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Placement Directors:

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Citizenship: Canadian

Doctoral Studies:
McGill University, 2016 to present
Ph.D. Candidate in Economics
Thesis Title: "Three Essays in Industrial Organization"
Expected Completion Date: August 2022

References:

Professor Laura Lasio
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Professor John W. Galbraith
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Prior Studies:
M.A. Economics, *Supervisor: Licun Xue*, McGill University, 2016
B.Mus. Jazz Performance (Saxophone), McGill University, 2005

Research Fields:
Primary fields: Industrial Organization and Regulation, Econometrics

Secondary fields: Environmental Economics

Teaching Experience:

Winter 2018	Economic Statistics Honours, McGill University, joint with John W. Galbraith
Summer 2020	Mathematics for Economists (graduate), McGill University

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2019-2022	FRQSC Doctoral Research Scholarship
2019-2021	SSHRC Doctoral Research Scholarship
2019	Graduate Mobility Award
2016-2020	McGill University Doctoral Fellowship

Research Papers:

"*Electric Cars and Network Effects: Are Subsidies the Right Tool for Reducing Emissions?*", (Job Market Paper)

Abstract: This paper studies the impact of the *Roulez Vert* program, which subsidized new purchases of electric vehicles in the province of Quebec, Canada. I explore several outcomes crucial to policymakers: how costly it is to replace traditional vehicles with electric or to avoid carbon emissions using subsidies, and the impact they have on sales, prices, and charging station deployment. To study these questions, I rely on structural demand and supply estimation methods (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995). I build on Springel's (2017) methodology and propose a new model for charging station deployment. In my setup, county-level governments choose where and how many stations to install in their region to provide charging capacity to EV owners. My findings suggest the subsidy program to be responsible for 45.7% of electric vehicle sales and 27.7% of charging stations installed between 2012 and 2018. I estimate abating emissions in this way to have an average cost $1,345 and a marginal cost of $1,541 per ton of CO_2 which is significantly higher than current estimates for the social costs of carbon. Part of the reason behind these sizeable costs is that 62.1% of new electric vehicle sales associated with the policy came from consumers that would have chosen not to purchase a vehicle if no subsidy was available, suggesting that the policy poorly targeted the right consumers.

"*Directed Search in the Housing Market with Market Valuations*", Working paper

Abstract: This paper studies strategic interactions and directed search in the housing market. Building on a rich dataset of housing transactions in the Seattle area, we document that asking prices alone are not a sufficiently strong signal from sellers to generate the patterns of directed search predicted by theory. We observe instead that sellers use publicly available market valuations as an anchor point for strategic interactions. For example, we find that advertising below the market valuation leads to more virtual visits, faster selling times and a higher probability of receiving multiple offers, while advertising above obtains a higher price. We propose a theoretical model that explains these patterns of conditional directed search. In our setup, market valuations serve two goals: they help sorting buyers across house types, and they provide an anchor point for sellers' strategies within house types. More precisely, sellers set their asking price relative to the market valuation to reveal their reservation value which direct buyers to the correct seller within a house type. We explore the consequences of being over- versus underestimated for two sellers with the same reservation value and show that being over-evaluated by the market leads to both a faster sale and a higher expected price compared to being under-evaluated.

Research Paper in Progress

"*Environmental Regulation in the Car Market with Consumer Heterogeneity: Countering the Rise of the SUV"*, in progress