has to play there later anyway.

Black 110. Black could capture the group at the bottom with 111, but White would destroy the centre territory. If Black answers White 111 at 1 in Dia. 3, White cuts off the three stones above; if instead Black plays 1 in Dia. 4, White forces with 2 to 8 and can live.

Black resigns after White 111.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

2 stones: Ebizawa Kenzo 3-dan

Date: 22nd May, 1859 (Jubango, Game 9)
168 moves. White resigns.

This is one of Ebizawa's best games from the series. Right from the beginning, with his invasion at 24, he seized the initiative and held on to it throughout.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)




Figure 2 (101 – 168)

20: connects

Game Seventy-Four: Shusaku v. Ito Showa (1859)
Castle Game Fifteen
Commentary by Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan

This is Shusaku's fourth castle game against Showa and the third in which he held black. It is another good, solid win for him.

White: Ito Showa 7-dan
Black: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan
Date: 17th November, 1859
235 moves. Black wins by 9 points.




Figure 1 (1 – 41)


Figure 1 (1 – 41). Showa's light play

White 10. Common now, but a little unusual in the Edo period.


White 12. If at 'a', Black will make a pincer at 12 or 'b'. White 12 aims at playing 'c', after which White could invade at 'd'. If White's stones at the bottom right are reinforced, he might be able to invade at 'd' without playing 'c'.

White 14 is superior to a pincer at 'e'. If Black plays 15 at 20, 'e' or 24 will be perfect for White, while if Black 'e', White 20 is just right.

Black 15 is an interesting strategy. If



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

White answers at 2 and 4 in Dia. 1, Black intends to extend to 5. However, if the Black 1 – White 2 exchange in Dia. 2 were made first, White would counterattack with 4 and 6, leading to a disadvantageous fight for Black.

White 18. Played to take sente. Also, if White played the joseki move at 31, White's overall position at the top would be too low. White does not mind if Black plays 31, because 4 and 12 are solid.

Black 21, 23. Black is sealed in the corner, but he is satisfied, since Black 11 counteracts White's outside influence.

White 28. A light move, typical of Showa. The joseki move is 'f', but then Black would continue his attack with 'g', which at the same time would erase White's moyo potential on the left.

White 34. If at 'h', Black will continue with 'i' or 'j'.

White 38. If omitted, Black 'k'.

Black 41. A nice, unhurried move. Black has to play something here, since 'l' (aiming next at 'g') would be an excellent move for White, but if he played at 'm', White would counterattack at 'n'.





Figure 2 (42 – 100)




Dia. 3

Figure 2 (42 – 100). Fight to control the centre


Black 45. The only move: Black reduces White's moyo and also aims at the sequence in Dia. 3.

Dia. 3. If White 2, Black cuts at 3 and destroys White's moyo. The hane at 11 is important, because it ensures life in the corner by preventing White from crossing underneath after 15. Note that Black 1 does not aim at the petty invasion at 'a'. White has to take gote with 46 to 50 in the figure to defend against this sequence. This is the Achilles' heel in his moyo strategy.

Black 51, played the moment White has strengthened himself on the left, is perfectly timed. Answering at 55 would be too submissive for White, while if he



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

plays 54 at 58, Black 54 would pose a threat to the white group on the right.

Black 63. Black 'a' might appear mandatory, but it is only worth fifteen points, while White 'b' would be worth much more. Continuing the attack with 63 makes good use of the aji of 61.

White 66. Necessary because of the weak point at 'c'.

Black 67. Correct shape – giving atari at 'b' would be bad.

Black 69. Black 'd' would have little effect on White.

White 72. White's main aim is to settle his group, but he is also looking for a chance to counterattack around 'e' or 'f'.

White 82. Another good move by Shōwa. The usual idea would be White 1 in Dia. 4, but that would let Black strengthen himself on both sides with 2 and 4. White 1 is purely defensive, so White would fall behind. Note that instead of 4 –

Dia. 5. Black 4 looks good, but it gives White the chance to attack at 'a' or 'b'. Black also has a weakness at 'c', so playing this way would be risky.

Black 87. White's cut at 90 is big, but if Black connected there, White would reduce Black's territory in sente with White 'f', Black 'g', White 89, Black 'h'. Black is playing very solidly.

White 96. If at 'i', Black 'j' or 'k' will be sente.

White 100. White does not have perfect eye-shape yet, but there is still plenty of aji on the outside, so he is in no danger of being captured.




Figure 3 (101 – 142)

Figure 3 (101 – 142). The endgame begins.

Black 15. Black 38 would also be big, but Black is planning to attack White. The latter promptly reinforces with 18 and 20. If Black omits 21 –

Dia. 6. White can cut at 1; if Black 2 to 6, White plays 7, threatening to make the placement at ‘a’. That gives Black very bad aji.


White 24 is a clever yose move. Black cannot answer at 2 in *Dia. 7* because of White 3. Note, however, that if White first exchanges 1 for Black 2 in *Dia. 8*, Black can capture with 4.

White 30 aims next at ‘a’; White ‘b’ would be slack. If White does nothing here, Black can play 1 to 7 in *Dia. 9* in sente. Playing 24 and 28 in the figure commits White to making territory here.


Black 31 sets up a hane at 41. Black ‘a’ instead would be slack.

Black 33 prevents White ‘c’, Black ‘d’, White 33.


White 38, 40. Worth about 15 points.




Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8




Dia. 9

Black 41. *Miai* with the top right corner.

White 42 is a probe; even without this stone, White’s group is alive.

Dia. 10. If Black wants to try to kill White, he has to attack with 1 to 5, but White 6, which threatens ‘a’, secures a connection to the top. However, if at some stage Black plays a stone around 6, White will have to add a stone to complete his eye-shape.

White 42 nips the attack in *Dia. 10* in the bud, but it also has another purpose.



Dia. 10





Figure 4 (143 – 200)



Dia. 11

Figure 4 (143 – 200). An uneventful finish

Black 43. If omitted, White can set up a serious ko with 1 to 9 in Dia. 11. Black must feel that connecting at 78 would be submissive.

White 48. If Black were allowed to play here, he would get a large territory with 84 and 'a'.

White 50 is correct. If at 'b', Black can continue with 96, White 'c', Black 'd', White 50.

Black 51 forestalls White 51.

Black 55. Black 'e' would be submissive.

Black 61. White 'f' would be big.

Figure 5 (201 – 235). A wide margin

White made no really bad moves in this game, yet he fell short by nine points. Perhaps the problem lay in his fuseki strategy in the bottom left corner. His




Figure 5 (201 – 235)

ko (at 14): 17, 20, 23, 26, 29

35: connects (beneath 9)

Black wins and connects the ko.

policy of building central thickness which was nullified by the stone already in place on the bottom right seems to have been misguided. Black's bold play with 63 etc. in Figure 2 made his lead secure.

Black wins by 9 points.

Like Yasui Sanchi and Sakaguchi Sentoku, the other two members of the Tempo Top Four to play in the castle games, Shōwa played Shusaku four times and recorded four losses. His overall results were nine wins to ten losses. He was the only member of the Tempo Top Four to survive the Meiji Restoration (he died in 1878 at the age of seventy-seven) and around 1874 he was promoted to 8-dan. His was truly a life devoted to go and for half a century he was one of the pillars of the go world.

Game Seventy-Five: Shusaku v. Hattori Seitetsu (1859)
Castle Game Sixteen
Commentary by Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan

This was the first year since 1853 that o-konomi games were played. Shusaku's opponent was the heir of the Hattori house, which ranked immediately below the top four houses. Seitetsu (1819 – 60) was originally a disciple of Gennan Inseki, who thought so highly of his talent that he wanted to make him the Inoue heir. He was forced to give up the idea because of Seitetsu's dissolute behavior, but he did have him made heir to the collateral Hattori house. Gennan commented: 'Although his conduct is reprehensible, I cannot bear to see his talent go to waste.' Seitetsu was apparently a popular character, and his go ability was also highly regarded. He participated in the castle games for the first time in 1859, when he was promoted to 7-dan, but he had an unlucky draw. In his official game he played Shuwa on black and was forced to resign after exactly one hundred moves, then he had to take white in this game against Shusaku. These were the only castle games he had a chance to play, for he died the following year.

White: Hattori Seitetsu 7-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Date: 17th November, 1859

248 moves. Black wins by 13 points.

Figure 1 (1 – 25). A painful choice

Black 11 – 17. Black plays for centre thickness. White 16 is a little unusual, the standard move being on the third line at 'a'. Instead of 16 –


Dia. 1. White 1 and 3 are not very good. Black 4 and 6 leave White with bad aji in the corner, as Black can block at 'a', threatening Black 'b'.

Black 19 and White 20 are miai.

White 22 is natural, as Black 21 aims at a pincer around 'b'.

Black 23. If White 16 were at 'a', Black would just press at 25.

White 24. If at 1 in Dia. 2, Black has



Dia. 1





Figure 1 (1 – 25)



Dia. 2

a severe continuation at 2, threatening Black 'a'. White would be forced to defend at 3. White plays 24 in the figure to avoid this result, but since that gives

Black a superb move at 25, it might have been better to follow Dia. 2.




Figure 2 (26 – 42)

Figure 2 (26 – 42). Submarine attack

White 30. White is not alive at the top, but Black cannot attack because of his weakness at 'a'. For example –


Dia. 3. If Black tries to kill White with 1, White counters with 2 to 6, then plays 8. If Black 9, White is able to break out with 10 to 14. If Black plays 5 at 6, White lives with White 'a', Black 14, White 5.

Black 31. If at 1 in Dia. 4, the continuation to 8 erases Black's thickness at the top. If instead Black attaches at 1 in Dia. 5, the continuation to 8 once again sees White heading towards the top. In these two diagrams Black is developing in the wrong direction.


White 32 is aggressive: White is still trying to counteract Black's thickness at the top.

Black 33. If at 'b', White 'c' will be sente.


White 34 is a striking move. White obviously feels that answering at 1 in Dia. 6 would be following Black's orders. Black 2 and 4 would be sente, so Black would be




Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

able to attack at 6 next. Since White is handicapped by his weakness at the top, he would prefer to avoid getting into a fight on the left side.

Black 35. Black is right not to worry too much about White 34; if Black 'd', White 36 and vice versa, neither result being of much help to Black. Simply blocking at 35 is best.

Black 37 is the best continuation. White has had his way in the bottom left corner, but at the cost of losing sente. If Black followed Dia. 7, White would live easily, and Black would be left with a cutting point.

White 38. White develops towards the centre while also offering encouragement from a distance to White Δ . He wants to probe Black's intentions before trying to escape with 42. Black's response is to aim at a double attack with 41: he wants White to play 'e', provoking Black 'f'. White of course cannot delay moving



Dia. 7

out with 42 any longer. The interesting feature of the fighting here is the way both players are switching to and fro, not deigning to answer the opponent immediately.




Figure 3 (43 – 56)

Figure 3 (43 – 56). Complications


Black 45 is a superb extension which seems to menace the whole board. Black must have felt pleased with the development of the game when he played here.

White 46 is indispensable — a move there by Black would be ideal, expanding his territory while attacking.


White 48, giving Black a helping push from behind, is not usually a good move, but in this case, if Black extends at 1 in Dia. 8, White intends to hane at 2. If Black 3, he has no good answer to White 4. He could of course eke out life with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', but that would hardly be a good result for him.

Black 49. Black 'a' would be most solid, but it would be purely defensive, having no effect on the opponent. Black 49 manages to attack White while defending against White 'a'.


Dia. 9. If White hanes at 1, Black dodges



Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

with 2, and there is little that White can do.

White 50. This hane, the vital point for leading Black into damezumari, revives the threat of White 'a'. If Black omits 51 —

Dia. 10. Black 2 is no longer an adequate answer to White 1, as White's atari at 3 unravels Black's whole position up to 13. Once Black has defended at 51 in the figure, he can refute White 1 by blocking at 5.

The fighting focussed on the hane at 'a' comes to a pause with Black 51. White is satisfied with having occupied the key point of 50 while under attack. Seitei has demonstrated that he is a fighter worthy of respect.

White reinforces his group with 52 and 56, then launches a bold attack in the centre with 56. Considering the remaining weaknesses in his own position, this attempt to surround Black requires some courage.




Figure 4 (57 – 80)

Figure 4 (57 – 80). An unusual exchange

White 62. Extending at 71, permitting Black 'a', is out of the question.


Black 63. Black 67, giving White a double atari, seems even more out of the question, so Black seems to be in trouble. However, after some preparation, Black boldly gives White the double atari.

White 64 is the only move. White cannot connect at 65, as Black would just make the ponnuki at 71.


Black 67. With his preparations completed, Black finally makes the move which has been the focus of the fighting here. Inviting the double atari may seem foolhardy, but Black has worked out a counter. The alternative to 67 would be hastening to take territory at the bottom with 1 in Dia. 11. However, White would force with 2, then extend at 4, isolating Black's centre stones. This would not be satisfactory for Black.

Black 69 is the crucial follow-up move which makes 67 possible. Needless to say, Black 72 – White 'a' would be bad.

White 70. If at 1 in Dia. 12, Black attacks with 2 and 4. Although the ponnuki would be a gain for White, his group at the bottom would be in bad trouble.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

In particular, the exchange of 69 in the figure for White 1 in this diagram would be a straight-out gain for Black, while he would still have an atari at 'a' in the diagram.

White 70 is a tesuji. If Black answers at 74, then White defends against the cut in sente with White 'b' – Black 'c', so he would be able to continue with White 72, Black 73, White 'd'. This result would be painful for Black, so he prefers to capture at 71.

A most unusual exchange follows, with both sides capturing two stones. Since this result is quite satisfactory for Black, however, one has to conclude that White's attack at 56 in Figure 3 has not been successful.

Black 75. Necessary to prevent White from playing at 75 to cut off Black's centre ponnuki. Black 75 also aims at Black 'e', so White is finally forced to defend with 76. The first stage of the game has come to a close, with the two main problem points – Black 67 and the top left corner – being resolved in quick succession.




Figure 5 (81 – 131)

Figure 5 (81 – 131). The decisive clash

Black 81. Preventing White 83, which would be sente. White 82 to 88 are necessary, as Black 'a' would take away White's second eye.

White 90 – 94. Preparation for the cut at 96. Playing a ko with 93 at 94 would be unreasonable for Black, as White 93 would threaten White 'b' next.

Black 95. A key point for either side.


White 98. Also a key point for either side.

White 102. If omitted, Black has a severe move at 1 in Dia. 13. White 2 to 6 there are forced, so Black would be able to seal White in on the side with 7 and 9.

Black 103. Another key point for either side.

Black 105. If at 'c', White 105 would make it difficult for Black to get eye-shape. Black has to give way with 105 and 107.

Black 109. Even though he is ahead, Black still plays the severest move. Black 109 threatens to cut off White 108 with a move around 'd', but meekly defending there would not be good enough for White. Instead he counterattacks with 110




Dia. 13


and 112, trying to break into the centre. The fight here will decide the game. Black has to save his group on the top right while keeping as much as possible of his centre territory intact.

Black 115. Giving atari here before capturing with 117 is important. If Black omits 115, playing 117 immediately, White would break into his territory with White 118, Black 119, White 120.

White 130. White could save his two stones with 1 in Dia. 14, but the problem is that Black would live in sente with 6 to 12. That would not be good enough.



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

Black 131. Cutting here is correct. Black has to resist the temptation to cut at 1 in Dia. 15, as White would spring a trap with 2 to 6.




Figure 6 (132 – 160)

Figure 6 (132 – 160). White's final challenge

Black has been quite successful in keeping White out of his large centre territory to the left, so pushing down at 34 is White's last chance. He has to take a lot of profit on the right to stay in the game, but Black has a counter prepared. His hane at 37 is a clever move which decides the game. The best that White can do is to cut at 38, but Black forces a trade with 39 etc. Note that the peep at 35 was made in preparation for the hane at 43.

The result to 55 settles the game. So far from catching up, White has in fact fallen behind in this fight. Although he plays it out to the bitter end, he could hardly hope for any further opportunity to create complications.

The most impressive feature of this game was the precision of Shusaku's reading. Poor Seitetsu found himself outmanoeuvred at every turn. Although quite a respectable player, taking white against Shusaku was asking too much of him.

Black wins by 13 points.




Figure 7 (161 – 200)




Figure 8 (201 – 248)

48: at 37

Game Seventy-Six: Shusaku v. Hayashi Yubi (1860)
Castle Game Seventeen
Commentary by Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan

Hayashi Yubi (1832 – 62) was the heir to the 12th Hayashi, Hakuei Monnyu. His real name was Takashio Keiji and he became the Hayashi heir in 1856, when he was 5-dan. He did not have a chance to become head of the house, for he died in August 1862 while traveling in the Echigo (modern Niigata) region. He played six castle games, of which he won two.

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan
Black: Hayashi Yubi 6-dan
Date: 8th December, 1860
276 moves. White wins by 4 points.




Figure 1 (1 – 23)

Figure 1 (1 – 23). A dubious move


The moves to 8 are the same as in Shusaku's game against Sentoku in 1858.

Black 11. White 12 is a perfect splitting move (wariuchi), so perhaps Black should play 11 at 12; if White answered at 11, extending to 19 would give Black an excellent position.

Black 13. The correct direction – Black 'a', permitting White 'b', would be bad.

White 16 forestalls Black 'c'.

White 20 is a thick move. The usual move is the pincer at 1 in Dia. 1. If



Black 2, White has to play 3, then if Black 4, White 5 is necessary to prevent Black 'a'. Black next presses at 6, and White's moyo potential vanishes.

Black 21. The usual move is jumping to 23, but Yubi must have had a reason for not playing there.

Dia. 2. If Black 1, White might play 2 and 4. If Black 5, the sequence to 12 is one possibility. Black might be dissatisfied because his group is still unsettled. Instead of 5 –

Dia. 3. Black could try jumping to 1. If 2 to 6, Black could jump out again to 7. White might continue with 8 to 16, but 17 would give Black a reasonable position. This result would be better for Black than what happens in the game.




Figure 2 (24 – 79)

Figure 2 (24 – 79). Attacking the moyo

White 24 is a strong move which perhaps Black overlooked. The simple extension of 1 in Dia. 4 would give Black a good move at 2, but that would be hoping for too much.


Black 25. Black cannot resist. Black 2 in Dia. 5 is sometimes a tesuji, but here the continuation to 13 is good for White because of the Δ stone. Black has no choice about crawling along the second line with 25 and 27, but being sealed in on the side like this is painful. Some of Black's lead from having the first move has already been whittled away.

White 30. Black 30 would create good follow-up moves at 'a' and 'b'.


White 32, which forestalls Black 'c', is a superb point for expanding White's moyo. However, Black's response at 33 is equally good, for it attacks the two white stones as well as building up Black's moyo.

Black 35. Black 'd' would leave some bad aji in the corner.


White 36 leads to a fight. The peaceful move is White 1 in Dia. 6. Black would probably play 2, but White could encroach upon the moyo with 'a'. If Black attacked




Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6




Dia. 7

at 'b', White could exchange 'c' for Black 'd', then hane out at 'e'. He would also have the aji of 'f', so this would be a reasonable game.


Black 37 and 39 are severe. The latter move looks like bad style, since the result is equivalent to letting White make a hane at the head of two stones, but here it is the only move. Instead of 37 –

Dia. 7. If Black 1, the continuation to 8 is forced; next, Black 9 is severe, but 10 is a strong answer. Black can cut at 11, but he does not gain much, for the threat of the ko at 'a' means that Black cannot cut at 'b'.



White 40 is the only move, though it lets Black make a very severe peep at 41. If White played 40 at 1 in Dia. 8, Black would force with 2 and 4, then close off his moyo with 6. This result would be much better for Black than Dia. 6.



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

Dia. 11
8: ko

Dia. 12

a large moyo. The game would be decided by Black's success in reducing this moyo.

White 56. White seems to be in trouble, but it is in this kind of position that one gets a glimpse of Shusaku's real strength. He begins with a tricky forcing move at 58.


Dia. 11. If Black carelessly answers at 2, White sets up a ko with 3 to 7. He has an ideal ko threat at 9, so Black collapses.

Black 63. The only other possibility is Black 68, but that would be wrong.

Dia. 12. If Black 1, White cuts at 4, then at 6; if Black tries to save his two stones with 7, White plays 8 to 12, forces with 14 and 16, then sets up a ladder with 18. Black 63 is therefore the only move.

White 64, 66. These forcing moves make it clear that White is planning to sacrifice his five stones. With 68 to 76, he is able to lay waste to Black's top area in sente, so his aggressive strategy with 48 and 50 has been a success. Shusaku's handling of this fight demonstrates his skill at sabaki and his flexibility. However, capturing the five stones has made Black thick, so the game is even.

White uses his sente to reinforce at 78. When Black pushes at 79, the second round of the game begins. Despite 78, Black is still aiming at the white group.



Dia. 10

When Black takes away White's base with 41 to 47, cutting with 48 and 50 is natural. Fleeing ignominiously with 48 at 'e' would let Black reinforce at 55. White's cut at 50 starts a perilous fight in which he seems to be fighting against the odds.

Black 53 is a surprising tesuji. If White answers at 55, Black walls off his moyo with 54, so White 54 is forced. Instead of 53 –

Dia. 9. Black could also play the more commonplace move of 1. If White simply extends to 2, Black keeps on pushing out with 3 to 9, then switches to 11, capturing the white group on the side. To avoid this –

Dia. 10. White would hane at 2. If Black cuts at 3, the sequence to 22 is one hypothetical continuation. Black takes considerable profit, but White gets quite





Figure 3 (80 – 105)

87: ko



Dia. 13

Figure 3 (80 – 105). A premature attack?


White 80. White 103 would be bad because of Black 81, White 86, Black 'a'.

Black 81. If at 'b', White will be happy to play 103.


White 82. White 2 in Dia. 13 would be bad. Black would force with 3 and 5, then play 7, creating a very difficult position for White. In addition to looking after his group at the bottom left, he would have to prevent Black from destroying his moyo on the right and he would also have to worry about his group above, with its weak point at 'a'.

Black 83. If at 84, White would play 86, giving Black an inferior result to that in Dia. 13.


White 88. White 'a' would still be bad because of Black 103, White 88, Black 'c'.




Dia. 14



Dia. 15



Dia. 16



Dia. 17

Black 89. Now that Black has strengthened himself sufficiently at the bottom, he strikes at the vital point of 89. This is certainly a severe move, but simply capturing at 'a' would be good enough. Also, if he is going to play 89, making a probe at 'd' first would be a good idea.

Dia. 14. If Black 1, White would probably reinforce at 2. Black could then invade the corner at 3; if White 4, Black could

play 5 to 9, then continue with the strong move of 11, challenging White to a ko with White 'a', Black 'b'. Instead of

Dia. 15. If White 2, 3 to 6 would follow; next, Black could play the tesuji of 7, enabling him to destroy White's area at the bottom.

There are other variations besides these two diagrams, but they should all be feasible for Black. As another possibility for

Dia. 16. The probe at 1 would be an interesting move. If White 2, Black could push through at 3, then attack at 5. White would be in considerable danger, so —

Dia. 17. He might defend at 2, but then Black would be able to break into the right side moyo with 3. Intercepting with 4 and 6 would be unreasonable; Black would get good shape with 5 to 15 and would be in no danger.


Attacking with 89 seems to have been a little premature. Once White has played 90, he will no longer answer Black 98 at 'e'. The probe at 'd' has also lost its effectiveness.

Dia. 18. If Black 1, White can now cut with 2 and 4, thanks to the Δ stone. Black would have to capture at 5, so White would be able to solidify his right side territory with 6 and 8. If Black later plays 'a', White easily saves his group with 'b'.


Black 91 shows Black's appreciation of the possibility of a counterattack against 1 in Dia. 18, but in itself it is a dubious move, for White profits by the exchange for 92. Black will have to inflict some damage on one of the white groups to gain compensation. Incidentally, 91 passed up Black's last chance of capturing at 'a'.

White 100. So long as Black cannot connect at 'f', White is safe.


Dia. 19. If Black 1, White easily links up with 2 to 6. All Black has achieved is to create cutting points in his position



Dia. 18



Dia. 19




Dia. 20

at 'a' and 'b'.


White 104. Necessary after Black 101 and 103. If White plays 104 at 105 —

Dia. 20. White can play 1, but he cannot answer 2 at 3. If he does, Black can connect at 4. White may resist with 5 to 11, but after 12 —

Dia. 21 (next page). Cutting at 13 is the only move, but when Black connects at 16, pushing out with 17 etc. is obviously doomed to failure. Even if White gets a semeai, his own group is very short of liberties — Black will throw in at 'a', then wedge in at 'b'. In view of this, reinforcing with 104 in the figure is the wisest course, even though Black 105 seems troublesome.



Dia. 21



Dia. 22




Figure 4 (106 – 150)


ko: 11, 14, 23, 26; 28: connects the ko

Figure 4 (106 – 150). *Black is outmanoeuvred in the ko.*


Black has put the white group at the bottom into ko, so his attack in the previous figure might seem to have been a success, but it all depends on how well Black does in this ko fight.

White 8. More efficient than 50.

Black 13. If Black finishes off the ko with 'a' in the figure, White will play 1 and 3 in Dia. 22, then attach at 5. If Black 6, White 7 is severe; if Black cuts at 8, White hits him with the 9 – 11 combination, which brings his captured stones back to life and cuts off a black group. Note that if White plays 13 at 'a', Black can play 'b'. Instead of 1 –



Dia. 23



Dia. 24


Dia. 23. White 1 and 3 are bad, as Black cuts at 4.

Dia. 24. White 3 is answered by the te-suji of 4. White cannot play 'b' because of Black's atari at 'a'.

White 16 is a clever answer to 15. Cutting at 50 is the safety-first move, but White has his eye on the weak points in Black's encircling net. He hopes to be able to dispense with 50.

Black 17. The fighting move. If Black connected at 1 in Dia. 25, White would be able to escape with 2 to 6. Black 7 would be unreasonable because of White 8, while if Black played 7 at 'a', White would escape with 'b'.

White creates some aji with 18 and 20, then cuts at 22. Black has little choice but to answer at 23: he cannot play Black 24, White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', because



Dia. 25

of his own shortage of liberties. When White recaptures the ko with 26, his problems with this group are over: Black does not have the time to continue with the ko, because White is threatening to play at 'd'.

Black 31. If omitted, Black would lose his eye-shape after White 31, Black 'e', White 'f'. Forcing Black to defend here means that White has managed to settle both his weak groups in sente. This gives him the lead.

White 36 – 42. White's reinforcement at 32 enables him to make the strongest counters to Black's invasion. However, he cannot have his own way in everything: he has to submit to Black's forcing moves at 43 and 45. Black is aiming at the contact play at 'g', but he cannot play there yet (see Dia. 26).

Figure 5 (151 – 200). Black's threat

Black 59 revives the threat of Black 'a'.

Dia. 26. If Black plays 1 before the addition of the Δ stone, White had a counter with 2 to 6. Now, however, Black can play 7 in sente, then cut at the bottom at 9. If White tries to escape, Black Δ and 7 are in just the right place to stop him dead in his tracks. White is forced to defend with 60 and 62 in the figure.

Black 85 aims at attacking the white group at the top. White 92 is an indirect defence. If Black attacks White's eye-





Figure 5 (151 – 200)




Dia. 26

shape with Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White can save his group with 'e'.

White 96 defends against Black 'f'.

White 98 is necessary. If omitted, Black can set up a ko with 1 to 7 in Dia. 27.



Dia. 27




Figure 6 (201 – 276)

8: retakes; 9, 12, 15: ko; 50: retakes; 57: atari (above 1); 58: connects (at 7); 59: connects (left of 3); 76: ko (at 44); White wins and connects the ko.

Figure 6 (201 – 276). Shusaku's brilliant shinogi

Black 3, 5. A desperation measure. White responds cautiously, securing his eye-shape with 16. After that there is nothing Black can do.

The feature of this game was the cleverness with which Shusaku parried the successive attacks launched by Yubi. The skill he displayed at shinogi makes this a model game for white.

White wins by 4 points.

Sakaguchi Sentoku v. Showa


Here is another game from the 1860 o-shiro-go. Sentoku performed badly against Shusaku, but he did have his moments. This game starts as a peaceful exercise in moyo-reducing, but Sentoku turns it into a lethal three-way attack.

White: Ito Showa 7-dan

Black : Sakaguchi Sentoku 7-dan

Date: 8th December, 1860. Played at Edo Castle. 145 moves. White resigns.

Figure 1. Black 13 is a new move, but,



Game Seventy-Seven: Shusaku v. Shuho (1861)

Murase Shuho, the greatest player of the late nineteenth century, had the good fortune to receive intensive instruction from both Shusaku and Shuwa; he played a total of thirty-eight recorded games with the former and fifty with the latter. In 1861 he played a famous jubango on josen with Shusaku, and his performance indicated that he was just about ready to play him on equal terms. Shuwa must have been very pleased with the progress of the player he thought of as the prospective heir to Shusaku. The results of the jubango are as follows:

Game 1 (April 8). Shusaku by 6 points.
 Game 2 (April 25). Shuho won by resig.
 Game 3 (August 21). Shuho by 2 points.
 Game 4 (September 3). Shuho by 1 point.
 Game 5 (September 12). Jigo.

Shuho won the jubango 6–3–1 jigo and just needed one more win on black to go to sen-ai-sen against Shusaku, but he never had the chance to play this extra game. Incidentally, apart from the 1861 castle games, the above games are the only ones played by Shusaku in the last year of his life.

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Black: Murase Shuho 6-dan

Date: 8th April, 1861 (Jubango Game 1)
 272 moves. White wins by 6 points.

*Commentary by Sekiyama Riichi 9-dan,
 with reference to a commentary by Shuho*

Figure 1 (1 – 38). Taisha variation

Black 9. Black could exchange 'a' for White 'b', then make the pincer at 9.

White 10. White 'c' is now more common.

Black 21. Black could also follow the usual joseki with 'd'. Black is only obliged to play 21 and 23 when the ladder is unfavourable.

Dia. 1. If White plays 4 after 1 to 3 in the standard joseki, Black is in trouble if the ladder at 'a' is unfavourable (in this game it is favourable for Black). Instead of 7 –

Dia. 2. If Black counters with 1, White plays a famous sacrifice-and-squeeze tesuji.

White 28. The same move as Shusaku played in his 1856 castle game with Showa.

Black 29, 31. Black's aim is to use this attack to fix up his shape. The usual move would be 29 at 'e' or 'f'. White 34 is a

Game 6 (September 29). Shusaku by 3 points.
 Game 7 (October 5, 18). Shuho by 1 point.
 Game 8 (October 7). Shusaku won by resig.
 Game 9 (October 28) Shuho won by resig.
 Game 10 (November 7). Shuho won by resig.






Figure 1 (1 – 38)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2 10 at 2,
 11 takes, 13 connects
 severe counter – connecting at 35 would be submissive.





Figure 2 (39 – 81)



Dia. 3

Figure 2 (39 – 81). Black's mistake in strategy

Black 39. Shuhō: ‘At first I thought that Black 39 was a good move, as it creates the possibility of a ko after 41 (i.e. Black ‘a’, aiming next at ‘b’), but on reflection I realised that taking sente with ‘c’ would have been better.’ Black ‘c’ would probably lead to the sequence in Dia. 3, in which Black develops more rapidly than in the game.

Black 45. Shuhō also regretted this move; the continuation to 49 gives Black the lead in territory, but it makes White too thick in the centre. Shuhō commented that he should have been satisfied with the standard move at ‘d’.

Black 51 prevents White ‘e’, but Black should first play a probe at ‘f’; if White answered at ‘g’, he could then play 51. White 56, making a clean capture of the black stone, is very big. If the Black ‘f’–White ‘g’ exchange had been made, Black

would have a lot of aji even if White attached at ‘h’.

White 56. White can tenuki in the centre because of his thickness on the left. With 56, White gets ideal shape on the right side and also draws level with Black in territory.

Black 57 and 59 make Black thick, but White takes the lead when he plays 60. Shuhō: ‘Black 57 and 59 are slack... Black should play 57 at 60.’


Black 61. Black has to invade: Black 70 would be too narrow, and Black ‘i’ would be too close to 49 and would also give White a good answer at ‘j’.

Black 63. Black usually plays 65 first, then plays 63 when White plays 64. Black 63 gives White the chance to switch to 1 in Dias. 4 and 5; whether Black hanes on the second or the fifth line, White gets a reasonable result. Black perhaps decided not to play 65 first because he did not want to let White follow Dia. 6.


White 68. White wants to settle his group as quickly as possible. If he makes the usual move, White 74, Black will play ‘k’, driving White towards his strong centre position.

Black 69. Shuhō thought that this move would cause White a lot of trouble and was taken aback when the simple connection at 70 proved to be an effective counter. White easily parries the attack up to 76.


White 78 offers some support to the group at the top. Black attaches at 81 in



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

the hope of engineering a double attack.





Figure 3 (82 – 130)

Figure 3 (82 – 130). White's centre sacrifice


Black 87. Playing at 88 would be safer, but Black must have felt that it would be slack. White would probably just give atari at 'a', then defend at 'b', forgetting about his two stones (78 and 82). When Black cuts at 87 first, fighting spirit demands that White play 88 and 90 even if these stones are captured later.

Black 95. A difficult point. If Black plays at 96, the simple answer for White would be to block at 'c' and make the cuts at 'd' and 99 miai. Answering with the cut at 'd' would be more complicated.


Dia. 7. If White forces with 2, then cuts at 4, the continuation to 8 is likely. If Black plays 'a' next, White easily links up with White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f'. However, the position is not so simple, because Black might play the Black 'g-h' combination, which is sente against the white group on the side, instead of 'a'. That makes it very hard to predict just what would



Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

happen after White 8.

When Black plays 95, the continuation to 100 is forced. This settles the centre white group, so Black switches to the top again. However, White 102 and 104 ensure that at the worst White can get a seki.

Black 105. Shuho commented that to have a chance of winning, he should have played the larger-scale move of 107. When Black plays 105, White can afford to sacrifice his centre stones. Another possibility for 105 would be attacking with 1 in Dia. 8.

Dia. 8. If Black 1, White would counter with 2 to 6, leading to an extremely difficult fight. There are so many variations that predicting the outcome would be impossible.

White 118 is the vital point: Black has to submit with 119 to 123.

Black 129 is dubious: Black should slide into the top left corner with 'e'. If White captured at 130, Black would continue with 'f', so White would have to answer 'e' with the sequence in Dia. 9. After

Black 9, White would probably switch to 130 in the figure to eliminate the threat of the ko, but Black would be left with the large move at 'a' in the diagram, so he would get a better result than in the game. If White did answer at 'a', playing 1 to 9 in sente would obviously be a big gain for Black.




Figure 4 (131 – 200)

ko: 36, 39, 42, 45; ko (at 52): 67, 70, 73, 76, 79, 82, 85, 88, 91, 94, 97, 100

Figure 4 (131 – 200). No profit from the ko

Black gains very little from the ko fight; White does not mind giving way with 48, since he has taken profit with 46. Black could not hope to win the large-scale




Figure 5 (201 – 272)

ko: 6, 9, 14, 21, 26, 29, 32, 35, 46, 49; 53: connects ko

ko ensuing if he played 47 at 48.

Black 69. If omitted, White 69, Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f'.

Figure 5 (201 – 272). A masterful win

White 36. White is prepared to cede the ko at the top, for Black 72 is no longer a threat after White 28.

Judging by his play in this game, Shuhō had still not reached maturity. Apart from his severe attack with 81 in Figure 2, the honours in this encounter went to Shusaku.

White wins by 6 points.

Game Seventy-Eight: Shusaku v. Shuhō (1861)

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Black: Murase Shuhō 6-dan

Date: 29th September, 1861 (Jubango Game 6)

261 moves. White wins by 3 points.

Commentary by Tainaka Shin 9-dan




Figure 1 (1 – 37)

Figure 1 (1 – 37). A careless response


White 8 is an important point. If White answered Black 7 at 2 in Dia. 1, the extension to 3 would give Black ideal shape on the right side. If White pushed up at 4, Black would expand his moyo with 5 and 7.

Dia. 2. Playing at 1 instead of 7 in the figure is also conceivable. However, White would then play 2, giving quite a different result from Dia. 1.


White 12 aims at doing something with White 4. If White enclosed the corner with a move at 13 instead, Black would play 12, solidifying the top right area.

Black 15. The high approach move seems appropriate in this game.


Black 21 looks natural, but is actually a dubious move. Usually when Black blocks here, then with 23 –




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4


Dia. 3. Black continues with the set sequence to 5. However, in this case the presence of the Δ stones means that Black's thickness is ineffective. In fact, there is even the danger that White might attack Black's wall, beginning with the peep at 'a'. Instead of 21 –

Dia. 4. The hane at 2 seems preferable. White would probably play 3 and 5, so Black could cut at 6. If next White 7, the moves to 11 would follow. Since he takes the corner profit in sente, this would be a good result for Black.


Black must have played 21 without thinking, but when White plays 22, he realises that blocking at 24 is not advisable. With 23 he changes course.

Black 29. The hane on top, at 1 in Dia. 5, also looks attractive.

Dia. 5 (next page). If White plays in the same way as in the game with 2 and



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

4, Black captures a stone with 5, clearly getting a superior result to the game.

Dia. 6. If White pulls back at 2 instead, building central thickness with 3 and 5 would give Black a reasonable game.

Figure 2 (38 – 76). White invades.

White 38 is a severe cut which gives Black little choice about discarding his two stones. If Black played 43 at 53, the centre fight would become too much of a burden for him. All the same, White's capture with 44 is big, as it renders Black's thickness here ineffectual.

White 50 and 52 are a calm response to Black's attempt to expand his left side moyo with 47 and 49. White is quietly strengthening himself.

White 60. This invasion is one of the key points of the game. Although White has been doing well, he still has to come in this far to prevent the territorial balance from tilting in Black's favour. In retrospect, it seems that it would have been a good idea for Black to follow Dia. 7 with 59.

Dia. 7. If Black attaches at 1 before White invades, White would at this stage have to answer at 2. Black could then





Figure 2 (38 – 76)



Dia. 7

switch to 3 in the centre and the presence of Black 1 would make it harder for White to invade at 'a'.

Black 73. This is not Shuhō in top form. Attacking on the other side, at 74, is preferable. White 74 and 76, which threaten Black's group on the right side, get White off to a good start in settling his group. These few moves play a big part in determining the course of the game.

Figure 3 (77 – 107). White takes the corner.

White 82 eliminates the threat of 'a'. Giving White this sente peep is another drawback of 73 in Figure 2.




Figure 3 (77 - 107)

White 90, 92. White's group is now virtually settled: Black's attack has failed. The game is very close.

White 96. Perfect timing. The ramifications of this move are worth looking at.

Dia. 8. If Black answers at 1, White hanes at 2; if Black 'a', White peeps at 'b', so Black has to cut at 3. Next —

Dia. 9. White cuts with 6 and 8, then hanes at 10. Black cannot cut at 11, because White counters with 12 and 14, making miai of linking up with 'a' and capturing three stones with 'b'. Instead of 11 —


Dia. 10. Black will have to answer at 1, but White can later play 'a' and 'b', making him extremely thick here.

Dia. 11. If Black answers White 96 at 1, cutting at 2 is a tesuji. If Black 'a', White 'b' would revert to *Dia. 8*. If Black 3, White gives atari at 4, then —


Dia. 12. Black 5 to 9 follow. The threat of connecting at 'a' makes White 'b' or 'c' sente.

Dia. 13. If Black connects solidly at 1, White plays 2; if Black 'a', White 'b' will be troublesome, so —


Dia. 14. Black will descend at 3 and




Dia. 8




Dia. 9




Dia. 10




Dia. 11




Dia. 12



Dia. 13



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

White will block at 4. Next, Black has to play 'a', and White should be able to play 'b' and 'c' in sente. Sacrificing two stones enables him to make a wall on the outside.

Dia. 15. Finally, there is Black 1; White attaches at 2 and is satisfied. White 'a' and 'b' should be sente, so White gets adequate compensation for sacrificing a stone.

Black 97. This counterattack is natural, considering Shuhō's aggressive nature. Following *Dias. 8* to *10* would be reasonable for Black, but one can understand why such a docile response did not appeal to him.

White breaks up Black's bottom territory with 100 to 106. Compared with the conventional response in *Dias. 8* to *10*,

Black suffers a loss of about twenty points. He hopes to take compensation for this by attacking with 107.




Figure 4 (108 – 165)

36: connects

Figure 4 (108 – 165). Rescuing the centre group

White settles the group on the side with 8 and 10, so Black switches to an attack on the centre group with 11 to 17. However, White effortlessly smothers the attack with 18 etc. He had probably read out this sequence when he played 96 in Figure 3.

Black 25. If Black connects at 1 in Dia. 16, he collapses after White 2 to 12. Capturing three white stones with 'a' does not give Black two eyes.

White 40. White cannot cut with 1 and 3 in Dia. 17. Black counters with 4 to 10, and White loses the fight.

White 42 is aggressive. If Black played 43 at 44, White would cut at 43 and make an exchange.

With 59, Black secures an area of about twenty points. This is his compensation for losing his territory at the bottom right, but it is not enough.

White wins by 3 points.





Figure 5 (166 – 200)




Figure 6 (201 – 261)

Game Seventy-Nine: Shusaku v. Hayashi Monnyu (1861)

Castle Game Eighteen

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan
Black: Hayashi Monnyu 7-dan
 Date: 17th November, 1861
 243 moves. White wins by 14 points.
Commentary by Sanno Hirotaka




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50). The winning move

White 6. White is developing more rapidly than Black: he has already played in three corners. Black should have played 5 in the empty corner at 'a'.


Black 11 is a little unusual when White has influence on the right side.

Black 19 should be at 20 or 'b' to have any effect on White.


White 22. Tenuki on the left side is best. If White played 22 at 24, defending at 'c' would make good shape for Black. White 22 is a good move, with an effective follow-up at 52 in Figure 2.

White 30 is the vital point. Black cannot connect at 1 in Dia. 1, as the hane at 2 would be just right for White. If Black cuts at 3, then White plays 4. Instead of 1 –


Dia. 2. Black would like to connect on



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3


top at 1. If White 2, the sequence to 7 would be satisfactory for Black, but –

Dia. 3. White might counter with 2 here, then try to capture the large black group with 4. Even if Black lived, which would not be easy, White would build a lot of thickness. Moreover, White would also have the aji of 'a'.

Black 31 therefore seems forced. That means that White 30 was the winning move, since the result to 40 is clearly favourable for White. Perhaps Black should have played 29 at 35.

Black 47. Trying to save the three stones with 1 in Dia. 4 is not advisable. Black can live, but in gote, while his group to the right loses its eye-shape on the side. White 8 would be very severe.

Black 49 is essential to maintain terri-



Dia. 4

torial balance. Black has to be prepared for an attack on his group below.




Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Figure 2 (51 – 100). White keeps the initiative.


White 52. An annoying move which gives White another peep at 56 and also sets up the cut with 60. The sequence from 52 to 62 makes victory for White certain.

White 66. Capturing three stones with 1 and 3 in Dia. 5 would be bad, as Black 4 is an effective cut. If White 3 at 'a', Black would be prepared to play a ko with 'b'. It is better to attack the group as a whole with 68 etc. in the figure. White wants to keep sente in the fight on the side so that he can switch to the top to reduce Black's moyo there.


Black 67. Seeking immediate life with 1 in Dia. 6 is preferable. If White 2 and 4, Black has no trouble surviving the attack.

Black 73. If at 74 or 75, then White 'a', Black 'b', White 73.


White 76. If at 1 in Dia. 7, Black would have an interesting move at 2; if White 3, then Black 4. This fight would be too risky for White (he would have to worry about the threat of Black 'a' or 'b').



Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Black 81. Black finally has to come back and connect, so White gets his sente. He quickly whittles Black's moyo at the top down to size with 82 and 86.


Black 97. The real game ends with this docile move. Black is so far behind in territory that he has to start a fight — the bigger the better.

Dia. 8. Black should launch an attack with 1 and 3. He has little chance of catching any white stones, since his own group below is weak and White has sente moves at 4 and 6, but still this would be better than tamely accepting defeat with 97 in the figure.

Figure 3 (101 – 150). An irrelevant end-game

Black 3. Played to prevent White 3, but it is a moot point whether this is the right timing.

This game was decided within the first



Dia. 8




Figure 3 (101 – 150)

hundred moves, but Monnyu continued to go through the motions for another one hundred and fifty moves. Actually, he performed much better than this when he played Shusaku with white in their castle game in 1851.

Figure 4 (151 – 200)

Black 89. Worth the same as playing at




Figure 4 (151 – 200)

93: connects at 54




Figure 5 (201 – 243)

29: connects; 43: connects (left of 7)

90.

Figure 5 (201 – 243)

White wins by 14 points.

Game Eighty: Shusaku v. Hayashi Yubi (1861)

Castle Game Nineteen

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Black: Hayashi Yubi 6-dan

Date: 17th, 18th November, 1861

142 moves. Black resigns.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshiro

This o-konomi game was Shusaku's last castle game. It was completed at the residence of the jisha-bugyo commissioner, Lord Matsudaira of Izu, on the 18th.




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50). Misuse of thickness

White 10 – 18. The joseki when the ladder (White 10 at 11, Black 10, White 'a', Black 16, White 'b') is unfavourable.

Black 19 would now be played at 'c'.

White 20. An excellent move. Black could have considered playing 19 at 20; if White then took the corner with 19, Black could switch to the oba of 27.

Black 21 is too close to Black's own thickness. Black should attack on the other side, at 40. White could answer at 'd', forcing Black 'b', but he would still have the job of settling his group ahead of him.

White 32 aims at capturing 19 on a large scale.


Black 33 is funny: correct shape here is Black 'e', which White would still answer at 34. Black 33 leaves the weak point at 'f' for White to aim at.

Black 47 shows a sad lack of fighting spirit. Black should counter with 'g', White 'h', Black 'i', White 'j', Black 'k'; White would not be able to continue with 'l' because of the threat of Black 'm'. Black 47 shows that Black is still too concerned with making territory in this part of the board.

Figure 2 (51 – 100). Passive play


Black 51. Black should make a splitting attack at 'a' or one space lower. Letting White link up so easily with 52 to 58 is much too passive.

Black 63. Intended as a forcing move, but White counters with 64 instead of answering in the centre. Playing 63 at 1 in Dia. 1 would have been more interesting. If White 2, Black could seal off the centre



Dia. 1

Dia. 2



Dia. 3




Figure 2 (51 – 100)




Figure 3 (101 – 142)

with 3, while if 2 at 3, Black could live by playing 'a'.

Black 65. If Black 1 in Dia. 2, White secures the corner with 2. That would be bad, since Black's outside wall is not as good as in Dia. 1, so Black has to play 65. However, he is dissatisfied with the result, as 66 and 72 weaken his centre position.

Black 79, 81. This attack comes too late, as at this stage White will gladly sacrifice three stones rather than permit Black 'b' in sente.

Figure 3 (101 – 142). White breaks through into the centre.


Black 1. Black should omit this and the next two moves and play immediately at 7. White 2 to 6 weaken the black group below, so when White plays 8, Black does not have time to block his path into the centre. Instead, he has to reinforce with 9 etc. Black has to continue with 21 and 23, but giving White a helpful push into the centre like this is hopeless.

Black 35. If at 1 in Dia. 3, White forces with 2 and 4, then plays 6. He has the threat of 'a' next, so Black cannot stop him from invading.


After 42, if Black 'a', White lives with 'b'.

Black resigns after White 142.

Shusaku's final castle game was one of his easiest, for he was able to coast to victory against Yubi. This game is also Shusaku's last completed game to survive, but there is one incomplete game from 1862 (exact date not known), which is given below. Shusaku's opponent, Narabayashi Kurakichi 5-dan (black), was a leading disciple of Yasui Sanchi.



Play suspended after 38 moves.



Part II

Shusaku v. Ota Yuzo (August 1842)

White: Ota Yuzo 6-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 2-dan (sen-ni)

Date: 23rd August, 1842

179 moves. White resigns.

This is Shusaku's second game on black against Yuzo (refer to pp. 42 – 43). The game ends in a spectacular semeai.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)

Shusaku v. Kadono Tadazaemon (April 1843)

White: Kadono Tadazaemon 6-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 3-dan

Date: 17th April, 1843. Moves after 181 not recorded. Black wins by 8 points.

More than a third of Shusaku's surviving games (12 out of 33) from 1843 are with Kadono Tadazaemon, Jowa's eldest son (refer to page 66).




Figure 1 (1 – 100)
58: connects




Figure 2 (101 – 179)




Figure 2 (101 – 181)

Shusaku v. Kadono Tadazaemon
(June 1843)

White: Kadono Tadazaemon 6-dan
Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 3-dan
Date: 21st June, 1843
211 moves. White resigns.

This is the first recorded game in which Shusaku played his favourite '1–3–5' fuseki pattern.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)

Shusaku v. Kadono (August 1843)

White: Kadono Tadazaemon 6-dan
Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 3-dan
Date: 3rd August, 1843
256 moves. Jigo.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)

Figure 1. White 58. If at 59, Black would live with the 'a-b-c' combination.

Figure 2. Black 11. Black 18 would be better.

Black 35. Black 46 is bigger.

Black 67. If at 'a', White 'b' is sente.




Figure 4 (101 – 211)

ko: 78, 81, 84, 87, 90,
93, 96, 99, 102, 105, 108




Figure 2 (101 – 200)

ko: 31, 40




Figure 3 (201 – 256)

31: connects (below 11); 49: connects ko;
54: takes ko; 55, 56: each connects ko

Shusaku v. Kishimoto Saichiro (August 1843)

White: Kishimoto Saichiro 4-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 3-dan

Date: 11th August, 1843

151 moves. White resigns.

Kishimoto was a senior Honinbo dis-




Figure 2 (71 – 151)

ciple with whom Shusaku played regularly during this period (refer to page 73).

Shusaku v. Ota Yuzo (September 1843)

White: Ota Yuzo 6-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 3-dan

Date: 11th September, 1843

99 moves. White resigns.

This is the second game in which Shusaku played the Shusaku-style fuseki.




Figure 1 (1 – 70)




Figure 1 (1 – 50) 25: connects




Figure 2 (51 – 99)

Shusaku v. Tsuruoka (September 1843)


White: Tsuruoka Saburosuke 4-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 3-dan

Date: 1st, intercalary 9th month, 1843

99 moves. White resigns.

Tsuruoka Saburosuke (1821 – 59), born in Edo, was a disciple of Honinbos Josaku and Shuwa. He was promoted to 4-dan in 1843, 5-dan in 1850 and 6-dan in 1854. He was a keen rival of Shusaku.



(1 – 99)

Shusaku v. Ota Yuzo (September 1843)

White: Ota Yuzo 6-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 3-dan

Date: 2nd, 9th intercalary month, 1843

254 moves. Black wins by 1 point.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)




Figure 2 (101 – 200)




Figure 3 (201 – 254)

White wins and connects the ko

Shusaku v. Ito Showa (October 1844)

White: Ito Showa 6-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 4-dan

Date: 29th October, 1844

159 moves. White resigns.

This is the final game of the four that Shusaku played with Ito Showa on his way home from Edo to Tonoura (see Games Eleven to Thirteen in Part One).




Figure 1 (1 – 100)




Figure 2 (101 – 159)

Shusaku v. Nakagawa Junsetsu (May 1846)

White: Kuwahara Shusaku 4-dan

Black: Nakagawa Junsetsu 5-dan

Date: 9th, 10th May, 1846

180 moves. Black resigns.

This is the third of the four games Shusaku played Nakagawa before his dramatic encounter with Gennan Inseki (refer to p. 98). (Commentary by Ishida). Figure 1. Black 49. Black 50 seems better,




Figure 1 (1 – 100) 66: connects




Figure 2 (101 – 180)

even though White might cut at 85. White 50 gives Shusaku the initiative.

Black 89. Black should peep at 93 first. White would connect at 95; if then Black 89, White would have to connect at 'a', so Black would be able to connect at 92. The exchange to 106 in Figure 2 is very favourable for White.

Figure 2. White 48. White plays safe – if White tried to kill Black with 'a', his own group would be endangered by Black 'b'. Securing his group with 48 and 50 is enough for White to keep his lead.

Black launches a second invasion with 59, but this time he does not get away with it.

Shusaku v. Gennan Inseki (July 1846)

White: Gennan Inseki 8-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 4-dan

Date: 29th, 30th July, 1846

197 moves. White resigns.

This game is the fourth of the series with Gennan Inseki. It is Shusaku's third game with just black and it is actually only the second game in the series to be completed, as the first and the third games were suspended (refer to Chapter Five).




Figure 1 (1 – 100)
ko: 50, 69




Figure 2 (101 – 197)

Shusaku v. Shuwa (October 1846)

White: Honinbo Shuwa 7-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan

Date: 14th October 1846

262 moves. Black wins by 6 points.

This is the first of the seventeen-game series Shuwa and Shusaku played in 1846–47. (Commentary by Ishida Yoshio).




Figure 1 (1 – 100)

Figure 1. Black 23. If Black 1 in Dia. 1, White intends to sacrifice his stones on the side. If White 4, Black has to play 5 to capture White, but White counters with 6 etc. The sequence to 17 is forced, after which White presses at 18. This would be perfect for White.

Black 27. If Black cuts at 'a', White will cut in turn with White 'b', Black 88, White 87.

Black 75, a very tight move, sets up a large yose play at 'c'.

Black 89. White can still attach at 'd', but if he did so, Black would exchange 'e' for White 'f', then run into the corner at 'g'.

Dia. 1
Figure 2. Black 3 eliminates the last




Figure 2 (101 – 200)

weakness, at 'a', in Black's position. Black is now certain to win.

White 36. If at 40, Black 'b' would be enough to win.

Black 37 etc. This invasion decides the game. Black has no weaknesses elsewhere, so White cannot hope to kill him.

White 64. If White wants to try to kill Black, he has to take away his eye-shape on the side with 64 at 72, but after




Figure 3 (201 – 262)

White wins and connects the ko.

Black 75, White 69, Black 65, White 66, Black 64, White 77, Black plays 'c' and it is the white group that dies.

Shusaku v. Shuwa (October 1846)

White: Honinbo Shuwa 7-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan

Date: 23rd October, 1846. Played at the residence of Akai Gorosaku.

230 moves. Black wins by 6 points.

This is the third game in the seventeen-game series between Shuwa and Shusaku. (Commentary by Maeda 9-dan, Takahashi 8-dan and Murashima 8-dan)






Figure 1 (1 – 100)



Dia. 1
6: connects



Dia. 2

Figure 1. Black 41. Black 'a' would make the game a moyo contest. Instead of 42, White could also attack at 45, which

would defend against Black 47.

Black 55. Black misses the chance to attack with the sequence in Dia. 1.

Black 61. Answering at 63 seems better. When White plays 62, Black cannot flee with 1 in Dia. 2 because of the Δ stone.

Black 77. Black should play Black 80, White 78, Black 'b' (if White extends above 76 instead of 78, then Black 'c').

White 98. White may have overlooked Black 99. Perhaps he expected Black 'd', White 'e', Black 'f', White 'g'.




Figure 2 (101 – 165) 4: ko




Figure 3 (166 – 230) 117: connects
Moves after 230 not recorded.

Shusaku v. Shuwa (February 1847)

White: Honinbo Shuwa 7-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan

Date: 17th February, 1847

103 moves. White resigns.

(Game Five of the Shuwa – Shusaku series)

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

White 8 induces Black 9 and 11, so that White can play 10 and 12. However, the modern approach would be to make a high pincer at 'a', in which case the joseki Black 9, White 10, Black 17, White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd' would probably follow.

Black 17. Securing the corner is essential once White has made a base for his group.

White 18 etc. The fighting here is similar to that in the modern Chinese-style fuseki pattern.

Black 29. To prevent White from settling himself with 40.

White 44–50. It is hard to see what White gains by these moves, especially by the block at 50. White should secure his group to the left by playing 50 at 'e'.




Figure 2 (51 – 103)


If Black then attacks at 'f', White can fight back with 'g', Black 'h', White 'i', Black 'j', White 'k'; if Black then cuts at 'l', White resists with 'm'.

Figure 2 (51 – 103)

Black 53 is the key point. For the rest of the game White is handicapped by the thinness of his groups. Being forced to secure life up to 66 is painful. When Black hanes at 67, he cannot lose. Note that after 67 White cannot connect at 'a' because of Black 'b', so White 50 in Figure 1 becomes completely pointless.

White 68. White's last hope is to aim at an attack with 94, but this is rather a distant prospect.

Black 99 is the decisive blow. White cannot resist with 1 to 7 in Dia. 1, as Black kills the group on the left with 8 and 10.



Dia. 1

This was a bad game for Shuwa, but still it is notable for the rigorousness of Shusaku's play.

Shusaku v. Shuwa (February 1847)

White: Honinbo Shuwa 7-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan

Date: 17th February, 1847

261 moves. Black wins by 4 points.

This game, the sixth in the series, was played on the same day as the previous game.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)




Figure 2 (101 – 200)

ko: 31, 34, 37, 40, 43, 48, 51, 56, 59,

62, 65; 67: connects




Figure 5 (201 – 261)

Black wins and connects the ko.

Shusaku v. Shuwa (July 1847)

White: Honinbo Shuwa 7-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan

Date: 11th July, 1847

Moves after 200 not recorded. Black wins by 8 points. Game Seven of the series.




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Shusaku v. Shuwa (July 1847)




Figure 2 (51 - 100)
ko: 74, 77





Figure 3 (101 - 200)
5: connects; ko: 94, 97, 100

White: Honinbo Shuwa 7-dan
Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan
Date: 13th July, 1847 (Game Eight)
93 moves. White resigns.



(1 - 93)

Shusaku v. Shuwa (July 1847)

White: Honinbo Shuwa 7-dan
Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan
Date: 15th July, 1847 (Game Twelve)
292 moves. Black wins by 9 points.




Figure 1 (1 - 100)

Shusaku v. Shuwa (August 1847)




Figure 2 (101 – 200)

ko: 38, 41, 44, 47, 50, 53, 56, 59, 62;
88: at 80; 89: at 25; 94: connects (at 31);
95: at 79; 98: at 90;
100: connects at 79

White: Honinbo Shuwa 7-dan
Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan
Date: 2nd August, 1847
326 moves. Black wins by 7 points.
(Game Thirteen)




Figure 1 (1 – 100)

94: ko; 96: connects




Figure 3 (201 – 292)

12: ko (at 8); 20: connects (at 15);
ko (at 9): 25, 30, 33; 71: connects (at 8);
92: connects (above 66)




Figure 2 (101 – 200)

ko (at 53): 61, 64, 67, 74, 77, 80, 83




Figure 3 (201 – 250)
25: connects (below 23)




Figure 4 (251 – 326)
ko: 54, 57, 60, 63, 66, 69, 72, 75, 78, 81, 84, 87, 90, 93; 95: connects (left of 51); 103: retakes; 117: connects (below 113); 126: connects (at 85);
White wins and connects the ko.

Shusaku v. Shuwa (August 1847)

White: Honinbo Shuwa 7-dan
Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan
Date: 8th August, 1847
161 moves. White resigns.
(Game Fourteen)




Figure 1 (1 – 100)




Figure 2 (101 – 161)

Shusaku v. Shuwa (September 1847)

White: Honinbo Shuwa 7-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan

Date: 3rd September, 1847

237 moves. White resigns. (Game Fifteen)

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio






Figure 1 (1 – 70)




Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Figure 1. White 24 is an aggressive move, but it leaves a defect in White's shape, so he has to sacrifice his corner stones when Black plays 31. White hopes to gain compensation by attacking the stones above.

Black 59. A good, calm move. If White jumps to 1 in Dia. 1, Black breaks through with 2 to 8. If instead White extends at 1 in Dia. 2, Black blocks him off from the



Dia. 3

Dia. 4

centre with 2 and 4, forcing him to flee at 'a'.

Figure 2. Black 79 secures the group. If White plays 1 etc. in Dia. 3, Black counters with the sequence to 10 and wins the corner semeai. If instead White plays 1 in Dia. 4, Black will play a ko with 2 to 6. White's group is weak as well as Black's, so Black 'a' might become a threat.

White 122. White stakes the game on this move. Black lets him save the corner group, because he is more interested in attacking the centre group.

Black 149 puts Black one move ahead in the semeai. Black first captures one half of the group —

Figure 3 (next page). Then the other half up to 67. The corner is a small price




Figure 2 (71 – 150)

to pay for this much profit. White attacks in the top left with 74, but he can only get a ko.

White 82. If White ignored Black's ko threat at 81, he would squeeze with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 82; if White then connected his five stones, Black would live in the corner with 'e', White 'f', Black 'g', which would be enough. (Note that Black retains the option of living in the corner anyway.)

White 136. If White tries to kill Black by playing at 137, Black gets two eyes with Black 136, White 'h', Black 'i', White 'j', Black 'k', White 'l', Black 'm', White 'n', Black 'o', White 'p', Black 'q'.




Figure 3 (151 – 237)

ko: 77, 80, 83, 86, 89, 92, 95, 98, 101;
103: captures (below 78); ko: 104, 107,
110, 113; ko (at 121): 127, 130, 133

Shusaku v. Ota Yuzo (September 1847)

White: Ota Yuzo 6-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan

Date: 8th September, 1847

296 moves. Black wins by 1 point.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)

99: ko




Figure 2 (101 – 200)

ko: 71, 74, 77; 79: connects; ko: 80, 83
86, 89; 99: ko (at 93)




Figure 3 (201 – 296)

*ko (at 2): 5, 8, 11; 13: connects (at 2);
ko (at 25): 28, 31, 34, 37, 40, 43, 46,
49; 51: connects (below 25); 94: connects
at (73)*

Shusaku v. Yasui Sanchi (September 1847)

*White: Yasui Sanchi 7-dan
Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan
Date: 11th September, 1847
139 moves. White resigns.*




Figure 1 (1 – 70)




Figure 2 (71 – 139)

Shusaku v. Shuwa (September 1847)

*White: Honinbo Shuwa 7-dan
Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan
Date: 16th September, 1847
326 moves. Black wins by 7 points.*

This is the final game of the seventeen-game series.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)




Figure 2 (101 – 200)

ko: 74, 77, 80, 83, 86, 89, 92, 95, 98




Figure 3 (201 – 250)

ko: 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 23, 28

49: ko (at 45)




Figure 4 (251 – 326)

ko: 55, 58, 63, 66, 69, 72, 75, 78, 81, 84; 90: connects (above 86); 125: connects (at 76); 126: connects (right of 70)

Shusaku v. Ota Yuzo (October 1847)

White: Ota Yuzo 6-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan

Date: 26th October, 1847

163 moves. White resigns.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)

68: connects




Figure 2 (101 – 163)

Shusaku v. Yasui Sanchi (November 1847)

White: Yasui Sanchi 7-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan

Date: 1st November (to move 83), 6th December, 1847

294 moves. Black wins by 5 points.

(This is Shusaku's fifth game against Yasui Sanchi and his fifth win.)




Figure 1 (1 – 100)




Figure 2 (101 – 200)

ko (at 7): 27, 64, 67, 70, 73, 76, 79, 82, 85, 88, 91, 94, 97, 100




Figure 3 (201 – 294)

10: ko; 63: connects; 94: connects ko

Shusaku v. Ota Yuzo (November 1847)

White: Kuwahara Shusaku 5-dan

Black: Ota Yuzo 6-dan

Date: 26th November, 21st December, 1847

138 moves. Black resigns.




Figure 1 (1 – 60)




Figure 2 (61 – 138)

Shusaku v. Ota Yuzo (June 1848)

White: Ota Yuzo 6-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 6-dan

Date: 28th June (to 89), 6th July, 1848.

266 moves. Black wins by 1 point.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio

This is Shusaku's first game against Yuzo since his promotion to 6-dan. It must have rankled to play a fellow 6-dan on sen'ai-sen.




Figure 1 (1 – 102)

84: connects

Figure 1. Black 89. Black cannot seal White in with Black 90 because of White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'.

Figure 2. When White lives at the top, Black falls behind, but his strong attack with 11 enables him to catch up again. The sequence from 21 to 37 is forced and Black gets some surprising territory in the centre.

Black 75 is thick, but connecting at 84 would be bigger. Perhaps Shusaku had read out that he had a win anyway.

Figure 3. Black 21. If Black makes a seki by connecting at 22, White will throw in at 21. White has more than enough




Figure 2 (103 – 200)
6: connects; 27: connects

threats to win the ko.

Likewise, Black must play at 61 rather than 62. If he did play 62, a jigo would result, for White would play 61 and would win the ko at 64.




Figure 3 (201 – 266)

Shusaku v. Ota Yuzo (July 1848)

White: Ota Yuzo 6-dan

Black: Kuwahara Shusaku 6-dan

Date: 18th July (to move 51), 18th September, 1848

159 moves. White resigns.




Figure 1 (1 – 70)




Figure 2 (71 – 159)
82: ko; 84: connects

Shusaku v. Ota Yuzo (September 1849)

White: Ota Yuzo 7-dan
 Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan
 Date: 1st September, 1849
 211 moves. White resigns.




Figure 1 (1 – 60)




Figure 2 (61 – 140)




Figure 3 (141 – 211)

80: captures 79; 81: at 70;
 ko (at 79): 83, 86, 89, 92, 95, 98, 101,
 104, 107, 110

Shusaku v. Ota Yuzo (September 1849)

White: Ota Yuzo 7-dan
 Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan
 Date: 8th September, 1849
 187 moves. White resigns.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)

49: connects




Figure 2 (101 – 187)
79: connects (at 34)

Shusaku v. Shuwa (October 1849)

White: Honinbo Shuwa 7-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Date: 14th October, 1849

Moves after 207 not recorded. Black wins by 9 points.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)




Figure 2 (101 – 207)
69: below 67; 87: ko (at 63)


Shusaku v. Ito Showa (November 1849)

White: Ito Showa 7-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Date: 5th November, 1849

119 moves. White resigns.



(1 – 119)

White 28. White should jump to 33. Black takes the initiative with 31. He uses his attack to wall off his right side territory and takes the lead. The game is decided by Black 75. (Iwamoto 9-dan)

Shusaku v. Sekiyama (June 1851)

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Black: Sekiyama Sendaiu

Date: 7th, 8th June, 1851. Nijubango, Game Six. Moves after 217 not recorded. White wins by 4 points.




Figure 1 (1 – 100) 74: ko

Sekiyama: 'White played many brilliant moves. Black 55 and 89 were good. Black played very badly in the middle game; White played with superb timing.'




Figure 2 (101 – 217) 108: connects

Shusaku v. Sekiyama (June 1851)

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Black: Sekiyama Sendaiu

Date: 17th June, 1851. Nijubango, Game Fifteen. 152 moves. Black resigns.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)

58: connects; ko: 80, 83, 86; 89: connects (at 70)

Sekiyama: 'Black did not play badly, but White played several brilliant moves. Black 43 was rash – it made the position bad for me. Black 99 was an oversight.'




Figure 2 (101 – 152)

Shusaku v. Sekiyama (June 1851)

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Black: Sekiyama Sendaiu

Date: 18th, 19th June, 1851. Nijubango, Game Seventeen. 173 moves. White resigns.

Figure 1. White 16. A very unusual shimari for Shusaku — he is imitating his opponent's favourite strategy.

Sekiyama: 'Black 67 is not good. Black 85 is questionable. White's play from 88 to 142 (Figure 2) is exquisite.'




Figure 1 (1 – 100) 100: connects




Figure 2 (101 – 173)
58: ko (at 44); 60: ko (below 57)

Figure 2. Sekiyama: 'Black 5 is slack; 39 is dubious. White 44 is not good.'

Shusaku v. Sekiyama (June 1851)

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Black: Sekiyama Sendaiu

Date: 23rd June, 1851. Nijubango, Game Twenty. Moves after 261 not recorded. Black wins by 1 point.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)
24: ko; 26: connects




Figure 2 (101 – 200)
ko: 56, 59, 62, 65, 68, 71, 74, 77, 80, 83, 86, 89, 92, 95, 98




Figure 3 (201 – 261)

ko: 4, 7, 10, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35;
37: connects (at 2); *38:* ko; *40:* connects (at 1)

Kishimoto Saichiro: ‘White let Black win this game.’

Shusaku v. Shuwa (October 1851)

White: Honinbo Shuwa 8-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Date: 22nd October, 1851

227 moves. Black wins by 4 points.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)

ko (at 56): 64, 67

White 28 in Figure 1 is the move that Jowa played against Akaboshi Intetsu (see Chapter One), but Shuwa does not continue by pushing up at 31.




Figure 2 (101 – 165)

29: ko (left of 26)




Figure 2 (166 – 227)

95: ko (at 81); *107:* connects (left of 87);
125: connects (at 92); *Black wins and connects the ko below 127.*

Shusaku v. Yasui Sanchi (December 1851)

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan

Black: Yasui Sanchi 7-dan

Date: 27th December, 1851. Moves after 200 not recorded. White wins by 4 points.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)

Shusaku v. Ota Yuzo (July 1852)

White: Ota Yuzo 7-dan

Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan (tagai-sen)

Date: 2nd, 12th July, 1852. Moves after 197 not recorded. Black wins by 4 points.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)




Figure 2 (101 – 200)

This was Shusaku's second game on white against Yasui Sanchi and his first win (he lost the previous game, played in 1849). His lifetime record against Sanchi was ten wins to two losses.




Figure 2 (101 – 197)

Shusaku v. Ota Yuzo (October 1852)

White: Ota Yuzo 7-dan
Black: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan
Date: 3rd October, 1852
 133 moves. White resigns.




Figure 1 (1 – 60)

Shusaku v. Kishimoto (October 1852)

White: Honinbo Shusaku 6-dan
Black: Kishimoto Saichiro 5-dan
Date: 19th October, 1st, 2nd November, 1852
 264 moves. Black wins by 8 points.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)

23: connects; 90: connects (at 67)




Figure 2 (61 – 133)
 64, 89: connect




Figure 2 (101 – 200)
 53: connects (left of 49)




Figure 3 (201 – 264)

35: ko (left of 26); 38: ko;
64: connects (left of 26)


Shusaku v. Shuho (September 1853)

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

2 stones: Murase Shuho 3-dan

Date: 15th September, 1853

139 moves. Black resigns.



(1 – 139)


Shusaku v. Shuho (September 1853)

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

2 stones: Murase Shuho 3-dan

Date: 19th September, 1853

115 moves. Black resigns.



(1 – 115) 58: connects


Shusaku v. Shuho (October 1853)

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

2 stones: Murase Shuho 3-dan

Date: 15th October, 1853

83 moves. Black resigns.



(1 – 83)

67: at 65; 77: connects

Shusaku v. Shuhō (December 1853)

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan
2 stones: Murase Shuhō 3-dan
Date: 20th December, 1853
137 moves. Black resigns.




Figure 1 (1 – 65)




Figure 2 (66 – 137)

Shusaku v. Shuhō (October 1854)

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan
Black: Murase Shuhō 4-dan
Date: 29th October, 1854
Moves after 208 not recorded. White wins by 8 points.
 (Note: The 4-dan for Shuhō is just a guess. It is known that he reached 3-dan in 1853 and 5-dan in 1855, but the exact dates are not known and there is no record of when he was promoted to 4-dan.)




Figure 1 (1 – 100) 89: ko (at 59)






Figure 2 (101 – 208) 35: connects (right of 11); ko: 37, 44; 56: connects

Shusaku v. Shuhō (November 1854)
White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan
Black: Murase Shuhō 4-dan
Date: 8th November, 1854
100 moves. Black resigns.



(1 - 100)


Shusaku v. Shuhō (November 1854)
White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan
Black: Murase Shuhō 4-dan
Date: 9th November, 1854
124 moves. Black resigns.



(1 - 124)

Black 49 is slack: it should be at 'a'.
White takes the lead with 50 to 54.

Shusaku v. Shuhō (November 1854)
White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan
Black: Murase Shuhō 4-dan
Date: 10th November, 1854
122 moves. Black resigns.



(1 - 122)

Shusaku v. Shuhō (October 1856)
White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan
Black: Murase Shuhō 5-dan
Date: 27th October, 1856
207 moves. Jigo.




Figure 1 (1 - 100) 83: connects




Figure 2 (101 – 207)

89: captures (below 12); 95: connects (at 12)

This interesting and unusual game was followed by another jigo – see Game Sixty-Five in Part One.

Shusaku v. Mizutani (April 1857)

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

4 stones: Mizutani Nuiji (age eleven)

Date: 18th April, 1857

104 moves. White resigns.

This is the second of Mizutani's two four-stone games against Shusaku (see page 326 for the first).




Figure 1 (1 – 60)






Figure 2 (61 – 104) 103: ko



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Figure 1. Black 32 is a courageous invasion. In an even game White would probably answer at 56, but that would be too mild when giving four stones. A difficult fight follows, but Mizutani plays with superb skill and precision. He does not make a single mistake in this game.

Figure 2. Black 66. The strongest move; Black 101 would just help White to attack the centre group with 'a'.

White 79. If at 1 in Dia. 1, Black captures with 2 to 12.

Black 96. Black would fall into a trap if he tried to capture White with 1 in Dia. 2, as White 4 (threatening 'a') is sente against the other group.

If White captures 96 after Black 104, Black plays 'b-f' and wins the semeai.

(From a commentary by Rin Kaiho 9-dan)

Shusaku v. Mizutani (April 1857)
 White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

3 stones: Mizutani Nuiji

Date: 19th April, 1857

140 moves. White resigns.

Figure 1. White 59 at 'a' would not be enough. Black 60 is bad, for it strengthens White. Black should play 60 at 64, then aim at 'b' or 'c'.

White 71. Too deep – 'd' is better.

Figure 2. Black 80 etc. A strong attack which isolates the invader. White has to play 97, but Black sets the seal on his




Figure 1 (1 – 75)




Figure 2 (76 – 140) 130: takes two stones

victory by capturing a stone with 100 to 104.


(From a commentary by Segoe Kensaku)

Shusaku v. Shuho (October 1857)


White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Black: Murase Shuho 5-dan

Date: 21st October, 1857. Moves after 187 not recorded. White wins by 3 points.



*Figure 1 (1 – 100)
67: connects*



*Figure 2 (101 – 187)
49: connects (at 18)*

Shusaku v. Ozawa (December 1858)

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Black: Ozawa Mitsugoro 5-dan

Date: 15th December, 1858. Moves after 237 not recorded. Black wins by 9 points.

Apart from Castle Game Fourteen (page 338), this is Shusaku's only game record to survive from 1858. It is interesting to note that Ozawa played the same quasi-Chinese style formation as Sentoku in the castle game. It is possible that one of these games may have been the inspiration for the Chinese-style fuseki.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)




Figure 2 (101 – 160) 37: connects

Ozawa Mitsugoro (dates not known) was a disciple of Shuwa. As this win against Shusaku shows, he was quite a strong player.




Figure 3 (161 – 237) 85: captures (at 81)

Shusaku v. Ebizawa (March 1859)

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

2 stones: Ebizawa Kenzo 3-dan

Date: 7th March, 1859 (Jubango, Game One)

Moves after 138 not recorded. Black wins by 5 points.




Figure 1 (1 – 65)




Figure 2 (66 – 138)

Figure 2. White 73 defends against Black 'a', but White could also invade at 'b' or 'c'. White 75 is another solid move – White could also play at 'd'.

The exchange from 82 to 94 earns Black victory. (Segoe)

Shusaku v. Ebizawa (April 1859)

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

2 stones: Ebizawa Kenzo 3-dan

Date: 6th April, 1859 (Jubango, Game Five)

256 moves. Black wins by 4 points.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)




Figure 2 (101 – 200) 13: connects at 4

Figure 1. Black 8. Not appropriate, since Black cannot get a ladder with 16 at 17.

Black 38 is a very severe invasion, but White 37 at 89 would be too slow (Black would play at 49).

White 57, 59. A superb combination. The result to 69 is favourable for White.

Figure 2. If Black plays 2 at 19, White will force with 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 48, Black 92, White 'e', Black 'f', then switch to 7, getting a good result. (Segoe)




Figure 3 (201 – 256) 41: retakes

Shusaku v. Ebizawa (April 1859)

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

2 stones: Ebizawa Kenzo 3-dan

Date: 19th April, 1859 (Jubango Game Six)

Moves after 233 not recorded. White wins by 5 points.





Figure 1 (1 – 80)

ko: 66, 69, 72


Figure 1. The result to 20 is equal.

Black 22. Black 35 would make better use of Black's thickness above. White 25 is a good invasion.

Black 40. Black misses a chance: he should cut at 1 in Dia. 1. The continuation to 11 is good for him (if White 10 at 11, the worst that can happen is a seki). If White counters with 2 in Dia. 2, Black is more than satisfied with the result to 11 (White has no eyes, while Black has a connection with 'a').



Dia. 1



Dia. 2
11: connects




Figure 2 (81 – 167)

White 47. If at 49, Black will cut at 55, then sacrifice two stones and squeeze when White cuts at 47.

Black 60. Black 'a' would be simpler. The fighting after 60 helps strengthen White.

Figure 2. If White 'a' after 120, Black gives atari at 'b', then makes the hane-komi at 'c'.

The invasion at 131 ensures White of victory; Black cannot hope to capture this stone.

(From a commentary by Ishida Yoshio)




Figure 3 (168 – 233) 85: ko

**Shusaku v. Inoue Matsumoto Inseki
(May 1859)**

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Black: Inoue Matsumoto Inseki 6-dan

Date: 14th (to move 69), 19th May, 1859
259 moves. White wins by 3 points.

This is Shusaku's third game against the 13th Inoue. He played him in the 7th and 11th castle games.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)




Figure 2 (101 – 200)

25: retakes; ko: 69, 72, 75;

99: connects (at 66)




Figure 3 (201 – 259)

Shusaku v. Ebizawa Kenzo (October 1859)

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Black: Ebizawa Kenzo 3-dan (sen-ni)

Date: 1st October, 1859 (Game Eleven)
279 moves. White wins by 7 points.

This is Ebizawa's first game just on black against Shusaku after he won the jubango 7–3.

Figure 1. White 18 might look narrow, but it is a good attacking move. If White enclosed the corner instead, Black might




Figure 1 (1 – 100)




Figure 2 (101 – 200)

ko: 28, 31, 34, 37, 40, 43, 46, 49, 52, 55, 58, 61

well play at 18 himself.

White 74 is a superb point, so Black should have played there with 73 (if then White 73, Black 'a' would be good enough).

Black 81. This attack does not work very well for Black.

Figure 2. White 62. White does not need to win the *ko*.

(From a commentary by Segoe)




Figure 3 (201 – 279)

31: connects (at 28); *ko:* 47, 50, 77; 79: connects (at 44)

Shusaku v. Ebizawa (October 1859)

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

2 stones: Ebizawa Kenzo 3-dan

Date: 15th October 1859. Moves after 229 not recorded. White wins by 1 point.




Figure 1 (1 – 65)

27: *ko*; 29: connects

Figure 1. Black 16 is meant as a ladder block if White cuts at 31, but after the joseki to 30, White can safely cut at 31. Black 16 is thus a failure – Black should have pressed at 19 instead.

Black 40. Black 41 looks better (Black




Figure 2 (66 – 150)

ko: 124, 127, 130, 133, 138, 141, 150




Figure 3 (151 – 229)

81: connects; 98: at 92; 125: at 94 could sacrifice 8–12–6 if need be.

White 60. Better at 'a'; 60 does not secure the corner.

Figure 2. Black 104. Wrong timing – securing the unsettled group with Black 109 is more urgent. (Segoe)

Shusaku v. Ebizawa (November 1859)


White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Black: Ebizawa Kenzo 3-dan

Date: 3rd November, 1859. Moves after 168 not recorded. White wins by 4 points.

Figure 1. Black 27 is an oba, but a keima at 'a' seems preferable. Permitting White to make the perfect shoulder-hit at 28 contradicts Black's strategy so far of building up influence.

Black 53. Letting White link up with



Dia. 1




Figure 1 (1 – 100)

54 and 56 is slack. Instead of 53, Black should exchange 'b' for White 'c', then attack at 'd'.

Black 87. Cutting with 1 and 3 in Dia. 1 is unreasonable.

Black 97 should be at 'e'. Taking gote up to 9 in the next figure is painful.

Shusaku's natural, straightforward play in this game gives one the feeling that he did not really have to exert himself to win. Ebizawa was not yet ready to play him on black.

(Commentary by Segoe)




Figure 2 (101 – 168)

Shusaku v. Shuhō (September 1861)
 White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan
 Black: Murase Shuhō 6-dan
 Date: 12th, 18th September, 1861
 Jubango, Game Five. 289 moves. Jigo
 Commentary by Sekiyama Riichi 9-dan




Figure 1 (1 – 100)

Figure 1. Shuhō: ‘White 16 and 18 are an interesting combination. White 18 would usually be played at 73.’

Shuhō: ‘Black 21 should be at 27.’ Developing the left side is pointless after White 20.

Shuhō: ‘It is hard to understand the meaning of White 22 and 24.’ These moves strengthen Black’s corner and destroy the aji of White ‘a’. White should play 22 at 26 or 29.

Black 55. If Black 56, then White 55, Black ‘b’, White ‘c’; if then Black ‘d’, White gives atari at 100, then gets a ladder with ‘e’ (thanks to White 52).

Black 71. Shuhō: ‘Simply playing at 73 would have upset White’s aim with 70. 71 and 73 fall in with White’s plans; this is not interesting for Black.’ The aim of 70 is to take away Black’s eye-shape and to drive him out into the centre. After White 74, Black 71 does begin to seem heavy.

Black 97. To make White heavy before




Figure 2 (101 – 200)

ko: 52, 55, 64; ko (at 32): 66, 69, 72; 77: connects (above 53); ko: 79, 82, 85, 88, 91, 94, 97; 99: connects (at 60); 100: ko

connecting at 99.

Figure 2. Black 5. Shuhō: ‘A careless mistake. If Black had played at 6 instead, Black would have won, though the game would have been close.’ If Black 5 at 6,




Figure 3 (201 – 289)

ko: 6, 11, 14 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32; 60: connects (at 3); 75: connects (at 4); 87: ko (at 47); 88: connects (at 27); 89: connects (at 50)

White 9, Black 5, White 8, Black 7, White 14 would follow. Black could then switch to 49.

Black suffers a loss in the sequence to 17. He launches a fierce attack on the centre white group, but is unsuccessful.

Shusaku v. Shuhō (October 1861)

White: Honinbo Shusaku 7-dan

Black: Murase Shuhō 6-dan

Date: 7th October, 1861. Jubango, Game Eight. 188 moves. Black resigns.




Figure 1 (1 – 50)




Figure 2 (51 – 100)

ko: 84, 87, 90, 93, 96, 99




Figure 3 (101 – 140)

ko: 7, 10; 38: connects (at 3)




Figure 4 (141 – 188)

Bibliographical Note

As mentioned in the preface, the original inspiration for compiling this book came from the detailed commentaries on Shusaku's games by Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan which were published as supplements to the magazine *Igo Shincho* from January 1978 to April 1979. To these were added commentaries drawn from a variety of sources, in particular, *Kido* and other Japanese go magazines, while frequent reference has also been made to the volume on Shusaku (with commentaries by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan) in the *Nihon Igo Taikei* series published by Chikuma Shobo. In addition, the commentaries on Shusaku's castle games by Sanno Hirotaka 9-dan were specially commissioned for this book. The additional games given in Part Two were selected from the four-volume work, *Honinbo Shusaku Zenshu* (Complete Games of Honinbo Shusaku), published by Seibundo Shinkosha.

The biographical chapter on Shusaku is mainly based on *Gosei Honinbo Shusaku* (Honinbo Shusaku, Saint of Go), a full-length biography by Kashimoto Kiyondo (published by the Igo Bunka-kai in 1969), while the chapter on the Shusaku-style fuseki is drawn from Volume Two of Rin Kaiho's *Kihon Fuseki Jiten* (Basic Dictionary of Fuseki), published by the Nihon Ki-in in 1978.

Further Reading

For readers whose interest is not yet exhausted, there is available a handful of other commentaries on Shusaku and the background games given in Chapter One.

Jowa v. Akaboshi Intetsu (July 1835) – *Go Review*, December 1967, pp. 49 – 64.

Shuwa v. Gennan Inseki (November, December 1840) – *Go Review*, May 1969, pp. 26 – 32.

Shuwa v. Gennan Inseki (May 1842) – Game 7 in *Appreciating Famous Games* by Ohira Shuzo (Ishi Press). Also in *Go Review*, March 1972, pp. 26 – 34 (but the historical description is rather shaky).

Shusaku v. Gennan Inseki (July 1846 – Game Fourteen in this book) – *Go Review*, January 1972, pp. 26 – 32; also *Go Review*, November 1967, pp. 34 – 40.

Shusaku v. Ota Yuzo (3rd October, 1848) – Game 9, *Appreciating Famous Games*.

Shusaku v. Ito Showa (November 1851 and June 1852 – Game Thirty-Three in this book) – Game 10, *Appreciating Famous Games*.

Shusaku v. Shuwa (22nd October, 1851 – given on page 404 of this book) – Game 8, *Appreciating Famous Games*.

Shusaku v. Ota Yuzo (June 1853 – Game Fifty-Four in this book) – *Go Review*, Spring 1975, pp. 56 – 63. (The commentary is by Fujisawa Hosai and it is also given, in a different translation, in *Go Review*, July 1968, pp. 19 – 24.)

There are also the articles listed below on the Shusaku-style fuseki.

'How to Improve at Fuseki' by Kato Masao, in *Go World*, No. 8, pp. 34 – 37.

'Fuseki by the Famous Shusaku', in *Go Review*, July–December, 1966.