

# Racial and Ethnic Representation In Local Election Offices\*

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## Abstract

Despite making up a large and growing share of the population, racial and ethnic minority group members lead vanishingly few local election offices in the US. Might increasing the share of racial and ethnic minorities alleviate persistent disparities in voter participation and give minority group members more confidence that the election was fair? To answer this question, I build a panel of the race of local election officials across thousands of counties and over two decades. I also conduct an original large-scale survey experiment to study confidence in elections. I reach three main findings: 1) while progress is slow, the share of local election officials from minority groups is growing faster than their share in the population; 2) having a minority group member run the election does not generally alleviate racial and ethnic disparities in voting; and 3) racial and ethnic minority group members are trusted more by minority residents to administer elections fairly.

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# 1 Introduction

Unlike any other Western democracy, the US relies on a large number of autonomous local officials to conduct our elections (Hale, Montjoy, and Brown 2015). These officials have varying levels of discretion to carry out a wide range of election duties, including registering voters, maintaining registration lists, siting polling places, conducting early and Election Day voting, hiring and training poll workers, selecting and maintaining voting equipment, processing provisional and absentee ballots, and tabulating and certifying election results. According to the 2022 Democracy Fund/Reed College Local Election Official Survey, two-thirds of election officials consider increasing voter turnout to be an important component of their jobs, and more than one in three agree that they should work to reduce demographic disparities in voter turnout.<sup>1</sup>.

Beyond a long history of de jure and de facto racial discrimination in elections (Keyssar 2000) and a series of new voting laws targeted at suppressing minority participation (Bentele and O'Brien 2013), a growing body of literature shows that racial and ethnic minorities continue to experience inequities in election administration. Local election officials respond to Black and Hispanic voters at lower rates than white voters (Hughes et al. 2020; White, Nathan, and Faller 2015), are assigned lower quality polling locations (Barreto, Cohen-Marks, and Woods 2009), experience significantly longer wait times at the polls (Ansolabehere 2009; Chen et al. 2020; Klain et al. 2020; Stein et al. 2020; Pettigrew 2017), have lower quality interactions with poll workers (Hall, Monson, and Patterson 2009), are more likely to be asked to show photo identification (Atkeson et al. 2010; Cobb, Greiner, and Quinn 2012), and are more likely to have their absentee (Baringer, Herron, and Smith 2020; Shino, Suttmann-Lea, and Smith 2021) and provisional (Merivaki and Smith 2020) ballots rejected. This environment contributes to lower levels of voter confidence among racial and ethnic minorities (Bowler et al. 2015; Bergeron-Boutin et al. 2023; Uribe et al. 2024), as well as ongoing

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<sup>1</sup><https://evic.reed.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/crosstabs.html>

disparities in voting participation rates (Fraga 2018). Turnout disparities are most acute for Latinos and Asians.

I examine the extent of racial/ethnic diversity among election officials over time and whether representation leads to improved voter participation and election administration. In order to do so, I combine an original panel of election officials across all 50 states, over 6,000 local election jurisdictions, and 25 years with large-scale administrative. I find that election administrators from minority groups has grown faster than their share in the population, from nearly all white in 2000 to about 12% identifying as Black, Latino, or Asian today. Utilizing a difference-in-differences design, I find that having a minority group member run the election office does not generally alleviate racial and ethnic disparities in voter registration and turnout rates, and minority clerks pursue similar election administration policies as white clerks. I field a large-scale survey experiment to examine the empowerment benefits of co-ethnic election official representation. Vignette and conjoint experiments show that racial and ethnic minority group members are trusted more by minority residents to lead elections fairly and white residents are equally trusting of minority and white election officials. Additionally, minority respondents who learn that their election official is also a racial minority report higher levels of voter confidence. These findings are encouraging in terms of descriptive representation, but also suggest representation is only one part of the solution to erasing long-standing racial disparities in the administration of elections.

## 2 Representation and Local Election Officials

Descriptive representation can lead to both positive behavioral/attitudinal changes among voters and to altered policy outputs. First, the well-established minority empowerment hypothesis posits that when racial and ethnic minorities see themselves represented in government, this leads to increased political efficacy, trust in political institutions, and political participation (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Gay 2001; Tate 2003). Most of this literature exam-

ines federal and state offices, but some has extended to looking at street-level bureaucrats such as school teachers (Stewart, Meier, and England 1989) and police officers (Theobald and Haider-Markel 2009). One recent study found that descriptively representative poll workers increases general confidence in election administration for African American and Hispanic voters (King and Barnes 2018).

Second, descriptive representation may lead policy makers and government bureaucrats to act in the interests of the minorities they represent, improving policy outputs. In other words, descriptive representation can improve substantive representation. Some studies have examined the substantive impact of descriptive representation on local offices such as city councils and police officers (Ba et al. 2021; Farris and Holman 2017). However, no literature has studied the effects of minority representation on policy outcomes in local election administration.

Minority election officials could affect both attitudinal change and policy outputs. Descriptively representative election officials could increase voter confidence among traditionally excluded minorities, indirectly leading to increased participation. They could also make policy decisions designed to reduce racial disparities in the quality of election administration, directly boosting turnout and indirectly improving voter confidence.

According to the 2022 Democracy Fund/Reed College survey data, over 90% of local election officials are white.<sup>2</sup>. It appears slightly more appointed officials are non-white, but the numbers are extremely low for both elected and appointed officials. Using data from the 2020 Democracy Fund/Reed College survey data, Ferrer and Geyn (2022) find that only 2.7% of appointed and 1.7% of elected officials are Black, 5.1% of appointed and 4.7% of elected officials are Latino, and 0.6% of appointed and 0.1% of elected officials are Asian. While this is discouraging from a descriptive representation perspective, it does mean that any positive effects of more minority election officials could potentially have a large impact when scaled to the population of administrators.

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<sup>2</sup><https://evic.reed.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/crosstabs.html>

## 3 Data and Methods

### 3.1 Data

There are four major data components for the observational analysis in this paper: panel data of local election officials, data on the race/ethnicity of local election officials, county-level turnout and registration figures by race, and other election administration outcome data. I collect a large-scale panel dataset of chief local election officials across 50 states that administered each even-year general election between 2000 and 2024.<sup>3</sup> For states with multiple election authorities at the local level, I use the official with primary responsibility for administering elections on Election Day, as defined by Ferrer and Geyn (2022) which builds on Kimball and Kropf (2006). For states with election boards, I code the official who handles the day-to-day responsibilities of running elections.<sup>4</sup> Appendix A.1 includes more details on how the data was collected and a table of election officials coded in each state. I use the full dataset for my analysis of changes in descriptive representation among election officials over time. In total, this dataset comprises 18,882 unique local election officials across 6,276 jurisdictions and all 50 states, and spans 2000 to 2024.


I use two methods for determining the race/ethnicity of these officials: subjective and geocoding. I led a team of research assistants in searching for photos and biographic information of the election officials. In total, we were able to capture subjective hand-coded race data for 3,318 unique local election officials, or about 1 out of every 6 election officials. This is not a random sample of jurisdictions, but coverage is better in larger jurisdictions, in later years, and in more racially and ethnically diverse states. The second method is Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding (BISG) analysis. This is a statistical method that combines census data on racial/ethnic composition of jurisdictions and the distribution of surnames by race/ethnicity. Imputing election officials' names and locations, BISG produces a posterior

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<sup>3</sup>2024 data is collected in January of that year.

<sup>4</sup>I could not identify a single individual in each election jurisdiction in New York in charge of running elections. Instead, I code both the Democratic and Republican co-chairs of the county election boards.

Figure 1: **Map of Local Election Official Racial Data Availability, 2000-2024.** This graph displays the best panel data of local election official/race ethnicity available in each county. Counties in light blue have complete subjective researcher-collected data between 2000 and 2024. Counties in dark blue do not have complete subjective race data, but do have BISG-derived estimates of election official race/ethnicity between 2000 and 2024. States with counties in grey administer elections at the municipal level; virtually all municipalities in these states have panel BISG data but do not have subjective researcher data available. Finally, counties in black are not in the data. Alaska's jurisdictions are not in data. Kauai county in Hawaii has a full manual panel, and the rest have full geocoded panel data.



probability that the election official is a certain race/ethnicity. I am able to capture geocoded race data for virtually every election official in the dataset, and code the race/ethnicity that is of highest probability (out of white, Black, Asian, Hispanic, and Other). Figure 1 shows data availability of election official race by county.

In general, the subjective data is higher quality than the BISG data. A validation exercise comparing election officials for whom both types are captured reveals that in 87.5% of cases, the predicted race matches the hand-coded race. However, this probability is inflated due to the fact that the population of election officials is overwhelmingly white. The likelihood that the BISG predicted race matches the subjective researcher-coded race is 97.9% for BISG-predicted whites, but is 46.5% for BISG-predicted Hispanics, 32.9% for BISG-predicted

Asians, 32.4% for BISG-predicted Blacks, and 6.9% for BISG-predicted Others. On the other hand, the likelihood that the subjectively coded race matches the BISG prediction is 88.8% for subjectively-coded whites, 75% for subjectively-coded Blacks, 70% for subjectively-coded Others, and 55.6% for subjectively-coded Asians. In short, BISG overestimates the likelihood that election officials are racial minorities. This is due to the fact that it makes predictions based on the overall population racial distribution, whereas the population of election officials and other leaders skews white.

I use the L2 nationwide voter file for county-level turnout and registration numerators by race. This data is available for even-year elections taking place between 2014 and 2020, and derives from a BISG-like calculation of each voter's race/ethnicity. This data encompasses billions of observations and captures the actual record of registrants and votes. In Appendix A.5, I conduct additional robustness tests of the main results using voter file data from Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, the three states with both race/ethnicity data on the voter file and where a single election official wields primary authority at the county-level.

For the denominator, I use both turnout and registration race shares (solely relying on numerator data) and turnout/registration rates using county Citizen Voting-Age Population (CVAP) data from the ACS 5-year reports.<sup>5</sup> These reports are available for 2000 and 2009-2022. I linearly interpolate between 2000 and 2009 to create a full county-level CVAP panel for Black, Latino, Asian, and white voters. I then remove county-level race/ethnicity populations with fewer than 100 estimated values to reduce noisy low-sample participation rates.<sup>6</sup> This is used as the denominator in calculations of race-specific turnout and registration rates.<sup>7</sup>

I assemble a set of county-level indicators of election administration policy using the US Election Assistance Commission's Election Administration and Voting Surveys (EAVS)

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<sup>5</sup><https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/about/voting-rights/cvap.html>

<sup>6</sup>Fraga (2018) chooses a similarly arbitrary but more conservative population threshold, removing county-level race-specific population estimates of fewer than 1000. Using this threshold yields similar results.

<sup>7</sup>Even with this cutoff, the turnout and registration rates using CVAP estimates remain noisy, especially in combination with poorly maintained registration files. In line with Morris and Shoub (2024), I cap all CVAP turnout and registration rates greater than 1 at 1.

from 2004 to 2022.<sup>8</sup> This survey measures county-level outcomes in every even-year general election. I measure the number of polling places per 1,000 people, provisional ballots cast, provisional ballots rejected, absentee ballots rejected, and the number of registrants removed from the voter roll. Following Ferrer, Geyn, and Thompson (2023) and Pettigrew (2017), I use data from the Congressional Election Study to measure the share of voters who had to wait at the polls for more than 30 minutes. This is available for general elections in 2006-2022 except for 2010.

### 3.2 Research Design

I limit causal analysis to county election jurisdictions where the election official captured has primary authority to administer elections. Figure A.1 maps data availability across counties used in the observational analysis.

I employ a difference-in-differences design, leveraging changes in the race/ethnicity of local election officials to measure the effects of switching between white and minority officials on voter turnout, registration, and election administration policies. This design overcomes confounding due to spurious connections between election official race and voter turnout, including fixed factors (population, density, racial and political composition) and common time-varying factors (candidates on the ballot, public mood). The key assumption is that jurisdictions that experience a switch are on similar voter participation and election administration trajectories.

I estimate a series of regressions of the form  $Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \delta_t + \beta Minority_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$ , where  $Y_{it}$  is a measure of voter turnout, registration, or election administration outcome in county  $i$  at election year  $t$ ,  $\alpha_i$  and  $\delta_t$  are county and year fixed effects, respectively, and  $Minority_{it}$  is a dummy variable taking 1 when counties have a racial/ethnic minority as their local election official and 0 when counties have a white official.  $\beta$  is the causal effect of a minority election official on voter participation and election administration outcomes.

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<sup>8</sup><https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys>

All main regression specifications include at the minimum Year by State fixed effects. This ensures that comparisons are only made between counties in the same state, addressing the possibility that states may be on different turnout trajectories. I further address parallel trending concerns by incorporating three additional sets of interacted fixed effects: Year by State by Non-Hispanic white population share, Year by State by Population, and Year by State by Democratic vote share fixed effects. The Year by Non-Hispanic white population fixed effect compares within-county over time change to other counties with similar racial demographics, whereas the Year by Democratic vote share fixed effect compares counties with similar partisan makeup and the Year by Population fixed effect compares counties with similar populations. These account for the possibility that counties that switch to a minority election official may also happen to shift demographics, population, or partisan trends in ways that are systematically related to turnout. All three interacted fixed effects are divided into quartiles and measured pre-treatment for each state.<sup>9</sup>

## 4 Descriptive Results

In this section, I present evidence that the number of minority local election officials across the country has increased over time. Existing surveys show that the population of local election officials are overwhelmingly white. However, all surveys to date have been cross-sectional samples and are therefore unable to clearly answer whether the descriptive representation of racial and ethnic minorities has increased. Survey samples also may produce noisy estimates of the population of election officials, and may also induce bias due to sampling and response rates. My panel data on administrator race overcomes these hurdles, conveying information on whether descriptive representation has increased over time without introducing any sampling or bias response issues.

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
<sup>9</sup>I measure Democratic vote share as votes for the top-ticket Democratic candidate divided by votes for the top-ticket Democratic and Republican candidates.

Figure 2 displays the percentage of Black, Latino, Asian, and White election officials that administered each even-year general election between 2000 and 2024. The left panel uses the best available data for determining election official race–researcher coded where possible, geocoded otherwise. The middle panel uses only BISG coding. The right panel uses only jurisdictions with complete panel researcher-coded data. All three panels show a similar story. In the early 2000s, approximately 95% of local election officials were white. This has slowly changed over the past 25 years, although how much is dependent on the data analyzed. Within the manually coded panel, minorities now make up 12% of all local election officials. According to the preferred and BISG panels, the figure is instead between 7 and 10 percent. Some of the reason for the conservative outlook with the Preferred panel could be due to the BISG’s overestimation of minorities in general. Therefore, as more jurisdictions in the dataset switch to manually-coded data over time, this could mask a more significant diversification trend. In the apples-to-apples BISG and Manual data comparisons, the diversifying trend is stronger.

Almost all representational change has been fueled by growth in the proportion of election officials that are Black. Only 2-4% of election officials in 2000 were Black; today, that figure has roughly doubled. Unfortunately, there has been less improvement in the representation of Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans. According to the BISG data, Hispanics now make up 2.6% of all local election officials, up from 1.5% in 2000. Asian representation has grown from 0.2% to 0.3%. There are few indigenous election officials.

Figure 3 visualizes the racial and ethnic makeup of election officials across jurisdictions over time. It shows the same slow but steady trend towards increasing racial and ethnic diversity in the profession pictured in Figure 2, especially in the South and West. There has been little change in ethnoracial diversity in the East or Midwest. Appendix A.3 includes maps visualizing manual and preferred data across the US, as well as state-specific graphs. The underlying trends discussed here remain the same.


Figure 2: **Local Election Administrator Race, 2000-2024.** This graph displays over time change in the race of local election officials over the past 25 years. All panels include jurisdictions only with full panel data available between 2000 and 2024. “Preferred” uses subjective researcher-coded race data where available and BISG otherwise. “BISG” uses Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding for race imputation. “Manual” uses jurisdictions for which there is a complete panel of hand-coded race data. Proportions are relative to the total number of jurisdictions in each dataset—5,920 in both the Preferred and BISG panels, and 337 jurisdictions in the Manual panel.



In summary, this descriptive evidence shows a positive trend in representation of racial minorities in election administration. Across the U.S., those tasked with running America’s elections are starting to look more like the voters they work for than they did a few decades ago. However, there remains a large disparity between the racial makeup of these states and the racial makeup of the pool of local election officials. According to data from the 2020 Census, the country’s population is 57.8% non-Hispanic white, 18.7% Hispanic or Latino, 12.1% Black, 3.8% Asian American, 8.6% Native American, and 10.2% two or more races. Additionally, racial minorities are not simply concentrated in a handful of populous jurisdictions. Over 400 counties are majority non-white across the country, over 700 are at least one-third minority, and one in three counties are at least 25% non-white.<sup>10</sup> Very few

<sup>10</sup><https://wwwaxios.com/2021/08/15/diversity-majority-minority-white-american-census>

Figure 3: **Local Election Administrator Race Map, 2000-2024.** This figure displays over time change in the race/ethnicity of local election officials over the past 25 years using Bayesian-Improved Surname Geocoding imputation. “Other” includes Native Americans.



states reach parity between their election official pool and their population, and Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans remain particularly underrepresented. These results align with survey findings from Civic Pulse, which has found a substantial increase in racial and ethnic representation of local government officials between 2013 and 2024.<sup>11</sup> I turn next to whether minority officials make different administrative decisions or empower voters of color to participate at higher rates.

## 5 Statistical Results

In this section, I present evidence that minority and white local election officials produce similar levels of minority participation rates and pursue similar election administration policies.

<sup>11</sup><https://www.civicpulse.org/diversity-representation>

## 5.1 Minority and White Officials Produce Similar Levels of Minority Voter Participation

Does descriptive representation improve participation for racial minorities? I test minority voter turnout and registration in this section using a combination of original data on local election officials and L2 voter files combined with a series of difference-in-difference estimates. All regressions include, at the minimum, both county and Year by State fixed effects.<sup>12</sup> This ensures that differential participation trends between states are not driving the results and that comparisons are only made of turnout differences between white- and minority-administered counties within the same state and election year. All estimates include robust standard errors clustered by county.

Table 1 displays difference-in-differences specifications testing the effects of minority election administration on Black voter participation, Table 2 shows the effects on Latino participation, Table 3 shows the effects on Asian participation, and Table 4 shows the effects on white participation. Across all specifications and all tables in the main analysis, a combination of manual and BISG-coded races are used, manual where available and BISG otherwise. Black, Asian, and Latino election officials are pooled together as minority officials to maximize statistical power. Since the vast majority of minority election officials are Black, the estimates are mostly powered by a switch between white and Black election officials. While Black officials might provide some representational benefits to other minorities due to a shared “people of color” racial affiliation (Pérez 2021), I expect point estimates to be largest for Black voter participation.

In all four tables, column 1 tests the effects of a switch to a minority election official on the CVAP turnout rate of that race, column 2 tests the effects on the share of voters of that race among all participants in the jurisdiction, column 3 tests the effects on CVAP registration rates, and column 4 tests the effects on the share of registrants of that race.

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<sup>12</sup>I also run specifications that include three additional interacted fixed effects: Year by State by Nonwhite quartile, Year by State by Population quartile, and Year by State by Democratic Vote Share quartile. The results are substantively similar.

All regressions include county and year by state fixed effects. Observations are smaller for turnout and registration rates among minorities than for turnout shares because counties with fewer than 100 CVAP residents of that race are excluded.

Table 1: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect Black Participation Rates (Manual + Geocoded Races, 2014-2020)

	Black Voter Turnout	Black Turnout Share	Black Reg	Black Reg Share
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Minority	0.001 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.002)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,889	8,132	4,889	8,132

Table 2: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect Latino Participation Rates (Manual + Geocoded Races, 2014-2020)

	Latino Voter Turnout	Latino Turnout Share	Latino Reg	Latino Reg Share
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Minority	0.006 (0.005)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.007)	0.001 (0.001)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,202	8,132	6,202	8,132

All specifications for Blacks, Latinos, and whites result in near-zero point estimates that are relatively precisely estimated. For instance, the point estimate in column 1 of Table 1 means that a county switch from a white to a non-white local election official results in an average boost to Black voter turnout by 0.1 percentage points. Effects larger than 1.5 percentage points can be confidently ruled out. Point estimates for Asian voter turnout and

Table 3: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect Asian Participation Rates (Manual + Geocoded Races, 2014-2020)

	Asian Voter Turnout (1)	Asian Turnout Share (2)	Asian Reg (3)	Asian Reg Share (4)
Minority	0.014 (0.012)	0.001 (0.0004)	0.014 (0.011)	0.0004 (0.0002)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,830	8,132	2,830	8,132

Table 4: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect White Participation Rates (Manual + Geocoded Races, 2014-2020)

	White Voter Turnout (1)	White Turnout Share (2)	White Reg (3)	White Reg Share (4)
Minority	0.006 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)	0.0003 (0.002)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8,132	8,132	8,132	8,132

Asian registration rates are slightly higher in Table 3, but these estimates are much less precise. Additionally, Asian turnout and registration shares do raise slightly, on average, and do reach statistical thresholds of significance. However, the effects are small. Column two indicates that a switch from a white to a minority election office boosts the share of voters that are Asian by 0.1 percentage points, compared with an average of 0.9% of voters being Asian. No other point estimates in these tables can be confidently distinguished from a null effect.

These null results carry over to difference-in-difference tests of overall registration and turnout rates. Section A.7 in the Online Appendix shows that minority election officials do not significantly improve voter participation rates, but rather oversee elections with similar levels of participation as white election officials. Additionally, the results hold when zeroing in on changes between white and Black or Latino election officials on coethnic voter participation. These regressions, displayed in Section A.6 in the Online Appendix, show that the main results are not simply due to a lack of solidarity between racial minorities. The findings hold across a range of additional data specifications, including using only manually coded data and limiting the analysis to jurisdictions where the individual election official has particularly strong or complete authority to run elections. These are found in Appendix A.4.

## 5.2 Minority and White Officials Administer Elections Similarly

I use EAVS and CCES data to explore whether minority and white election officials pursue different election administration policies. The results, found in Table 5, suggest that minority and white administrators run elections with similar numbers of polling places per 1,000 residents, provisional ballot usage, provisional rejection rates, absentee ballot rejection rates, registration removal rates, and share of voters waiting longer than 30 minutes to vote. No point estimate achieves conventional levels of statistical significance. The results hold when using the full dataset (2004-2022) rather than the 2014-2020 data in line with the main

analysis (Section A.6.1 in the online appendix). Taken together, there does not appear to be significant systematic differences in the election administration policies pursued by minority and white election officials.

Table 5: Minority Election Officials Pursue Similar Administration Policies (Manual + Geocoded Races, 2014-2020)

	Polling Places	Prov Share	Prov Rejection	Absentee Rejection	Reg Removal	Wait Share
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Minority	-0.019 (0.047)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.016 (0.026)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.010 (0.016)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,545	7,050	5,270	7,570	7,681	4,925

## 6 Experimental Results

The minority empowerment hypothesis (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Gay 2001; Tate 2003) suggests that descriptively representative officials should increase confidence among minorities and lead them to be more trusting in government. In the case of election administration, descriptively representative officials could increase voter confidence among traditionally excluded minorities and make them feel that voting is worthwhile. I conducted a pilot survey experiment module in the 2023 UCLA REPS Lab Omnibus Survey to test whether minority voters trust co-ethnic election officials to fairly administer elections more than they do white officials. The survey revealed positive empowerment benefits to co-ethnic representation among election officials (details and results of this study are in Section A.8 in the online appendix).

Building on the pilot study, I fielded the UCLA Representation Survey, a largescale nationwide survey conducted between April 29 and May 5, 2024 using ResearchCloud Connect. I collected responses from 3,200 participants comprising a representative sample of Americans besides oversamples of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. The survey hypotheses and analysis was preregistered on OSF.<sup>13</sup> In addition to basic demographic and political questions, the survey contained three experimental components: a vignette, a conjoint, and an information provision experiment. I conduct a vignette experiment to discern whether respondents favor co-ethnic election officials, a conjoint experiment to uncover how much the race of election officials matter in relation to other characteristics, and an information provision experiment to understand the real-world implications of Americans learning more about their local election officials. Finally, the survey included factual questions about respondents' local election official to measure knowledge about the position. I describe the main results of each component in the subsections below and leave additional analysis, technical details of the survey, and the survey instrument to Section A.9 in the online appendix. All regressions include post-stratification weights to ensure the sample is representative of the nationwide adult population.


## 6.1 Vignette Experiment

Respondents read a short vignette of a person described as potentially taking charge of elections in their county for the 2024 presidential election. The official was described with fixed job experience in election administration, political identity, age, and views on voter identification and absentee voting. They were also described as either white (control) or of the same race/ethnicity as the respondent (treatment). Respondents were then asked to rate how much they trust this official to conduct their elections fairly and how likely they would be to vote if this official became their election administrator. Using difference-in-means estimation, I compare the average response for same-race respondents in the treatment

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<sup>13</sup>[osf.io/k7hq2](https://osf.io/k7hq2)

Figure 4: **Vignette Survey Experiment Difference-In-Means**. This figure visualizes difference-in-means regressions comparing Black, Latino, and Asian respondents' trust in their election official and reported likelihood of voting given a co-ethnic official rather than a white official. Each outcome is measured on a five-point Likert response scale.



condition with the average response for same-race respondents in the control condition. I hypothesize that racial minorities will express greater trust in their election official and report a higher likelihood of voting if their local election official is described as co-ethnic rather than as white.

Figure 4 shows the output of difference-in-means tests comparing the responses given a co-ethnic election official to the responses given a white election official for minority respondents. The results show a modest but statistically significant positive effect for both outcomes. Respondents presented with a coethnic election official rather than a white official are express 0.2 points higher confidence in that election official to fairly count their vote (out of a five-point scale), and express being 0.15 points more likely to vote if the potential election official runs their election.

The results are robust to the inclusion of controls for a wide range of political, economic, and demographic factors (A.40). They also hold across racial groups, although the results are less precisely estimated (A.41). It appears that Hispanics are the most responsive to the coethnic treatment, followed by Black respondents.

This experiment isolates the effects of race in the presence of a great deal of additional political and demographic information about the election official. Voters are unlikely to know this much information about their local election official. As such, the vignette experiment trades off some degree of external validity for high internal validity. Little is left to the imagination of respondents—they cannot assume that simply because someone is a racial minority, they are a Democrat and support liberal election policies.

## 6.2 Conjoint Experiment

I conducted a paired-choice conjoint analysis (Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto 2015). This experiment tests the revealed preferences of respondents when they are forced to choose between two candidates with different bundles of attributes (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). Previous studies have conducted similar analyses to estimate public support for descriptive representation among federal positions such as Supreme Court nominees (Kaslovsky, Rogowski, and Stone 2021; Sen 2017) and congressional candidates (Costa 2021; Lemi 2021), as well as candidates for an unspecified office (Kirkland and Coppock 2018). However, few studies for local officials exist. Sung (2023) tests revealed preferences for local prosecutor candidates, Stauffer, Miller, and Keiser (2023) examine mayoral candidates, and Crowder-Meyer, Gadarian, and Trounstine (2021) study mayoral and city council candidates. This is one of the first studies to test mass revealed preferences for any local office and the first to test revealed preferences for election officials.


Respondents were presented with two candidates running to be the person in charge of administering elections in their county. Each candidate's party affiliation (Democrat, Republican, or Independent), age (30, 50, or 70), gender (male or female), race/ethnicity (white,

Hispanic, Black, or Asian), years of experience in election administration (2 years, 10 years, or 20 years), support for voter ID laws (support/oppose), and support for expansive absentee voting provisions (support/oppose) were randomly chosen. Respondents were then asked which candidate they “trust more to do the job well”, and were forced to choose between one of the two candidates. Each respondent completed four iterations of the randomized conjoint experiment. I use these tests to compute average marginal component effects (AMCE) for each attribute level, or the causal effect of the attribute on preferring that candidate. This experiment reveals how much respondents care about each attribute, and therefore whether participants care about the race of their election official relative to their party affiliation, age, gender, experience, and election administration policy preferences. I hypothesize that minority respondents will have a greater propensity to select co-ethnic candidates and will care about the race of these hypothetical candidates relative to other attributes than whites will.

Figure 5 shows the main results (Table A.43 in the online appendix displays regression output). The x-axis measures the average marginal component effect of each attribute level, or the probability that a respondent will pick a candidate with that characteristic rather than the reference attribute level. For instance, the first point estimate, Democrat, means that respondents were about 4% less likely to select candidates that were Democrats than were Independents, all else equal.

The biggest factors in a respondent’s selection are, in decreasing order of importance, years of experience, election administration policy positions, party, and age. Respondents placed extremely high value on candidates who possessed 10 years of relevant experience, and also preferred those with five years of experience to those with only two years. Respondents were more than 10% likelier to select an election official who supports voter ID laws and supports expanding vote-by-mail. Respondents also preferred Independents to candidates with a major party affiliation. Finally, candidates tended to dislike candidates who were 70

Figure 5: **Conjoint Survey Experiment AMCEs**. This figure visualizes average marginal component effects of the local election official conjoint experiment conducted as part of the 2024 UCLA Representation Survey. Attributes are grouped together by color. 95% confidence intervals are illustrated. Point estimates of 0 without confidence intervals are the reference level for each attribute.



years old, but did not have a preference between 30-year-olds and 50-year-olds. All of these findings are in line with my preregistered expectations for the conjoint.

Respondents had a small but statistically significant preference for female candidates over male candidates (AMCE of 2.2%). Respondents also tended to prefer racial minorities over whites, although these differences do not attain traditional thresholds of significance.

I more closely examine the racial preferences of whites and minorities in Figure 6 by breaking down respondents by race. Overall, this figure shows similar relative preferences in election officials across racial groups. Regardless of race, respondents highly value experience, popular election policy beliefs, Independent party affiliation, and youth. However, this graph does reveal small but meaningful differences in the ways racial minorities evaluate co-ethnic and co-POC candidates. Black respondents were 7% more likely to choose Black candidates over white candidates, all else equal, and were 4% more likely to pick a Hispanic candidate

over a white one. Asians exhibited similarly strong co-ethnic affinity, and Hispanics exhibited strong affinity to by Asian and Hispanic candidates. In contrast, white respondents were indifferent to candidate race. While the overall effects are still modest, they are roughly equivalent with the preference for five years of experience over two years, and for candidates that support voter ID laws over those that do not.

Figure 7 directly compares the AMCEs of minority respondents to those of Whites. In the top panel, the deviation of the race AMCEs from zero for Asian, Black, and Hispanic respondents, compared with the lack of deviation among White respondents, again indicates that racial minorities indeed have stronger preferences about the race of their local election official. The bottom panel shows the relative preferences of Asians, Blacks, and Hispanics compared to Whites. In each case, one of the larger deviations is towards co-ethnics. In other words, while the absolute value of race is modest for racial minorities when compared with other candidate attributes, racial minorities care a lot more that local election officials match their race than whites do. This is one of the largest distinguishing characteristics between the preferences of racial minorities and whites, on par or larger than their differences in preferences for a specific party or policy position.


Tabular regression output for Figures 6 and 7 can be found in Section A.9.2 in the Online Appendix. I also run a robustness test examining the preferences of Nonwhites versus whites, which yields similar results.

In sum, the conjoint analysis reveals a modest but meaningful preference among racial minorities for co-ethnic and co-POC local election officials. Additionally, I have shown that racial minorities care more about election officials' race than white do, and that race is one of the biggest points of preference divergence between minorities and whites.


### 6.3 Information Provision Experiment

The final experiment is a novel information provision that tests whether learning about a participant's local election official improves their trust in U.S. elections. Providing factual

Figure 6: **Conjoint Survey Experiment AMCEs - By Respondent Race**. This figure visualizes average marginal component effects of the local election official conjoint experiment conducted as part of the 2024 UCLA Representation Survey, with effects separated by race. 95% confidence intervals are illustrated. Point estimates of 0 without confidence intervals are the reference level for each attribute.



**Figure 7: Conjoint Survey Experiment AMCEs - Differences By Respondent Race.** This figure visualizes differences between racial minorities and whites in average marginal component effects of the local election official conjoint experiment. 95% confidence intervals are illustrated. Point estimates of 0 without confidence intervals are the reference level for each attribute. “A-W” means “Asian - White” AMCEs, “B-W” means “Black - White” AMCEs, and “H-W” means “Hispanic-White” AMCEs.



information to respondents is a common practice in economics (Haaland, Roth, and Wohlfart 2023). In political science, it has been used to test how respondents update their (biased) beliefs about the world (Hill 2017). Providing tailored information specific to each respondent is much rarer, especially beyond provisioning general politician characteristics such as party identification and ideology (Kendall, Nannicini, and Trebbi 2015; Prina and Royer 2014; Roth, Settele, and Wohlfart 2022). Providing tailored information about political officials to

respondents has been done in developing countries (Arias et al. 2019; Banerjee et al. 2011; Pande 2011), but my study will be one of the first to do this in the United States.

This experiment utilizes my original largescale data collection of the name of every chief local election official across the thousands of separate election jurisdictions in the U.S. (Hale, Montjoy, and Brown 2015). It also uses my original data on the race/ethnicity of each election official, as well as their gender and the institutional position, selection method, and tenure length of each official (Ferrer and Geyn 2022; Ferrer, Thompson, and Orey 2024,?).<sup>14</sup> This allows me to match participants with their current election official based on the zip code they provide earlier in the survey.<sup>15</sup> Participants were block-randomized by their racial identity into three conditions. In the control, participants were informed about their county of residence and the number of registered voters in that county. In the first treatment condition, they received the name, gender, position, and selection method of their local election official in addition to the number of registered voters. In the second treatment condition, they received all of the information in the first treatment in addition to the race/ethnicity of their election official. Respondents were then asked a series of post-treatment questions concerning their confidence that their vote is counted as intended and that their election official impartially administers elections. Respondents were assigned treatments based on an unequal probability distribution, with half of respondents assigned to the information + race treatment and a quarter each assigned to control and the information without race treatment. This was done to ensure sufficient power for tests of co-ethnic race reveal. As with the vignette experiment, I use difference-in-means estimation, comparing the average response for same-race respondents in each treatment condition with the average response for same-race respondents in the control condition, as well as the pooled difference-in-means across treatment conditions. I hypothesize that providing respondents information about

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<sup>14</sup>Gender was imputed using election official first name and the ‘gender’ package in R. More thorough explanations of the other data sources can be found in the cited articles.

<sup>15</sup>For zip codes that span multiple counties, the county with the majority of the zip code’s area was chosen. While it is true that approximately 20% of zip codes cross county lines, in most cases the vast majority of the zip code lies in one county.


their election official will improve voter confidence and that minority respondents who learn that their local election official looks like them will have higher confidence in the integrity of elections.

Figure 8 shows the respondent effects of learning about their local election official on confidence in the integrity of elections. Election confidence is measured as confidence in respondent's local election official, confidence that their vote is counted accurate, confidence that the vote in their jurisdiction, state, and nation are counted accurately, and belief in widespread voter fraud marring the 2020 presidential election results. Almost all point estimates are close to zero and all are precisely estimated. Additionally, the only point estimate statistically distinguishable from zero is negative: respondents reported *less* confidence that votes nationwide will be counted as voters intend in the 2024 presidential election, after learning about their local election official. On their face, these results suggest there is no relationship between knowledge about one's election official and confidence in the integrity of the election.

Does learning that a respondent's local election official is co-ethnic or co-POC increase voter confidence? Simply sub-setting to racial minorities and conducting a difference-in-means test between treatment groups will not answer this question, as whether or not a respondent has a co-ethnic election official is not randomly distributed. Rather, it is possible (and likely) that the revealed race of the respondent's election official will be white, and therefore the treatment effect of revealed race will be null or negative as a result. Sub-setting to racial minorities and comparing those who learn their election official is co-POC vs. those who learn their election official is white also fails to produce a causal estimated.


Therefore, I filter to minority respondents who have a minority election official. This ensures that the comparison between treatment and control measures the effect of learning that a respondent's election official is co-ethnic against a counterfactual where the respondent potentially remains unaware of this fact. The results, shown in Figure 9, shows modest but detectable positive effects for certain types of voter confidence. When minorities learn that

Figure 8: **Information Provision Experiment Difference-In-Means**. This figure visualizes differences-in-means regressions comparing the effects of learning nothing about your local election official (control) to learning their name, position, selection method, years of experience, and gender (“LEO Info” treatment) and to additionally learning their race (“LEO Info + Race” treatment). Point estimates are grouped by treatment and each represent a separate post-treatment question measuring respondent voter confidence. Dependent variables are measured on a 4-point scale with a “I don’t know” option. Regressions include demographic and political controls. 95% confidence intervals are shown.



their election official is also a racial minority, they report higher levels of confidence that their vote will be counted accurately in the 2024 presidential election. The effect is 0.17 on a four-point scale and is statistically distinguishable from zero. Additionally, minority respondents report higher levels of confidence in the national vote and lower levels of fraud in the 2020 election, compared to respondents with co-POC election officials in the control condition. Respondents report no greater confidence in their election official to be impartial, nor greater confidence that their jurisdiction or state’s vote count was accurate. Tabular regression output and additional robustness tests of the information provision experiment can be found in Appendix A.9.3.

**Figure 9: Information Provision Experiment Difference-In-Means - Among Minority Respondents with POC Election Officials.** This figure visualizes differences-in-means regressions comparing the effects of learning nothing about your local election official (control) to learning their name, position, selection method, years of experience, and gender (“LEO Info” treatment) and to additionally learning their race (“LEO Info + Race” treatment). Respondents are filtered to POCs who have POC election officials. Point estimates are grouped by treatment and each represent a separate post-treatment question measuring respondent voter confidence. Dependent variables are measured on a 4-point scale with a “I don’t know” option. Regressions include demographic and political controls. 95% confidence intervals are shown.



In summary, providing respondents information about their election officials failed to increase their voter confidence. However, minority respondents who learn that their election official is co-POC appear to have greater confidence in the integrity of elections.

## 7 Why Do Minority and White Officials Administer Elections Similarly?

Given the evidence in previous literature for the minority empowerment hypothesis, the null effects of descriptive representation on policy outputs, and the rather modest effects found in survey experiments, why have I failed here to find a stronger link between descriptive representation and improved administrative outcomes? I explore first why minority election officials might fail to affect behavioral or attitudinal change in their constituents and second why minority officials may pursue similar policies to white officials. I then test whether minority election officials see altered election expenditure environments.

Minority empowerment depends on the visibility of the official and interactions between the official and their constituents. Election officials tend to have minimal visibility and only interact with a small percentage of their constituents. Unlike President, Senator, or even Mayor, election administration is not a high-profile job. Additionally, election officials in most states bear multiple responsibilities and may have unintuitive titles. In both Alabama and Georgia, election officials are probate judges and also carry out the responsibilities of judge. A decline in local news coverage has generally led to less informed citizens (Rubado and Jennings 2020). Finally, voters typically interact with poll workers who volunteer to work on Election Day rather than the actual chief election officer for their jurisdiction. All of these factors reduce the ability of minority election officials to increase non-white turnout through empowerment.

What about policy outcomes? Recent literature suggests partisan differences between election officials are smaller than conventional wisdom suggests. Ferrer, Geyn, and Thompson (2023) find that Democratic and Republican election officials produce similar levels of presidential Democratic vote share and turnout rates. They also administer elections similarly across the broad range of policy indicators tested in Table 5. If Democrats and

Republicans administer elections similarly, it makes sense that white and Black officials do so as well.

Ferrer, Geyn, and Thompson (2023) examined four explanations for their finding of minimal partisanship: the reelection incentive forces election officials to moderate in order to win, officials face a collective action problem in altering election outcomes, election officials are less polarized in their election policy views than the general public, and administration policies do not make much of an impact of outcomes such as registration and turnout rates. The evidence led them to support the latter two conclusions. Election officials appear to be self-selecting and truly seek to do the best job possible given limited resources and technical demands. In this case, this means both minority and white officials may seek to boost voter participation rates and alleviate racial disparities in turnout. This would result in the null results observed. Additionally, it is likely that election administration policies may not have that big of an effect on turnout. (Clinton et al. 2020) This means that observed differences in election administration policies will not clearly translate into differences in race-specific participation rates.

## 7.1 Do Restrictive Administrative Environments Explain the Results?

I test one additional explanation: that minority election officials face hostile political environments when they come into office. Perhaps these officials sincerely seek to increase resources for their minority constituents, providing more polling places, better election equipment, and more staffing. However, final decisions on expenditures usually rest with other county bodies such as the County Executive or County Supervisors. If these election officials are starved of resources by other actors, it could also explain the null results observed. I test this using election administration expenditure data from Mohr et al. (2018). This dataset includes estimated yearly election administration costs for half of all states spanning from the 2000s to 2016, though there is significant missingness and high within-county variance. Table 6

displays the results of a difference-in-differences regression testing the effects of switching to a minority election official on logged total county election expenditures.

Table 6: Minority Local Election Officials Do Not Affect Election Expenditures (Manual + Geocoded Races, 2000-2016)

	Log Total Election Expenditures			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Minority	-0.048 (0.061)	0.007 (0.059)	-0.021 (0.059)	-0.011 (0.063)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	No	No	No
Year x State x Nonwhite FEs	No	Yes	No	No
Year x State x Pop FEs	No	No	Yes	No
Year x State x Dem VS FEs	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	2,778	2,778	2,778	2,778

While the results are fairly imprecise, there is no clear pattern of increased or decreased election expenditures once non-white election officials assume office. The point estimate in column 1 implies that switching from a white to a minority election official decreases total election expenditures in that jurisdiction by 4.7%. However, the effect is not statistically distinguishable from zero, and is attenuated when jurisdictions are only compared with those with similar pretreatment demographic, population, or partisan makeups.

In sum, it appears that minority election officials do not see their budgets significantly reduced, nor are they able to appreciably grow their budgets more than white officials.

## 8 Conclusion

Local election officials are the front-line workers of America’s democracy. But do they represent their voters? Using original largescale administrative data and a causally credible research design, I show that racial minorities make up a small but growing share of leadership

positions in local election offices. However, having a minority group member in charge does not generally alleviate racial and ethnic disparities in voting. Minority and white chief local election officials oversee elections with similar levels of registration and turnout rates among Blacks, Latinos, Asians, and whites and with similar administrative outcomes. Using an original survey experiment that is nationally representative of the U.S. adult population, I find evidence that minority officials are more trusted by co-ethnic residents to run elections fairly and that white residents are equally trusting of minority and white election officials. Minority participants responded positively to vignettes that described the potential for their election official to match their race. Respondents also preferred fictitious candidates for chief local election official who matched their race or ethnicity. When provided true information that respondents' election official matched their minority racial status, participants became slightly more trusting of the system.

It is normatively desirable that a diversifying America is starting to be reflected in those tasked with running its democracy. Twenty years ago, virtually all election officials were white. Today, that is no longer the case. Additionally, it is reassuring that the reality of an unrepresentative class of election administrators does not obviously translate into inferior election quality outcomes.

However, these results are discouraging for eliminating long-standing racial and ethnic disparities in voter participation and the quality of election administration. Electing more Black and Brown officials is an important step to ensuring equity in the voting experience, but it is only one piece of the solution. Minority voters prefer co-ethnic officials in charge and report trusting these officials more to manage elections fairly. But minority election officials are unable to reduce the racial turnout gap (Fraga 2018).

Minority election officials differ from white officials on many dimensions beyond simply their skin color and ancestry. They are more likely to belong to the Democratic than the Republican party, probably hold more liberal election policy views, may be younger on average, and are more likely to be appointed than white officials (Ferrer and Geyn 2022).

Racial treatment effects bundle all of these differences together. This is not necessarily a bad thing. In a series of survey experiments, I isolate the effects of race beyond some of the obvious characteristics that may otherwise be inferred. However, it is still possible that respondents made assumptions about an election official given their race, even when provided with evidence contradicting those assumptions.

Future research should leverage variation in selection method to test whether certain institutional mechanisms such as direct elections, consolidated authority, or partisan labels on the ballot moderate the effects of descriptive representation. Certain forms of election administration are artifacts of a dark history of racism. For instance, in the 1960s, counties in the South eliminated elected offices in the wake of the Voting Rights Act for the express purpose of maintaining white power (Komisarchik 2018). Most counties in states such as Alabama, Georgia, and Texas maintain separate registration and election administration officers which were originally instituted in order to prevent African Americans from registering to vote. Recently, legislators in Georgia have pushed through changes to election official selection, some of which have shifted power from longstanding Black officials to partisan-minded white appointees.<sup>16</sup>.

An increasingly polarized and dangerous national environment for elections may spillover into the local level, and has made it ever more important that the local officials responsible for running America's elections in a professional and nonpartisan manner are up to the task. It also makes it more important that these officials descriptively and substantively represent their constituents and gain their trust in the endeavor of preserving our shared democracy.

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<sup>16</sup><https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2022/03/14/georgia-elections-fraud-purge/>

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# Online Appendix

Intended for online publication only.

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## A.1 Collection and Coding of Local Election Officials

I collect the majority of the data from state government websites either through election results for elected officials—building on Ferrer, Geyn, and Thompson (2023)—or from directories of these officials. I acquire the lists from a mix of archived websites, state election publications, and public information requests. Where state-level data is not available, I search one county at a time, collecting data from past election results, archived website pages, or via direct communication with county offices. More details of the data collection can be found in Ferrer, Thompson, and Orey (2024).

Table A.1 displays data on the selected local election officials for each state, as well as the number of jurisdictions in the state, the number of jurisdictions with a full panel of data, the level of geography captured, the selection method of the officials, whether the modal official captured in each state is the sole and/or primary election authority, the data sources used, and the start and end year of the data collected.

Table A.1: Local Election Officials Captured in the Dataset

State	Jurisdictions	Jurisdictions Used	Geography	Election Official	Selection Method	Sole Authority	Primary Authority	Data Source	Data Start	Data End
Alabama	67	67	County	Probate Judge	Elected	No	Yes	Elections and State	1996	2024
Alaska	5	4	Region	Regional Election Supervisor	Appointed	Yes	Yes	State	2000	2024
Arizona	15	15	County	County Election Administrator / County Recorder	Mixed	No	Yes	State	2000	2024
Arkansas	75	75	County	Clerk	Elected	No	Yes	State	2000	2024
California	58	58	County	Clerk / Registrar of Voters / Auditor / Director of Elections	Mixed	Yes	Yes	State	1996	2024
Colorado	64	63	County	Clerk and Recorder	Mixed	Yes	Yes	Elections and State	1998	2024
Connecticut	178	171	Municipal	Clerk	Mixed	No	No	State	2000	2024
Delaware	3	3	County	Director of Elections	Appointed	No	No	State	1996	2024
Florida	67	67	County	Supervisor of Elections	Mixed	No	Yes	Elections and State	1998	2024
Georgia	159	159	County	Elections Director / Probate Judge	Mixed	No	No	Elections and State	1996	2024
Hawaii	5	4	County	Clerk	Appointed	Yes	Yes	State	2000	2024
Idaho	44	44	County	Clerk	Elected	Yes	Yes	Elections	2000	2024
Illinois	102	102	County	Clerk / Executive Director	Mixed	Yes	Yes	Elections and State	2000	2024
Indiana	92	92	County	Clerk	Elected	No	Yes	Elections and State	1998	2024
Iowa	99	99	County	Auditor	Elected	Yes	Yes	Elections and State	2000	2024
Kansas	105	105	County	Clerk	Elected	Yes	Yes	State	2000	2024
Kentucky	120	120	County	Clerk	Elected	No	Yes	Elections and State	1998	2024
Louisiana	64	64	Parish	Clerk of Court	Elected	No	Yes	State	2000	2024
Maine	504	502	Municipal	Clerk	Mixed	No	Yes	State	1998	2024
Maryland	24	24	County	Election Director	Appointed	No	No	State	2000	2024
Massachusetts	351	0	Municipal	Clerk / Elections Commissioner	Mixed	No	Yes	Verified Voting	2012	2024
Michigan	83	83	County	Clerk	Elected	No	No	State and NGO	2000	2024
Minnesota	87	87	County	Auditor / Election Director	Mixed	No	Yes	State	2000	2024
Mississippi	82	82	County	Circuit Clerk	Elected	No	No	State	2000	2024
Missouri	115	110	County	Clerk / Director of Elections	Elected	Yes	Yes	State	2000	2024
Montana	56	56	County	Clerk and Recorder / Election Administrator	Mixed	Yes	Yes	Elections and State	1996	2024
Nebraska	93	93	County	Clerk / Election Commissioner	Mixed	Yes	Yes	Elections and State	2000	2024
Nevada	17	17	County	Clerk / Registrar of Voters	Mixed	Yes	Yes	Elections and State	2000	2024
New Hampshire	234	234	Municipal	Clerk	Mixed	No	No	State and NGO	2000	2024
New Jersey	21	21	County	Clerk	Elected	No	No	State	2000	2024
New Mexico	33	33	County	Clerk	Elected	No	Yes	Elections and State	2000	2024
New York	62	58	County	Election Commissioner	Appointed	No	No	State	2000	2024
North Carolina	100	100	County	Election Director	Appointed	No	No	State	2000	2024
North Dakota	53	53	County	Auditor	Elected	Yes	Yes	State	2000	2024
Ohio	88	88	County	County Election Director	Appointed	No	No	State and Local	2000	2024
Oklahoma	77	77	County	Election Board Secretary	Appointed	No	No	State	1996	2024
Oregon	36	36	County	Clerk / Elections Director	Mixed	Yes	Yes	State	2000	2024
Pennsylvania	67	67	County	Director of Elections	Appointed	No	Yes	State	2000	2024
Rhode Island	39	39	Municipal	Clerk / Registrar / Election Director	Mixed	No	Yes	State and Local	2000	2024
South Carolina	46	46	County	Director of Voter Registration and Elections	Appointed	No	No	State	2000	2024
South Dakota	66	64	County	Auditor	Mixed	Yes	Yes	Elections and State	2000	2024
Tennessee	95	95	County	Administrator of Elections	Appointed	No	No	State	2000	2024
Texas	254	254	County	Elections Administrator / Clerk / Tax Assessor	Mixed	No	Yes	State	2000	2024
Utah	29	29	County	Clerk	Elected	Yes	Yes	Elections and State	1998	2024
Vermont	246	246	Municipal	Clerk	Mixed	No	Yes	State	2000	2024
Virginia	133	133	County	General Registrar	Appointed	No	Yes	State and Local	1998	2024
Washington	39	39	County	Auditor / Elections Director	Elected	Yes	Yes	Elections, State, and NGO	2000	2024
West Virginia	55	55	County	Clerk / Elections Coordinator	Mixed	No	Yes	Elections and State	2000	2024
Wisconsin	1851	1779	Municipal	Clerk	Mixed	No	Yes	State	2000	2024
Wyoming	23	23	County	Clerk	Elected	Yes	Yes	Elections and State	1998	2024


Number of jurisdictions are total number of jurisdictions in that state. Jurisdictions Used are the number of jurisdictions with a full panel of data between 2000 and 2024 and used in the main analysis. In states where multiple officials are coded, a ‘/’ separates each distinct official and they are listed in order by frequency. I aim to code the official in each jurisdiction with primary authority to administer elections, especially those who oversee voting administration on Election Day. In jurisdictions with boards, I identify the single official with the most responsibility in running elections. In New York, no single individual could be identified so I code the two election commissioners in each jurisdiction. I exclude jurisdictions in other states where no single individual could be identified. I was unable to collect municipal-level data in Michigan, so instead code the most important county-level official. I was unable to collect data on municipal moderators in New Hampshire, so instead code the municipal clerk. Selection method indicates whether all officials coded in each state are elected or appointed to their position in that jurisdiction, excepting local legislative bodies that determine election administration budgets and appointing bodies whose sole purpose is to select a chief election official. Primary authority indicates whether the official coded is in charge of the majority of election administration responsibilities in the jurisdiction. For both columns, the modal coded official in the state is classified. For election source, ‘State’ indicates the data derives from the state election authority; ‘Elections’ indicates the data derives from election results, and ‘NGO’ indicates the data derives from a state-level independent organization, typically a state association of election officials. The date ranges indicate the maximal amount of data captured for each state, although only data from 2000 onwards is used in the analysis.

## A.2 Data Map of Jurisdictions Used in Observational Analysis

Observational data analysis of the effects of minority election administration is limited to county jurisdictions where a single individual has primary responsibility to run elections. This is to ensure that the analysis focuses on places where we should expect to find an effect, if one exists. Because the L2 data is available for all even-year general elections between 2014 and 2020, those are the years that compromise the data panel. Figure A.1 maps counties by data availability used in the observational analysis.


In total, these restrictions mean I conduct statistical analysis on a set of 4,453 unique local election officials, encompassing 2,861 jurisdictions across 4 election cycles. I have complete manual race coding between 2014 and 2020 for 1,161 local election officials across 949 jurisdictions.

**Figure A.1: Map of Local Election Official Racial Data Availability For Observational Analysis, 2014-2020.** This graph displays the best panel data of local election official/race ethnicity available in each county used in statistical analysis. Counties in light blue have complete subjective researcher-collected data between 2014 and 2020. Counties in dark blue do not have complete subjective race data, but do have BISG-derived estimates of election official race/ethnicity between 2014 and 2020. Counties in grey are not in scope, either because their elections are administered at the municipal level or there is not an single individual election official with primary responsibility to run elections. Counties in black are not in the data.




### **A.3 Additional Descriptive Data Visualizations of Changes in Racial Composition of Local Election Officials**


**Figure A.2: Local Election Administrator Race By State, 2000-2024 - Preferred Data.** This figure displays over time change in the race/ethnicity of local election officials over the past 25 years, broken down by state. The race data comes from subjective researcher-coded race imputation where available and BISG race imputation otherwise.




**Figure A.3: Local Election Administrator Race By State, 2000-2024 - BISG Data.** This figure displays over time change in the race/ethnicity of local election officials over the past 25 years, broken down by state. The race data comes from BISG race imputation.




**Figure A.4: Local Election Administrator Race By State, 2000-2024 - Manual Data.** This figure displays over time change in the race/ethnicity of local election officials over the past 25 years, broken down by state, for states with at least 10 jurisdictions with panel data of subjective researcher-coded races. Only jurisdictions with complete panel data are included in this graph.



**Figure A.5: Local Election Administrator Race Map, 2000-2024 - Preferred Data.**  
This figure displays over time change in the race/ethnicity of local election officials over the past 25 years using subjective researcher-coded race imputation where available and BISG race imputation otherwise.



**Figure A.6: Local Election Administrator Race Map, 2000-2024 - Manual Data.**  
This figure displays over time change in the race/ethnicity of local election officials over the past 25 years using subjective researcher-coded race imputation.



## A.4 Replicating Main Results Using Alternative Race Data Specifications

In this section, I replicate the main results with four alternate data specifications: (1) using only manually race-coded data, (2) using only manually race-coded data in jurisdictions with a complete panel of data between 2014 and 2020, (3) using only manual race-coded panel data in jurisdictions where the local election official wields strong authority (they undertake nearly all administrative duties), and (4) jurisdictions where the local election official wields sole authority (they undertake all administrative duties). These data specifications grow increasingly restrictive but are the cases we should be most likely to observe effects. In each case, I replicate five main specifications: Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

Across all specifications, the same basic story remains: there is little apparent effect on minority voter turnout or election administration outcomes when a county switches from a white official to non-white official.

### A.4.1 Manual Race-Coded Data

Table A.2: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect Black Participation Rates (Manual Race, 2014-2020)

	Black Voter Turnout (1)	Black Turnout Share (2)	Black Reg (3)	Black Reg Share (4)
Minority	-0.0002 (0.008)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.0003 (0.002)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,758	3,787	2,758	3,787

Table A.3: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect Latino Participation Rates (Manual Race, 2014-2020)

	Latino Voter Turnout (1)	Latino Turnout Share (2)	Latino Reg (3)	Latino Reg Share (4)
Minority	-0.003 (0.009)	0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.011)	0.002 (0.002)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,154	3,787	3,154	3,787

Table A.4: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect Asian Participation Rates (Manual Race, 2014-2020)

	Asian Voter Turnout (1)	Asian Turnout Share (2)	Asian Reg (3)	Asian Reg Share (4)
Minority	0.016 (0.015)	0.002 (0.001)	0.012 (0.016)	0.001 (0.0004)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,718	3,787	1,718	3,787

Table A.5: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect White Participation Rates (Manual Race, 2014-2020)

	White Voter Turnout (1)	White Turnout Share (2)	White Reg (3)	White Reg Share (4)
Minority	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.003)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,787	3,787	3,787	3,787

Table A.6: Minority Election Officials Pursue Similar Administration Policies (Manual Race, 2014-2020)

	Polling Places	Prov Share	Prov Rejection	Absentee Rejection	Reg Removal	Wait Share
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Minority	-0.052 (0.080)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.006 (0.045)	0.006 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.018)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,464	3,440	2,698	3,420	3,645	2,575

## A.4.2 Manual Race-Coded Panel

Table A.7: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect Black Participation Rates (Manual Race Panel, 2014-2020)

	Black Voter Turnout (1)	Black Turnout Share (2)	Black Reg (3)	Black Reg Share (4)
Minority	0.001 (0.009)	0.0005 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.002)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,259	2,968	2,259	2,968

Table A.8: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect Latino Participation Rates (Manual Race Panel, 2014-2020)

	Latino Voter Turnout (1)	Latino Turnout Share (2)	Latino Reg (3)	Latino Reg Share (4)
Minority	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.0004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.012)	0.002 (0.002)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,471	2,968	2,471	2,968

Table A.9: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect Asian Participation Rates (Manual Race Panel, 2014-2020)

	Asian Voter Turnout (1)	Asian Turnout Share (2)	Asian Reg (3)	Asian Reg Share (4)
Minority	0.016 (0.015)	0.002 (0.001)	0.012 (0.016)	0.001 (0.0004)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,415	2,968	1,415	2,968

Table A.10: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect White Participation Rates (Manual Race Panel, 2014-2020)

	White Voter Turnout (1)	White Turnout Share (2)	White Reg (3)	White Reg Share (4)
Minority	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.003)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,968	2,968	2,968	2,968

Table A.11: Minority Election Officials Pursue Similar Administration Policies (Manual Race Panel, 2014-2020)

	Polling Places	Prov Share	Prov Rejection	Absentee Rejection	Reg Removal	Wait Share
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Minority	-0.058 (0.088)	0.001 (0.002)	0.009 (0.045)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.0003 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.018)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,299	2,741	2,177	2,642	2,865	2,053

### A.4.3 Manual Race-Coded Panel - Strong Authority

Table A.12: Minority Election Officials With Strong Authority Do Not Affect Black Participation Rates (Manual Race Panel, 2014-2020)

	Black Voter Turnout (1)	Black Turnout Share (2)	Black Reg (3)	Black Reg Share (4)
Minority	0.004 (0.017)	0.002 (0.005)	0.017 (0.025)	-0.002 (0.002)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	909	1,396	909	1,396

Table A.13: Minority Election Officials With Strong Authority Do Not Affect Latino Participation Rates (Manual Race Panel, 2014-2020)

	Latino Voter Turnout (1)	Latino Turnout Share (2)	Latino Reg (3)	Latino Reg Share (4)
Minority	-0.020 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.017)	0.003 (0.003)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,170	1,396	1,170	1,396

Table A.14: Minority Election Officials With Strong Authority Do Not Affect Asian Participation Rates (Manual Race Panel, 2014-2020)

	Asian Voter Turnout (1)	Asian Turnout Share (2)	Asian Reg (3)	Asian Reg Share (4)
Minority	0.001 (0.015)	0.001 (0.001)	0.007 (0.025)	0.0002 (0.001)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	718	1,396	718	1,396

Table A.15: Minority Election Officials With Strong Authority Do Not Affect White Participation Rates (Manual Race Panel, 2014-2020)

	White Voter Turnout (1)	White Turnout Share (2)	White Reg (3)	White Reg Share (4)
Minority	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.0002 (0.005)	-0.0005 (0.005)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,396	1,396	1,396	1,396

Table A.16: Minority Election Officials With Strong Authority Pursue Similar Administration Policies (Manual Race Panel, 2014-2020)

	Polling Places	Prov Share	Prov Rejection	Absentee Rejection	Reg Removal	Wait Share
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Minority	0.006 (0.020)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.011 (0.048)	0.001 (0.002)	0.006 (0.011)	0.004 (0.020)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	533	1,310	1,043	1,385	1,354	918

#### A.4.4 Manual Race-Coded Panel - Sole Authority

Table A.17: Minority Election Officials With Sole Authority Do Not Affect Black Participation Rates (Manual Race Panel, 2014-2020)

	Black Voter Turnout (1)	Black Turnout Share (2)	Black Reg (3)	Black Reg Share (4)
Minority	0.043 (0.039)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.098 (0.061)	-0.002 (0.002)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	551	1,024	551	1,024

Table A.18: Minority Election Officials With Sole Authority Do Not Affect Latino Participation Rates (Manual Race Panel, 2014-2020)

	Latino Voter Turnout (1)	Latino Turnout Share (2)	Latino Reg (3)	Latino Reg Share (4)
Minority	0.006 (0.013)	0.002 (0.008)	0.010 (0.019)	0.003 (0.005)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	817	1,024	817	1,024

Table A.19: Minority Election Officials With Sole Authority Do Not Affect Asian Participation Rates (Manual Race Panel, 2014-2020)

	Asian Voter Turnout (1)	Asian Turnout Share (2)	Asian Reg (3)	Asian Reg Share (4)
Minority	-0.015 (0.012)	0.003 (0.003)	0.008 (0.010)	0.0002 (0.002)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	488	1,024	488	1,024

Table A.20: Minority Election Officials With Sole Authority Do Not Affect White Participation Rates (Manual Race Panel, 2014-2020)

	White Voter Turnout (1)	White Turnout Share (2)	White Reg (3)	White Reg Share (4)
Minority	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.011 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.008)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,024	1,024	1,024	1,024

Table A.21: Minority Election Officials With Sole Authority Pursue Similar Administration Policies (Manual Race Panel, 2014-2020)

	Polling Places (1)	Prov Share (2)	Prov Rejection (3)	Absentee Rejection (4)	Reg Removal (5)	Wait Share (6)
Minority	0.017 (0.034)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.164 (0.072)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.019 (0.029)	0.011 (0.012)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	349	950	699	1,015	982	596

## A.5 Analysis of Southern States Using Voter-Provided Race Data

In this section, I conduct a robustness test of the main analysis using higher-quality administrative data from the three states where it is usefully available; Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. Rather than BISG-imputed race in the voter file, in these states voters provide their race on the registration form.

Table A.22 displays difference-in-differences specifications testing the effects of minority election administration on Black voter participation, Table A.23 shows the effects on Latino participation, Table A.24 shows the effects on Asian participation, and Table A.25 shows the effects on white participation. As in the main analysis, Black, Asian, and Latino election officials are pooled together as minority officials to maximize statistical power.

In all four tables, column 1, my preferred specification, uses a combination of Georgia administrative and L2 voter file data from 2014 onward to test the effects of minority election administration on minority voter turnout. Column 2 uses both Georgia administrative data and the full L2 data, calculating turnout rates back to 1996. For Tables A.22 and A.25 testing Black and white turnout rates, respectively, there is enough administrative data from Georgia to use it exclusively. This is done in column 3. In all four tables, the final column tests race-specific registration rates using administrative data. The results are in line with the main analysis, revealing near-zero point estimates that are precisely estimated.

I also run a set of specifications using race-specific turnout and registration shares. Tables A.26 show participation shares for Blacks, Latinos, Asians, and whites, respectively. The results are similarly null and more precisely estimated.

Table A.22: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect Black Participation Rates (AL, FL, and GA, 1996-2022)

	Black Voter Turnout		Black Reg	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Minority	0.001 (0.010)	0.007 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.016)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Data	Admin + L2	Admin + L2 Full	Admin	Admin
Observations	1,641	2,184	842	2,447

Table A.23: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect Latino Participation Rates (AL, FL, and GA, 1996-2022)

	Latino Voter Turnout		Latino Reg
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Minority	-0.009 (0.013)	0.002 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.013)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Data	Admin + L2	Admin + L2 Full	Admin
Observations	944	1,587	1,230

Table A.24: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect Asian Participation Rates (AL, FL, and GA, 1996-2022)

	Asian Voter Turnout	Asian Reg	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Minority	0.020 (0.015)	0.002 (0.016)	0.014 (0.032)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Data	Admin + L2	Admin + L2 Full	Admin
Observations	518	887	631

Table A.25: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect White Participation Rates (AL, FL, and GA, 1996-2022)

	White Voter Turnout	White Reg		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Minority	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.030)	-0.021 (0.013)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Data	Admin + L2	Admin + L2 Full	Admin	Admin
Observations	1,682	2,228	879	2,495

Table A.26: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect Share of Black Participation (AL, FL, and GA, 1996-2022)

	Black Turnout Share			Black Reg Share
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Minority	0.004 (0.004)	0.005 (0.003)	0.001 (0.009)	0.014 (0.006)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Data	Admin + L2	Admin + L2 Full	Admin	Admin
Observations	1,683	2,229	879	2,496

Table A.27: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect Share of Latino Participation (AL, FL, and GA, 1996-2022)

	Latino Turnout Share		Latino Reg Share
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Minority	-0.002 (0.005)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.004)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Data	Admin + L2	Admin + L2 Full	Admin
Observations	1,285	2,225	1,620

Table A.28: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect Share of Asian Participation (AL, FL, and GA, 1996-2022)

	Asian Turnout Share	Asian Reg Share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Minority	0.0004 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)	0.0005 (0.001)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Data	Admin + L2	Admin + L2 Full	Admin
Observations	1,117	2,216	1,139

Table A.29: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect Share of White Participation (AL, FL, and GA, 1996-2022)

	White Turnout Share	White Reg Share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Minority	0.0004 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	0.010 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.007)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Data	Admin + L2	Admin + L2 Full	Admin	Admin
Observations	1,683	2,229	879	2,496

## A.6 Coethnic Election Officials Produce Similar Levels of Participation as Non-Coethnic Officials

The main estimates presented in Section 5 pooled Black, Latino, and Asian local election officials together as minorities. In this section, I explore whether switching to a Black local election official improves Black participation rates and, similarly, whether switching to a Latino official improves Latino participation rates. Table A.30 shows the effects of coethnic representation on Blacks and Table A.31 shows the effects of coethnic representation on Latinos.

Table A.30: Black Election Officials Do Not Affect Black Participation Rates (Manual + Geocoded Races, 2014-2020)

	Black Voter Turnout (1)	Black Turnout Share (2)	Black Reg (3)	Black Reg Share (4)
Black LEO	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.003 (0.005)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,889	8,132	4,889	8,132

The results do not substantively differ from those presented in the main analysis. In fact, the point estimates are more negative than in the main analysis, though less precisely estimated giving the reduced power of the tests. It does not appear that coethnic representation in the local election official boosts turnout or registration.

Table A.31: Latino Election Officials Do Not Affect Latino Participation Rates (Manual + Geocoded Races, 2014-2020)

	Latino Turnout Share (1)	Latino Turnout Share (2)	Latino Reg (3)	Latino Reg Share (4)
Latino LEO	0.003 (0.006)	0.006 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.001 (0.002)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,202	8,132	6,202	8,132

### A.6.1 Minority and White Officials Administer Elections Similarly - Full Dataset

In the main analysis, I showed that minority and white local election officials administer elections similarly across a wide range of policies. The panel was limited to 2014-2020 to keep the data in line with the regressions displayed in Section 5.1. Table A.32 displays the results of an analysis using the full 2004-2022 panel of available data. More data significantly improves the precision of the estimates and flips the direction of some of the point estimates. Even so, all point estimates remain statistically indistinguishable from null results. I read this are further evidence that minority and white election officials administer elections in similar ways.

Table A.32: Minority Election Officials Pursue Similar Administration Policies (Manual + Geocoded Races, 2004-2022)

	Polling Places	Prov Share	Prov Rejection	Absentee Rejection	Reg Removal	Wait Share
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Minority	0.036 (0.026)	0.001 (0.001)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.010 (0.009)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	13,924	14,231	10,630	17,165	16,172	8,697

## A.7 Minority and White Officials Produce Similar Levels of Overall Voter Participation

Do minority election officials positively impact aggregate turnout and registration rates?

Table A.33 displays the results of a two-way fixed effects regression estimating the effects of switching from a white to a minority local election official on overall voter turnout, using the same 2014-2020 time-span as the main analysis and CVAP as the denominator. Column 1 shows that counties switching from white to minority election officials see an average increase in overall voter turnout of 0.1 percentage points. The result is precisely estimated and we can confidently rule out effects larger than 1 percentage point. Column 2 tightens the comparisons to counties within the same state with similar pretreatment demographic makeup, column 3 makes comparisons between counties with similar pretreatment populations, and column 4 compares counties with similar partisan makeups. In all three, the point estimate is close to 0.

Table A.33: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect Overall Turnout Rates (Manual + Geocoded Races, 2014-2020)

	Voter Turnout			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Minority	0.001 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	No	No	No
Year x State x Nonwhite FEs	No	Yes	No	No
Year x State x Pop FEs	No	No	Yes	No
Year x State x Dem VS FEs	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	8,132	8,132	8,132	8,132

Table A.34 displays the output of regression specifications testing the effects of minority local election administration on overall voter registration rates. The results are nearly identical to Table A.33, with near-zero point estimates that precisely estimated.<sup>17</sup>

Table A.34: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect Overall Registration Rates (Manual + Geocoded Races, 2014-2020)

	Voter Registration			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Minority	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	No	No	No
Year x State x Nonwhite FEs	No	Yes	No	No
Year x State x Pop FEs	No	No	Yes	No
Year x State x Dem VS FEs	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	8,132	8,132	8,132	8,132

Finally, because overall participation rates are not reliant on the L2 data, we are able to increase the length of the panel. I employ county-level turnout and registration data from Dave Leip's Election Atlas<sup>18</sup> and county-level voting-age population (VAP) from the U.S. National Cancer Institute.<sup>19</sup> Tables A.35 and A.36 display overall turnout and registration results, respectively, this time using the full 2000-2022 panel for voter turnout and 2000-2020 for registration rates. This analysis yields similar results, with the overall registration rates trending, if anything, slightly negative.

In sum, these findings suggest that minority election officials do not significantly improve voter participation rates, but rather oversee elections with similar levels of participation as white election officials.

<sup>17</sup>For both turnout and registration rates, regressions including only Presidential contests yield substantively identical findings.

<sup>18</sup><https://uselectionatlas.org/>

<sup>19</sup><https://seer.cancer.gov/popdata/>

Table A.35: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect Overall Turnout Rates (Manual + Geocoded Races, 2000-2022)

	Voter Turnout (VAP)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Minority	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	No	No	No
Year x State x Nonwhite FEs	No	Yes	No	No
Year x State x Pop FEs	No	No	Yes	No
Year x State x Dem VS FEs	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	24,396	24,396	24,396	24,396

Table A.36: Minority Election Officials Do Not Affect Overall Registration Rates (Manual + Geocoded Races, 2000-2020)

	Voter Registration			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Minority	-0.007 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.003)	-0.008 (0.003)
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	No	No	No
Year x State x Nonwhite FEs	No	Yes	No	No
Year x State x Pop FEs	No	No	Yes	No
Year x State x Dem VS FEs	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	23,760	23,760	23,760	23,760

## A.8 Pilot Survey Appendix

I conducted a pilot survey experiment as part of the 2023 UCLA REPS Lab Omnibus Survey. This survey was a multi-investigator study run by Efrén Pérez and fielded between March and June 2023. It included a convenience sample of 548 undergraduate participants from UCLA, U Riverside, UC Irvine, and Howard University recruited by professors in high-enrollment political science courses and received approval by the UCLA IRB prior to fielding. The survey asked a range of demographic questions about each participant before the experimental modules. Respondents were debriefed at the end of the study about the fictitious nature of the vignette description and the purpose of the experiment. Respondents received course credit for participation in the study and were notified about their right to choose not to participate or withdraw from participation at any time.

Respondents read a short vignette of a local election official who was described as determining the eligibility of absentee ballots in Fayette County, GA in the 2020 presidential election, a salient election and county. The race/ethnicity of the official was included in the description, as well as their job tenure, party affiliation, age, geographic background, and views on voter identification and absentee voting. Respondents were randomly assigned into two conditions: one describing the official as white (control) and one describing the official as the same race/ethnicity as the respondent (treatment). All other variables were held constant. Respondents were asked two questions: whether they trust that official to fairly administer elections, and whether they would be more or less likely to vote if that official was their election administrator. Both were measured on a 5-point Likert response scale. The full module instrument can be found in the following appendix subsection.

Table A.37 displays difference-in-means estimations pooled across Black, Latino, and Asian respondents. Column 1 shows that respondents tend to trust co-ethnic local election officials to fairly administer elections slightly more than white election officials, on average. Minority respondents give an average trust rating of 3.12 out of 5 to co-ethnic election officials, compared with 2.91 to white officials otherwise identically described, a standardized

effect size of 0.24. Column 2 shows that minority respondents report being slightly more likely to vote when their election official shares their ethnic/racial affiliation than when they are white, although the effect size is similarly modest. Regressions run separately for Black, Latino, and Asian respondents, found in A.9 in the Online Appendix, yield similar results.

Table A.37: Experiment: Coethnic Local Election Officials Boost Voter Confidence and Participation Willingness

	Trust Official (1)	Likelier to Vote (2)
Coethnic LEO	0.209* (0.112)	0.224** (0.094)
Constant	2.906*** (0.079)	2.838*** (0.066)
Observations	230	230

Table A.38 displays difference-in-means regressions run separately for Black, Latino, and Asian respondents. The results are noisier due to the small sample sizes, though they provide a similar overall picture of modest positive effects due to descriptive representation.

The results show some evidence that descriptive representation among election officials matters, but the magnitude of the effect is rather small.

Table A.38: Experiment: Coethnic Local Election Officials Boost Voter Confidence and Participation Willingness

	Trust Official			Likelier to Vote		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Coethnic LEO	0.151 (0.163)	0.322* (0.169)	0.118 (0.343)	-0.151 (0.139)	0.554*** (0.119)	0.529 (0.320)
Constant	2.925*** (0.115)	2.957*** (0.117)	2.706*** (0.243)	3.038*** (0.098)	2.702*** (0.082)	2.588*** (0.226)
Race	Latino	Asian	Black	Latino	Asian	Black
Observations	106	90	34	106	90	34

### A.8.1 Pilot Survey Instrument

This section includes the pilot survey instrument module as part of the 2023 UCLA REPS Lab Omnibus Survey.

For Black respondents: Don Brown has been the Elections Administrator of Fayette County, Georgia for the past eight years. He is [Black/white], identifies with the Democratic Party, is 53 years of age, and has lived in Fayette County his whole life. Don supports stricter voter identification laws and expanding absentee voting opportunities for voters. In the 2020 presidential election, he was in charge of determining the eligibility of 10,000 absentee ballots received by the county, and rejected those that did not meet state requirements.

Do you trust Don Brown to fairly administer elections? 1 = Strongly distrust, 2 = distrust, 3= neither trust nor distrust, 4 = trust, 5 = strongly trust

If Don Brown was your election administrator, would you be more or less likely to vote in the next presidential election? 1 = Much less likely, 2 = less likely, 3 = no difference, 4 = more likely, 5 = much more likely

For Latino respondents: [David Marin/ Davíd Marín] has been the Elections Administrator of Fayette County, Georgia for the past eight years. He is [Latino/white], identifies with the Democratic Party, is 53 years of age, and has lived in Fayette County his whole life. Don supports stricter voter identification laws and expanding absentee voting opportunities for voters. In the 2020 presidential election, he was in charge of determining the eligibility of 10,000 absentee ballots received by the county, and rejected those that did not meet state requirements.

Do you trust [David Marin/ Davíd Marín] to fairly administer elections? 1 = Strongly distrust, 2 = distrust, 3= neither trust nor distrust, 4 = trust, 5 = strongly trust

If [David Marin/ Davíd Marín] was your election administrator, would you be more or less likely to vote in the next presidential election? 1 = Much less likely, 2 = less likely, 3 = no difference, 4 = more likely, 5 = much more likely

For Asian respondents: Eric Lee has been the Elections Administrator of Fayette County, Georgia for the past eight years. He is [Asian/white], identifies with the Democratic Party, is 53 years of age, and has lived in Fayette County his whole life. Don supports stricter voter identification laws and expanding absentee voting opportunities for voters. In the 2020 presidential election, he was in charge of determining the eligibility of 10,000 absentee ballots received by the county, and rejected those that did not meet state requirements.

Do you trust Eric Lee to fairly administer elections? 1 = Strongly distrust, 2 = distrust, 3= neither trust nor distrust, 4 = trust, 5 = strongly trust

If Eric Lee was your election administrator, would you be more or less likely to vote in the next presidential election? 1 = Much less likely, 2 = less likely, 3 = no difference, 4 = more likely, 5 = much more likely

## A.9 Experimental Survey Appendix

The survey received approval from the UCLA IRB Review Board prior to fielding.

### A.9.1 Vignette Experiment Additional Analysis

Table A.39 presents formal regression output for Figure 4. Table A.40 includes controls for age, gender, education, income, party, ideology, political awareness, 2020 presidential vote, and evangelical. Tables A.41 and A.42 show separate results for Black, Hispanic, and Asian respondents, with the latter table including controls.

Table A.39: Experiment: Coethnic Local Election Officials Boost Voter Confidence and Participation Willingness

	Trust Official	Likelier to Vote
	(1)	(2)
Coethnic LEO	0.210*** (0.053)	0.153*** (0.054)
Constant	-0.143*** (0.038)	-0.137*** (0.038)
Controls	No	No
Observations	1,400	1,400

Table A.40: Experiment: Coethnic Local Election Officials Boost Voter Confidence and Participation Willingness

	Trust Official		Likelier to Vote	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Coethnic LEO	0.210*** (0.053)	0.182*** (0.053)	0.153*** (0.054)	0.174*** (0.055)
age		0.007*** (0.002)		0.012*** (0.002)
woman		0.049 (0.055)		-0.027 (0.056)
educ4		-0.027 (0.028)		-0.007 (0.029)
income		0.030*** (0.007)		0.034*** (0.007)
partyIndependent		-0.104 (0.068)		-0.041 (0.070)
partyOther		-0.318*** (0.096)		-0.337*** (0.100)
partyRepublican		-0.252** (0.112)		-0.270** (0.116)
conservative		-0.101*** (0.031)		-0.058* (0.032)
politically_aware		0.020 (0.027)		0.044 (0.028)
vote_trump		-0.634*** (0.108)		-0.087 (0.111)
evangelical		0.077 (0.073)		0.179** (0.075)
Constant	-0.143*** (0.038)	-0.148 (0.123)	-0.137*** (0.038)	-0.563*** (0.127)
Observations	1,400	801,338	1,400	1,338

Table A.41: Experiment: Coethnic Local Election Officials Boost Voter Confidence and Participation Willingness

	Trust Official			Likelier to Vote		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Coethnic LEO	0.071 (0.083)	0.366*** (0.095)	0.094 (0.098)	0.203** (0.084)	0.174* (0.096)	-0.034 (0.100)
Constant	-0.047 (0.058)	-0.201*** (0.067)	-0.071 (0.070)	-0.163*** (0.059)	-0.132* (0.068)	-0.012 (0.072)
Race	Black	Asian	Hispanic	Black	Asian	Hispanic
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	590	393	417	590	393	417

Table A.42: Experiment: Coethnic Local Election Officials Boost Voter Confidence and Participation Willingness

	Trust Official			Likelier to Vote		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Coethnic LEO	0.087 (0.082)	0.292*** (0.095)	0.134 (0.098)	0.254*** (0.080)	0.186* (0.097)	-0.040 (0.109)
age	0.005 (0.003)	0.015*** (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)
woman	0.049 (0.089)	0.113 (0.096)	0.113 (0.105)	0.256*** (0.087)	-0.200** (0.098)	-0.149 (0.116)
educ4	-0.053 (0.046)	-0.043 (0.052)	-0.023 (0.055)	-0.015 (0.045)	-0.027 (0.053)	0.056 (0.061)
income	0.044*** (0.012)	0.010 (0.014)	0.008 (0.012)	0.081*** (0.012)	0.007 (0.015)	-0.015 (0.013)
partyIndependent	-0.029 (0.107)	-0.198 (0.123)	-0.179 (0.124)	-0.029 (0.104)	0.025 (0.126)	-0.251* (0.138)
partyOther	-0.107 (0.140)	-0.524*** (0.184)	-0.451** (0.187)	-0.320** (0.136)	-0.419** (0.189)	-0.243 (0.208)
partyRepublican	-0.078 (0.207)	-0.553*** (0.191)	-0.210 (0.200)	0.049 (0.202)	-0.527*** (0.197)	-0.219 (0.222)
conservative	-0.140*** (0.049)	-0.009 (0.054)	-0.155** (0.064)	-0.158*** (0.048)	0.066 (0.056)	-0.106 (0.071)
politically_aware	0.077* (0.043)	0.003 (0.046)	0.041 (0.056)	0.015 (0.042)	0.111** (0.047)	-0.019 (0.062)
vote_trump	-0.849*** (0.208)	-0.412** (0.175)	-0.774*** (0.190)	-0.459** (0.202)	-0.089 (0.180)	0.478** (0.210)
evangelical	0.122 (0.096)	0.015 (0.152)	0.315* (0.181)	0.288*** (0.093)	-0.065 (0.156)	0.448** (0.200)
Constant	-0.007 (0.205)	-0.451** (0.214)	0.228 (0.227)	-0.859*** (0.200)	-0.682*** (0.220)	0.213 (0.252)
Race	Black	Asian	82 Hispanic	Black	Asian	Hispanic
Observations	566	381	391	566	381	391

## A.9.2 Conjoint Experiment Additional Analysis

The following three tables are tabular output for the conjoint visualizes displayed in the main text.

Table A.43: Local Election Official Conjoint Experiment AMCEs

Feature	Level	Estiamte	Std. Error
Party	Independent	0	
	Republican	-0.096	(0.01)
	Democrat	-0.041	(0.01)
Age	30 years old	0	
	50 years old	0.005	(0.009)
	70 years old	-0.072	(0.01)
Sex	Male	0	
	Female	0.022	(0.008)
Race	White	0	
	Asian	0.014	(0.011)
	Hispanic	0.019	(0.012)
Experience	Black	0.015	(0.011)
	2 years	0	
	5 years	0.095	(0.01)
Require ID	10 years	0.182	(0.01)
	Opposes	0	
	Supports	0.126	(0.01)
Expand VBM	Opposes	0	
	Supports	0.108	(0.009)

Additionally, I include visualizations and tabular output comparing white and minority preferences. The findings are congruent with the evidence presented in the main analysis. Non-whites prefer POCs to whites and that they have more intensive preferences for race than do whites.

Table A.44: Local Election Official Conjoint Experiment AMCEs - By Race

Respondent	Feature	Level	Estimate	Std. Error
White	Party	Independent	0	
		Republican	-0.096	(0.013)
		Democrat	-0.048	(0.013)
	Age	30 years old	0	
		50 years old	0.009	(0.012)
		70 years old	-0.048	(0.013)
	Sex	Male	0	
		Female	0.028	(0.01)
	Race	White	0	
		Asian	0.003	(0.014)
		Hispanic	0.013	(0.015)
		Black	0.011	(0.014)
Asian	Experience	2 years	0	
		5 years	0.095	(0.012)
		10 years	0.174	(0.012)
	Require ID	Opposes	0	
		Supports	0.149	(0.012)
	Expand VBM	Opposes	0	
		Supports	0.104	(0.012)
		Opposes	0	
		Supports	0.135	(0.026)
Hispanic	Party	Independent	0	
		Republican	-0.128	(0.027)
		Democrat	-0.042	(0.032)
	Age	30 years old	0	
		50 years old	0.026	(0.027)
		70 years old	-0.121	(0.034)
	Sex	Male	0	
		Female	0.017	(0.023)
	Race	White	0	
		Asian	0.073	(0.034)
		Hispanic	0.047	(0.035)
		Black	0.015	(0.035)
Black	Experience	2 years	0	
		5 years	0.107	(0.033)
		10 years	0.193	(0.031)
	Require ID	Opposes	0	
		Supports	0.073	(0.028)
	Expand VBM	Opposes	0	
		Supports	0.115	(0.027)
		Opposes	0	
		Supports	0.135	(0.021)

Table A.45: Local Election Official Conjoint Experiment AMCEs - Race Diff

Comparison	Feature	Level	Estiamte	Std. Error
Asian - White	Age	50 years old	-0.068	(0.03)
		70 years old	-0.070	(0.032)
	Experience	10 years	0.023	(0.032)
		5 years	-0.010	(0.028)
	Expand VBM	Supports	0.031	(0.029)
		Democrat	0.045	(0.027)
		Republican	0.037	(0.031)
	Race	Asian	0.057	(0.034)
		Black	-0.022	(0.035)
		Hispanic	-0.010	(0.034)
Black - White	Require ID	Supports	-0.076	(0.03)
		Female	-0.024	(0.025)
	Age	50 years old	-0.037	(0.027)
		70 years old	-0.077	(0.027)
	Experience	10 years	0.031	(0.027)
		5 years	-0.005	(0.025)
	Expand VBM	Supports	0.031	(0.024)
		Democrat	0.003	(0.027)
		Republican	-0.021	(0.027)
Hispanic - White	Race	Asian	0.007	(0.03)
		Black	0.059	(0.029)
		Hispanic	0.025	(0.031)
	Require ID	Supports	-0.061	(0.028)
		Female	-0.018	(0.022)
	Age	50 years old	0.017	(0.03)
		70 years old	-0.072	(0.036)
	Experience	10 years	0.019	(0.033)
		5 years	0.012	(0.035)
	Expand VBM	Supports	0.011	(0.03)
		Democrat	0.006	(0.034)
		Republican	-0.032	(0.03)
	Race	Asian	0.069	(0.037)
		Black	0.004	(0.038)
		Hispanic	0.035	(0.038)
	Require ID	Supports	-0.075	(0.03)
		Female	-0.010	(0.025)


Table A.46: Local Election Official Conjoint Experiment AMCEs - By White

Respondent	Feature	Level	Estiamte	Std. Error
White	Party	Independent	0	
		Republican	-0.096	(0.013)
		Democrat	-0.048	(0.013)
	Age	30 years old	0	
		50 years old	0.009	(0.012)
		70 years old	-0.048	(0.013)
	Sex	Male	0	
		Female	0.028	(0.01)
	Race	White	0	
		Asian	0.003	(0.014)
		Hispanic	0.013	(0.015)
		Black	0.011	(0.014)
Nonwhite	Experience	2 years	0	
		5 years	0.095	(0.012)
		10 years	0.174	(0.012)
	Require ID	Opposes	0	
		Supports	0.149	(0.012)
	Expand VBM	Opposes	0	
		Supports	0.104	(0.012)
	Party	Independent	0	
		Republican	-0.098	(0.016)
		Democrat	-0.030	(0.017)
	Age	30 years old	0	
		50 years old	-0.005	(0.015)
		70 years old	-0.118	(0.017)
	Sex	Male	0	
		Female	0.011	(0.013)
	Race	White	0	
		Asian	0.035	(0.018)
		Hispanic	0.030	(0.018)
		Black	0.022	(0.018)
	Experience	2 years	0	
		5 years	0.096	(0.017)
		10 years	0.198	(0.017)
	Require ID	Opposes	0	
		Supports	0.083	(0.015)
	Expand VBM	Opposes	0	
		Supports	0.117	(0.015)


Table A.47: Local Election Official Conjoint Experiment AMCEs - White Diff

Comparison	Feature	Level	Estiamte	Std. Error
Nonwhite - White	Age	50 years old	-0.015	(0.019)
		70 years old	-0.069	(0.021)
	Experience	10 years	0.023	(0.021)
		5 years	0	(0.021)
	Expand VBM	Supports	0.013	(0.019)
		Democrat	0.018	(0.021)
	Party	Republican	-0.002	(0.021)
	Race	Asian	0.032	(0.023)
		Black	0.011	(0.023)
		Hispanic	0.017	(0.024)
	Require ID	Supports	-0.066	(0.02)
		Female	-0.017	(0.016)

**Figure A.7: Conjoint Survey Experiment AMCEs - By White/Nonwhite.** This figure visualizes average marginal component effects of the local election official conjoint experiment conducted as part of the 2024 UCLA Representation Survey, with effects separated by white/nonwhite. 95% confidence intervals are illustrated. Point estimates of 0 without confidence intervals are the reference level for each attribute.



**Figure A.8: Conjoint Survey Experiment AMCEs - By White/Nonwhite.** This figure visualizes differences between racial minorities and whites in average marginal component effects of the local election official conjoint experiment. 95% confidence intervals are illustrated. Point estimates of 0 without confidence intervals are the reference level for each attribute.



### A.9.3 Information Provision Experiment Additional Analysis

Tables A.48 and A.49 correspond with Figures 8 and 9 in the main analysis, respectively.

Table A.48: Experiment: Revealing Info About Local Election Official Does Not Boost Voter Confidence (with controls)

	LEO Confidence	Vote Confidence	Juris Confidence	State Confidence	Nation Confidence	Fraud
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
LEO Info	-0.025 (0.040)	-0.018 (0.038)	-0.045 (0.039)	-0.022 (0.043)	-0.127*** (0.046)	0.035 (0.051)
LEO Info + Race	-0.001 (0.033)	-0.012 (0.032)	0.013 (0.033)	-0.009 (0.036)	-0.066* (0.039)	-0.024 (0.043)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,699	2,812	2,814	2,834	2,822	2,928

Table A.49: Experiment: Revealing Info About Local Election Official Does Not Boost Voter Confidence (POC Reveal, with controls)

	LEO Confidence	Vote Confidence	Juris Confidence	State Confidence	Nation Confidence	Fraud
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
LEO Info	-0.070 (0.126)	0.053 (0.108)	-0.150 (0.112)	-0.094 (0.117)	0.040 (0.119)	0.009 (0.153)
LEO Info + Race	-0.013 (0.107)	0.173* (0.093)	0.064 (0.098)	0.049 (0.102)	0.110 (0.104)	-0.216 (0.133)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	363	384	386	388	382	403

Table A.50 is similar to Table A.48 above, except it subsets respondents to POCs. The results show null effects on voter confidence, in line with the main analysis.

Table A.50: Experiment: Revealing Info About Local Election Official Does Not Boost Voter Confidence (POCs, with controls)

	LEO Confidence	Vote Confidence	Juris Confidence	State Confidence	Nation Confidence	Fraud
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
LEO Info	-0.047 (0.065)	-0.035 (0.060)	-0.121** (0.061)	-0.107 (0.066)	-0.077 (0.067)	0.026 (0.082)
LEO Info + Race	-0.065 (0.055)	-0.055 (0.050)	0.001 (0.052)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.063 (0.057)	-0.114 (0.069)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,178	1,240	1,249	1,262	1,252	1,308

#### **A.9.4 Experimental Survey Instrument**

This section includes the complete UCLA Representation Survey instrument, coded in Qualtrics, and fielded between April 29 and May 5, 2024 on CloudResearch Connect.

## Consent Block

We want to get your reactions to some things that are going on in the country. You can skip any question you do not wish to answer. The survey will take approximately 10 minutes to complete.

For more information you can review the study information sheet by visiting [this link](#) (this will open in a new tab).

Let's get started!

Now that you've seen the study information sheet are you ready to tell us what you think?

- Yes
- No

## NCAA Basketball 1

Did you watch any of the men's or women's NCAA college basketball tournament this year?

- Yes, I watched the men's tournament
- Yes, I watched the women's tournament
- Yes, I watched both tournaments
- No

The championship game of the men's basketball tournament was between Purdue and UConn. Did you root for one of these teams to win?

- Yes, I rooted for Purdue.
- Yes, I rooted for UConn.
- No, I didn't root for either team.

The championship game of the women's basketball tournament was between South Carolina and Iowa. Did you root for one of these teams to win?

- Yes, I rooted for South Carolina
- Yes, I rooted for Iowa
- No, I didn't root for either team

## NCAA Basketball 2

The championship game of the men's basketball tournament was between Purdue and UConn. Did you root for one of these teams to win?

- Yes, I rooted for Purdue.
- Yes, I rooted for UConn.
- No, I didn't root for either team.

The championship game of the women's basketball tournament was between South Carolina and Iowa. Did you root for one of these teams to win?

- Yes, I rooted for South Carolina
- Yes, I rooted for Iowa
- No, I didn't root for either team

## Demographic Block 1

Would you say things in this country today are...

- Generally headed in the right direction
- Off on the wrong track

Not sure

Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, while others understandably aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on...

- Most of the time
- Some of the time
- Only now and then
- Hardly at all

In the past 24 hours, have you gotten news from any of the following sources? Check all that apply.

- Local TV
- Local newspaper (print or digital)
- National TV
- National newspaper (print or digital)
- Social media
- Radio or podcast

Are you currently registered to vote or, like many people, are

you not registered to vote or not eligible to vote?

- Yes, registered to vote
- No, not registered
- No, not eligible to vote
- Not sure

## **Conjoint Experiment**

In the U.S., elections are run by counties or towns. Each local area elects or appoints a person to the job of running the elections. Their duties can include registering voters, recruiting volunteers to work the polls on Election Day, and certifying the election results.

We're interested in what kind of person you think should do this job. We are going to give you information about two candidates, who we'll call Candidate A and Candidate B, and ask you to make a choice between them. You will repeat this exercise multiple times.

**Candidate A**

**Candidate B**

Republican	Democrat
70 years old	70 years old
Male	Female
Hispanic	Hispanic
5 years of experience in election administration	5 years of experience in election administration
Opposes requiring voters to show a driver's license at the polls	Supports requiring voters to show a driver's license at the polls
Opposes increasing the number of people who vote by mail in elections	Opposes increasing the number of people who vote by mail in elections

If you had to make a choice, which candidate would you trust more to do the job well?

- Candidate A
- Candidate B

**Candidate A**

**Candidate B**


If you had to make a choice, which candidate would you trust more to do the job well?

- Candidate A
- Candidate B

### Candidate A


### Candidate B


If you had to make a choice, which candidate would you trust more to do the job well?

- Candidate A
- Candidate B

### Candidate A


### Candidate B


If you had to make a choice, which candidate would you trust more to do the job well?

- Candidate A
- Candidate B

## **Demographic block 2**

The next few questions are so we can get to know you a bit better.

What genres of music do you enjoy listening to? Check all that apply.

- Rock
- Pop
- Hip-hop/Rap
- Blues
- Classical
- Jazz
- R&B
- Soul
- Country
- Folk music

- Other
- I don't listen to much music

When it comes to politics, do you think of yourself as liberal, moderate, or conservative?

- Very Liberal
- Somewhat Liberal
- Moderate
- Somewhat Conservative
- Very Conservative
- None of these

Some people have multiple racial and ethnic identities. Which of the following do you consider to be a part of your racial or ethnic makeup? Check as many as you think apply.

- White
- Hispanic or Latino
- Black or African American
- Asian American
- American Indian/Native American or Alaska Native
- Arab, Middle Eastern or North African
- Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
- Other

Even if they are all important, which of these would you consider your primary race or ethnicity, if you had to choose one?

- White
- Hispanic or Latino
- Black or African American
- Asian American
- American Indian/Native American or Alaska Native
- Arab, Middle Eastern or North African
- Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander

In the 2020 presidential election, a lot of people didn't vote because they were just too busy, not that interested in politics, or frankly didn't like their choices. Did you vote in this election?

- Yes, I am 100% certain I voted
- I think I voted
- I think I did not vote
- I am 100% certain I did not vote
- I was not eligible to vote

Who did you vote for in the 2020 presidential election?

- Donald Trump
- Joe Biden
- Some other candidate
- Not sure

Who would you have voted for in the 2020 presidential election, if you had cast a ballot?

- Donald Trump
- Joe Biden
- Some other candidate
- Not sure

Please select your current state of residence.

To make sure we have a representative sample of people from all across \${q://QID218/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}, please enter your five-digit zip code. For example: 90095

## **Vignette Experiment Transition**

For the next portion of the survey you'll read a statement. Please read this closely as you may be asked about the statement later.

### **Vignette Experiment - Black R-Black T**

Don Brown is being considered to oversee the 2024 presidential election in your area. Mr. Brown is a 53-year-old Black man with eight years of experience in election administration. A member of the Democratic Party, he supports requiring voters to show their driver's license at the polls and expanding opportunities for voters to cast their ballots in the mail. In the 2020 presidential election, Mr. Brown was in charge of determining the eligibility of ballots received by mail, and rejected those that did not meet state requirements.

How much do you trust Don Brown to count your vote fairly?

- Strongly distrust
- Distrust
- Neither trust nor distrust
- Trust
- Strongly trust

If Don Brown oversees the 2024 presidential election in your area, would you be more or less likely to vote in the November election?

- Much less likely
- Less likely
- No difference
- More likely
- Much more likely

## **Vignette Experiment – Black R-White T**

Don Brown is being considered to oversee the 2024 presidential election in your area. Mr. Brown is a 53-year-old white man with eight years of experience in election administration. A member of the Democratic Party, he

supports requiring voters to show their driver's license at the polls and expanding opportunities for voters to cast their ballots in the mail. In the 2020 presidential election, Mr. Brown was in charge of determining the eligibility of ballots received by mail, and rejected those that did not meet state requirements.

How much do you trust Don Brown to count your vote fairly?

- Strongly distrust
- Distrust
- Neither trust nor distrust
- Trust
- Strongly trust

If Don Brown oversees the 2024 presidential election in your area, would you be more or less likely to vote in the November election?

- Much less likely
- Less likely
- No difference
- More likely
- Much more likely

## Vignette Experiment - Hispanic R-Hispanic T

Davíd Martín is being considered to oversee the 2024 presidential election in your area. Mr. Martín is a 53-year-old Hispanic man with eight years of experience in election administration. A member of the Democratic Party, he supports requiring voters to show their driver's license at the polls and expanding opportunities for voters to cast their ballots in the mail. In the 2020 presidential election, Mr. Martín was in charge of determining the eligibility of ballots received by mail, and rejected those that did not meet state requirements.

How much do you trust Davíd Martín to count your vote fairly?

- Strongly distrust
- Distrust
- Neither trust nor distrust
- Trust
- Strongly trust

If David Martín oversees the 2024 presidential election in your area, would you be more or less likely to vote in the November election?

- Much less likely
- Less likely
- No difference
- More likely
- Much more likely

### **Vignette Experiment - Hispanic R-White T**

David Martin is being considered to oversee the 2024 presidential election in your area. Mr. Martin is a 53-year-old white man with eight years of experience in election administration. A member of the Democratic Party, he supports requiring voters to show their driver's license at the polls and expanding opportunities for voters to cast their ballots in the mail. In the 2020 presidential election, Mr. Martin was in charge of determining the eligibility of ballots received by mail, and rejected those that did not meet state requirements.

How much do you trust David Martin to count your vote fairly?

- Strongly distrust
- Distrust
- Neither trust nor distrust
- Trust
- Strongly trust

If David Martin oversees the 2024 presidential election in your area, would you be more or less likely to vote in the November election?

- Much less likely
- Less likely
- No difference
- More likely
- Much more likely

## **Vignette Experiment - Asian R-Asian T**

Eric Lee is being considered to oversee the 2024 presidential election in your area. Mr. Lee is a 53-year-old Asian man with eight years of experience in election administration. A

member of the Democratic Party, he supports requiring voters to show their driver's license at the polls and expanding opportunities for voters to cast their ballots in the mail. In the 2020 presidential election, Mr. Lee was in charge of determining the eligibility of ballots received by mail, and rejected those that did not meet state requirements.

How much do you trust Eric Lee to count your vote fairly?

- Strongly distrust
- Distrust
- Neither trust nor distrust
- Trust
- Strongly trust

If Eric Lee oversees the 2024 presidential election in your area, would you be more or less likely to vote in the November election?

- Much less likely
- Less likely
- No difference
- More likely
- Much more likely

## Vignette Experiment - Asian R-White T

Eric Lee is being considered to oversee the 2024 presidential election in your area. Mr. Lee is a 53-year-old white man with eight years of experience in election administration. A member of the Democratic Party, he supports requiring voters to show their driver's license at the polls and expanding opportunities for voters to cast their ballots in the mail. In the 2020 presidential election, Mr. Lee was in charge of determining the eligibility of ballots received by mail, and rejected those that did not meet state requirements.

How much do you trust Eric Lee to count your vote fairly?

- Strongly distrust
- Distrust
- Neither trust nor distrust
- Trust
- Strongly trust

If Eric Lee oversees the 2024 presidential election in your area, would you be more or less likely to vote in the November election?

- Much less likely
- Less likely
- No difference
- More likely
- Much more likely

## **Knowledge of Local Election Official**

With life as busy as it is, many people understandably don't have time to keep up with all the details of politics. Some people know the names of local officials and others don't. Without consulting other people or the internet, answer the following questions to the best of your ability.

What official in your local area is responsible for running elections?

- Clerk / Recorder
- Tax Assessor
- Election Administrator / Commissioner / Director / Supervisor / Manager

- Auditor / Treasurer
- Registrar of Voters
- Probate Judge
- Board of Elections / Election Commission
- Other
- Don't Know

In your local area, how is the official responsible for running elections selected?

- Directly elected
- Appointed or hired
- Don't know

Is one of these persons responsible for running elections in your local area? If so, select that person.

- Janine Chester
- Diana V Hill
- Earl Glaeser
- Anne R Moses
- \${e://Field/leo\_name}
- None of these
- Don't know

## Demographic Block 3

What is your religion? Check all that apply.

- Christian
- Protestant
- Catholic
- Mormon
- Orthodox Christian
- Jewish
- Muslim
- Buddhist
- Hindu
- Atheist
- Agnostic
- Nothing in particular
- Something else

Would you describe yourself as a 'born-again' or evangelical Christian?

- Yes
- No

In the past year, how often have you discussed politics with your friends, co-workers, family, or others around you?

- Multiple times a week
- At least once a week
- Once or twice a month
- Almost never

## **Information Provision Experiment - Control**

Next, we'd like to provide some information based on the zip code you shared earlier. You live in \${e://Field/county}, \${e://Field/state}. There are \${e://Field/registration} registered voters in your city.

Next, we'd like to provide some information based on the zip code you shared earlier. You live in \${e://Field/county} County, \${e://Field/state}. There are \${e://Field/registration} registered voters in your county.

## Information Provision Experiment – Treatment 1

Next, we'd like to provide some information based on the zip code you shared earlier. \${e://Field/leo\_name} runs elections in your county as the \${e://Field/leo\_selection} \${e://Field/leo\_office}.

\${e://Field/leo\_pronoun} \${e://Field/leo\_Iname} has \${e://Field/leo\_tenure} years of experience in this role and is preparing to oversee the 2024 presidential election for \${e://Field/registration} registered voters.

## Information Provision Experiment – Treatment 2

Next, we'd like to provide some information based on the zip code you shared earlier. \${e://Field/leo\_name} runs elections in your county as the \${e://Field/leo\_selection} \${e://Field/leo\_office}. \${e://Field/leo\_Iname} is a \${e://Field/leo\_race} \${e://Field/leo\_gender} with \${e://Field/leo\_tenure} years of experience in this role and is preparing to oversee the 2024 presidential election for \${e://Field/registration} registered voters.

## Post-Treatment Outcomes

Thinking ahead to the 2024 presidential election, how confident are you that **your vote** in the General Election will be counted as you intend, if you decide to vote?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident
- I don't know

How confident are you that your local election official will impartially administer the 2024 presidential election in **your county**?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident
- I don't know

How confident are you that your local election official will impartially administer the 2024 presidential election in **your**

## municipality?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident
- I don't know

Think about vote counting throughout **your county**, and not just your own personal situation. How confident are you that votes in your area will be counted as voters intended in the 2024 presidential election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident
- I don't know

Think about vote counting throughout **your municipality**, and not just your own personal situation. How confident are you that votes in your area will be counted as voters intended in the 2024 presidential election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident

- Not too confident
- Not at all confident
- I don't know

How confident are you that votes  
in  **\${q://QID218/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}**  will be  
counted as voters intend in the 2024 presidential election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident
- I don't know

How confident are you that votes **nationwide** will be  
counted as voters intend in the 2024 presidential election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident
- I don't know

How much voter fraud do you think occurred in the 2020 presidential election?

- None
- A negligible amount (definitely not enough to change the election results)
- A little (probably not enough to change the election results)
- Some (maybe enough to change the election results)
- A lot (definitely enough to change the election results)

## **Post-Treatment Racial Attitudes (Moderators)**

How important is being  
\$ {q://QID155/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} to your  
identity?

- Extremely important
- Very important
- Moderately important
- Slightly important
- Not at all important

How important is being  
\$ {q://QID227/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} to your  
identity?

- Extremely important
- Very important
- Moderately important
- Slightly important
- Not at all important

Thinking about your friends, how many have the same racial or ethnic background as you?

- All of them
- Most of them
- About half of them
- Some of them
- Very few of them

## **Debrief**

We thank you for your time spent taking this survey! You can learn more about the study you just participated in and what we're trying to study by visiting [this link](#) (this will open in a new tab).

Please click the submit button below to be redirected back to CloudResearch Connect and record your responses.

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