GREENVILLE
TECHNICAL COLLEGE
SECURITY BREACH
2020

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Security Breach Timeline

- 1. Attackers gained access to GTC's network (Unknown Date, 2020).
- 2. Attackers exfiltrated approximately 600GB of data from affected servers, workstations, and storage (Unknown Date, 2020).
- 3. Attackers initiated their ransomware, encrypting the impacted servers, workstations, and storage (August 2020).
- 4. GTC discovered the malware infection affecting their systems (August 27, 2020).
- 5. GTC publicly announced a potential security incident (August 28, 2020).
- 6. Avaddon claimed responsibility for the attack (August 29, 2020).
- 7. GTC acknowledged the credibility of the attack and the extent of the data breach (September 1, 2020).
- 8. System Disruption Update provided recommendations for victims and acknowledged the data breach (October 23, 2020).
- 9. GTC's Board acknowledged the breach, leading to financial repercussions and project delays (January 20, 2021).
- 10. FBI informed GTC that the investigation is ongoing, and progress has been made in identifying the ransomware attackers (November 16, 2022).

Avaddon Ransomware Mapped with Mitre Att@ck

Initial Access: Attackers gained access to GTC's network (Unknown Date, 2020).

Unknown Technique

Execution: Attackers establish a foothold within GTC's network using exploits in GTC's network vulnerabilities (Unknown Date, 2020).

- T1106: Native API
- T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation

Persistence: Attackers maintain foothold within GTC's network (Unknown Date, 2020).

Unknown Technique

Privilege Escalation: Attackers escalated their privileges (Unknown Date, 2020).

Unknown Technique

Defense Evasion: Attackers evade detection (Unknown Date, 2020).

- T1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1112: Modify Registry
- T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information

Credential Access: Attackers may have accessed credentials during the lateral movement and privilege escalation stages (Unknown Date, 2020).

Unknown Technique

Discovery: Attackers identify and assess GTC's systems, network configuration, and vulnerabilities (Unknown Date, 2020).

- T1083: File and Directory Discovery
- T1135: Network Share Discovery
- T1057: Process Discovery
- T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery

Lateral Movement: Attackers laterally moved within GTC's network using exploits in GTC's vulnerabilities (Unknown Date, 2020).

Unknown Technique

Collection: Attackers exfiltrated approximately 600GB of data from affected servers, workstations, and storage (Unknown Date, 2020).

Unknown Technique

Command and Control: Attackers maintain communication with their C2 infrastructure to facilitate continuous control of the victim's environment (Unknown Date, 2020).

Unknown Technique

Exfiltration: Attackers exfiltrated approximately 600GB of data (Unknown Date, 2020).

Unknown Technique

Impact: Attackers initiated their ransomware, which caused the impacted servers, workstations, and storage to be encrypted (August 2020).

- T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact
- T1490: Inhibit System Recovery
- T1489: Service Stop

Avaddon Ransomware Mapped by Mitre Att@ck

Network Boundary Bridging

Avaddon Ransomware Threat Actor for Greenville Technical College incident 2020				Enterprise ATT&CK v12				Linux, macOS, Windows, Network, Containers, Office 365, SaaS, Google Workspace, laaS, Azure AD			
Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Account Man ipul ali on	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	Adversary-in-the-Middle	Account Discovery	Exploi tatio n of Remote Services	Adversary-in-the-Middle	Application Layer Proto col	Automate d Exfiltration	Account Access Re move I
Exploit Public-Facing Application	AppleScript	BITS Jobs	Bypass User Account Control	Bypass User Account Control	Brute Force	Application Window Discovery	Internal Spearph ishing	Archive Collected Data	Communi cation Through Removable Media	Data Transfer Size Limits	Data Destruction
External Remote Services	JavaScript	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	Elevated Execution with Prompt	Elevated Execution with Prompt	Crede nti als from Password Stores	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer	Audi o Capture	Data Encoding	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Data Encrypted for Impact
Hardware Additions	Network Device CLI	Active Setup	Setuid and Setgid	Setuid and Setgid	Exploitation for Cre dential Access	Cloud Infrastructure Discovery	Remote Service Session Hij acking	Automate d Collection	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Data Manipulation
Phishing	PowerShe II	Authentication Package	Sudo and Sudo Caching	Sudo and Sudo Caching	Forced Authentication	Cloud Service Dashboard	Remote Services	Browser Session Hijacking	Dynami c Resolution	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Defacement
Replication Through Removable Media	Python	Kernel Modul es a nd Extensions	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Forge Web Credentials	Cloud Service Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Clipboard Data	Encrypted Channel	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Disk Wipe
Supply Chain Compromise	Unix Shell	Login Items	Boot or Log on Autostart Execution	BITS Jobs	Input Capture	Cloud Storage Object Discovery	Software De ployment To ols	Data from Cloud Storage	Fallback Channels	Exfiltration Over Web Service	Endpoint Denial of Service
Trusted Relationship	Visual Basic	LSASS Driver	Active Setup	Build Image on Host	Modify Authentication Process	Container and Resource Discovery	Taint Shared Content	Data from Configuration Repository	Ingress Too I Transfer	Scheduled Transfer	Firmware Corruption
Valid Accounts	Windows Command Shell	Port Monitors	Authentication Package	Debugger Evasion	Multi-Factor Authentication Interception	Deb ugger Evasion	Use Alternate Authentication Material	Data from Information Repositories	Multi-Stage Channels	Transfer Data to Cloud Account	Inhibit System Recovery
	Container Administration Command	Print Processors	Kernel Modul es and Extensions	Deo bfu sca te/Decod e Files or Information	Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation	Domain Trust Discovery		Data from Local System	Non-Application Layer Protocol		Network Denial of Service
	Deploy Container	Re-ope ned Applications	Login Items	Deploy Container	Network Sniffing	File and Directory Discovery		Data from Network Shared Drive	Non-Standard Port		Resource Hijacking
	Exploitation for Client Execution	Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	LSASS Driver	Dire d Volume Access	OS Crede ntial Dumping	Group Policy Discovery		Data from Removable Media	Protocol Tunn eling		Service Stop
	Inter-Process Communication	Security Support Provider	Port Monitors	Domain Policy Modification	Ste al Application Access To ke n	Network Service Discovery		Data Staged	Proxy		System Shutdown/Reboot
	Native API	Shortcut Modification	Print Processors	Execution Guardrails	Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates	Network Share Discovery		Email Collection	Remote Access Software		
<i> </i>	Scheduled Task/Job	Time Providers	Re-ope ned Ap plication s	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets	Network Sniffing		Input Capture	Traffic Signaling		
	Serverless Execution	Winlog on Helper DLL	Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	File and Directory Permissions Modification	Ste al Web Session Cookie	Password Policy Discovery		Screen Capture	We b Service		
	Shared Modules	XDG Auto start Entries	Security Support Provider	Hide Artifacts	Unsecure d C redentials	Periph eral Device Discovery		Video Capture			
	Software De ployment To ols	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Shortcut Modification	Hij ack Execution Flow		Permission Groups Discovery					
	System Services	Browser Extensions	Time Providers	Impair Defenses		Process Discovery					
	User Execution	Compromise Client Software Binary	Winlog on Helper DLL	Disable Cloud Logs		Query Registry					
	Windows Management Instrumentation	Create Account	XDG Auto start Entries	Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall		Remote System Discovery					
		Create or Modify System Process	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Disable or Modify System Firewall		Software Discovery					
		Event Triggered Execution	Create or Modify System Process	Disable or Modify Tools		System Information Discovery					
		External Remote Services	Domain Policy Modification	Disable Windows Event Logging		System Location Discovery					
		Hijack Execution Flow	Escape to Host	Downgrade Attack		System Language Discovery					
		Implant Internal Image	Event Triggered Execution	Imp air Command History Logging		System Network Configuration Discovery					
		Modify Authentication Process	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Indicator Blocking		System Network Con nections Discovery					
		Office Application Startup	Hijack Execution Flow	Safe Mod e Boot		System Owner/User Discovery					
		Pre-OS Boot	Process Injection	Indicator Removal		System Service Discovery					
		Scheduled Task/Job	Schedu led Task/Job	Indirect Command Execution		System Time Discovery					
		Server Software Component	Valid Accounts	Masquera ding		Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion					
		Traffic Signaling		Modify Authentication Process							
		Valid Accounts		Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure							

Insufficient Security Measures

 Greenville Tech's cybersecurity program had weak protections in place, making it easier for hackers to access sensitive information.

"The only truly secure system is one that is powered off, cast in a block of concrete and sealed in a lead-lined room with armed guards." - Gene Spafford, Computer Security Expert

Addressing Insufficient Security Measures

- Regular software updates and patch management
- Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA)
- Regular employee training and awareness programs

"Passwords are like underwear: don't let people see them, change them very often, and don't share them with strangers." - Chris Pirillo, Technology Blogger and Entrepreneur

Inadequate Monitoring and Detection

 Greenville Tech's systems lacked effective monitoring and detection tools, making it difficult to identify potential threats and breaches early.

"There are two types of companies: those that have been hacked, and those that will be." - Robert Mueller, Former FBI Director

Addressing Inadequate Monitoring and Detection

- Implement a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system
- Conduct regular vulnerability assessments and penetration tests
- Establish a 24/7 security operations center (SOC)

Limited User Access Control

 Greenville Tech had inadequate user access controls, allowing unauthorized users to access sensitive information more easily.

"If you spend more on coffee than on IT security, you will be hacked. What's more, you deserve to be hacked." - Richard Clarke, Author and National Security Expert

Addressing Limited User Access Control

- Implement the principle of least privilege (POLP)
- Regularly review and update user access permissions
- Use role-based access control (RBAC) to manage permissions

Insufficient Incident Response Plan

 Greenville Tech did not have a well-defined incident response plan, leading to slower and less effective actions during the security breach.

"There are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don't know we don't know." - Donald Rumsfeld, Former U.S. Secretary of Defense

Addressing Insufficient Incident Response Plan

- Develop a comprehensive incident response plan
- Establish an incident response team (IRT)
- Conduct regular incident response drills and exercises

Repercussions of Greenville Tech's Security Breach

- Identity theft and fraud risks for affected individuals
- Loss of trust in the institution
- Financial costs for breach response and mitigation
- Legal liabilities and potential lawsuits
- Damage to Greenville Tech's reputation



Limiting Damage from Repercussions

- Provide identity theft protection and credit monitoring services to affected individuals
- Transparent communication and public relations efforts to rebuild trust
- Collaborate with law enforcement to track down the perpetrators

Thank You and Contact Information

Thank you for your time! If you have any questions or comments about this presentation or cybersecurity, please reach out to me.

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Slides Prepared April 2023



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