**Cloudproxy Nuts and Bolts**

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**Overview**

Cloudproxy is a software system that provides *remotely authenticated* isolation, confidentiality and integrity of code and data for Hosted Systems preventing attacks from co-tenants and (under modest assumptions) insiders in a remote data center on supporting hardware. To achieve this, Cloudproxy uses on two components: a “Host System” (raw hardware, Virtual Machine Manager, Operating System) which provides capabilities described below to a “Hosted System” (VM, Application, Container).

Cloudproxy provides a mechanism at each level of the software stack to isolate Hosted Systems, measure and remotely verify the exact software and configuration information constituting the Hosted System and provide security services like sealing that ensures that information (like keys) can be securely provisioned and retrieved only by the correct Hosted System, while isolated, on a supported platform.

A key concept for Cloudproxy is Code Identity and Measurement that is coupled with isolation, secret provisioning. A Host System measures a Hosted System incorporating the actual binary code and configuration information resulting in an unforgeable, compact global identity for that code and execution context. Since the Hosted System knows the “identity” of each Hosted System (i.e.- the unforgeable global identity), it can store secrets that only the Hosted System will receive[[1]](#footnote-1). The Host Systems can also “attest” to statements made by Hosted Systems by incorporating the unforgeable global identity in statements it signs (again with keys only an isolated Host System has access to). The upshot of this is that a Cloudproxy Hosted System can be isolated, maintain secrets only it knows to encrypt and integrity protect all data it receives or sends, and it can securely authenticate itself over an otherwise unprotected network connection and thus employ authenticated public keys tied to its identity that can be relied upon by communicating parties.

Readers can consult [1] for a fuller description.

**The Tao**

A Hosted System uses the Cloudproxy API, called the Tao, to achieve the security promises (program isolation, and confidentiality and integrity for programs and data) provided by Cloudproxy. The programming model is simple and require only a few API calls. The Tao Library is linked into an executable to provide the programming interface in Go or C++.

The basic calls are:

**StartHostedProgram**: StartHostedProgram instructs the Host System to measure and start a new, isolated Hosted System. It names the binary image and other context data to start the program. The Hosted System could be, for example, a VM if the Host System is a VMM or an isolated Linux process if the Host System is Linux.

**Seal**: Seal takes an opaque data blob and appends the measurement of the Hosted System. It encrypts and integrity protects the resulting object (using keys only the Host System knows) and returns the resulting opaque object to the Hosted System. Hosted Systems typically “seal” private signing and encryption keys so they can be later recovered when the Hosted System is restarted using “Unseal” below.

**Unseal**: Unseal takes an opaque blob (produced by a prior “Seal”) from a Hosted System. It decrypts (and checks the integrity of) the blob and compares the measurement of the Hosted System requesting the unseal with the measurement of the Hosted System named in the blob. If the measurements match, it returns the protected data.

**Attest**: Attest takes a blob from a Hosted System and signs a statement naming the blob and the measurement of the Hosted System requesting the Attest. It returns the signed statement (the “Attestation”) along with a certificate (the “Host Certificate”) from an authority certifying that the public key it used to sign the statement belongs to a verified Host System with enumerated security characteristics. See [1] for details for the “Trust Model” and mechanism that allows a recipient of such a certificate to rely on the association between the public key named in the Host Certificate and a trustworthy Cloudproxy Hosted System. The meaning of the signed blob is, informally, “Statement X came from the program with Measurement M while it was isolated. Hosted Systems mainly use attest as follows: they generate a public-private key pair and seal the private key; then they request an attest of the corresponding public key. A party receiving the Attestation and Host Certificate can cryptographically verify the public key came from the named program while isolated and thus subsequent proof of possession of the private key can be used to authenticate statements from the Hosted System.

**GetRandom**: GetRandom provides cryptographically random bits, typically for key generation.

**Principal Names**

Principal names in Cloudproxy are hierarchical and securely name the principal. For example, a principal rooted in a public key will have the public key in its name and a program principal (a measured Cloudproxy Hosted System will have the measurement in the principal name.

The root name for a hosted program, in the development case, might look something like

key([080110011801224508011241046cdc82f70552eb...]).Program([25fac93bd4cc868352c78f4d34df6d2747a17f85...])

Here, key([080110011801224508011…])represents the signing key of the host and Program([25fac93bd4cc868352c78f4d34df6d2747a17f85...])extends the host name with the hash of the hosted program (25fac93bd4cc868352c78f4d34df6d2747a17f85...). If the host were a real Linux host rooted in a TPM boot, its name would name the AIK and the PCRs of the booted Linux systems which incorporate the hash of the Authenticated Code Module (“ACM”) that the bios called to start the authenticated boot and the hash of the Linux image and it’s initramfs[[2]](#footnote-2).

**The Tao Paradigm**

The Tao is almost always used in a stereotypical way which we refer to as the Tao Paradigm. Programs always have policy public keys embedded (PKpolicy) in their image either explicitly or implicitly. Statements signed by the corresponding private key (pKpolicy), and only those statements, are accepted as authoritative and acted on by these programs. The policy key(s) plus the Hosted System code, reflected in its measurement, fully describe how the Hosted System should behave and, hence, an authenticate measurement is a reliable description of expected behavior.

In the Tao Paradigm, when a program first starts on a Hosted System, it makes up a public/private key-pair (PKprogram/ pKprogram) and several symmetric keys that it uses to “seal” information for itself; it then “seals,” using the Host System interface, all this private (key) information[[3]](#footnote-3). Next it requests an Attestation from its Host System, naming the newly generated PKprogram and sends the Attestation to a service for the security domain which confirms the security properties in the Attestation and Host Certificate and, if these meet security domain requirements, the security domain service signs (with pKpolicy) an x509 certificate specifying PKprogram and the Tao Principal Name of the Hosted System (as mentioned above, this name, specifies, among other things, the Hosted System measurement). This resulting certificate, called the Program Certificate, can be used by any Hosted System to prove its identity to another Hosted System in the same security domain. Program Certificates are used to negotiate encrypted, integrity protected SSL-like channels between Hosted Systems (the “Tao Channel”) and Hosted Systems can share information over these channels with full assurance that the it knows the code identity and security properties of its channel peer. Once established each endpoint of the channel “speaks for” each Hosted System.

Hosted Systems in the same security domain can full trust other Hosted Systems in the same security domain with data or processing. Typically, a Hosted System uses the symmetric keys it generates and seals at initialization to encrypt and integrity protect information it stores on disks or remotely.

Employing a centralized security domain service eliminates the need for all Cloudproxy Hosted Systems in a security domain to maintain lists of trusted hardware or trusted programs and simplifies distribution, maintenance and upgrade.

Often, Hosted Systems in the same security domain will share intermediate keys used to protect data that may be used on many Host System environments. As discussed below, when software is upgraded or a new Hosted System in a security domain is added, these keys can be shared based on policy-key signed directives as Host or Hosted Systems are upgraded or new systems are introduced in a controlled but flexible way eliminating the danger that data might become inaccessible if a particular Cloudproxy system is replaced or becomes damaged or unavailable.

**The Extended Tao**

Given the Tao Paradigm that is almost universally employed, the Tao contains some additional support functions.

*DomainLoad* is used to store and retrieve Program Certificates and sealed data.

*Extend* allows a Hosted System to extend its Principal Name with arbitrary data. For example, rather than having a policy embedded in a program image, a Hosted System can extend its name with a policy key it reads and the new Principal Name will reflect this value thus rooting the “inter security domain” policy.

There are helper functions to build and verify Program Certificates, perform common crypto tasks like key generation and establish the Tao Channel.

There is also support for authorization in the Tao. Guards make authorization decisions. Current guards include:

* the liberal guard: this guard returns true for every authorization query
* the conservative guard: this guard returns false for every authorization query
* the ACL guard: this guard provides a list of statements that must return true when the guard is queried for these statements.
* the datalog guard: this guard translates statements in the CloudProxy auth language (see tao/auth/doc.go for details) to datalog statements and uses the Go datalog engine from github.com/kevinawalsh/datalog to answer authorization queries. See tao/datalog\_guard.go for the translation from the CloudProxy auth language to datalog. And see install.sh for an example policy.

**Hardware roots of Trust**

Cloudproxy requires that the lowest level system software must be measured by a hardware component which must also be able to provide attest services and seal/unseal services (and optionally some hardware assist for isolation of Hosted Systems). Absent hardware protection, remote users have no principled way to trust the security promises (isolation, confidentiality, integrity, verified code identity) since “insiders” might silently change security critical software or steal keys.

Cloudproxy supports TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 as hardware roots of Trust for Host Systems booted on raw hardware. We have implemented support for other mechanisms. Adding a new hardware mechanism is relatively straightforward provided the new hardware supports accurate measurement of booted images, isolation for Hosted Systems and attestation which is used to initialize the key hierarchy.

Once the base Host System is safely measured and booted on a supported hardware, Cloudproxy implements support for recursive Host Systems at almost every layer of software including:

1. A Host System running under a VMM which isolates Hosted Systems consisting of Virtual Machines.
2. A Host System running in an operating system which isolates Hosted Systems consisting of processes (or applications).
3. A Host System running in an operating system which isolates Hosted systems hosted subordinate Operating Systems or Containers.
4. A Host System running in an application (like a browser) which isolates Hosted systems consisting of sub-applications, like plug-ins.

In all cases, Hosted Systems have the same Tao interface to the Host System and can use any Host Service (for example, any system call on Linux) so the programming model at each Hosted System layer is essentially unchanged from the non-Cloudproxy case.

**Sample Applications**

This paper is intended to allow you to use Cloudproxy immediately on a Linux Cloudproxy Host System. To this end we include installation instructions for TPM 2.0 protected hardware with SMX extensions and a complete annotated simple application called, cleverly, SimpleExample.

There are more complete examples in go/apps/fileproxy.

**Installing Cloudproxy**

Complete instructions for Linux installation which allows you to run Simple application are here.

When your ready for installation instructions for a VMM, look at the installations instructions for KVM here

**Simple Example**

We provide annotated sample code for a simple example in Go and C++ containing all the critical Cloudproxy elements. A full working version of the example is in go/apps/simpleexample. We assume you have a correctly installed Go development tools or C++ development tools as well as protobuf, gtest and gflags.

There are yhree application components in SimpleExample, each producing a separate executable:

1. Simple Client (in simpleclient.go)
2. Simple Server (in simpleserver.go)
3. Simple Security Domain Signing Service (in simpledomainservice.go)

Common code used by the client and server is in simplecommon.go.

The Simple Server makes up a secret and stores it. The Simple Client uses a Tao Channel to contact the Simple Server to learn the secret and store it securely. We don’t implement rollback protection or distributed key management for intermediate secrets in SimpleExample just to keep the example as simple as possible. We give sample code in Go and C++ for the Simple Client and Simple Server. The sample application also uses a Simple Security Domain Signing Service which checks the measurements in the Attestations for the Simple Client and Simple Server and, if the measurements are correct, it signs the Program Certificate. We did not provide sample code for this since the Simple Security Domain Signing Service is, well, simple and need not run on Cloudproxy (although there are good reasons for doing so --- see the key management scenarios below for some reasons).

In the annotated code in this document, error code and some helper functions omitted.

**The API – Go**

Domains represent security contexts; they encapsulate configuration information like names, path to key blobs, path to policy key, and the guard employed for authorization decisions.

CreateDomain initializes a new Domain, writing its configuration files to a directory. This creates the directory and, if needed, a policy key pair encrypted with the given password when stored on disk; it also initializes a default guard. The call is:

func CreateDomain(cfg DomainConfig, configPath string, password []byte) (\*Domain, error)

Any parameters left empty in cfg will be set to reasonable default values.

Domain information is loaded from a text file, typically called tao.config via the call:

LoadDomain(configPath string, password []byte)(\*Domain, error)

which returns a domain object if successful. The password is used to load a key set from disk. If no password is provided, then LoadDomain will attempt to load verification keys only. For example, LoadDomain is called with a configPath and an nil password to load the policy verification key.

A configuration object, type DomainConfig, holds configuration information for the domain between Tao activations.

[The](http://github.com/jlmucb/cloudproxy/tao) [API used by](http://github.com/jlmucb/cloudproxy/tao/auth) a Hosted System:

* [GetRandomBytes(chil](http://github.com/jlmucb/cloudproxy/tao/auth)[dSubp](http://github.com/jlmucb/cloudproxy/tao)[rin auth.SubPrin, n int) (bytes []by](http://github.com/jlmucb/cloudproxy/tao/net)[te, err error): returns a slice of n random bytes.](http://github.com/jlmucb/cloudproxy/tao)
* GetSharedSecret(tag string, n int) (bytes []byte, err error): returns a slice of n secret bytes. (This is not currently used in any test programs).
* Attest(childSubprin auth.SubPrin, issuer \*auth.Prin, time, expiration \*int64, message auth.Form) (\*Attestation, error) : requests the Tao host sign a statement on behalf of the caller
* Encrypt(data []byte) (encrypted []byte, err error): seals data.
* Decrypt(encrypted []byte) (data []byte, err error): unseal.
* AddedHostedProgram(childSubprin auth.SubPrin) error: create new program.
* RemovedHostedProgram(childSubprin auth.SubPrin) error: kill hosted program.
* TaoHostName() auth.Prin: Get the Tao principal name assigned to this hosted Tao host. (Unix pathname with hashes, right? --- )for a hosted program under the linux tao, the TaoHostName might be something like tpm([...]).PCRs(...))

A hosted system represented by a tao, tao, obtains the pointer to its host interface by calling tao.Parent().

The network interface for the Tao channel:

* func DialWithKeys(network, addr string, guard tao.Guard, v \*tao.Verifier, keys \*tao.Keys) (net.Conn, error)
* func Listen(network, laddr string, config \*tls.Config, g tao.Guard, v \*tao.Verifier, del \*tao.Attestation) (net.Listener, error)

**The API -- C++**

***Simple Client in Go (annotated)***

var simplecfg = flag.String("../simpledomain/tao.config",

"../simpledomain/tao.config", "path to tao configuration")

var serverHost = flag.String("host", "localhost",

"address for client/server")

var serverPort = flag.String("port", "8123",

"port for client/server")

var serverAddr string

func main() {

// This holds the cloudproxy specific data for this program

// like Program Cert and Program Private key.

var clientProgramObject simpleexample.ProgramPolicy

// Parse flags, etc (omitted)

// Load domain info for this domain

simpleDomain, err := tao.LoadDomain(\*hostcfg, nil)

if err != nil {

log.Fatalln("simpleclient: Can't load domain")

// Subsequent error checking omitted.

}

var derPolicyCert []byte

if simpleDomain.Keys.Cert != nil {

derPolicyCert = simpleDomain.Keys.Cert.Raw

}

// Extend my name.

err := simpleDomain.ExtendTaoName(tao.Parent())

e := auth.PrinExt{Name: "simpleclient\_version\_1"}

err = tao.Parent().ExtendTaoName(auth.SubPrin{e})

// Retrieve my name.

taoName, err := tao.Parent().GetTaoName()

// Get my keys

sealedSymmetricKey, sealedSigningKey, programCert, delegation, err :=

simplecommon.LoadProgramKeys(\*simpleClientPath)

…

// Unseal my symmetric keys, or initialize them.

var symKeys []byte

if sealedSymmetricKey != nil {

symKeys, policy, err := tao.Parent().Unseal(sealedSymmetricKey)

…

} else {

symKeys, err :=simplecommon.InitializeSealedSymmetricKeys(

\*simpleClientPath, tao.Parent(),

simpleclient.SizeofSymmetricKeys)

…

}

// Remember to zero my keys.

defer simplecommon.ZeroBytes(symKeys)

// Get my private key if present or initialize them.

var signingKey \*tao.Keys

if sealedSigningKey != nil {

signingKey, err = simplecommon.SigningKeyFromBlob(tao.Parent(),

sealedSigningKey, programCert, delegation)

…

} else {

signingKey, err = simplecommon.InitializeSealedSigningKey(

\*simpleclientPath, tao.Parent(), \*simpleDomain)

…

}

// Get the program cert.

\_ = clientProgramObject.InitProgramPolicy(derPolicyCert, taoName.String(),

\*signingKey, symKeys, programCert)

// Parse policy cert and make it the root of our heierarchy.

policyCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(derPolicyCert)

…

pool := x509.NewCertPool()

pool.AddCert(policyCert)

// Open the Tao Channel.

tlsc, err := taonet.EncodeTLSCert(signingKey)

…

conn, err := tls.Dial("tcp", serverAddr, &tls.Config{

RootCAs: pool,

Certificates: []tls.Certificate{\*tlsc},

InsecureSkipVerify: false,

})

…

ms := util.NewMessageStream(conn)

// Get Tao name of Server.

// Send a simple request and get response.

/\*

rule := "Delegate(\"jlm\", \"tom\", \"getfile\",\"myfile\")"

log.Printf("simpleclient, sending rule: %s\n", rule)

err = fileproxy.SendRule(ms, rule, userCert)

…

status, message, size, err := fileproxy.GetResponse(ms)

…

\*/

log.Printf("simpleclient: Done\n")

}

***Simple Server in Go***

var simplecfg = flag.String("../simpledomain/tao.config", "../simpledomain/tao.config", "path to simple tao configuration")

func serviceThead(ms \*util.MessageStream, clientProgramName string,

serverProgramPolicy \*simplecommon.ProgramPolicy) {

// How do I know if the connection terminates?

for {

log.Printf("clientServiceThead: ReadString\n")

strbytes, err := ms.ReadString()

terminate, err := resourceMaster.HandleServiceRequest(ms, fileServerProgramPolicy, clientProgramName, []byte(strbytes))

if terminate {

break

}

}

}

func server(serverAddr string, prin string, derPolicyCert []byte,

signingKey \*tao.Keys, serverProgramPolicy \*simplecommon.ProgramPolicy) {

var sock net.Listener

log.Printf("simpleserver: server\n")

// Setup Policy root for verify.

policyCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(derPolicyCert)

pool := x509.NewCertPool()

pool.AddCert(policyCert)

tlsc, err := taonet.EncodeTLSCert(signingKey)

conf := &tls.Config{

RootCAs: pool,

Certificates: []tls.Certificate{\*tlsc},

InsecureSkipVerify: false,

ClientAuth: tls.RequireAnyClientCert,

}

sock, err = tls.Listen("tcp", serverAddr, conf)

// Service client connections.

for {

conn, err := sock.Accept()

var clientName string

clientName = "XYZZY"

err = conn.(\*tls.Conn).Handshake()

if err != nil {

log.Printf("simpleserver: TLS handshake failed\n")

}

peerCerts := conn.(\*tls.Conn).ConnectionState().PeerCertificates

if peerCerts == nil {

log.Printf("simpleserver: can't get peer list\n")

} else {

peerCert :=

conn.(\*tls.Conn).ConnectionState().PeerCertificates[0]

if peerCert.Raw == nil {

log.Printf("simpleserver: can't get peer name\n")

} else {

if peerCert.Subject.OrganizationalUnit != nil {

clientName = peerCert.Subject.OrganizationalUnit[0]

}

}

}

log.Printf("simpleserver, peer name: %s\n", clientName)

ms := util.NewMessageStream(conn)

go serviceThead(ms, clientName, serverProgramPolicy)

}

}

func main() {

var serverProgramPolicy simplecommon.ProgramPolicy

// Some initialization skipped.

// Load CloudProxy domain configuration.

simpleDomain, err := tao.LoadDomain(\*simplecfg, nil)

// Get policy cert for this domain.

var derPolicyCert []byte

if simpleDomain.Keys.Cert != nil {

derPolicyCert = simpleDomain.Keys.Cert.Raw

}

err = simpleDomain.ExtendTaoName(tao.Parent())

// Extend my name.

e := auth.PrinExt{Name: "simpleserver\_version\_1"}

err = tao.Parent().ExtendTaoName(auth.SubPrin{e})

taoName, err := tao.Parent().GetTaoName()

// Get my keys and certs (or initialize them).

var programCert []byte

sealedSymmetricKey, sealedSigningKey, programCert, delegation, err :=

simplecommon.LoadProgramKeys(\*simpleserverPath)

// Get my symmetric keys.

var symKeys []byte

// Make sure my keys are zeroed.

defer simplecommon.ZeroBytes(symKeys)

if sealedSymmetricKey != nil {

symKeys, policy, err := tao.Parent().Unseal(sealedSymmetricKey)

} else {

symKeys, err = simplecommon.InitializeSealedSymmetricKeys(

\*simpleserverPath, tao.Parent(),

simplecommon.SizeofSymmetricKeys)

}

// Get my Program Key.

var signingKey \*tao.Keys

if sealedSigningKey != nil {

log.Printf("retrieving signing key\n")

signingKey, err = simplecommon.SigningKeyFromBlob(tao.Parent(),

sealedSigningKey, programCert, delegation)

} else {

signingKey, err = simplecommon.InitializeSealedSigningKey(\*simpleserverPath,

tao.Parent(), \*simpleDomain)

programCert = signingKey.Cert.Raw

}

taoNameStr := taoName.String()

\_ = serverProgramPolicy.InitProgramPolicy(derPolicyCert, taoNameStr,

\*signingKey, symKeys, programCert)

err = server(serverAddr, taoNameStr, derPolicyCert, signingKey,

&serverProgramPolicy)

log.Printf("simpleserver: done\n")

}

***SimpleDomainService in Go***

***Some Common code in Go***

const SizeofSymmetricKeys = 64

type ProgramPolicy struct {

Initialized bool

TaoName string

ThePolicyCert []byte

ProgramSigningKey tao.Keys

ProgramSymKeys []byte

ProgramCert []byte

}

func (pp \*ProgramPolicy) InitProgramPolicy(policyCert []byte, taoName string,

signingKey tao.Keys, symKeys []byte, programCert []byte) bool {

log.Printf("InitProgramPolicy\n")

pp.ThePolicyCert = policyCert

pp.TaoName = taoName

pp.ProgramSigningKey = signingKey

pp.ProgramSymKeys = symKeys

pp.ProgramCert = programCert

pp.Initialized = true

log.Printf("InitProgramPolicy done\n")

return true

}

// RequestTruncatedAttestation connects to a CA instance, sends the attestation

// for an X.509 certificate, and gets back a truncated attestation with a new

// principal name based on the policy key.

func RequestKeyNegoAttestation(network, addr string, keys \*tao.Keys,

v \*tao.Verifier) (\*tao.Attestation, error) {

…

}

tlsCert, err := taonet.EncodeTLSCert(keys)

…

conn, err := tls.Dial(network, addr, &tls.Config{

RootCAs: x509.NewCertPool(),

Certificates: []tls.Certificate{\*tlsCert},

InsecureSkipVerify: true,

})

…

defer conn.Close()

// Tao handshake: send client delegation.

ms := util.NewMessageStream(conn)

if \_, err = ms.WriteMessage(keys.Delegation); err != nil {

return nil, err

}

// Read the truncated attestation and check it.

var a tao.Attestation

…

ok, err := v.Verify(a.SerializedStatement,

tao.AttestationSigningContext, a.Signature)

…

return &a, nil

}

// returns sealed symmetric key, sealed signing key, DER encoded cert, delegation, error

func LoadProgramKeys(path string) ([]byte, []byte, []byte, []byte, error) {

\_, err := os.Stat(path + "sealedsymmetrickey")

…

\_, err = os.Stat(path + "sealedsigningKey")

…

\_, err = os.Stat(path + "signerCert")

…

sealedSymmetricKey, err := ioutil.ReadFile(path + "sealedsymmetricKey")

…

sealedSigningKey, err := ioutil.ReadFile(path + "sealedsigningKey")

…

derCert, err := ioutil.ReadFile(path + "signerCert")

…

ds, err := ioutil.ReadFile(path + "delegationBlob")

…

return sealedSymmetricKey, sealedSigningKey, derCert, ds, nil

}

func CreateSigningKey(t tao.Tao) (\*tao.Keys, []byte, error) {

log.Printf("CreateSigningKey\n")

self, err := t.GetTaoName()

k, err := tao.NewTemporaryKeys(tao.Signing)

…

publicString := strings.Replace(self.String(), "(", "", -1)

publicString = strings.Replace(publicString, ")", "", -1)

details := tao.X509Details{

Country: "US",

Organization: "Google",

CommonName: publicString}

subjectname := tao.NewX509Name(details)

derCert, err := k.SigningKey.CreateSelfSignedDER(subjectname)

…

cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(derCert)

…

k.Cert = cert

s := &auth.Speaksfor{

Delegate: k.SigningKey.ToPrincipal(),

Delegator: self}

…

if k.Delegation, err = t.Attest(&self, nil, nil, s); err != nil {

return nil, nil, err

}

…

return k, derCert, nil

}

func InitializeSealedSymmetricKeys(path string, t tao.Tao, keysize int)

[]byte, error) {

unsealed, err := tao.Parent().GetRandomBytes(keysize)

…

sealed, err := tao.Parent().Seal(unsealed, tao.SealPolicyDefault)

…

ioutil.WriteFile(path+"sealedsymmetrickey", sealed, os.ModePerm)

return unsealed, nil

}

func InitializeSealedSigningKey(path string, t tao.Tao, domain tao.Domain) (\*tao.Keys, error) {

k, derCert, err := CreateSigningKey(t)

…

na, err := RequestKeyNegoAttestation("tcp", \*caAddr, k,

domain.Keys.VerifyingKey)

…

k.Delegation = na

pa, \_ := auth.UnmarshalForm(na.SerializedStatement)

var saysStatement \*auth.Says

if ptr, ok := pa.(\*auth.Says); ok {

saysStatement = ptr

} else if val, ok := pa.(auth.Says); ok {

saysStatement = &val

}

sf, ok := saysStatement.Message.(auth.Speaksfor)

if ok != true {

return nil, errors.New("says doesnt have speaksfor message")

}

kprin, ok := sf.Delegate.(auth.Term)

…

newCert := auth.Bytes(kprin.(auth.Bytes))

k.Cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(newCert)

…

signingKeyBlob, err := tao.MarshalSignerDER(k.SigningKey)

…

sealedSigningKey, err := t.Seal(signingKeyBlob, tao.SealPolicyDefault)

err = ioutil.WriteFile(path+"sealedsigningKey", sealedSigningKey,

os.ModePerm)

err = ioutil.WriteFile(path+"signerCert", newCert, os.ModePerm)

delegateBlob, err := proto.Marshal(k.Delegation)

return k, nil

}

func SigningKeyFromBlob(t tao.Tao, sealedKeyBlob []byte, certBlob []byte,

delegateBlob []byte) (\*tao.Keys, error) {

k := &tao.Keys{}

cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(certBlob)

…

k.Cert = cert

k.Delegation = new(tao.Attestation)

err = proto.Unmarshal(delegateBlob, k.Delegation)

…

signingKeyBlob, policy, err := tao.Parent().Unseal(sealedKeyBlob)

…

k.SigningKey, err = tao.UnmarshalSignerDER(signingKeyBlob)

k.Cert = cert

return k, err

}

func GetResponse(ms \*util.MessageStream) (\*string, \*string, \*int, error) {

…

}

func PrintResponse(status \*string, message \*string, size \*int) {

…

}

func SendResponse(ms \*util.MessageStream, status string, errMessage string, size int) error {

…

}

func SendProtocolMessage(ms \*util.MessageStream, size int, buf []byte) error {

…

}

func GetProtocolMessage(ms \*util.MessageStream) ([]byte, error) {

…

}

***Simple Client in C++***

***Simple Server in C++***

**Upgrade and key management scenarios**

Since sealed material is only provided to a Hosted System with exactly the same code identity that sealed the material running on the exact same Host System, while isolated by that Host System, you may be worried about lost data when a Hosted System breaks or becomes unavailable or limitations that affect key management, software upgrade or distribution when the Hosted System runs on other Host Systems. In fact, it is rather easy to accommodate all these circumstances, and many others, efficiently, securely and in most cases automatically using Cloudproxy although the Cloudproxy applications must make provisions for this during development.

Below are a few sever example key management techniques that can be used when a Cloudproxy application is upgraded, a new Cloudproxy application (in the same security domain) is launched, or as applications migrate to other Host Systems. All these mechanisms preserve the confidentiality and integrity of all Cloudproxy applications and data used and produced in the security domain or particular host hardware.

There is a discussion of many of the mechanisms as they might affect client software used across different security domains by users with no control over the application code while supporting consumer transparency (the most challenging case) in [4]. Here we restrict ourselves to cooperating server applications for simplicity.

To ease description, imagine all application data is stored locally or remotely and probably redundantly in encrypted, integrity protected files. Each file is encrypted and integrity protected with individual file keys and each file key is itself encrypted and integrity protected with a partitioned Sealing keys. Different partitions are protected by different keys to reduce the risk of universal compromise. Every key has exposed meta data consisting of a globally unique name for the entity it protects, the key type and an “epoch.” Epochs increases monotonically as the keys are rotated[[4]](#footnote-4). As keys for a new epoch become available, the objects they protect are re-encrypted, over a reasonable period of time (the Rotation Period), during this time keys for the prior epoch are available and can be used to decrypt objects; however, as soon as new epoch keys are available all new data is encrypted with the new epoch keys. At the end of the Rotation Period, once applications have confirmed that all data is protected with the keys from the most recent epoch, old epoch keys are deprecated. As a reminder: there are other possible mech

1. The first option to deal with “brittle keys” protecting application data is standard: use a distributed key server like Keyczar (or many others). In this case, Cloudlproxy applications do no locally store data protection keys but contact a key server (over a Tao Channel). The key server (which does key rotation, etc, as many do) authenticates the Hosted System that needs keys it is authorized to receive and communicates those keys. Hosted Systems can be upgraded or introduces and all policy can be maintained by the key service. Hosted Systems will need to respond to “reinitialize” requests periodically as keys rotate. Note that even when policy keys change (for example, as a result of a compromised security domain server) and applications change radically, continuity of operation is assured.
2. An alternative, less centralized, key rotation mechanism allows individual Hosted Systems to maintain their own keys to protect files as well as perform key rotation themselves. When software is upgraded or new programs are introduced, the new programs or upgraded programs come with a certificate signed by the policy key that instruct one Hosted System to disclose these keys to the new version (or new) Hosted System. Since this can result in lost data if a Host System becomes unavailable, Hosted Systems would likely distribute these keys to different instances on different machines to ensure continuity.
3. Finally, when new data protection keys are established for an application task, Hosted Systems can contact a domain service to receive intermediate keys for registered files or file classes. These keys can be sealed using the Host System provided Seal and used without contacting the service each time the Hosted System starts. This mechanism places additional administrative burden on each Hosted System to contact the “key sharing service” as intermediate keys rotate but this is not uncommon.

It is important to note that while the foregoing descriptions treat keys as “all or nothing” entities, all these scheme have corresponding “split key” implementations to achieve higher security. In addition to pure key management, any security domain may elect to have Cloudproxy archive repositories (centralized and distributed). Such an archive application, upon which security domain policy confers access to data, can, in the background, archive data to (centralized or distributed) repositories. Finally, note that application upgrade (given a data key management solution) is automatic even when the policy keys change: New versions of Hosted Systems simply re-initialize (get new program keys and certificates) using the (centralized or distributed) security domain service and no special provision, aside from current policy at the security domain service, need be provided[[5]](#footnote-5).

**References**

**[1] Manferdelli, Roeder, Schneider, The CloudProxy Tao for Trusted Computing,** <http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2013/EECS-2013-135.pdf>.

**[2] CloudProxy Source code,** [http:/](http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2013/EECS-2013-135.pdf)/github.com/jlmucb/cloudproxy.

**[3] TCG, TPM specs,** <http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/tpm_library_specification>

[4] **Beekman, Manferdelli, Wagner,** AsiaCCS, 2016.

**The Guard**

The Guard interface:

* Subprincipal() auth.SubPrin: returns a unique subprincipal for this policy.
* Save(key \*Signer) error: writes all persistent policy data to disk, signed by key
* Authorize(name auth.Prin, op string, args []string) error
* Retract(name auth.Prin, op string, args []string) error
* IsAuthorized(name auth.Prin, op string, args []string) bool
* AddRule(rule string) error
* RetractRule(rule string) error
* Clear() error: removes all rules.
* Query(query string) (bool, error)
* RuleCount() int
* GetRule(i int) string.
* String() string: returns a string suitable for showing auth info.

1. To do this, the Host System must be isolated and have access to secrets only it knows. The foundation for this consists of primitives hardware provides to the “base” Cloudproxy systems it boots. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Initramfs will have security critical code like the service that implements the Tao so it must be measured along with the kernel image to provide an accurate identity for the “running Linux OS.” [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The Tao also provides rollback protection for this sealed data. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. And you certainly should rotate keys as part of effective cryptographic hygiene! [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Many events may cause such a policy change including a determination that previously trusted hardware elements have been compromised. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)