JANA GIESELMANN

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Research Interests: Microeconomics Theory, Behavioral Economics, Industrial Organization

EDUCATION

Heinrich-Heine University Düsseldorf (HHU)   *since 10/2020*
Doctoral degree in Economics
Advisor: Paul Heidhues

Yale University   *09/2022-05/2023*
Visiting PhD Student
Host: Philipp Strack

Heinrich-Heine University Düsseldorf   *10/2018-09/2020*
Master of Science in Economics (1,0; best possible grade)

Waseda University, Tokyo   *09/2019-02/2020*
Visiting Student

Heinrich-Heine University Düsseldorf   *10/2015-08/2018*
Bachelor of Science in Economics (1,2)

ADDITIONAL EDUCATION

PhD Courses in Advanced Microeconomic Theory (Yale)   *2022/2023*

Selma Meyer Mentoring Programme (HHU, career training for women in academia) *2022*

briq Summer School in Behavioral Economics (briq Institute, virtual)   *2021*

Courses in Analysis and Linear Algebra (HHU, Department of Mathematics)   *2021*

RESEARCH PROJECTS

(Mis-)Matchmaker (Job Market Paper)
As platforms collect more user data, they can tailor algorithms to better match users. At the same time, on matching platforms, users pay to be matched by the platform, while the platform makes money as long as it does not match them. This paper analyzes the matching rule of a profit-maximizing monopoly platform when the incentives between users and the platform are misaligned. Contrary to the intuition that more data about users might improve matching efficiency and speed, I show that more data allows the platform to design a matching rule that increases search time and distorts matching and sorting outcomes in the market. I demonstrate that frequently studied matching rules, such as random matching and positive assortative matching, can be suboptimal for the platform. Instead, the platform strategically lowers match quality to increase search time and thus profits, leading to unnecessary delays and potentially inefficient matches. Finally, I provide two explanations for why platforms adopt business models with misaligned incentives: targeted advertising and the presence of overconfident users.

Faking Network Size
Users have an incentive to join large platforms, and hence platforms want to convince users that they have a large user base. I consider a monopolist platform's incentive and ability to signal its user base when there is uncertainty regarding the amount of potential users. The platform can signal using either fake accounts or prices. When — as in some real-world examples — users are naive regarding the platform's ability to use fake accounts, small platforms use them to profit from the artificial increase in demand. If users are sophisticated, larger platforms use fake profiles to differentiate themselves from smaller ones, and — in contrast to the case of naive consumers — platforms would benefit from a ban on such business practices.

Credibility of Secretly Colluding Manufactures in Retail Contracting — *with Matthias Hunold, Johannes Muthers and Alexander Rasch*
With two exclusive manufacturer-retailer pairs and secret contracting, we show that potential strategic misinterpretations and misunderstandings by retailers are important for the feasibility of manufacturer collusion in vertically related markets. We model the retailer's (potentially incorrect) expectations about their competitor's wholesale price offers. If retailer's beliefs are stubborn and they incorrectly believe collusion to be infeasible, it is impossible for manufacturers to collude. By contrast, if retailers anticipate the collusive strategy and condition their action on past offers, collusion becomes feasible. We introduce the property of opportunism-proofness that excludes profitable joint deviations by the collusive entity and discuss adaptive beliefs.

Dating Platforms: The Case of Fake Profiles — *with Alexander Rasch*
This paper examines the use of fake profiles by two-sided platforms to stimulate demand and increase profits. By deceiving naïve users, platforms invest into an artificial increase of the network size on one side of the market. Whereas firms are caught in a prisoner's dilemma if users single-home on both sides of the market, users are protected by platform competition. If users on one side of the market multi-home, firms can increase their prices for the multi-homing side, and they lower their prices for the single-homing side. Investments into fake profiles stimulate demand, such that multi-homing demand and profits increase. Platforms and users as a group can profit from investments under these circumstances.

CONFERENCES AND INVITED TALKS

Virtual DFG Workshop (CMCPFR), Micro Theory Breakfast (Yale), BECCLE Conference, Oligo Workshop, Brown Bag Seminar (DICE), EARIE 2024, EEA-ESEM 2024, VfS 2024, Annual DFG Workshopt (CMCPFR), MLSE Seminar Maastricht (invited, scheduled), Seminar CEU Vienna (invited, scheduled)   *2024*

Micro Theory Lunch (Yale), Micro Theory Breakfast (Yale), Swiss IO Day (Bern University),

Brown Bag Seminar (DICE), EARIE 2023   *2023*

15th RGS Doctoral Conference, 26th Spring Meeting of Young Economists,
Applied Behavioral Theory Workshop (DICE), DICE Winter School   *2022*

4th Doctoral Workshop on the Economics of Digitization at TSE, Virtual Oligo Workshop,
Brown Bag Seminar (DICE), PhD Research Workshop (DICE)   *2021*

TEACHING AND RESEARCH ASSISTANCE

Research Assistant for Philipp Strack (Yale University)   *09/2022-05/2023*

Behavioral Industrial Organization   *Summer 2022,2023,2024*
Co-Instructor: Lectures (Master/PhD course)

Behavioral Economic Theory   *Winter 2021/22,2023/24,2024/25*
Co-Instructor: Lectures and Tutorials (Master/PhD course)

Media Economics: Special Topics   *Winter 2020/21, 2021/22*
Tutorials (Bachelor course)

Microeconomics and Economic Policy   *2016-2020*
Tutorials (Bachelor course)

SCHOLARSHIP, GRANTS AND AWARDS

HHU Mobility Grant for Female Researchers   *2024*
Mobility Grant financed by the HHU Equal Opportunities Office (900 Euro)

DAAD scholarship   *2022-2023*
German Academic Exchange Service (15,000 Euro)

HHU High Potential Mobility Grant   *2019-2020*
Scholarship for studies abroad (3,375 Euro)

Deutschlandstipendium ("Chancen nutzen") at HHU   *2016-2020*
Scholarship for outperforming students (14,400 Euro)

Best Bachelor's and Master's Theses in Economics at HHU   *2018, 2020*

ADDITIONAL SKILLS

Languages   German (native), English (fluent)
IT Skills   LaTeX, Maple, Gurobi, Stata, R

REFERENCES

Prof. Paul Heidhues, PhD
HHU Düsseldorf
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Prof. Dr. Alexander Rasch
HHU Düsseldorf
rasch@dice.hhu.de

Prof. Dr. Markus Reisinger
Frankfurt School of Finance and Management
m.reisinger@fs.de

Prof. Dr. Philipp Strack
Yale University
philipp.strack@yale.edu