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ORIGINAL

Vol.  
1 of 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject  
to Criminal Sanctions

R2574

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate SElect Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities

76000-10774

Wednesday, February 11, 1976

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over  
to the Committee for destruction)

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	<b>CONTENTS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
1		
2	<u>TESTIMONY OF:</u>	
3	AMLASH Case Officer	3
4		
5		
6		
7	<b>E X H I B I T S</b>	
8	AMLASH Case Officer Exhibit No. 1	70
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
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1                   **EXECUTIVE SESSION**  
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Wednesday, February 11, 1976

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United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations with Respect to  
Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 o'clock  
am., in Room 608, Carroll Arms Hotel, the Honorable Richard  
S. Schweiker presiding.

Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).

Staff: Paul Wallach, Ed Greissing, Jim Johnston, Dan Dwyer  
and Frederick Baron, Professional Staff Members.

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PROCEEDINGS

1 Senator Schweiker. Will you stand and raise your right  
2 hand.

3 Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to  
4 give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,  
5 so help you God?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. I do.

7 Mr. Johnston. First of all, sir, we'll start with some  
8 procedural matters. I'm not going to ask you to state your  
9 name for the record because we have agreed before beginning  
10 here today that you would testify under an alias so as not to  
11 jeopardize your ongoing activities.

12 Is that the way you understand our agreement?

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1 TESTIMONY OF AMLASH CASE OFFICER  
2 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.  
3 Mr. Johnston. Is that satisfactory to you?  
4 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.  
5 Mr. Johnston. Now, you understand that at any time we  
6 refer to your participation or your authorship of a document or  
7 receipt of a document, we are prepared to substantiate the  
8 reference that we are making, and we are not trying to avoid  
9 proving the fact that it is indeed you that were involved in  
10 the incident. It is simply because we were not able to use  
11 your name.  
12 AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.  
13 Mr. Johnston. Now, you've previously testified before this  
14 Committee, and I assume you've had a copy of the Committee  
15 rules, and we have another copy available in case you want to  
16 refer to them.  
17 And are you appearing here voluntarily today without  
18 a counsel?  
19 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I am.  
20 Mr. Johnston. Do you understand that at any point during  
21 this examination you are free to stop answering any questions  
22 and request the advice of Counsel?  
23 AMLASH Case Officer. I do.  
24 Mr. Johnston. And do you understand as well that all your  
25 constitutional rights are intact here before the Committee

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1 including the Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent, if you  
2 choose.

3 AMLASH Case Officer. I do.

4 Mr. Johnston. All right.

5 Let me state that the purpose of this interview is to  
6 refine and clarify certain questions about the AMLASH operation.

7 It is my understanding that you were the case officer on  
8 the AMLASH operation from the time period, say, of the first  
9 of September on through, for all relevant purposes, December '63,  
10 and November '64, is that correct?

11 AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

12 Mr. Johnston. At this time you were a member of what was  
13 called the Special Affairs Staff, is that correct?

14 AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

15 Mr. Johnston. And that's abbreviated SAS.

16 AMLASH Case Officer. Right.

17 Mr. Johnston. Would you describe your position in SAS  
18 and your relationship to Mr. Fitzgerald, who was Chief of  
19 SAS?

20 AMLASH Case Officer. I was a special assistant to Mr.  
21 Fitzgerald, charged with the responsibility of attempting to  
22 organize a military coup inside Cuba against Fidel Castro.

23 Mr. Johnston. Did you report directly to Mr. Fitzgerald  
24 on your work?

25 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I did.

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1           Mr. Johnston. Was there anyone else knowledgeable in  
2           SAS of what you were doing?

3           AMLASH Case Officer. Only the other people who were  
4           involved working on the project.

5           Mr. Johnston. What was the relationship between SAS and  
6           the Western Hemisphere Division under, at that time, I believe,  
7           Mr. J. C. King?

8           AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall exactly what the  
9           organizational relationship was at that time. I do know that  
10          we operated on a somewhat -- I wouldn't say autonomous basis  
11          from the Division itself, but the chain of command was certainly  
12          from Mr. Fitzgerald, not necessarily through the Division  
13          Chief, but up to the DDP at that time.

14          Mr. Johnston. Who was Mr. Helms.

15          AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

16          Mr. Johnston. In other words, there could be direct  
17          reporting from Mr. Fitzgerald to Mr. Helms.

18          AMLASH Case Officer. Oh, yes.

19          Mr. Johnston. Is it necessary that Mr. King was knowledgeable  
20          of all operations of SAS?

21          AMLASH Case Officer. Not necessarily. I don't know if he  
22          was kept fully advised of all the operations or not.

23          Mr. Johnston. Did he know generally what you were doing?

24          AMLASH Case Officer. I presume he did, yes.

25          Mr. Johnston. And how often did he and Mr. Fitzgerald

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1 meet to coordinate. They do coordination of their work?

2 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know. I wasn't involved  
3 in that part of it.

4 Mr. Johnston. Was SAS targeted directly at Cuba, or  
5 were there other countries under its jurisdiction?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. No. SAS was strictly a task force  
7 set up to deal with the Cuban problem.

8 Mr. Johnston. And finally on this general matter, who  
9 did -- who gave the counterintelligence support for SAS operations?

10 AMLASH Case Officer. We had a Counterintelligence Branch  
11 within SAS.

12 Mr. Johnston. Who headed that in the fall of '63?

13 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall. There was a change.  
14 I don't recall the name.

15 Mr. Johnston. Let me -- as I stated earlier, you of  
16 course have testified before, and I have before me the  
17 transcript and I'm not proposing really to trap you in any nature  
18 with this transcript. However, there are some things that were  
19 not asked before that I would like to clarify.

20 First of all, how and why was AMLASH first contacted to  
21 set up the September meeting that you attended?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. He had been contacted the year before  
23 in Helsinki, and we found out at that time that he was coming  
24 out to a sporting event in the Western Hemisphere, so we went  
25 down and contacted him.

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1           Mr. Johnston. In my review of the file -- and I don't think  
2 we have the document here today, but my notes indicate there  
3 was a cable from Langley to Rome on 19 June 1963, that is in  
4 the AMLASH file.

5           AMLASH Case Officer. Would you repeat the question?

6           Mr. Johnston. In my review of the AMLASH file, there is  
7 a cable from headquarters to Rome on 19 June 1963 which states  
8 that AMWHP, who was your contact with AMLASH, had sent a letter  
9 as part of "an activation effort to reluctant dragon."

10          I ask, do you have any recollection or any knowledge  
11 that this was a sign to AMLASH that CIA was back in contact  
12 with him or wanted to go back in contact with him?

13          AMLASH Case Officer. I can't comment on that because  
14 I didn't get into the operation until September of '63, and  
15 this took place before I became involved in that part of the  
16 AMLASH operation.

17          Mr. Johnston. So in other words, you're saying you don't  
18 really know who made the contact with AMLASH?

19          AMLASH Case Officer. We had contact with AMLASH from the  
20 year before. He had been contacted by a CIA case officer in  
21 Helsinki.

22          Mr. Johnston. In July and August, 1962.

23          AMLASH Case Officer. Right.

24          Mr. Johnston. Then he returned to Cuba.

25          AMLASH Case Officer. And this was the first time, to

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1 the best of my knowledge, that he had come out from Cuba  
2 since the Helsinki trip.

3 Mr. Johnston. In other words, you're not aware of any  
4 prior contact between CIA or an intermediary and AMLASH?

5 AMLASH Case Officer. Not between that period of time.

6 Mr. Johnston. All right. You met with AMLASH in Brazil  
7 on September 5th through 9th. I don't mean you specifically,  
8 but the general meetings with AMLASH were in that time frame.

9 Is that your recollection?

10 AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

11 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall seeing a cable, or receiving  
12 instructions from headquarters to the effect -- and this is  
13 after your series of meetings -- instructions to the effect  
14 that headquarters felt that AMLASH appeared hopeless as an  
15 intelligence performer, and should be approached as a chief  
16 conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts. He should  
17 be urged to recruit a few trusted friends to assist him  
18 initially in FI and ops reporting and then progress to sabotage  
19 and more serious matters on a more orderly basis.

20 Do you recall seeing something to that effect after your  
21 Brazil meetings with him?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't specifically recall the cable  
23 itself, but certainly that would be in line with the thinking  
24 at that time.

25 If I may state, he was not considered a controlled asset.

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(NSA)

1 shall we say, and it was somebody with whom we felt that we  
2 could collaborate in organizing the internal group.

3 Mr. Johnston. But my summary of the cable would indicate  
4 that on September 9th, or after your meetings in Brazil, you  
5 really didn't think of him as a gatherer of information, but  
6 as someone who wanted to go on to other things, as a  
7 conspirator of some kind.

8 AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

9 Mr. Johnston. The file also has a document in it, the  
10 AMLASH file, dated 16 September, marked OFPA 72775. I don't  
11 really know what an OFPA is.

12 AMLASH Case Officer. It's a dispatch.

13 Mr. Johnston. In any event, it reports a transcript of  
14 the conversation, and to the best of my ability to understand  
15 the document, it's a conversation of an intercept in the Cuban  
16 Embassy in Paris.<sup>11</sup> The document says "Mary: I don't want to  
17 imagine things, but this thing of" AMLASH -- uses his real  
18 name. I have sanitized this -- "Moreno. It is either a  
19 tremendous secret or a top secret matter." And then there is an  
20 unreadable portion, and then a word either "treason" or  
21 "reason" I'm not sure what is referred to, and then a partici-  
22 pant whose name is Betty says, "I believe it is a top secret  
23 matter."

24 My question to you is, did you, in September of '63, know  
25 about this intercept?

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1 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't specifically recall today  
2 that I would have known about it. I presume if we had it in  
3 file, that I was working with it, that I would have seen it.

4 Mr. Johnston. Do you have any information about any recollection  
5 about something on this order?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. No.

7 Mr. Johnston. And assume that at least the portion I  
8 quoted seems to reflect on the Cubans' view of AMLASH's  
9 activities in Paris.

10 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, it may have. As I recall, I  
11 think that he was also at that time -- I may be wrong, and we  
12 would have to go back to the files to check, but he was rather  
13 outspoken to some of his closer friends in the fact that he was  
14 no longer happy with the revolution, with Castro.

15 Mr. Johnston. I don't want to dwell on this, if you don't  
16 have a recollection, but this conversation seems to indicate  
17 that the employees in the [Cuban=embassy] think that AMLASH is  
18 there on a top secret mission.

19 AMLASH Case Officer. Probably so because of his independent  
20 way of comportment. He didn't answer to anybody.

21 Senator Schweiker. What was his role in government at  
22 that point?

23 AMLASH Case Officer. He was -- excuse me, this must have  
24 been '63. He was a personal representative of Castro to the  
25 games, first in Brazil, and I don't think he had a specific

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1 post in '63, as I recall. He had been Deputy Minister of  
2 Interior. He had been a military attache in Spain. I don't think  
3 he had a specific post at that time.

4 Excuse me, if I may add just one more point. Before that he  
5 had been President of the Student Federation at the University  
6 of Havana. He may still have been in that post, or about the  
7 time that he was getting out of it, and this is, I think, where  
8 really the trouble between this particular fellow and the Castro  
9 brothers more or less came to ahead.

10 Mr. Johnston. On the 19th of September, Jim Wave sent a  
11 message to headquarters basically warning, giving a warning,  
12 making the statement that there was an anti-Communist group in  
13 Cuba, and the name AMLASH is part of that group, and it concluded  
14 by saying that Fidel is allegedly aware of both the anti-Communist  
15 group and a Communist group, and that he acts as a moderator  
16 between them in order to maintain cohesion in the government of  
17 Cuba.

18 Do you recall receiving that information?

19 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall specifically receiving  
20 that information, but I do recall that at that time Fidel  
21 Castro himself was talking about -- was concerned about a  
22 Communist takeover of the revolution, and he did meet with the  
23 subject and some other friends of his in order to prevent this.

24 Mr. Johnston. When was this?

25 AMLASH Case Officer. This was in the early '60s sometime.  
26

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1 Senator Schweiker. What year were you in?  
2

3 Mr. Johnston. '63.  
4

5 AMLASH Case Officer. This was before '63. This must have  
6 been in '62.

7 Mr. Wallach. This is before his trip to the Soviet  
8 Union?

9 Mr. Johnston. Before Castro's trip?

10 Mr. Wallach. Right.

11 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

12 MR. Johnston. The question being put is after your  
13 meeting in Brazil with AMLASH, Jim Wave cabled headquarters that  
14 AMLASH was part of a group of anti-Communist Cuban government  
15 leaders and that Castro was aware of that fact.

16 AMLASH Case Officer. My answer to you is that he certainly  
17 was because he had been talking with these people, including  
18 AMLASH, a year before. Yes.

19 Senator Schweiker. Castro was aware that he was anti-  
20 Communist?

21 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, that he was one of the anti-  
22 Communist group.

23 Senator Schweiker. Why would he be so trusted and be the  
24 special representative at that point in time if he was known  
25 as anti-Communist?

26 AMLASH Case Officer. Because of the relationship with  
27 Castro. Castro himself had not declared his Communist, more or  
28 less.

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1 less intentions, as of that time.

2 Senator Schweiker. Wait, this was after the Cuban missile  
3 crisis. This was '63, and the Cuban missile crisis was '62.  
4 I'm confused here.

5 AMLASH Case Officer. Let's go back to the dates here.

6 Senator Schweiker. The Jim Wave date is September 1963,  
7 and he knows at this point, allegedly now, that this AMLASH  
8 was a member of an anti-Communist group. I have trouble  
9 reconciling that with not pinpointing AMLASH and his possible  
10 subversive agent. I think that is what Jim is getting to.

11 AMLASH Case Officer. Again, my answer is I don't know  
12 specifically why or what the origin of the '63 J. M. Wave  
13 cable was.

14 My answer again to the question is that Castro, from his  
15 previous knowledge, going back to '62, did know and had consulted  
16 with this group of people of which AMLASH was one, who were the  
17 group of Anti-Communist officers in the revolution.

18 Mr. Johnston. So --

19 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know why in '63 this report  
20 would have come out, but it would confirm Castro's knowledge  
21 of this group, yes.

22 Mr. Johnston. Let me move on into October. There was a  
23 meeting with AMLASH.

24 Senator Schweiker. How long did he tolerate anti-Communist  
25 officers in high positions in his government? I've got to

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1 believe there's some cutoff here. I realize the uniqueness and  
2 broadness of his support earlier, but it would just seem to me  
3 that at some point he really had to weed out, not necessarily  
4 weed out or be suspect of anti-Communist officers who had too  
5 high decision making in his government, would he not, or am I  
6 missing something?

7 AMLASH Case Officer. No, not really, because out of this  
8 group that was mentioned, and with whom he himself discussed  
9 the need in the early '60s to keep, say, the Communists out,  
10 some of those officers are still in his government today.

11 Now, they may have changed, or Castro may have changed, but  
12 he didn't purge all this group of officers. Maybe he won them  
13 over, and if they are still there, evidently he has some  
14 confidence in them.

15 Mr. Johnston. According to the file, there was a meeting on  
16 October 5th, apparently, in Paris, and I'm not sure that you were  
17 the case officer at that meeting, and the cable from Paris  
18 sets the tone of that meeting as AMLASH apparently was trying  
19 to get things off his chest in talking to you.

20 Were you the case officer at that meeting?

21 AMLASH Case Officer. I was the case officer during that  
22 period of time.

23 Go into a little of the detail because we did talk about  
24 these problems.

25 Mr. Johnston. There appeared from the file two meetings

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1 in early October 1963, the first meeting on or about October  
2 5th that AMLASH comes in and says I want to get things off my  
3 chest, and seems to express great dissatisfaction with the  
4 CIA's position.

5 Then there's a second meeting on October 13th or so where  
6 he specifically asks to meet with Robert Kennedy, and you  
7 previously testified about that second meeting.

8 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

9 Mr. Johnston. Now, the file indicates there was an  
10 earlier meeting on October 5th, and AMLASH was complaining  
11 apparently about the low level espionage matters that had been  
12 discussed in Brazil, and implying that he had a more valuable  
13 role to play, and the file says the case officer provided the  
14 necessary assurances that his feelings were not in fact  
15 true, and that his case was receiving the consideration at  
16 the highest levels.

17 With this problem which had undoubtedly been bothering  
18 AMLASH off his chest, a much more relaxed AMLASH departed,  
19 stating his desire to return to Cuba to undertake the big  
20 job.

21 Do you recall that meeting?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. I think you are getting those two  
23 meetings mixed up. In other words, the later one, yes. I  
24 was there and talking to him in the second meeting. In the  
25 first meeting I don't recall precisely, but there could have

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1 been a meeting with a contact in Paris, in other words, not a  
2 case officer, but the contact we had in Paris. I don't remember  
3 who that was, one of the officers there.

4 Mr. Johnston. In addition to you he was in contact with --  
5 AMLASH Case Officer. Only for purposes of contact. I mean,  
6 only to make contact with me, not to carry on the case. But  
7 he knew that the other officer was a friend of mine, and he  
8 was in touch with him, and when he came to Paris he would get  
9 in touch with him. So I would be notified.

10 Mr. Johnston. I think you have used his name in the  
11 prior transcript, <sup>03</sup> [redacted], the case officer?

12 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, because he was the one who  
13 furnished the quarters where we had the meetings.

14 Mr. Johnston. In furnishing the quarters, did you have a  
15 taping system going as to the discussions that would take place?  
16 AMLASH Case Officer. No, I don't believe we taped any of  
17 those meetings?

18 Mr. Johnston. Is it procedure to tape meetings with  
19 Agents?

20 AMLASH Case Officer. Sometimes. It is not a standard  
21 procedure. Sometimes it is not physically possible.

22 Mr. Johnston. Let me go back into this meeting of October  
23 5th, which you don't recall that you were at this meeting, is  
24 that correct?

25 AMLASH Case Officer. There probably could have been the

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17

1 meeting when he first arrived in Paris, and the meeting that he  
2 had -- I don't recall specifically.

3 I do recall, if I may, I do recall that he said he was  
4 unhappy because of the requirements, the intelligence require-  
5 ments that we had levied on him in Brazil, and it is true that  
6 his position was at that time, even in Brazil, and later in  
7 Paris, that he was not disposed to cooperate just to furnish  
8 intelligence. In other words, he felt that he wanted to do  
9 something about the removal of Castro but was not just prepared  
10 to keep us advised as to what was going on. He recognized that  
11 this was certainly part of a needed operation, but he did not  
12 consider himself just as a provider of information.

13 Mr. Johnston. Let me go off the record for a minute  
14 because I want to use a code name.

15 (Discussion off the record.)

16 Mr. Johnston. Having mentioned the code name that is  
17 used in this cable, you now recall you were at the 5 October  
18 meeting?

19 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

20 Mr. Johnston. And the cable, you can look at it, indicates  
21 that AMLASH was in a confessional mood.

22 My question to you is, after recalling that meeting, was  
23 it basically one where he was expressing his concern about  
24 the CIA role for him?

25 Mr. Johnston. He was expressing his concern for what?

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1 Mr. Johnston. The CIA's plans for using him.  
2 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. He was concerned as to how and  
3 in what way he was to cooperate with CIA. He was also -- and  
4 we must underline this, right from the beginning, dubious  
5 as to our resolve to really follow through on initiating a  
6 coup against Castro.

7 Mr. Johnston. Is the cable correct in stating that he was  
8 assured that his case was receiving consideration at the  
9 highest levels?

10 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

11 Mr. Johnston. Was the word "highest level" used, or was  
12 a name used?

13 AMLASH Case Officer. Highest levels, but at that stage  
14 of the game he knew he was talking to CIA, so highest levels  
15 in CIA is what was meant at that particular time.

16 Mr. Johnston. That's the word you used?

17 You didn't say Director McCone?

18 AMLASH Case Officer. I did not use names, no.

19 Mr. Johnston. On October 5th, you reassured him that his  
20 consideration, that his case was receiving consideration at  
21 least at the highest levels of CIA, and the cable reflects  
22 that when he left that meeting he seemed much more relaxed about  
23 the case.

24 Is that an accurate portrayal of the meeting?

25 AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

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1       Mr. Johnston. As I mentioned, there was another meeting  
2       on or about October 13th, where, as I understand it, AMLASH  
3       made his demand or his request to meet with Robert Kennedy, and  
4       he made that request to meet with Kennedy by name.

5       Is that correct?

6       AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, he did.

7       Well, he said somebody such as, somebody high in the  
8       administration, again, to receive the assurances that we were  
9       prepared to -- that we were serious about developing and  
10      organizing a coup.

11      Mr. Johnston. After that meeting, you were recalled to  
12      Langley for discussions, is that correct?

13      AMLASH Case Officer. I was traveling back and forth  
14      between Paris and Langley, yes. I don't recall if I was  
15      recalled at that particular time, but I would go there -- I  
16      was TDY.

17      Mr. Johnston. I want to set the stage. There is a  
18      message from the Director, 75683, to London, directing you to  
19      return to headquarters for discussion of all facets of the  
20      case.

21      This is after you reported that AMLASH wants to meet  
22      with someone like Robert Kennedy.

23      Do you recall that flow of events?

24      AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

25      Mr. Johnston. What discussions did you have at Langley,

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1 and I don't want to go through your previous testimony again,  
2 but basically are we correct in understanding that out of the  
3 discussions at Langley came a decision to go to Paris with  
4 Mr. Fitzgerald representing himself as a personal representative  
5 of Robert Kennedy?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

7 Mr. Johnston. Then you met on October 29, according to  
8 the file, with AMLASH, Mr. Fitzgerald, in Paris.

9 Is that correct?

10 AMLASH Case Officer. Excuse me. Can I go off the  
11 record?

12 (Discussion off the record.)

13 Mr. Wallach. I think you stated that AMLASH said that he  
14 would like to meet with one of the U.S. leaders such as  
15 Robert Kennedy?

16 AMLASH Case Officer. A high representative in the U.S.  
17 Government.

18 Mr. Wallach. Did he mention any other names that you  
19 recall?

20 AMLASH Case Officer. No, not that I recall.

21 Mr. Wallach. Just Robert Kennedy?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. Such as Robert Kennedy.

23 Mr. Wallach. Did AMLASH, to the best of your knowledge,  
24 from what he told you, know about any prior assassination  
25 attempts that had been run by the U.S.?

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1 AMLASH Case Officer. No.

2 Mr. Wallach. Did he have any reason to believe that Robert  
3 Kennedy had been involved with any of the sabotage operations  
4 as contrasted with any assassination attempts?

5 AMLASH Case Officer. If he knew, he never mentioned it to  
6 me. We never discussed that.

7 Mr. Wallach. In other words, you didn't say to him,  
8 how did you know that Robert Kennedy -- or why did you pick  
9 Robert Kennedy.

10 AMLASH Case Officer. No, not at all. I mean, it's a  
11 perfectly, I think, logical name to have been mentioned at  
12 that time, because by him, since he was the President's brother  
13 and since he was the Attorney General, he wanted somebody high  
14 in the Government; at one time he had mentioned the President,  
15 you know, I want to talk to the President.

16 Mr. Wallach. It seems strange to me he didn't pick the  
17 Secretary of State or someone like that.

18 AMLASH Case Officer. No.

19 Mr. Wallach. What I'm trying to get at --

20 AMLASH Case Officer. He wanted somebody directly to the  
21 President. In other words, he wanted the assurances  
22 from the highest authority, again, from the President of  
23 the United States.

24 Mr. Wallach. What I'm trying to get at is we, from our  
25 examination of the alleged assassination attempts, have also

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1 gone into the sabotage attempts, MONGOOSE, etc, and found out  
2 that Bobby Kennedy did play a role in the sabotage attempts.

3 What I'm trying to get from you is your understanding of  
4 whether or not AMLASH, from his Cuban side, knew that the  
5 Kennedy's had played that role, and would necessarily say I want  
6 to talk to Robert Kennedy for that reason.

7 AMLASH Case Officer. No. He never mentioned it, not at  
8 all in any way.

9 Mr. Johnston. Let me finally go to the October 29th meeting,  
10 and before we went on the record this morning, you were  
11 explaining to us how you characterized the AMLASH operation.

12 Would you repeat in summary form what you told us before  
13 we went on the record?

14 AMLASH Case Officer. The operation was never conceived,  
15 certainly, carried out during the period I was associated with  
16 it, but was never conceived as an assassination plot. It was  
17 conceived as a coup in order to organize a military group  
18 within Cuba to overthrow Castro.

19 Mr. Johnston. Did you have the understanding that if  
20 necessary AMLASH was proposing to assassinate the Castro  
21 brothers?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. Assassination was not a subject of  
23 discussion that came up at every meeting or contact that we  
24 had with AMLASH. It was so stated by him that he felt that  
25 the only way to initiate a coup in Cuba was to direct the

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1 first blow at the leadership.

2 Since we were not willing to discuss specifically eliminating  
3 Castro, this was never discussed in terms of the operation.  
4 We certainly had no doubt that in his mind this was the only  
5 way to go about it.

6 Mr. Johnston. And you dealt with him on that basis?

7 AMLASH Case Officer. Trying to temporize this, and if  
8 possible we were not looking for a bloody coup at that time,  
9 planning a bloody coup inside Cuba, but we were trying to  
10 certainly get him to think in terms of much more than just the  
11 elimination of the leadership.

12 Mr. Johnston. And to broaden it.

13 AMLASH Case Officer. To broaden it into a coup. Our  
14 interest was the coup, not the specifics of how he got it  
15 started.

16 Mr. Johnston. You were concerned about whether his  
17 plans were realistic, weren't you?

18 AMLASH Case Officer. Very definitely, yes.

19 Senator Schweiker. Did you personally evaluate AMLASH  
20 as fully capable of leading a coup and being able to implement  
21 it and carry it out if support were given?

22 How did you evaluate AMLASH?

23 As I understand from the dialogue here, and also from  
24 reading a summary of these, at first the operations talk was  
25 fairly low level sabotage, which he out of hand rejected, and

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1 he pictured himself as a leader of a top level effort on the  
2 condition that it had assurances of government support and top  
3 level support here.

4 Now, I guess my question to you is, how, as case officer,  
5 did you evaluate his capability? Did you evaluate him as  
6 someone who could lead a coup and who would, that our government  
7 could put trust in, faith in in terms of his ability to carry it  
8 out or not?

9 AMLASH Case Officer. At that time we did not evaluate  
10 him as the leader of a coup. He was not our candidate to be  
11 the next ruler of Cuba. He was only evaluated in our dealings  
12 with him on the basis of what he and his group could contribute  
13 to a coup inside Cuba.

14 So I don't recall at any time that he was selected or that  
15 anybody ever talked of him as the next leader in Cuba.

16 Mr. Baron. Wasn't there some thought that he would be a  
17 good rallying point for strong leaders of a new government in  
18 Cuba, that he had an ability to attract good people to work with  
19 him?

20 AMLASH Case Officer. He had proven this because he had  
21 been one of the two leaders, or the two top leaders of the  
22 Directorado Revolutionario, which is the Revolutionary Directorate  
23 which is a group not part of the 26th of July Movement, but a  
24 separate group, which is -- he was one of the leaders, and  
25 became a military commander of that group, separate from the 26

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1 of July movement.

2 So he had a group in the DR which we knew about, and he  
3 afforded himself very well in the fighting -- this was in the  
4 province of Lasvillas, during the time that Castro was -- he  
5 was in a separate area of the country.

6 Mr. Baron. I had a recollection which I haven't checked  
7 against our transcripts that when we discussed this before,  
8 you had said although AMLASH might not be considered the leader  
9 of a new government, that he was a potential candidate for that  
10 job. He might not be a good military leader, but he would have  
11 an ability to bring good people together in a new government.

12 AMLASH Case Officer. Of the people left in Cuba at that time,  
13 we didn't have much of a choice. I mean, you know, we weren't  
14 in contact. He was one of the few who could travel.

15 Senator Schweiker. You put him up near the top but not  
16 necessarily at the top.

17 AMLASH Case Officer. That's right, as one being able to  
18 contribute.

19 Senator Schweiker. And you didn't have too many options  
20 at that point.

21 AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

22 Mr. Johnston. One of the documents that CIA previously  
23 provided us in a sanitized version is a memorandum for the  
24 record dated 19 November 1963, and the subject is Plans for  
25 AMLASH Contact, and let me just show you that and ask you

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1 if you not necessarily prepared that document, because it is a  
2 sanitized document, but whether you prepared a document  
3 that that apparently came from, the memorandum for record of  
4 November 19th.

5 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I recall.

6 Mr. Johnston. You prepared that document?

7 AMLASH Case Officer. I believe I prepared the memorandum  
8 from which that extract was made, yes.

9 Mr. Johnston. When did you prepare that?

10 AMLASH Case Officer. It had to be late October sometime.

11 Mr. Johnston. November 19th is the date.

12 AMLASH Case Officer. Early November, certainly after  
13 my October meeting with him in Paris, and before going back,  
14 19 November, that's probably it.

15 Mr. Johnston. Is that the date you prepared it?

16 AMLASH Case Officer. That's the date I prepared it. I  
17 don't remember when I returned from Paris after the October-  
18 meetings.

19 Mr. Johnston. You prepared a memorandum for the record  
20 on the contact before you went to the meeting in Paris on  
21 November 22nd?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. Oh, yes.

23 Mr. Johnston. Part of that document, Paragraph 3, states  
24 that you would show AMLASH a copy of the President's speech in  
25 Miami.

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1        AMLASH Case Officer. No. I didn't show him a copy of the  
2 speech at all.

3        Mr. Johnston. Let me show you Paragraph 3 of that.

4        They were talking about leading up to the November 22nd  
5 meeting with AMLASH.

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1 AMLASH Case Officer. It may have been planned to show  
2 him a copy of the speech, but as I recall it was not shown him.  
3 I talked to him about it, but I don't recall having shown him  
4 the speech. But it was probably clear that I could have taken  
5 a copy of that speech to him and shown it to him.

6 Mr. Johnston. Paragraph 4 of that document states---  
7 would you just read it?

8 AMLASH Case Officer. "Chief SA has requested written  
9 reports on AMLASH operation be kept to a minimum."

10 Mr. Johnston. And that's Desmond Fitzgerald, is that  
11 correct?

12 AMLASH Case Officer. That's correct.

13 Mr. Johnston. Did Mr. Fitzgerald tell you that on  
14 November 19th?

15 AMLASH Case Officer. It might not have been the first  
16 time he mentioned this because -- in other words, on sensitive  
17 operations it was always a case of trying to limit the number  
18 of people aware of sensitive operations and this certainly is  
19 considered in that category.

20 He reiterated, I presume, since I put it in the memo at  
21 that time that the written communications would be minimized.

22 Mr. Johnston. And this is a memorandum for record.

23 AMLASH Case Officer. Remember also this is primarily the  
24 cables because I had to communicate with headquarters and the  
25 station in Paris. I didn't have my independent communications.

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Mr. Johnston. Where were you on November 19th?

AMLASH Case Officer. At headquarters. He told me this personally.

Mr. Johnston. Okay. Is it normal to prepare a memorandum for the record about plans for contact of an agent?

AMLASH Case Officer. Normally, yes.

Mr. Johnston. So there's nothing unusual in your preparing this memorandum for record. Is that your testimony?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, there wasn't anything unusual about it. That's the usual thing unless advised to the contrary.

Mr. Johnston. The last time you testified before the Committee you mentioned on November 22nd you had a pen-like device with a hypodermic needle on it. This memorandum for record of November 19th does not mention that.

Is there some reason that it doesn't?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I don't remember why it would not have been mentioned. I don't recall when I left for Paris. I may have left for Paris on the 21st and --

Mr. Johnston. I think that's correct.

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know if the decision had been made that we would even show him something like this at that time.

Mr. Johnston. You're talking about the 19th?

AMLASH Case Officer. About the 19th, when I wrote the memorandum.

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1       Mr. Johnston. When you left for Paris my understanding  
2       is that you carried the device.

3       AMLASH Case Officer. That's right, I carried it with me.

4       Mr. Johnston. And you had approval to show it to him?

5       AMLASH Case Officer. I had approval to show it to him.

6       Mr. Johnston. The file indicates that AMLASH was contacted  
7       on November 20th, I believe, in order to set up the November  
8       22nd meeting and he was telephoned by, I assume, somebody in  
9       Paris.

10      Did you arrange that or were you knowledgeable of that  
11     fact?

12      AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. I was going to go there to  
13     see him. We would have made arrangements to set the meeting up.

14      Mr. Johnston. The cable reporting the telephone call on  
15     November 20th states that somebody apparently was in the room  
16     with AMLASH when he was telephoned, and that therefore there  
17     had to be a telephone conversation by the CIA agent calling  
18     him and the CIA agent --

19      Pardon me. AMLASH asked if the meeting would be of interest  
20     to him, and the CIA agent said, I don't know if it's going to  
21     be of interest to you but it's the meeting you requested. And  
22     I ask you your understanding of what was meant by the meeting  
23     that you requested?

24      AMLASH Case Officer. Probably to give him an answer on  
25     the caches that he wanted inside Cuba, and I understand that was

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1 the primary point which had not been, he had not been informed  
2 of this at the previous meeting with Fitzgerald, so were we  
3 going to give him that material? In other words, it was given  
4 to him later in the caches, was that material going to be given  
5 to him?

6 Mr. Johnston. What about the pen device?

7 AMLASH Case Officer. The pen device was something again,  
8 it could have been part of that package. I don't think he was  
9 specifically asking about the pen device because we had been  
10 so reluctant to even discuss something like this with him and  
11 he knew it that he was primarily concerned with the caches.

12 Mr. Johnston. Is it correct to say that at the October  
13 29th meeting AMLASH was happy with the U.S. policy but asking  
14 for equipment to do the job?

15 AMLASH Case Officer. To initiate the coup.

16 In other words, he didn't want a massive amount of  
17 equipment but he said we do need some equipment to get the  
18 thing started.

19 Mr. Johnston. And that that was in his mind on November  
20 20th.

21 AMLASH Case Officer. When he made the call?

22 Mr. Johnston. When the call was made to him and he was  
23 told that the November 22nd meeting was the one that he had  
24 requested.

25 AMLASH Case Officer. Probably so.

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Mr. Johnston. And that AMLASH would have understood that  
 that was what you were going to give him, some or all of the  
 things discussed at the October 29th meeting.

AMLASII Case Officer. To see what could be given to him,  
 not if it was or anything like this because Paris didn't know  
 what we were prepared to tell him at the 22 November meeting.

Mr. Johnston. As you said before, you were at Langley  
 on the 20th. There's a cable indicating you left Washington  
 arriving in Paris on the morning of November 22nd.

Is that your recollection?

AMLASII Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Did anyone go with you from Washington  
 to Paris?

AMLASII Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Mr. Fitzgerald was where at the time?

AMLASII Case Officer. At Langley. He was present at the  
 meeting, at the late October meeting, not at the 22 November  
 meeting.

Mr. Johnston. Okay. Let's go then to the November 22nd  
 meeting. You previously testified as you recall it was late  
 afternoon or evening because it was dark when you came out.

AMLASII Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Where was it held? What kind of place  
 was it held?

AMLASII Case Officer. I don't recall that we used a safe

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7 1 house or in the study of Ted Stenc's home.

2 Mr. Johnston. Who was there at the meeting? You and  
3 AMLASH.

4 AMLASH Case Officer. The October meeting?

5 Mr. Johnston. I'm sorry, November 22nd meeting.

6 AMLASH Case Officer. AMLASH and myself.

7 Mr. Johnston. Nobody else was there?

8 AMLASH Case Officer. If it was [Red Stenc]<sup>03</sup> home, it  
9 may have been in another part of the house but he was not at  
10 the meeting.

11 Mr. Johnston. Did you have that meeting taped?

12 AMLASH Case Officer. No, not that I recall.

13 Mr. Johnston. If you did have it taped, where would the  
14 tape be today?

15 AMLASH Case Officer. In the file.

16 Mr. Johnston. In this file?

17 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. I don't recall that that  
18 meeting was taped. I don't think it was possible to tape it.

19 Mr. Johnston. Who was knowledgeable of that meeting  
20 outside yourself and AMLASH? Generally, were the people at  
21 the Paris station aware of it?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. Not generally, no. It could have  
23 been the Chief of Station, naturally, and [Red Stenc]<sup>03</sup>.

24 Mr. Johnston. At a meeting like that did you have some  
25 kind of back-up support, counter-surveillance, any kind of

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1 back-up support so that you could be assured that you were not  
2 under surveillance at the meeting?

3 AMLASH Case Officer. No, I took the necessary precautions  
4 in going to the meeting to assure myself. I didn't have somebody  
5 else following me to tell me if I had any surveillance on me.

6 Mr. Johnston. What about AMLASH?

7 AMLASH Case Officer. We don't know. I don't know if  
8 he was counter-surveilled.

9 Senator Schweiker. Could AMLASH have been a double agent?

10 AMLASH Case Officer. That's a good question. I can only  
11 give you an opinion. I didn't think so then and even with  
12 everything that has happened today, I don't think so today.

13 Again, that is strictly my opinion.

14 Senator Schweiker. In a nutshell, and I realize this is  
15 a very difficult, complex area, why don't you think so?

16 AMLASH Case Officer. Because of the power play that  
17 was taking place in Cuba at that time between certainly the  
18 26th of July people and Castro trying to consolidate his  
19 position, this was the early '60s now, around his people and  
20 his movement, the fact that we had information from several  
21 sources that he was disillusioned with the revolution.

22 Senator Schweiker. He, meaning AMLASH?

23 AMLASH Case Officer. He, AMLASH, was disillusioned.

24 Senator Schweiker. And he wasn't in the 26th of July?

25 AMLASH Case Officer. He was not in the 26th of July.

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1 He was DR. So he was not a member of Castro's July 26th movement  
2 He was one of the other revolutionary groups which had student  
3 support primarily and urban support and compared to Castro's  
4 rural so-called support.

5 So there was a struggle going on there. In other words,  
6 this was not an imaginary type of thing. The background that  
7 we could check did not, to the best of my recollection at any  
8 time lead us to believe in our relation with him at that time  
9 that he was playing a double game.

10 The other reason that I felt that way at the time was that  
11 we had to persuade him to return to Cuba to stay. He was  
12 ready to defect, to leave. He didn't want to come to the  
13 United States with all the rest of the Cubans who were here  
14 because he had stayed on, he felt, too long with the revolution.  
15 But he was ready to leave Cuba and to defect. He was fed up  
16 with the way life was. A lot of the travel that he did was  
17 that he would take any opportunity to get off of the island.  
18 He had told us, me personally, that and this was also confirmed  
19 by other sources.

20 Senator Schweiker. Wouldn't one of your reasons also  
21 be that he is in jail now?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. That would be a very good reason.  
23 I think I mentioned that the last time, certainly when I was  
24 talking about this. If he was taken back --

25 Senator Schweiker. Are we absolutely certain he's in

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1 jail now?

2 AMLASH Case Officer. We checked that I believe the last  
3 time, I think the last report we had was what, a couple of  
4 years ago?

5 Mr. Baron. I was given the name of a CIA contact in  
6 Florida who had been on the Island of Pines at one point and  
7 said as far as he knew, although he hadn't been in Cuba for  
8 several years, AMLASH was a prisoner, but he wasn't in prison.  
9 He was doing some sort of hospital work which was considered  
10 part of his rehabilitation program.

11 AMLASH Case Officer. He was a doctor, wasn't he, for  
12 the prison?

13 Mr. Baron. Yes.

14 AMLASH Case Officer. He had more freedom because he  
15 was being used as a doctor for the prisoner but he still was  
16 still on the Isle of Pines.

17 Mr. Baron. It is my understanding that he was working  
18 as a doctor even outside the prison and again, this is just  
19 hearsay of one contact that I called on the phone.

20 Mr. Wallach. Are you positive that someone just not  
21 using his name is there, that he switched over using an alias?  
22 You wouldn't have intelligence of that type?

23 AMLASH Case Officer. No.

24 Mr. Wallach. I want to quickly follow-up on something:  
25 that Jim and the Senator were getting at.

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1 Why were you not willing to discuss with AMLASH the  
2 assassination of Castro?

3 AMLASH Case Officer. We?

4 Mr. Wallach. You have told us --

5 AMLASH Case Officer. We were very reluctant to discuss  
6 the subject.

7 Mr. Wallach. Why?

8 AMLASH Case Office. I guess we didn't want to get involved  
9 in assassinations.

10 Mr. Wallach. But you had them before this.

11 AMLASH Case Officer. I didn't know this, and certainly  
12 in this operation the objective of this operation was not to  
13 go in and assassinate Castro but a much bigger type of program.

14 Mr. Wallach. But that was the first step, or at least  
15 the potential first step.

16 AMLASH Case Officer. He was convinced that was the only  
17 first step. AMLASH. We weren't convinced that it had to be,  
18 at that time that it had to be the first step, and that's why  
19 we didn't want to discuss and we didn't discuss and we were  
20 reluctant to discuss this subject with him.

21 Mr. Wallach. At the late October meeting I think you  
22 said before that -- what did you request that led to the giving  
23 him of the pen, the hypodermic needle?

24 AMLASH Case Officer. The pen he requested was something  
25 with which to protect himself now.

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1 Mr. Wallach. A pen with a hypodermic needle would protect  
2 himself?

3 AMLASH Case Officer. He put himself in a situation and  
4 asked us the question. He said I may be confronted by Castro  
5 or by Raoul or by one or the other of Castro's people in a  
6 meeting in which I am not armed, and I may be confronted with  
7 an accusation of plotting against the regime.

8 And at that time he said this would be before we are  
9 ready to move in fomenting the coup, and he said, I would like  
10 to have something with which I can protect myself at that time.  
11 In fact, the words that I think I mentioned here before was,  
12 if I fall, I don't want to be the only one going down.

13 So he was seeing himself in a situation of going back into  
14 Cuba, of being in a meeting in which he could have been, because  
15 again, of the relationships. Fidel Castro himself or Raoul  
16 Castro could confront him in their office, accuse him.

17 Mr. Wallach. Couldn't he use that pen offensively and  
18 not defensively?

19 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, he could have. He was not  
20 at that time talking about using it offensively and we weren't  
21 discussing the offensive use of that pen.

22 Senator Schweiker. Following up the point that I  
23 switched away from as to whether Cuban intelligence might have  
24 been trailing him or following him or observing what you were  
25 doing with him, we have some knowledge, I gather, from a summary

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1 here that AMLASH's one-time Cuban mistress was believed to be  
2 working for Cuban intelligence and her brother was known to  
3 be Cuban intelligence.

4 If this is correct, wouldn't that pretty well mean that  
5 whatever he was doing over there might well be observed by  
6 Cuban intelligence even though he might have been a straight  
7 single agent in terms of working with us and not a double agent  
8 that they may well have known or monitored what in fact he was  
9 doing with us?

10 AMLASH Case Officer. This is possible, Senator. We  
11 had no indication at the time that they were monitoring his  
12 activities. Again, he was at such a level and the people  
13 certainly in Paris and the Cubans overseas knew that he was  
14 at such a level that we never heard that they were ever given  
15 this mission.

16 Senator Schweiker. Have you heard that his Cuban  
17 mistress was working with Cuban intelligence?

18 AMLASH Case Officer. Which one of his mistresses,  
19 because he's had several, including his sister who worked for  
20 the Presidency, his own sister.

21 Mr. Johnston. We extracted that from a file and I'm  
22 sorry but in the respect and the need to keep that information  
23 compartmented I did not take her name down and I don't think we  
24 have the file that indicates that.

25 My recollection is that he had a mistress for a considerable

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Phone Date 2007-06-06

1 period of time who was, who was suspected of being the GI,  
 2 and certainly her brother was actually known to be an employee  
 3 of the GI.

4 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall the specific case,  
 5 but let me remind you that he was the Deputy Minister of  
 6 the Interior, which did have the security services at that time  
 7 under that ministry. So it wouldn't surprise me that there would  
 8 be somebody he would know in that ministry.

9 Mr. Johnston. AMLASH was?

10 AMLASH Case Officer. AMLASH was at one time before he  
 11 was President of the Student Federation.

12 Mr. Johnston. Not in '63?

13 AMLASH Case Officer. No.

14 Senator Schweiker. And Cuban intelligence would have  
 15 come under him?

16 AMLASH Case Officer. Some of the security apparatus  
 17 was under the Ministry of Interior, but he was in that job,  
 18 I don't recall, a very short period of time.

19 Mr. Wallach. If Castro knew about the assassination  
 20 attempts, you would assume that AMLASH would have known, wouldn't  
 21 you, from being in that position?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. We don't know if at that time that  
 23 he knew that -- well, he was saying, in other words, he was on  
 24 the radio every day saying that the Yankees were making an  
 25 attempt on his life but that he knew the specifics of operations.

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1 I don't think we have that information, or at least I never  
2 have seen it.

3 After the Bay of Pigs every occasion that he had he would  
4 accuse the imperialists of mounting another operation against  
5 him.

6 Mr. Baron. Just a couple more questions on this point.

7 Did you take any special precautions aside from the standard  
8 precautions that you would take in dealing with any foreign  
9 contact?

10 Were special precautions taken in dealing with AMLASH  
11 to guard against the prospect that he was either a double agent  
12 or under surveillance by Cuban intelligence?

13 AMLASH Case Officer. What would you mean by special  
14 precautions?

15 Mr. Baron. You would have to tell me more about the  
16 techniques that you could use, than I could tell you.

17 AMLASH Case Officer. What I would do is to make sure  
18 that I wasn't under surveillance in going to the meeting or  
19 at the meeting, and we would certainly check the meeting places  
20 to make sure that the meeting places were not under surveillance  
21 by them, which would also hopefully would have picked up in  
22 the surveillance that he would have had on him coming to the  
23 meetings.

24 I don't recall that we ever put him under surveillance  
25 in Paris, which would have meant disclosing our interest in him

**TOP SECRET**

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gsb 16 1 either to our surveillance team or the French police, or whoever.

2 So we never did that because, again, of our interest in  
3 protecting and minimizing the number of people who knew we were  
4 in contact with him.

5 Again, I refer you, I think, to what the Senator raised  
6 before, that he was arrested and sentenced, and as I recall,  
7 I may be wrong but as I recall the contacts that we had with  
8 him in Paris never surfaced in that trial. He never, as far  
9 as the transcript that we have of the trial, he never reported,  
10 he never testified about the contacts that he had with us.

11 It was only afterwards when he was in contact with the exile  
12 group.

13 Mr. Baron. So you never took any affirmative action  
14 against him or investigated him or treated him in any way that  
15 you would treat a person suspected of being a double agent  
16 or being closely watched by an intelligence service?

17 AMLASH Case Officer. Not in mounting an investigation  
18 against him because in doing that we would have to show our  
19 interest in him to other people, so we did not do that.

20 What we could do with myself and with the other knowledgeable  
21 people say in Paris, of him, we did do and did everything  
22 we possibly could do.

23 In other words, to check where he was and who he was  
24 seeing and through the telephone taps and to ensure that when  
25 he came to meet us that that meeting was secure,

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**TOP SECRET**

43

gsb 17 1 that we did.

2 Mr. Johnston. Let me go back to the November 22nd  
3 meeting.

4 As you recall, after you met AMLASH there, did you give  
5 him the newspaper article about the Kennedy speech?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall. I may have shown  
7 him the article. To the best of my recollection, we talked about  
8 the speech and he had, I think, at that time, the article had  
9 already appeared in the French newspaper and he had read it.

10 Mr. Johnston. What did you tell him about the article?

11 AMLASH Case Officer. Well, he liked the article. It  
12 was one in which I think the Administration, as I vaguely recall,  
13 was taking a rather positive stand.

14 Mr. Johnston. Was this Kennedy's speech before the  
15 Inter-American Press Association in Miami on November 18th?

16 AMLASH Case Officer. I believe so.

17 Mr. Johnston. I have an extract from that.

18 AMLASH Case Officer. I'm not 100 percent certain, but  
19 I think it was.

20 Mr. Johnston. There's an indication that you told him  
21 that Fitzgerald helped to write the speech.

22 Do you recall doing that?

23 AMLASH Case Officer. I could have.

24 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall specifically?

25 AMLASH Case Officer. Specifically, no, but we did discuss

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1 the speech.

Mr. Johnston. You have testified a great deal about the poison pen or the pen device and my only question is what is your best recollection about what happened to the pen? Did he take it with him? Did you take it with you when you left the meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. Again, as I mentioned to you the last time, I don't remember specifically if I kept the pen and threw it away or if he kept it.

What I do remember was his reaction when I showed him the pen. I can't today tell you for sure that he kept the pen.

Mr. Johnston. It seems to me that's rather compromising evidence, if he kept the pen and you recall that. It's also such compromising evidence -- I have difficulty believing you would have thrown it away.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, because it was compromising evidence. I had carried it one way. I mean I wasn't going to carry it back. It was nothing but a Papermate pen in which a hypodermic needle had been inserted.

In other words, it wasn't a \$10,000 piece of equipment or anything like this.

Mr. Johnston. I agree, but it's a very compromising piece of evidence to have around.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right. But what I can't

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gash-19 1 recall specifically is whether it was broken, thrown away or --  
2 Mr. Wallach. Why do you believe he wouldn't have taken  
3 it with him?

4 AMLASH Case Officer. He said he wouldn't. I specifically  
5 remember this. He says, and then later on he says, I'm not  
6 going to take any compromising material back with me.

7 This would have been a piece of compromising material.  
8 He did not like the pen. The only point probably that we made  
9 with him is that we were willing to consider, because he knew  
10 our opposition to something like this, that we were even willing  
11 to consider showing him something that -- whether he could  
12 again defend himself.

13 He did not think it was a good idea.

14 Senator Schweiker. What kind of weapon or substance  
15 could he get that would not compromise him? I'm a little  
16 confused. He wanted something to defend himself, but he  
17 doesn't want anything that will compromise him.

18 Unless you have a disappearing weapon, what could he  
19 possibly get that would not compromise him to take back?

20 AMLASH Case Officer. Well, we were talking also about  
21 caches inside Cuba at that time, so it could have been dropped  
22 to him inside Cuba. He didn't exactly have to take it back  
23 with him.

24 In other words, here again, the whole idea of this was  
25 not to give him something there that he would be able to take

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46

gsh 20 1 back with him.

2 Mr. Wallach. Were arrangements made for caches inside  
3 Cuba if he was worried about defending himself?

4 AMLASH Case Officer. He had asked for caches inside  
5 Cuba.

6 Mr. Johnston. Can you be positive that he did not leave  
7 the meeting with the pen in his possession?

8 AMLASH Case Officer. I cannot be positive that he didn't.  
9 I'm almost sure that he didn't.

10 Mr. Johnston. Did you ever ask him for the pen back?  
11 Do you recall asking him to give you the pen back before the  
12 meeting concluded or after the conclusion of the meeting?

13 AMLASH Case Officer. Since I recollect his reaction to  
14 it that, you know, it's no good, I just can't logically believe  
15 that he would have kept the pen. This is the point. But I  
16 don't specifically recall what was done with it except that  
17 it was probably destroyed.

18 In other words, you know, broken, throw the needle out  
19 of it and break the pen.

20 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall asking him to give you the  
21 pen back?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. No, but I don't recall that he  
23 took it in the first place, because what I recall is, gee, is  
24 that the best that you can come up with type of thing.

25 So he was not in any way enthused about what we had shown

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1 him.

2 Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you, is it correct you did  
3 promise him at this meeting that you would drop rifles with  
4 telescopic sights for him in Cuba?

5 AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

6 Mr. Johnston. Was there any mention of paying him money  
7 to support his coup plans?

8 AMLASH Case Officer. He had never really asked for  
9 money. In promising him full support for the coup, if money  
10 was required I presume that could be conjecture that he could  
11 get that also, but he did not specifically ask for money.

12 Mr. Johnston. Was there discussion of his escape in  
13 the event he assassinated Castro or killed Castro but did not  
14 pull off the coup?

15 AMLASH Case Officer. At the last meeting I don't believe  
16 that was discussed.

17 Mr. Johnston. At your prior meeting?

18 AMLASH Case Officer. If it was, it was touched upon,  
19 but as I recall, and this is from reading the file afterward.  
20 where this was discussed was a year later when he was in contact  
21 with the exile group. I think it was with the exile group that  
22 he was then concerned about, how do I get out if something  
23 goes wrong and we can't pull the coup.

24 But we did not at the 22 November meeting, I don't believe  
25 we discussed that. In fact, I'm sure we didn't discuss it.

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1 Mr. Johnston. When did the meeting end? About what  
2 time?

3 What time did the meeting end?

4 AMLASH Case Officer. Approximately 10:00 in the evening.

5 Mr. Johnston. And we basically discussed while we  
6 were off the record the fact that the assassination occurred  
7 at 12:30 in Dallas, which we think would have been around 7:30  
8 in Paris, and the meeting was then over at 10:00 o'clock.

9 When you walked out of the meeting you testified previously  
10 that you heard about the assassination.

11 Is that correct?

12 AMLASH Case Officer. That's correct.

13 Mr. Johnston. And that's the first word you heard about  
14 the assassination?

15 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

16 Mr. Johnston. You previously said that AMLASH made a  
17 comment about that. Was there any other discussion of the  
18 assassination by AMLASH?

19 AMLASH Case Officer. That was it, because I left him  
20 at that time.

21 Mr. Johnston. I don't understand. If the meeting is  
22 either in a house or somewhere else how you would leave together  
23 and you would have access to a radio or something to hear the  
24 report.

25 AMLASH Case Officer. If it was in the house, it could

**TOP SECRET**

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49

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1 have been the occupant of the house who told us. In fact, I  
2 am sure it was the occupant of the house, **Red Stent**, who told  
3 us he had just heard on the radio about the assassination when  
4 we came out of the meeting. We didn't go or come together  
5 to the house. He left on his own and then I left after he left.

6 Mr. Johnston. So in other words, what you're saying is  
7 that you're not walking out of the building but you're in the  
8 house and the meeting is over and **Red Stent** knows that the  
9 meeting is over and that he tells you.

10 AMLASH Case Officer. We came out of the room, out of  
11 the study in which we were holding the meeting, and when we  
12 came out of that into his living room he told us what he had  
13 just heard on the radio.

14 Mr. Johnston. And then AMLASH made this comment and  
15 walked out of the door?

16 AMLASH Case Officer. AMLASH made this comment and  
17 shortly thereafter I don't recall, we finished our business.  
18 He was -- I don't remember the exact quote. You have it on  
19 the record there, like why does it have to happen to somebody  
20 like that.

21 Mr. Johnston. Did you know who committed the assassination  
22 at this time?

23 AMLASH Case Officer. No.

24 Mr. Johnston. And even with that you don't recall whether  
25 AMLASH walked out the door with the poison pen?

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1 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't believe he did, I don't  
2 believe he did and it could very well be that what I would have  
3 done is pull the hypodermic needle out of it, that's very  
4 simple, and then it's just a pen, throw the pen away or keep  
5 the pen.

6 It's not a complicated object, in other words. It was  
7 very simple to just pull the hypodermic needle out of it, and  
8 that's probably what was done. But I don't recall specifically  
9 that I did it.

10 Mr. Johnston. Did you do that after the meeting was over?

11 AMLASH Case Officer. No, it was during the meeting, not  
12 after.

13 Mr. Johnston. Now there's an indication that you got  
14 instructions from Washington after the meeting to break off  
15 contact with AMLASH.

16 Do you recall receiving those instructions or instructions  
17 to that effect?

18 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, there was a cable, I  
19 believe, as I recall. It wasn't necessarily to break off contact  
20 with AMLASH because everybody knew that that was the last  
21 meeting. He was preparing to, we knew this, he had been preparing  
22 and we had been talking to him since October since he was out  
23 about his return to Cuba.

24 Senator Schweiker. Did the arms drop cache ever occur?

25 AMLASH Case Officer. I had left, I wasn't involved in

**TOP SECRET**

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**TOP SECRET**

51

gsh 2445

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1 that part of it, Senator. Again, only from the record that I  
2 read afterwards, I think a couple of drops were made to him.  
3 In fact, the next year or something like that.

4 Mr. Johnston. I'm not sure exactly what was left or  
5 what he received or what was available.

6 AMLASH Case Officer. And I don't know if he ever picked  
7 them up. I don't think we know that.

8 Mr. Wallach. Why did he tell you he wanted the rifles  
9 with telescopic sights?

10 AMLASH Case Officer. Well, he wanted grenades and he  
11 wanted dynamite too to storm the headquarters later on. We  
12 said, well, look, could you expand this somewhat too, and he  
13 was talking about, well, yes, and we should probably attack  
14 the radio station at the same time. It was a matter of attacking  
15 a building, whether it was a radio station or whatever it was,  
16 in order to, in his mind, he was probably thinking of attacking  
17 the headquarters, Castro's headquarters.

18 Mr. Johnston. Let me refresh your recollection. In  
19 your previous testimony with the Select Committee on page 114  
20 you stated:

21 "When we came out of that meeting we heard the news  
22 of President Kennedy's assassination and I received a cable  
23 after that which I thought that this was probably the reason  
24 the whole operation was being re-assessed.

25 AMLASH Case Officer. That was strictly my thought at that

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**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

52

gsh 26

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1 time.

2 Mr. Johnston. And on page 115 of your prior transcript  
3 you said, "well, the whole Cuban operation, the way I interpreted  
4 it, was being called on."

5 Did you receive a cable to that effect?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. It was a very cryptic cable saying,  
7 you know, return to Washington, which I was going to do anyway,  
8 so this is why --

9 Mr. Johnston. Did it say to break off contact with  
10 AMLASH?

11 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall that it did but  
12 it didn't make any difference because headquarters knew that  
13 that was the last meeting with him before he was returning to  
14 Cuba anyway.

15 So there was no reason to tell me to break off contact  
16 with him. This is what I'm trying to say.

17 Mr. Johnston. Supposedly the 1967 IG report, and I  
18 don't know where they got their information, said that was an  
19 OPIM cable.

20 AMLASH Case Officer. That's Operation Immediate. In  
21 other words, it's an immediate cable. That set precedence  
22 on the cable.

23 Mr. Johnston. And what does that mean for transmitting --

24 AMLASH Case Officer. It was transmitted before a routine  
25 cable or a priority cable. It's just the precedence --

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Mr. Johnston. It has the highest priority next to FLASH.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's the one below FLASH.

Mr. Johnston. And that tells you to break off the meeting  
or to come back to Washington?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall receiving that?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And you read that?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, or I was told about it because

I didn't go into the embassy to read it, so I don't think they  
brought the cable out to me but I was told to go on back to  
Washington.

Mr. Johnston. Let me state that that cable is apparently  
not in the AMLASH file and the 1967 Inspector General could not  
find that cable.

Does that surprise you?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, it doesn't really because  
I don't think there was that much importance given to that  
kind of cable at that time.

What you say about the Operation Immediate, we handled  
all of our traffic, more or less, in this case on an immediate  
basis because of the short periods of time that we had with  
AMLASH.

So if you are implying that because of the OP AM cable  
that there was something else behind this, no, I don't think that

**TOP SECRET**

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gsh 28 1 there was in any way. It was just, you know, return to Washington,  
2 and as I assumed, and I assumed at that time that certainly the  
3 whole Cuban operation was going to be re-assessed after what  
4 happened to President Kennedy.

5 Mr. Johnston. Now there is in the file a cable reporting  
6 from Paris to Washington reporting that you planned to depart  
7 Paris that morning of November 23rd and arrive in Washington  
8 8:10.

9 Did you in fact take that flight?

10 AMLASH Case Officer. Did you ever find that cable?

11 Mr. Johnston. I saw the cable of your return to  
12 Washington.

13 AMLASH Case Officer. If it referred to a cable, that  
14 was the one telling me to come back. This is a travel-type  
15 of exchange.

16 Mr. Johnston. Did you in fact arrive back in Washington  
17 I said 8:10. I'm sorry, it would be 18:10, which would be  
18 6:00 Washington time.

19 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

20 Mr. Johnston. Where did you go when you arrived in  
21 Washington at 6:10 in the evening on November 23rd?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall specifically if  
23 I stopped by my home, which is en route to the office, whether  
24 I went right back to the office before going home

25 Mr. Johnston. But you did go to the office sometime that

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**TOP SECRET**

55

gsh 29

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1 evening?

2 AMLASH Case Officer. I may have.

3 Mr. Johnston. Did you go to the office on the 24th?

4 AMLASH Case Officer. Oh, yes.

5 Mr. Johnston. That was a Sunday?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. It could have been.

7 Mr. Wallach. One question about the cable that we can't

8 find.

9 Did you have any other business in Paris besides AMLASH?

10 AMLASH Case Officer. Not specifically at that time.

11 Mr. Wallach. Was there a date that you intended to  
12 return?

13 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

14 Mr. Wallach. When was that date officially?

15 AMLASH Case Officer. About the time that I returned.

16 Mr. Wallach. Why would they have sent you a cable  
17 telling you to return if you intended to return that day?

18 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know. This was probably  
19 a reaction to what had happened. But again, I want to point  
20 out to you that travel cables of this type, even if your plans are  
21 such, and the way I was travelling at that time I was not  
22 travelling on a <sup>99</sup> ~~Diplomatic Passport~~ or anything like that. You  
23 don't even need a regular passport to travel France. It was  
24 just to keep track and record of our personal travel.

25 In other words, it's our security to make sure that

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

56

gsh 30

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1 that headquarters knows that we are coming back and I sent a  
2 cable saying I'm arriving on such and such a date, the same  
3 way I sent a cable to Paris telling them I'm arriving on such  
4 and such a date.

5 Mr. Johnston. Would you have sent your cable without  
6 getting a cable first from them?

7 AMLASH Case Officer. I could have, sure.

8 Mr. Johnston. I'm not sure I understand the purpose  
9 of their cable. Were you saying it's a regular thing that they  
10 will send extra traffic?

11 AMLASH Case Officer. I can't tell you what the purpose  
12 of their cable was except what I'm trying to explain to you  
13 is that keeping headquarters informed or headquarters inquiring  
14 of you in such circumstances, it's not unusual to get a cable,  
15 you know, advise us when you're going to return or please  
16 return or us sending a cable.

17 If there was any other reason for sending that cable,  
18 I can only conjecture, I don't know, that it was because of  
19 what had happened.

20 End 3B  
21 Begin 3A  
22 410 FIFTH STREET, S.E., WASHINGTON, D.C.  
23 24

Mr. Johnston. I'd like the record to show that Senator  
Schweiker has left and you are aware that without the Senator  
being here you have the prerogative to stop your testimony.

25 Do you understand that?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And that if we proceed, that you can continue

**TOP SECRET**

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57

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31 1 to stop at any time during the testimony and ask for it to  
2 continue when we have a Senator present.

3 Do you understand that?

4 AMLASH Case Officer. Right.

5 Mr. Johnston. Are you willing to continue under the  
6 conditions of not having a Senator here?

7 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I am.

8 Mr. Johnston. We have you back in Washington at 6:10  
9 on November 23rd, and you may or may not have gone to the office  
10 that day and you said you definitely did go to the office on  
11 November 24th, on Sunday.

12 AMLASH Case Officer. Probably so. Scratch definitely.  
13 I'm probably not that definite about it, but I'm sure I touched  
14 base with the office as soon as I returned, either telephonically  
15 or physically going there.

16 Mr. Johnston. Let me refresh your recollection then and  
17 remind you that Oswald was killed on November 24th, Sunday.

18 Does that aid you in recalling where you were at that  
19 time?

20 AMLASH Case Officer. No. I mean I was home, certainly.

21 Mr. Johnston. You mean home in Washington?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. In Washington.

23 Mr. Johnston. But you don't know whether you were at  
24 the office or at home on that day?

25 AMLASH Case Officer. It depends on the hour that we

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58

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1 may have been working.

2 If you're going back to asking about normal hours that  
3 we kept during that period of time, Sunday was just another  
4 working day, so you know, it wasn't because it was Sunday that  
5 we would not have been in the office.

6 Mr. Johnston. But you can't recall being in the office?

7 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall being in the office.  
8 When we heard the information that Oswald was involved, I  
9 could very well have been home.

10 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall being in the office when  
11 you heard that Oswald was shot?

12 AMLASH Case Officer. No.

13 Mr. Johnston. Did you hold, when did you first talk  
14 to the chief of the section about your meeting?

15 AMLASH Case Officer. Specifically, I don't recall when.  
16 What would have been unusual is for me to have called the office  
17 when I got in and whether I went there or not, I don't recall.  
18 And then I either talked to Fitzgerald who would have been,  
19 he would have been the only person I would have talked to. If  
20 he was in on that Sunday and I went in, I would have talked to  
21 him on Sunday, and if not, it would have been on Monday.

22 Mr. Johnston. Did you talk to Mr. Helms about the  
23 November 22nd meeting?

24 AMLASH Case Officer. No, I did not talk to Helms.

25 Mr. Johnston. Did you talk to Mr. McCone about the

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59

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1 November 22nd meeting?

2 AMLASH Case Officer. No.

3 Mr. Johnston. Did you talk to anyone in technical  
4 services about the pen device or the meeting?

5 AMLASH Case Officer. Not at the time, no.

6 Mr. Johnston. So it was your recollection that the only  
7 one you talked to in this time period of November 23rd and  
8 November 24th, November 25th about the meeting in Paris is

9 Mr. Fitzgerald?

10 AMLASH Case Officer. To the best of my recollection, yes.

11 Mr. Johnston. And what is your recollection of that  
12 discussion?

13 AMLASH Case Officer. The report, as to what had taken  
14 place, reporting that he had not thought highly of the device  
15 that we had provided him with, that he did not intend to carry  
16 it back, that he was pleased with the fact that we had decided  
17 that we would put caches down for him inside Cuba, the  
18 reaffirmation of U.S. support for his movement inside of Cuba,  
19 the fact that he had decided definitely to return and had  
20 made his reservations to return, and his dismay and his  
21 reaction when he had heard that Kennedy had been assassinated  
22 when we got to the meeting.

23 Mr. Johnston. Was there a discussion about any link  
24 between AMLASH or your Cuban operations and the Kennedy  
25 assassination?

**TOP SECRET**

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60

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1 AMLASH Case Officer. None whatsoever that I can remember.  
2 Mr. Johnston. No discussion between you and Fitzgerald  
3 at all about any connection?

4 AMLASH Case Officer. No, not that I can recall.

5 Mr. Johnston. When you say not that you can recall, are  
6 you saying that it's possible but you don't recall it, or are  
7 you certain, fairly certain to the best of your recollection?

8 AMLASH Case Officer. I'm fairly certain to the best  
9 of my knowledge that there was no connection between the AMLASH  
10 in other words, that we discussed it, we discussed the Kennedy  
11 assassination. I'm sure we did. I mean who wasn't discussing  
12 the Kennedy assassination at that time. That we tied the  
13 Kennedy assassination in with AMLASH, I don't recall any kind  
14 of conversation of that nature.

15 Mr. Johnston. On November 23rd and November 24th and  
16 November 25th?

17 AMLASH Case Officer. Right.

18 Mr. Johnston. All right. Let me point you to one of  
19 the documents we wanted to ask you about and it is a contact  
20 report dated 25 November, and let me just show that to you.

21 Is that a document -- let me state for the record what  
22 it is.

23 It's the original, apparently copy, of the November 25th  
24 contact report of the November 22nd meeting.

25 Did you prepare that contact report?

**TOP SECRET**

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GSH 35

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1 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

2 Mr. Johnston. And is that the document you prepared?

3 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

4 Mr. Johnston. I'm asking you directly is that the  
5 very document you prepared? That's a very specific question.

6 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

7 Mr. Johnston. When did you prepare that?

8 AMLASH Case Officer. The date is 25 November.

9 Mr. Johnston. Is it your recollection that that's the  
10 date you prepared that?

11 AMLASH Case Officer. Probably so.

12 Mr. Johnston. Do you have a recollection of doing it  
13 on that date?

14 AMLASH Case Officer. Not specifically on the 25th, but  
15 if the document is dated the 25th, I presume that's the day  
16 that I did the memorandum.

17 Mr. Johnston. Now how did you prepare it? Did you  
18 dictate it to somebody who then typed it up, or did you yourself  
19 personally prepare it? And in asking you that question, is there  
20 any way to tell from the document how it was prepared?

21 AMLASH Case Officer. No, the secretary probably typed  
22 it. I mean I didn't type it myself.

23 Mr. Johnston. You did not type it yourself.

24 Is there any way to tell from the document? There are  
25 no initials on it or anything that would indicate that it was

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dictated and typed?

AMLASH Case Officer. No. What are you asking me?

Mr. Johnston. I'm just asking you if you're the one that prepared that or how it got prepared?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, it's a contact report of my meeting with AMLASH.

Mr. Johnston. And you prepared that document?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. But you did not type it?

AMLASH Case Officer. I did not type it, so I could have dictated it to a secretary or wrote it out longhand and gave it to her and she typed it.

Mr. Johnston. What about the fact that on November 19th in your memorandum for record you indicated that Fitzgerald wanted written reports to be kept to a minimum?

With those instructions why did you prepare a contract report?

AMLASH Case Officer. Because I probably contacted

Fitzgerald about it and he said prepare the one on this meeting.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall that?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall that but that would be a normal thing.

Mr. Johnston. That he would have in effect ...

AMLASH Case Officer. I briefed him on this, and then I said, let's have a memorandum, a contact report on that.

**TOP SECRET**

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63

In other words, when he said "minimize the written communications on the operation, he didn't say we won't have any other communications on any other memos on it or any further memorandums on it.

So what would happen if you put things within the dates here, I had briefed him on this and then it was by agreement or maybe by his order that he told me to write up a contact report.

Mr. Johnston. Have you had an opportunity to examine that report either before you came here? I'm not sure we've given you enough opportunity to look at it closely while here. Maybe you could take that time right now to look at the document.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Look at page 3 of the document. Compare page 2 and page 3. Page 3 is in a much different type than page 2.

Do you notice that? It's much fainter.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, it's fainter, and I don't know if the type looks like it's the same but it's fainter.

Mr. Johnston. Do you have any explanation for that?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Was page 3 what you prepared on November 21st?

AMLASH Officer. I didn't personally prepare it again, so I could have given the secretary my long hand report, something could have happened, and then I finished it and she put it on a second page. That is possible. I don't have any explanation

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gash 38 1 why it's lighter than the other one. The type appears to be the  
2 same.

3 Mr. Johnston. Are you saying that the way you prepared it  
4 it's possible that the second page and third page were prepared  
5 on different days?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. No, it could have been at different  
7 times of the day. If I had written out the first part of the  
8 contact report and I hadn't finished it, the secretary could  
9 very well have started to type it, and then when I finished it  
10 I would have given her the last page to type because it was all  
11 on the 25th.

12 Mr. Johnston. Are you saying --

13 AMLASH Case Officer. Because there's no date on the  
14 second page.

15 Mr. Johnston. You're stating that your recollection is  
16 that that document was typed on one day by one person.

17 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, probably so. That's the  
18 usual case. I have no reason to doubt why it would have been  
19 done any differently.

20 Mr. Johnston. What about the information on page 3?  
21 Is that the substance, in fact? Is that exactly what you wrote  
22 on November 25th about the contact?

23 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, and in fact I draw your  
24 attention to the part on the secret writing material because  
25 we were very concerned as to how we would continue to communicate

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65

sh 39

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1 with him inside Cuba and this was one of the subjects that  
2 were discussed at the last meeting, communications. So that  
3 is not a new subject matter. That is definitely part of the  
4 subject matter that was discussed at the last meeting, which  
5 was communications with him.

6 Mr. Johnston. And it's your testimony that this report  
7 as it exists in that file is exactly the report that you prepared  
8 on November 25th?

9 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes..

10 Mr. Johnston. You'll note that the report does not  
11 mention the pen device or AMLASH's reaction to your giving it  
12 to him.

13 AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

14 Mr. Johnston. You left that out of your original report.  
15 You did not make a written report on --

16 AMLASH Case Officer. I did not make a written report  
17 on that.

18 Mr. Johnston. Why was that?

19 AMLASH Case Officer. Probably because Fitzgerald said  
20 not to.

21 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall Fitzgerald saying not to?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall it, but that's  
23 certainly what I'd have to assume.

24 In other words, don't include that part of it.

25 Mr. Johnston. Should it have gone in there in a normal

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**TOP SECRET**

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66

gsh 344-400  
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1 report?

2 AMLASH Case Officer. In a normal report, yes. But this  
3 certainly was a rather, again, sensitive subject that we were  
4 talking about. He did not accept it and I don't think that at  
5 that time it was felt that anything else should be said about  
6 it.

7 Mr. Johnston. Why is that?

8 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know why. Again, because  
9 of the sensitivity, I presume, of the subject.

10 Mr. Johnston. And again, is it your recollection that  
11 Fitzgerald, is it your testimony that Fitzgerald told you not  
12 to put a reference to the pen device in the report?

13 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall if he specifically  
14 told me not to put it in or if when I gave him the report he  
15 was satisfied that it was not in.

16 Mr. Baron. Why would a reference to the pen device be  
17 any more sensitive than references to arms caches or suggestions  
18 of assassinations or all the other kinds of things that were  
19 already in the file?

20 AMLASH Case Officer. Because again, in conjunction with  
21 this particular operation it was not an assassination operation.  
22 It was a coup operation. This was one of the aberrations of the  
23 operation which we got involved in strictly to provide bona  
24 fides to the man that we were dealing with and we were concerned  
25 for his personal security.

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67

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1        In other words, it was not part of the operational plan  
2 to provide him with any such devices for the purposes of  
3 assassinating Castro. The rifles and the grenades and all of  
4 this was something that was necessary to start a coup.

5        In other words, it was not directed at one particular  
6 person.

7        I think this was probably the thinking at that time and  
8 why such points did not get into it because this was not part  
9 of the AMLASH plan of operation.

10       Mr. Baron. For the sake of the accuracy of the records  
11 and the protection of the people who were involved at the CIA,  
12 wouldn't even the tender of such a device to AMLASH for whatever  
13 purposes normally be put into the records?

14       AMLASH Case Officer. Not in a contact report because in  
15 a contact report this goes into the regular file. Whether  
16 Fitzgerald would have made a note of this some place else I  
17 don't know, but in the regular contact report which goes into  
18 the regular file -- in other words, say the secretary would  
19 know about it and this could have been the other part of it.

20       In other words, to reduce the number of people, to contain  
21 the number of people.

22       Mr. Baron. Do you recall anything in your discussions  
23 with Fitzgerald that led you to believe that one of the  
24 factors that was in his mind in assessing the sensitivity of  
25 this tender of a poison pen device was the day on which it

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**TOP SECRET**

68

gsh 42  
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1 happened as opposed to simply the fact that such a device was  
2 offered?

3 AMLASH Case Officer. If it was in his mind, he never  
4 stated it to me. I think it was just the overall sensitivity  
5 that the Agency had been, has now, and always has had on  
6 assassinations.

7 I mean it's not the specific of what had happened that  
8 time. Assassinations were not part of the routine business of  
9 the Agency.

10 Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you, you have mentioned the  
11 secretary who prepared it. Do you recall the name of the  
12 secretary who prepared this document?

13 AMLASH Case Officer. No, I don't.

14 Mr. Johnston. Did you have a regular secretary?

15 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

16 Mr. Johnston. What was her name?

17 AMLASH Case Officer. She could have prepared it or  
18 it could have been Fitzgerald's secretary because, again, of  
19 the days, the Sunday.

20 I don't recall the name.

21 Mr. Johnston. You don't recall your secretary's name?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. Well, I don't remember if a girl  
23 by the name of Bobbie Hernandez was still with me. She was  
24 my secretary during part of that time. She was probably my  
25 secretary then.

**TOP SECRET**

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69

1 I don't recall Fitzgerald's secretary's name, and she  
2 could have typed it, but it would have been one of the two girls  
3 Mr. Johnston. Let me show you the report again and on  
4 page 1 of the report, I think it's paragraph 2 of that, that  
5 discusses the newspaper article, the Kennedy speech. Paragraph  
6 two:

7 "AMLASH stated he was returning to Cuba." The second  
8 sentence of that is -- "subject was pleased to read a copy of  
9 President Kennedy's 18 November speech in Miami and was even  
10 more pleased to hear that Fitzgerald had helped to prepare  
11 the President's speech. You the case officer reiterated the  
12 assurances given by Fitzgerald of full U.S. support if a  
13 real coup against the regime was successful."

14 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, that's right.

15 Mr. Johnston. Does that refresh your recollection about  
16 whether or not you gave him the speech?

17 AMLASH Case Officer. No, because at that time it  
18 could have already been printed in the Paris newspaper and  
19 he could very well have read it in one of the Parisian newspapers.  
20 But again, I could have had a copy of a newspaper clipping of  
21 the speech with me.

22 Mr. Johnston. But in the least does that refresh your  
23 recollection that you told AMLASH that Fitzgerald helped prepare  
24 the speech?

25 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, Fitzgerald told me that we

**TOP SECRET**

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70

sh 44 1 could tell him.

2 Mr. Johnston. Would you recall the portion of the  
3 speech you pointed out to AMLASH?

4 AMLASH Case Officer. No portion was pointed out to him.  
5 It was just that Fitzgerald had helped in preparation of the  
6 speech.

7 Mr. Johnston. I could show you a copy. This is an  
8 extract I have prepared from the November 19th, 1963 Washington  
9 Post, page A15, which carries an AP story of November 18th  
10 saying:

11 "The following is the text of President Kennedy's address  
12 tonight before the Inter-American Press Association."

13 And I have extracted the only portions as are relevant  
14 to Cuba. Now I'll give you a chance to read it.

15 Incidentally, I'd like to have this marked as Exhibit 1  
16 for the record.

17 (The document referred to  
18 was marked for identification  
19 as AMLASH Case Officer  
20 Exhibit No. 1)

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71

gsh 45

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1 Mr. Johnston. I point out that in that speech, do you  
2 have a recollection of this being the part of the speech or  
3 you discussed this aspect of the speech?

4 AMLASH Case Officer. We did not discuss the speech  
5 paragraph by paragraph. All we did was a very small passing  
6 remark . . . about the speech.

7 He had probably to the best of my recollection already  
8 read it in one of the Parisian newspapers, or if I had a news-  
9 paper clipping of the speech, he glanced at it while we were  
10 there, but I don't recall that. But he was certainly satisfied  
11 with the tone of the speech.

12 Mr. Johnston. You must have read the speech before  
13 you mentioned it to him. Is this the portion that you had in  
14 mind that would satisfy him about the tone of the speech?

15 AMLASH Case Officer. Certainly this sets the tone for  
16 the whole speech. The extracts that you have made here sets  
17 the tone for the full speech and specifically the one in which  
18 once the barrier is removed, we will be ready and anxious  
19 to work with the Cuban people in pursuit of those progressive  
20 goals which in a few short years stirred the hopes and the  
21 sympathy of many people throughout the entire hemisphere.

22 Mr. Johnston. Was it your intent by making reference to  
23 the speech in your meeting with AMLASH to show that higher  
24 authority was behind what you were doing?

25 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, precisely.

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1       Mr. Johnston. And you felt that this speech coincided  
2 with what you were telling AMLASH?

3       AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, that the U.S. Government was  
4 prepared, the assurances at first that Gerald had given him  
5 and I had been giving him that the U.S. Government was willing  
6 to support the Cuban people.

7       Mr. Baron. In the excerpt from the speech that we have  
8 just shown you it says:

9       "It is important to restate what now divides Cuba from  
10 my country and from all the American countries. It is the  
11 fact that a small band of conspirators has stripped the Cuban  
12 people of their freedom and handed over the independence and  
13 sovereignty of the Cuban nation to forces beyond the hemisphere.

14       Then it continues: "This and this alone divides us.  
15 As long as this is true, nothing is possible. Without it,  
16 everything is possible. Once this barrier is removed, we will  
17 be ready and anxious to work with the Cuban people."

18       That's the end of the quote.

19       Is it your understanding that this reference to a small  
20 band of conspirators is a reference to the Castro government?

21       AMLASH Case Officer. Precisely.

22       Mr. Baron. And in your report of November 19th, or your  
23 memorandum for the record of November 19th, you had mentioned  
24 that -- well, I will simply quote from the report. It says:

25       "Show AMLASH One copy of President's Miami speech (remark

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73

gsh 144-6000  
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1 to AMLASH One that blank helped with speech).

2 AMLASH Case Officer. Fitzgerald.

3 Mr. Baron. Blank is Fitzgerald.

4 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. This memorandum was written  
5 before I went to Paris, so, in effect, these were my marching  
6 orders that I could use showing that the U.S. Government, indeed

7 Mr. Baron. Would support a move against the Castro  
8 government.

9 AMLASH Case Officer. Would support the move against  
10 Castro.

11 Mr. Baron. And did you know for a fact that Fitzgerald  
12 helped with the preparation of the speech?

13 AMLASH Case Officer. Only from what Fitzgerald told  
14 me.

15 Mr. Baron. What did Fitzgerald tell you?

16 AMLASH Case Officer. I can't give you a specific quote  
17 but I presume that he had had some input into the speech. This,  
18 again, wouldn't necessarily be Fitzgerald himself. It could  
19 be but it could also be the SAS, the CIA input into the speech,  
20 which is normal in Presidential speeches that there are inputs  
21 from different agencies.

22 End 3A, b 3B  
23 Mr. Baron. Did Fitzgerald say anything to you about  
24 preparation of this speech that led you to believe that the  
25 President or anyone close to him who had been involved in the  
preparation of the speech had been made knowledgeable of the

**TOP SECRET**

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1 AMLASH operation?

2 " AMLASH Case Officer. No. Fitzgerald never told me  
3 specifically that the President had been apprised of this.  
4 The general objective, I never had any doubts in my mind that  
5 the general objective of organizing a coup against Castro did  
6 not have the highest governmental approval. I mean this was  
7 never a question, I don't think, in my mind. Again, not  
8 specifically assassination because what I mentioned before,  
9 I don't think Fitzgerald or Helms or anybody else would  
10 specifically have briefed anybody that the AMLASH operation was  
11 an assassination plot because it wasn't.

12 Mr. Baron. So you had no basis for believing that the  
13 President was informed that a component of the AMLASH operation  
14 was assassination?

15 AMLASH Case Officer. No, I have no reason. I don't  
16 know. Nobody told me that he had or he hadn't.

17 Mr. Baron. Did Fitzgerald make it clear to you that  
18 in providing input to this speech he had the specific purpose  
19 in mind of giving a public signal to AMLASH that he would receive  
20 support from the highest quarters of the U.S. Government if he  
21 would move for a coup?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, this was my understanding.

23 Mr. Baron. That the speech was to be a specific signal  
24 to opponents of Castro inside Cuba as opposed to a general  
25 statement of U.S. policy?

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73

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AMLAsh Case Officer. That's right.

2 Mr. Baron. Can you recall anything about your conversation  
3 that produced that understanding?

4 AMLASH Case Officer. No, just the general conversation  
5 of the time and what we were trying to do.

6 In other words, we were trying to organize a coup and  
7 the problems that we had been through specifically with AMLASH  
8 in trying to persuade him that the U.S. government was serious  
9 about supporting Cubans who were opposed to Castro.

10 So this statement that appeared in the speech was  
11 certainly public notice that this was the case.

12 Mr. Baron. Did Fitzgerald or anyone else say anything  
13 to you that led you to believe that the President had been  
14 specifically informed that representations would be made such  
15 as the ones on October 29th that Robert Kennedy or other high  
16 American officials would stand behind AMLASH?

17 AMLASH Case Officer. No, he didn't specifically tell me.

18 Mr. Baron. Did your conversations with Fitzgerald about  
19 this speech, his input to this speech, lead you to believe that  
20 the President had been specifically informed that a poison  
21 pen device was being prepared to be tendered on November 22nd?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. No.

23 Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you in a different context  
24 now, was there a decision after the assassination to break off  
25 further contacts with AMLASH?

**TOP SECRET**

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76

gsh 50

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1 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, but that decision evolved,  
2 it wasn't an automatic decision right after the assassination.  
3 In fact, as you recall from my previous testimony we had  
4 contact with AMLASH again in late '64 when he came out. I  
5 think the only hesitancy at that time was what's the new policy?  
6 Does the new President want to continue to, in our attempts  
7 to organize a plot against Castro, a coup against Castro --

8 That probably was the hesitancy, not the fact that it  
9 was immediately decided to stop contact, which, as I said before,  
10 it wasn't, because we saw him again.

11 Mr. Johnston. Was there a discussion at all in November  
12 or December 1963 about the relationship between the AMLASH  
13 operation and the assassination of President Kennedy?

14 AMLASH Case Officer. Not that I recall.

15 Mr. Johnston. Let me show you, we have in several versions  
16 and the one that is most available is this document here, and  
17 I have got the document you're looking at is in Volume 12,  
18 I believe, of the AMLASH file.

19 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

20 Mr. Johnston. And it is a yellow legal size paper.

21 AMLASH Case Officer. Let me correct. It's not a document.  
22 It is evidently somebody's type-written notes of probably the  
23 recollection of what had happened.

24 Mr. Johnston. Okay, and it's on yellow legal-size paper  
25 typed. And I also have a document that I'm sure is in the file

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77

gsh 51 1 but we don't have it pointed out. It's the sanitized version  
2 of a memorandum for the record dated 29 March, 1965, subject  
3 AMLASH, and both of them convey the same subject, the same  
4 information. And on the paragraph that has the marking at the  
5 left and the language of those documents, those documents say  
6 "22 November, '63, Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Sanchez assured subject  
7 that this Agency would give him everything he needed."

8 Is that the portion you're reading?

9 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

10 Mr. Johnston. "(Telescopic sight, silencer, all the  
11 money he wanted). Situation changed when Mr. Sanchez and  
12 Mr. Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that President  
13 Kennedy had been assassination. Because of this fact, plans  
14 of subject changed and it was decided that this Agency could  
15 have no part in the assassination of a government leader (including  
16 Castro), and it would not aid subject in his attempt.

17 "This included the following: 'We would not furnish  
18 the silencer, nor scope, nor any money for direct assassination;  
19 furthermore, we would not lift a finger to help subject escape  
20 from Cuba should he assassinate Castro.'"

21 Did you prepare this document?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. I did not prepare this document.  
23 I was not with the task force with SAS at the time this document  
24 was prepared on 29 March, '65. I had already left.

25 Again, the only thing I can state for you here on what

**TOP SECRET**

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78

gsh 2

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1 I knew of the operation, that this was somebody trying to put  
2 together, this was a memo from Chief FI probably in the task  
3 force trying to put together by this time, 29 March, what had  
4 happened. The other document since it's, it's probably a later  
5 date, the yellow document was somebody probably again trying to  
6 reconstruct what had happened. The facts are not as I knew  
7 them at the time.

8 Both paragraphs have condensed an evolution that took  
9 place over a period of a year and the decision probably was not  
10 made until '65 after I had left the operation, that we were  
11 pulling out.

12 But the facts as stated here in those two documents are  
13 incorrect, and certainly the timing that they insinuate is  
14 wrong.

15 Mr. Johnston. I think we should develop that on the  
16 record and if you want to point out what facts are incorrect,  
17 why don't you do so?

18 AMLASH Case Officer. "The situation changed when Mr.  
19 Sanchez and Mr. Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that  
20 President Kennedy had been assassinated." That's incorrect.

21 Fitzgerald wasn't with me on the 22nd of November meeting.

22 Mr. Johnston. Okay. What about the sentence before  
23 that, that Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Sanchez assured subject that  
24 this Agency would give him everything he needed, with your  
25 qualifier that Fitzgerald was not at the meeting?

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**TOP SECRET**

79

gash 53

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1 AMLASH Case Officer. This was at the meeting in October  
2 and not at the November meeting because that is correct,  
3 provided you put it in the right context.

4 Mr. Johnston. What about the statement, all the money  
5 he wanted?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. Inferred. I mean I don't recall  
7 that money was ever discussed with this man at any time. In  
8 fact I was asked this question before and I couldn't really  
9 recollect when I had given him some money.

10 It turns out that the record shows that I did give him  
11 \$350 for his expenses. But money, specifically, again, that  
12 is somebody else interpreting. I don't know of any other  
13 document or certainly any memorandum for the record that I  
14 prepared in which money specifically was mentioned.

15 Mr. Johnston. But would you disagree with the statement?

16 AMLASH Case Officer. Well, the statement as a whole,  
17 if you leave out the money, which again, anything that he needs.

18 Mr. Johnston. Well, that's what we want to leave in.  
19 the money.

20 AMLASH Case Officer. If he needs the money, I think it  
21 was not excluded in the offer. But what I'm saying --

22 Mr. Johnston. This makes a positive statement, him  
23 saying that you and Mr. Fitzgerald assured AMLASH that the  
24 Agency would give him everything he needed, all the money he  
25 wanted.

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1 And I'm asking you directly either on October 29th or  
2 November 22nd did you make that assurance to him?

3 AMLASH Case Officer. I can't recall that such an issue  
4 was made of money because he never asked for money and we  
5 specifically didn't have to respond to telling him that we  
6 would give him money. In telling him that the support necessary,  
7 all of the support necessary for a coup, I think it is implied  
8 that he would get whatever he needed, which would mean supplies,  
9 but not specifically money, and the reason I state this is that  
10 money was never a subject of contention between the Agency and  
11 AMLASH. He never asked for money, he never was offered  
12 specifically money.

13 Mr. Johnston. Was he assured that he would get all the  
14 money he wanted?

15 AMLASH Case Officer. All the support he needed, not  
16 the money that he wanted. He never asked for money.

17 Mr. Johnston. I'm not asking you what he asked for.  
18 I'm asking you what you told him. In this thing it says  
19 you assured him that you would give him all the money that he  
20 wanted.

21 Did you give that assurance to him?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. I did not because I did not  
23 write this document. And the person who wrote this document  
24 that I know of didn't write it from any factual report at any  
25 time.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

81

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This is not a document. This is somebody's notes in putting together. These are rough notes typed on yellow, legal sized paper of somebody trying to reconstruct what happened here probably two or three years afterwards.

Mr. Johnston. I guess what I'm asking is a yes or no answer. In October or November, 1963, did you or Mr. Fitzgerald, to your knowledge, assure AMLASH that he would receive all the money he wanted?

AMLAASH Case Officer. No, and I must qualify that. Unless you want to infer that in giving him the support that he needed he would also receive money. But money specifically, all he wanted, was never a part of the conversations, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. Johnston. We have talked about the next sentence and it continues.

"Because of this fact plans of subject changed and it was decided the Agency could have no part in the assassination of a government leader, including Castro."

Is that accurate? I'm giving you an opportunity to rebut the document.

AMLAASH Case Officer. It's accurate from the point of view --

You have to put it in the right time frame, in the right context. When he was met in late '64, after having visited and lived in Cuba for a year or almost a year, he came back more

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82

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1 convinced than before that the only way a coup could be launched  
2 in Cuba was the elimination of Castro and when he expressed this  
3 conviction, not in '63 but in late '64, is when the Agency, and  
4 I presume the U.S. Government at that time felt we can't  
5 continue that directly involved with AMLASH.

6 Mr. Johnston. And the last sentence of that:

7 "This included the following -- 'We would not furnish  
8 the silencer, nor scope, nor any money for direct assassination.  
9 Furthermore, we would not lift a finger to help the subject  
10 escape from Cuba should he assassinate Castro.'"

11 Was that the substance of the discussion immediately  
12 after the assassination of President Kennedy?

13 AMLASH Case Officer. No. A year later in November of  
14 '64.

15 Mr. Johnston. And you're saying that this does not  
16 describe the fall AMLASH meeting?

17 AMLASH Case Officer. It does not. It is a mixture of  
18 what happened over at least a two year period.

19 Mr. Johnston. It perplexes me somewhat that your  
20 failure to keep written records would so warp later thinkers  
21 as to what was going on. I mean take the March, 1965 document.  
22 As of March, 1965 CIA is going on the assumption that you  
23 and Fitzgerald met AMLASH in Paris, that you assured him that  
24 he would get all the money he wanted and that your plans  
25 changed after the meeting because of the Kennedy assassination.

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**TOP SECRET**

83

gash 57 1 AMLASH Case Officer, I can't sit here and presume to  
give you an explanation for that as to where the person who  
prepared that particular memorandum got that information. The  
file itself indicates, as you are well aware, that Fitzgerald  
did not travel to Paris in November. He travelled in October.

So the person who prepared the 29 March, 1965 memo came  
up with this particular type of information, I don't know.

Mr. Johnston. Who is that memo addressed to again?

AMLAsh Case Officer. This is to Chief, PI from Chief,  
Reports.

Mr. Johnston. So your only explanation, your explanation  
for the memo is that it is inaccurate but even if it is  
inaccurate, it indicates that in March, 1965 these people had  
it all wrong as to what the AMLASH operation was all about.

AMLAsh Case Officer. If you want to interpret exactly  
what they wrote here, yes, it was wrong. Now I'm not saying  
that it was wrong because it could have been. I don't know.  
I'm just saying it could have been that they didn't have access  
to all the restricted files because this operation until it  
received its recent publicity was kept on a very restricted  
basis.

So the Chief of Reports, I don't even know, well,  
probably the Chief of Reports in the division or maybe some  
place, probably did not have access to all of the operational  
files.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

84

gash 58

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1                   Mr. Greissing, you're saying that the information itself  
2                   is inaccurate only in a chronological way, that it is developed?

3                   AMLASH Case Officer. Certainly wrong in its chronological  
4                   context, definitely because it throws everything into one  
5                   very small period of time, in reporting or trying to report  
6                   what took place over a much longer period of time.

7                   Mr. Greissing. But the facts that are there over a  
8                   period of a year would be true?

9                   AMLASH Case Officer. But not in this context.

10                  Mr. Greissing. But I'm saying over the period of a  
11                  year from 1 November to the following November when you actually  
12                  informed AMLASH of the feelings that the Agency had developed  
13                  at that time, I believe it is the next sentence down.

14                  AMLASH Case Officer. What is wrong here, what is wrong  
15                  is that after we left that meeting, which I presume they left  
16                  the meeting, I presume they're talking about, yes, the 22  
17                  November, '63 meeting -- this is absolutely wrong, that when  
18                  we left that meeting to discover that President Kennedy had  
19                  been assassinated, we had told him, you know, that this was  
20                  all off.

21                  That is wrong. It was not at that meeting that he  
22                  was told that. He went back after that meeting with the idea  
23                  of organizing a coup inside Cuba.

24                  Mr. Greissing. I believe it clarifies that later in  
25                  the next paragraph. It says that this information was given

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**TOP SECRET**

85

1 to AMLASH the following November in 1964.

2 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. So I don't know why we're  
3 taking that particular piece of information out of context  
4 because in that same memorandum it does state that.

5 Mr. Johnston. Let me move off these documents. The  
6 file on AMLASH contains a November 27th report from Paris which  
7 indicated a source in the Cuban embassy in Paris.

8 AMLASH Case Officer. Excuse me. November 27th of  
9 what year?

10 Mr. Johnston. 1963. A source in the Cuban embassy  
11 in Paris was complaining about AMLASH's denigrating the  
12 revolution.

13 Did you see that report on November 27th, 1963?

14 AMLASH Case Officer. I probably did. I can't  
15 specifically recall that I did.

16 Mr. Johnston. And as I read the report, or my statement  
17 to you of its substance, it would suggest to you that AMLASH  
18 was known by given diplomatic personnel in Paris to be putting  
19 down the Castro revolution.

20 AMLASH Case Officer. It depends on who. In other words,  
21 who did he say this to because he did have friends in the  
22 different embassies.

23 Mr. Johnston. The Cuban embassy?

24 AMLASH Case Officer. He stayed at the Cuban embassy. He  
25 was a Cuban official at that time. So he had friends who were

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**TOP SECRET**

86

Sh 10

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1 of like mind that he was. They were not happy with the way the  
2 revolution was moving.

3 Mr. Johnston. So that fact would have been more broadly  
4 known say in the Cuban embassy?

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5 AMLASH Case Officer. Oh, yes. This was fairly well  
6 known.

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87

1                   Mr. Johnston. The cable seems to indicate that the source  
2 of the information was complaining about AMLASH's denigrating  
3 the revolution, and went on to say that she or he wished he  
4 or she had a tape recorder to record what AMLASH and another  
5 person were saying, suggesting it is not a friendly source to  
6 AMLASH.

7                   AMLASH Case Officer. Well, that suggests -- and again, I  
8 can't give you any definitive explanation for it -- what that  
9 suggests is that she overheard AMLASH talking with somebody  
10 else of like mind, and she didn't like what she heard, I guess.

11                  Mr. Johnston. Let's go now to again what you talked about,  
12 any link in your mind or in Fitzgerald's mind in November and  
13 December 1963 between what you had been doing with AMLASH and  
14 the assassination of President Kennedy?

15                  AMLASH Case Officer. None whatsoever, none whatsoever,  
16 and no discussion, and again, again, I go back and take you  
17 back in time, if you can place yourself back in 1963 and not  
18 1976, after all of this has taken place, after we have had  
19 all the public theories expressed of the connections, all built  
20 on circumstantial evidence of what and who were involved in  
21 the Kennedy Assassination. I take you back and try to place  
22 yourself back within the context of this operation in 1963  
23 when this happened.

24                  First of all, I have to preface what I have to say by  
25 saying that this was not an assassination plot, so there would

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

88

1 be no reason why we would be connecting Kennedy's assassination  
2 with this assassination plot. This was not an assassination  
3 plot, it was not conceived as an assassination plot. As a coup  
4 against Fidel Castro, yes. The fact that the U.S. Government  
5 was not happy and was supporting people who were opposed to  
6 Castro, this was well known. This was in the aftermath, '63, of  
7 the Bay of Pigs. So there was really in the context of the  
8 time the fact that this was not an assassination plot conceived  
9 as an assassination plot, there was really no reason to  
10 connect this one particular operation with the tragedy of  
11 President Kennedy.

12 Mr. Johnston. Okay.

13 We do know that on the 29th of October Fitzgerald told  
14 AMLASH that Robert Kennedy was behind the plot or behind  
15 AMLASH's proposal, is that correct?

16 AMLASH Case Officer. What we told him was that the U.S.  
17 Government was prepared to support a coup against Fidel  
18 Castro.

19 Mr. Johnston. And AMLASH had previously told you that  
20 at least one of his plans for a coup would require the assassi-  
21 nation of the Castro Brothers.

22 AMLASH Case Officer. He had not exactly put it in those  
23 terms, but he certainly felt that the first move would have  
24 to be against the leadership, yes. In other words, we never  
25 talked to him in terms of assassination, and I want this

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89

1           perfectly clear.

2           Mr. Johnston. And he told you before the 29th meeting that  
3           the first step would probably have to be the assassination of  
4           the Castros?

5           AMLASH Case Officer. He never told me assassination because  
6           he didn't even like to use the word "assassination."

7           Mr. Johnston. What word did he like to use?

8           AMLASH Case Officer. The neutralization, the elimination  
9           if you will, of the leadership.

10          The first move in any coup attempt, in order for the  
11          other officers to fall in line, would have to be the removal,  
12          the removal of Fidel Castro, because of the loyalties that he  
13          still had personally with some of the officers.

14          Mr. Johnston. And after he told you that on October  
15          29th, you gave him an assurance that Robert Kennedy backed his  
16          proposal generally.

17          AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, the U.S. Government and  
18          Fitzgerald as the representative of Robert Kennedy, supported  
19          a coup against Castro.

20          Mr. Johnston. On the very day of the assassination, you  
21          referenced the speech of President Kennedy's talking about  
22          an ouster of the current regime in Cuba.

23          AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

24          Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of the September 7th  
25          statement of Fidel Castro's, threatening the lives of U.S.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

90

1 leaders, and let me -- I have a poor Xerox copy, but especially  
2 a portion of that statement by Fidel Castro on September 7th  
3 at a party at the Brazilian embassy in Havana, he talked to a  
4 reporter, Daniel Harker of AP and said, among other things,  
5 "we are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. The United  
6 States leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist  
7 plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be  
8 safe."

9 I would think from your description of the AMLASH operation  
10 that AMLASH had a plan to eliminate Cuban leaders, and that  
11 it is very possible --

12 AMLASH Case Officer. So did everybody else. So did every  
13 other Cuban exile who was plotting against Castro.

14 Mr. Johnston. But this is in the Brazilian Embassy on  
15 September 7th, and you started - meeting with AMLASH on  
16 September 5th in Brazil, and it may be coincidence, but Castro  
17 does give a warning about United States leaders aiding terrorist  
18 plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, and you were doing that very  
19 thing.

20 AMLASH Case Officer. There is probably a coincidence  
21 there. I don't recall that I knew of this at that time. I've  
22 certainly heard of it since, but I don't see the point that you  
23 are trying to make, because if Castro is behind or was behind  
24 AMLASH to involve him in the assassination of an American  
25 leader, then are you proposing that he would also publicly

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**TOP SECRET**

91

1 in the Brazilian embassy state that this was going to take  
2 place?

3 In other words, was he telegraphing this plan that he  
4 had?

5 Mr. Johnston. I don't know. I assume not.

6 AMLASH Case Officer. I would find it highly unusual that  
7 if he was serious about being involved in something like this,  
8 that he would publicly announce his plan, but I may be wrong.  
9 That's just my opinion.

10 Mr. Johnston. So we have this Castro speech of September  
11 7th, whatever that means, and we have the AMLASH operations  
12 we talked about in November and October, and then almost  
13 at the very moment of the Kennedy assassination we have your  
14 meeting with AMLASH and giving him the technical equipment or  
15 the assurances of technical equipment that he had requested at  
16 the October 29th meeting.

17 You knew on November 24th, certainly November 25th, that  
18 the alleged assassin of President Kennedy was pro-Castro, Lee  
19 Harvey Oswald was pro-Castro.

20 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't even know that at this  
21 time.

22 Mr. Johnston. You don't know that at this time?

23 AMLASH Case Officer. No, where did you get that?

24 Mr. Johnston. You don't know?

25 AMLASH Case Officer. That he was pro-Castro?

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**TOP SECRET**

92

1           Mr. Baron. Wasn't that a logical deduction from the fact  
2 that he was part of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee?

3           AMLASH Case Officer. It could have been, but I haven't  
4 seen that.

5           Mr. Greissing. He had come out publicly in interviews  
6 stating that he was for Castro and would defend Castro if the  
7 U.S. took action.

8           AMLASH Case Officer. Well, probably so, but I never had --

9           Mr. Johnston. And in fact, Oswald had visited Mexico City, and  
10 on November 25th, the very day you wrote your contact report,  
11 the Mexico City chief of station cabled headquarters and reminded  
12 them about the Castro speech threat, and I assume that our informa-  
13 tion is that Mr. King was handling the activity in Mexico  
14 City.

15          AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

16          Mr. Johnston. So on November 25th he was aware of the  
17 threat, reminded of the threat.

18          I think it is fair to say that Mr. King knew that Oswald  
19 had visited the Cuban embassy in Mexico City. He knew that on  
20 November 25th.

21          Another CIA document indicates that Chief of Station Wynn  
22 Scott -- I don't know whether you knew him -- in Mexico City,  
23 on November 25th read a message to the President of Mexico  
24 in which he said, Mr. Scott's memo says there are still some  
25 important questions concerning Oswald and his visit to Mexico

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**TOP SECRET**

93

1 City. Was the assassination of President Kennedy planned by  
2 Fidel Castro, and were the final details worked out inside the  
3 Cuban embassy in Mexico?

4 That's again on November 25th.

5 There's no reason for you to have seen the document.

6 AMLASH Case Office. I don't know that, but again, I'll  
7 just question, this was just a question that was asked. I  
8 wouldn't report it as fact.

9 Mr. Johnston. No, on November 25th that is a question  
10 being raised.

11 Knowing now, looking back at Mr. King, we have the Western  
12 Hemisphere Division on November 25th is informed that Castro  
13 has made a threat against U.S. leaders, that the chief of  
14 station in Mexico City is telling [the President of Mexico]<sup>08</sup>  
15 that there is a possibility that Castro was behind it.  
16 Oswald was known to be pro-Castro, and on November 22nd, you  
17 in turn were meeting in Paris, giving a high level Cuban  
18 assurances that his coup plot that might include assassination  
19 of Castro was backed by the U.S. and that yet you made no  
20 connection between those, all those events, and there was no  
21 discussion of any connection.

22 AMLASH Case Officer. No, there was no discussion between  
23 the -- the connection between the assassination of President  
24 Kennedy and the AMLASH operation.

25 Mr. Johnston. Was there an investigation?

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**TOP SECRET**

94

1                    AMLASH Case Officer. Not to my knowledge. I left the  
2 operation right after that, so I wouldn't know if there was  
3 or wasn't. But the coincidence that you are talking about,  
4 if you are connecting or trying now to imply that there was a  
5 connection between AMLASH and the fact that it was on the 22nd  
6 of November, the same date as President Kennedy's assassination,  
7 they must have had a very terrific system of communication.

8                    Mr. Johnston. Although you had set up the meeting on the  
9 20th of November, is that right?

10                  AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, but he didn't know specifically  
11 what we were going to say. In fact, the answer that we could  
12 have given him could have been reversed.

13                  Mr. Johnston. Well, you said he requested it.

14                  AMLASH Case Officer. Well, he requested it before he left,  
15 but the assurances, you can go back before that. You can go back  
16 to the October meeting when the assurances of support were given  
17 to him.

18                  So I can't -- I find it very difficult to follow what you  
19 are trying to imply or to relate AMLASH directly to the  
20 assassination on 22 November. This is what I find difficult to  
21 understand.

22                  Mr. Johnston. Let me show you a copy of a cable, no  
23 indication that the cable went to SAS. The cable is Mexico  
24 City, 7045, dated 24 November '63 and by way of background,  
25 tell you that immediately upon the assassination, the personnel

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1 in Mexico City then started putting the entire Soviet apparatus  
2 in Mexico City under surveillance and pulling the records, and I  
3 don't want to read this into the record because it uses a  
4 true name.

5 Let's go off the record.

6 (Discussion off the record.)

7 Mr. Johnston. Let me read it, except for the true name.

8 It says "Provided below sufficiently definitive summary  
9 of local contacts of Ivan Gavrilovich Alferiev." It gives his  
10 contacts, it says "23 December 1961 with the Third Secretary of  
11 Cuban Cultural Attache," naming her, and arranging a press  
12 conference for AMLASH. It's a very tangential relationship  
13 with the AMLASH operation, but again, on November 24th, 1963,  
14 Mexico City is reporting KGB ... or ... Alferiev's contacts, and  
15 it includes a contact in '61 with AMLASH.

16 So I have difficulty believing that they are, in hindsight,  
17 not related, and that on November 24th or November 25th no  
18 one at CIA related the two events.

19 AMLASH Case Officer. What I'm telling you is -- I'm not  
20 telling you that no one at CIA relates the two events. You  
21 asked me the specific question, did you and Fitzgerald discuss  
22 any relationship. My answer to you was that Fitzgerald and I  
23 did not specifically discuss that.

24 Mr. Johnston. Do you know of anyone who discussed it?

25 AMLASH Case Officer. No.

**TOP SECRET**

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**TOP SECRET**

96

1                   Mr. Johnston. Do you know of any investigation that was  
2 conducted?

3                   AMLASH Case Officer. No.

4                   (A brief recess was taken.)

5                   Mr. Johnston. Let me now talk -- and again the groundwork  
6 is that you were unaware of any investigation of a connection  
7 between the two, and you were unaware of any discussion about  
8 a connection between AMLASH and Kennedy's assassination.

9                   Is that a correct summary?

10                  AMLASH Case Officer. That's correct.

11                  Mr. Johnston. I will show you a document. For the record,  
12 this is a document appearing in Volume IV of the AMLASH  
13 file, and the first page of it has AMLASH's name on it, but  
14 I call your attention to the red handwriting in the upper right  
15 hand corner of that, on that cover sheet, and it says, "not to  
16 leave this office, per" blank's "orders."

17                  Is that correct?

18                  This document has handwriting in the upper writing hand  
19 corner that it is not to leave this office, whatever that is.

20                  AMLASH Case Officer. Without specific clearance, without  
21 orders.

22                  Mr. Johnston. Do you have any recollection of such orders  
23 being given by any one, yourself, or Mr. Fitzgerald?

24                  AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, what we have talked about before,  
25 that Mr. Fitzgerald gave orders to minimize the knowledgeability

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

97

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1 of this particular operation because of its sensitivity.

2 Mr. Johnston. And that is the reason that this instruction  
3 was given about the file, this particular file or this  
4 particular document?

5 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. I can't see at this time that  
6 anything else would have been thought of at that time.

7 Mr. Johnston. What suddenly required that order to be  
8 given?

9 AMLASH Case Officer. Well, nothing specific except that  
10 by December of '63, the man with whom we were dealing, AMLASH I,  
11 was going back, or was probably back by that time already in  
12 Cuba. It was primarily probably I would say as much to protect  
13 his security as anything else.

14 Mr. Johnston. So that nobody else -- did this have the  
15 effect of blocking knowledge of the AMLASH operation from other  
16 people within the Agency?

17 AMLASH Case Officer. Probably from my office down. Certainly  
18 not Fitzgerald, not the Director or not anybody else who needed  
19 to know about the operation, absolutely not. This was just  
20 circulation within other components of SAS. That would not --  
21 in other words, a note of this type would only mean that I  
22 would be, or whoever would clear the order would be asked  
23 before this file was allowed to circulate or was given to  
24 anybody.

25 Mr. Johnston. And I don't want to indicate -- my question

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

98

1 does not imply intent or anyone's purpose, but would this  
2 notation have blocked anyone but Mr. Helms or Mr. Fitzgerald  
3 from getting access to this file?

4 AMLASH Case Officer. No. This is too informal. If you  
5 want to block a file like this, there is a much more formal  
6 procedure to go by, to block the file for, say, the Director's  
7 use only, or even at that time, the Chief of SAS. A note  
8 like this is strictly, can only be interpreted to restrict the  
9 circulation of this file for the other people in SAS below my  
10 office, not restricting it for anybody else.

11 Mr. Johnston. Upwards.

12 What about laterally? What about to the other divisions?

13 AMLASH Case Officer. Laterally also. In other words, they  
14 would have to be checked out. It would have to be. We would  
15 have to know who got the file. It is a matter of control. This  
16 is what it amounts to, really. It is to know who the file  
17 goes to. It is to control the file.

18 Mr. Johnston. But you do that anyway, right?

19 That's routine procedure. This seems to be something more  
20 than that, of saying don't let this leave without my approval.

21 AMLASH Case Officer. No, it isn't anything more than that.  
22 and I think that you're really much more into it than what it  
23 is.

24 I don't even recall giving -- telling the secretary this  
25 particular thing. It probably came about from the minimized

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1 circulation order that Fitzgerald had given way before in  
2 October, as I recall.

3 Mr. Johnston. Did you expect this instruction to be carried  
4 out, that the file would not leave the office until you had  
5 given your personal approval or Fitzgerald had approved it?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. I would have thought that my  
7 secretary would not have permitted this file to leave unless  
8 cleared.

9 Mr. Johnston. We previously discussed whether Mr. King  
10 knew about the operation.

11 Did he specifically know, to your knowledge, about the  
12 AMLASH operation in the fall of 1963?

13 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know. I never briefed him  
14 personally.

15 Mr. Johnston. Did you have any reason to know that he  
16 did know about AMLASH operation?

17 AMLASH Case Officer. No.

18 Mr. Johnston. Our notes indicate that on February 4th,  
19 1964, Mr. King sent a memo to you requirements for AMLASH, and  
20 I'll show you our notes. They basically detail questions,  
21 intelligence information to be gathered from AMLASH.

22 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't specifically remember receiving  
23 this, but if we have -- certainly the fact that we have an  
24 asset who can surface any intelligence requirements from the  
25 community or anybody else in the Agency, it would be perfectly

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1 normal for anybody to send these requirements.

2 Mr. Johnston. Would you agree, at least from that summary  
3 of the document, that really he's asking you to get intelligence  
4 type information from AMLASH?

5 Is that correct?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

7 Mr. Johnston. And given the October 5th, 1963 meeting when  
8 AMLASH sort of indicated he didn't want anything to do with  
9 that, this would be very inconsistent for someone who was  
10 knowledgeable about AMLASH.

11 AMLASH Case Officer. What are the dates?

12 Mr. Johnston. October 5th, 1963, is when AMLASH complained  
13 about the low level espionage requirements.

14 AMLASH Case Officer. He did not want -- he did not say  
15 that he would not surface intelligence requirements. He did  
16 not want to exclusively be that type of an asset.

17 So therefore it would be perfectly normal, regardless of  
18 what he thought himself to be, or what even we may have thought  
19 for him to be, that if he had access to information, we were  
20 going to levy the requirements on him.

21 Mr. Johnston. My direct question is, then, having read  
22 the summary apparently prepared by Mr. King, and sent on  
23 February 2nd, 1964, do you think that Mr. King knew about the  
24 AMLASH operation, the events of October and November?

25 AMLASH Case Officer. If he sent us a memo giving us

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

101

1 requirements for AMLASH, at a minimum he had to know that we had  
2 an agent with this particular access. But he knew about the  
3 operation? Not necessarily so.

4 Mr. Johnston. Do you find this consistent with the  
5 nature of the operation as of November 22nd, 1963?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. Explain that. I don't understand.  
7 What are you -- what is your question?

8 Mr. Johnston. As of November 22nd, 1963, you were now  
9 involved in coup plotting with AMLASH, and were delivering or  
10 planned to deliver the equipment, rifles, sights, explosives,  
11 to assist him in that coup. It seems inconsistent, suddenly in  
12 February, to go back to trying to get espionage information  
13 from him.

14 AMLASH Case Officer. First of all, I have to address  
15 that question from this point. Receiving a memo from King at  
16 that time doesn't necessarily mean that we are going to levy  
17 the requirements on AMLASH.

18 Mr. Johnston. Oh, I agree with that.

19 AMLASH Case Officer. So, to clarify the other part of your  
20 question, that if we needed intelligence after the October  
21 '63 meeting in which he said I'm not going to be strictly a  
22 source for intelligence, I want to do something more for my  
23 country, it would not be in any way out of the ordinary to  
24 ask him to send information that we felt was required on the  
25 outside.

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**TOP SECRET**

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1           Mr. Johnston. So you are saying you would not infer from  
2         this document a conclusion one way or the other about whether  
3         Mr. King knew the details of the AMLASH coup plotting.

4           AMLASH Case Officer. No.

5           Mr. Johnston. As a final matter from my point, as we did  
6         in your past meetings, could you briefly summarize, were you  
7         contacted prior to today's session at the Agency, and did you  
8         discuss your testimony or the ramifications of your testimony  
9         with anyone at the Agency?

10          AMLASH Case Officer. I was called yesterday morning,  
11         February 10th, by Mr. Walter Elder, and informed that I was  
12         to come here at 10:00 o'clock to discuss the AMLASH operation,  
13         and that you would be over yesterday afternoon to mark those  
14         portions of the file that you wished to discuss.

15          I picked up the files from the review staff last night and  
16         came here this morning.

17          Mr. Johnston. Did you discuss the substance or proposed  
18         substance of your testimony with anyone?

19          AMLASH Case Officer. No. I read the file and informed  
20         myself as to those points that you wanted to talk about.

21          Mr. Johnston. That's all the questions we have.

22          I want to thank you very much for spending the time with  
23         us today.

24          Is there any other comment you would like to make?

25          AMLASH Case Officer. No, not at all.

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1 You're quite welcome.

2 (Whereupon, at 1:15 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the above-  
3 entitled matter was concluded.)

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Exhibit A

An Extract From Kennedy's Address to Press  
Washington Post, Tuesday, November 19, 1963, p. A15

(AP) Nov. 18 -- The following is a text of President Kennedy's address tonight before the Inter-American Press Association:

\* \* \*

"The genuine Cuban revolution -- because it was against the tyranny and corruption of the past -- had the support of many whose aims and concepts were noble.

"But that hope for freedom and progress was destroyed.

"The goals proclaimed in the Sierra Maestra were betrayed in Havana.

"It is important to restate what now divides Cuba from my country and from all the American countries: It is the fact that a small band of conspirators has stripped the Cuban people of their freedom and handed over the independence and sovereignty of the Cuban nation to forces beyond the hemisphere. They have made Cuba a victim of foreign imperialism, an instrument of the policy of others, a weapon in an effort dictated by external powers to subvert the other American republics. This, and this alone divides us. As long as this is true nothing is possible. Without it everything is possible.

Ready and Anxious

"Once this barrier is removed we will be ready and anxious to work with the Cuban people in pursuit of those progressive goals which, a few short years ago, stirred their hopes and the sympathy of many people throughout the entire hemisphere.

"No Cuban need feel trapped between dependence on the broken promises of foreign communism and the hostility of the rest of the hemisphere. For once Cuban sovereignty has been restored we will extend the hand of friendship and assistance to a Cuba whose political and economic institutions have been shaped by the will of the Cuban people."

\* \* \*