Automated Market-Making Supervised by Professor Nick Whiteley

Joshua Acton

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Introduction

- How do financial markets work at the level of individual participants?
- How can we use stochastic control theory to model the behaviour of market participants?
- The Avellaneda-Stoikov Model
- Results on the statistical properties of the limit orderbook

What is a financial market?

- Stocks, bonds, commodities, all manner of derivatives
- Multiple buyers, multiple sellers
- Prices determined by trading
- So how does trading actually occur inside the exchange?

The limit orderbook

- Can either place *limit* orders or *market* orders
- Limit orders guaruntee price but not execution
 - ▶ Limit orders can also be ammended/updated for as long as they exist
- Market orders guaruntee execution but not price
- ullet Spread between best bid and best ask $ightarrow \pounds 0.02$
- Can view the mid-price (here £1.00) as the "true" price

Side	Price /£	Volume
Α	1.02	50
Α	1.01	30
_	1.00	0
В	0.99	25
В	0.98	45

The limit orderbook

After market buy order for 20 shares:

Side	Price /£	Volume
Α	1.02	50
Α	1.01	10
_	1.00	0
В	0.99	25
В	0.98	45

After another market buy order for 30 shares:

Side	Price /£	Volume
Α	1.02	30
Α	1.01	0
_	1.00	0
В	0.99	25
В	0.98	45

Dealer considerations

Problem:

- What if no one wants to sell? resp. buy?
- What if buyers and sellers have wildly different price expectations?

Idea:

- ullet Simultaneously place bid and ask limit orders o simultaneously buying and selling
- Enables other market participants to always have someone to trade against → "providing liquidity"
- Narrows the spread between bid and ask prices, decreasing implied cost of trading
- Dealer profits the small spread between buying and selling, multiplied across a large trading volume

Risks:

- Informed traders
- Inventory



Modelling dealer behavior

If dealer accrues positive inventory:

- Want to sell more than buy
- Set lower ask price

If dealer accrues negative inventory:

- Want to buy more than sell
- Set a higher bid price

Now the maths...

Stochastic Optimal Control

Following Pham (2009):

System:

$$dX_t = b(X_t, \alpha_t)dt + \sigma(X_t, \alpha_t)dW_t$$
 (1)

Objective (Finite time horizon):

$$v(t,x) := \sup_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_{t}^{T} f(s, X_{s}^{t,x}, \alpha_{s}) ds + g(X_{T}^{t,x}) \right]$$
 (2)

Dynamic Programming Principle:

$$v(t,x) = \sup_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_{t}^{\theta} f(s, X_{s}^{t,x}, \alpha_{s}) ds + v(\theta, X_{\theta}^{t,x}) \right]$$
(3)

Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equation:

$$\frac{\partial v}{\partial t}(t,x) + \sup_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \left[\mathcal{L}^{\alpha} v(t,x) + f(t,x,\alpha) \right] = 0 \tag{4}$$

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The Avellaneda-Stoikov model

Following Avellaneda & Stoikov (2008):

Model market mid-price as Brownian motion with variance σ^2 (no drift)

$$\mathrm{d}S_t = \sigma \mathrm{d}W_t, \ t \in [0, T]$$

The dealer quotes bid p^b and ask p^a with spreads $\delta^b=s-p^b$ and $\delta^a=p^a-s$ respectively. We assume that

- ullet Market buy orders 'lift' the dealer's sell orders at Poisson rate $\lambda^a(\delta^a)$
- ullet Market sell orders 'hit' the dealer's bid orders at Poisson rate $\lambda^b(\delta^b)$
- ullet λ is a decreasing function of δ

Have stochastic wealth and inventory:

$$dX_t = p^a dN_t^a - p^b dN_t^b$$
 (5)

$$q_t = N_t^b - N_t^a \tag{6}$$

The Avellaneda-Stoikov model

Objective function: Maximise expected utility of terminal wealth over possible bid/ask spreads $\delta^{\it a},\delta^{\it b}$

$$u(s, x, q, t) = \max_{\delta^a, \delta^b} \mathbb{E}\left[-e^{-\gamma(X_T + q_T S_T)}|\mathcal{F}_t\right]$$
 (7)

- HJB equation very difficult, maybe impossible, to solve analytically
- Through some asymptotic approximations we can work out an approximate solution in terms of our model paramaters

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The Avellaneda-Stoikov model

We obtain

$$r(s,q,t) = s - q\gamma\sigma^2(T-t)$$
 (8)

which coincides with our indifference price for the dealer with static inventory, and

$$\delta^{a} + \delta^{b} = \gamma \sigma^{2} (T - t) + \frac{2}{\gamma} \log \left(1 + \frac{\gamma}{k} \right)$$
 (9)

with γ and σ as before, k is a parameter from the orderbook describing how market order size impacts prices.

Statistical properties of the limit order book

Poisson intensity $\lambda(\delta)$ describes how likely a limit order is to be executed as a function of it's distance to the mid-price. Need some statistics regarding:

- Overall frequency of market orders
 - For simplicity, assume constant Λ
- Size distribution of market orders
 - "Econophysics" \implies power law $f^Q(x) \propto x^{-1-\alpha}$
- Price impact of large market orders
 - lacktriangle "Econophysics" \Longrightarrow either $\Delta p \propto Q^{eta}$ or $\Delta p \propto \log Q$

Using the second result for price impact we obtain:


$$\lambda(\delta) = \Lambda \mathbb{P}(\Delta \rho > \delta) = \Lambda \mathbb{P}(\log Q > K\delta)$$
$$= \Lambda \mathbb{P}\left(Q > e^{K\delta}\right)$$
$$= \Lambda \int_{e^{K\delta}}^{\infty} x^{-1-\alpha} dx$$
$$= Ae^{-k\alpha\delta}$$

The Avellaneda-Stoikov model - Summary

• Estimate parameters from market data

At each timestep, given current inventory and estimated parameters:

- Compute reservation price r(s, q, t)
- Compute spread $\delta^a + \delta^b$
- Set quotes $p^a=s+rac{\delta^a+\delta^b}{2}$, $p^b=s-rac{\delta^a+\delta^b}{2}$



Conclusion

- Stochastic control provides a useful framework through which to analyse the behaviour of market participants
- We can apply this framework to model the optimal behaviour of a dealer in financial markets
- This behaviour depends on the statistical properties of the particular market, which we can infer from market data

Thank you for your attention!

Questions?

email: josh.acton.2021@bristol.ac.uk