**Cloudproxy Nuts and Bolts**

John Manferdelli[[1]](#footnote-1)

**Overview**

Cloudproxy is a software system that provides *remotely authenticated* isolation, confidentiality and integrity of code and data for Hosted Systems preventing attacks from co-tenants and (under modest assumptions) insiders in a remote data center on supporting hardware. To achieve this, Cloudproxy uses two components: a “Host System” (raw hardware, Virtual Machine Manager, Operating System) which provides capabilities described below to a “Hosted System” (VM, Application, Container).

Cloudproxy provides a mechanism, at each level of the software stack, to isolate Hosted Systems, measure and remotely verify the exact software and configuration information constituting the Hosted System and provide security services like sealing that ensures that information (like keys) can be securely provisioned and retrieved only by the correct Hosted System, while isolated, on a supported platform.

A key concept for Cloudproxy is Code Identity and Measurement that is coupled with isolation and secret provisioning. A Host System measures a Hosted System incorporating the actual binary code and configuration information affecting execution resulting in an unforgeable, compact global identity for that code and execution context. Since the Hosted System knows the “identity” of each Hosted System (i.e.- the unforgeable global identity), it can store secrets that only the Hosted System will receive[[2]](#footnote-2). The Host Systems can also “attest” to statements made by Hosted Systems by incorporating the unforgeable global identity in statements it signs (again with keys only an isolated Host System has access to). The upshot of this is that a Cloudproxy Hosted System can be isolated, maintain secrets only it knows to encrypt and integrity protect all data it receives or sends, and it can securely authenticate itself over an otherwise unprotected network connection and thus employ authenticated public keys tied to its identity that can be relied upon by communicating parties.

Readers can consult [1] for a fuller description. Source code is in [2].

**The Cloudproxy API**

A Hosted System uses the Cloudproxy API, called the Tao, to achieve the security promises (program isolation, and confidentiality and integrity for programs and data) provided by Cloudproxy. The programming model is simple and requires only a few API calls. The Tao provides a programming interface in Go or C++.

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The basic Tao API calls are:

*AddHostedProgram* instructs the Host System to measure and start a new, isolated Hosted System. It names the binary image and other context data used to start the program. The Hosted System could be, for example, a VM if the Host System is a VMM or an isolated Linux process if the Host System is Linux.

*Seal* takes an opaque data blob and appends the measurement of the Hosted System. It encrypts and integrity protects the resulting object (using keys only the Host System knows) and returns the resulting opaque object to the Hosted System. Hosted Systems typically “seal” private signing and encryption keys so they can be later recovered when the Hosted System is restarted using “Unseal” below.

*Unseal* takes an opaque blob (produced by a prior “Seal”) from a Hosted System. It decrypts (and checks the integrity of) the blob and compares the measurement of the Hosted System requesting the unseal with the measurement of the Hosted System named in the blob. If the measurements match, it returns the protected data.

*Attest* takes a blob from a Hosted System and signs a statement naming the blob and the measurement of the Hosted System requesting the Attest. It returns the signed statement (the “Attestation”) along with a certificate (the “Host Certificate”) from an authority certifying that the public key it used to sign the statement belongs to a verified Host System with enumerated security characteristics[[3]](#footnote-3). The meaning of the signed blob is, informally, “*Statement X came from the program with Measurement M while it was isolated*.” Hosted Systems mainly use attest as follows: The Hosted System generates a public-private key pair and seal the private key. Then they request an Attestation of the corresponding public key. A party receiving the Attestation and Host Certificate can cryptographically verify the public key came from the named program while isolated and thus subsequent proof of possession of the private key can be used to authenticate statements from the Hosted System.

*GetRandom* provides cryptographically random bits, typically for key generation.

**Principal Names**

Principal names in Cloudproxy are hierarchical and securely name the principal. For example, a principal rooted in a public key will have the public key (or a cryptographic hash of it) in its name and a program principal (a measured Cloudproxy Hosted System) will have the measurement in the principal name (i.e.-a cryptographic hash).

The root name for a hosted program, in the development case, might look something like

key([080110011801224508011241046cdc82f70552eb...]).Program([25fac93bd4cc868352c78f4d34df6d2747a17f85...])

Here, key([**080110011801224508011…])**represents the signing key of the host and Program([25fac93bd4cc868352c78f4d34df6d2747a17f85...])extends the host name with the hash of the Hosted System[[4]](#footnote-4). If the host were a Linux host rooted in a TPM boot, its name would include the AIK and the PCRs of the booted Linux systems, the hash of the Authenticated Code Module (“ACM”) that initiated the authenticated boot and the hash of the Linux image and it’s initramfs[[5]](#footnote-5). In the section on SimpleExample execution output, there are many more examples of Tao Principal names.

**The Tao Paradigm**

The Tao is almost always used in a stereotypical way which we refer to as the Tao Paradigm. Cloudproxy programs always have policy public keys embedded (PKpolicy) in their image either explicitly or implicitly[[6]](#footnote-6). Statements signed by the corresponding private key (pKpolicy), and only those statements, are accepted as authoritative and acted on by these programs. The policy key(s) plus the Hosted System code and configuration, reflected in its measurement, fully describe how the Hosted System should behave and, hence, an authenticated measurement is a reliable description of expected behavior.

In the Tao Paradigm, when a program first starts on a Hosted System, it makes up a public/private key-pair (PKprogram/ pKprogram) and several symmetric keys that it uses to “seal” information for itself. A Hosted System then “seals,” using the Host System interface, all this private (key) information[[7]](#footnote-7). After that, the Hosted System requests an Attestation from its Host System, naming the newly generated PKprogram and sends the resulting Attestation to a security domain service which confirms the security properties in the Attestation and Host Certificate[[8]](#footnote-8). If the Attestation and Host Certificate meet security domain requirements, the security domain service signs (with pKpolicy) an x509 certificate specifying PKprogram and the Tao Principal Name of the Hosted System. The resulting certificate, called the *Program Certificate*, can be used by any Hosted System to prove its identity to another Hosted System in the same security domain. Program Certificates are used to negotiate encrypted, integrity protected TLS-like channels between Hosted Systems (the “Tao Channel”); Hosted System can share information over these channels with full assurance of the code identity and security properties of its channel peer. Once established, each endpoint of the Tao Channel “speaks for” its respective Hosted System.

Hosted Systems in the same security domain can fully trust other authenticated Hosted Systems in that security domain with data or processing. Typically, a Hosted System uses the symmetric keys it generates and seals at initialization to encrypt and integrity protect information it stores on disks or remotely.

Employing a centralized security domain service eliminates the need for each and every Cloudproxy Hosted System in a security domain to maintain lists of trusted hardware or trusted programs and simplifies distribution, maintenance and upgrade.

Often, Hosted Systems in the same security domain will share intermediate keys used to protect data that may be used on many Host System environments. As discussed below, when software is upgraded or a new Hosted System in a security domain is added, these keys can be shared based on policy-key signed directives as Host or Hosted Systems are upgraded or new systems are introduced in a controlled but flexible way eliminating the danger that data might become inaccessible if a particular Cloudproxy system is replaced or becomes damaged or unavailable.

**The Extended Tao**

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Given the Tao Paradigm that is almost universally employed, the Tao contains some additional support functions. All these functions are in the Tao Library (along with the basic Tao Library functions above).

*DomainLoad* is used to store and retrieve Program Certificates and sealed policy data.

*GetTaoName* gets the principal name for the hosted system.

*Parent* gets the parent interface to the Tao.

*ExtendTaoName* allows a Hosted System to extend its Principal Name with arbitrary data. For example, rather than having a policy embedded in a program image, a Hosted System can extend its name with a policy key it reads and the new Principal Name will reflect this value.

The API for the Tao Library is set forth in the appendix but it is most easily learned by looking at the code example and corresponding output below.

The Tao Library also contains helper functions to build and verify Program Certificates, perform common crypto tasks like key generation and establish the Tao Channel. Again, these are most easily understood by looking at the code example below.

Finally, the Tao Library has rather extensive and flexible authorization support. Authorization decision are performed by *guards* make.

Current guards include:

* The liberal guard: this guard returns true for every authorization query
* The conservative guard: this guard returns false for every authorization query
* The ACL guard: this guard provides a list of statements that must return true when the guard is queried for these statements.
* The datalog guard (used in the example below): this guard translates statements in the CloudProxy auth language (see tao/auth/doc.go for details) to datalog statements and uses the Go datalog engine from github.com/kevinawalsh/datalog to answer authorization queries. See install.sh for an example policy.

**Hardware roots of Trust**

Cloudproxy requires that the lowest level system software (the “base system”) be measured by a hardware component which also provides attest services and seal/unseal services and some hardware assist to isolate Hosted Systems. Absent hardware protection, remote users have no principled way to trust the security promises (isolation, confidentiality, integrity, verified code identity) since “insiders” might silently change security critical software or steal keys.

Cloudproxy supports TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 as hardware roots of Trust for Host Systems booted on raw hardware. We have implemented support for other mechanisms and believe adding a new hardware mechanism is relatively easy. In addition, Cloudproxy also can initialize and run on a “soft Tao” which simulates secure base system protection (but is not secure). This allows for easy debugging.

Once the base Host System is safely measured and booted on a supported hardware, Cloudproxy implements support for recursive Host Systems at almost every layer of software including:

1. A Host System consisting of hardware (e.g. - TPM, SMX) that hosts a VMM which isolates Hosted Systems consisting of Virtual Machines.
2. A Host System running in an operating system which isolates Hosted Systems consisting of processes (or applications).
3. A Host System running in an operating system which isolates Hosted systems hosted consisting of subordinate Operating Systems or Containers.
4. A Host System running in an application (like a browser) which isolates Hosted Systems consisting of sub-applications, like plug-ins.

In all cases, Hosted Systems have the same Tao interface to the Host System and can use any non-Cloudproxy host service (for example, any system call on Linux) so the programming model at each Hosted System layer is essentially unchanged from the non-Cloudproxy case.

**Sample Applications**

This paper is intended to allow you to use Cloudproxy immediately on a Linux based Cloudproxy Host System. To this end we include installation instructions for running under a “soft Tao” and TPM 1.2 based Tao protected hardware with SMX extensions. We also include the annotated code for a simple application called, cleverly, SimpleExample.

There are more complex examples in go/apps.

**Installing Cloudproxy**

First, you should download the Cloudproxy repository from [2]. To do this, assuming you have git repository support, type

git clone <https://github.com/jlmucb/cloudproxy>,

or,

go get <https://github.com/jlmucb/cloudproxy>.

This latter command will also install the needed go libraries. You can also download a zipped repository from github. You should probably install this in ~/src/github.com/jlmucb (which we refer to as $CLOUDPROXYDIR) to save go compilation problems later. It’s a good idea to put go binaries in ~/bin as is common. Follow the installation instructions in $CLOUDPROXYDIR/Doc. That directory also contains [1] and an up to date version of this document as well as installation instructions for TPM 2.0 capable machines and installation for a Cloudproxy enabled KVM hypervisor and Docker containers.

You must also install the Go development tools (and C++ development tools if you use the C++ version) as well as protobuf, gtest and gflags as described in the Go documentation.

Next, compile, and initialize the SimpleExample application in $CLOUDPROXYDIR/go/apps/SimpleExample and run it as described in the next section.

**Simple Example**

There are three application components in SimpleExample, each producing a separate executable:

1. Simple Client (in $CLOUDPROXYDIR/go/apps/SimpleExample/SimpleClient simpleclient.go)
2. Simple Server (in $CLOUDPROXYDIR/go/apps/SimpleExample/SimpleServer/simpleserver.go)
3. Simple Security Domain Signing Service (in $CLOUDPROXYDIR/go/apps/SimpleExample/SimpleDomainService/simpledomainservice.go)

Common code used by the client and server is in $CLOUDPROXYDIR/go/apps/SimpleExample/taosupport.

When *simpleclient* and *simpleserver* start for the first time on the Host System, they provide Attestations to *simpledomainservice* and, if the measurements are correct, *simpledomainservice* signs their respective Program Certificates with pKpolicy). This interaction is depicted below.

![](data:application/pdf;base64,)

After initialization of keys and secrets, *simpleserver* makes up a secret waits for *simpleclient* to request their secret. Each *simpleclient* instance uses a Tao Channel to contact the *simpleserver* to learn the secret. We don’t implement rollback protection or distributed key management for intermediate secrets in SimpleExample just to keep the example as simple as possible. *SimpleDomainService* is the domain service for SimpleExample.

![](data:application/pdf;base64,)

We describe the Tao API, compilation and installation, execution and output of the Go version of SimpleExample in the sections below. We also provide annotation for all the SimpleExample code containing all the critical Cloudproxy elements to help you get used to the programming model. Since the domain service does not use Tao primitives directly, we don’t annotate that code here although $CLOUDPROXYDIR/go/apps/SimpleExample contains a full working version. A corresponding version of the annotated C++ version appears in Appendix III.

Although SimpleExample is very simple, the Tao relevant code in SimpleExample can be used with little change even in complex Cloudproxy applications.

**The API – Go**

Domains represent security contexts. Security contexts encapsulate configuration information like names, path to key blobs, path to policy key, and the guard employed for authorization decisions.

*CreateDomain* initializes a new Domain, writing its configuration files to a directory. This creates the directory and, if needed, a policy key pair encrypted with the given password when stored on disk; it also initializes a default guard. The call is:

func CreateDomain(cfg DomainConfig, configPath string, password []byte) (\*Domain, error)

Any parameters left empty in cfg will be set to reasonable default values.

Domain information is loaded from a text file, typically called tao.config via the call:

LoadDomain(configPath string, password []byte)(\*Domain, error)

which returns a domain object, if successful. The password is used to load a key set from disk. If no password is provided, then *LoadDomain* will attempt to load verification keys only. For example, *LoadDomain* is called with a configPath and an empty password to load the policy verification key.

The network interface for the Tao channel consists of:

* func DialWithKeys(network, addr string, guard tao.Guard, v \*tao.Verifier, keys \*tao.Keys) (net.Conn, error)
* func Listen(network, laddr string, config \*tls.Config, g tao.Guard, v \*tao.Verifier, del \*tao.Attestation) (net.Listener, error)

The complete Tao Library API is described in Appendix II but the best way to learn it is by looking at the annotated code here and in the distribution.

***Simple Client in Go (annotated)***

The *simpleclient* code (omitting imports and flag definitions) is as follows:

func main() {

// This holds the cloudproxy specific data for simpleclient

// including the Program Cert and Program Private key.

var clientProgramData taosupport.TaoProgramData

// Make sure we zero keys when we're done.

defer taosupport.ClearTaoProgramData(&clientProgramData)

// Parse flags

flag.Parse()

serverAddr = \*serverHost + ":" + \*serverPort

// Load domain info for this domain and establish Clouproxy keys and properties.

// This handles reading in existing (sealed) Cloudproxy keys and properties, or,

// if this is the first call (or a call after state has been erased), this also

// handles initialization of keys and certificates with a domain server holding

// the private policy key.

// If TaoParadigm completes without error, clientProgramData contains all the

// Cloudproxy information needed throughout program execution and, in addition,

// ensures that this information is sealed and stored in simpleClientPath for

// subsequent invocations.

if taosupport.TaoParadigm(simpleCfg, simpleClientPath, &clientProgramData) !=

nil {

log.Fatalln("simpleclient: Can't establish Tao")

}

fmt.Printf("simpleclient: TaoParadigm complete, name: %s\n",

clientProgramData.TaoName)

// Open the Tao Channel using the Program key. This program does all the

// standard channel negotiation and presents the secure server name after

// negotiation is complete. ms is the bi-directional confidentiality and

// integrity protected channel between simpleclient and simpleserver.

ms, serverName, err := taosupport.OpenTaoChannel(&clientProgramData, &serverAddr)

if err != nil {

log.Fatalln("simpleclient: Can't establish Tao Channel")

}

log.Printf("simpleclient: establish Tao Channel with %s, %s\n",

serverAddr, serverName)

// Send a simple request and get response.

// simpleclient and simpleserver. There's only on request: tell me the

// secret.

secretRequest := "SecretRequest"

msg := new(taosupport.SimpleMessage)

msg.RequestType = &secretRequest

taosupport.SendRequest(ms, msg)

if err != nil {

log.Fatalln("simpleclient: Error in response to SendRequest\n")

}

respmsg, err := taosupport.GetResponse(ms)

if err != nil {

log.Fatalln("simpleclient: Error in response to GetResponse\n")

}

// This is the secret.

retrieveSecret := respmsg.Data[0]

// Encrypt and store the secret in simpleclient's save area.

out, err := taosupport.Protect(clientProgramData.ProgramSymKeys, retrieveSecret)

if err != nil {

log.Fatalln("simpleclient: Error protecting data\n")

}

err = ioutil.WriteFile(path.Join(\*simpleClientPath,

"retrieved\_secret"), out, os.ModePerm)

if err != nil {

log.Fatalln("simpleclient: error saving retrieved secret\n")

}

// Close down.

log.Printf("simpleclient: secret is %s, done\n", retrieveSecret)

}

***Simple Server in Go***

Here is the *simpleserver* code without imports, flag definitions, support code, and code that is similar to *simpleclient.*  Error processing has also been removed for brevity.

// Handle service request, req and return response over channel (ms).

// This handles the one valid service request: "SecretRequest"

// and terminates the channel after the first successful request

// which is not generally what would happen in most channels.

// Note that in the future, we might want to use grpc rather than custom

// service request/response buffers but we don't want to introduce complexity

// into this example. The single request response buffer is defined in

// taosupport/taosupport.proto.

func HandleServiceRequest(ms \*util.MessageStream,

serverProgramData \*taosupport.TaoProgramData,

clientProgramName string, req \*taosupport.SimpleMessage) (bool, error) {

// The somewhat boring secret is the corresponding simpleclient's program name||43

secret := clientProgramName + "43"

if \*req.RequestType == "SecretRequest" {

req.Data = append(req.Data, []byte(secret))

…

return true, nil

} else {

…

}

}

// This just handles the requests.

func serviceThead(ms \*util.MessageStream, clientProgramName string,

serverProgramData \*taosupport.TaoProgramData) {

for {

req, err := taosupport.GetRequest(ms)

…

…

terminate, \_ := HandleServiceRequest(ms, serverProgramData,

clientProgramName, req)

if terminate {

break

}

}

…

}

// This is the server. It implements the server Tao Channel negotiation corresponding

// to the client's taosupport.OpenTaoChannel. It's possible we should move this into

// taosupport/taosupport.go since it should not vary very much from implementation to

// implementation.

func server(serverAddr string, serverProgramData \*taosupport.TaoProgramData) {

var sock net.Listener

// Set up the single root certificate for channel negotiation which is the

// policy key cert.

pool := x509.NewCertPool()

policyCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(serverProgramData.PolicyCert)

if err != nil {

log.Printf("simpleserver, can't parse policyCert: ", err, "\n")

return

}

// Make the policy cert the unique root of the verification chain.

pool.AddCert(policyCert)

tlsc, err := tao.EncodeTLSCert(&serverProgramData.ProgramKey)

…

conf := &tls.Config{

…

}

// Listen for clients.

…

sock, err = tls.Listen("tcp", serverAddr, conf)

…

// Service client connections.

for {

log.Printf("server: at accept\n")

conn, err := sock.Accept()

…

var clientName string

err = conn.(\*tls.Conn).Handshake()

…

peerCerts := conn.(\*tls.Conn).ConnectionState().PeerCertificates

…

peerCert := conn.(\*tls.Conn).ConnectionState().PeerCertificates[0]

…

clientName = peerCert.Subject.OrganizationalUnit[0]

log.Printf("server, peer client name: %s\n", clientName)

ms := util.NewMessageStream(conn)

// At this point the handshake is complete and we fork a service thread

// to communicate with this simpleclient. ms is the bi-directional

// confidentiality and integrity protected channel corresponding to the

// channel opened by OpenTaoChannel.

go serviceThead(ms, clientName, serverProgramData)

}

}

func main() {

// main is very similar to the initial parts on main in simpleclient.

// see the comments there.

…

server(serverAddr, &serverProgramData)

log.Printf("simpleserver: done\n")

}

***Some Common code in Go***

Here is the important common code. We only include critical code.

type TaoProgramData struct {

// true after initialization.

Initialized bool

// Program name.

TaoName string

// DER encoded policy cert for domain.

PolicyCert []byte

// Private program key.

ProgramKey tao.Keys

// Symmetric Keys for program.

ProgramSymKeys []byte

// Program Cert.

ProgramCert []byte

// Path for program to read and write files.

ProgramFilePath \*string

}

func ClearTaoProgramData(programData \*TaoProgramData) {

…

}

// RequestTruncatedAttestation connects to a CA instance, sends the attestation

// for an X.509 certificate, and gets back a truncated attestation with a new

// principal name based on the policy key.

func RequestDomainServiceCert(network, addr string, keys \*tao.Keys,

v \*tao.Verifier) (\*tao.Attestation, error) {

…

tlsCert, err := tao.EncodeTLSCert(keys)

…

conn, err := tls.Dial(network, addr, &tls.Config{

RootCAs: x509.NewCertPool(),

Certificates: []tls.Certificate{\*tlsCert},

InsecureSkipVerify: true,

})

…

// Tao handshake: send client delegation.

ms := util.NewMessageStream(conn)

…

// Read the truncated attestation and check it.

var a tao.Attestation

…

ok, err := v.Verify(a.SerializedStatement, tao.AttestationSigningContext, a.Signature)

…

if !ok {

return nil, errors.New("invalid attestation signature from Tao CA")

}

return &a, nil

}

func InitializeSealedSymmetricKeys(filePath string, t tao.Tao, keysize int) (

[]byte, error) {

// Make up symmetric key and save sealed version.

log.Printf("InitializeSealedSymmetricKeys\n")

unsealed, err := tao.Parent().GetRandomBytes(keysize)

…

sealed, err := tao.Parent().Seal(unsealed, tao.SealPolicyDefault)

…

ioutil.WriteFile(path.Join(filePath, "sealedsymmetricKey"), sealed, os.ModePerm)

return unsealed, nil

}

func InitializeSealedProgramKey(filePath string, t tao.Tao, domain tao.Domain) (

\*tao.Keys, error) {

k, derCert, err := CreateSigningKey(t)

…

// Request attestations. Policy key is verifier.

na, err := RequestDomainServiceCert("tcp", \*caAddr, k, domain.Keys.VerifyingKey)

…

k.Delegation = na

pa, \_ := auth.UnmarshalForm(na.SerializedStatement)

var saysStatement \*auth.Says

if ptr, ok := pa.(\*auth.Says); ok {

saysStatement = ptr

} else if val, ok := pa.(auth.Says); ok {

saysStatement = &val

}

sf, ok := saysStatement.Message.(auth.Speaksfor)

if ok != true {

return nil, errors.New("InitializeSealedProgramKey: says doesnt have speaksfor message")

}

kprin, ok := sf.Delegate.(auth.Term)

if ok != true {

return nil, errors.New("InitializeSealedProgramKey: speaksfor message doesn't have Delegate")

}

newCert := auth.Bytes(kprin.(auth.Bytes))

k.Cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(newCert)

…

programKeyBlob, err := tao.MarshalSignerDER(k.SigningKey)

…

sealedProgramKey, err := t.Seal(programKeyBlob, tao.SealPolicyDefault)

…

err = ioutil.WriteFile(path.Join(filePath, "sealedsigningKey"), sealedProgramKey, os.ModePerm)

…

err = ioutil.WriteFile(path.Join(filePath, "signerCert"), newCert, os.ModePerm)

…

delegateBlob, err := proto.Marshal(k.Delegation)

…

err = ioutil.WriteFile(path.Join(filePath, "delegationBlob"), delegateBlob, os.ModePerm)

…

return k, nil

}

func (pp \*TaoProgramData) FillTaoProgramData(policyCert []byte, taoName string,

programKey tao.Keys, symKeys []byte, programCert []byte,

filePath \*string) bool {

pp.PolicyCert = policyCert

pp.TaoName = taoName

pp.ProgramKey = programKey

pp.ProgramSymKeys = symKeys

pp.ProgramCert = programCert

pp.ProgramFilePath = filePath

pp.Initialized = true

return true

}

// Load domain info for the domain and establish Clouproxy keys and properties.

// This handles reading in existing (sealed) Cloudproxy keys and properties, or,

// if this is the first call (or a call after state has been erased), this also

// handles initialization of keys and certificates including interaction with the

// domain signing service and storage of new sealed keys and certificates.

// If TaoParadigm completes without error, programObject contains all the

// Cloudproxy information needed throughout the calling program execution

// ensures that this information is sealed and stored for subsequent invocations.

func TaoParadigm(cfg \*string, filePath \*string,

programObject \*TaoProgramData) (error) {

// Load domain info for this domain.

simpleDomain, err := tao.LoadDomain(\*cfg, nil)

…

// Get policy cert.

if simpleDomain.Keys.Cert == nil {

return errors.New("TaoParadigm: Can't retrieve policy cert")

}

derPolicyCert := simpleDomain.Keys.Cert.Raw

…

// hash of policyCert identifies the extension

policyKeyName := sha256.Sum256(derPolicyCert)

hexPolicyCert := hex.EncodeToString(policyKeyName[0:32])

// Extend my Tao Principal name with policy key.

t := make([]auth.Term, 1, 1)

t[0] = auth.TermVar(hexPolicyCert)

e := auth.PrinExt{Name: "key",

Arg: t}

err = tao.Parent().ExtendTaoName(auth.SubPrin{e})

…

// Retrieve extended name.

taoName, err := tao.Parent().GetTaoName()

…

log.Printf("TaoParadigm: my name is %s\n", taoName)

// Get my keys and certificates.

sealedSymmetricKey, sealedProgramKey, programCert, delegation, err :=

LoadProgramKeys(\*filePath)

…

// Unseal my symmetric keys, or initialize them.

var symKeys []byte

var policy string

if sealedSymmetricKey != nil {

symKeys, policy, err = tao.Parent().Unseal(sealedSymmetricKey)

…

} else {

symKeys, err = InitializeSealedSymmetricKeys(\*filePath, tao.Parent(),

SizeofSymmetricKeys)

…

}

}

…

// Get my Program private key if present or initialize it.

var programKey \*tao.Keys

if sealedProgramKey != nil {

programKey, err = SigningKeyFromBlob(tao.Parent(),

sealedProgramKey, programCert, delegation)

…

} else {

// Get Program key.

programKey, err = InitializeSealedProgramKey(

\*filePath, tao.Parent(),

\*simpleDomain)

…

}

log.Printf("TaoParadigm: Retrieved Signing key\n")

// Initialize Program policy object.

ok := programObject.FilTaoProgramData(derPolicyCert, taoName.String(),

\*programKey, symKeys, programKey.Cert.Raw, filePath)

if !ok {

return errors.New("TaoParadigm: Can't initialize TaoProgramData")

}

return nil

}

// Establishes the Tao Channel for a client and returns the stream for subsequent reads

// and writes as well as the server's Tao Principal Name.

func OpenTaoChannel(programObject \*TaoProgramData, serverAddr \*string) (

\*util.MessageStream, \*string, error) {

// Parse policy cert and make it the root of our heierarchy for verifying

// Tao Channel peer.

policyCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(programObject.PolicyCert)

…

pool := x509.NewCertPool()

pool.AddCert(policyCert)

// Open the Tao Channel using the Program key.

tlsc, err := tao.EncodeTLSCert(&programObject.ProgramKey)

…

conn, err := tls.Dial("tcp", \*serverAddr, &tls.Config{

RootCAs: pool,

Certificates: []tls.Certificate{\*tlsc},

InsecureSkipVerify: false,

})

…

// server name.

peerName := policyCert.Subject.OrganizationalUnit[0]

// Stream for Tao Channel.

ms := util.NewMessageStream(conn)

return ms, &peerName, nil

}

…

// Returns sealed symmetric key, sealed signing key,

// DER encoded program cert, delegation, error.

// Only returns errors if file exists but can’t be read.

func LoadProgramKeys(filePath string) ([]byte, []byte, []byte, []byte, error) {

…

return sealedSymmetricKey, sealedProgramKey, derCert, ds, nil

}

**Configuring, compiling and running SimpleExample**

When the Tao Host System starts, it requires several kinds of information:

* A public key that roots the *Tao* on the hardware,
* Host data, including the mechanism used to communicate between the Hosted System and the Host System, rules affecting which Hosted Systems the Host System should run, and, in the case of a hardware rooted Host System, the hardware mechanism that is employed (e.g., TPM 1.2 or TPM 2.0).
* Domain data (in our case for the simpleexample domain) including the policy key and corresponding private key, and the self signed policy cert.

In addition, we need an implementation for the “Host System” which incudes support for the host provided isolation mechanism and communications channels used to communicate with Hosted Systems. In our case, the Host System is Linux and the implementation (whether using a soft tao, TPM 1.2 or TPM 2.0) is linux\_host[[9]](#footnote-9).

The public key rooting the hardware tao is usually produced by a tpm utility; in the TPM 1.2 nomenclature, this is called the AIK. The public key rooting the TPM 2.0 is the endorsement key. In our demo, we use a “soft tao” which is rooted in a key.

The Host Data consisting of keys and Host Certificate (used to validate nested Host System Attestation), and are in $CLOUDPROXYDIR/go/apps/SimpleExample/SimpleDomain/domain.simpleexample/linux\_tao\_host.

The Domain data including the policy key and corresponding private key, hostname, host type and communications channel, information related to the guards used[[10]](#footnote-10) as well as signatures over the binaries that are part of the domain (if the Host System limits what Hosted Systems it will rum, in our case, these are the *simpleclient* and *simpleserver* binaries).

In simpleexample, all these information files in $CLOUDPROXYDIR/go/apps/SimpleExample/SimpleDomain/domain.simpleexample. Other sub-directories of $CLOUDPROXYDIR/go/apps/SimpleExample/SimpleDomain/domain.simpleexample, namely, SimpleClient, SimpleServer and SimpleDomainService contains data files stored and retrieved by these programs (like sealed keys and Program Certificates).

There is a single utility, called *tao* which initializes this domain data, activates the tao host and runs the applications. We provide shell scripts to call *tao* with the right arguments, these scripts are in SimpleDomain.

The scripts use several path variables, namely:

TAO\_HOST\_DOMAIN\_DIR=~/src/github.com/jlmucb/cloudproxy/go/apps/simpleexample/SimpleDomain

OLD\_TEMPLATE=$TAO\_HOST\_DOMAIN\_DIR/domain\_template.simpleexample

DOMAIN=/Domains/domain.simpleexample

TEMPLATE=/Domains/domain\_template.simpleexample

BINPATH=~/bin

In addition, we need a generic domain template. We have provided a sample template in *SimpleDomain/domain\_template.simpleexample*. However, you can generate such a template by running *gentemplate*, which consists of:

$BINPATH/tao domain init -tao\_domain $DOMAIN -config\_template $TEMPLATE -pass "xxx"

/home/jlm/src/github.com/jlmucb/cloudproxy/go/run/scripts/domain\_template.pb > $TEMPLATE

sed "s/REPLACE\_WITH\_DOMAIN\_GUARD\_TYPE/Datalog/g"

This template contains information included in the policy cert, the basic datalog rules used by the domain when authenticating images and the location of the images which must me measured and included in the policy database in SimpleDomainService.

First, we must initialize the directory that will hold domain information. We do this by first

mkdir /Domains

and then calling initidomainstorage which consists of:

#

source ./defines

if [ -e $DOMAIN ]

then

ls -l $DOMAIN

else

mkdir $DOMAIN

fi

cp $OLD\_TEMPLATE $TEMPLATE

source ./defines

if [[ -e $DOMAIN/SimpleClient]]

then

echo "$DOMAIN/SimpleClient exists"

else

mkdir $DOMAIN/SimpleClient

echo "$DOMAIN/SimpleClient created"

fi

if [[ -e $DOMAIN/SimpleServer]]

then

echo "$DOMAIN/SimpleServer exists"

else

mkdir $DOMAIN/SimpleServer

echo "$DOMAIN/SimpleServer created"

fi

if [[ -e $DOMAIN/SimpleDomainService]]

then

echo "$DOMAIN/SimpleDomainService exists"

else

mkdir $DOMAIN/SimpleDomainService

echo "$DOMAIN/SimpleDomainService created"

fi

To initialize the (soft) key, call initkey which does the following:

#

source ./defines

if [[ -e $DOMAIN/linux\_tao\_host ]]

then

echo "$DOMAIN/linux\_tao\_host exists"

else

mkdir $DOMAIN/linux\_tao\_host

echo "$DOMAIN/linux\_tao\_host created"

fi

KEY\_NAME="$($BINPATH/tao domain newsoft -soft\_pass xxx -config\_template $TEMPLATE $DOMAIN/linux\_tao\_host)"

echo "host\_name: \"$KEY\_NAME\"" >> $TEMPLATE

“newsoft” means generate a new soft key. The arguments following the flags “-config\_template -tao\_ -pass” specify respectively the location of the template, the location where the domain information is stored and the password protecting the private policy key. This produces the xxx file containing root Tao key. If using the tpm, you’d call a corresponding program to put the AIK in template.

To initialize the domain, call initdomain which does the following:

#

source ./defines

$BINPATH/tao domain init -tao\_domain $DOMAIN -config\_template $TEMPLATE -pub\_domain\_address "127.0.0.1" -pass xxx

$BINPATH/tao domain policy -add\_host -add\_programs -add\_linux\_host -add\_guard -tao\_domain \

$DOMAIN -pass xxx -config\_template $TEMPLATE

The first call produces the files in $DOMAIN/linux\_tao\_host/{cert,keys,host.config}. The second measures the applications in the domain.

To initialize the (Linux) host, call inithost which does the following:

$BINPATH/tao host init -tao\_domain $DOMAIN -hosting process -root -pass xxx

This generates linux host configuration information which is in SimpleDomain/domain.simpleexample/linux\_tao\_host. The argument to the “-hosting” flag is the kind of child hosts, namely, Linux processes. The “-root” flag means this is a “root” host (i.e. – the lowest level tao). For hosts stacked on other hosts, we would use the “-stacked” flag. For example,

$BINPATH/tao host init -tao\_domain $DOMAIN -hosting process -stacked -parent\_type tpm

To run the host, call runhost, which consists of:

$BINPATH/tao host start -tao\_domain $DOMAIN -host linux\_tao\_host/ -pass xxx &

The argument to the “-host” flag is the subdirectory of SimpleDomain/domain.simpleexample that contains the host information.

Finally, to run a Hosted System, like simpleclient, we would say:

$BINPATH/tao run $BINPATH/simpleclient -tao\_domain $DOMAIN &

We have provided an additional script, “*runall*” which starts all the Hosted Systems and SimpleDomainService.

To summarize, to run simpleexample the very first time, call *initkey*, *initdomain* and *inithost*. If no host is running, call *runhost*. Each time you run tests call *runall* but remember to kill these services afterwards.

Some further observations: The password supplied in the calls to tao domain init and tao domain policy protect access to the policy private key. The password supplied to the tao newsoft, tao host init and tao host run protect the soft host private key; this password is usually not the same as the key protecting the policy private key. linux\_host which implements the Linux Host System and as the shell scripts are configured, uses the rules generated by tao domain policy to decide whether to run an application. Normally, the Host System does not use application security domain rules to determine what to run and, in fact, usually will run any application. This can be accomplished with the inclusion of the rule:

LinuxHost(x)

(forall P: forall T: forall H: TrustedHost(T) and LinuxHost(H) and Subprin(P, T, H) implies TrustedLinuxHost(P))

(forall P: Program(P))

(forall P: forall Q: forall H: Program(Q) and TrustedLinuxHost(H) and Subprin(P, H, Q) implies MemberProgram(P))

where x is the measurement of the linux\_host or an “AllowAll” policy. As you become familiar with the Datalog rules, you can apply them flexibly but that is a distraction in SimpleExample.

**What the output from SimpleExample teaches us about the Tao**

The most concrete way to understand Cloudproxy is to follow the code example and the output. Here is a brief description of the output of the Go version of SimpleExample using a “soft” tao. In the execution setup, the domain information is in /Domains/domain.simpleexample; this includes the template, tao prepared configuration files and three directories: SimpleClient, SimpleServer and SimpleDomainService which are directories in which application information (mostly sealed keys) are stored for, respectively, SimpleClient, SimpleServer and SimpleDomainService. Binaries are stored in the directory ~/bin as is customary in go.

In the repository, there are also three shell scripts to facilitate running the examples. The script compile compiles the applications and puts them into bin. After making the directory, /Domains, use *initdomainstorage* to initialize the storage areas. Copy the script clean into /Domains/domain.simpleexample/SimpleDomain and make it executable.

Thereafter, modify any code you wish to and run *compile* in $CLOUDPROXYDIR/go/apps/SimpleExample/SimpleDomain to compile the programs. ***Then*** *as root*, run *runall* to run SimpleExample. After it runs, you can run *clean*, in /Domains/domain.simpleexample/SimpleDomain, to erase the output files. *clean* runs a ps aux | fgrep simple at the end to tell you what lingering processes to kill (kill -9) so you can run subsequent tests.

Our example uses the Datalog authorization subsystem so system rules are expressed in the Datalog policy language. Example statements in Datalog can be seen in the template file.

When you look at the output, you’ll notice, at the beginning:

Warning: Passwords on the command line are not secure. Use -pass option only for testing.

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Warning: Passwords on the command line are not secure. Use -pass option only for testing.

Linux Tao Service (key([08011001180122450801124104310f3c0d7c5ff1...])) started and waiting for requests

2016/02/20 11:27:13 simpledomainservice: Loaded domain

2016/02/20 11:27:13 simpledomainservice: accepting connections

This indicates that the linux\_host, simpledomainservice, simpleclient and simpleserver have been initialized. The second section shows that the linux\_host for the soft tao (with the indicated key) has started. The final section indicates that the domain service is started and waiting for request.

Next, you’ll notice,

TaoParadigm: my name is key([08011001180...]).Program([94d80d932fbc...]).key(f3169de17b1032dde230423f7d11dde89c143de147188fa67acf613d63da0420)

This is from *simpleserver*, and it is the Tao Principal Name of your *simpleserver* program, running on your Host System, after it has been extended with the hash of the loaded policy certificate. If you look at the source code for *simpleserver*, you’ll notice that the policy key is not embedded in the code; if it had been, the policy key would be reflected in the program measurement. Instead, we read in the policy key cert and extend the *simpleserver* Tao Principal Name with the hash of the self-signed policy cert. The Tao Principal Name is hierarchical. The first segment, “key([08011001180...])”, describes the host root[[11]](#footnote-11). The second segment, “Program([94d80d932fbc...])”, describes the *simpleserver* program reflecting its measurement. The third segment, “key(f3169de17b1032dde230423f7d11dde89c143de147188fa67acf613d63da0420)”, describes the policy key as noted above. Observe that the Tao Principal Name fully reflects all the program code as well as the policy it will execute (as represented by the policy key).

For the rest of this description, we will simplify terms like “Program([94d80d932fbc...])” as “Program(*program-measurement*)”.

Next, notice the statement:

simpledomainservice, speaksfor: key(*simpleserver\_program\_key*) speaksfor key(*host-key*).Program(*simpleserver-measurement*).key(*policy-key*)

This is the statement that TaoParadigm will use to request an attestation from the Linux Host System. The resulting Host System supplied attestation is

key(*host-system-key*) from *notBefore* until *notAfter* says [*simpleserver-program-certificate*] speaksfor key(*linux-host*).Program(*simpleserver-measurement*).key(*policy-key*)

This statement is sent to the domain service which, after checking the measurements and domain policy signs a certificate (with pKpolicy) that includes the statement

key(*policy-key*) from *notBefore* until *notAfter* says [*simpleserver-program-certificate*] speaksfor key(*linux-host*).Program(*simpleserver-measurement*).key(*policy-key*)

This is the *simpleserver* Program certificate. *Simpleserver*, as we described in the code annotations, stores this certificate, and sealed versions of the corresponding private *simpleserver* ProgramKey and SymmetricKeys. Decrypted and useable versions of these keys are populated in *serverProgramData* by *TaoParadigm*.

After initialization, *simpleserver* waits for client connections.

*simpleclient* meanwhile, goes through the same *TaoParadigm* initialization (which is not duplicated here) obtaining its Program certificate. *ServerClient* calls *OpenTaoChannel* with it’s Program Cerificate and corresponding key. You’ll notice, later in the output, that *simpleserver* opens a secure channel with a peer

key(*linux-host*).Program(*simple-client-measurement*).key(*policy-key*)

That peer is just your *simpleclient*. Normally, the Host System on which *simpleclient* runs will be different from the one *simpleserver* runs although in our case, they run on the same host.

Finally, you’ll notice that *simpleserver* receives a request

2016/02/20 11:27:16 message type: 1

2016/02/20 11:27:16 request\_type: SecretRequest

and returns the secret which is received by simpleclient as

simpleclient: secret iskey(linux-host).Program(simpleclient-measurement).key(policy-key)43

*simpleclient* encrypts and integrity protects the secret with its symmetric keys and the process concludes.

We have only discussed the major output elements here. Your output will contain much more including log messages from *simpledomainserver*.

The certificate for the simpleclient (which is in /Domains/domain.simpleexample/SimpleClient/signerCert) is:

Certificate:

Data:

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number: 1455996433984 (0x15300267640)

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

Issuer: C=US, O=CloudProxy, OU=, ST=WA, CN=SimpleExampleTest

Validity

Not Before: Feb 20 19:27:16 2016 GMT

Not After : Feb 20 19:27:16 2017 GMT

Subject: C=US, O=Google, OU=key([08011001180122450801124104310f3c0d7c5ff1490ace20f167e7de1d5c6847c84d498c3b4a8087031b49d9a38e7e59f4c5e4f23adc6ce2e394c7ac48923bcfcd7446bba0f86ef8bbdf89b6d5]).Program([d38d94100ae2bb57cccb97cb347ab060fb28c382bafe138f253fd19b491b1a15]).key(f3169de17b1032dde230423f7d11dde89c143de147188fa67acf613d63da0420), ST=, CN=localhost

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey

Public-Key: (256 bit)

pub:

04:7a:d5:40:f6:80:fd:73:a5:80:b8:88:57:7c:60:

6d:87:b6:78:4a:3f:fc:1c:cc:40:af:34:2d:98:31:

02:21:02:71:65:66:7f:90:49:91:88:91:21:43:c7:

f5:50:de:0a:7c:58:c8:6c:10:06:46:fc:3c:1a:a1:

bb:c7:20:c6:83

ASN1 OID: prime256v1

X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Key Usage: critical

Key Agreement, Certificate Sign

X509v3 Extended Key Usage:

TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

30:44:02:20:0c:a0:99:55:79:0d:b7:26:20:07:38:03:da:ba:

ff:28:0c:fd:94:f6:4e:5f:b1:ad:41:11:89:42:61:fd:5b:e7:

02:20:7f:26:62:ee:2a:4c:90:e4:f4:7c:d6:c6:2c:b6:1d:db:

d8:4a:bc:b9:60:26:aa:80:e8:bf:74:bd:ee:34:cb:fe

You’ll notice that /Domains/domain.simpleexample/SimpleClient/ also contains the files

sealedsigningKey (*simpleclient’s* sealed program private key), retrieved\_secret (the “secret” encrypted with *simpleclient’s* symmetric keys) and sealedsymmetricKey (*simpleclient’s* sealed symmetric keys).

**Running SimpleExample on a TPM1.2 machine**

TODO

**Upgrade and key management scenarios**

Since sealed material is only provided to a Hosted System with exactly the same code identity that sealed the material running on the exact same Host System, while isolated by that Host System, you may be worried about lost data when a Hosted System breaks or becomes unavailable or limitations that may affect key management, software upgrade or distribution when the Hosted System runs on other Host Systems. In fact, it is rather easy to accommodate all these circumstances, and many others, efficiently, securely and in most cases automatically using Cloudproxy, although Cloudproxy applications must make provisions for this during development.

Below are a few sever example key management techniques that can be used when a Cloudproxy application is upgraded, a new Cloudproxy application (in the same security domain) is launched, or as applications migrate to other Host Systems. All these mechanisms preserve the confidentiality and integrity of all Cloudproxy applications and their data.

There is a discussion of many of the mechanisms, as they might affect client software used across different security domains, by users with no control over the application code while supporting consumer transparency (the most challenging case) in [4]. Here we restrict ourselves to cooperating server applications for simplicity.

To ease description, imagine all application data is stored locally or remotely and probably redundantly in encrypted, integrity protected files. Each file is encrypted and integrity protected with individual file keys and each file key is itself encrypted and integrity protected with a group sealing keys. Different groups of file keys are protected by different sealing keys to reduce the risk of universal compromise. Every key has exposed meta data consisting of a globally unique name for the entity it protects, the key type and an “epoch.” Epochs increases monotonically as the keys are rotated[[12]](#footnote-12). As keys for a new epoch become available, the objects they protect are re-encrypted, over a reasonable period of time (the Rotation Period). During this time, keys for the prior epoch are available and can be used to decrypt objects; however, as soon as new epoch keys are available, all new data is encrypted with the new epoch keys. At the end of the Rotation Period, once applications have confirmed that all data is protected with the keys from the most recent epoch, old epoch keys are deprecated.

The first option to deal with “brittle keys” protecting application data is standard: use a distributed key server like Keyczar (or many others). In this case, Cloudproxy applications do not locally store data protection keys but contact a key server (over a Tao Channel). The key server (which does key rotation, etc., as many do) authenticates the Hosted System that needs keys and verifies that it is authorized to receive those keys; if so they are transmitted over the Tao Channel. Hosted Systems can be upgraded and all authorization policy can be maintained by the key service. Hosted Systems will need to respond to “reinitialize” requests periodically as keys rotate.

An alternative, less centralized, key rotation mechanism allows individual Hosted Systems maintaining their own keys to protect files as well as perform key rotation themselves. When software is upgraded or new programs are introduced, the new programs or upgraded programs come with a certificate signed by the policy key that instruct one Hosted System to disclose these keys to the new version (or new) Hosted System. Since this can result in lost data if a Host System becomes unavailable, Hosted Systems would likely distribute these keys to different instances on different machines to ensure continuity.

Finally, when new data protection keys are established for an application task, Hosted Systems can contact a domain service to receive intermediate keys for registered files or file classes. These keys can be sealed using the Host System provided Seal and used without contacting the service each time the Hosted System starts. This mechanism places additional administrative burden on each Hosted System to contact the “key sharing service” as intermediate keys rotate but this is not uncommon.

It is important to note that while the foregoing descriptions treat keys as “all or nothing” entities, all these scheme have corresponding “split key” implementations to achieve higher security. In addition, any security domain may elect to have an authorized Cloudproxy Hosted System archive data. Such an archive application, upon which security domain policy confers access to data, can, in the background, archive data to (centralized or distributed) repositories.

As a reminder: there are other possible mechanisms to do key management.

Finally, note that application upgrade (given a data key management solution) is automatic even when the policy keys change: New versions of Hosted Systems simply re-initialize (get new program keys and certificates) using the (centralized or distributed) security domain service and no special provision, aside from current policy at the security domain service, need be provided[[13]](#footnote-13).

**Suggested Exercises**

That’s all there is to using Cloudproxy. Here are some suggested exercises to complete the training:

1. Write a more complicated set of domain applications; for example, see “$CLOUDPROXYDIR/go/apps/fileproxy.”
2. Boot a Linux Host System on tpm supported hardware using the TPM to root the Linux Tao (see … for instructions).
3. Boot a KVM Host System on tpm supported hardware and then run a stacked VM host in a Linux partition (see … for instructions). SimpleExample should run fine in the VM(s) with slight changes to the initialization scripts.
4. Explore the Data log engine (examples?)
5. What happens if you make a modification to simpleclient.go and immediately run it on linux\_host without reinitializing the domain?

**References**

**[1] Manferdelli, Roeder, Schneider, The CloudProxy Tao for Trusted Computing,** <http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2013/EECS-2013-135.pdf>.

**[2] CloudProxy Source code,** [http:/](http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2013/EECS-2013-135.pdf)/github.com/jlmucb/cloudproxy.

**[3] TCG, TPM specs,** <http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/tpm_library_specification>

[4] **Beekman, Manferdelli, Wagner,** Attestation Transparency: Building secure Internet services for legacy clients**.** AsiaCCS, 2016.

**The Guard**

The Guard interface:

* Subprincipal() auth.SubPrin: returns a unique subprincipal for this policy.
* Save(key \*Signer) error: writes all persistent policy data to disk, signed by key
* Authorize(name auth.Prin, op string, args []string) error
* Retract(name auth.Prin, op string, args []string) error
* IsAuthorized(name auth.Prin, op string, args []string) bool
* AddRule(rule string) error
* RetractRule(rule string) error
* Clear() error: removes all rules.
* Query(query string) (bool, error)
* RuleCount() int
* GetRule(i int) string.
* String() string: returns a string suitable for showing auth info.

**CloudProxy Go API’s**

type Tao interface {

// GetTaoName returns the Tao principal name assigned

// to the caller.

GetTaoName() (name auth.Prin, err error)

// ExtendTaoName irreversibly extends the Tao principal

// name of the caller.

ExtendTaoName(subprin auth.SubPrin) error

// GetRandomBytes returns a slice of n random bytes.

GetRandomBytes(n int) (bytes []byte, err error)

// Rand produces an io.Reader for random bytes from this Tao.

Rand() io.Reader

// Attest requests the Tao host sign a statement on behalf of

// the caller. The

// optional issuer, time and expiration will be given default

// values if nil.

Attest(issuer \*auth.Prin, time, expiration \*int64,

message auth.Form)(\*Attestation, error)

// Seal encrypts data so only certain hosted programs can

// unseal it.

Seal(data []byte, policy string) (sealed []byte, err error)

// Unseal decrypts data that has been sealed by the Seal()

// operation, but only

// if the policy specified during the Seal() operation is

// satisfied.

Unseal(sealed []byte) (data []byte, policy string, err error)

}

// Parent returns the interface to the underlying host Tao. It depends

// on a specific environment variable being set. On success it

// memoizes the result before returning it because there should only

// ever be a single channel to the host.

// On failure, it logs a message using glog and returns nil.

// Note: errors are not returned so that, once it is confirmed that Parent

// returns a non-nil value, callers can use the function result in an

// expression, e.g.:

// name, err := tao.Parent().GetTaoName()

func Parent() Tao {

ParentFromConfig(Config{})

return cachedHost

}

type Host interface {

// GetRandomBytes returns a slice of n random bytes.

GetRandomBytes(childSubprin auth.SubPrin, n int)

(bytes []byte, err error)

// Attest requests the Tao host sign a statement on behalf of

// the caller.

Attest(childSubprin auth.SubPrin, issuer \*auth.Prin,

time, expiration \*int64, message auth.Form)

(\*Attestation, error)

// Encrypt data so that only this host can access it.

Encrypt(data []byte) (encrypted []byte, err error)

// Decrypt data that only this host can access.

Decrypt(encrypted []byte) (data []byte, err error)

// Notify this Host that a new hosted program has been created.

AddedHostedProgram(childSubprin auth.SubPrin) error

// Notify this Host that a hosted program has been killed.

RemovedHostedProgram(childSubprin auth.SubPrin) error

// Get the Tao principal name assigned to this hosted Tao

// host. The name encodes the full path from the root Tao,

// through all intermediary Tao hosts, to this hosted Tao

// host.

HostName() auth.Prin

}

**SimpleExample in C++**

***Simple Client in C++***

***Simple Server in C++***

1. John is [manferdelli@google.com](mailto:manferdelli@google.com). Based on work with Tom Roeder ([tmroeder@google.com](mailto:tmroeder@google.com)) and Kevin Walsh(kevin.walsh@holycross.edu). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. To do this, the Host System must be isolated and have access to secrets only it knows. The foundation for this consists of hardware primitives provides to the “base” Cloudproxy systems it boots. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See [1] for details for the “Trust Model” enabling a recipient of such a certificate to rely on the association between the public key named in the Host Certificate and a trustworthy Cloudproxy Hosted System. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. As indicated by the ellipsis (“…”) principal names are often longer and may even contain, say the full modulus of an RSA public key. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Initramfs will have security critical code like the service that implements the Tao so it must be measured along with the kernel image to provide an accurate identity for the “running Linux OS.” [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Explicitly embedding the key just means that it appears in initialized data measured as part of the program. An example of implicit embedding, which is described in more detail below, is reading in, say, the policy key and extending the identity of the program with that key. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. The sample code in go/apps/fileproxy demonstrates rollback protection for this sealed data and we plan to improve local rollback support in the near future. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. The actual attestation being signed by the Host System expressed in a formalized language is PKprogram speaksfor the Hosted System Principal name. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. linux\_host is also the implementation used by a KVM Host System and Docker containers and in fact, all Host Systems running on Linux.. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Look at domain.go for further details. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. If the root host had been a TPM, the name would include the TPM’s AIK, and the contents of PCR 17 and 18 which contain the measurement of the booted Linux, extended with the initramfs which contains all the security critical files used by the Linux instance [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. And you certainly should rotate keys as part of effective cryptographic hygiene! [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Many events may cause such a policy change including a determination that previously trusted hardware elements have been compromised. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)