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Contacts

Designation	Telephone (Office)	E-mail
Chairman, Board of Governors	88-02-9347914	chairman@biiss.org
Director General	88-02-8312609	dgbiiss@biiss.org
Research Director-1	88-02-9331977	rd1@biiss.org
Research Director-2	88-02-8360198	shaheen@biiss.org

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Nazmul Arifeen
A. S. M. Tarek Hassan Semul

DRUMMING OF NUCLEAR ARMAGEDDON: LOOMING NUCLEAR STANDOFF ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Abstract

After Pyongyang's test of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) capable of hitting the mainland United States (US), the possibility of an Armageddon or the 'end of the world' seems more realistic than ever. In particular, North Korea's threat to take out the US military base in Guam has altered the strategic equations. Given the recent escalation of tension between North Korea and global powers, this paper provides an insight into the triggers and the credibility of North Korean nuclear threats with a view to analysing way out for de-escalation. By exploring the triggering factors behind the standoff and their ramifications, it contends that policy dichotomy of great powers, unrestrained rhetoric from the key players and ill-suited bargaining tactics may lead to miscalculations by adversaries, potentially aggravating the crisis. Based on these arguments, the paper ends with an exposition of possible options to de-escalate the situation.

1.   Introduction

An all-out nuclear war is often equated with an Armageddon—a biblical notion that implies a catastrophic conflict which will end the world as we know it, along with the human race. Ever since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, which took the world on the verge of nuclear destruction, the international community has not come any closer to a nuclear standoff.[1] Political leaders are deemed rational actors and they are aware that a nuclear exchange might outweigh the cost. Pyongyang's recent missile tests, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, alarmingly intensified the fear of a nuclear standoff on the Korean Peninsula. To a lesser extent, the coincidence of the election of the United States (US) President Donald Trump, the election of a relatively-dovish South Korean President Moon Jae-in, and the timing of the assassination of Kim Jong-un's half-brother Kim Jong-nam at a Malaysian airport have added to the complexity of the crisis in one way or another. Despite the recurring nature of Korea's nuclear problem in international politics, never in the past did a nuclear crisis appear so imminent. Since the beginning of the year 2017, North Korea has fired 18 missiles

Nazmul Arifeen and **A. S. M. Tarek Hassan Semul** are Research Officers at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). The authors' e-mail addresses are: arifeen@biiss.org and tarek@biiss.org respectively.

[1] For a closer look at how the nuclear crisis between the US and the former USSR was averted, see James G. Blight and Janet M. Lang, *The Armageddon Letters: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro in the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012.

as of the first week of August 2017 (see, Chart 1),[2] some of them capable of carrying nuclear payloads and able to reach targets as far as the continental US. Pyongyang has threatened to use nuclear weapons as a deterrent against Washington's alleged plot for 'decapitation strike'. While such provocations are not completely new to the Korean Peninsula, as North Korea tested missiles in the past, nonetheless, the looming crisis is regarded as more grave than the country's past provocations.

In the backdrop of a looming nuclear conflict and potential further escalation, this paper intends to provide a fresh and useful insight into the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Such endeavour is justified given the triumph of Donald Trump as the President of the US who has hinted more hardline policies towards North Korea in his recent statements. The question it seeks to answer is how to de-escalate the looming nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In order to achieve this objective, the paper analyses whether the nuclear threat from North Korea is credible, what North Korea wants to achieve with its nukes and what triggered the crisis and finally, what the objectives of the great powers and other players directly involved in the crisis are.

This paper intends to explore the causes behind the unfolding of the nuclear crisis by looking at the credibility of threats and the policy objectives of the great powers. Given the isolationist nature of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) or North Korea, it was imperative for the global community to engage Pyongyang in a multilateral talk to dial down its nuclear ambition. The collapse of the 'Six-Party Talks'[3] owing to contradictory positions and interests of the parties involved, and North Korea's determination for acquiring nuclear weapons are the causes behind the recent crisis. The paper argues that rather than becoming too optimistic about complete de-nuclearisation, the foremost and crucial task at hand should be to neutralise an imminent nuclear war, not the 'complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement' (CVID) as pursued by the US. Once the crisis is relatively de-escalated, further diplomatic channels can be used to revert North Korean nuclearisation, through incentives and effective deterrence. To dissuade the looming crisis on the Korean Peninsula and to avoid a potential nuclear Armageddon, all parties must take into account the importance of strategic assurance.

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[2] Joshua Berlinger, "North Korea's Missile Tests: By the Numbers", *CNN*, 07 August 2017, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/29/asia/north-korea-missile-tests/index.html, accessed on 10 August 2017; Bonnie Berkowitz, Laris Karklis and Kevin Schaul, "How Three Recent Launches Signaled New Leaps in North Korea's Missile Capabilities", *Washington Post*, 10 August 2017, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/world/north-korea-launch/, accessed on 11 August 2017.

[3] The "Six-Party Talks" was multilateral negotiation mechanism to prevent nuclearisation of North Korea after it had withdrawn from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003. It comprised of countries that were either immediate neighbours of North Korea or a global power. The members were the US, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and North Korea. No round negotiation was held after 2007 and the talk was finally discontinued when Pyongyang tested missiles in 2009.

The research conducted for this paper relies on secondary sources, gathered from academic journals, books and newspaper articles. Given the unfolding nature of an imminent crisis where real-time information was crucial, the developments upto the second week of August 2017 were analysed. The research is not variable-driven, *i.e.,* it does not seek to establish a causal mechanism to justify why certain set of things might or might not happen. This complexity arises because the paper has considered multiple actors with diverging interests and courses of diplomatic manoeuvre at their disposal. The nature of the paper is, therefore, suggestive - to argue the best possible options to get out of this crisis by analysing alternatives and what *may* and *may not* work in this scenario. It employed case studies and content analysis (of speeches and official positions of the actors) to understand the key stakeholders' policies which was analysed in light of offensive realist theories.

The arguments in this paper are developed in six sections. The second section following the introduction provides a comprehensive theoretical framework to understand the behaviour of North Korea. This provides a solid understanding of the problem in the light of various International Relations (IR) theories. The third section provides a background on the nuclearisation process of the DPRK by taking a fresh look into North Korea's nuclear development, its objectives for nuclearisation, and its motivations for the latest escalation. By analysing motivations, policy positions and major issues of contention for the key players, the fourth section discusses the role of major powers and North Korea's neighbours. The fifth section analyses the potential outcome of the conflict by focusing on possible options to de-escalate the crisis. Finally, the sixth section draws conclusion based on the discussion.

2.   Theoretical Overview of the Problem

Theories are intended to help grapple with complex problems of international relations. As such, an analytic framework is necessary to better understand the problem informed by theories of International Relations. The looming nuclear crisis cannot be resolved until the underlying causes are identified. There are two important theoretical puzzles that need to be answered in this regard. First of all, what dictates North Korea's behaviour? Is it caused by its position in international society or is this just a manifestation of its internal problems?

The second puzzle is to understand whether there is a real threat from North Korean nuclearisation. If the threats are mere rhetoric, regional and global powers will not take the country seriously to warrant a negotiated settlement of the imminent crisis.

Nicholas Anderson points out that there are two primary groups of scholars when it comes to explaining the nuclearisation of North Korea.[4] The first line of

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4   Nicholas Anderson, "Explaining North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions: Power and Position on the Korean Peninsula", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, May 2017, pp. 1–21.

arguments claims that the problem is rooted in the US policies regarding the Korean Peninsula, which has threatened Pyongyang militarily by forming alliance with South Korea and Japan, isolated it politically by constraining its ability to manoeuvre at international forums, and finally, severely weakened it economically through imposing trade embargoes. This group of analysts, known as the *doves*, believes that North Korea is not inherently belligerent, rather it reacts to these threats by strengthening its nuclear capabilities. Peace-loving doves view the international pressure on the country as the driver for its nuclearisation. Conversely, the other group of scholars, known as the *hawks*, believe that the problem does not lie with the policies of the US. Instead, it is a demonstration of North Korea's authoritarian and undemocratic internal policies, *i.e.,* the crux of the problem lies at the domestic politics. The *hawks* are convinced that nuclearisation is a means for North Korean regime to cling to power and is a sign of its authoritarian internal politics. This 'dove-hawk' debate speaks to the fact that depending on what 'level of analysis' is chosen to analyse the issues, root causes of the problem would be entirely different.

There is a great debate in IR scholarship as to *what* causes this state behaviour: Is it the structure of international system, domestic politics or a combination of both? The paradox here is to untangle whether or not it is the external factors or the domestic politics that motivates North Korea to acquire nuclear bombs. This paper takes the view that the problem lies in the anarchic nature of international system. Different variants of realism render meaningful theoretical lens to understand the intricacies of the problem. All variants of realism concur that the international system is "anarchic"[5] due to the states being primary actors. In this view, North Korea must pursue self-interest because of the structure of the anarchic international system. As far as IR theory is concerned, anarchy signifies the lack of order-imposing authority. In the absence of a supranational authority above sovereign states, North Korea must depend on "self-help"[6] and maximise its national interest. Its primary goal is survival in an anarchical system, akin to Hobbesian "state of nature"[7] where every man must fight with another for survival.

Neoclassical realism, a term coined by Gideon Rose, differs from the other variants of structural realism in explaining state behaviour. It argues that state behaviour is not merely conditioned by the 'anarchic nature' of the international system, rather the domestic factors are equally important as the key motivating factor for states' actions.[8] Despite the role played by the prevailing international system, neoclassical realists believe that domestic politics also plays an important role. Leaders are often constrained by domestic pressure and how decisions are taken within a

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[5] Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited", *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2000, pp. 128–61; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory", *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1988, pp. 615–28.

[6] Kenneth N. Waltz, *ibid*.

[7] John M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 21.

[8] Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", *World Politics*, Vol. 51, No. 01, 1998, pp. 144–172.

state. Hence, neoclassical realism posits that, to decipher a particular foreign policy behaviour of state, examining only the systemic variables is not enough, rather the composition and priorities of the domestic actors are also imperative.[9] In North Korea's case, neoclassical realism would prescribe to scrutinise the domestic dynamics along with the structural determinants to understand the motivation for its nuclearisation. However, to employ this particular theory in North Korean case poses different sets of challenges. DPRK, being an isolated actor in the international system with an authoritarian regime, has one of the most closed societies. The little information that is available on the regime and its power structure often lacks reliability. One crucial challenge, therefore, is to isolate the facts from the fiction, as information gets filtered through the Western lens of scrutiny and thus can be blamed as biased. On the other hand, since many authoritarian rulers employ propaganda to consolidate and legitimise their positions, it will be unscientific to rely on North Korean official sources for information. Therefore, using neoclassical realism is troublesome to understand the motivation for North Korean nuclearisation.

Two other variants of neorealism - offensive and defensive realism - concentrate on structural constraints rather than domestic variables to explain state behaviour. According to these two theories, a 'self-help' structure requires that Pyongyang ensure its survival either by 'maximisation of power' or 'maximisation of security'. These two, however, are mutually exclusive. As Jeffrey Taliaferro contends, "offensive realism and defensive realism generate radically different prescriptions for military doctrine, foreign economic policy, military intervention, and crisis management".[10] Defensive realists believe that in an anarchic system states cannot trust each other; they can, nevertheless, maximise their *security* by means of alliance building and cooperation so as to enhance their security *vis-à-vis* their adversaries. Again, it is the order or structure of the international system that dictates states' behaviours in this regard. Taking the case of North Korea, it can be argued that it has very limited options to enhance its security by forging alliance and economic cooperation, because of economic sanctions and trade embargoes.

Conversely, offensive realists would posit that North Korea must pursue self-interest and maximise *power*, not because it is inherent in the human nature as classical realists believed;[11] rather, the order of the international system dictates state behaviour. Its focus remains on the external factors for states behaviour instead of domestic or individual determinants of state actions. Power maximisation has its own limitations. As a state increases its power by arming itself, it causes insecurity for other states. As such, it leads to a never-ending arms race between states. These arguments are closely aligned with what Nicholas Anderson calls the *hawks*. Extrapolating this

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 148.
[10] Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *op. cit.*, pp. 129–130.
[11] Thucydides' *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, Niccolo Machiavelli's *The Prince* and Thomas Hobbes' *The Leviathan*—all attempted to show that states' aggressive behaviour is, in fact, a manifestation of human propensity for self-interest.

theory to the North Korean case implies that from its perception of its power and position in the international system, only accumulation of power can guarantee its survival. The impact of domestic constraints is relatively negligible as the systemic pressure is overwhelming enough to dictate a state's behaviour within an 'anarchic structure'.[12] Therefore, this paper applies offensive realism as the tool for analysing North Korea's aspirations for nuclearisation and its ramifications for the looming nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

3. Reassessing Nuclear Threat from North Korea

The Korean Peninsula is perhaps one of the most capricious regions of the world today. In the aftermath of the Korean War in the early 1950s, when two great powers locked horns in a battle for ideological supremacy and military primacy in the region, North Korea aligned itself with the Soviet bloc during the Cold War. It still continues to reject Westernisation.[13] The end of the Korean War between the two Koreas came not through the signing of a formal peace treaty, but a mere agreed armistice. As such, hostility between the warring parties remained. It was exacerbated by the fact that the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union did not bring any shift in the ideological orientation of the DPRK.[14] In the ensuing decades, sporadic tension has led to deteriorating relationship between the two countries.

The Korean nuclear crisis has been a recurrent problem. Former editor of Japan's *Asahi Shimbun* newspaper noted that the recent crisis is the third of its kind.[15] Similar crisis surfaced in the past and was diffused when North Korea first declared its nuclear programme in the early 1990s and again in the early 2000s when the world came to know about its secret uranium enrichment programme. This time around, the already-tensed relationship reached a tipping point due to North Korea's repeated nuclear tests. The ambiguity regarding its purpose and intentions has heightened tension across the Peninsula, which is home to some of the key US allies in the region. North Korean domestic and foreign policy being secretive in nature, it is difficult to decipher DPRK's true intentions regarding its nuclear ambition. This is what has been stated earlier as the second puzzle. The assumption of this paper rests on the premise that the nuclear threat from DPRK are credible. Hence, the rest of the section analyses North Korea's intentions, discusses a brief history of how it obtained nuclear weapons, and reassesses the credibility of its threat.

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[12] Gideon Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

[13] Charlotte Alfred, "How North Korea Became So Isolated", *Huffington Post*, 17 October 2014, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/17/north-korea-history-isolation_n_5991000.html, accessed on 27 May 2017.

[14] Moira Lavelle, "A Brief History of Border Conflict between North and South Korea", *Public Radio International (PRI)*, 20 August 2015, available at http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-08-20/brief-history-border-conflict-between-north-and-south-korea, accessed on 25 June 2017.

[15] Yoichi Funabashi, "A Third Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula", *The Japan Times*, 09 May 2017, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/05/09/commentary/world-commentary/third-nuclear-crisis-korean-Peninsula, accessed on 25 May 2017.

Chart 1: North Korea's Missile Tests: Frequency and Numbers

Kim family missile tests

Source: Joshua Berlinger, "North Korea's Missile Tests: By the Numbers." *CNN*, 07 August 2017, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/29/asia/north-korea-missile-tests/index.html, accessed on 10 August 2017.

3.1   *What North Korea Really Wants: Objectives and Priorities*

Explanations for nuclear proliferation maintain that the anticipation of war and the threat to the state's survival are the key motivators for proliferation.[16] North Korea's interpretation of the global structure drives it to go nuclear to augment its chances of survival in a hostile international system. Pyongyang's demand for a rightful position as a nuclear armed state along with the withdrawal of all economic sanctions against the regime is a testament that North Korea is dissatisfied with its current position in the international system. The US-South Korea alliance, the former's military deployment to safeguard the latter from the DPRK's aggression has been treated as the sign of hostility from the US to North Korea. The reversal of security arrangements which augments its insecurities and perpetuates its pariah status is what it really wants.

Although offensive realists argue that domestic politics plays insignificant role as to why states go nuclear, nevertheless, it does have significant internal ramifications. On the domestic front, acquiring nuclear weapons means solidifying the position of the Kim dynasty. A robust nuclear and missile programme also implies that popular support would rally behind the political elites further consolidating their power and stifling any opportunity for political opposition that may arise. It, thus, serves the dual purpose of projecting power internationally and legitimising a despotic regime locally.

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[16] Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro, "Conflict and Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation", *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2017, pp. 333–334.

The demands that the DPRK made to the US through different channels of communications revolve around a common theme: the acceptance of the North Korea as a worthy member of the international community; and the Kim dynasty as a legitimate regime.[17] In pursuit of these, North Korea uses its nuclear programme as a bargaining chip not only to gain political leverage at the negotiating table but also makes it a primary strategic objective to counterbalance the US conventional military strength on the Peninsula and its predominance in the region. Thus, in Pyongyang's view, having nuclear bombs is the ultimate game changer in this strategic chessboard.

3.2   *Origins of the Bomb*

Despite Pyongyang's desire to acquire nuclear bombs, the difficulty to obtain them cannot be overstated. This also pertains to the question of credibility and its capacity to mount a nuclear attack. Not only uranium enrichment is a time-consuming process, it also requires state-of-the-art technologies which economically weak countries cannot afford. North Korea is one of the poorest countries in the world. It faces difficulties in feeding millions of its population. Average North Koreans are a few inches shorter than their southern counterpart because of widespread malnutrition.[18] Given the international isolation that severely stymied its economic growth, how credible is it that North Korea has acquired nuclear bombs and ballistic missile capabilities to target its adversary states?

The first hurdle was obtaining financial resources to continue advancement of nuclear devices and delivery systems. While it might be elusive to common knowledge, North Korea has been able to inflate its state coffer by selling arms, munitions and spare parts to its clientele.[19] In the years prior to its Taepodong-2 missile test in 2006, Kim Jong-il exported Scud-type missiles worth US$ 110 million to Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen and Syria. The annual income of the regime was believed to be around US$ 1-2 billion from international aid, arms sale and remittances.[20] Despite a heavy toll on overall economic performance and mass destitution, North Korea did not have so much trouble as to prevent it from going ahead with its nuclear programme. Scholars also suggested the existence of a network between countries like Iran and North Korea where they offshore or outsource materials from each other.[21]

The second obstacle was to manage technologies for both nuclear bomb and ballistic missiles devices used for delivering them to a desired destination. North Korea signed nuclear cooperation agreements with the former Soviet Union and China in

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[17] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

[18] Richard Knight, "Are North Koreans Really Three Inches Shorter than South Koreans?", *BBC News*, 23 April 2012, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17774210, accessed on 29 June, 2017.

[19] Andrea Berger, "Disrupting North Korea's Military Markets", *Survival*, Vol. 58, No. 3, 2016, pp. 101–130.

[20] Jasper Becker, *Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 164.

[21] John R. Haines, "Foreseeable, Foreseen, Ignored: Is Iran Advancing Its Missile Program at Home While Offshoring Its Nuclear Program to North Korea?", The Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), January 2016.

1950.[22] Following China's first nuclear test in 1964, North Korea's request for a nuclear bomb was unanimously rejected by the Soviet Union and China. Yet, assistance and cooperation continued; especially from Moscow which helped Pyongyang establish its experimental reactor in Yongbyon in the early 1980s.[23] Given that the reactor was built with Russian assistance, Russia was able to mount pressure on Pyongyang to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

However, without a functional delivery system, only nukes cannot pose a credible threat or deterrence. It was widely believed that North Korea's highly enriched uranium (HEU), required to produce a nuclear bomb, came from Pakistan's nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, who travelled to Saudi Arabia, Libya, Syria and North Korea to sell technological know-how. He visited North Korea a total of thirteen times and traded nuclear bomb with Pyongyang in exchange for the ballistic missile technology, which Pakistan needed to be able to strike India.[24] It was not a mere coincidence that when Pakistan tested its first Ghauri missile in 1998, North Korea announced its Taepodong long-range missiles.[25]

3.3 *Credibility of the Threat*

A successful nuclear deterrence lies upon the credibility of threat. The more credible the threat of a nuclear strike is, the more likely it is that the deterrence will work. And this will only function when the deterring party has the power to inflict unacceptable degree of damage on its enemy, and the enemy also perceives that the deterring party is willing to do so.[26] Hence, the credibility of threat rests on two key variables: the balance of military capabilities between the belligerent parties and their relative level of resolve. For the DPRK to pose a credible nuclear deterrence against the US, it is imperative not only to achieve the nuclear strike capability, but also to send a clear signal to convince Washington regarding the determination of Pyongyang to strike. Nuclear capability entails the possession of nuclear bombs as well as a combination of a credible delivery system, *i.e.,* land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBMs) or Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs), aerial-based strategic bombers and finally sea-based Submarine - launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) - a combination known as the 'nuclear triad'. North Korea's domestic production of Hwasong-class missiles capable of carrying conventional, chemical and possibly biological weapon at a maximum range of 1000 kilometres marked the first breakthrough in its missile development programme

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[22] Glyn Ford and Soyoung Kwon, *North Korea on the Brink: Struggle for Survival*, London: Pluto Press, 2008, pp. 148–150.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 149.

[24] Jasper Becker, *op. cit.,* p. 188.

[25] Former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto also admitted she had bought missile technology from Pyongyang in 1993 when she was in power. However, she stressed that it was not in exchange for nuclear bomb, but Pakistan bought it with money. See, "Missile Technology Bought from N. Korea: Benazir", *Dawn*, 19 July 2004, available at http://www.dawn.com/news/364962, accessed on 05 June 2017.

[26] Paul Huth, Christopher Gelpi and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes: Testing Rational Deterrence Theory and Structural Realism", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, No. 3, 1993, pp. 609–623.

in 1984.[27] After Kim Jong-un took over in the late 2011, Pyongyang's nuclear programme gained a rapid momentum making it a 'primary strategic commitment'. During his regime, more than 80 test missiles were fired in addition to three nuclear tests, in which he surpassed his father and grandfather's combined efforts.[28]

Map 1: North Korea's Ballistic Missiles: Capability and Range

Source: "North Korea Fires Long-Range ICBM Missile: Reports", *Al Jazeera*, 29 July 2017, available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/pentagon-north-korea-ballistic-missile-launch-detected-170728153900450.html, accessed on 02 August 2017.

[27] "What We Know about North Korea's Missile Programme", *BBC News*, 10 August 2017, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17399847, accessed on 10 August 2017.

[28] Eleanor Albert, "What's the Status of North Korea's Nuclear Program?", *Council on Foreign Relations,* 15 August 2017, available at https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-military-capabilities, accessed on 15 August 2017.

The above map shows different types of ballistic missiles with diffrent ranges that the DPRK has developed and are in either operational or developmental phase. For example, Pyongyang tested two ICBMs of Hawsong-14 class in July 2017; which the Pentagon confirmed has the capacity of hitting a target within 9000+ kilometre range, bringing the US state of Alaska in its reach. There is a debate as to the size of the payload it can carry or whether it will survive an atmospheric re-entry. There is also ambiguity regarding the target-accuracy of these ballistic missiles, because of their reliance on Soviet-era guidance system. Some have claimed that those obsolete guidance systems have been replaced with GPS guidance system making the nuclear threat from DPRK considerably more credible than ever before.[29] These debates notwithstanding, North Korea is now believed to have means to mount a nuclear strike on the US soil.

3.4   *The Triggers: Guam Incident*

As well as credibility, North Korea also sent clear signals of its intent to attack US interests in the Pacific. Following the July 2017 ICBM test, it was reported in international media on 08 August 2017 that Kim Jong-un regime was "carefully examining the operational plan for making an enveloping fire at the areas around Guam"[30] with its Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Hwasong-12. US President Donald Trump responded that any North Korean attack "will be met with fire and fury…the likes of which the world has never seen before."[31]

Guam is a tiny island of 544 square kilometres located in the western Pacific. Famous for its tourist attractions, the island suddenly became the centre of looming nuclear standoff. The question remains as to why Pyongyang would put its regime at risk by threatening to take out Guam. A careful scrutiny is required to understand and appreciate the strategic value of Guam to the US. Firstly, the Pacific island's location is pivotal to serve as the US military outpost for surveillance and to project military clout. It is also strategically located in between the Korean Peninsula and South China Sea.

Guam has been the home to approximately 7,000 of the US armed forces and their families. It has three key military bases. The Andersen Air Force Base enables flights and operation of strategic long-range bombers like B-1B as well as the Navy's Helicopter Combat Support Squadron 25. The naval base is rightly regarded as one of the most 'strategically important' installations for the US in the Pacific. The island is guarded by the US Army's Terminal High Altitude Area Defence or the THAAD missile defence system. The strategic deployment of B-1Bs in the region since 2004 has been

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[29] *Ibid*.
[30] "North Korea 'Considering Missile Strike on US Guam Base'", *BBC News*, 09 August 2017, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40871416, accessed on 10 August 2017.
[31] Nick Allen, "North Korea 'Examining Plan to Strike Guam' as Donald Trump Warns Threats Will Be Met with 'Fire and Fury'", *The Telegraph*, 08 August 2017, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/08/north-korea-has-produced-miniaturised-nuclear-warhead-fit-inside/, accessed on 10 August 2017.

vital to ensuring support for exercise and often as a display of military might. The patrolling of US strategic bombers in close proximity of DPRK's airspace has long been the reason of headache for the North Korean leadership.[32]

Therefore, the threat from the DPRK came as no surprise to Washington as the US intelligence agencies were well aware of the regime's recent success with manufacturing a miniature nuclear warhead that can fit inside an ICBM. A recently-leaked US Defence Intelligence Agency report to *the Washington Post* suggests, "The intelligence community assesses North Korea has produced nuclear weapons for ballistic missile delivery, to include delivery by ICBM-class missiles."[33] Although not official, but the report confirms Pyongyang's nuclear capability to successfully launch a nuclear ICBM which may bring some parts of the US mainland under nuclear threat.

Moreover, despite escalation of tension with North Korea, the US remained committed to a prescheduled annual-joint exercise with South Korea known as 'Ulchi-Freedom' from 21-31 August 2017, which involved sea, land and air forces. Past exercises like these often included 'decapitation strikes' – trial operations to enhance the skills to kill Kim Jong-un and his military top brass; and is interpreted by Pyongyang as a direct threat to its regime.[34] This is also seen as an effort to send a clear signal of resolve to Pyongyang regarding the US determination to stand by its allies.

4.   The Role of Global and Regional Powers: An Analysis of Stakeholders' Objectives

This section intends to discuss the first puzzle that was mentioned in the beginning of the second section regarding North Korea's aspiration for nuclear weapon in relation to its position in the global power structure and the objectives or interests of the global and regional players. Offensive realist interpretation entails that the interests of key global and regional players shape the existing power structure. In consequence, it influences the North Korea's aspiration to acquire nuclear weapons as Pyongyang perceives the existing world structure as a hostile one and intends to shift the status quo. Therefore, the threat of a nuclear Armageddon emanating from the Korean Peninsula is as much a cause of concern for the US as its immediate neighbours. In order to resolve the issue, a multilateral negotiation mechanism was set-up in 2003 comprising North Korea and the regional states in the Korean Peninsula, named after the number of parties to the negotiation. China hosted the talks participated by the US, South Korea, North Korea, Russia and Japan. Six rounds of talks were held from 2003 until it stalled when Pyongyang tested ballistic missiles accompanied by a nuclear test

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[32] Krishnadev Calamur, "Why North Korea Is Threatening Guam", *The Atlantic*, 08 August 2017, available at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/north-korea-guam/536286/, accessed on 09 August 2017.
[33] Joby Warrick *et al.*, *op. cit*.
[34] Oliver Holmes, "US and South Korea to Stage Huge Military Exercise Despite North Korea Crisis", *The Guardian*, 11 August 2017, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/11/north-korea-us-south-korea-huge-military-exercise, accessed on 12 August 2017.

in 2006.[35] The negotiation ultimately fell apart in 2009. The US Treasury Department accused Pyongyang in September 2005 of laundering money and counterfeiting currency through Macau-based Banco Delta Asia.[36] Therefore, the US removed North Korea from 'the state sponsor of terrorism' list to pave the way for further negotiation.

A multilateral negotiation with Pyongyang has been proved to be difficult due to the parties' diverse interests and priorities. This section analyses the objectives of neighbouring countries and global powers *vis-à-vis* North Korea's de-nuclearisaiton.

4.1   *US in the Korean Peninsula: Déjà Vu of Cuban Missile Crisis all over again*

There are some clear drivers of the US policy in the Korean Peninsula. These priorities greatly shape the US foreign policy objectives. Firstly, the US does not want to increase the number in the nuclear members' club. Therefore, the US advocated a comprehensive, verifiable, irreversible de-nuclearisation (CVID) of the North Korea. However, as the paper has argued before, this policy was unacceptable to Pyongyang.

Secondly, the US policies in the region are shaped by its commitment as a security provider to Japan and South Korea. Its policies are also influenced by the growing role of China and a potentially resurgent Russia. The US has the responsibility to protect its allies in the region. It is bound by treaty to protect Japan. With South Korea, it shares the core values of democracy promotion, peace and stability in the region. The balance of power in the Korean Peninsula is shifting towards China, due to its increasing economic and military clout. By reining in a nuclear North Korea, the US can maintain status quo in the region.

During the Obama administration, there was relative calm regarding the Korean nuclear issue. The US policies towards North Korea remain uncertain under the new administration of Donald Trump. While some have claimed that Trump's stance on Pyongyang does deviate much from his predecessor Obama's, nonetheless, the current US President made contradictory remarks on how to pursue foreign policy with regard to North Korea. There are three major points of departure which can be identified from Trump's policies. Firstly, he envisaged a "chance that [the US] could end up having a major, major conflict with North Korea".[37] Although some believe that Trump is likely to follow Obama's footsteps. However, he has resorted to harsher rhetoric and declared to be tough on North Korea. Secondly, and on the contrary, he said that he would be "honoured" to meet the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un,

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[35] Tara O, *The Collapse of North Korea: Challenges, Planning and Geopolitics of Unification*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp. 78–79.
[36] David Lague and Donald Greenlees, "Squeeze on Banco Delta Asia Hit North Korea Where It Hurt", *The New York Times*, 18 January 2007, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/18/world/asia/18iht-north.4255039.html, accessed on 21 May 2017.
[37] Gerry Mullany, "Trump Warns That 'Major, Major Conflict' With North Korea Is Possible", *The New York Times*, 27 April 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/world/asia/trump-north-korea-kim-jong-un.html, accessed on 28 May 2017.

under right circumstances.[38] The phrasing and the timing of this words were highly criticised. It is not customary for an incumbent US President to note that meeting an autocratic leader from a rogue nation would be a lifetime opportunity. It has given all the wrong signals that a running US President can possibly give. Thirdly, one of the major security issues in the Korean Peninsula is the proposed THAAD missile defence system. The defence system with intercept capabilities is aimed at detecting and destroying any ballistic missiles fired by Pyongyang. In a recent interview with the *Reuters*, President Trump demanded that South Korea should shoulder the financial burden of one billion US dollars for the defence system.

These policy changes have affected the regional balance of power, and have sent provocative signals to North Korea. Because of power asymmetry and positions in the regional relational dynamics, Pyongyang seeks to bolster its regime security by eliminating possible threat. Indeed, the regime feels that it is under threat owing to US policy shifts.

4.2   *China: A Test for Legitimacy as a Global Power*

China has historically played an active role in dialing down the nuclear tension with North Korea. It is widely believed to have wielded considerable diplomatic clout over Pyongyang. Until recent escalation, in the face of persistent economic sanctions, China was the only friend which stood by the country. Beijing has historically provided unwavering support to Pyongyang. The relationship is more than the camaraderie of communist ideology. North Korea is also China's security guarantor on the Peninsula where both Japan and South Korea consider the US as their close allies. Because of China's cozy relations with North Korea, it is justifiable to ask what its interests are vis-à-vis Pyongyang. Notwithstanding China's historic support to North Korea, Beijing is deeply connected to the global economy. Its recent emergence as an economic superpower exceeding the US has expanded its sphere of influence. Stephen M. Walt, a professor of Harvard University, succinctly summarised China's policy with regard to North Korea. He noted:

> "China doesn't want North Korea to collapse and certainly doesn't want the Korean Peninsula unified under a pro-U.S. government in Seoul, but it doesn't like Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities or missile program one bit".[39]

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[38] Julian Borger, "Donald Trump: I'd Be Honored to Meet Kim Jong-Un Under 'Right Circumstances'", *The Guardian*, 01 May 2017, available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/may/01/donald-trump-kim-jong-un-meeting-north-korea, accessed on 27 May 2017.
[39] Stephen Walt, "Donald Trump Is Defining Successful Foreign Policy Down", *Foreign Policy*, 08 August 2017, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/08/donald-trump-is-defining-successful-foreign-policy-down/, accessed on 12 August 2017.

The country also feels uneasiness on a number of US policies in the region. First, the deployment of THAAD anti-missile shield worries China. The US and its allies' ability to intercept and neutralise missiles fired by North Korea would also be able to weaken China's deterrence against its adversaries and alter the status quo in favour of the US. Chinese concern on the Peninsula is not merely gaining an upper hand in a political game; rather, it has serious domestic challenges unrelated to politics arising out of the crisis. For example, the influx of refugees in the wake of a full-scale war in the region as well as a political chaos ensuing regime collapse of Pyongyang remains the top concern for China.[40]

Despite China's interest in not allowing further US presence and influence in the region, it has genuinely taken measures to put pressure on Pyongyang. After recent UN Security Council Resolution 2371 which imposed restrictions on North Korean seafood and coal, key sources of its foreign currency reserve, the Chinese government has restricted North Korean imports.[41] The US reliance on China to rein in North Korea also exhibits China's clout over the situation and its increasing role in defusing the tension.

4.3   *Opportunity for Resurgent Russia*

As well as China, the nuclear crisis is an opportunity for Russia to flex muscle in Northeast Asia. Van Jackson contended in the *Foreign Affairs* magazine that Russia's relations with the "hermit kingdom"[42] of North Korea are inversely proportional to Pyongyang's relations with the US;[43] whenever US-Russia relations deteriorate Russia-North Korea relations get better. This coziness is further explained by a resurgent Russia's desire to counterweight US hegemony in its backyard. The other reason for enhanced backing of North Korea is strategic. Russia opposes the idea of the anti-ballistic missile system in the Korean Peninsula. US-developed THAAD was being deployed in South Korea until it was halted by the new South Korean President Moon Jae-in. The problem with such missile shield is that they weaken deterrence and increases tension.

In the recent time, the two countries continue to enhance their bilateral relations. President Vladimir Putin maintains a close relation with the North Korean regime. Moscow pardoned Pyongyang billion dollars in debt which the latter received

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[40] Shi Yinhong, "Painful Lessons, Reversing Practices, and Ongoing Limitations: China Facing North Korea since 2003", in Carla P. Freeman (ed.), *China and North Korea: Strategic and Policy Perspectives from a Changing China*, First edition, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 19.

[41] Jane Perlez, "China's Crackdown on North Korea Over U.N. Sanctions Starts to Pinch", *The New York Times*, 16 August 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/16/world/asia/china-north-korea-seafood-exports.html, accessed on 16 August 2017.

[42] Any country uninclined to engage in dialogues with rest of the world is called a hermit kingdom. In recent times, the term often used exclusively for North Korea to denote its isolation and detachment from the international community.

[43] Van Jackson, "Putin and the Hermit Kingdom", *Foreign Affairs*, 22 February 2015, available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2015-02-22/putin-and-hermit-kingdom, accessed on 25 May 2017.

from the former Soviet Union. North Korean labourers often travelled to Siberia to work in the constructions site.[44] Despite strategic calculations, Russia has a keen interest in resolving the crisis which would strengthen its position as a global leader.

4.4   *Return of South Korea's 'Sunshine': Eclipse for US Dominance*

No country has a more direct stake in an increasing nuclear tension than South Korea - North Korea's sibling separated by the Korean War of 1950-1953. Not only will any nuclear fallout directly cause casualty in the North, the problem has serious ramifications for the South. Both Koreas anticipate a future unification of the two countries, as was the case with Germany in the late 1990s. The border between the two Koreas, officially called the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), is often dubbed as "the Korean Wall", a metaphor to allude to that of the divided Germany until the fall of the Berlin Wall.[45] Nevertheless, mutual distrust and animosity persist.

During the heydays of six-nation negotiation, South Korea took a lenient policy towards Pyongyang known as the 'sunshine policy' guided by neoliberal theories. At its core, the policy aimed to promote mutual trust and demilitarisation of North Korea by providing aid and assistance. A separate Unification Ministry was established in Seoul to channel funds to the North. The then South Korean President Kim Dae-jung received Nobel Peace prize in 2000 for the sunshine policy. The policy, nonetheless, failed to live up to its promises and the six-party talks collapsed. There were several reasons for the failure of the policy. With the election of George Bush in 2001, neo-conservatives believed that if the US becomes too much lenient on North Korea, it would undermine the US supremacy in the region. The situation was aggravated when Bush declared North Korea an 'Axis of Evil', along with Iran and Iraq, in 2002. The US also designated North Korea a 'state sponsor of terrorism'. This reinforced North Korean paranoia that its external security concerns are well-founded. These exposed serious fault lines in the neoliberal thinking with regard to Korean crisis.

The anticipation of the two Koreas' reunification notwithstanding, South Korea has largely sidetracked from formulating a clear policy objective with regard to the North. As the recent Presidential election in Seoul suggests, North Korea remains a vital political agenda in the election campaign. In a recent *Foreign Policy* article Patricia Kim argued:

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[44] Amanda Erickson, "Russia Warns against 'intimidating' North Korea after its Latest Missile Launch", *Washington Post*, 17 May 2017, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/05/15/russia-warns-against-intimidating-north-korea-after-its-latest-missile-launch/, accessed on 29 May 2017.

[45] Key-young Son, *South Korean Engagement Policies and North Korea: Identities, Norms and the Sunshine Policy*, New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 1–2.

"While the North Korean nuclear crisis was front and center in the South Korean presidential election, the policy debates that took place were largely short on substance. Instead of presenting innovative or concrete ideas to the South Korean people, the candidates engaged in the same old myopic arguments about which previous administration was to blame for the current situation."[46]

After the triumph of the liberal politician Moon Jae-in, this lack of direction in the foreign policy was expectedly picked by the North Korean regime.

There have been some hopes of a return of sunshine policy. The new South Korean leader Moon Jae-in, who sworn in on 10 May 2017, is a proponent of engagement with the North.[47] He served as the Chief of Staff under the former President Roh Moo-hyun during the mid-2000s and closely oversaw the implementation of the policy. His policy changes would undermine a hardline US policy.

These developments provided an impetus for North Korea to intensify its drive for nuclear weapons. First, new South Korean President's intention to return to the sunshine policies are deemed as weakness. Second, return to the sunshine policy would put South Korea and the US on a collision course.[48]

4.5   *Japan as a "Spoiler"*

Japan's uneasiness to the crisis is well-founded. Besides its proximity to Pyongyang, Japan has history of animosity with North Korea. Several of North Korea's recent missiles landed off the Japanese coast. However, Japan's interests go beyond the nuclear threat. Several authors have argued that its primary intentions to become a party did not only rest on nuclear issue; rather, the locus of its attention remained on resolving bilateral issues with North Korea rather than a political solution to the nuclear crisis.[49] Japanese policies are driven by domestic political considerations. A number of internal factors explain its objectives. First, North Korea's perception of the Japanese occupation of Koreas in the early twentieth century followed by the latter's demand for compensation for atrocities committed by Japan. In the case of possible reunification, two Koreas would be united in demanding compensations from Japan for its crimes committed during its imperial rule.[50] The second is the abduction of

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[46] Patricia Kim, "South Korea Doesn't Have a Clue What to Do About the North", *Foreign Policy*, 12 May 2017, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/12/south-korea-doesnt-have-a-clue-what-to-do-about-the-north/, accessed on 25 May 2017.
[47] Emily Tamkin, "In South Korea, Will Moon Bring Back Sunshine?", *Foreign Policy*, 09 May 2017, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/09/in-south-korea-will-moon-bring-back-sunshine/, accessed on 22 May 2017.
[48] Dan De Luce, "South Korean Elections Could Derail Trump's Plans to Get Tough on North Korea", *Foreign Policy*, 10 April 2017, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/10/south-korean-elections-could-derail-trumps-plans-to-get-tough-on-north-korea/, accessed on 24 May 2017.
[49] Leszek Buszynski, *Negotiating with North Korea: The Six Party Talks and the Nuclear Issue*, Oxon: Routledge, 2013, pp. 42–43.
[50] Gilbert Rozman, *Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 131.

Japanese fishermen by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, Japan has pushed these issues to the negotiation agenda, sidelining core issues of contention relating to North Korea's nuclear programme.

Besides domestic politics, Japan has regional political considerations that may have caused it to feel hesitant about the prospects of multilateral talks. While Japan wants a peaceful resolution of the crisis, nevertheless, the existing mechanisms of negotiation - where China acts as the chair of the six-party talks - is in conflict with its national interest. Under no circumstances would Japan allow a permanent security umbrella that inherently accepts China's supremacy in the region. Furthermore, North Korea provides a welcome justification for enhancing military capabilities of Japan.[51] As far as a multilateral negotiation with North Korea is concerned, Japan's role has often been deemed as "spoiler" in the negotiation forum because of its insistence on resolving bilateral issues that has little value for the nuclear negotiation.[52] It was deemed a spoiler not because it differed over the outcome of the negotiation but its preference for certain course of actions.[53]

5.   Avoiding a Full-scale Nuclear War

As the preceding discussion suggests, the six party talks was destined to malfunction owing to self-interest of the parties involved in the negotiation. This section analyses possible policy options to de-escalate the crisis. Autocratic regimes often do not make any distinction between state security and regime security. For Pyongyang, the security of the state of North Korea is inseparable from the security of Kim Jong family. The division of two Koreas is a Cold War relic, in a sense that they were divided based on capitalist-communist ideological lines that are barely relevant to present-day global politics. One obvious limitation of the recommendations discussed in this paper is that devising a platform to negotiate these would be difficult. Nevertheless, understanding the solutions would mean that stakeholders are more cognisant of the root causes and it would also make readers appreciate the intricacies of the problem. The possible solutions are categorised in two types: one that relates to the regime of Kim Jong-il and one that relates to the future of it *i.e.,* what ensues after the expected reunification of two Koreas.

It is said that nuclear weapons do not have war values; they only have symbolic and deterrent values meaning that most countries that possess these bombs do not plan on using them. Nevertheless, possessing a nuclear arsenal makes sure that adversaries would think twice before attacking. This is why some realist

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[51] Maaike Okano-Heijmans, "Japan as Spoiler in the Six-Party Talks: Single-Issue Politics and Economic Diplomacy Towards North Korea", Clingendael: The Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 22 October 2008, available at https://www.clingendael.nl/publication/japan-spoiler-six-party-talks-single-issue-politics-and-economic-diplomacy-towards-north, accessed on 25 May 2017.

[52] Gilbert Rozman, pp. 190–191; Leszek Buszynski, pp. 15 and 45.

[53] Marie-Joëlle Zahar, "Reframing the Spoiler Debate in Peace Processes", in John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty (eds.), *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-War Reconstruction*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

scholars of International Relations such as John Mearsheimer argued that nuclear weapons can ensure stability. If this line of argument is correct, the US or any other country is unlike to attack North Korea given that it already has nuclear warheads and delivery systems in its arsenal. Its effectiveness is as good as the rationality of actors and decision makers. Leaders with suicidal tendencies or those who believe that mass death of their own population would be preferable to a humiliating defeat may well act entirely differently. Therefore, provocations, threats and rhetoric will not de-escalate the nuclear tension on the Korean Peninsula.

5.1   *Imperative for Restrained Rhetoric*

The members of nuclear club of states have nuclear doctrines outlining under what circumstances they would use nuclear weapons. Some countries have no-first-use policy in place. They will not use their nuclear weapons first unless they are attacked by a nuclear weapon first. However, this also requires that they have 'second strike capability', *i.e.,* they are able to mount a nuclear attack in case their nuclear stockpile is destroyed by the adversary in a first attack. Yet, this is a luxury that not all nuclear powers can enjoy. If a nuclear power does not have credible second-strike capability, it will not risk its total destruction by not initiating the first attack. This is applicable for countries with no credible nuclear triad: a combination of land, submarine and air-based delivery system.

This is why signal from belligerent parties plays an important role. No country would want to falsely provoke its adversary because it might lead the latter to use nuclear weapons first. In the latest crisis, both sides are giving wrong signals by engaging in a cyclic game of rhetoric and exchange of heated words. While President Trump has recently said the US nuclear weapons are "locked and loaded". Deterrence works when both parties take each other seriously and threats are not exaggerated. If the US cannot follow through its threat of responding with "fire and fury", there will be questions as to its willpower or courage to mount a preemptive strike on North Korean nuclear sites. There are at least two possible consequences: US would lose the credibility of its threats, or in a worst case scenario, North Korea would be frightened to initiate a nuclear war to overcome its strategic disadvantage. Because it has been observed that in an asymmetric warfare, it is usually the weaker power that initiates the war to baffle the enemy with an element of surprise.[54] Given the doubt that weaker party would be able to survive an attack, it is more likely that it would attack first. As such, the immediate priority of the parties involved in the Korean nuclear crisis should refrain from engaging in a battle of words to prevent a surprise attack. The onus is on President Trump because of the US's superiority and higher stake.

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[54] This theoretical question has been addressed at length by T. V. Paul of McGill University, Canada. For further scrutiny on why this is the case, see, T. V. Paul, *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

5.2   Perils of 'Good Cop, Bad Cop'

'Good Cop, Bad Cop' is an old bargaining/negotiation technique where one cop threatens a person during interrogation with grave consequences, if he does not comply. Another cop treats the interrogatee nicely and offers incentives for cooperation. President Trump's initial response to prevent North Korea seems to show that it has engaged in playing the good cop, and the bad cop bargaining game with Pyongyang. Sometimes his senior officials have assumed the role of good cop while the President played bad cop. His statements, thus, have oscillated between appeasement and provocation. He previously praised the North Korean leader for being able to maintain his powerful position despite internal/external conspiracies against him. Trump said of Kim Jong-un in an interview given to the CBS News:

> "At a very young age, he was able to assume power. A lot of people, I'm sure, tried to take that power away, whether it was his uncle or anybody else. And he was able to do it. So obviously, he's a pretty smart cookie."[55]

However, his recent statements against Pyongyang were fierce and strong. He forcefully said that any North Korean provocation "will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen."[56] This good cop/bad cop policy may also signal a lack of policy coherence within the US foreign policy making circle. On the other hand, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has assured the American public that the US is not sliding into a possible nuclear war and there is no imminent threat.[57] A White House staff Sebastian Gorka who serves as the Deputy Assistant to the POTUS criticised Secretary Tillerson for "speaking out of turn" and commenting on a military issue that does not concern the Secretary of State.[58] This shows that it may not be a good cop/bad cop technique; instead, the US does not have a well-thought-out policy on how to prevent North Korea from firing more missiles.

Curtis Martin argued, complexities of international diplomacy prohibit the imitation of an interrogation room.[59] Because actors may use indirect channels to communicate, as in the case of Washington and Pyongyang, messages are likely to be distorted and threats miscalculated. Especially, when a threat of nuclear war is concerned, playing good cop and bad cop should not be the diplomatic tool of choice.

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[55] John Dickerson, "Full Transcript: President Donald Trump's Interview with 'Face the Nation'", *CBS News*, 30 April 2017, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-interview-full-transcript-face-the-nation/, accessed on 25 June 2017.
[56] Jeff Zeleny, Dan Merica and Kevin Liptak, "Trump's 'Fire and Fury' Remark Was Improvised but Familiar", *CNN*, 09 August 2017, available at http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/09/politics/trump-fire-fury-improvise-north-korea/index.html, accessed on 10 August 2017.
[57] Paul McLeary, "Trump Increases Rhetoric on North Korea, As His Aides Fight It Out", *Foreign Policy*, 10 August 2017, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/10/trump-increases-rhetoric-on-north-korea-as-his-aides-fight-it-out/, accessed on 12 August 2017.
[58] *Ibid.*
[59] Curtis H. Martin, "'Good Cop/Bad Cop' as a Model for Nonproliferation Diplomacy Toward North Korea and Iran", *The Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2007, pp. 61–88.

One internal dynamics that explains the actions of the current leader is that the regime suffers from legitimacy crisis. In the psyche of North Korean leadership, this apprehension was fortified by the US talking about regime change, demonstrated in the wake of Arab spring.

5.3   *Charting the Course for the Aftermath of Reunification*

What happens after potential reunification of Koreas is a concern for all parties. Both Koreas anticipate a future reunification of the country. What is disputed is, however, who would be at the political control. North Korea is isolated and economically weaker; but militarily superior. Conversely, South Korea has a booming economy, it is internationally well connected in terms of trade and foreign investment, and finally, is backed up by its western allies. Pyongyang's political elites are apprehensive of losing their political fortune on case of such future event.

Aside from both Koreas, neither China nor Russia wants permanent presence of US forces in their backyard. As long as there is no assurance from the US that it would play a limited role in case of a regime collapse or reunification, both China and Russia will resist any likelihood of US preeminence in the Korean Peninsula. This question is intricately linked with a negotiated settlement of the crisis.

5.4   *Strategic Reassurance*

For China, reunification poses another challenge. North Korea shares land borders with China and South Korea does not. The collapse of North Korea's current regime would invariably lead to the deepening role of South and its western allies. Because of the treaty between the US and Seoul, American troops will be on the ground. A unified Korea with the political control resting in the hands of political elite from the South would imply that American troops maintain a presence in the region. This will be unacceptable to both Russia and China for strategic reasons. As such, the US policy makers should focus on what Eduardo Araral calls "strategic reassurance" between China and the US.[60] The US should guarantee the regional actors that its role in case of a reunification would be limited and it would not interfere in the internal affairs of other neighbouring countries. The recent escalation has brought all powerful state closer than anytime they were in the past. China and Russia are eager to cooperate to defuse the crisis more than ever. Stephen Walt argues that "North Korea deserves most of the credit for this display of great-power unity".[61]

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[60] Eduardo Araral, "U.S.-China Relations: A Game of Strategic Reassurance", *Foreign Affairs*, 07 August 2017, available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/sponsored/us-china-relations-game-strategic-reassurance, accessed on 12 August 2017.
[61] Stephen Walt, *op. cit*.

5.5   *Bringing back Multi-Party Negotiation, Save Spoilers*

The major parties to multilateral negotiation have diverging interests and objectives with regard to Korean nuclear problem. There were some inherent problems of the multilateral negotiation mechanism devised to resolve the nuclear armament of North Korea. Japan has an "inflated sense of its power" in the region and the US also concedes to this view.[62] Gilbert Rozman argues that neither Japan nor the US is willing to turn the Six-Party Talk into a permanent security mechanism, because doing so would officially recognise China's predominance in the region. This would change the status quo of the region.

5.6   *Diplomacy and Negotiation*

North Korea has relatively advanced nuclear reactors and, despite some failures, it has successfully launched several Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). The United States should not rule out limited de-nuclearisation in dealing with Pyongyang. Mutual assured destruction (MAD) would imply that North Korea has credible nuclear deterrence and the US cannot mount a decapitation strike without risking a retaliation from North Korea. If that is the case, threats and rhetoric will no longer work. The only option would be diplomacy and negotiation.

The *hawks* in Washington are eager to start a war with North Korea without resorting to diplomacy. Those in favour of this argument claim that nuclear deterrence is strengthened by a country attaining 'second strike capabilities'–when a country is able to strike even after being hit by its adversaries. Second strike capabilities bolster deterrence because they ensure mutual assured destruction (MAD). The current stand-off cannot be peacefully resolved without giving diplomacy a chance. It has become clear that rhetoric and hollow threats from either side cannot dissuade the other from further escalation. Given the delicacy of the matter and grave consequences involved, it is high time both sides agree to negotiate.

5.7   *Engaging the United Nations*

The UN is often handicapped by the veto power of permanent members of its Security Council. But the biggest advantage of engaging through the UN is its ability to garner international support. The composition of multi-party negotiation framework is parochial. Given the global implications of the problem, the UN should play a bigger role. The merits of UN's direct involvement are twofold. First, this would allow other neutral parties to talk to Pyongyang out of its current stance. Third parties are known to be effective in international negotiation. Secondly, any decision that may involve use of force against North Korea would have much international credibility if the UN is directly involved.

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[62] Gilbert Rozman, *Strategic Thinking About the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught Between North Korea and the United States*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 28.

Secondly, in the face of persistent missile tests by Pyongyang, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2371 was passed unanimously on 07 August 2017. Although this resolution is unlike to significantly alter the current state of affairs, it would nonetheless put pressure on North Korea by the way of stifling its foreign exchange earnings by limiting its international trade.[63] The resolution seeks to reduce the country's international trade to below US$ 1 billion annually, from its current US$ 3 billion export revenue.[64] This would prevent North Korea to send migrant workers to other countries, imposed trade restrictions on its major imports including seafood. It will be denied port access to North Korean vessels. Since test missiles are very costly to manufacture, it is expected that North Korea would require to channeling funds from other domestic source to be able to produce more missiles. The resolution also gives due recognition to the achievements of the Six-Party Talks.

Regardless of the tougher wording of the latest resolution, it is 16th of its kind since North Korea left the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993.[65] In fact, the previous resolution was adopted only five months ago. Passing a resolution does not guarantee that clandestine trade and illicit trafficking would end overnight. Despite this, what is required is to internationalise the gravity of the problem by having more countries on board. As the decision was adopted unanimously in the UN Security Council, it will have more legitimacy than unilateral preventive actions by the West.

6.   Conclusion

A North Korea with fully armed nuclear capability is a threat to peace and security not only to the US and its allies but also to China and Russia. The stakes are much higher when the leaders of nuclear-armed states are bereft of rationality. Therefore, despite the relative coziness of relations, both China and Russia cannot overrule the threats from Pyongyang. Nevertheless, for both countries the permanent presence of US troops so close to their borders is a bigger cause of concern. This has prevented deeper cooperation among powerful stakeholders such as China and Russia.

Any attempt for peaceful resolution will need to acknowledge the bitter truth that it is now a reality that North Korea is a nuclear state, like India and Pakistan. This would be imprudent to overlook two recent significant developments: first, North Korea has already exhibited that it possesses ICBM capable of hitting the US mainland; and second, it has warheads compact enough to fit in a ballistic missile as noted by Joby Warrick *et al.* in a recently *Washington Post* article.

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[63] Joseph DeThomas, "UNSCR 2371: An Invitation to Evasion", *38 North*, 07 August 2017, available at http://www.38north.org/2017/08/jdethomas080717/, accessed on 10 August 2017. For a list of prior UN sanctions, see Kelsey Davenport, "UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea", *Arms Control Association*, August 2017, available at https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea, accessed on 13 August 2017.

[64] Stephen Walt, *op. cit*.

[65] *Ibid.*

When it comes to effective deterrence, miscalculations and miscommunications are the major impediments. President Trump's apparent policy of playing good cop and bad cop is a dangerous game to be played in an international crisis, where nuclear bombs are at stake. A regime that is bent to protect itself cannot be prevented by using appeasement either.

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Moonis Ahmar

UNDERSTANDING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: PAKISTAN AND THE PREDICAMENT OF YOUTH

Abstract

In South Asia, contemporary Pakistan is one of the most affected countries as far as terrorism and violent extremism are concerned. Although, the phenomenon is not new in Pakistan, the country, however, witnessed a gradual resurgence of violence and extremism during the last three decades. This paper examines the phenomenon of violent extremism by linking it with the radicalisation of youths in Pakistan. It dwells at length the permeation of extremism in various segments of Pakistani society in the post-1971 Pakistan; the role of state in not reversing the tide of religious extremism which got an impetus because of the Afghan War and the events occurring in post- 9/11 period. Why the culture of tolerance witnessed erosion in the last four decades and how ethics and values declined particularly among the new generation of Pakistan are also be examined in the paper. More so, the transformation of extremism from moderate to radical and violent are also examined while focusing on the erosion of the culture of tolerance and the permeation of violence at societal level. A road map dealing with the predicament of youths in Pakistan by eradicating extremism is also discussed and plausible solutions of growing radicalisation of youths of this country are delineated in this paper. It is argued that meaningful steps need to be undertaken by the people at the helm of affairs to ensure positive transformation in the approach, attitude and behaviour of youths to prevent them from falling into the trap of intolerance, extremism and violence. And such steps include not only social, economic and governance reforms but also must include extensive reforms of the education sector as well.

1.   Introduction

The phenomenon of violent extremism in Pakistan is not new but it got an impetus in the last three decades. Intolerance, radicalisation, militancy, violence and terrorism take their roots in a society which is frustrated and ridden with economic and social injustices. Therefore, extremism, if not controlled, can take a violent shape; can polarise the youths of the country and destabilise not only society but also the state. It is not only in Pakistan where the youth is vulnerable to violent extremism, but it is a phenomenon, which is common in South Asia and in other regions of the world.

Moonis Ahmar, PhD is former Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences and currently Meritorious Professor at the Department of International Relations, University of Karachi. He is also Director, Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, Department of International Relations, University of Karachi. His e-mail address is: amoonis@hotmail.com

Conceptual understanding of violent extremism means the mindset and approach which promote feelings of hatred and fanaticism against a particular person or a group. When intolerance permeates in the minds of people because of various reasons, the outcome is its transformation in a violent manner threatening the survival and security of people.

This paper will examine the phenomenon of violent extremism by linking it with the radicalisation of youths in Pakistan by responding to following questions:

1. What is the conceptual *basis* of violent extremism?

2. How has violent extremism *impacted* on the society of Pakistan?

3. How is the *predicament* of the youths of Pakistan related to the phenomenon of violent extremism?

4. How can violent extremism in Pakistan be *neutralised* and what are the impediments in this regard?

5. How can the *process* of de-radicalisation of youths of Pakistan be unleashed?

Furthermore, the paper will dwell at length the permeation of extremism in various segments of Pakistani society in the post-1971 Pakistan and the role of state in not reversing the tide of religious extremism which got an impetus because of the Afghan War and the events unfolding in post-9/11 period. Why the culture of tolerance witnessed erosion in the last four decades and how ethics and values declined particularly among the new generation of Pakistan will also be examined in this paper. More so, the transformation of extremism from moderate to radical and violent will also be examined in this paper while focusing on the erosion of the culture of tolerance and the permeation of violence at the societal level. A road map dealing with the predicament of youth in Pakistan by eradicating extremism will also be discussed and plausible solutions of growing radicalisation of youths of this country will also be delineated in this paper. The central idea that is analysed in this paper is: 'Human and Social Development' in Pakistan will not take place unless its youths are productive with better social learning, education and professional training.

The culture of violent extremism was noticeable in Pakistan, even before 1971. For instance, in November 1970 at the Karachi airport, the airline cargo truck driver, Feroze Abdullah killed the Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Zygfryd Wolniak who was accompanying the Polish President Marian Spychalksi and going back to his country after five-day official visit to Pakistan. In that incident three Pakistani security staff, press reporter and photographer were killed and many were injured. According to Associated Press, the driver was arrested and confessed to the police that, "I want

to eliminate all enemies of Islam. I wanted to kill all the visiting Polish party who are Socialists. Socialism is against Islam and Socialists want to destroy Islam and Moslems".[1] Such was the mindset representing a school of thought which propagated hate against a particular ideology. During 1970 and 1977 election campaigns, religion were used by various political parties merely for political gains and reflected their extremist and militant mindsets. The slogan that "Islam is in danger" was used by the right-wing political parties during 1970 elections so as to get popular support but failed in their task as religious parties faced an electoral rout in these elections.

The replacement of the culture of tolerance with the culture of violent extremism in Pakistan is an interesting phenomenon because once a relatively peaceful country is now perceived that it has been transformed as extremist and radical. How Pakistan can transform as moderate and tolerant country needs a major shift in its societal and state approach on issues which are critical in nature and must be dealt in a prudent manner. Transformation in the mindset of people who over a period of decades patronised and promoted extremism will, however, be an uphill task but needs to be taken by the state and societal actors.

2.   Conceptual Basis of Violent Extremism

The shift from extremism to its violent form in Pakistan is the outcome of a process encompassing transformation in attitude, behaviour, role and perception of people over a period of several decades. Following the unleashing of the so-called process of Islamisation by the then military regime of General M. Zia-ul-Haq and the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, a new generation of 'Jihadists' emerged in Pakistan propagating religious extremism.[2] The culture of extremism and violent extremism is thus a phenomenon of 1980s but has deepened in Pakistani society with the passage of time. Analysing the nexus between extremism and culture, Elaine Pressman finds "extremism to be culturally relative term in that extremist beliefs are dependent on the cultural perspective since the person who holds views which are considered to be extreme within one cultural context or time may not be considered to hold extremist beliefs within another cultural context or time".[3]

How the concept of extremism and violent extremism are defined and why there still exist misconceptions about the rise of intolerance and violence needs

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[1] *Daily Kent Stater*, Vol. LVI, No. 24, 04 November 1970. Available at http://dks.library.kent.edu/cgi-bin/ken tstate?a=d&d=dks19701104-01.2.7, accessed on 02 April 2016.

[2] Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror,* New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2005, pp. 89-132.

[3] See Dr. Elaine Pressman, "Risk Assessment Decisions from Violent Political Extremism 2009-02", Canadian Center for Security and Intelligence Studies, 2009, quoted in Muhammad Feyyaz, "Youth extremism in Pakistan – Magnitude Channels, Resident Spheres and Response," in *Defense Against Terrorism Review*, Vol. 6. No. 1, Spring & Fall 2014, p. 65. Muhammad Feyyaz argues that the literature views extremists as diseased, immoderate, inflexible or irrational actors of times mixing conservatism as well as sentimental attitudes of society with religion as narrative. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

to be examined in some detail. According to the Macmillan English Dictionary extremism is a, "tendency to have political or religious ideas that are considered extremely unreasonable by most people".[4] Ideas which some people, groups or state wants to impose on others is counterproductive and reflects an extremist mindset. The Greenwood Encyclopaedia of International Relations defines extremism as, "immoderation in policy or in one's intellectual, political, or social opinions and judgments".[5] A country which has a history of intolerance and promoting fascism cannot be termed as normal and is certainly a threat to those who want to adhere to a peaceful way of life. Oxford English Dictionary defines extremism as "opposed to moderate".[6] In the Safire's Political Dictionary, extremism has been defined as "a position at the either end of the ideological spectrum and home of politically far-out".[7] Merriam-Webster dictionary defines extremism as, "the quality or state of being extreme". Collins English Dictionary defines extremism as, "it is a behaviour or beliefs of extremists".[8] Therefore, moderation and sanity cannot be imposed merely by speeches, table talk or rhetoric but requires a mindset which has a respect for other cultures and religions as a key to eradicate extremism and violent extremism. The National Action Plan (NAP) of Pakistan which was announced following the attack on Army Public School (APC) on 16 December 2014, killing dozens of children focused on de-radicalising society and eradicating violent extremism.

According to a research carried out by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Islamabad, "extremism means forcefully rejecting the existing means of political participation, attempting to create new ideologies and narratives to bring about a structural change in all spheres of life (social, political, economic or ethnic) by challenging the legitimacy of existing system institutions".[9] In a book, *Extremism and the Internet* by Peter Brophy, Jenny Craven and Shelagh Fisher, extremism is defined as "an individual or group's willingness to promote their cause by violence and by the denial of fundamental human rights to others".[10] In a book, *Political Extremism and Rationality* edited by Albert Breton *et al.*, "political extremist could be defined as one who uses extremist method, for examples, bombings, inflammatory language, terrorist activity and so forth, but whose platform is or may be centrist rather than extremist in political (left-right) space".[11] Nobel laureate from South Africa, Archbishop Desmond Tutu defines extremism as: "when you do not allow for a different point

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[4] *Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners*, Oxford: Macmillan Edition, 2002, p. 490.
[5] Cathal J. Nolan, *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations,* Vol. 1, A-E, London: Greenwood Publishing Company, 2002, p. 529.
[6] *The Oxford English Dictionary,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
[7] *Safire's Political Dictionary,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
[8] *Collins Cobuild English Dictionary,* London: Harper Collins Publications, 1995, p. 589.
[9] Syed Mazhar Abbas Zaidi, "The Process of Radicalization: Contextualizing the Case of Pakistan", in *Conflict and Peace Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 2, April 2011, quoted in Abdul Basit, "Countering Violent Extremism: Evaluating Pakistan's Counter-Radicalization and De-radicalization", in *IPRI Journal*, Vol. XV, No 2, Summer 2015, p. 47.
[10] Peter Brophy, Jenny Craven, and Shelagh Fisher, *Extremism and the Internet,* Manchester: Center for Research in Library & Information Management, 1999, p. 19.
[11] Albert Breton, *et al.* (eds.), *Political Extremism and Rationality,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 25.

of view; when you hold your own views as being quite exclusive; when you don't allow the possibility of difference. When extremism starts to have a political end, for example to force governments to the table of negotiations for some changes in their policies. It starts to become synonymous with radicalisation".[12] Based on the above definitions and discussion on extremism four major conclusions could be drawn. First, extremism is a mindset which tends to impose one's own way of life and ideology on others by coercive and fearful means. Second, extremism is contrary to normal behaviour of people and it tries to propagate something which can lead to violence and destruction. Third, the transformation of a moderate and peaceful culture into extremist is a universal phenomenon as all over the world one can notice the assertion of extremist groups. Finally, extremist approach, if transformed as a policy of state can be lethal because it can result into widespread violence. Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Japan adopted extremism, intolerance, violence and aggression as a state policy by persecuting and eliminating their opponents thus causing lethal damage to humanity. Furthermore, extremism flourishes in a culture of intolerance where dissent and critical thinking are not acceptable by those people and groups who want to impose their own ideology or way of life.

Conceptual dimensions of extremism and violent extremism should also include three major characteristics. First, the deep level of frustration, anger and antagonism prevailing among those who behave or act in an intolerant manner either because of their economic predicament or fear that their culture or religion may be under threat. Second, the motivation and inspiration from those who convince potential extremists about the justness of their cause or ideology. Extremism is the outcome of a process in which substantial indoctrination takes place till the time the potential extremist is ready to go to any length in order to achieve his or her objective. Third, the extremist mindset lacks prudence and rationality in order to justify militant or terrorist act. To a large extent, the bulk of violent extremists are those who are categorised as youths and it is this segment of society which is highly vulnerable to violence and terrorism. Furthermore, the transition from a normal to an extremist mindset also includes the absence of a positive approach and the productive use of time. In a country where human development is the priority and people are engaged in productive activities, there are meagre prospects of people, particularly the youth drifting into extremism or violent extremism. Such things only happen in a society where there is huge unemployment; lack of acquiring good quality and affordable education; absence of good health, sports and recreational opportunities. During the 1960s, Pakistan was considered as a role model in many developing countries particularly South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia because, the focus and thrust of government at that time was on strengthening the process of modernisation, industrialisation and human development. Dr. Mahbub ul Haq, the legendary figure in Pakistan's economy was known for his focus and emphasis on Human and Social

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[12] Available at http://theplayhouse.org.uk/tapestry/category/background/what-is-extremism/, accessed on 23 March 2016.

Development[13]. Had Dr. Mahbubul Haq's vision on 'Social and Human Development' in Pakistan been sustained, neither the radicalisation nor the extremism among the youths of Pakistan would have taken place because of his thrust on providing better education, health, housing and employment opportunities.

3.   Impact of Violent Extremism

A major impact of violent extremism is the erosion of values of tolerance, moderation and enlightenment in Pakistani society. In a situation when youths constitute the major segment of population, their drift into extremism and violence results in societal chaos and instability. Therefore, violent extremism and its manifestations can at best be understood in terms of four major characteristics:

a. Inbuilt violent nature;

b. Reactive nature because of injustices, discrimination and persecution;

c. Absence of the rule of law and a viable justice system; and

d. Acceptability of violence in society.

Together with these characteristics one can also observe the use of religion, race and language to evoke hatred and violence against a particular community.

According to the Australian government's programme "living safe together building community resilience to violent extremism", "violent extremism is the beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals. This includes terrorism and other forms of politically motivated and communal violences. If a person or group decides that fear, terror and violence are justified to achieve ideological, political or social change, and then acts accordingly, this is violent extremism. All forms of violent extremism seek change through fear and intimidation rather than through peaceful means".[14] Motivations for violent extremism can be buttressed by offering benefits in terms of money, promoting the biases and hatred against a particular ideology or community and promising a place in heaven as in the case of Muslim jihadists. Motivation to go to heaven if given life for the cause of Islam and Jihad lured hundreds of youths of Pakistan to become suicide bombers and cause lethal damage to the lives of thousands of people.

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[13] Sanjaya Baru, "Mahbub ul Haq and Human Development A Tribute", *Economic and Political Weekly,* Vol. 33, No. 35, 29 August - 04 September, 1998, pp. 2275-79. Also see, Khadija Haq and Richard Ponzio, "Introduction" in Khadija Haq & Richard Ponzio, (eds.), *Pioneering the Human Development Revolution: An Intellectual Biography of Mahbub Ul Haq,* New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008.
[14] Available at https://www.livingsafetogether.gov.au/aboutus/Pages/what-is-violent-extremism.aspx, accessed on 24 March 2016.

Eight major implications of violent extremism particularly in the context of Pakistan are:

1. Polarisation of society resulting into the permeation of intolerance at the grassroots level;

2. Potential and actual use of force;

3. Stalemate in vibrant economic and commercial activities;

4. Stagnation in productive educational activities;

5. Frustration, anger and antagonism leading to chaos and disorder;

6. Deepening of insecurity in different segments of society;

7. Erosion of the rule of law and governance; and

8. Fragility of the power of youth to bring positive change in society.

Violent extremism in Pakistan is not a new phenomenon because as pointed out earlier it is the outcome of several decades of state and societal negligence on issues which can deepen extremism, intolerance, militancy, radicalisation and terrorism. Two types of violent extremism are noticeable in post-1971 Pakistan. First, ethnic violent extremism which got its impetus in Sindh and Balochistan following the surge of Baloch, Sindhi and Mohajir nationalism. The first outbreak of violent extremism took place in Sindh in July 1972 when the Urdu speaking community rejected the passage of Sindhi language bill in the Sindh Assembly resulting into the eruption of language riots in different cities and towns of Sindh. The second phase of ethnic violent extremism occurred in late 1980s and early 1990s when large scale Mohajir-Pashtun and Mohajir-Sindhi riots took place in Karachi and in Hyderabad because of clash of interests among ethnic communities on issues of employment and land resources. Second, religious violent extremism, which transformed into sectarian violence during 1980s. Following the proliferation of weapons and the rise of Jihadi culture getting an impetus against the backdrop of Afghan Jihad and the surge of sectarian militant organisations, thousands of people were killed in various violent and terrorist acts particularly since 9/11. The red mosque episode of July 2007 and the military operation in Swat in 2009[15] caused large scale casualties resulting into the surge of terrorist acts particularly suicide attacks in different parts of Pakistan.

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[15] Ziaur Rehman, Irfan Haider and Fazal Maula Zahid, "Swat: An Unquiet Calm", *Daily Dawn,* Karachi, 21 September 2014.

As a result of the use of hard power to quell insurgency in Swat in 2009 launched by the defunct Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) radicalisation of youths emerged as a serious threat to society. Systematic attacks on schools, particularly girl's schools, in the tribal areas of Pakistan and in Swat meant that violent religious extremist groups wanted to deny youth's access to education.

How the implications of violent extremism could effectively be dealt with and what are the impediments in this regard also require attention and analysis. There is no quick fix solution to deal with violent extremism but there is certainly a possibility to cope with the implications of this menace by following four strategies. First, zero tolerance for intolerance and militancy by discouraging all such acts which create hate and anger against a particular community. This requires change in the mindset of those people who negate the existence of a particular community or an ideology. Second, exclusion of all such contents in syllabi of schools, colleges and universities which promote biases and subjectivity against a particular community by targeting their way of life or propagating to impose their way of life on others. Since the minds of youths are quite sensitive and indoctrination in favour of a particular ideology or an ethnic/lingual group may be easy, it is the responsibility of state to make sure that education is not used to poison the minds of youths. It is a matter of utmost concern that subjectivity and biases are often promoted in history text books by relegating the socio-cultural or religious status of a community or a religion. When state is weak or follows a policy of appeasement or indifference *vis-à-vis* hardliners and extremists the outcome is the deepening of the culture of intolerance and aggression causing insecurity among religious minorities and all those groups whose culture and languages are targeted.

Third, endurance of good governance, rule of law, efficient and affordable justice system can go a long way in diluting the menace of violent extremism. Extremism in its violent form evolves in the minds of people and its eradication can only take place when there is a positive transformation of human mind in the form of tolerance and peace. Fourth, human development and human security is the most effective way to deal with the implications of violent extremism because pro-people development will neutralise all such elements which thrive and promote violent extremism particularly among the youths on accounts of poverty, social and economic backwardnesses. By providing adequate employment opportunities to the youths and engaging them in positive activities, much can be done to tackle the menace of violent extremism. By promoting the culture of sports and other healthy activities, the level of frustration, anger and antagonism among the youths may be significantly reduced. Radicalisation of youth is not only a critical issue in Pakistan but in many other countries, particularly those belonging to the Muslim world. Exposure of successful countries of the world to the younger generations by arranging study tours; providing scholarships in

large numbers to deserving students for their higher studies particularly in the first world countries will be a valuable investment to utilise energies of youths in scientific and educational discourse. Training of youths in different professional fields can also contribute in curbing violent extremism particularly in those parts of the country where threats of militancy are quite serious.

4.   Youth and Violent Extremism in Pakistan

The most vulnerable segment of Pakistani society is youth and its predicament is responsible for the permeation of extremist ideas in its mind. Around 40 per cent of Pakistani population is composed of youths which can be an asset as far as the process of development is concerned but unfortunately because of state and societal neglect, youths are often used as a fuel by extremist groups. According to a Pakistani writer, "extremism may have penetrated almost all segments of the Pakistani society. In the long-term defeating terrorism only through state-led efforts looks dim without engaging the community at multiple levels. The mindset prevailing among the Pakistani community is that eradicating extremism and terrorism is only government's job".[16] That, "extremism in Pakistan is certainly not confined to religiously inspired militancy and terrorism only; it is prevalent in the society at all levels. A large segment of the Pakistani society especially the youth is vulnerable to extremist propaganda".[17]Therefore, it is argued that, "research on various asymmetrical conflicts indicate that the youth that constitute the rank and file of any insurgent or extremist group participate in violence for a variety of overlapping reasons. They are either coerced by the families and communities or motivated by their adverse socio-economic circumstances to join terrorism".[18] How the youth of Pakistan, which has enormous potential to contribute and excel in different fields, drifted into the path of extremism and radicalisation needs to be analysed in some detail. How the universities of Pakistan, which should be the centres of learning and research, transformed into sanctuaries of religious and ethnic extremist elements?

Alarmists argue that the universities of Pakistan are highly vulnerable to the surge of violent extremism[19], because of the presence and activities of various extremist, militant and terrorist religious organisations. It is not only the students who are involved in promoting violent extremism but some faculties are also suspected of preaching intolerance and violence. According to a news report, in December 2015, two Punjab University faculty members and one student were taken into custody by the Lahore Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) during a

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[16] Abdul Basit, "Countering Violent Extremism: Evaluating Pakistan's Counter Radicalization and De-radicalization Initiative," *IPRI Journal*, Vol. XV, No. 2, Summer 2015, p. 64.
[17] *Ibid*., p. 68.
[18] *Ibid*., p. 51.
[19] See editorial, "Extremism in Universities", *Daily Dawn*, Karachi, 17 July 2017. Also see, Raza Khan, "Extremism and Education in Pakistan", *The Express Tribune,* Karachi, 01 June 2017.

raid on University premises for their alleged links with the banned Hizbut Tahrir (HuT).[20] Furthermore, another newspaper report revealed that "security officials have initiated a probe against a professor for running a network of international terrorist organisation - Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) - inside the Karachi University Campus".[21] Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, which is a premier institution of higher education in Pakistan, is also experiencing the deepening of the culture of extremism. According to a news report entitled, "Penetration of Extremist Elements Growing in QAU", it was revealed that, "last week the students of Quaid-e-Azam University shut down the campus over patronisation of a student organisation with extremist ideology by a group of faculty members. The teaching faculty and students fear the top ranked university will lose its candour soon if the influence of conservative and orthodox elements continue to grow".[22] There may be other reports about how academic institutions are influenced by the extremists and violent mindset using religion for their political purposes. Student organisations having affiliations with various political parties propagating religious extremism are held responsible for indoctrination of young minds with extremist ideology.

A violent expression of youths against fellow student was witnessed on 14 April 2017, when Mashal Khan a 23-year-old student of Abdul Wali Khan University, Mardan was killed and another seriously injured by a vigilante mob for allegedly "publishing blasphemous content online".[23] An article on Mashal's inhuman murder states that, "in an unbelievably horrifying incident yesterday, a few hundred students of Abdul Wali Khan University, Mardan lynched to death one of their classmates on suspicion of uploading blasphemous content on the social networking site Facebook. As per the account of some students at the university, Mohammad Mashal Khan, a 23-year-old journalism student, was sitting in his hostel room when a mob burst in. They promptly dragged him out, before subjecting him to a gratuitous torturing spree that ended in him being beaten to death and subsequently shot".[24] The investigations which were ordered to probe the inhuman murder of Mashal Khan found him innocent of charges of blasphemy and found those university students and staff of the university responsible who were against his critical approach on the matters of corruption and nepotism in his university. The incident of Abdul Wali Khan University depicted the alarming state of aggression and violence among the youths who brutally killed their fellow student on suspicions of blasphemy and holding anti-religious views. The perceived surge of violent extremism in different campuses of Pakistani universities is a source of alarm. The challenge of countering violent extremism

[20] "Two PU faculty members, student arrested for Hizbut Tahrir links: CTD", *Dawn*, 14 December 2015.

[21] *Pakistan Today*, 22 March 2016.

[22] "Penetration of Extremist Elements Growing in QAU", *The Nation*, 20 March 2016.

[23] See news report, "Mardan University student lynched by mob over alleged blasphemy: police", *Daily Dawn,* Karachi, 15 April 2017.

[24] Marvi Sirmed, "The unforgivable murder of Mashal of Mardan", *Daily Times,* Lahore, 14 April 2017.

among the youths studying in higher educational institutions must be taken seriously by the policy-makers of Pakistan who in the National Action Plan (NAP) unveiled after the terrorist attack at the Army Public School on 16 December 2014, emphasised on eradicating extremism and radicalisation as far as the younger strata of society is concerned.

There is no short cut to eradicate violent extremism but an approach based on three "P"s *i.e.,* prudence, pragmatism and perseverance can certainly go a long way in dealing with the causes that trigger the outbreak of violent extremism among the youths of Pakistan.

Six steps, if taken by the people at the helm of affairs, can certainly ensure positive transformation in the approach, attitude and behaviour among those youths who are considered as intolerant, extremist and violent. First, taking measures against those who use the youths for accomplishment of their evil designs. This would require zero tolerance for ethnic and religious extremist groups who first indoctrinate minds which are immature and then use them for carrying out violent and terrorist activities. Terrorist cells, where indoctrination and training is given to potential suicide bombers who happen to be youths are primarily located in the tribal areas of Pakistan.[25] The nexus between violent extremist groups located in Pakistan and Afghanistan is a fundamental cause of concern for those who fear the destruction of the present generation at the hands of those who use religion and ethnicity for political purposes. Second, the youths of Pakistan must be engaged in healthy activities like sports, culture, travel and tourism. Furthermore, their energy and skills must be utilised for community services and technological innovation. Since an empty mind is a devil's paradise, the lack of engagement of youth in healthy activities is a cause of frustration, anger, antagonism and violence. It is not only the responsibility of state to provide better educational and employment opportunities for the youths of Pakistan but the civil society and corporate sector must also play a meaningful role in this regard. Third, vision for a better future of Pakistan is the essence for eradicating extremism, intolerance, militancy, radicalisation and terrorism. Better Pakistan means a country which is normal in its way of life, attitude and behaviour and where non-issues are not projected for fanning ethnic and religious extremism. Respect for one's religion, sect, race, language and class is the key to ensure a stable society. The engagement of youth in economic and social development of Pakistan is the need of the hour so that the vision for a better Pakistan is transformed from a myth to a reality.

If there is rise in the standard of living of an ordinary Pakistani and his/her purchasing power increases, it means the decline of extremist and intolerant behaviour. Violent extremism gets a space when poverty is rampant; when there

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[25] Khuram Iqbal, *The Making of Pakistani Human Bombs*, London: Laxington Books, 2015.

is massive unemployment; when there is absence of the rule of law and good governance. Since the youths are the future of Pakistan their disempowerment and marginalisation is lethal for the positive future of the country. A healthy, empowered, enlightened and educated youth will certainly neutralise those who since long have got enormous space to foment militancy and violent extremism in society. Fourth, promoting the culture of reading among the youths is the essence of their 'constructive engagement' paving the way for an enlightened mindset. Unfortunately, there is a sharp decline in the standard of education in Pakistan in the last four decades which has much to do with the erosion of culture of reading. Lack of focus and wastage of time on activities which are at the expense of their academic growth augment their wilderness. Therefore, it is imperative that educational reforms focusing on inculcating analytical skills and critical thinking among students will go a long way in defeating the forces of retrogression, extremism and radicalisation. This would require a shift in educational priorities whereby uniformity in the standard of education and syllabi needs to be enforced in the whole of Pakistan. Seeds of extremism and violent extremism are planted in a situation where good quality education is not provided to all the students of Pakistan whether studying in schools, colleges and universities. It is the responsibility of the state of Pakistan to make sure that education till high school is made free and compulsory and of good quality so that sense of deprivation on the basis of class and social status is eradicated.

Fifth, providing students a sense of participation is imperative in order to develop leadership skills. Since February 1984, when student's unions were banned in Pakistan by the then Martial Law regime of General Zia-ul-Haq, one can observe the sharp rise in extremism, intolerance, radicalisation and militancy among the youths. Student's unions, despite their imperfections, provided a viable platform to college and university students to get training in managing affairs related to their educational institutions and developing a sense of responsibility along with leadership qualities. Banning of student's unions created a vacuum which deprived the youths of Pakistan to play a leadership role in the country's politics, economy and other fields of life. One plausible way to counter extremist, militant and intolerant thoughts and groups is by providing student community a sense of participation by restoring student's union. Counter argument against the unbanning of student's union is based on the narrative that such an act may deepen violence in the campus as student parties are more violent and intolerant than three decades ago and political parties pull their strings in order to serve their vested interests.

Be as it may, the risk in lifting the ban on student's union exists, but a bigger risk is in the shape of frustration, anger and extremism which exist in the absence of student's unions. Finally, materials taught particularly at the school level propagating biases and hate against a particular community must be

removed so that young minds are not poisoned. An extremist mindset in youth is not created automatically but is also the outcome of the environment and what he or she is taught. The so-called religious groups may oppose the removal of such materials from history textbooks but the risk of teaching factually wrong history will keep the minds of youths closed and devoid of objectivity and reasoning. Courageous and bold stance taken by the state will save the future generations of Pakistan from further damage.

5.   Conclusion

Countering violent extremism is not similar to countering terrorism because the latter is the culmination of a violent mindset. Yet, without effectively dealing with extremism and violent extremism terrorism cannot be eradicated. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme as outlined by a Pakistani writer on countering extremism and terrorism must have a conceptual framework. According to him,

> Before launching any major CVE programme evolving conceptual framework is imperative to understand the trends that underpin the phenomenon. It will be the first step towards well-meaning and holistic CVE programmes in Pakistan. A nuanced understanding of what works, and what does not, in a particular environment is crucial for the success of any CVE programme.[26]

He further suggests that in "CVE programme at the broader level, without improvement in governance, economic and security situation, CVE efforts will have a minimal impact. A national level CVE policy, if implemented judicially is one commitment among many others to bring about positive change in the society".[27] Furthermore, "the family, public schools, colleges, public universities, mosques and madrasas have emerged as the key channels to spawn extremism among youths. In the reformation drive, both by the governmental and non-state agencies, local as well as foreign, the family which is the building block of society, should become the prime focus of attention. It is recommended that out of the 25 million people in the major urban centres of the four provinces and some 10 million people in rural Punjab, the youth segment of the unemployed and under employed amounts to six million should receive first priority for rehabilitation. These elements can cause social unrest and violence which, if mistaken for religious violence can compound response strategies with higher risk of societal disturbance".[28] Such recommendations are worth for consideration and must be implemented by the concerned stakeholders with a purpose to transform extremist

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[26] Abdul Basit, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

[28] Muhammad Feyyaz, "Youth Extremism in Pakistan – Magnitude, Channels, Resident Spheres and Responses." *Defense Against Terrorism Review*, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring & Fall 2014, p. 87.

and violent minds of youths of Pakistan through a process of enlightenment and development. After all, the shift from a normal behaviour to extremist is easy but the transformation of a violent mindset to peaceful one is quite difficult.

Reforms to de-radicalise the youths of Pakistan cannot be implemented unless there is political will and determination on the part of those who are at the helm of affairs. Ban on the use of religion for political purposes and preaching hate against a particular minority or sect is the need of the hour. Religious extremism and fanaticism is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan and is as old as the history of this country. What is different today is the permeation of the culture of violence in the length and breadth of Pakistan in the shape of suicide attacks, killing and injuring hundreds of innocent people and deepening the level of insecurity. When the culture of violence is deep rooted and after every violent incident one can hear same old rhetoric on the part of state authorities to punish culprits, nothing changes and the prospects of eradicating violent extremism would remain elusive. Hence, the predicament of youths in Pakistani society has deepened because of societal violence threatening their present and future.

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Sajid Karim
Mohammad Jasim Uddin

FOREIGN POLICY OF BANGLADESH: EMERGING CHALLENGES

Abstract

Being placed in between low-income and lower-middle-income country status, Bangladesh aspires to be a developed one by 2041. But there are several emerging foreign policy challenges for the country. This paper limits its scope to some specific challenges *i.e.,* soft power diplomacy and image building, trade in goods and services, attracting foreign direct investment, suiting development assistance with development priorities, ensuring energy security, developing transport connectivity, addressing transnational issues like water security and maritime security, addressing climate change issues and balancing between/ among parties, interests and initiatives. Examining existing literature and interview transcripts and undertaking interpretative approach, the paper tries to develop its main argument - economic issues and economic diplomacy encompassing resource mobilisation will remain crucial to formulate and implement foreign policy agenda of Bangladesh. In mobilising resources, actors concerned with foreign policy of Bangladesh need to work at multiple-levels with proper understanding of internal and external dynamics, policy priorities of vital countries as well as the organisations and instruments to make the policy a success.

1.   Introduction

The concept of foreign policy is as old as the perception of state's mutual interaction. States as sovereign actors call for interacting mutually, which results into formation of foreign policy.[1] In broader sense, foreign policy can be defined as a government's strategy for interacting with other states.[2] Narrowly, it is the sum of principles, interests, objectives and plan of actions adopted by a state in a complex domestic and international environment to conduct its relations with other states and

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Sajid Karim is Research Officer at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). His e-mail address is sajidkarim87@gmail.com. **Mohammad Jasim Uddin, PhD** is Senior Research Fellow at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). His e-mail address is jasim_biiss@yahoo. com. The paper was earlier presented in the seminar titled, "Foreign Policy of Bangladesh: Roadmap for Realisation of Vision 2041", jointly organised by National Defence College (NDC), Bangladesh, Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), and Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) on 13 October 2016. An abridged version of the paper appeared in the proceedings of the seminar published by NDC.

[1] Sadia Mushtaq and Ishtiaq Ahmad Choudhry, "Conceptualization of Foreign Policy: An Analytical Analysis", *Berkley Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 3, Spring 2013.
[2] Christopher Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 1.

non-state actors.[3] Foreign policy is thus, the extension of national policy.[4] It is shaped by different factors like geography, history, national ideology and capacity, leadership, public opinion, socio-political orientation, geo-political and global environment *etc*. Expansion of the field of international relations and growing mutual interaction between states with non-state actors and their inalienable interdependence demand expansion of the scope of foreign policy. Hence, contemporary understanding of foreign policy incorporates the role of intergovernmental bodies and transnational organisations along with nation-states into its domain.

Bangladesh has been promoting such a foreign policy that is keen to advocate its national interest and image, economic development and self-ideology. There is no denying that economic compulsions have always been at the forefront in setting the country's foreign policy priorities. Over the time, the scope of Bangladesh foreign policy has been widened and consequently, several issues have been crucial, *e.g.,* multilateralism and regional cooperation, addressing climate vulnerabilities, combating terrorism and violent extremism, pursuing maritime diplomacy and blue economy, promoting international labour migration and preserving their rights, facilitating regional connectivity, ensuring safe and sustainable energy resources, mobilising international support for debt reduction, market expansion and promotion of trade, and branding Bangladesh as a progressive nation.

As Bangladesh has recently graduated from low-income to a lower-middle-income country and aspires to become an upper middle income country by 2030 and a developed one by 2041, there are a number of emerging challenges facing foreign policy of Bangladesh, ranging from socio-political to economic, environmental and security oriented challenges. The world is in transition and recent years have been witnessing major changes in the contemporary international relations – changes in many ways unprecedented in character – which makes it extremely difficult for countries like Bangladesh to set its foreign policy priorities. The paper limits its scope in analysing the emerging challenges based on several factors and actors of foreign policy making. The factors include soft power diplomacy and image building, trade in goods and services (*e.g.*, manpower export), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Official Development Assistance (ODA), energy, transport connectivity, water and maritime security, climate change and balancing between parties, interests and initiatives.

This paper examines documents (*e.g.*, existing literature) and interview transcripts. Documentary information helps to collect explicit data and usually comes from a variety of sources, *e.g.*, government documents, academic studies, news clippings and articles sourced from print media, documents from various organisations, *etc*. On the other hand, this paper adopts semi-structured interview by constructing topic guide and selecting respondents purposively. Moreover, the

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[3] James Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, New York: The Free Press, 1971, p. 67.
[4] F. S. Northledge, "The Nature of Foreign Policy", in F. S. Northedge (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of the Powers*, London: Faber and Faber, 1968, p. 16.

paper undertakes interpretive approach, a method of qualitative data analysis. The approach is of two types – thin and thick. To analyse scope of Bangladesh foreign policy and specific emerging challenges, thick interpretation is adopted.

The paper is divided into five sections including introduction and conclusion. First section is introduction. Second section begins with the definitional nitty-gritty of foreign policy and ends with conceptualisation of emerging challenges for Bangladesh. Third section briefly discusses Bangladesh foreign policy and its scopes, determinants and different important aspects. Fourth section details specific emerging foreign policy challenges of Bangladesh. Fifth section concludes the paper.

2.   Foreign Policy: From Definitional Nitty-gritty to Emerging Challenges

The term foreign policy is defined with varied connotations. C. Hill defined foreign policy as the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations.[5] In the words of L. Neack, foreign policy is the intentions, statements and actions of an actor (state) … directed towards the external world.[6] It is the plan of action to manage issues that may arise with other states. L. Jensen argued that "foreign policy is a pattern of attitude and behaviour, which a state adopts to interact with the international community".[7] This is substantiated by G. Modelski who defined foreign policy as "the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment".[8] Modelski emphasised only those aspects of policy, which aim at the change in the existing behaviour of states, as the primary objectives of foreign policy. On behavioural aspect, Rodee stated that "foreign policy involves the formulation and implementation of a group of principles, which shape the behaviour pattern of a state, while negotiating with other states to protect or further its vital interests".[9] Foreign policy thus includes both the change in the existing behaviour and the continuation of the behaviour at different times. J. Frankel stated that foreign policy "consists of decisions and actions which involve, to a certain extent, relations between one state and others".[10] On a different note, if a state decides not to have any relations with some country, it is also a foreign policy and this was a key argument of F. Gross.[11]

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[5] Hill, *op. cit*.

[6] Laura Neack, *Foreign Policy: US and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, p. 26.

[7] Lloyd Jensen, *Explaining Foreign Policy*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982, p. 14.

[8] George Modelski, *A Theory of Foreign Policy,* London: Pall Mall Press, 1962, pp. 6-7.

[9] C. C. Rodee, cited in V. N. Khanna, *International Relations*, India: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 5th Edition, 2013, p. 270.

[10] Joseph Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-Making*, London: Oxford University Press, 1968.

[11] F. Gross, cited in L. S. Srivastava and V. P. Joshi, *International Relations: From 1914 to Present Day*, Meerut: GOEL Publishing House, 2005.

Nation-states and their governments no longer enjoy monopoly of power in controlling their national economies or social developments. The growing impact of globalisation, increased internationalisation of daily life and emergence of free market economy have forced nation-states to broaden the scope of their foreign policies. Thus, foreign policy encompasses state's relation with non-state actors which include international bodies and transnational organisations. It includes activities such as adhering to international laws and conventions, membership and involvement of multilateral bodies, *e.g.*, the United Nations (UN), alliances and security agreements, trade agreements, supplying foreign aid to developing countries or areas affected by natural disaster, *etc.* It is a critical area of foreign policy because it shapes state's relationship, reputation and trade status with its neighbours and beyond. It also affects a nation's international standing or how it is viewed by the rest of the world.

There is no denying that states formulate foreign policy to secure self-interests inscribed in their domestic policy. Bismarck stated that foreign policy is the extension of domestic policy.[12] Emajuddin noted, "conceptually foreign policy is that part of national policy of a state which is related to external environment".[13] Holsti said that "foreign policy is the action towards international environment and the conditions, usually domestic, under which these actions are formulated is concerned essentially with foreign policy".[14] Kissinger argued, "foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends".[15] All these substantiate that domestic policy of a country and its national interests play important role in formulating the country's foreign policy. The domestic policy is evolved by politico-economic ideology, social structure, national character and partisan/domestic politics of a particular state and the internal factors determine how countries behave toward the world beyond their borders. Thus, examining preferences and configurations of key domestic factors are crucial.[16] Importantly, domestic politics dictates how a country will interact with rest of the world, international bodies and transnational organisations and what will be the country's position while responding to its national security issues against the growing threats of international environment. There is also counter argument that domestic policy cannot totally influence and dictate country's foreign relations as over the long run a state's foreign policy cannot transcend the limits and opportunities thrown by global environment.[17] In a nutshell, in the words of Chakraborty, foreign policy is a state's continuous response to pressures in the forms of constrains and incentives emanating

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[12] Bismarck, cited in Md. Abdul Halim, "Foreign Policy of Bangladesh: Framework of Analysis", in Emajuddin Ahamed (ed.), *Foreign Policy of Bangladesh: A Small State's Imperative,* Dhaka: Kamol Kuri Prokashon, 2004, p. 80.

[13] Emajuddin Ahmed, "Introduction", in Emajuddin Ahmed (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of Bangladesh*, Dhaka: The University Press Ltd, 1989, p. vii.

[14] K. J Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework of Analysis*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1967, p . 21.

[15] Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy", in George S. Masalinant and Gilbert Abcarim (eds.), *International Politics Introductory Readings*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970, p. 155.

[16] Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", *World Politics*, Vol. 51, No. 1, October 1998, p. 148.

[17] *Ibid.,* p. 151.

from international system in order to safeguard its national interests. States are thus, bound to formulate foreign policy for their own survival as these states have to be keen about their calculus of national interests in international relations.[18] What play vital role is the international politics and market to shape state's foreign policies and priorities.[19] As a matter of fact, understanding objectives, scopes and compulsions of foreign policy are crucial.

In a broader sense, while the scope of foreign policy can be expressed with three "D's" (Defence, Diplomacy and Development), upholding national interest is the ultimate objective of foreign policy.[20] National interests include, but not limited to, self preservation, safeguarding territorial integrity, national security and identity, economic promotion, social development, image building and augmentation of national prestige. National interests are the factors looming large in diplomatic negotiations at multiple levels. In pursuing national interests, states are at times compelled to consider universal ideals, principles of international law and morality. Constant changes in global environment and the complexity of great power rivalries make things difficult for states to adjust their foreign policy. Here lies orientation and effective utilisation of hard power and soft power diplomacy to deal with intricacies in formulating foreign policy. Hard power helps protect state's territorial integrity and internal stability, establish dominance in global politics, deter competitors, coerce belligerent states, *etc.* By contrast, soft power diplomacy usually includes national culture, customs, beliefs, arts, morals, social habits and other capabilities. States deploy cultural diplomacy as an efficient tool of soft power diplomacy to materialise various foreign policy goals.[21] States strive for increasing national prestige and image building. Cultural diplomacy helps materialise the two.

Promotion of economic interests is a crucial aspect of national interests. States face the challenges of established and changing international economic architectures. Therefore, national interests have been more economic than political, and foreign policy is ever increasingly being guided by economic factors than by political ones.[22] Here lies the essence of economic diplomacy in foreign policy and its upcoming challenges, *e.g.*, negotiating economic and trade agreements, eliminating divergences, harmonising standards in various aspects, *etc.*, at different levels. Two emerging challenges of economic diplomacy are – facing scarcity of energy and

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[18] Gobinda Chakraborty, "Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Assessment", *Bangladesh Political Science Review*, Vol. 11, No. 1, December 2015, p. 206.

[19] Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

[20] Nafees Asiya Syed, "The 3 D's of Foreign Affairs", Annual Report, *Harvard Political Review*, 17 September 2010, available at http://harvardpolitics.com/arusa/the-3ds-of-foreign-affairs/, accessed on 10 January 2017; Nathan Finney, "A Culture of Inclusion: Defense, Diplomacy, and Development as a Modern American Foreign Policy", *Small Wars Journal*, 26 September 2010.

[21] Hwajung Kim, "Cultural Diplomacy as the Means of Soft Power in an Information Age", *Institute for Cultural Diplomacy,* December 2011, available at http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/pdf/case-studies/Hwajung_Kim_Cultural_Diplomacy_as_the_Means_of_Soft_Power_in_the_Information_Age.pdf, accessed on 15 January 2017.

[22] L. S. Srivastava and V. P. Joshi, *International Relations: From 1914 to Present Day*, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

reducing barriers in establishing regional connectivity, physical in nature. Scarcity of energy is a serious concern. It is at the core of geopolitics and can be both a source of conflict and cooperation at multiple levels. Therefore, the issue of energy diplomacy comes to the fore and ensuring energy security remains an emerging challenge of foreign policy.[23] Another challenging factor that shapes state's foreign policy is the issue of regional connectivity. How interlinked trade and economic promotion is with regional transport connectivity is practically evident. But the challenges remain with both hard infrastructure (*e.g.*, lack of physical infrastructure) and soft infrastructure (*e.g.*, regulatory constrains, lack of effective institution, mechanism and process). Importantly, negotiating the issue at multi-levels is critical.

From geographical viewpoint, national interest and foreign policy significantly evolve with some vital notions, *e.g.*, water diplomacy, maritime diplomacy and climate diplomacy. Common water resource management or water politics is a key to conflict between/among states and thus, water diplomacy is a challenging aspect of a state's foreign policy. Deep-sea water incorporating the phenomena of marine resources, maritime security and maritime connectivity is being at the core of geo-political contention and accordingly, maritime diplomacy and the concept of blue economy[24] arise in the parlance of foreign policy.[25] Relatively, a new distinct focus of foreign policy is the inflation of extreme climate event, change in environment and its adverse consequences. This calls for multi-stakeholder consultation and mutual cooperation. Here lies the challenges of climate diplomacy, *e.g.*, negotiation on loss and damage, demand of compensation, finding realistic solution, *etc.*

Comparatively another new phenomenon in politics is the existence of pressure groups. Their techniques, *e.g.*, balancing issue-oriented initiatives[26] have enabled them to claim enlarged role in shaping a country's foreign policy. These groups yield a considerable influence on their respective governments, which the latter cannot always avoid. At times, national government has to negotiate with the

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[23] Energy diplomacy refers to any diplomatic activity designed to enhance access to energy resources. For details, see Marco Giuli, "Getting Energy Diplomacy Right: A Challenge Starting at Home", European Policy Centre, 23 October 2015, available at http://epc.eu/pub_details.php?cat_id=4&pub_id=6052, accessed on 06 December 2016.

[24] The idea of the "blue economy" was conceived at the Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, held in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012. Fundamental to this concept is the principle of equity, ensuring that developing countries optimise the benefits received from development of their marine environments (*e.g.*, agreements related to fishery, bio-prospecting, oil and mineral extraction); promote national equity, including gender equality and in particular the generation of inclusive growth and decent jobs for all; and have their concerns and interests properly reflected in the development of seas beyond national jurisdictions, including the refinement of international governance mechanisms and their concerns for states proximate to seabed development. For details, see, "The Blue Economy: Origin and Concept", available at https://www.col.org/news/items/blue-economy-origin-and-concept, accessed on 29 April 2017.

[25] "Blue Economy: Concept, Elements and Evolution", IASPOINT: Integrated IAS General Studies by GKToday, 16 April 2016, available at https://academy.gktoday.in/current-affairs/blue-economy-concept-elements-and-evolution/, accessed on 14 December 2016.

[26] The ambiguity of addressing energy security not at the cost of creating climate change oriented concerns.

entities to formulate any policy. Thus, conflict between parties and interests is going to be an emerging challenge of foreign policy. Another contemporary challenge in global politics and in the parlance of foreign policy is the rise of terrorism and violent extremism. There are criticisms against international counterterrorism regime that it lacks globally accepted agreement and multilateral actions involving different stakeholders. Therefore, despite several efforts from countries around the world, global terrorism is growing unabated, creating havoc in different countries, severely disrupting the peace and stability of the world.

3. Foreign Policy of Bangladesh

Foundation of Bangladesh foreign policy was laid by an articulation - friendship to all, malice to none. This remains cardinal driving force of Bangladesh foreign policy.[27] Fundamental principles that Bangladesh always sought to uphold in its foreign policy have been to work for national sovereignty and equality, non-interference in internal affairs of other states, peaceful settlement of international disputes and respect for global law and the principles enunciated in the UN Charter which all of are clearly depicted in Article 25 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.[28] Constitutional direction of Bangladesh foreign policy encompasses strive for renunciation of the use of force in international relations and for general and complete disarmament; uphold the right of every people freely to determine and build up its own social, economic and political system by ways and means of its own free choice; and support oppressed peoples throughout the world waging a just struggle against imperialism, colonialism or racialism.[29] Thus, areas of Bangladesh's foreign policy are multifaceted consisting major issues like promoting national interest, safeguarding and growing national power, protecting territorial integrity, achieving socio-economic development, upholding national ideology, maintaining cultural identity and national dignity, expanding mutual cooperation and developing partnership.

There are four important aspects of Bangladesh's domestic policy - protection, peace, progress and power. These are also important factors of the country's foreign policy. The word 'protection' is not limited to territorial security and physical survival. It encompasses socio-economic security aspects, *e.g.*, economic, food, water, energy and environmental security. 'Peace' denotes socio-political stability, not only confined to national territory but also extended at regional and global level. 'Progress' persuades economic growth and development, addresses citizens' social development with a minimum standard of living, inscribed in the Constitution of Bangladesh. 'Power' signifies national power which is crucial as far as domestic and foreign policies are

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[27] M. Morshed Khan, "Foreign Policy Dimension: Issues, Options and Directions", in Abul Kalam (ed.), *Bangladesh in the New Millennium,* Dhaka: The University Press limited, 2004, p. 59.
[28] For details of Article 25 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, visit, http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/sections_detail.php?id=367&sections_id=24573, accessed on 20 November 2016.
[29] Article 25, Part II, *Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh*, *ibid.*

concerned. With the four notions, Bangladesh has decided to develop a robust and proactive foreign policy, which would assist the country to achieve the upper-middle-income status and subsequently become a developed nation. In achieving the landmarks, some of Bangladesh's major decisions to build and nurture its foreign policy include promoting bilateral relations, multilateralism and regional cooperation; abating climate change impacts; combating terrorism and violent extremism; pursuing maritime diplomacy and blue economy; promoting international labour migration and preserving their rights; facilitating regional connectivity; ensuring safe and sustainable energy resources; mobilising international support for debt reduction, market expansion and promotion of trade; and branding Bangladesh as a secular, democratic and progressive nation. Materialising the decisions requires strong supports from neighbours, regional friends and major powers.

As per the constitutional provision, upholding national interest and safeguarding national power lie at the core of Bangladesh foreign policy. Though national interest varies from country to country, overriding one is preservation of national sovereignty and territorial integrity which is also true for Bangladesh. Foreign policy of Bangladesh aims to ensure physical survival of the state which includes internal security and protection from external aggression. It is a constant endeavour of Bangladesh foreign policy to safeguard its national power and to augment it whenever opportunities arise. Bangladesh's national security and national power are closely associated with its military capacity and ability to pursue hard power diplomacy. Modernisation of military and pursuing military diplomacy are thus important aspects of Bangladesh foreign policy which have gained greater attention in recent times. It should be kept in mind that in the world of today the weapons are not only used for wars, but also are produced to deter. The complexity of multi-polar world, global power politics and regional power structure have forced the nations like Bangladesh to think about the issue of hard power seriously for their own survival. Bangladesh is closely working with China, Russia, India and the US to strengthen its military, buying modern and advanced military equipments and expanding its military capabilities. The country is also regularly participating in different military exercises with friendly nations to showcase and hone its military might.

Within the parlance of foreign policy and national security, a critical issue that has gained much importance in recent times is terrorism and violent extremism. Bangladesh is not out of the danger of such trans-boundary crime. The rise of terrorism and violent extremism has been lethal by the manipulation of religious doctrines, use of modern technology, advanced communication facilities and overseas money transfers. It has also become complicated in particular by the proliferation of cheap but highly destructive small arms, and widespread radicalisation of youths. The government of Bangladesh has taken zero-tolerance policy which has also become an important notion of its foreign policy.[30] The country has rendered greater importance

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[30] "Bangladesh's Fight against Terrorism Continues", 18 July 2016, available at https://www.albd.org/index.php/en/resources/special-reports/3857-bangladesh-s-fight-against-terrorism-continues, accessed on 01 May 2017.

on global cooperation and engaged itself with several regional and international bodies for countering forces of terror. Representing Bangladesh as a moderate and tolerant country which is totally against any kind of terrorism and religious extremism is also pursued by the diplomats of the country with great importance.

Upholding national interests notably and equally consider issues of economic security, energy security, maritime security and environmental security. Therefore, economic diplomacy, energy diplomacy, maritime diplomacy and environmental diplomacy constitute important parts of Bangladesh foreign policy. Consequently, growing bilateral relations, engaging with regional and multilateral platforms are of contemporary agendas. Bangladesh's relations with countries especially with the neighbours have always been of vital interests to the country's foreign policy, not only for national security implications but also for positive contributions they might have for the realisation of legitimate economic interests. Bangladesh is fully committed to work consistently towards furthering, deepening and consolidating friendly relations with South Asian neighbours, India in particular. Apart from some issues, at present, the country is enjoying warm relations with most of its South Asian neighbours and envisages continuing such momentum. Beyond South Asia, Bangladesh has attached special emphasis to its relations with Southeast Asian nations. It is keen to strengthen age-old relations with countries of the region and is eager to explore potentials through mutual cooperation and diplomatic efforts. Bangladesh continues its diplomatic effort to peacefully settle Rohingya Refugee crisis with Myanmar, which remains a source of contention between the two neighbours for long. On the other hand, Bangladesh's relations with the East Asian countries namely – China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan – are highly crucial for its foreign policy as they are Bangladesh's close economic and development partners. Bangladesh will continue furthering its existing friendly relations with these countries for its accelerated economic growth and sustainable development.

The target for a developed Bangladesh by the year 2041 encompasses a vision for greater engagement with countries of the western world. The US, UK, Canada and members of the European Union (EU) will continue to be close friends and development partners of Bangladesh, making important contributions to the country's development efforts through different kinds of cooperation. These countries are and would remain Bangladesh's important trading partners.[31] Apart from economy and trade, with these countries, Bangladesh shares a deep commitment to uphold democracy and fundamental human rights, and a keen desire to contribute to regional and global peace. Bangladesh will continue to work closely with them also in seeking effective response to transnational issues like climate change, environmental

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[31] For details of Bangladesh's trade, see, 'Bangladesh: Country Brief", International Trade Centre, available at http://www.intracen.org/country/bangladesh/, accessed on 01 May 2017; "Bangladesh", available at http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/bgd/; "The Observatory of Economic Complexity", available at https://atlas.media.mit.edu, accessed on 01 May 2017; "Bangladesh Trade at a Glance: Most Recent Values", World Integrated Trade Solution, available at http://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/BGD, accessed on 01 May 2017.

degradation, trans-boundary crime, human trafficking, global migration, terrorism and violent extremism, *etc.*

Bangladesh's relations with countries of the Muslim world, deeply rooted in common bond of faith, traditions and commitment to the spirit of religion, are of great importance for the country's foreign policy. Solidarity of the Muslim Ummah and areas of cooperation within the structure of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) are vital for Bangladesh economy as the country's largest share of foreign earnings comes from remittances sent by Bangladeshi migrant workers residing in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.[32] Maintenance and expansion of existing labour markets and search for untapped potentials in the Arab countries stand top in the country's foreign policy priorities. Bangladesh is now also focusing on diversifying its trade contacts in the region. On the contrary, on economic grounds, Bangladesh is yet to tap much potential in the regions - East Asia, Central Asia, Africa and Latin America - which are now a major push of the country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). Bangladesh has taken several initiatives to intensify and consolidate relationships of cooperation with countries of these regions in order to explore the potentials.

Beyond bilateral relations, Bangladesh is a firm believer of multi-level cooperation and this is a key aspect of the country's foreign policy. The country pioneered regional cooperation in South Asia known as South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and still believes that this regional platform could be a vital instrument contributing to the consolidation of peace in South Asia, accelerated development of the region and establishment of cooperative links that would enable the people of South Asia to address mutual differences and work energies for the common good of the entire region.[33] Apart from SAARC, Bangladesh is also a founder member of Developing Eight (D-8) and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). Bangladesh's engagements with sub-regional initiatives like BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal) and BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar) are also a clear manifestation of the country's deeper commitment to cooperate with its immediate and distant neighbours. Besides, Bangladesh is the member of different multilateral initiatives like ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM), *etc.*, which are now considered as the second tier of the future regional foreign policy priorities. Bangladesh continues its constant endeavour to develop closer ties with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and has signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. There are some emerging multilateral initiatives like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) and RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) in which Bangladesh is not a member. But getting maximum benefits from these multilateral frameworks and

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[32] "International Migration from Bangladesh", Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, available at https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/laenderprofile/216104/international-migration-from-bangladesh, accessed on 28 April 2017.

[33] Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

engaging with the initiatives in time are also a focus of the country's foreign policy.

For broader multilateral platforms, foreign policy of Bangladesh targets playing an active role at the UN, UN specialised agencies and in all international organisations of which the country today is a member. Through robust diplomatic efforts, Bangladesh has been able to be elected at different influential positions of various international organisations, *e.g.*, International Maritime Organization (IMO), United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), UN Women, Human Rights Council, United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), *etc.* The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) is also continuing its persistent diplomatic efforts to popularise the Honourable Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's People's Empowerment Model which has been globally praised and adopted by the UN.[34]

Not only bilateral but also regional and multilateral engagements are focused on gaining politico-economic gains. Since independence of Bangladesh, economic diplomacy has thus been a major thrust of the country's foreign policy. Both economy and foreign policy of Bangladesh are in transition, moving from aid dependency to trade integration and its augmentation. In this context, Bangladesh has focused on growing multi-level trade relations, engaging with regional and mega trade blocs and attracting FDI. These require economic diplomacy. Here, it is pertinent to mention the importance of labour migration from Bangladesh. The country is vocal in global forums regarding migration and continues its diplomatic efforts to establish rights of migrants. With around 10 million workers residing abroad, protecting their rights and ensuring other facilities are crucial for diplomatic missions of Bangladesh.[35] This is also a priority issue of the country's foreign policy and economic diplomacy. Several initiatives have already been taken to translate the notion of economic diplomacy into concrete actions. Some of the steps include reorienting efforts to promote trade volume and FDI inflow in Bangladesh, constantly looking for markets for Bangladeshi workers abroad to increase inflow of remittances, enhancing interface with private sectors, trade and investment related bodies as well as maintaining coordination with line ministries or agencies dealing with the matters including Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Finance, Board of Investment (BoI), Bangladesh Export

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[34] Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's 'People's Empowerment and Peace Model', which she placed at the 66th UN General Assembly on 24 September 2011, was included in the resolution of the General Assembly by all nations on 22 December.
[35] For details about labour migration from Bangladesh, see, "Overseas Employment of Bangladeshi Workers: Trends, Prospects, and Challenges", *ADB Briefs*, No. 63, August 2016; "Overseas Employment and Remittances From 1976-2016", Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training, Ministry of Expatriates' Welfare and Overseas Employment, Government of Bangladesh, available at http://www.bmet.gov.bd/BMET/viewStatReport.action?reportnumber=20, accessed on 26 April 2017.

Processing Zones Authority (BEPZA), Export Promotion Bureau (EPB), *etc.* Bangladesh is also negotiating for preferential access to markets of the western countries as well as those of India and China. Asymmetry in bilateral trade relations with these two is a concern, which Bangladesh is trying to deal efficiently.

Energy is the lifeline of modern economy and a key aspect of economic diplomacy. Bangladesh needs a steady average economic growth of eight per cent or above to become a developed nation by 2041. For maintaining such growth, Bangladesh demands adequate amount of energy supply which the country lacks. Moreover, it is not endowed with abundant and varieties of energy resources and sources. Hence, Bangladesh continues pursuing energy diplomacy robustly to foster regional cooperation in order to meet its present demand of energy and future sustainability of energy supply. Multilateral regional cooperation in energy sector will reduce dependency risk on a single source of energy and will unlock regional long-term energy potential in a cost effective way. Every stakeholder can be benefited from that. Consequently, Bangladesh is now focusing on integrating energy security interests into foreign policy decision making, prioritising energy diplomacy in foreign policy to take the leverage of bilateral and multilateral energy cooperation with neighbours and other states.

After resolving maritime boundary disputes with India and Myanmar, Bangladesh focuses on exploration and development of oil and gas resources in the Bay of Bengal's shallow and deep waters. It is looking at exploring prospects in the offshore areas located between India's producing Bengal Basin and Myanmar's Rakhine Basin.[36] Two different arbitrations under the UN Convention on Law of the Sea have demarcated Bangladesh's maritime border and resolved ownership issues concerning offshore territories. Energy and maritime diplomacy have thus been crucial components of the country's foreign policy. Bangladesh with the help of maritime diplomacy is now also focusing to establish its legal rights over its newly demarcated maritime boundary for transportation, exploration of bio-vital material, marine and fisheries resources. The country being a littoral state of Indian Ocean and with strategic interests has been vocal and actively participating in different multilateral Indian Ocean forums like Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), *etc.* Such initiatives aforesaid are to realise and materialise the concept of 'blue economy' as a priority area of Bangladesh foreign policy.

Another vital area of Bangladesh foreign policy is to work on environmental diplomacy, particularly climate diplomacy in addressing a major developmental concern - adverse impact of global warming and climate change. Increased temperature, one of the most vivid depictions of climate change, will add twin

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[36] Bangladesh has resolved maritime boundary dispute with Myanmar and India in 2012 and 2014 respectively and now it has sovereign rights over 118,813 sq km of area in the Bay of Bengal. For details, see, "Bangladesh Maritime Boundary: Where Do We Stand Now?", *Foreign Affairs Insights and Reviews*, available at http://fairbd. net/bangladesh-maritime-boundary-where-do-we-stand-now/, accessed on 02 May 2017.

problems for Bangladesh - melting of glaciers and sea level rise. While Himalayan glaciers feeding waters to Bangladesh rivers are slowly disappearing, coastal zones including the Sundarbans mangrove forests are being threatened by rising sea levels. Most of the problems are originated or caused by factors that are external to Bangladesh.[37] As a result, Bangladesh is now intensively pursuing climate diplomacy to align itself with countries, which are also facing similar problems due to global warming and climate change, and to make a joint initiative so that their voices are united in the four key aspects of climate change (adaptation, mitigation, technology transfer and funding) at all regional and international forums. The country has continued to project its vulnerabilities to global community through its active participation and diplomatic lobbying. Bangladesh is now leading climate discourse globally which has been possible because of the unwavering effort of the country's climate diplomacy.

Besides, three "C"s – consular diplomacy, conference diplomacy and cultural diplomacy – are important aspects of Bangladesh foreign policy. Interconnected areas of providing citizens with consular services and working with diaspora are getting considerable attention. The MoFA of Bangladesh is focusing on consular diplomacy to improve its consular services in different missions abroad. The country is also focusing on its global image and branding. Hence, pursuing conference diplomacy has been a regular phenomenon to increase Bangladesh's involvement in global arena, uphold an image of secular, democratic and progressive Bangladesh contributing to global peace and stability. On the other hand, with a rich and diverse culture and deeply rooted heritage, cultural diplomacy being an important tool of soft power diplomacy and its promotion have been pertinent to the country's foreign policy. Cultural diplomacy can be exploited for branding of Bangladesh and building images of the country.

4.   Emerging Challenges of Bangladesh Foreign Policy

In a world that is changing fast, being a country transitioning from lower-middle-income to upper-middle-income and wishing for a developed one, a set of emerging questions arises. With what and whom, to engage and not to engage, and again whether to engage actively or passively? What to negotiate at what level [*e.g.*, bilateral (*e.g.*, for raw materials at the cheapest cost), regional, plurilateral and multilateral (*e.g.*, for addressing Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)]? How to engage or disengage with major as well as emerging powers and to what extent? What to affect at what levels in growing steadily? How to deal with close-door neighbours? How to engage with mega blocs (*e.g.*, for economic or specifically trade)? How to deal with countries/regions bearing major implications? How to segregate offers potential either far or immediate? How far to liberalise (*e.g.*, for trade, economy,

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[37] Harun ur Rashid, *Bangladesh Foreign Policy: Realities, Priorities and Challenges*, Dhaka: Academic Press and Publishers Library, 2010.

etc.,) and believe in protectionism by what time? These are some of many questions to be critical in near and distant future while considering emerging challenges facing foreign policy of Bangladesh. These require practicing multiple sorts of diplomacy, *e.g.*, economic, political, conference, consular, commercial, maritime, *etc*. In this section, the scope of emerging challenges is limited to some factors, and actors of foreign policy making. The factors include soft power diplomacy and image building, trade in goods, manpower export, FDI, ODA, energy, transport connectivity, water and maritime security, climate change and balancing between parties, interests and initiatives.

Before going to discuss what to prioritise or what the major challenges are, there are also some issues to be explored. Who are the actors of foreign policy making, whether direct or relevant? How active, dynamic, capable, patient and responsible are they? How informed the actors are with required sorts of diplomacy and negotiation, information and intelligence[38] to avoid any strategic surprise? What is the tactic of making foreign policy, whether adhoc or ideational, whether proactive or reactive in nature, whether coherent or consistent? How resourced the actors are with necessary budget, assets and coordination? These are really deterministic on how a country is going to face emerging challenges of its foreign policy. Bangladesh will not be an exception to the phenomena.

An important issue is foreign policy making, which involves multifaceted and diverse actors, various institutions and processes. Modelski defines foreign policy making as the process whereby a state adjusts its actions to those of other states so as to minimise adverse actions and maximise the favourable actions of foreign states.[39] There are three broad schools of thought dealing with the debates of foreign policy making. Firstly, the *Innenpolitik* School that argues domestic dynamics are primarily responsible for any state's foreign policy behaviour. Secondly, the *Aussenpolitik* School that offers the opposite: pressures from international system, which include either incentives or constrains, influencing states in their foreign policy pursuits. Finally, Integrative Approaches usually combine both domestic dynamics and international systemic pressures.[40] In the case of Bangladesh, foreign policy making is still considered as an exclusive matter of government and bureaucracy where the Prime Minister (PM) and her office, advisers to PM, cabinet headed by the PM, parliamentary standing committee, Foreign Minister, MoFA and their missions abroad with their yearly reports, as well as ministries, institutions and agencies related with trade and economy[41] are most important actors. At the functional level, there are some other important actors, for

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[38] Intelligence refers to a cyclical process of defining needs, collection, processing and analysis of information, and the dissemination of such information to decision-makers.

[39] G. Modelski, *A Theory of Foreign Policy*, London: Pall Mall, 1962, p. 3.

[40] Chakraborty, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

[41] Ministry of Finance, especially Economic Relations Division, Ministry of Trade and Commerce, Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources, Ministry of Expatriates' Welfare and Overseas Employment *etc.*

example, political parties, influential political and business elites, press and media, intelligence agencies, specialised bodies, pressure groups and associations, *etc.* In the rules of business[42] prepared by the GoB, role of government agencies is specified but challenges lie with the coordination of their tasks vested on them.[43] although the parliament arranges debates on various issues, its engagement with the issues on external affairs of the country is not always visible. Likewise, the coordinating role of MoFA is interrupted owing to lack of inter-ministerial cohesion.[44] In fact, in numerous occasions, fragmented and compartmentalised approaches of different ministries towards the conduct of external relations create bottleneck in producing a coherent and integrated policy. In such a situation, though sometimes media and press play important role as a crucial actor, public opinion gets insignificant attention/reflection in the whole process. Most importantly, the role of academia remains limited, and to some extent elusive in the process of foreign policy making.[45] Consequently, total control and authority of the foreign policy making is believed to be influenced by "groupthink"[46] attitude. Therefore, it can be said that dearth of proper coordination and engagement of crucial actors and institutions; inept role played by some of them; and the complex processes of country's foreign policy making continue to be the critical challenges.

Exercising soft power diplomacy is a challenging task for any country's foreign policy like Bangladesh. There has to be a substantial investment in matters of culture or what Joseph Nye called the use of "soft power". A beginning could be made by sponsoring 'Bangladesh Cultural Centre' in different cities of the world or working with Bangladeshi diaspora, Non-Resident Bangladeshis (NRBs) and particularly with migrant students and workers.[47] Besides mainstreaming cultural diplomacy, branding Bangladesh and increasing its images globally are of the essence. Being (a) one of the top performing countries of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), (b) an example of successful disaster management and Ready Made Garment (RMG) exporter, (c) one of the largest troops contributing countries in the UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), (d) an nation of cricket loving nation, *etc.* has given Bangladesh a branding and a global image. The country does not want to lose it by any context, whether it is by terrorism, extremism or

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[42] Cabinet Division, *Rules of Business 1996*, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh: Cabinet Division, available at http://cabinet.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/cabinet.portal.gov.bd/legislative_information/d8e711a8_0744_47d4_a1fd_fce1dfb1a5d7/Rules%20of%20Business%20December-20140001.pdf, accessed on 31 July 2017.

[43] Authors' interview with Ambassador Munshi Faiz Ahmad, Chairman, Board of Governors, Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS) in July 2017.

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] Authors' interview with Professor Dr. Rashed Uz Zaman, Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka and with Professor Gobinda Chakraborty, Department of Political Science, University of Dhaka in July 2017.

[46] Groupthink is a phenomenon that occurs within a group of people in which the desire for harmony might result in debatable decision making outcomes. The term was coined by social psychologist Irving Janis in 1972.

[47] Imtiaz Ahmed, "Bangladesh Foreign Policy: Constraints, Compulsions and Choices", *BIISS Journal*, Vol. 32, No. 3, July 2011.

violence within or outside its periphery. Nonetheless, these are challenging with costs and consequences.

What would be the guiding issues of any country's foreign policy, particularly for a country like Bangladesh that is transitioning? Undeniably, responses will include trade in goods and services, investment, developmental assistance, energy security, connectivity, water and climate change. These will get immense priority at multiple-levels. The more a country is rich in negotiating the issues at multiple-levels, the more it will flourish with resource mobilisation. The alternative will definitely produce challenges. Bangladesh is no exception to that.

With very few selected items (*e.g.*, RMG) and some traditional markets (*e.g.*, EU, North America), Bangladesh's international trade moves ahead with a set of challenging questions. How Bangladesh successfully could exercise "decoupling" (*e.g.*, connecting with the east[48], increasing economic engagement with regions like East or Central Asia, Africa and Latin America)? How to offset "uncertainties" (detailed in Annex 1) at home (*e.g.*, industrial accident and labour unrest) with spill-over effects (*e.g.*, reconsidering [of buyers] sourcing options whether to continue or not) as well as on bilateral (*e.g.*, US Generalised System of Preference (GSP), regional (*e.g.*, proposed EU-India Free Trade Area (FTA) and international (*e.g.*, Aid for Trade (AfT), implementing Nairobi text on Rules of Origin (RoO) trade fronts that are likely to affect?[49] What to compensate (*e.g.*, trade privileges) while graduating to Middle Income Country (MIC) status and what preparations (*e.g.*, increasing supply side capacities) ought to be undertaken? How Brexit and its aftermath could be dealt with (*e.g.*, negotiating Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA)? What are the implications (*e.g.*, losing competitiveness of exports) of not being part of any plurilateral trading agreements (*e.g.*, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP)? How Bangladesh could be a party of mega trading bloc? What is the necessary homework for that? To what extent, trade liberalisation and trade integration at multiple-levels are necessary for trade promotion?[50] What trade blocs (*e.g.*, South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) FTA, Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), *etc.*) to be prioritised? How Bangladesh could negotiate the issues of preferential RoO, Duty Free Quota Free (DFQF) market access, Special and Differential (S&D) treatment, preferential provision for having local content or value

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[48] Japan and Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) of the Asia-Pacific region namely South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand - a centre of economic power second only to the west. Industrial Asia with its surplus capital, modern technology, technical know-how and a growing market for the products of labour-intensive industries offers enormous opportunities. This may include cooperation in such vital areas as trade and investment, transfer of technology, human resource development, environment and others. China, Japan, India and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) states are becoming increasingly important in world economy transcending the borders of Asia.

[49] Authors' Interview with Dr. Ahsan H. Mansur, Executive Director, Policy Research Institute (PRI), Bangladesh in 2014.

[50] *Ibid.*

addition and waiving of several types of duties? How Bangladesh could be engaged with Global Value Chain (GVC) and increase FDI-centric trade? How both horizontal and vertical diversifications of products could be pursued? How to increase trade and business capability of Bangladesh? How successfully Bangladesh could devise its trade negotiable issues at multiple-levels? How strongly instruments of trade diplomacy be exercised by Bangladeshi negotiators? These are very challenging issues of Bangladesh's trade promotion, a key aspect of the country's foreign policy.

Trade in services, *e.g.*, manpower export, has long been vital not only for eradicating poverty, offsetting unemployment and promoting rural development of Bangladesh but also for the country's increasing reserves, overall economic growth and development. Since the late 1970s, manpower export sector flourished with erratic trends, though remittances increased. But recently the inflow of remittances decreased due to various reasons. Shrinking new recruitment opportunities, expatriates compelling to return home, sudden official/unofficial ban on recruitment, difficulty in renewing residential permit, strict enforcement of immigration rules and layoffs or long-run vacation by employers, cancellation of visas, difficulty in regularising unauthorised workers, lack of interest in employing less-skilled workers, fraudulent practices of recruiting agencies, migrants' ignorance on legal issues and cultural settings of destination countries are major concerns for Bangladesh's traditional manpower export destinations (*e.g.*, countries in the Middle-east and Southeast Asia). Therefore, further exploring traditional sectors and markets by addressing country- and region-wise dilemmas will remain critical for Bangladesh foreign policy.[51] Important would be introducing "ladderisation"[52] system. Mapping potential destinations and sectors by examining global labour market scenario, increasing promotional activities and legally-binding arrangements, specifying actors-specific timely efforts and making manpower-oriented economic diplomacy effective are crucial. Indeed, expanding the sector would be a challenging issue of Bangladesh's foreign policy. Mobilising opinion within the international community to ensure the protection of rights of migrant workers, including those of undocumented workers in the receiving countries will also be a great concern for Bangladesh in the coming days.

In comparison with countries growing at six per cent growth or more, Bangladesh still lags behind in receiving and attracting FDI even after undertaking several initiatives and policies. Nurturing long-term relations with foreign investors, retaining current investors, targeting potential investors, continuing relations with investors, seeking strong manufacturing base in Asia, mapping sectors and countries-specific FDI opportunities, encouraging FDI by global companies in Bangladeshi RMG, engaging more with recent shift in global FDI composition,

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[51] Authors' interview with Dr. Tasneem Siddique, Executive Committee Member, Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU), Bangladesh in 2014.
[52] For those who worked abroad, are skilled and came back home; such workers with advanced guidance could further be exported.

increasing investment promotional activities, looking for joint ventures, dealing nuances related to competitors, establishing some Special Economic Zones (SEZs) nearby India's north-eastern states, encouraging FDI from NRBs and increasing regional connectivity are vital issues for Bangladesh. Indeed, turning FDI proposals into FDI reality is an emerging challenge of the country's foreign policy.[53] What it requires is also challenging: to continue relations with states that have already realised FDI in Bangladesh, intensify relations with states keen to offer FDI and classify potential states to attract them in investing prospective sectors; to tap investment complementarities and mobilise FDI by pursuing economic diplomacy at multiple-levels; concluding and updating legally-binding contracts, intensifying the role of Bangladesh's foreign missions and employing commercial diplomats; promoting consular diplomacy, engaging NRBs and Bangladeshi diaspora, showcasing environment favourable for FDI, increasing positive image of Bangladesh globally; finding out and addressing what to do to enhance global image of Bangladesh abroad; trying to include Bangladesh in the list of a country's mid-/long-term outward investment plans; liberalising FDI regimes in line with requirements of existing and potential investors.

Fluctuating Country Programmable Aid (CPA), shifting priority from grants to loans and diverse preferences for funnelling foreign aid are radical developments of global aid diplomacy. Though foreign policy of Bangladesh has been shifting from foreign aid to international trade, the former is still significant to meet development priorities of the country. The challenging issues of Bangladesh's aid diplomacy are realising global aid dynamism, meeting commitment and disbursement of aid gap, lessening difficulties among the GoB and Global Financial Institutions (GFIs) and between/among the GFIs, examining conditionalities of aid, assessing Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) in a single project, studying emerging Development Partners (DPs) as the new sources of ODA, assessing aid modalities to fully access International Development Association (IDA) allocations, examining conditionalities to access AfT and global climate fund, *etc.*[54] Therefore, what requires are: negotiating with DPs on aid conditionalities, understanding psychology of donors, studying long-term plans of major DPs, encouraging non-traditional DPs (*e.g.*, India, China, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), New Development Bank (NDB) to set up their country-level offices in Bangladesh, influencing headquarters of regional and GFIs to empower their branch offices in Bangladesh, strengthening already established joint aid assessment mechanisms, and pressurising DPs to harmonise their aid strategies with Bangladesh's developmental goals. For mobilising climate aid, important steps include (i) participating actively through dispatching experts in climate change related multiple-level forums; (ii) increasing bilateral efforts through signing MoUs and agreements; (iii) showcasing Bangladesh to climate

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[53] Authors' interview with Ambassador Farooq Sobhan, President and CEO, Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI), Bangladesh in 2014.
[54] Authors' interview with Dr. Shamsul Alam, Member, General Economics Division, Planning Commission, Ministry of Planning, Bangladesh in 2014.

change related global watchdogs and donors on how already disbursed funds are being utilised and how committed funds would be used; and (iv) exercising climate diplomacy coined with economic diplomacy.[55]

Taking economic potential further will require resolving the deficit in the energy sector. Or, to put it differently, Bangladesh must embark upon a newer phase in its foreign policy, that is, energy diplomacy creatively.[56] Procurement of energy at the cheapest costs will be a big challenge for the country in the upcoming years. If Bangladesh is to go beyond its current economic growth and reach growth of 10 per cent in less than a decade's time then it needs to fulfil its energy requirements on a priority basis. Bangladesh needs to think beyond oil and coal and keep all options, including peaceful nuclear technologies open. Energy trading (*e.g.*, electricity, diesel, *etc.*) between India and Bangladesh, Bangladesh-Singapore energy cooperation, Bangladesh-Russia energy collaboration, thinking of inter-grid connectivity and energy trading within BBIN countries, planning to lay a 6900-km gas pipeline (to carry gas, Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) and diesel) between BIM (Bangladesh, India and Myanmar) countries, examining International Oil Companies (IOCs) to extract energy resources from the Bay of Bengal, starting to implement mega energy projects, *etc.*, are some of the initiatives that would help Bangladesh resolve its energy deficiency.[57] Nonetheless, energy cooperation and sufficiency need formulating a coordinated plan for development of the energy infrastructure, and this will remain a key challenge before Bangladesh's foreign policy.

For keeping the existing growth momentum continuing and taking it to a higher level, bilateral, sub-regional and regional transport connectivity will have increasing priority as they are likely to facilitate trade and investment cooperation and people-to-people contact. At bilateral level, transport connectivity between Bangladesh and India and between Bangladesh and Myanmar will be crucial. With a potential and strategic geographical location, Bangladesh is expected to be a transport hub of many linked regions. Keeping these in view, Bangladesh has already been a party of several connectivity initiatives like BBIN Motor Vehicle Agreement (MVA), Bangladesh China India Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC), United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP)-led Trans Asian Highway (TAH) and Trans Asian Railway (TAR) initiatives and proposed SAARC MVA and BIMSTEC-led thinking respectively. What will remain challenging includes: at bilateral level, developing hard and soft infrastructure (*e.g.*, introducing e-governance and digitalisation at entry and exit points) in unison as well as prioritising national interests and development needs beyond politics regarding perceived security threats; agreeing on common routes in BBIN MVA and BCIM-EC and take all out effort to operationalise these agreements; signing SAARC MVA; implementing UNESCAP-led TAH and TAR initiatives; mobilising financial resources,

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[55] Authors' interview with Dr. Ainun Nishat, Professor Emeritus, BRAC University, Bangladesh in 2014.

[56] Imtiaz Ahmed, *op. cit.*

[57] *Ibid.*

receiving and utilisation of resources in time; implementing projects within stipulated timeframe, *etc.* Not only engaging with regional connectivity initiatives but also implementing mega projects within Bangladesh like proposed deep sea port, Payra sea port, economic zones projects, further modernising Chittagong and Mongla ports, *etc.*, are challenging tasks. Most importantly, harmonising regional connectivity initiatives will be critical.[58] In addition to that, as Bangladesh is a littoral state of the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean, eyeing maritime connectivity through different initiatives (*e.g.*, One Belt One Road (OBOR), Maritime Silk Route (MSR) by China or Indian projects like Mausum[59], Spice Route Project[60] and Sagar Mala[61], *etc.*) for expansion of the country's trade and meeting energy requirements will really be a challenging task of its foreign policy.

Like before, a key challenge of Bangladesh foreign policy will hang about common water resource management between/among countries concerned. Hence, bargaining with India on the sharing of the River Ganges and Teesta river water sharing agreement will remain a daunting task.[62] On the contrary, settlement of maritime dispute between BIM countries has given Bangladesh opportunities to have legal arrangements with international companies to explore marine resources (both living and non-living) from the Bay of Bengal. While Japan is keen to cooperate with Bangladesh through Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt (BIG-B) initiative, China has come out with its OBOR or 21st Century MSR. These two are coined with the Bay. Maritime connectivity through the Bay towards Indian Ocean and South China Sea (SCS) is being crucial. As a country on the coast of the Bay of Bengal, the gateway to Indian Ocean, the geo-political importance of Bangladesh has increased manifold. Bangladesh faces the Indian Ocean through the Bay of Bengal which is gradually being militarised by many littoral states. Peacetime functions of the navy of many coastal countries have changed considerably. It is not confined to defence of territories. The navies patrol the distant waters to keep safe the sea lanes for transportation of oil from the Middle East to Far East and promotion of trade. Thus, importance of the Bay of Bengal or "Blue Economy" is growing. It has

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[58] Authors' interview with Riaz Hamidullah, Director General, Economic Affairs Wing, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh in 2014..

[59] Project 'Mausam' is the Ministry of Culture project of Indian government to be implemented by Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts (IGNCA), New Delhi as the nodal coordinating agency with support of Archeological Survey of India and National Museum as associate bodies. Focusing on monsoon patterns, cultural routes and maritime landscapes, Project 'Mausam' is examining key processes and phenomena that link different parts of the Indian Ocean littoral as well as those that connect the coastal centres to their hinterlands.

[60] This 'Spice route project' of India aims to explore the multi-faceted Indo-Pacific Ocean 'world' – collating archaeological and historical research in order to document the diversity of cultural, commercial and religious interactions in the Indian Ocean – extending from East Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, the Indian subcontinent and Sri Lanka to the Southeast Asian archipelago.

[61] Sagar Mala project is a strategic and customer-oriented initiative of the Government of India to modernise India's ports so that port-led development can be augmented and coastlines can be developed to contribute in India's growth

[62] Authors' interview with Dr. Ainun Nishat, *op. cit.*

given Bangladesh a huge chance to be growing as a regional power and a maritime nation. But at the same time, challenges remain with ocean governance, marine resource management, monitoring and playing a role in the area of security, *etc*. These have long term connotations.

Another long term concern is climate change. With the dire condition of the marginalised people owing to the issue of environment particularly global warming, Bangladesh is already on the top of the Global Climate Risk Index.[63] Most of the problems originated or caused by climate change are external to Bangladesh. The long-term effects of climate change are likely to hinder the progress towards sustainable development and undermine the development gains. Hundreds of thousands of coastal impoverished communities have already been displaced and pushed into extreme poverty without any livelihood opportunity and shelter. Millions more will follow if the sea level rise and saline water intrusion continue to move upward in the inland. A 45 cm rise in sea level will not only affect the vast coastal ecosystem, hamper agriculture and food production, it has the potential to dislocate about 38 million people from 20 coastal districts.[64] This is a challenge that could only be met with regional and global efforts and therefore, climate diplomacy is bound to emerge in the priority list of Bangladesh foreign policy agenda. Climate-induced displacements will create new housing, livelihood and settlement challenges. It will enhance competition and conflict over scarce resources including land, water, fisheries and forests. Rural to urban as well as cross border migration will continue in the slums without adequate income, food, water, shelters and basic amenities. Therefore, segregating issues of climate change to be negotiated at multiple-levels would be a concern. Challenges will remain with stakeholders and policymakers to be continuously equipped in environmental discourse and climate negotiations to reap benefits from climate diplomacy. Resource (financial) mobilisation from domestic sources and from the GFIs or global arrangements will also be crucial. Furthermore, negotiation on the issues of adaptation, mitigation, technology transfer and global climate fund will be critical for Bangladesh foreign policy. Therefore, blending of climate diplomacy, political diplomacy and economic diplomacy is very important.

Besides, conflict between parties and interests is going to be an emerging challenge of Bangladesh foreign policy. There are concerns about balancing initiatives regarding energy and climate change. On the one hand, green development and sustainable development are of the essence. While on the other hand, industrialisation and economic growth require adequate supply of

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[63] Bangladesh ranked sixth in the Global Climate Risk Index prepared by Germanwatch; for details, see, S. Kreft, D. Eckstein and I. Melchior, *Global Climate Risk Index 2017*, Germany: Germanwatch, November 2016, available at https://germanwatch.org/en/download/16411.pdf, accessed on 15 July 2017.
[64] Marjana Chowdhury, "Climate Change Challenges in Bangladesh", 29 July 2015, available at https://iep. berkeley.edu/node/9781, accessed on 01 May 2017.

energy.[65] Another point is that Bangladesh requires development assistance, for both facilitating development and tackling climate vulnerabilities. While some argue for having what is on offer or supply, many argue for receiving aid based on development priorities.[66] In the case of manpower export, some focus on skills, while many argue for increasing numbers of unskilled manpower. Likewise, while some argue for reducing dependency on traditional markets in goods and services trade, others are keen to focus on decoupling. Indeed, Bangladesh requires both simultaneously. Based on the factors aforesaid, there are parties and interests in clash. How to balance in between the two is essential and will remain a key challenge for Bangladesh.

5.   Concluding Remarks

The paper discusses comprehensively specific emerging challenges of Bangladesh foreign policy. The challenges include exercising soft power diplomacy, branding Bangladesh and increasing its images, consolidating trade promotion both in goods and services, attracting FDI, coping with global aid diplomacy, materialising energy diplomacy, strengthening regional and sub-regional transport connectivity, working on trans-border water resource management, pursuing blue economy and maritime diplomacy, addressing climate vulnerabilities, trans-border terrorism and violent extremism, and conflict between parties and interests.

In order to address the challenges taking into account changing realities both in domestic and international scene, foreign policy needs to be both proactive and reactive. Actors concerned with foreign policy need to work at multiple-levels with proper understanding of internal and external dynamics, vital countries or organisations and instruments to make the policy a success. As an instance, the success of foreign policy depends to a certain extent on how diplomats can take advantage of the prevailing global and regional developments. At the same time, increasing trade/ foreign missions and consulates, providing adequate consular services for NRBs in different missions and effective mobilisation of expertise are indispensable.

Mobilisation of expertise and resource mobilisation (*e.g.,* human, natural, financial and non-financial resources) are vital in formulating and implementing foreign policy of Bangladesh. Resource mobilisation requires speeding up of exploration of domestically available resources, making use of complementary resources and sharing with regional and sub-regional countries, pursuing long-term strategies to strengthen regional/sub-regional trade and economic cooperation (also in resolving cross-border issues), facilitating competitive strength of industrial

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[65] Michael T. Klare, "Global Warming: It's About Energy", *Alternet*, 16 February 2007, available at http://www. alternet.org/story/48089/global_warming%3A_it%27s_about_energy, accessed on 25 April 2017.
[66] Mohammad Jasim Uddin, "Economic Diplomacy of Bangladesh: ODA in Perspective", *BIISS Journal*, Vol. 37, No. 1, January 2016.

sector and raising competitiveness of Bangladesh's exports, signing comprehensive FTA with the US and EU, building necessary trade related supply side capacities and raising efficacy of trade facilitation measures, emerging as the largest ever manufacturing and export-led take off, internationalising local companies, stimulating FDI inflow and exploiting full potential to export manpower.

ANNEX

Annex 1: Uncertainties

- With a zero-duty benefit under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, African export of RMG has been on the rise to the US. Big companies are eyeing Africa as a future site for apparel production that can be exported to the US, duty and quota free. Consequently, Bangladesh may lose competitiveness to African nations for exporting garments to the US in the face of discriminatory duty benefits.

- Signing of proposed EU-India FTA and Vietnam's joining TPP may have negative impacts on Bangladesh's RMG exports but it will depend on how flexible sourcing requirements and rules are structured. Bangladesh's competitive advantage due to GSP in the EU markets is under threat following Vietnam's recent free trade deal with the EU.

- Myanmar and Cambodia are emerging in the low-end segment that Bangladesh occupies.

- When Bangladesh graduates from its Least Developed Country (LDC) status and loses its existing preferential access to major markets, export growth would face strong barriers. Unless Bangladesh enters FTAs, export-led growth would be vulnerable.

- What are the implications for RMG exporters of Bangladesh if the US attitude not to return GSP facility continues to persist?

- If India imposes ban on exporting cotton to Bangladesh and importing raw jute from the country? If India continues to impose an anti-dumping tariff (up to 20 per cent) on Bangladeshi jute goods, it could deal a heavy blow to Bangladeshi millers and exporters. Besides, concern lies on whether India would lift countervailing duty on importing RMG from Bangladesh?

- A recent concern is Brexit. Bangladesh exports more than US$ 3 billion to the UK, of which 90 per cent constitute RMG. Withdrawing DFQF market access, grabbing bigger market share by competing countries (*e.g.*, India, Vietnam, Cambodia and Pakistan) in the UK, increasing cost of import in the UK, imposing tariffs on imports to protect domestic industries of the UK and depressed demand among the UK people are some future challenges for Bangladesh. These will erode competitiveness of Bangladeshi exports.

- If Bangladesh remains out of mega trading blocs, its exports would face unequal tariff and non-tariff barriers while competitors being part of the blocs will gain competitive edge in Bangladesh's key export markets.

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Md. Ziaul Haque Sheikh

AKBAR'S INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE, POST-SECULARISM AND GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

Abstract

Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori depict a conceptual map of a range of possible approaches and ways in which Global Intellectual History (GIH) can be formulated as an academic discipline. Various scholars from different fields propose to widen its scope and boundaries - from trans-local and western-centric to intra-regional, trans-continental, trans-national and even beyond the geographical designation. In this writing, an attempt has been made to bring the idea of *"Suhl-i-kul",* a state sponsored 'interreligious-dialogue' initiated by Akbar (1556-1605), a mediaeval Mughal emperor of India, as a content of GIH. This study assumes that the concept of *"Suhl-i-kul"* can be matched with the idea of 'post-secularism' which demands that such concept can create a trans-religious global formation and contribute to establish a peaceful society in a religiously pluralist world, especially from the perspective of multi-religious South Asia.

1.   Introduction

In their writing, Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori along with other scholars cover almost all fields of social intellectual inquiry for Global Intellectual History (GIH)[1], but one of the important fields, they are somewhat reluctant [un]consciously to bring into the contents of GIH, is the 'religious phenomenon'.[2] Cemil Aydin in his writing, *Globalizing the Intellectual History of the Idea of the "Muslim World"* has sought to bring the idea of the Ottomans' *'Khilafat'* and 'Pan-Islamism' as an alternative internationalism and counter-universalism to challenge the itineraries of universal conceptual movements that originate in the Western world.[3] But, it seldom wraps up the religious phenomenon in the proposed discipline of GIH. Therefore, it remains an area for scholarly exercise about 'how can we bring the religious phenomenon

Md. Ziaul Haque Sheikh is Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic History and Culture, Jagannath University, Dhaka, Bangladesh. Currently, he is a PhD Research Fellow at the Department of International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi, India. His e-mail address is: ziaduds@gmail.com

[1] I am indebted to Dr. Siddharth Mallavarapu, Chairperson, Department of International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi, India, who has introduced me with the idea of GIH and encouraged me to think and write about it. However, the earlier version of this paper has been presented in the "International Conference on Terrorism in the Wave of Islamic State", held on 7-8 January, 2017, organised by the Department of Criminology, University of Dhaka.

[2] Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, "Approaches to Global Intellectual History", in Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (eds.), *Global Intellectual History*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2013, pp. 3-28.

[3] Cemil Aydin, "Globalizing the Intellectual History of the Idea of the 'Muslim World", in Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 159-186.

into the content of GIH?' Would the inclusion of any religious concept in GIH trigger the search about any particular religion as the absolute truth and universality? When GIH is tempting to avoid any type of centrism, would such intellectual inclusion transform this discipline into a particular religious-centric? In this writing, we will settle these questions and seek to bring the idea of Akbar's *"Suhl-i-kul"* [4], a state sponsored 'interreligious-dialogue' with an assumption that this concept can have the potentiality to be treated as the 'pioneer' of today's post-secularism that necessitates religious concepts can also create trans-religious global formation. Hence, it can also contribute in establishing a peaceful society in a religiously pluralist world.

2.   GIH and Reviewing Its Content

According to Moyn and Sartori, "Global Intellectual History is intended to showcase the available choices at a threshold moment in the possible formation of an intellectual history extending across geographical parameters far larger than usual."[5] The view of Duncan Bell is that "global intellectual history is an antidote to deliberating form of scholarly parochialism, insisting that ideas are not constrained or constituted by political borders, but are instead produced and consumed within cross-cutting, geographically dispersed field of discourse".[6] However, Fredrick Cooper in his article, "*How Global Do We Want Our Intellectual History to Be*?" more critically frames the word "global" in GIH and divides it into soft and hard versions. To him, soft version of 'global' directs cross-national, cross-continental and cross-cultural interconnected history and hard version of 'global' leads to a centralisation of ideas, encircling the world and formulating the proposition about the world as a whole by using modern technology.[7] While Fredric Cooper regards GIH as interconnected history, Sudipta Kaviraj, in his writing, "*Global Intellectual History: Meanings and Methods"* disagrees with Cooper's remark and defines GIH as a highly rewarding field of comparative history.[8] He makes an effort to distinguish between interconnected and comparative history by arguing that interconnected history is supplied by the modern analysts and it does not exist inside the intentional field of history that is being explored. He argues that interconnected history is extrinsic and contains the element of presentism to focus on the connection between two phenomenons. On the other hand, comparative history is intrinsic and free from any presentism, which is the main demand of GIH.[9] However, GIH is the web of knowledge, which studies

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[4] *Suhl-i-kul* is a Persian term which means peace with all. This is the religious policy of Akbar by which he extended his liberal policy and toleration to all religions and creeds and would not recognise any difference among religions owing to unite all citizen in a common bond of peace. The great outcome of this policy was to engage religious leaders of different religions into the state sponsored interreligious dialogue.

[5] Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[6] Duncan Bell, "Making and Taking Worlds", in Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 255.

[7] Fredrick Cooper, "How Global Do we want Our Intellectual History to be?", in Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 284.

[8] Sudipta Kaviraj, "Global Intellectual History: Meanings and Methods", in Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 295-320.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 298.

the concepts and thinkers around the world and across the ages and keeps it beyond any centrism. It also searches about the originality of existing universal knowledge, exploring those nonglobalised ideas and philosophers that have had the potentiality to be global but need agencies for its fulfilment.

The project of GIH opens a wide range of scope to cover various concepts and thinkers across the pace and time. Both Moyn and Sartori intend to offer a model for global intellectual history beyond its showcase, specially, Sartori wants to keep it in so provocative manner that anyone interested in the future expansion of the enterprise should be able to engage it directly. He has brought in a key concept of how culture travels in a determinist frame of global capitalism by focusing on Bengal's contribution in the formation of global political economy.[10] The challenge of GIH is that an attempt to search the potentiality of any previous idea that had the capacity to be globalised but has the possibility to be misplaced due to its truncation or situational appropriation as fulfilled by a particular agency. Moyn brings the event of Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) as the pioneer of human rights movements, however, he argues that it is submerged by latter human rights movements.[11] Duncan Bell also discusses about the scope of GIH and views that GIH as a species of world making project does not assume or prescribe any particular special scale; rather it concentrates on exploring the universality.[12] To him, this project cognitively encompasses the world to frame the global not based on geographical design or non-western approach, but instead, includes the imaginative world. He includes world making contents and resources as the subject of GIH. He has also brought in the idea of scientific innovation as the content of GIH. Janaki Bakhle brings the idea of anti-colonial nationalist role of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar as the content of GIH by situating this into three strands of interlinked historical discourses, *viz.,* modern Indian history, early modern South Asian literary history, and Marathi literary and political history.[13] While Sartori argues that key concepts and ideas travel around the world, however, Bakhle adds a new dimension to this argument. She contends that while tracking and analysing the planned route or itinerary of the movement or travel of any key concept and idea around the world, it is generally seen that when any idea or concept travels, local milieu adds colour to that universal idea or concept.[14] Cemil Aydin attempts to bring the idea of the Ottomans' *"Khilafat"* and "Pan-Islamism" as an alternative internationalism and counter-universalism in order to challenge the privilege of the universal conceptual movements that originate in the Western world.[15] Vanissa Smith examines the process of cultural exchange by cultural intermediaries,

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[10] Andrew Sartori, *Bengal in Global Concept History: Culturalism in the Age of Capital*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005, p. 63, cited in Samuel Moyn, "On the Nonglobalization of Ideas", in Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 199.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 199.

[12] Duncan Bell*, op. cit.,* p. 226.

[13] Janaki Bakhle, "Putting Global Intellectual History in Its Place", in Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 228-229.

[14] *Ibid*.

[15] Cemil Aydin, *op. cit.,* p. 161.

according to which European knowledge has been depending on earliest contacts. He urges to rethink about this process of cultural exchange due to the fact that although cultural intermediaries are able to negotiate language and know about the epistemologies, practices, genres and methodologies, they become subject to rhetorical and discursive imperatives and occlude their agency, subtly transforming them from subject into object of knowledge.[16] Sheldon Pollock incorporates the idea of cosmopolitanism, vernacularism and pre-modernity in the GIH and discusses about how local and trans-local cultures formulate the intellectual circuit in particular areas. He makes an example by saying that Sanskrit cosmopolitanism does not take entire world or even same space as a whole but it can take an intellectual circuit of South Asia—crossing boundaries of a political unit and vernacular languages.[17] Siep Stuurman compares the relationship between nomads and settlers by referring three writers Herodotus, Sima Qian and Ibn Khaldun. By studying their writings, he has found that although there were cultural and political differences, they all significantly perceived a common humanity. There was political affinity and they confronted the common problem. This commonality is transcended to the particular intellectual and political framework.[18] In these ways, scholars have begun to formulate the GIH with a broader scope in order to incorporate a range of new concepts and ideas in it. In this writing, therefore, an attempt has been made to add Akbar's interreligious dialogue to be considered as a new contour of the GIH.

3.   Reasoning the Religion in GIH Premises

Religion is a much contested concept. The attempt to define it has led to debates among theologians, social scientists and philosophers. J. E. Barnhart has sought to identify the various problems in the definition.[19] Wilfred Cantwell Smith believes that the term is extremely difficult to define and in recent decades there has been a bewildering variety of definitions.[20] According to him, the concept of religion comes to mean not only in the Enlightenment sense the various system of what people believed, and not only in the Catholic sense what they ritually practised, and not only a sense of inwardly feeling, but increasingly the historical development of all these over the long sweep of centuries.[21] However, we will not engage here about the discourse on an in-depth definition of religion, rather reflect on religion as a belief and a set of practices in the context of International Relations. Smith defines religion as "an overt system, whether of beliefs, practices, values or whatever. Such a system has an extension of

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[16] Vanissa Smith, "Joseph Banks's Intermediaries: Rethinking Global Cultural Exchange", in Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 82.

[17] Sheldon Pollock, "Cosmopolitanism, Vernacularism, and Premodernity", in Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 59-80.

[18] Siep Stuurman, "Common Humanity and Cultural Difference on the Sedentary–nomadic Frontier: Herodotus, Sima Qian, and Ibn Khaldun", in Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 33-58.

[19] Joe E Barnhart, *The Study of Religion and Its Meaning: New Explorations in Light of Karl Popper and Emile Durkheim,* The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1977.

[20] Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1963, p. 20.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

time, some relation to an area, and is related to a particular community".[22] Talal Asad designates religion as "first and foremost an act" that identifies an essence (belief in God) and certain actions, signs and symbols.[23] According to him, "Religion has been part of the restructuration of particular times and spaces, a re-articulation of practical knowledge and power, of subjective behaviours, sensibilities, needs and expectation of modernity."[24] Clifford Geertz sees religion as "(1) a system of symbols which acts (2) to establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic."[25] He has contended that instead of looking at the social function of religion, we should explore what religion means to people and how it helps them to make sense of the world and human existence. He added that there are three basic elements to every religion: a set of beliefs, sacred objects and practices.[26]

However, religion had been playing a significant role in state mechanism until the 17th and 18th centuries. The technological advancement and scientific innovation of science and knowledge in Europe surpassed the necessity of using religion in the public and state sphere. However, it was not only due to the advancement of science and technology but also due to overwhelming misuse of religion in public sphere and Churches as well as use of religion as a mode of exploitation of general people, the significance of religion in public sphere was undermined. According to Ramesh Thakur, while most religions preach universal brotherhood, religion has been a source of friction throughout human history.[27] Besides, in the mediaeval and early modern era, European countries were facing a range of intra-religious conflicts within the Christianity. Thus, religion-based mediaeval state system discouraged middle-class bourgeoisies from adopting religion-centric state mechanism and encouraged them to the formation of a state separated from religion.

To come out from friction and misuse of religions European states began to adopt secularism as one of the state's basic principles and gradually secularism emerged as a global phenomenon. Secularism is always understood as a complex idea in terms of its defining principles and applications. Talal Asad examines "secularism not merely a political ideology that structures the modern liberal state but a unity of historical complex that includes behaviour, knowledge and sensibility in the flow of everyday life".[28] Jean Bauberot defines secularism as complete absence or equal-distance from all religions; it means that the process by which religious institutions

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[22] *Ibid.*, p. 48.
[23] Talal Asad, "Reading a Modern Classic: WC Smith's The Meaning and End of Religion", *History of Religions*, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2001, p. 220.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 221.
[25] Geertz Clifford, *The Interpretation of Cultures,* New York: Basic, 1973, pp. 412-453.
[26] *Ibid.*
[27] Ramesh Thakur, "Ayodhya and the Politics of India's Secularism: A Double-Standards Discourse", *Asian Survey,* Vol. 33, No. 7, 1993, p. 646.
[28] Talal Asad, *op. cit.,* p. 206.

and actions will be separated from any sort of state's patronage.[29] France is such type of country. Scholars like Martha Nussbaum holds that American secularism relies on six principles–equality, equal respect, freedom of conscience, accommodation, non-establishments and separation of Church and State.[30] Another two Western scholars Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor said that secularism is constituted by four principles – equality of respect, freedom of conscience, state neutrality towards religion and separation of Church and State.[31] They are regarded as liberal pluralist scholars. However, Graeme Smith has sought the religiosity within secularism and termed secularism as "Western Secularism" and rebutted others' argument in a way that Western Secularism is the extension of Christianity.[32] Even, they oppose the interfaith interaction. Therefore, scholars like John R. Mott has opposed this trend and enhanced the preaching of Christianity through missionary work.[33]

However, another group has been trying to settle the religious issues through interreligious dialogue since the last decade of 19th century. They have given importance over the interreligious connection or religious interaction. They arranged the "Parliament of the World's Religions" in 1893 in Chicago, United States, where different representatives from various religions met together and discussed about religious issues. The Parliament of the World's Religions has no legitimate authority in framing any global principle since it has no formal recognition either from any state or any recognised international organisations. Therefore, it has no access to the international system. However, at this point, it is important to deliberate on the meaning of what interreligious dialogue really is.

4.   Interreligious Dialogue: Meaning and Method

The term 'interreligious' covers various religions and 'dialogue' is composed of Greek words 'dia' and 'logos'. 'Dia' means across, thoroughly, altogether *etc.*, and 'logos' means thinking. Therefore, dialogue means thinking together and interreligious dialogue means *thinking together about all religions*. Anne Hege Grung defines interreligious dialogue as organised encounters between people who belonging to different religious traditions where social, political and religious interests are played out and negotiated.[34] She argues that it creates strong connections between religions without overlapping them. Other contextual

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[29] Jean Bauberot, "The Two Thresholds of Laicization", in R. Bhargava, *Secularism and Its Critics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 95.

[30] M. Nussbaum, *Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality,* New York: Basic Books, 2008, p.11.

[31] Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor, *Secularism and Freedom of Conscience.* Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011, p. 22.

[32] Graeme Smith, *A Short History of Secularism,* London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2008, p. 3.

[33] *The Evangelization of the World in this Generation.* New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1991, pp. 1-10.

[34] Anne Hege Grung, "Interreligious Dialogue: Moving between Compartmentalization and Complexity", *Approaching Religion*, 2011, p. 25.

discourses and fields are also connected to the field of interreligious dialogue such as gender, management of plurality, secularism and secularity. Stanley Jedidiah Samartha views that interreligious dialogue is much more than just a talking activity; it involves a larger relationship of living together and working together with friendliness, commitment, trust and openness by which we can be engaged and informed about the understanding, critical appreciation and balanced judgment.[35] Talal Asad opines that interreligious dialogue is a comparative study of religions.[36] However, Leonard Swidler examines the dialogue as the reflection of relationality among different religions.[37] In a nutshell, interreligious dialogue is a parliament like discussion where people from different religions set together to search the common religious norms, values and human concerns irrespective of their religious affiliations, and then, they translate those into social virtues in order to make an influential change in the behaviour in public sphere. Through this interaction and motivation, inner thinking of the people is generally changed from absolutism of any religion in order to creating a fellow-feeling to other religions in a way that my religion is not the only and superior religion in the world.

Anne Hege Grung has suggested two models of interreligious dialogue. First, where religious differences are apprehended as constitutive and multicultural views, and second, where religious differences are seen as a challenge due to its complexity.[38] She says that the aim of the first model is to increase the apprehension and understanding and to decrease the tensions of religious differences at local, national and global levels. This apprehension can extend from religious periphery to other social and political fields and incorporate and engage in interreligious dialogue. The second model covers philosophical, theological and ethical reasonings of interreligious dialogue. Leonard Swidler has proposed the "*Cosmic Dance of Dialogue"* model in interreligious dialogue that is composed with *Deep Dialogue*, *Critical Thinking* and *Competitive–Cooperation* synchronically.[39] When representatives from various religions seriously engage in dialogue that is called *deep dialogue*. After engaging in dialogue, when they begin critical thinking about the particular discussion that is called *critical thinking*. In interreligious dialogue, it does not mean to criticise someone or something, rather it means to think logically to make a judgment or decision. We can take a decision logically or thoughtfully when we can first analyse it and then follow three questions what? Whence? and Whether? What means we need to develop our conscience as far as possible on what we are discussing about. This consciousness leads discussants to the logical argument and then, whence question would arrive and accordingly,

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[35] Stanley Jedidiah Samartha, "The Progress and Promise of Inter-religious Dialogues", 1972, available at https://nirc.nanzan-u.ac.jp/nfile/3211, accessed on 13 November 2014.
[36] Talal Asad, *op. cit.*, p. 205.
[37] Leonard Swidler, "Nobody Knows Everything about Anything: The Cosmic Dance of Dialogue", *Journal of Ecumenical Studies,* Vol. 45, No. 2, 2010, pp. 175-177.
[38] Anne Hege Grung, *op. cit.,* p. 25.
[39] Leonard Swidler, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-177.

ask where is the factual evidence for what we are talking about? Is it valid or trustworthy source? The whole process leads the discussants into *competitive – cooperative* mode. This mode is consisted of the complete circle of perception, thought, decision and action.[40] Therefore, if we engage into the world religious affairs in a deeply dialogical manner and critically analyse and synthesise our perceptions and thought and take decisions accordingly, then our actions follow the competitive-cooperative mode, rather than competitive–conflict mode.

However, S. J. Samartha tries to give a guideline for interreligious dialogue. These are: i. representatives from different religions should have commitments and integrity while approaching to a particular religion; ii. dialogue should not be limited to mere academic discussion on religious matters, rather it includes a large number of people, especially, in multi-religious societies to discard their distrust and fear between each other and to build up mutual trust and confidence; iii. representatives should ignore their own religious symbolism during discussion periods; iv. dialogue should focus on other social and political matters like poverty, conflict and translate religious norms and values into social and global values for mitigating various socio-political disputes.[41]

However, some of the important issues have been missed in the existing method of interreligious dialogue. Firstly, there is no clarification, if interreligious dialogue would discuss to compare or interconnect or interact between different religions. However, in all cases, interreligious dialogue can be conducted in a comparative study method. Through this method, we can compare good norms of all religions, extract them and then take the best norm to translate into socio-political values in order to peaceful co-existence. This method can be applicable at local, national and global levels. However, in terms of essence of religion (believe in God and basic principles etc.), there is no scope to interconnect this essence but the norms and actions which do not mismatch with the essence of any religion can be interconnected. In this way, interaction can be avoided among the essence of religions, but can be augmented among the people of different faiths.

Secondly, an important issue that requires resolution in the project of interreligious dialogue is, whether it should be patronised by the government or confined to the private initiatives. However, if the state patronises the interreligious dialogue, then the state should consider whether it makes any conflict with its secular character or not.

5.   Akbar's Interreligious Dialogue and GIH

Above, we have discussed about the GIH and its contents and interreligious dialogue. In this section, an attempt has been made to match the above

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[40] *Ibid.*, p. 11.
[41] Stanley Jedidiah Samartha, *op. cit.,* p. 113.

deliberation with the content of GIH. Scholars usually give the credit to Parliament of the World's religions, 1893, in arranging the first interreligious dialogue, but the concept of interreligious dialogue can be traced back to Akbar's (1556-1605) concept of *Suhl-i-kul,* a doctrine of *reconciliation* or *peace with all*.

Jalal Uddin Muhammad Akbar came to power in Mughal India in 1556. That time India was dominated and ruled by minor Muslim conquerors. Against the circumstances, Akbar felt that to keep multi-religious India peaceful and stable, the state must have such a secular policy in which people from different religions could not only participate in state's affairs but also could perform and express their own religious affairs. His secular policy was reflected in his Indianisation of military and administrative policies and the abolition of *Jizya* in 1563. The concept of *Suhl-i-kul* is one of the innovative ideas of him. Following this concept, he undertook plural liberalist religious policy and arranged regular interreligious dialogue at Fatehpur Sikri. Accordingly, in 1575, he established *Ibadat Khana* for gathering various spiritual religious leaders who discussed about different religious matters. Makhan Lal Roy Choudhury in his famous book, *The Din-i-Ilahi or The Religion of Akbar* views that in terms of all practical religious purposes, Fatehpur remained as the seat of the first great parliament of religions of the world for about four years.[42]

However, the concept of interreligious dialogue of Akbar does have the potentiality of becoming universal. The state under him recognised all religions and invited the representatives from the Muslims – Shayekh, Sayed, Ulama, Umara, Shia, Sunni and Sufis, Hindus - Hindu *Sanyasis*, Brahman scholars, *Purushuttom* and Devi, *Yogis*, Jain Monks, Parsi Mobads, Roman Catholic Missionaries from Goa, Zoroastrian priests and Buddhists. The gathering in Fatehpur was the constellation of all religions and there were arguments, counter arguments and even in some occasions quarrels. Akbar attempted to seek consolation in different religions mixing Hindu *Sanyasis* with Christian missionaries and Zoroastrian priests.[43] In some occasions, the main agenda of discussion was to seek the truth but the ultimate aim was to create an idea among the representatives that no faith is absolute; different faiths can co-exist in a state.

During the reign of Akbar, there was no such academic suggestion about the method of interreligious dialogue, however, after critically analysing his policy, it is found that there was a comparative discussion in *Ibadat khana* among the delegates of various religions. Akbar did not impose or even motivated any religious representatives to speak against his own religion. There was only one drawback of his initiative that he formed a new religion in 1579, called *Din-i-Ilahi* by fusing the

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[42] Makhan Lal Roy Choudhury, *The Din-i-Ilahi: Or, The Religion of Akbar,* Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1941, p. 138.
[43] Ehsan Ghodratollahi, "Akbar, the Doctrine of Solh-i-Koll and Hindu-Muslim Relations", *Journal of Religious Thought,* Vol. 21, 2007, p. 10.

essence of different religions. However, it was his personal decision. That decision did not come from interreligious discussion held at *Ibadat khana*. Besides, after forming his new religion, Akbar did not ask any religious delegate to convert him into his newly created religion. His ultimate intention of arranging interreligious dialogue was not to form a new religion, rather to make an avenue for interaction among the different religious representatives, so that, no religious delegate could claim that the world was composed of only one religion- 'that is ours'.

Akbar's interreligious dialogue can be incorporated into the content of GIH following the directions and ideas of two GIH protagonists. One is Bakhle's idea, who has added a new dimension to Sartori's concept that key concepts and ideas travel around the world but tracking and analysing their planned route or itinerary is the important mode of writing global intellectual history owing to the fact that local milieu adds colour to a universal premise of any concept.[44] After analysing Savarkar's role in framing nationalist movement in India, he views that although there was a connection between Giuseppe Mazzini's idea of nationalism and Savarkar's idea of nationalism but there was a distinction between these two. Mazzini had not felt any necessity to use religion in the movement of unification of Italy, however, Savarkar, personally a secular character, started to use religion to unite Indians. Other is Samuel Moyn's idea of nonglobalisation. By this concept, he has attempted to search the potentiality of any previous ideas that had the capacity to be globalised but it had been misplaced due to its truncation or situational appropriation fulfilled by a particular agency. Accordingly, he brings the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) as the pioneer of human rights movement. He views that the idea of human rights movement of Haitian Revolution has been submerged by latter human rights movements.[45] Such submerged and potentially nonglobalised idea can be brought into the project of GIH.

From Bakhle's point of view, we may think that the outlook of historians about Akbar's religious policy is generally confined within their own milieu. Historians usually discuss Akbar's religious policy from their own perspective and they are divided themselves on the intentions of Akbar about religion. Religious historians see his initiative having the intention to deride others' religious faiths. They severely criticise the fusion of religion initiated by Akbar. Abdul Qader Badauni as protagonist of Sunni school of thought has criticised Akbar's religious policy and focused on his ultimate intention to form a new religion – *Din-i-Ilahi*.[46] Political historians comprehend his intentionality as to appease the different religious sections owing to prolong the Mughal rule in India. Some historians have evaluated the intentions of Akbar's religious policy on both grounds – to set up new religion by fusing different faiths and rituals of different religions, and to satisfy all the sections

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[44] Janaki Bakhle, *op. cit.*, p. 232.
[45] Samuel Moyn, *op. cit.*, p. 201.
[46] See Mulla Abdul Qadir Badauni, *Muntakhab-ut Tawarikh*, 3 Vols., Ahmad Ali, Kabir al-Din Ahmad and W. Nassau Lees, (eds.), Calcutta: Calcutta College, 1865.

of religious people for extending the tenure of Mughal rule in India. Hence, their criticisms have been confined to their beliefs and they did not find the notion of universalism in Akbar's innovative idea of interreligious dialogue. Such confinement can be regarded as defective of historical trajectories and also as a reflection of their straitjacket approach to their own cognitive circuit. However, there is one distinction of applying Janaki's model in assessing the universalism or globalism of Akbar's interreligious dialogue that is, the travelling of ideas and her focus on the impact of the local milieu - how a universal idea can get a regional and local colour, and here, our focus is on the impact of the global milieu - how the regional and local concepts and ideas can assume a universal colour in the present world.

In the contexts of nonglobalising idea and truncation and 'fulfilment theory' of Moyn, Akbar's interreligious idea was truncated in the shape of the Council for Parliament of the World's Religions, which was formed in 1888 in Chicago and formally began its journey in 1893 by arranging a formal global interreligious dialogue *i.e.*, Parliament of the World's Religions. From India, Swami Vivekananda attended the congregation and delivered a remarkable speech on the importance of interreligious dialogue. He argued that the ultimate aim of interreligious dialogue was not to fuse different faiths, rather to get all religions interconnected where each religion must assimilate its similarities of others as well as interact with different faiths in order to keep one's own beliefs intact while no religion will be made to disappear or be replaced by a new single religion.[47] Some scholars regard the Parliament of the World's Religion as the first such kind of initiatives. It is also recognised by Medias and fulfilled by different agencies. Like Haiti's human rights revolution, Akbar's contribution in interreligious dialogue remains non-globalised, although it has the potentiality to transcend into the global level.

5.1   *Akbar's Interreligious Dialogue and its Relevance to the Post-Secular World*

The world in the 20th century had witnessed overwhelming decline in religious influence in public life and the confinement of religion in the personal matters, which is usually termed by the intellectuals as the secular modern era. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehard, two scholars of Harvard University and University of Michigan, in their writing "*Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics World Wide*" analyse the approach of contemporary intellectuals and view that the death of religion was the conventional wisdom in social science during most of the 20th century. Indeed, it has been regarded as the master model of sociological inquiry, where secularisation was ranked with bureaucratisation and rationalisation and the urbanisation became the key historical revolution that transformed mediaeval agrarian societies into modern industrial nations.[48] After analysing World Values

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[47] John H Barrows (ed.), *The World's Parliament of Religions: An Illustrated and Popular Story of the World's First Parliament of Religions, Held in Chicago in Connection with the Columbian Exposition of 1893.* Vol. 2. Chicago: The Parliament Publishing Company, 1893, p. 170.

[48] Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehard, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics World Wide,* Cambridge:

Survey data, they however, remark that the world is, in general, more religious than previous year of the study and during the last decade, and the secularisation theory and modernism thesis about the slow and steady death of religion is currently experiencing the most sustained challenge in the global premises. It is due to the facts of continuity of popularity in churchgoing in the United States, the emergence of spirituality in Europe, the evangelical revival that swept through Latin America, the growth of fundamentalist movements and religious parties in the Muslim world, and the upsurge of ethno-religious conflicts in international affairs. Conservative political scientist Samuel Huntington foresaw this political ecology as the 'clash of civilization' between Christian dominated Western world and Muslim dominated Eastern world.[49] In this respect, Western scholars like Warren S. Goldstein, Robert Billah, Peter Burger and Charles Taylor have criticised the secularisation theory and some of them termed secularisation as a failed project.[50]

5.2   *Post Secularism*

The latest development in the ongoing debate on religion and secularisation is the Post-secularism. A German sociologist and scholar Jurgen Habermas first used this term in his book, *"Europe: The Faltering Project'*. Incorporating the analysis of Robert N. Billah and Robert D. Putnam regarding the religious ecology of the current world, he says that "Post-secularism" can be applied to the public consciousness in Europe so far. However, as for the time being it has to adjust itself to the continued existence of religious communities in an increasingly secularised environment.[51] He argues that on the one hand, anthropocentric understanding, differentiation of social subsystems and the development from agrarian to industrial and post-industrial society lead the world to secular trend. While on the other hand, growing incidents of religiously motivated conflicts and wide dissemination of such news by mass-media, increasing influence of religion in public opinion and private morality and the growing number of immigrants with various religious values lead to the consciousness engendering post-secular society.

However, Habermas introduces the post-secular concept based on two ideas – i. secularisation, to elaborate, does not essentially lead to the waning of religious influences and, ii. the increase of religious importance does not cause to endanger the secularisation process.[52] He agreed that there is no deficiency in a secular democratic state that is fulfilled by religion as secularism also does not

Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 3.
[49] Samuel P. Huntington,   *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order,* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997, p. 2.
[50] Warren S. Goldstein, "Secularization Pattern in the Old Paradigm", *Sociology of Religion,* Vol. 70, No. 2, 2009, pp. 157-178. See also, Robert Bellah, *Beyond Belief: Essay on Religion in a Post-traditionalist World,* California: University of California Press, 1991.
[51] Jurgen Habermas, *Europe: The Faltering Project,* translated by Ciran Cronin, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009, p. 61.
[52] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

cause to an end to religion. In this context, he argues that religious norms can be translated into general accessible social norms. Thus, secular citizens must have the cognitive openness to learn from religions and the religious persons also must have to learn from secularism. It is complementary learning process by which religiously neutral social and state's norms will emerge. Thus, this development of religio-political ecology is a paradigm shift from the age of predominance of the scientific and non-metaphysical rationality to a new metaphysical and post-metaphysical rationality, where neither metaphysics nor the non-metaphysical rationality reigns alone.[53] Recently, another writer Pasquale Ferrara in his writing *Globalization and Post-Secularism: Religious and Universal Common Identity* tries to incorporate religion into four dimensions- i. religion and interstate relations; ii. religion and internationalism; iii. religion and transnationalism and iv. religion and globalisation.[54] In these four dynamics, he also focuses to translate the religious norms to social value in a secular manner through dialogue. However, Akbar's idea of *'Suhl-i-kul'* can be termed as the pioneer of post-secular design of the state. On the one hand, he showed his secular approach in maintaining state affairs, at the same time he did not misrecognise the religious presence in that contemporary India. He arranged the religious dialogue where the representatives of different religions gathered to showcase the cognitive openness to learn from different religions. It may be said that his project of *'Suhl-i-kul'* was unsuccessful as it was not sustained and made seldom impact on state affairs. However, *'Suhl-i-kul'* as a concept of interreligious dialogue may definitely have the potentiality to be treated as the pioneer of the idea of post-secularism.

6.   Conclusion

Finally, it can be said that interreligious dialogue is an important phenomenon in the current religious ecology of the world. Without interreligious dialogue among the world's religions, no peace in the world will exist and without peace, no world order will sustain.[55] The private venture of the Parliament of the World's Religions may be regarded as the reflection of Akbar's idea of *'Suhl-i-kul'.* However, this mediaeval idea can be incorporated in today's post-secular world and the international system in order to establish a religiously pluralist world where people from different religions live together in harmony. Akbar represented the model of Indian secularism where secularism means religious tolerance and all religions are equal before state's patronage. This idea can pave the way of translating different religious values and norms into the religiously neutral social values that may inspire all religious persons to co-exist peacefully. Therefore,

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[53] M. G. Mazumder, *Interrogating Post-Secularism: Jurgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, and Talal Asad,* University of Pittsburg, 2011, p. 4.

[54] Pasquale Ferrara, "Globalization and Post-Secularism: Religions and a Universal Common Identity", *Claritas: Journal of Dialogue and Culture*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 62-67.

[55] Hans Kung, *Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethics,* New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1991, p. 98.

today's western post-secular idea can be matched with the mediaeval religious tolerance and interreligious policy of Akbar. Thus, this mediaeval South Asian idea has the potentiality to become universal and may lead the GIH into a new height.

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Khawaja Masnoon Zayeem

RADICALISATION THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA: A SALIENT FEATURE OF MODERN TERRORISM

Abstract

The world is witnessing an era of globalisation, the influence of which cannot be ignored by anybody. Effects of globalisation have also influenced the evolution of modern terrorism. With the advent of modern technologies in various fields, the violent extremist groups have been using them to their own advantage and expanding their activities at a rapid pace. One of the major contributions of the modern communication technology is the development of Social Media Sites. The global militant groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have been using the social media platforms to further strengthen their operations, especially in their propaganda mechanisms and radicalisation process to recruit new members. With this changing scenario, radicalisation through social media emerges as a big challenge for the counterterrorism forces around the world to face the growing threat of modern terrorism. The situation requires the counterterrorism strategies to be re-evaluated and amended in a way that is adaptable to the changing tactics used by the militant groups. The paper tries to critically analyse the use of social media in the radicalisation and propaganda efforts by the violent extremist groups as well as the changes brought into the contemporary terrorism through this phenomenon. The paper also tries to relate the strengths and weaknesses of the global counterterrorism strategies with these changes to formulate some pragmatic policy recommendations.

1.   Introduction

Terrorism is currently one of the biggest global challenges in the world. The militant groups are continuously changing their strategies and adopting new tactics to meet the new challenges. This changing tactics also include the modernisation and modification of the means of radicalisation to recruit new members. In this era of globalisation, nobody can ignore and escape the advancements of communication technologies. The development of modern communication technologies like Internet and online Social Media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and others have immensely fostered the flow of information and ideas across the world. As a result, violent extremist groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS have begun to fervently use the social media sites to radicalise the young Muslims around the world and recruit new members. Cases of online radicalisation have been emerging constantly and as the investigations

Khawaja Masnoon Zayeem is an independent researcher and currently pursuing a Masters Degree in International Relations at the University of Dhaka. His e-mail address is: msn.zym@gmail.com

have revealed, perpetrators of some of the high-profile militant attacks around the world were all radicalised through some form of social media influence.

The paper mainly focuses on the contemporary Islamist militancy led by the ISIS and Al Qaeda. The context of the paper is the relation between the process of globalisation and modern terrorism. With improved telecommunications, the extremist groups have become more powerful than ever before. This new strength is strongly visible in their propaganda efforts which have proved to be highly effective. With this end in view, the research question of the paper is: how the radicalisation through social media is affecting global terrorism? The main objectives of the research are to understand the modern radicalisation process, identify the loopholes in the global counterterrorism strategies and suggest possible ways forward.

The research conducted for this paper is qualitative, based on secondary sources. The research took place in duration of three months and includes extensive reviews of literatures by some distinguished scholars and experts related to terrorism studies. Because of being relatively a recent phenomenon, there is yet to be much study over the use of social media in contemporary terrorism which explains the low amount of available literature about the topic. The research in this paper also relied on some online photos and videos collected from social media to analyse the process of radicalisation through social media and the overall propaganda movements by the extremist groups. Reports of some government agencies are also reviewed to understand the counterterrorism strategies.

The paper highlights the selection of individuals as well as the process of their radicalisation by the extremists. Here, some notable instances are discussed to explain the main components of the propaganda strategies of militant groups, especially in the use of social media. After the radicalisation process, the possible outcomes are also shown which are leaving huge impact in the membership and organisational structure of the terrorist groups. The latter parts of the paper analyses the favourable changes in the operations of extremist groups through the use of social media, as well as the counterterrorism strategies of different countries to combat their growing strength. To analyse the counterterrorism strategies, the representative countries have been selected with a view to portraying a global picture in the context. Lastly, some policy recommendations have been proposed to formulate more effective strategies.

2.   Contextualisation: Globalisation and Spread of Modern Terrorism

Globalisation has become one of the defining features of modern era that has been influencing almost each and every activity in this world. Without delving into the steadfast definitions of globalisation, it can be explained as a process of interconnectedness. Through globalisation, faster flow of information has been ensured with the development of advanced communication technologies. As a result, people

living in long distance can stay connected to each other through adopting these improved communication systems, like Internet. The consequences of globalisation have affected everybody and people are both benefitting as well as suffering from its effects. Among the many effects of globalisation, the spread of modern terrorism is one of the most prominent global challenges the world is facing at present.[1]

The prime advantage that globalisation has provided to terrorism is the expansion of its network into a transnational level.[2] The emergence of global terror groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS is the most relevant occurrence of this feature. The two groups have successfully established affiliated terror groups among several countries, almost resembling the characteristics of a multinational corporation. Al Qaeda has formed numerous branches in different regions of the world. The Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) operates in the Middle East region based out of Yemen[3], while the Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) is carrying out its activities in South Asia.[4] The organisation has also formed separate affiliated groups in other regions like North and West Africa, Levant and Horn of Africa among others.[5]

The ISIS is another example of a global terror organisation. Based out of the central regions of Iraq and Syria, ISIS has set up a network of affiliated groups in Libya, Sinai, Yemen, Algeria, South Asia and West Africa. The main objective behind such expansion of networks is the promotion and spread of the ideologies and causes of these militant groups, using the tool of globalisation.[6]

Globalisation has also made the militant groups to evolve with the changing tides and adopt new strategies in their operations.[7] An interesting component of this phenomenon is the increasing use of media by the terrorist groups to expand their notability. Coverage among the global media outlets enhances the publicity of these organisations which helps them to swell their networks.[8] In recent years, some terror organisations have established their own media networks to further propagate their agenda. The *Dabiq* magazine and the *Al Hayat Media Centre*, operated by the ISIS, are distinctly a crucial part of the organisation's extensive propaganda movements and so are the magazines *Inspire* and *Resurgence* for Al Qaeda.[9]

[1] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism", *International Security,* Vol. 27, No. 3, 2003, pp. 46-51.
[2] Paul R. Pillar, "The Diffusion of Terrorism", *Mediterranean Quarterly,* Vol. 21, No. 1, 2010, p. 4.
[3] Bryce Loidolt, "Managing the Global and Local: The Dual Agendas of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2011, pp. 102-104.
[4] Dawood Azami, "The Islamic State in South and Central Asia", *Survival*, Vol. 58, No. 4, 2016, p. 139.
[5] Celine Marie I. Novenario, "Differentiating Al Qaeda and the Islamic State through Strategies Publicized in *Jihadist* Magazines", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* Vol. 39, No. 11, 2016, pp. 957-959.
[6] Daniel Byman, "Understanding the Islamic State — A Review Essay", *International Security,* Vol. 40, No. 4, 2016, pp. 127-139.
[7] Albert J. Bergesen and Omar Lizardo, "International Terrorism and the World-System", *Sociological Theory,* Vol. 22, No. 1, 2004, pp. 41-43.
[8] Nicholas J. O'Shaughnessy and Paul R. Baines, "Selling terror: The symbolization and positioning of Jihad", *Marketing Theory*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2009, pp. 227-228.
[9] Novenario, *op. cit.*, pp. 956-969.

In this context, the recruitment strategies of these militant groups have also changed over the years. The use of internet by the terrorists is increasingly becoming a frequent occurrence to attract potential militants. The terror groups are now seeking greater presence in the cyber space to promote themselves and their ideas. Members of such groups are also specialising in utilising the social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and others to expand their networks. Media and literature related to the militant organisations are spread throughout the internet which is publicly accessible, allowing a greater number of people to get indoctrinated with the extremist ideas and carry out violent actions, some without even directly associating with a militant group.

3. Radicalisation and Social Media

The propaganda activities of the extremist groups and the process of persuading the individuals to join their causes have been referred to as different terms by different organisations or scholars. This paper, however, will refer to it as 'radicalisation' which is the most used term for such activities among the government documents and academic pieces. Radicalisation is the fundamental activity for the extremist groups to recruit new members and expand the organisation. A growing focus on the issue of radicalisation and its relation with violent acts could be noticed especially after the Madrid Train Bombings in March 2004 and the London Bombings in July 2005, when the European Commission issued a special report titled, 'Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation' to analyse the causes and prelude to such terrorist incidents.[10] However, similar to the situation with the term 'Terrorism', there is no universally accepted definition of 'radicalisation', though some state security agencies of different countries have tried to define it through their own interpretations. According to the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) of the Netherlands, radicalisation is:

> "Growing readiness to pursue and/or support - if necessary by undemocratic means - far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a threat to, the democratic order."[11]

The Danish Security and Intelligence Service defines 'violent radicalisation' as:

> "A process by which a person to an increasing extent accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, in an attempt to reach a specific political/ideological objective".[12]

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[10] Magnus Hörnqvist and Janne Flyghed, "Exclusion or culture? The rise and the ambiguity of the radicalisation debate", *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* Vol. 5, No. 3, 2012, pp. 319-324.
[11] Randy Borum, "Radicalization into Violent Extremism I : A Review of Social Science Theories", *Journal of Strategic Security*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2012, p. 12.
[12] *Ibid.*

The UK Home Office refers to radicalisation as:

"The process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism[13] and, in some cases, then to join terrorist groups."[14]

Some similar key elements could be identified in these definitions, for instance, a considerable emphasis on the perceived threat to democracy. Even though a pro-Western bias could be seen in the definitions, as of now these state agencies are the only ones of their kind in the world who have tried to define the issue of radicalisation. To overcome these biases, it can be asserted that radicalisation is a process by which an individual receives the elements of ideas and ideologies which are considered to be too extreme from the conventional interpretations and which makes the behaviour of the individual to be violent in promoting those ideas.

Radicalisation could be either self-processed or deliberately induced by others. Different violent extremist groups have developed their own strategies of radicalisation though there are some common elements. Traditionally, the extremist groups have used some sort of incentives to recruit new members. These incentives could be material or abstract. Consequently, in the earlier stages of contemporary terrorism, a general perception existed that most of the recruits were mainly influenced by their economic and cultural backgrounds, which has been countered by opposing arguments as well as evidences.[15]

The key objective of radicalisation is to indoctrinate extremist ideas within the individual. During the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, the Afghan Mujahedeen was formed through propagandas of how Islam was being degraded in the Soviet controlled Afghanistan. This made the masses to rebel against the rule and join the Mujahedeen.[16] Soon this propaganda spread all over the Muslim world and foreign fighters were recruited to fight the Soviets. After the Soviet-Afghan War, these foreign fighters returned to their countries of origin and started to promote the same extremist ideas that they received before the war.[17]

In the post 9/11 era, Al Qaeda emerged as a leading militant group in the world and one of their main strategies to radicalise the Muslims were triggering anti-Western sentiments. Al Qaeda's chief recruiting hubs were situated in the countries, most notably Afghanistan and Iraq among others, heavily affected by the Global War

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[13] The UK Home Office defines 'extremism' as "vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. Extremism also includes calls for death of members of the armed forces". See Prevent Duty Guidance: for England and Wales, p. 7.
[14] Borum, *op. cit.*
[15] Anne Marie Baylouny, "Emotions, Poverty, or Politics? Misconceptions about Islamist Movements", *Connections,* Vol. 3, No. 1, 2004, pp. 41-43.
[16] Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, *The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War,* Leavenworth, USA: Mentor Enterprises, 1995, pp. xiii-xix.
[17] Barak Mendelsohn, "Foreign Fighters - Recent Trends", *Orbis,* Vol. 55, No. 2, 2011, pp. 189-192.

on Terror, fought by the US led coalition forces.[18] People in these countries joined the extremist groups, trusting them to drive the US away and escape the massive human rights violations committed by the coalition forces. The human rights violations of the Muslims were later propagated in other countries to radicalise individuals around the world and establish affiliated networks.[19]

In rise of ISIS, the primary tool in radicalisation was the propaganda of repression of Sunni masses by the Shia dominated regimes. The Iraq War in 2003 left the country with a huge vacuum of power which was later filled up by a majoritarian system of government, dominated by Shias. The new regime was not surprisingly prejudiced toward the Sunni community of the country and as a result, several Sunni tribes were dejected from this outcome and rebelled against the government. Anti-Shia sentiments later reached the neighbouring Syria which, in 2011, was facing a massive civil war against Bashar Al Assad, the Shia dictator of the country. Riding on this anti-Shia sentiments, ISIS under Abu Bakr al Baghdadi amassed a large militant group and occupied vast territories within Iraq and Syria with a vision to establish a Caliphate across the globe.[20]

Based on these evolving strategies of the extremist groups, it can be said that during the radicalisation process, the groups mainly seek for individuals going through some sort of marginalisation, discrimination, repression and grievances. Besides, the target audience also includes the people who are sympathetic to the cause of these extremist groups and inclined to give support in any form.

3.1.   *Use of Social Media*

Social media platforms have emerged as a key tool in recent years in the development of the modern communication system. Use of social media as an instrument of faster flow of information and messages has made them a part and parcel of human lives. A major advantage of social media is that the information flow through such platforms could reach a massive audience within a very short time. As a result, social media has become a popular tool for social mobilisation or any collective action for a public outcry. A notable example is the Arab Spring, especially in Tunisia and Egypt where social media sites like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube were extensively used by the protesters to organise the anti-government movements against the unpopular autocratic regimes. In December 2010, the images of the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia were extensively shared in Facebook by the protesters to further strengthen the movement against

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[18] Bruce Hoffman, "Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism, and Future Potentialities: An Assessment", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* Vol. 26, No. 6, 2003, pp. 429-437.

[19] Royce Hutson, Taylor Long and Michael Page, "Pathways to Violent Radicalisation in the Middle East: A Model for Future Studies of Transnational Jihad", *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 154, No. 2, 2009, pp. 20-23.

[20] Ahmed S. Hashim, "The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate", *Middle East Policy,* Vol. 21, No. 4, 2014, pp. 69-79.

the Ben Ali regime and ultimately succeeded to overthrow the Tunisian President by January 2011, leading to the beginning of democratic parliamentary governance in the country. The spirit of this Tunisian revolution spread to the neighbouring Arab countries and triggered a series of sturdy protests against the oppressive dictators.[21] In recent times, a new trend could be noticed where many top level government officials (including heads of states and governments) are using different social media sites to be more connected with the citizens and enhance their popularity among the masses through easily disseminating favourable information or messages.[22] As such, social media has redefined the concept of e-governance, by enabling the digital medium of communication to enhance the governance activities.[23] Consequently, the extremist groups have also become increasingly involved in social media in their radicalisation process and propaganda activities.

An important feature of social media is that its user base is mainly dominated by the youths, a key characteristic in the target audience sought by the militant groups. Social media sites like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube have become sort of a necessity for the youths, especially the urban ones. These youths are also well educated and quite tech-savvy, being exposed to modern technologies and gadgets. The recent terror incidents have shown that the global militant groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS have now been seeking educated and technologically knowledgeable new recruits. This serves mainly two purposes. First, having educated people joining the extremist groups will raise the acceptance of the ideologies that they propagate. Second, technologically skilled recruits will enhance the capabilities of the groups in various terms to fight the increasingly stronger counterterrorism forces.

Social media has become a powerful tool for the militant groups to spread their message and further promote themselves. Since 2004, Al Qaeda has been showing a changing pattern in its propaganda operations by uploading video messages of its leaders online rather than sending them to global media outlets. Anwar Al Awlaki[24], often dubbed as the 'Bin Laden of Internet', established substantial presence of Al Qaeda in the cyber space, having a Facebook page as well as a blog site. Videos of his lectures on YouTube are still inspiring the potential militants to carry out attacks.[25] In 2007, Al Qaeda launched its own online messaging application, 'Mujahedeen Secrets', to enhance the clandestine communications among its networks.[26]

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[21] Habibul Haque Khondker, "Role of the New Media in the Arab Spring", *Globalizations,* Vol. 8, No. 5, 2011, pp. 675-679.
[22] John Carlo Bertot, Paul T. Jaeger and Derek Hansen, "The impact of polices on government social media usage: Issues, challenges, and recommendations", *Government Information Quarterly,* Vol. 29, No. 1, 2012, pp. 30-33.
[23] *Ibid*.
[24] Anwar Al Awlaki was a major recruiter and motivator of Al Qaeda. He was killed in 2011 in a drone strike in southern Yemen.
[25] Scott Shane, Richard Perez-Pena and Aurelien Breeden, "In-Betweeners Are Part of a Rich Recruiting Pool for Jihadists", *The New York Times*, 22 September 2016.
[26] Eric Schmitt and Michael S. Schmidt, "Qaeda Plot Leak Has Undermined U.S. Intelligence", *The New York Times,* 29 September 2013.

The ISIS also has a large and sophisticated presence in the cyber platforms which is considered as a unique feature of this militant group. Use of Twitter by the ISIS members is a distinctive element of their propaganda efforts where they have even launched their own Twitter app 'The Dawn of Glad Tidings' to send latest news and updates about the organisation to its subscribers.[27] Since 2015, the ISIS members have also begun to use the online messaging application 'Telegram', after increasing surveillance and crackdown on other social media platforms by the security agencies around the world.[28] Messages, photos and videos related to the fighters and their attacks as well as the overall society of the ISIS held territories are quite often shared on the social media to increase their acceptance and notability among the wider audience.

3.2.   *Target Audience*

According to Julian Charvat[29], the audience could be divided into four groups: general population, sympathisers, supporters and activists[30] (see Table 1). The general population includes people living a usual life and opposed to any form of violent extremism. They are highly unlikely to get radicalised by the extremist ideas. The sympathisers are those who are also opposed to terrorism but sympathetic to the cause or objective of the terrorists. This group of people considers the non-violent legal and legitimate protests and movements to be the best ways of achieving the desired goals. Supporters are the people who publically condemn violent extremism but are sympathetic to the cause of the extremists and consider violence to be justified in achieving the goal. The fourth group is the activists who, unlike the other three groups, publically support terrorism and are compassionate to the cause and ideology of the terrorists but yet to join a terror group or commit an act of violent extremism.

Table 1: Groups of Audience for Radicalisation			
Group	Public image	Support to violence	Support to the cause
General population	Condemn terrorism	No	No
Sympathisers	Condemn terrorism	No	Yes
Supporters	Condemn terrorism	Yes	Yes
Activists	Support terrorism	Yes	Yes

Source: Julian Charvat, "Radicalization on the Internet", *Defence Against Terrorism Review,* Vol. 3, No. 2, 2010, pp. 76-77.

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[27] J. M. Berger, "How ISIS Games Twitter", *The Atlantic*, 16 June 2014, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-iraq-twitter-social-media-strategy/372856/, accessed on 10 December 2016.

[28] Anthony Cuthbertson, "Isis Telegram channel doubles followers to 9,000 in less than 1 week", *International Business Times*, 12 October 2015, available at http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-telegram-channel-doubles-followers-9000-less-1-week-1523665, accessed on 10 December 2016.

[29] Julian Charvat is a former Course Director in the *Centre of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism*, a NATO affiliated Think Tank in Ankara, Turkey.

[30] Julian Charvat, "Radicalization on the Internet", *Defence Against Terrorism Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2010, pp. 76-77.

The militant groups usually seek some key traits among the individuals to consider them as potential recruits. The marginalised people are one of the prime target groups for radicalisation.[31] These people include religious and ethnic minorities who are victims of discrimination or alienation from the society; immigrants and refugees who are unwelcomed in their host societies; or the politically suppressed groups.[32] This marginalisation could be in the form of lack of some basic rights and amenities like education, judicial access, employment etc.[33] The terrorists also look for people with some sort of grievances toward the society for perceived wrong. Such grievances exist in states with unpopular governments and lack of rule of law.[34] The recruitment of fighters by the ISIS from the Sunni community in Iraq and anti-Assad elements in Syria is a major manifestation of such exploitation of the marginalisation and grievances of communities and individuals by the militant groups. Individuals going through relative deprivation or being lesser privileged than other communities happen to suffer from low self-esteem and identity crisis and become a major target audience for the terrorists.[35] These individuals often aspire to find excitement in their life and belongingness to a group which they try to fill up by joining a militant group.

The recruiters have been using the social media sites and applications in recent years to target the youth community - another major component of the desired features in a potential recruit. Youths are easy to convince and desired due to their energy and zeal. Recruiters typically look for urban educated youths through the social media and try to radicalise them. Social media also links the recruiters to the tech-savvy individuals who are increasingly sought by the terror groups to secure technical knowhow about various gadgets and communication technologies. Through specific forums for likeminded people within the social media platforms, the recruiters also look for categorising the audience into different groups based on their allegiance to the cause and ideology of the terrorist organisations. Such forums also help them to sort the marginalised communities or people with social grievances.[36]

3.3. *The Radicalisation Process*

The radicalisation process goes through several phases that gradually transform an individual into a violent extremist. Usually, the radicalisation process starts with the sympathisers who gradually climb up the ladder to become a supporter, an activist and ultimately a terrorist. The process includes both the deliberate

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[31] Sarah Lyons-Padilla, Michele J. Gelfand, Hedieh Mirahmadi, Mehreen Farooq and Marieke van Egmond, "Belonging nowhere: Marginalization & radicalization risk among Muslim Immigrants", *Behavioral Science & Policy*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2015, pp. 1-10.
[32] *Ibid*.
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism", *Terrorism and Political Violence,* Vol. 20, No. 3, 2008, pp. 417-419.
[35] Michael King and Donald M. Taylor, "The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists: A Review of Theoretical Models and Social Psychological Evidence", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2011, pp. 607-611.
[36] Charvat, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

radicalisation by targeting a particular individual or the general propaganda movements by the militant groups. A recruiter first comes across a potential recruit and gradually gets acquainted with him/her, gets closer through increasing interactions, begin to give knowledge about Islamic way of life and lastly start to plant the ideas of the need for a change in the current world order and the necessity for a global jihad.[37] Besides, an individual may get self-radicalised out of curiosity and accessing the publicly available propaganda literature and media.

Social media has become the biggest tool for radicalisation process by the terrorists. In some recent incidents, it has been seen that recruiters are increasingly using the social media platforms to lure the youths into joining their organisations. A precedent set by Anwar Al Awlaki while working as a recruiter for Al Qaeda, radicalisation through social media is now a new norm for the militant groups. The existing members of the militant groups often stay connected to their families and friends through social media and contribute to the radicalisation of the natives of their countries of origin. The pattern could be seen in the attempted joining of ISIS by three teenage girls from Colorado, US in 2014, where the girls were radicalised through social media by the Western-origin recruiters in Turkey, Syria and Iraq. These fighters were also supposedly guiding them on the travelling process to Syria.[38] The use of popular Hashtags in Twitter to release major news and updates is a notable component in the propaganda machinery of ISIS.

In their radicalisation activities, a major use of social media by the extremist groups is to spread the graphic images and videos of atrocities of Muslims, particularly in Iraq, Syria and Palestine, among the sympathisers. Nowadays, videos and pictures of injured or dead children from Syria are heavily shared on social media sites like Facebook and Twitter with, in some cases, quite upsetting stories. This makes the audience to be increasingly sympathetic to the cause of the extremist groups. A noteworthy example is that of Colleen LaRose alias Jihad Jane who had unsuccessfully attempted to kill an allegedly blasphemous Swedish artist in 2008 and contributed to the financing of terrorist groups, was mainly influenced by the videos of torture and civilian casualties on YouTube, particularly against the Muslim children in Palestine and Iraq by the Israeli and US forces respectively.[39] Often recruiters use some specific forums where the discussions are focused and specialised and where many young individuals, going through some sort of hardships in real lives, try to seek answers to spiritual questions related to life. Coming across the radical and often misinterpreted religious literature makes these individuals to be sympathetic to the cause of the extremist groups.[40] At some stages, videos in YouTube containing lectures of radical Islamist scholars are shared with the supporters. Lectures

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[37] Different terrorist guidelines of recruitment, for example, Abu Amru Al Qa'idy, "A Course in the Art of Recruiting", 2010.

[38] Michael King and Donald M. Taylor, *op. cit.,* pp. 607-611.

[39] Tom Holt, Joshua D. Freilich, Steven Chermak and Clark McCauley. "Political radicalization on the Internet: Extremist content, government control, and the power of victim and jihad videos", *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict,* Vol. 8, No. 2, 2015, pp. 113-114.

[40] Charvat, *op. cit.,* pp. 82-83.

of prominent motivators like Anwar Al Awlaki leave a deep impact on the individuals because of their skillful persuasive techniques and make them more dedicated to the cause.[41] The recruiters also use some online chatting applications where users can send encrypted messages, as evident through the use of Telegram by ISIS.

The radicalisation process of ISIS also includes an interesting feature to lure young men. The recruiters often compare the lifestyle of their fighters with that of the protagonists of the popular video games played by the young men and release posters, videos and memes through social media containing such messages asking them to join real wars instead of imitated games.[42] Such propaganda is especially useful in attracting the individuals who seek excitement in their lives.

In recent years, the militant organisations have become more interested in recruiting female members as they can be married to the male fighters which will ultimately lure in more male fighters. The radicalisation of female recruits displays a bit of different strategy with some common elements. The female members of ISIS also use the social media to further promote the organisation among the female folk and try to alter the typical views about the status of women in the ISIS occupied territories. Aqsa Mahmood, an ISIS member who was influential in radicalising three British school girls to join the organisation, used her blog page to explain that women can get their basic amenities in ISIS occupied territories just like any other place in their own country.[43] The ISIS female members also try to portray the romantic relationship with their new husbands through the social media to assert that true love could be found only by joining ISIS. One such member is Bird of Jannah (pseudonym), a Malaysian woman, who used to post stories about her relationship with her ISIS fighter husband on her Tumblr page, embracing poetic expressions about their romantic bond.[44]

4 .   Outcomes: Shaping the New Breed of Militants

Radicalisation by the recruiters as well as the propaganda efforts by the militant groups make an individual more devoted to their ideology and more inclined towards committing violent acts to achieve the desired goals of the organisations. Some individuals act as 'lone-wolves' who are self-radicalised and do not join a militant organisation but carry out terrorist attacks within their capacities. Between 1993 and 2011, the percentage of online-radicalised lone-wolves increased from none to about 60 per cent (Figure 1). Since 2010, there has been a growing tendency by the terrorist groups to encourage lone wolf attacks, as evident in the issues of Al Qaeda's

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[41] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes,* Vienna: Publishing and Library Section, United Nations Office, 2012, pp. 35-36.
[42] Simon Parkin, "How Isis hijacked pop culture, from Hollywood to video games", *The Guardian*, 29 January 2016.
[43] Jethro Mullen, "What is ISIS appeal for young people?", *CNN*, 25 February 2015, available at http://edition. cnn.com/2015/02/25/middleeast/isis-kids-propaganda/, accessed on 10 December 2016.
[44] Ellie Hall, "An ISIS Love Story: Till Martyrdom Do Us Part", *BuzzFeed News*, 18 September 2014, available at https:// www.buzzfeed.com/ellievhall/an-isis-love-story-till-martyrdom-do-us part, accessed on 10 December 2016.

digital propaganda magazine the *Inspire.*[45] Messages of these issues contain technical information about making a bomb 'at home' as well as comprehensive details on using different weapons and ammunition.[46] The terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California in 2015 is one of the most significant incidents of such lone-wolf attacks in recent times. FBI investigations reveal that the perpetrators Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik were "consuming poison on the Internet", however, no further details have been released.[47] There is a high possibility that this online poison must have been accessed through some social media platforms, most likely propagated by the ISIS.

Figure 1: Online-Radicalised Lone-Wolves

Source: Paul Gilly and Emily Corner, "Lone actor terrorist use of the Internet and the behavioural correlates" in Lee Jarvis, Stuart MacDonald, Thomas M. Chen (eds.), *Terrorism Online: Politics, Law and Technology*, New York: Routledge, 2015, p. 39.

Some of the radicalised individuals directly join the terrorist groups as militants while others work indirectly to the cause of the groups. Such indirect activism includes providing funding to the terrorist organisation in carrying out their militant activities. Since 2013, such private funding has become a key source of financing for the militant groups as evident in the financing of the groups operating in Syria.[48] The private financiers usually use the social media platforms like Twitter to accumulate funds worth millions of dollars from the sympathisers around the world, which would be used to fund the purchase of weapons, grooming or nurturing new fighters or to support specific missions.[49]

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[45] Martin Rudner, "Electronic Jihad: The Internet as Al Qaeda's Catalyst for Global Terror", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2017, pp. 10-23.

[46] *Ibid.*

[47] Al Baker and Mark Santora, "San Bernardino Attackers Discussed Jihad in Private Messages, F.B.I. Says", *The New York Times,* 16 December 2015.

[48] Joby Warrick, "Private donations give edge to Islamists in Syria, officials say", *The Washington Post*, 21 September 2013.

[49] *Ibid.*

A major portion of the social media recruits works in the cyber-cells of the terrorist groups to extend the propaganda efforts on the Internet as well as radicalise others to join the organisation. Apart from the online propaganda and recruitment activities, the cyber cell members of the terrorist groups have now been indulging into defacing and breaching data of websites and online pages of different state agencies which could prove to be a massive threat to the global security. One such recruit was Junaid Hussain, a UK born hacker who worked for the Cyber Caliphate, the online propaganda wing of ISIS.[50] Before being killed in an airstrike in August 2015, Hussain was involved in the hacking of the official Twitter and YouTube accounts of the US Central Command in January 2015 along with the online radicalisation and recruitment of several other fighters for ISIS.[51] Reports indicate that he also worked to develop new hackers for the terrorist group and was believed to be capable of breaching the servers of banks and financial institutions to extort millions of dollars to fund their violent activities.[52] According to a neighbour and long-time family friend, Hussain "was radicalised by a computer"[53] referring to the possibilities of use of social media sites in his recruitment into the ISIS. In August of the same year, a group identifying themselves as Islamic State Hacking Division, published personal details of 1,400 military personnel and officials of influential state agencies of the US, allegedly by breaching the government databases.[54] Although the US officials have denied having their server breached by the hackers, such disclosure of this crucial information is a serious threat to the safety of US military and government officials.

The Al Qaeda has also been making significant strides toward improving its cyber cell, though still not as efficient as ISIS. Initially, only being deployed as the digital propaganda and recruitment arm, the cyber activists of the organisation seem to be expanding their pursuit with the emergence of 'Al Qaeda Electronic (AQE)' in 2015, as the official cyber warfare branch of Al Qaeda led by Yahya Al Nemr.[55] The group is still believed to be at its infancy and has defaced some low value websites with few allegedly denial-of-service attacks.[56] Here as well, the members of this hacking group could be recruited through social media as the group's media wing, Al Maarek, uses its Facebook and Twitter pages to publicise their successful cyber operations.[57] It is true that these cyber terrorist cells are yet to have sufficient capabilities to impose major

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[50] Kimiko De Freytas-Tamura, "Junaid Hussain, ISIS Recruiter, Reported Killed in Airstrike", *The New York Times,* 27 August 2015.

[51] *Ibid.*

[52] Russell Myers, "Jihadist hackers targeting celebrity and business bank accounts to fund Islamic State terror campaign", *The Mirror,* 15 August 2014.

[53] Nick Mccarthy, "Isis hacker Junaid Hussain 'was radicalised by a computer', neighbour claims", *Birmingham Mail,* 27 August 2015, available at http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/isis-hacker-junaid-hussain-was-9941768, accessed on 03 July 2017.

[54] Michael Safi, "Isis 'hacking division' releases details of 1,400 Americans and urges attacks", *The Guardian*,13 August 2015.

[55] Eric Liu, *Al Qaeda Electronic: A Sleeping Dog?*, Critical Threats Project, Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2015, pp. 4-10.

[56] *Ibid.*

[57] *Ibid.*

cyber offensives, affecting critical digital infrastructure around the world. However, there should be little doubt that they are gradually moving towards achieving that level of expertise and capacity to become a deadlier threat in the coming days.

4.1.   *Values Added by Social Media*

The change in strategy by the terror groups to use social media in their radicalisation process has brought about some favourable ramifications in their operations. Social media, being a blessing of modern communication technology, serves as a major platform for swift and easy flow of information. Through social media, the terror groups can now easily communicate within their networks and disseminate the necessary messages in a very quick time. It helps them to stay connected with their affiliated branches in distant countries and keeps them motivated and dedicated to their cause which ultimately makes it easier to mobilise the members for the collective action of the terrorist groups.[58] These branches could get all the latest updates about their parent organisation with minimum efforts. Social media also helps the terrorist groups to better guide its fighters in their missions and keep a track on them while in action. This makes their operations more effective and raises the morale of their members. In the process, the terror groups become stronger and more capable to inflict larger casualties and damages.

Another major value added by social media is its capability to reach a wider audience. Through the use of social media, the terror groups can now recruit from a diverse pool of population. Such diversity of demographics could be seen in the profile of foreign fighters of ISIS and Al Qaeda. Through such diversity, the militant organisations are now benefitting from a wide range of skills and talents provided by its diverse group of members. Social media also increases the value of propaganda efforts by the terrorist groups manifolds which help them extensively in their expansion of networks. It helps the organisation in their strategic communication system by making it comprehensive, multi-platform and focus-based. Through social media, the recruiters can easily reach the desired target audience with the help of specialised forums and chat rooms. Use of social media also increases the counter-vigilance capabilities of the terror groups by making them untraceable in the cyberspace. Online chatting applications like Telegram with an option for exchanging encrypted messages protect the secrecy of the terrorist organisations and serve as major medium to disseminate clandestine information.

A crucial aspect of the use of social media by the terror groups is the radicalisation of the urban educated youths with backgrounds in well-off families. The urban educated people are usually considered an enlightened community, especially in the developing countries. Such perception could be noticed when the

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[58] Gadi Wolfsfeld, Elad Segev and Tamir Sheafer, "Social Media and the Arab Spring: Politics Comes First", *The International Journal of Press/Politics,* Vol. 18, No. 2, 2013, pp. 115-117.

rural and less-educated people, especially the youths, try to emulate the lifestyle of the urban people. When a youth from an urban educated background joins a terrorist organisation, it automatically creates a curiosity among others about the organisation and makes them interested in it; a behavior, demonstrated by the psychological theory of 'Cognitive Bias'[59]. Besides, there is a common perception that people living in poverty or with poor living conditions are more inclined to joining the terrorist organisations. The recruitment of the youth from well-off families into the militant organisations challenges this conventional notion. One such case is that of the Bangladeshi militant Nibras Islam, one of the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in the Bangladesh capital Dhaka in July 2016, who was an engineering student at the Monash University in Malaysia. The involvement of such an educated youth from a well-to-do family in a violent extremist attack shocked the entire country.[60] As a result, people become increasingly interested in such terrorist organisations and in some cases, go on to join them. Overall, such phenomenon raises the acceptance of the ideologies and causes of the militant groups.

5.   Global Counterterrorism Strategies: Strength and Loopholes

To combat the growing menace of global terrorism, several states have begun to formulate counterterrorism strategies based on their needs and requirements. Usually, the counterterrorism efforts could be divided into two categories, hard approach and soft approach. The hard approach refers to the activities of military and security personnel involving into direct combat with the terrorist groups. The soft approach, on the other hand, includes a broad range of efforts to deny the terrorist recruitment of individuals by instigating counter narratives, addressing the grievances of the marginalised communities and improving the overall situation of the society to eradicate its vulnerability to militancy.

Since the 9/11, the US has been considering the threat of terrorism with an immense gravity and striving to frame an effective national counterterrorism strategy. Since 2001, the White House has published three editions of its national counterterrorism strategy – in 2003, 2006 and 2011. The latest one, National Strategy for Counterterrorism 2013, is yet to be publicly available. Not surprisingly, all these counterterrorism strategies are mostly directed towards the recent surge of religious terrorism by Islamist violent extremist groups. A key element of the counterterrorism strategy of the US is the development of the vulnerable societies in the forms of poverty alleviation, upholding the democratic environment, eradicating inequality and women and youth empowerment. These efforts could contribute to preventing the radicalisation of the people. The strategy also calls for providing necessary training and equipment to the vulnerable states who are the biggest victims of global

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[59] Cognitive bias is a psychological term that refers to the situation when an individual gives up rational thinking after being influenced by social influence, emotional and moral motivations.
[60] Siddharthya Roy, "A Year of Bangladesh's War on Terror", *The Diplomat,* 6 July 2017.

terrorism. A major change in the US strategy has been the promotion of and assistance in upholding good governance particularly in the terrorism affected countries. A notable instance is Afghanistan where the US is withdrawing its troops but continue to assist in the new governance system since the removal of the Taliban from power,[61] perhaps resulting from a lesson drawn from the experience during the Soviet-Afghan War.

One thing the strategy has tried to make clear is that "The US is not and never will be at war with Islam".[62] Such messages will leave a dent on the propaganda movements by the violent extremist groups and make them losing their acceptance. However, the strategy clearly lacks a comprehensive approach to deal with the growing radicalisation and propaganda efforts by the extremist groups through social media. There has been no mention about any proposed surveillance or counter propaganda efforts. The Obama administration had accepted the shortcomings of their counterterrorism efforts in dealing with the increasingly stronger propaganda movements and decided to expand the activities of Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications under the Department of State[63]. In recent years, the US counterterrorism operations have been demonstrating a pattern of aerial strikes and drone attacks in the militant held areas.[64] While these operations are indeed useful in eliminating some top militant commanders, the collateral damages caused by the aerial attacks in the form of scores of civilian casualties pretty much diminish the value of such operations. These civilian casualties are later used by the extremist groups in their propaganda drives which ultimately bolster their organisational strength.

The European Union (EU) has also formulated a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy based on four pillars - Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond.[65] 'Prevent' emphasises on the tools and mechanisms to counter radicalisation and prevent the people from joining the extremist groups. 'Protect' calls for measures to boost up the institutional and infrastructural capabilities to ensure security from attacks. 'Pursue' deals with issues like intelligence and information sharing as well as border control to pursue the perpetrators. 'Respond' demonstrates the measures and policies to tackle the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Like the US, the counterterrorism strategy of EU also stresses the need for good governance, human rights, economic prosperity and intercultural dialogue to stop the radicalisation process. The most significant aspect of the EU counterterrorism strategy is the accentuation of cooperation among the member states of EU in the form of intelligence sharing, sharing of best practices as well as capacity building. The EU also appears to be a bit cautious about the radicalisation process going on the Internet. In 2015, the EU

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[61] The White House, *National Security Strategy*, Washington DC, 2015, p. 9.
[62] The White House, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, Washington DC, 2011, p. 17.
[63] Eric Schmitt, "US Intensifies Effort to Blunt ISIS' Message", *The New York Times*, 16 February 2015.
[64] Rosa Brooks, "US Counterterrorism Strategy Is the Definition of Insanity", *Foreign Policy*, 24 June 2015.
[65] Council of the European Union, *The European Union Counter-terrorism Strategy*, Brussels, 2005, p. 3.

Internet Referral Unit was established by the Europol.[66] The unit has identified 3,200 contents across 45 different platforms in the Internet, of which about 91 per cent have been removed.[67] There is, however, a lot to be done, especially given the fact that several European youths are still joining militant groups like ISIS, being radicalised through the Internet.

The counterterrorism strategies of entities other than the US and EU are largely kept classified and not available publicly, which makes it difficult to analyse their effectiveness or weaknesses. However, through observing the actions of these countries, some elements of their strategies could be discerned. Because of its recent rise as an emerging super power, China's counterterrorism strategy deserves a special scrutiny, which is based on the perceived 'Three Evils' – terrorism, separatism and religious fundamentalism.[68] China's counterterrorism efforts are mostly concentrated in the province of Xinjiang, witnessing a separatist movement by the ethnic Uyghur Muslims. The violent extremist groups operating in the region, most notably the Turkistan Islamic Party, also known as East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), are allegedly linked with Al Qaeda in the forms of training and funding of operations.[69] China's counterterrorism strategy has combined the characteristics of both 'hard' and 'soft approaches',[70] evident in the frequent crackdowns on the militant groups along with efforts to ensure economic development. An important element of China's counterterrorism strategy seems to be the censorship of cultural and media agencies, dedicated to blocking anti-state contents, as seen in the government approaches.[71] The strategy also includes strict surveillance which has been manifested in the recent government policy of instructing the Muslim residents of Xinjiang to install a spyware in their mobile phones.[72] These censorships and heavy surveillance could prove to be effective in keeping the propaganda materials of the terrorist organisations at bay. However, excessive censorships also violate the right to freedom of expression of the people while heavy surveillance will curb on their privacy. This situation could further alienate the Uyghur Muslims from the society, leading to the growing grievances and their eventual participation in violent extremist activities.

Among the African countries, Nigeria is one of the most severely affected states by terrorist activities. The most prominent violent extremist group operating

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[66] European Police Office, a law enforcement agency of the EU.
[67] European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,* Brussels, p. 7.
[68] Chien Peng Chung, "Confronting terrorism and other evils in China : all quiet on the western front?" *The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly,* Vol. 4, No. 2, 2006, pp. 77-78.
[69] Phillip B. K. Potter, "Terrorism in China: Growing Threats with Global Implications", *Strategic Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 7, No. 4, 2013, pp. 71-74.
[70] Michael Clarke, "China, Xinjiang and the internationalisation of the Uyghur issue", *Global Change, Peace & Security,* Vol. 22, No. 2, 2010, pp. 220-221.
[71] *Ibid.*
[72] Yi Shu Ng, "China is force-installing spyware onto Muslim citizens' phones, to monitor them", *Mashable*, 21 July 2017, available at http://mashable.com/2017/07/21/china-spyware-xinjiang/#Pn2_0cirzOqn, accessed on 01 August 2017.

in the country is Boko Haram, an ISIS-affiliated organisation[73], notoriously known for its brutalities and widespread terrorist networks throughout Nigeria and in the neighbouring countries.[74] Nigeria's National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) was first formulated in 2014 under the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan and have released one revised edition ever since.[75] The NACTEST, on paper, does talk about soft approaches like counter radicalisation efforts to prevent the individuals from joining the terrorist groups, in the form of one of the five work streams of the strategy called 'Forestall'. However, the ground realities suggest the government is more inclined towards the hard approach as seen in the massive military deployment in the affected regions as well as the austere security measures against the civilians.[76] A major deficit of the NACTEST is that it fails to illustrate any proper guideline on the capacity building of the government institutions and the military, especially when the Nigerian military has been receiving widespread criticisms because of its alleged corruptions in the procurement of military equipment to combat the ongoing insurgencies.[77]

Some policy formulations over counterterrorism have also been conducted by the United Nations (UN). In 2001, the UN formed the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and in 2005, the member states of the General Assembly[78] adopted the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy which is reviewed in every two years. The strategy is based on four pillars stated as:[79]

1. Addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism;

2. Preventing and combatting terrorism;

3. Building Member States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard; and

4. Ensuring the respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for countering terrorism.

The article 12 under pillar II specially talks about the online activities by the extremist groups and calls for cooperation on international and regional level to

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[73] "IS welcomes Boko Haram allegiance: tape", *Yahoo News,* 12 March 2015, available at https://www.yahoo.com/news/accepts-allegiance-nigeria-jihadists-boko-haram-201513146.html, accessed on 03 July 2017.
[74] Eugene Eji, "Rethinking Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism Strategy", *The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs,* Vol. 18, No. 3, 2016, pp. 201-203.
[75] *Ibid.*, pp. 204-208.
[76] *Ibid.*
[77] *Ibid.,* p. 61.
[78] The General Assembly is one of the six principal organs of the UN where all the member states of the UN are included.
[79] "United Nations Action To Counter Terrorism", available at http://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/, accessed on 10 December 2016.

combat it.[80] The strategy, however, exhibits some major weaknesses; a notable one is the lack of any clear definition for terms like terrorism, extremism or radicalisation, following the trend in other counterterrorism strategies.

6.   Way Forward

The countries and organisations like UN are yet to create a universal definition of radicalisation. The absence of such definition is a major obstacle in bringing in the recruiters and motivators of violent extremism to the court. To formulate effective laws, acts or conventions, there is no alternative to a proper definition of the crime. As it can be seen, the terror groups are increasingly becoming transnational. Universality of these definitions will make it easier for countries to cooperate in the judicial processes.

A major deficiency in the different counterterrorism strategies is the lack of proper and specific solution to counter the radicalisation process through Internet, especially the social media. Though not mentioned in the official strategies, countries do indulge in surveillance of the cyberspace and often takedown suspicious contents. The US, for example, have urged some internet companies to takedown contents by Anwar Al Awlaki, which have allegedly radicalised a large number of extremists to carry out violent acts.[81] Though surveillance over the Internet is indeed necessary to ensure national and global security, the relevant agencies must also be careful that they do not violate the right to freedom of expression. Such violations could, in return, instigate new grievances among the youth and make them vulnerable to radicalisation. Proper space must be created to ensure the expression of opinions from all sorts of people, even for the sympathisers or supporters of extremist groups. Such a space will create an environment of constructive debates where people could counter the arguments of the extremists. In this way, the extremists will be bound to leave the path of violence. Besides, the freedom of press and media is also an essential component to build a pluralistic society. Extensive censorship of media causes the people to rely on alternative sources of news out of curiosity which often comes from questionable sources and contain misinformed views. Such alternative sources could also include contents produced by the terrorist organisations which would ultimately radicalise the individuals to hold violent extremist views.

A key to reach success in counterterrorism is the good relations between law enforcement agencies and the civilians. Trust on the law enforcement agencies is crucial in countering the radicalisation process. However, considering some recent events, it could be seen that the law enforcement agencies are dramatically losing their acceptance. In the US for example, the allegations of racial prejudice against the police have dented their image to a great extent. Such mistrust on the police could be one of the reasons behind the radicalisation of Afro-American youths in the US. In many developing countries, the law enforcement agencies are often used

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[80] "UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy", available at https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy, accessed on 10 December 2016.
[81] Scott Shane, "Internet Firms Urged to Limit Work of Anwar al-Awlaki", *The New York Times*, 18 December 2015.

by the governments against the political opponents of the ruling parties. Such acts are also detrimental to the image of the law enforcement agencies which ultimately diminish the trust over the agencies. The counterterrorism strategies must include some effective provisions for enhancing the trust and relations between the law enforcement agencies and the civilians. The strategies should also embody elements of proper guidelines to ensure effective capacity building of the security agencies, especially in the developing countries. Such guidelines must have provisions for necessary modernisation of the forces as well as transparency and accountability in this effort to prevent misuse of the disbursed funds.

Effective intelligence sharing is also a vital element in the counterterrorism efforts. However, there is a lack of effective cooperation among the states as far as intelligence sharing is concerned. The US involves itself in extensive intelligence sharing with several countries but refrain from such cooperation with countries like Iran.[82] Given Iran's geopolitical location, intelligence sharing with this country will provide some useful information regarding the extremist groups based in the Middle East. The EU is also mainly concerned with intelligence sharing among its member states and the US. Such constraints in intelligence sharing stem from the fear of possible dissemination of information critical to their national interests. Countries must get rid of such mistrust and should cooperate in extensive intelligence sharing for effective counterterrorism operations.

7.   Conclusion

The use of social media in the radicalisation process challenges the traditional notion that recruits of the extremist groups mainly belong to poor and less educated backgrounds. On the other hand, social media has left the extremist groups with bigger outreach and larger acceptance. The threat of global terrorism has become such a big challenge that it requires an equally strenuous effort. The counterterrorism strategies adopted by different countries in the world, indeed, have some useful suggestions and recommendations that could help to mitigate the spread of terrorism. But the existence of some key weaknesses is also a matter of great concern. Moreover, the modern terror organisations continue to change their strategies time to time to be adaptive to new challenges posed by the global counterterrorism forces. The current situation requires an innovative and prudent strategy to face the challenges of global terrorism.

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[82] Derek S. Reveron, "Counterterrorism and Intelligence Cooperation", *Journal of Global Change and Governance,* Vol. 1, No. 3, 2008, pp. 9-10.

There are numerous counterterrorism operations being carried out in different parts of the world, involving heavily armed counterterrorism forces. But the policymakers must understand the fact that only the 'hard approach' is not going to help them. Effective measures to stop the radicalisation process must be implemented to kill the root cause of the threat. The counterterrorism efforts must remain a step ahead of the extremist groups to be adaptive to their changing tactics. The radicalisation through social media is one such case of the changing tactics but will not be limited to that. The policymakers must be innovative in predicting the future scenario and formulating the ways to deal with it. While in many cases, there is no alternative to military actions in the counterterrorism operations, the strategy to such operations must ensure the minimum possible collateral damage. Such strategy should not only look for immediate results but must also stay careful about long term consequences.

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Mailing Address

1/46, Old Elephant Road (West of Ramna Police Station), Dhaka-1000, Bangladesh.
Fax: 88-02-48312625, info@biiss.org, website: www.biiss.org