# Opening the Black Box Appendix

These are the statistical appendices for **Opening the Black Box of International Aid: Understanding Delivery Actors and Democratization** by Caroline Dunton and Jack Hasler.

For questions or comments on these appedices, please contact Jack Hasler at jhasler@gwu.edu.

### Appendix A1: Donor Countries

DonorName	Mean_Aid	Min_Recipients	Max_Recipients
Australia	773.38	28	86
Austria	108.99	76	100
Belgium	202.43	60	98
Canada	457.13	56	110
Czech Republic	11.75	64	73
Denmark	180.60	3	81
Estonia	3.15	15	19
Finland	84.52	35	95
France	1211.80	94	113
Germany	1868.92	89	116
Greece	47.55	14	82
Hungary	17.84	83	93
Iceland	5.68	6	12
Ireland	144.62	56	79
Italy	112.42	36	103
Japan	908.97	47	115
Korea	236.14	85	106
Latvia	0.42	6	6
Lithuania	1.75	16	24
Luxembourg	57.23	44	63
Netherlands	343.12	1	81
New Zealand	37.12	16	53
Norway	404.24	89	96
Poland	67.09	61	83
Portugal	88.26	37	49
Slovak Republic	3.84	32	45
Slovenia	4.21	14	25
Spain	383.99	85	100
Sweden	426.22	59	100
Switzerland	163.54	56	87
United Kingdom	1764.14	94	109
United States	4996.01	97	115

## Appendix A2: Recipient Countries

RecipientName	Mean_Aid	Min_Donors	Max_Donors
Afghanistan	1795.23	25	27
Albania	76.95	7	24
Algeria	97.68	6	20
Angola	59.79	7	20
Argentina	33.49	6	22
Armenia	43.37	4	22
Azerbaijan	25.09	5	21
Bangladesh	271.68	5	25
Belarus	43.30	6	26
Benin	69.69	6	21
Bhutan	12.95	4	15
Bolivia	112.40	8	24
Botswana	80.72	4	16
Brazil	170.59	9	27
Burkina Faso	114.29	8	20
Burundi	49.89	7	23
Cabo Verde	47.63	5	14
Cambodia	145.48	6	25
Cameroon	116.45	6	21
Central African	9.87	3	13
Republic			
Chad	15.47	4	12
Chile	32.49	7	23
China (People's	641.94	7	28
Republic of)			
Colombia	242.43	8	24
Comoros	8.72	2	6
Congo	16.37	5	17
Costa Rica	14.37	4	18
Cote dIvoire	90.78	5	19
Croatia	27.69	8	19
Cuba	25.62	8	21
Democratic	197.36	7	24
Republic of the			
Congo			
Djibouti	18.71	4	10
Dominican	43.42	3	17
Republic		_	
Ecuador	52.96	7	21
Egypt	183.24	7	26
El Salvador	63.61	6	22
Equatorial Guinea	6.04	2	9
Eritrea	8.44	4	15
Ethiopia	455.51	8	28
Fiji	26.63	2	10
Former Yugoslav	43.20	7	24
Republic of			
Macedonia			
Gabon	21.10	4	12

RecipientName	Mean Aid	Min Donors	Max Donors
Gambia	5.00	4	18
Georgia	78.49	6	24
Ghana	140.94	7	24
Guatemala	100.32	6	22
Guinea	40.03	4	19
Guinea-Bissau	13.67	4	14
Guyana	15.42	3	11
Haiti	198.54	6	19
Honduras	73.78	6	22
India	345.43	7	26
Indonesia	505.13	8	24
Iran	66.23	4	19
Iraq	551.72	17	21
Jamaica	18.16	4	13
Jordan	221.31	5	24
Kazakhstan	30.05	5	23
Kenya	501.05	9	28
Kyrgyzstan	42.89	6	23
Lao People's	59.30	4	21
Democratic	00.00		21
Republic			
Lebanon	135.74	7	23
Lesotho	34.50	3	13
Liberia	68.37	4	18
Libya	15.68	3	18
Madagascar	53.76	6	19
Malawi	162.40	6	24
Malaysia	37.24	3	17
Mali	146.00	6	23
Mauritania	28.67	4	15
Mauritius	11.81	4	13
Mexico	189.40	6	25
Moldova	49.09	6	26
Mongolia	62.65	5	21
Montenegro	13.34	11	19
Morocco	250.80	7	24
Mozambique	390.49	9	22
Myanmar	99.77	4	24
Namibia	91.78	7	21
Nepal	139.87	5	24
Nicaragua	79.60	8	22
Niger	47.22	5	20
Nigeria	418.29	7	23
Oman	1.77	1	8
Pakistan	474.70	5	24
Panama	8.27	4	15
Papua New Guinea	202.61	3	15
Paraguay	31.91	5	20
Peru	126.99	9	25
Philippines	144.23	6	23
ppo	111.20	0	20

(00,000,000)			
RecipientName	Mean_Aid	Min_Donors	Max_Donors
Rwanda	189.68	7	25
Saudi Arabia	5.45	2	7
Senegal	143.56	8	23
Sierra Leone	47.65	4	21
Solomon Islands	136.91	2	9
Somalia	116.74	17	21
South Africa	509.43	9	27
South Sudan	175.21	14	20
Sri Lanka	63.50	6	23
Sudan	185.89	7	44
Suriname	10.59	3	10
Swaziland	28.41	2	16
Syrian Arab	25.33	4	10
Republic			
Tajikistan	31.04	5	21
Tanzania	439.02	8	23
Thailand	59.58	5	25
Timor-Leste	78.70	5	17
Togo	23.45	6	18
Trinidad and	1.12	2	10
Tobago			
Tunisia	130.75	6	23
Turkey	162.34	7	25
Turkmenistan	5.14	2	12
Uganda	376.37	9	27
Ukraine	174.21	6	29
Uruguay	9.03	5	19
Uzbekistan	34.59	4	22
Venezuela	22.18	7	20
Yemen	97.96	5	22
Zambia	278.96	6	21
Zimbabwe	153.91	7	25

#### Appendix B1: ECM Model

One of the things you can test for with an error correction model is endogeneity resulting from reverse causality. This is possible if we believe countries are likely to systematically change their method of delivering aid and how much they give based changes in a country's level of democracy. The following ecm model should have coefficients that are 0 for all but the lagged dependent variables. Some are significantly different from 0, which suggests that some endogeity may be present. Intuitively, this makes sense because aid will be allocated partially based on existing levels of democracy.

Here we only present the ECM model for Polity since those results are the most robust, but ECMs for the other Models can be produced upon request.

Table 2:

		$D\epsilon$	ependent varial	ble:	
	NGO	IGO	CORP	DONOR	RECIP
lag_ngo	0.578*** (0.006)				
lag_igo		0.318*** (0.007)			
$lag\_corp$			0.414*** (0.022)		
$lag\_gov\_d$				0.655*** (0.006)	
$lag\_gov\_r$					0.522*** (0.007)
lag_polity2	0.052*** (0.009)	0.013 (0.010)	$0.006 \\ (0.005)$	0.025** (0.011)	0.052*** (0.011)
$lag\_gdp$	0.00001*** (0.00000)	-0.00000 $(0.00000)$	$-0.00000^{**}$ $(0.00000)$	0.00002*** (0.00000)	0.00001*** (0.00000)
$lag\_pop$	$-0.000^*$ (0.000)	$-0.000^{***}$ $(0.000)$	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	$0.000 \\ (0.000)$
lag_urban	0.004** (0.002)	0.003 $(0.002)$	0.009*** (0.001)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.022*** (0.002)
diff_polity2	0.041*** (0.010)	0.023** (0.011)	-0.003 $(0.005)$	0.042*** (0.012)	0.011 $(0.012)$
$diff\_gdp$	0.00001*** (0.00000)	-0.00000 $(0.00000)$	0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00003*** (0.00000)	0.00001*** (0.00000)
diff_pop	$0.000 \\ (0.000)$	-0.000 $(0.000)$	$0.000 \\ (0.000)$	-0.000 $(0.000)$	-0.000 $(0.000)$
diff_urban	$-0.025^{**}$ $(0.011)$	-0.018 (0.013)	0.010 (0.006)	0.019 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.014)
Observations $R^2$ Adjusted $R^2$ F Statistic (df = 9; 16392)	19,067 0.404 0.307 1,234.053***	19,067 0.103 -0.043 209.128***	19,067 0.031 -0.127 57.709***	19,067 0.471 0.384 1,620.328***	19,067 0.285 0.168 725.610***





Table 3:

	Dependent variable:						
	NGO	IGO	CORP	DONOR	RECIP		
lag_ngo	0.579*** (0.006)						
lag_igo		0.318*** (0.007)					
lag_corp			0.414*** (0.022)				
lag_gov_d				0.655*** (0.006)			
$lag\_gov\_r$					0.523*** (0.007)		
lag_poly	0.045*** (0.009)	0.026*** (0.010)	-0.0003 $(0.005)$	0.025** (0.011)	0.036*** (0.010)		
$lag\_gdp$	0.00001*** (0.00000)	-0.00000 $(0.00000)$	$-0.00000^{**}$ $(0.00000)$	0.00002*** (0.00000)	0.00001*** (0.00000)		
lag_pop	-0.000 $(0.000)$	$-0.000^{***}$ $(0.000)$	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	$0.000 \\ (0.000)$		
lag_urban	0.004** (0.002)	0.003 $(0.002)$	0.009*** (0.001)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.002)		
diff_poly	0.041*** (0.011)	0.053*** (0.012)	-0.008 (0.006)	0.011 (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)		
diff_gdp	0.00001*** (0.00000)	-0.00000 $(0.00000)$	0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00003*** (0.00000)	0.00001*** (0.00000)		
diff_pop	$0.000 \\ (0.000)$	-0.000 $(0.000)$	$0.000 \\ (0.000)$	-0.000 $(0.000)$	-0.000 $(0.000)$		
diff_urban	$-0.025^{**}$ $(0.011)$	-0.019 (0.013)	0.010* (0.006)	0.020 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.014)		
Observations $R^2$ Adjusted $R^2$	19,067 0.404	19,067 0.104	19,067 0.031	19,067 0.471	19,067 0.284		
F Statistic (df = $9$ ; $16392$ )	0.306 1,232.466***	$-0.042$ $211.120^{***}$	-0.127 $57.679***$	0.384 1,618.870***	0.168 723.643***		




### Appendix C1: Other Types of Democracy Measures

For space reasons, the egalitarian and deliberative measures in VDem were not included in the main results, but they are presented here. They provide even stronger support for our theory.


Table 4: All VDem Results

	Dependent variable:					
	Electoral	Liberal	Participatory	Deliberative	Egalitarian	
Donor Gov	0.007 $(0.005)$	0.006 $(0.004)$	$0.007^*$ $(0.004)$	0.018*** (0.005)	0.008* (0.004)	
Target Gov	0.004 (0.006)	$0.010^*$ $(0.005)$	0.006 (0.005)	0.010* (0.006)	0.004 (0.005)	
NGO	0.029*** (0.006)	0.020*** (0.005)	0.031*** (0.005)	0.033*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)	
IGO	0.026*** (0.006)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.024*** (0.005)	0.028*** (0.007)	0.020*** (0.005)	
Corporation	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.020 (0.012)	-0.023 (0.016)	-0.020 (0.012)	
Other	0.015*** (0.005)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.010*** (0.004)	$0.024^{***}$ $(0.005)$	0.015*** (0.004)	
$\log(\text{GDP})$	0.091*** (0.011)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.034*** (0.009)	0.030*** (0.012)	0.051*** (0.009)	
Urban	$-0.015^{***}$ $(0.002)$	$-0.014^{***}$ $(0.002)$	$-0.016^{***}$ $(0.002)$	$-0.029^{***}$ $(0.002)$	$-0.015^{***}$ $(0.002)$	
$\log(\text{Population})$	0.212*** (0.047)	0.298*** (0.042)	0.333*** (0.039)	0.067 $(0.049)$	0.115*** (0.038)	
Observations $R^2$ Adjusted $R^2$ F Statistic (df = 9; 19058)	21,935 0.011 -0.138 23.208***	21,935 0.009 -0.141 18.816***	21,935 0.013 -0.136 26.970***	21,935 0.024 -0.124 51.072***	21,935 0.011 -0.139 22.711***	

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



### Coefficient Raw Tests






Table 5:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby	Model
1	Rec Gov v NGO	8.045	0.005	0.028	0.033	Electoral
2	Rec Gov v IGO	6.350	0.012	0.047	0.051	Electoral
3	Rec Gov v Corp	2.872	0.090	0.128	0.245	Electoral
4	Donor Gov v NGO	6.972	0.008	0.041	0.045	Electoral
5	Donor Gov v IGO	5.410	0.020	0.060	0.073	Electoral
6	Donor Gov v Corp	3.427	0.064	0.128	0.199	Electoral
7	NGO v Corp	9.945	0.002	0.013	0.033	Electoral
8	IGO v Corp	8.291	0.004	0.028	0.033	Electoral

Table 6:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby	Model
1	Rec Gov v NGO	1.819	0.177	0.460	0.506	Liberal
2	Rec Gov v IGO	1.746	0.186	0.460	0.506	Liberal
3	Rec Gov v Corp	2.744	0.098	0.412	0.425	Liberal
4	Donor Gov v NGO	3.314	0.069	0.412	0.374	Liberal
5	Donor Gov v IGO	3.311	0.069	0.412	0.374	Liberal
6	Donor Gov v Corp	2.039	0.153	0.460	0.506	Liberal
7	NGO v Corp	5.391	0.020	0.162	0.278	Liberal
8	IGO v Corp	4.988	0.026	0.179	0.278	Liberal

Table 7:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby	Model
1	Rec Gov v NGO	12.088	0.001	0.004	0.005	Participatory
2	Rec Gov v IGO	6.544	0.011	0.042	0.046	Participatory
3	Rec Gov v Corp	3.704	0.054	0.084	0.148	Participatory
4	Donor Gov v NGO	11.548	0.001	0.004	0.005	Participatory
5	Donor Gov v IGO	6.045	0.014	0.042	0.051	Participatory
6	Donor Gov v Corp	4.131	0.042	0.084	0.131	Participatory
7	NGO v Corp	13.823	0.0002	0.002	0.004	Participatory
8	IGO v Corp	9.705	0.002	0.009	0.010	Participatory

Table 8:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby	Model
1	Rec Gov v NGO	6.396	0.011	0.069	0.083	Egalitarian
2	Rec Gov v IGO	5.499	0.019	0.095	0.103	Egalitarian
3	Rec Gov v Corp	3.454	0.063	0.132	0.172	Egalitarian
4	Donor Gov v NGO	4.386	0.036	0.132	0.131	Egalitarian
5	Donor Gov v IGO	3.643	0.056	0.132	0.172	Egalitarian
6	Donor Gov v Corp	4.547	0.033	0.132	0.131	Egalitarian
7	NGO v Corp	9.909	0.002	0.013	0.035	Egalitarian
8	IGO v Corp	8.671	0.003	0.023	0.035	Egalitarian

Table 9:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby	Model
1	Rec Gov v NGO	6.422	0.011	0.068	0.072	Deliberative
2	Rec Gov v IGO	4.117	0.042	0.169	0.154	Deliberative
3	Rec Gov v Corp	4.124	0.042	0.169	0.154	Deliberative
4	Donor Gov v NGO	3.121	0.077	0.169	0.240	Deliberative
5	Donor Gov v IGO	1.518	0.218	0.218	0.592	Deliberative
6	Donor Gov v Corp	6.144	0.013	0.068	0.072	Deliberative
7	NGO v Corp	11.005	0.001	0.007	0.020	Deliberative
8	IGO v Corp	8.681	0.003	0.023	0.035	Deliberative

#### Appendix C2: Freedom House

As stated in the paper, VDem was chosen for its comprehensive appraoch and clear rating guidelines while polity was chosen for its ubiquity in the discipline. Freedom House can be somewhat more opaque in its ratings which are based on expert answers to questions rather than a cohesive overview. That said, they are still a useful robustness check to make sure our results are not dependent on a particular rating of democracy.


The scales for civil liberties, political rights and status come from Freedom House inverted relative to the other two and the other measures used in our paper (a lower score means more democratic). For consistency and ease of interpretation, we invert them back. As such, all but the rule of law model suppo our arugment to some degree. This is not surprising as our coding as "democratic purpose" excludes some types of aid that might be targetted at rule of law, such as aid to police forces and prisons.


It is worth noting that for civil liberties and personal autonomy, the coefficient for aid delivered by the recipient country is statistically significant, contradicting our theory. While the effect is not robust to other specifications of the dependent variable, it does present some cause for caution.

Table 10: All Freedom House Results

		Depen	dent variable:		
	Civil Liberties	Personal Autonomy	Political Rights	Rule of Law	Status
Donor Gov	0.004	-0.005	0.006	-0.0001	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Target Gov	$0.014^{***}$	0.011**	0.008	0.0004	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)
NGO	0.005	-0.002	0.034***	-0.004	0.006
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)
IGO	0.007	-0.015***	0.015**	0.001	0.018**
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Corporation	$-0.068^*$	-0.046	-0.061	-0.033	$-0.091^*$
•	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.045)	(0.032)	(0.050)
Other	0.006	0.004	-0.008	0.010***	$-0.010^*$
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)
$\log(\text{GDP})$	0.084***	0.248***	0.105***	0.046***	0.066***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Urban	-0.019***	-0.036***	-0.013***	$-0.007^{***}$	-0.043***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
log(Population)	-0.720***	0.063	-0.248***	$-0.741^{***}$	0.109*
O( 1 /	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.056)	(0.041)	(0.063)
Observations	19,654	19,654	19,654	19,654	19,654
$R^2$	0.060	0.068	0.011	0.052	0.026
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.097	-0.088	-0.155	-0.107	-0.137
F Statistic (df = 9; 16831)	120.080***	136.471***	20.681***	102.314***	50.862***

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01








Table 11:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby	Model
1	Rec Gov v NGO	1.231	0.267	1	1	Civil Liberties
2	Rec Gov v IGO	0.779	0.377	1	1	Civil Liberties
3	Rec Gov v Corp	5.241	0.022	0.176	0.228	Civil Liberties
4	Donor Gov v NGO	0.012	0.912	1	1	Civil Liberties
5	Donor Gov v IGO	0.131	0.717	1	1	Civil Liberties
6	Donor Gov v Corp	4.139	0.042	0.263	0.228	Civil Liberties
7	NGO v Corp	4.168	0.041	0.263	0.228	Civil Liberties
8	IGO v Corp	4.323	0.038	0.263	0.228	Civil Liberties

Table 12:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby	Model
1	Rec Gov v NGO	6.795	0.009	0.064	0.099	Personal Autonomy
2	Rec Gov v IGO	0.461	0.497	0.680	1	Personal Autonomy
3	Rec Gov v Corp	2.347	0.125	0.502	0.488	Personal Autonomy
4	Donor Gov v NGO	9.080	0.003	0.021	0.056	Personal Autonomy
5	Donor Gov v IGO	0.910	0.340	0.680	1	Personal Autonomy
6	Donor Gov v Corp	2.237	0.135	0.502	0.488	Personal Autonomy
7	NGO v Corp	4.435	0.035	0.211	0.255	Personal Autonomy
8	IGO v Corp	2.783	0.095	0.476	0.488	Personal Autonomy

Table 13:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby	Model
1	Rec Gov v NGO	3.615	0.057	0.401	0.487	Political Rights
2	Rec Gov v IGO	15.197	0.0001	0.001	0.002	Political Rights
3	Rec Gov v Corp	3.352	0.067	0.403	0.487	Political Rights
4	Donor Gov v NGO	0.215	0.643	0.667	1	Political Rights
5	Donor Gov v IGO	2.761	0.097	0.483	0.525	Political Rights
6	Donor Gov v Corp	1.751	0.186	0.636	0.673	Political Rights
7	NGO v Corp	1.984	0.159	0.636	0.673	Political Rights
8	IGO v Corp	0.935	0.334	0.667	1	Political Rights

Table 14:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby	Model
1	Rec Gov v NGO	0.402	0.526	1	1	Rule of Law
2	Rec Gov v IGO	0.0002	0.990	1	1	Rule of Law
3	Rec Gov v Corp	1.053	0.305	1	1	Rule of Law
4	Donor Gov v NGO	0.359	0.549	1	1	Rule of Law
5	Donor Gov v IGO	0.009	0.926	1	1	Rule of Law
6	Donor Gov v Corp	1.033	0.309	1	1	Rule of Law
7	NGO v Corp	0.783	0.376	1	1	Rule of Law
8	IGO v Corp	1.043	0.307	1	1	Rule of Law

Table 15:


	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby	Model
1	Rec Gov v NGO	0.016	0.901	0.901	1	Status
2	Rec Gov v IGO	1.432	0.231	0.694	0.839	Status
3	Rec Gov v Corp	3.541	0.060	0.339	0.326	Status
4	Donor Gov v NGO	0.947	0.330	0.694	1	Status
5	Donor Gov v IGO	4.540	0.033	0.265	0.326	Status
6	Donor Gov v Corp	2.956	0.086	0.342	0.372	Status
7	NGO v Corp	3.636	0.057	0.339	0.326	Status
8	IGO v Corp	4.528	0.033	0.265	0.326	Status

## Appendix C3: Lagged measures of democracy


Table 16: Main Results with Lagged DV  $\,$ 

		Depender	nt variable:	
	Electoral	Liberal	Participatory	PolityIV
Donor Gov	-0.002 $(0.004)$	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)
Target Gov	$-0.010^{**}$ $(0.005)$	$-0.010^{**}$ (0.004)	-0.006 $(0.004)$	-0.005 $(0.005)$
NGO	0.015*** (0.005)	0.008* (0.004)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.023*** (0.005)
IGO	0.026*** (0.006)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.006)
Corporation	$-0.074^{**}$ $(0.034)$	-0.036 (0.028)	$-0.048^*$ (0.026)	-0.018 $(0.035)$
Other	-0.004 (0.002)	$-0.003^*$ (0.002)	$-0.004^{**}$ (0.002)	$-0.006^{**}$ $(0.002)$
$\log(\text{GDP})$	0.041*** (0.011)	0.022** (0.009)	0.003 $(0.008)$	-0.008 (0.011)
Urban	$-0.016^{***}$ $(0.002)$	$-0.012^{***}$ $(0.002)$	$-0.012^{***}$ $(0.001)$	$-0.013^{***}$ $(0.002)$
$\log(\text{Population})$	0.257*** (0.047)	0.242*** (0.039)	0.252*** (0.036)	0.327*** (0.048)
lag_poly	0.627*** (0.007)			
lag_lib		0.707*** (0.006)		
lag_partip			0.709*** (0.006)	
lag_polity				0.108*** (0.001)
Observations $R^2$ Adjusted $R^2$ F Statistic (df = 10; 14289)	16,840 0.403 0.296 962.866***	16,840 0.481 0.388 1,321.962***	16,840 0.481 0.388 1,323.382***	16,840 0.334 0.215 716.009***

Note:










Table 17:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	12.954	0.0003	0.003	0.007
2	Rec Gov v IGO	7.694	0.006	0.039	0.060
3	Rec Gov v Corp	0.122	0.726	1	1
4	Donor Gov v NGO	6.907	0.009	0.052	0.062
5	Donor Gov v IGO	2.999	0.083	0.416	0.453
6	Donor Gov v Corp	0.372	0.542	1	1
7	NGO v Corp	1.341	0.247	0.987	1
8	IGO v Corp	0.925	0.336	1	1

Table 18:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	10.417	0.001	0.007	0.009
2	Rec Gov v IGO	22.246	0.00000	0.00002	0.0001
3	Rec Gov v Corp	3.429	0.064	0.070	0.174
4	Donor Gov v NGO	5.154	0.023	0.070	0.084
5	Donor Gov v IGO	14.709	0.0001	0.001	0.001
6	Donor Gov v Corp	4.461	0.035	0.070	0.108
7	NGO v Corp	6.614	0.010	0.040	0.044
8	IGO v Corp	8.287	0.004	0.020	0.022

Table 19:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	7.609	0.006	0.041	0.054
2	Rec Gov v IGO	14.629	0.0001	0.001	0.003
3	Rec Gov v Corp	0.823	0.364	0.476	0.990
4	Donor Gov v NGO	2.429	0.119	0.476	0.461
5	Donor Gov v IGO	7.167	0.007	0.045	0.054
6	Donor Gov v Corp	1.457	0.227	0.476	0.706
7	NGO v Corp	2.325	0.127	0.476	0.461
8	IGO v Corp	3.051	0.081	0.403	0.439

Table 20:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	8.989	0.003	0.016	0.020
2	Rec Gov v IGO	13.928	0.0002	0.002	0.004
3	Rec Gov v Corp	2.650	0.104	0.140	0.281
4	Donor Gov v NGO	5.658	0.017	0.074	0.076
5	Donor Gov v IGO	9.871	0.002	0.012	0.018
6	Donor Gov v Corp	3.284	0.070	0.140	0.217
7	NGO v Corp	5.277	0.022	0.074	0.078
8	IGO v Corp	5.948	0.015	0.074	0.076

### Appendix C4: Including all types of donors

These results include all donors in the original CRS data, not just country donors. The most significant inclusion is organizations that use their own money as opposed to being delivery method for money from a country. Since these organizations will almost always use themselves, these results are biased in favor on the organizations and our hypotheses.





Table 21: Main Results

		$Dependent\ variable:$				
	Electoral	Liberal	Participatory	PolityIV		
Donor Gov	0.004	0.006	0.005	0.010**		
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)		
Target Gov	0.013***	0.013***	0.011***	0.013***		
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)		
NGO	0.026***	0.018***	0.028***	0.034***		
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)		
IGO	0.024***	0.017***	0.022***	0.017***		
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)		
Corporation	-0.019	-0.012	-0.017	-0.001		
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)		
Other	0.012***	0.011***	0.009***	0.009**		
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)		
$\log(\text{GDP})$	0.084***	0.041***	0.031***	0.038***		
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)		
Urban	$-0.014^{***}$	$-0.012^{***}$	-0.015***	-0.009***		
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)		
log(Population)	0.212***	0.273***	0.327***	0.521***		
-, - ,	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.039)		
Observations	30,775	30,775	30,775	30,775		
$R^2$	0.010	0.008	0.011	0.019		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.146	-0.149	-0.145	-0.136		
F Statistic (df = 9; 26582)	29.551***	22.833***	33.734***	56.246***		

Note:

### Coefficient Raw Tests






Table 22:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	10.882	0.001	0.007	0.011
2	Rec Gov v IGO	0.530	0.466	1	1
3	Rec Gov v Corp	0.976	0.323	1	1
4	Donor Gov v NGO	11.141	0.001	0.007	0.011
5	Donor Gov v IGO	1.181	0.277	1	1
6	Donor Gov v Corp	0.554	0.457	1	1
7	NGO v Corp	5.921	0.015	0.090	0.108
8	IGO v Corp	1.547	0.214	1	1

Table 23:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	3.943	0.047	0.141	0.171
2	Rec Gov v IGO	3.463	0.063	0.141	0.195
3	Rec Gov v Corp	5.303	0.021	0.085	0.093
4	Donor Gov v NGO	8.308	0.004	0.023	0.021
5	Donor Gov v IGO	8.343	0.004	0.023	0.021
6	Donor Gov v Corp	2.676	0.102	0.141	0.277
7	NGO v Corp	9.508	0.002	0.016	0.021
8	IGO v Corp	8.827	0.003	0.021	0.021

Table 24:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	0.735	0.391	0.783	1
2	Rec Gov v IGO	0.461	0.497	0.783	1
3	Rec Gov v Corp	4.152	0.042	0.250	0.301
4	Donor Gov v NGO	3.497	0.061	0.307	0.315
5	Donor Gov v IGO	3.228	0.072	0.307	0.315
6	Donor Gov v Corp	1.916	0.166	0.499	0.603
7	NGO v Corp	5.382	0.020	0.163	0.297
8	IGO v Corp	4.870	0.027	0.191	0.297

Table 25:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	8.670	0.003	0.016	0.018
2	Rec Gov v IGO	3.981	0.046	0.092	0.143
3	Rec Gov v Corp	6.260	0.012	0.037	0.045
4	Donor Gov v NGO	12.948	0.0003	0.002	0.003
5	Donor Gov v IGO	8.200	0.004	0.017	0.018
6	Donor Gov v Corp	3.605	0.058	0.092	0.157
7	NGO v Corp	13.745	0.0002	0.002	0.003
8	IGO v Corp	10.346	0.001	0.008	0.009


#### Appendix C5: Analysis by Recipient-Year

Aggregating by recipient pools together variation that might exist on the donor level. By using the dyad level, however, we may be artifically increasing the importance of recipients that receive aid from numerous sources. As a robustness check, we aggregate by the recipient in the models below. The results generally also support our argument, that less fungible sources like NGOs and IGOs increase democratization more. Under this specification, corporations increase democracy by a significant but smaller amount for two of the four dependent variables.


Table 26: Main Results

		Depend	lent variable:	
	Electoral	Liberal	Participatory	PolityIV
Donor Gov	0.003	0.0003	0.002	-0.006
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Target Gov	0.005	0.010	0.009	0.029***
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)
NGO	0.027	0.022	0.032**	0.043**
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.017)
IGO	0.046***	0.044***	0.039***	$0.026^{*}$
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Corporation	$-0.030^*$	-0.017	$-0.024^{*}$	0.003
•	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Other	-0.008	-0.003	-0.008	0.0003
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.013)
$\log(GDP)$	0.009	-0.023	-0.053	-0.072
,	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.044)
Urban	-0.008	-0.007	-0.013**	-0.007
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
log(Population)	-0.029	0.009	0.121	0.252
	(0.183)	(0.159)	(0.149)	(0.181)
Observations	1,370	1,370	1,370	1,370
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.029	0.030	0.036	0.045
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.071	-0.070	-0.063	-0.053
F Statistic (df = 9; 1241)	4.142***	4.307***	5.197***	6.509***

Note:



### Coefficient Raw Tests






Table 27:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	0.485	0.486	1	1
2	Rec Gov v IGO	0.031	0.859	1	1
3	Rec Gov v Corp	1.628	0.202	1	1
4	Donor Gov v NGO	4.184	0.041	0.327	0.589
5	Donor Gov v IGO	3.706	0.054	0.379	0.589
6	Donor Gov v Corp	0.191	0.662	1	1
7	NGO v Corp	2.680	0.102	0.610	0.737
8	IGO v Corp	1.051	0.305	1	1

Table 28:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	1.232	0.267	0.534	0.829
2	Rec Gov v IGO	5.175	0.023	0.134	0.125
3	Rec Gov v Corp	2.721	0.099	0.330	0.359
4	Donor Gov v NGO	1.027	0.311	0.534	0.845
5	Donor Gov v IGO	6.957	0.008	0.058	0.091
6	Donor Gov v Corp	3.013	0.083	0.330	0.359
7	NGO v Corp	5.221	0.022	0.134	0.125
8	IGO v Corp	10.965	0.001	0.007	0.020

Table 29:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	0.424	0.515	0.891	1
2	Rec Gov v IGO	4.500	0.034	0.203	0.246
3	Rec Gov v Corp	2.208	0.137	0.549	0.597
4	Donor Gov v NGO	1.062	0.303	0.891	0.940
5	Donor Gov v IGO	9.288	0.002	0.018	0.026
6	Donor Gov v Corp	1.087	0.297	0.891	0.940
7	NGO v Corp	3.163	0.075	0.377	0.409
8	IGO v Corp	9.241	0.002	0.018	0.026

Table 30:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	1.974	0.160	0.276	0.435
2	Rec Gov v IGO	4.003	0.045	0.227	0.247
3	Rec Gov v Corp	3.563	0.059	0.236	0.257
4	Donor Gov v NGO	2.277	0.131	0.276	0.408
5	Donor Gov v IGO	7.269	0.007	0.045	0.051
6	Donor Gov v Corp	2.837	0.092	0.276	0.334
7	NGO v Corp	7.414	0.006	0.045	0.051
8	IGO v Corp	10.965	0.001	0.007	0.020


#### Appendix C6: Effect of All Aid on Democratization

In this appendix, we consider all ODA on democratization outcomes, not just aid intended to democratize a country. It still includes military and other aid excluded from the OECD's ODA defintion, but includes a large amount of aid intended to assist developing countries in other ways.


Table 31: Main Results

	Table 91. IV.	iam itesuits					
	Dependent variable:						
	Electoral	Liberal	Participatory	PolityIV			
Donor Gov	-0.0001 $(0.0004)$	0.0001 $(0.0004)$	0.004*** (0.0004)	$0.007^{***} (0.0004)$			
Target Gov	$0.005^{***}$ $(0.0004)$	$0.004^{***}$ $(0.0004)$	0.007*** (0.0003)	0.013*** (0.0004)			
NGO	$-0.001^*$ $(0.0004)$	$-0.001^{**}$ (0.0003)	0.002*** (0.0003)	0.006*** (0.0004)			
IGO	$-0.003^{***}$ $(0.001)$	$-0.002^{***}$ $(0.0005)$	0.0002 $(0.0004)$	0.005*** (0.001)			
Corporation	$-0.006^{***}$ $(0.001)$	$-0.006^{***}$ $(0.001)$	$-0.002^{***}$ $(0.001)$	0.005*** (0.001)			
Other	0.0004 $(0.0003)$	-0.0004 $(0.0003)$	0.001*** (0.0003)	0.002*** (0.0003)			
$\log(\text{GDP})$	0.099*** (0.002)	0.049*** (0.001)	0.048*** (0.001)	0.036*** (0.002)			
Urban	$-0.026^{***}$ $(0.0003)$	$-0.020^{***}$ $(0.0002)$	$-0.025^{***}$ $(0.0002)$	$-0.007^{***}$ $(0.0003)$			
$\log(\text{Population})$	0.259*** (0.006)	0.329*** (0.006)	0.398*** (0.006)	0.487*** (0.007)			
Observations R <sup>2</sup> Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> F Statistic (df = 9; 1056412)	1,059,782 0.010 0.007 1,238.451***	1,059,782 0.007 0.004 822.935***	1,059,782 0.012 0.009 1,397.539***	1,059,782 0.012 0.009 1,455.626***			

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



### Coefficient Raw Tests






Table 32:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	324.967	0	0	0
2	Rec Gov v IGO	213.870	0	0	0
3	Rec Gov v Corp	64.965	0	0	0
4	Donor Gov v NGO	5.333	0.021	0.084	0.091
5	Donor Gov v IGO	12.527	0.0004	0.002	0.002
6	Donor Gov v Corp	2.233	0.135	0.405	0.490
7	NGO v Corp	0.386	0.534	1	1
8	IGO v Corp	0.280	0.596	1	1

Table 33:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	218.795	0	0	0
2	Rec Gov v IGO	223.389	0	0	0
3	Rec Gov v Corp	144.749	0	0	0
4	Donor Gov v NGO	1.891	0.169	0.169	0.460
5	Donor Gov v IGO	31.669	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
6	Donor Gov v Corp	43.509	0	0	0
7	NGO v Corp	39.121	0	0	0
8	IGO v Corp	9.812	0.002	0.003	0.005


Table 34:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	193.601	0	0	0
2	Rec Gov v IGO	147.003	0	0	0
3	Rec Gov v Corp	153.460	0	0	0
4	Donor Gov v NGO	6.475	0.011	0.011	0.030
5	Donor Gov v IGO	16.889	0.00004	0.0001	0.0001
6	Donor Gov v Corp	60.662	0	0	0
7	NGO v Corp	49.264	0	0	0
8	IGO v Corp	25.866	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000

Table 35:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	219.062	0	0	0
2	Rec Gov v IGO	221.984	0	0	0
3	Rec Gov v Corp	133.764	0	0	0
4	Donor Gov v NGO	23.614	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
5	Donor Gov v IGO	62.208	0	0	0
6	Donor Gov v Corp	55.635	0	0	0
7	NGO v Corp	33.144	0	0.00000	0.00000
8	IGO v Corp	7.336	0.007	0.007	0.018

Appendix C7: Effect of Broader Dem Aid Coding on Democratization



Coefficient Raw Tests 32

Rec Gov v NGO Rec Gov v IGO Model

Table 36: Main Results

		Depende	ent variable:	
	Electoral	Liberal	Participatory	PolityIV
Donor Gov	0.007	0.006	$0.007^{*}$	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Target Gov	0.004	$0.010^{*}$	0.006	0.014**
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
NGO	0.029***	0.020***	0.031***	0.041***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
IGO	0.026***	0.020***	0.024***	0.015**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Corporation	-0.023	-0.014	-0.020	-0.005
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Other	0.015***	0.013***	0.010***	0.006
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
$\log(GDP)$	0.091***	0.047***	0.034***	0.042***
- (	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Urban	-0.015***	$-0.014^{***}$	-0.016***	-0.010***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log(Population)	0.212***	0.298***	0.333***	0.517***
,	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.047)
Observations	21,935	21,935	21,935	21,935
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.011	0.009	0.013	0.019
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.138	-0.141	-0.136	-0.129
F Statistic (df = 9; 19058)	23.208***	18.816***	26.970***	40.632***

Note:

Table 37:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	9.260	0.002	0.016	0.025
2	Rec Gov v IGO	0.009	0.925	1	1
3	Rec Gov v Corp	1.476	0.224	1	1
4	Donor Gov v NGO	15.537	0.0001	0.001	0.002
5	Donor Gov v IGO	0.792	0.373	1	1
6	Donor Gov v Corp	0.647	0.421	1	1
7	NGO v Corp	7.841	0.005	0.031	0.037
8	IGO v Corp	1.422	0.233	1	1

Table 38:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	8.045	0.005	0.028	0.033
2	Rec Gov v IGO	6.350	0.012	0.047	0.051
3	Rec Gov v Corp	2.872	0.090	0.128	0.245
4	Donor Gov v NGO	6.972	0.008	0.041	0.045
5	Donor Gov v IGO	5.410	0.020	0.060	0.073
6	Donor Gov v Corp	3.427	0.064	0.128	0.199
7	NGO v Corp	9.945	0.002	0.013	0.033
8	IGO v Corp	8.291	0.004	0.028	0.033

Table 39:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	1.819	0.177	0.460	0.506
2	Rec Gov v IGO	1.746	0.186	0.460	0.506
3	Rec Gov v Corp	2.744	0.098	0.412	0.425
4	Donor Gov v NGO	3.314	0.069	0.412	0.374
5	Donor Gov v IGO	3.311	0.069	0.412	0.374
6	Donor Gov v Corp	2.039	0.153	0.460	0.506
7	NGO v Corp	5.391	0.020	0.162	0.278
8	IGO v Corp	4.988	0.026	0.179	0.278

Table 40:


	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	12.088	0.001	0.004	0.005
2	Rec Gov v IGO	6.544	0.011	0.042	0.046
3	Rec Gov v Corp	3.704	0.054	0.084	0.148
4	Donor Gov v NGO	11.548	0.001	0.004	0.005
5	Donor Gov v IGO	6.045	0.014	0.042	0.051
6	Donor Gov v Corp	4.131	0.042	0.084	0.131
7	NGO v Corp	13.823	0.0002	0.002	0.004
8	IGO v Corp	9.705	0.002	0.009	0.010

## Appendix C8: Effect of Narrow Dem Aid Coding on Democratization


Table 41: Main Results

	$Dependent\ variable:$				
	Electoral	Liberal	Participatory	PolityIV	
Donor Gov	0.010	0.011	0.011	0.005	
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)	
Target Gov	0.011	$0.017^{*}$	0.009	0.019*	
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	
NGO	0.038***	0.028***	0.041***	0.048***	
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)	
IGO	0.018**	0.012	$0.012^{*}$	0.045***	
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)	
Corporation	0.029	$0.035^{*}$	0.030	0.047**	
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.023)	
Other	0.031***	0.026***	0.023***	0.022***	
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	
$\log(\text{GDP})$	0.118***	0.063***	0.059***	0.064***	
- (	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)	
Urban	$-0.017^{***}$	-0.015***	$-0.017^{***}$	-0.008***	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	
log(Population)	0.139**	0.251***	0.262***	0.443***	
-	(0.055)	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.055)	
Observations	15,838	15,838	15,838	15,838	
$R^2$	0.013	0.010	0.013	0.019	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.154	-0.158	-0.154	-0.147	
F Statistic (df = $9$ ; $13542$ )	20.379***	14.511***	19.942***	29.880***	

Note:



### Coefficient Raw Tests






Table 42:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	4.584	0.032	0.194	0.234
2	Rec Gov v IGO	3.840	0.050	0.250	0.272
3	Rec Gov v Corp	1.209	0.272	0.815	0.984
4	Donor Gov v NGO	10.353	0.001	0.010	0.015
5	Donor Gov v IGO	10.193	0.001	0.010	0.015
6	Donor Gov v Corp	2.675	0.102	0.408	0.443
7	NGO v Corp	0.002	0.969	1	1
8	IGO v Corp	0.008	0.931	1	1

Table 43:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	4.140	0.042	0.293	0.455
2	Rec Gov v IGO	0.256	0.613	1	1
3	Rec Gov v Corp	0.491	0.484	1	1
4	Donor Gov v NGO	4.611	0.032	0.254	0.455
5	Donor Gov v IGO	0.379	0.538	1	1
6	Donor Gov v Corp	0.544	0.461	1	1
7	NGO v Corp	0.148	0.700	1	1
8	IGO v Corp	0.192	0.661	1	1

Table 44:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	0.809	0.369	1	1
2	Rec Gov v IGO	0.165	0.685	1	1
3	Rec Gov v Corp	0.614	0.433	1	1
4	Donor Gov v NGO	1.873	0.171	1	1
5	Donor Gov v IGO	0.003	0.957	1	1
6	Donor Gov v Corp	1.034	0.309	1	1
7	$NGO \ v \ Corp$	0.095	0.758	1	1
8	IGO v Corp	0.981	0.322	1	1

Table 45:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	7.949	0.005	0.038	0.074
2	Rec Gov v IGO	0.085	0.770	1	1
3	Rec Gov v Corp	1.015	0.314	1	1
4	Donor Gov v NGO	7.312	0.007	0.048	0.074
5	Donor Gov v IGO	0.016	0.899	1	1
6	Donor Gov v Corp	0.841	0.359	1	1
7	NGO v Corp	0.246	0.620	1	1
8	IGO v Corp	0.730	0.393	1	1

## Appendix D1: Narrow Codings of Democracy

Category	Description
Public sector policy	Institution-building assistance to strengthen core public sector
and administrative	management systems and capacities. This includes macro-economic
management	and other policy management, co-ordination, planning and reform;
	human resource management; organisational development; civil
	service reform; e-government; development planning, monitoring and
	evaluation; support to ministries involved in aid co-ordination; other
	ministries and government departments when sector cannot be
	specified. (Use specific sector codes for development of systems and
	capacities in sector ministries.)
Public finance	Fiscal policy and planning; support to ministries of finance;
management	strengthening financial and managerial accountability; public
	expenditure management; improving financial management systems;
	budget drafting; inter-governmental fiscal relations, public audit,
	public debt. (Use code 15114 for domestic revenue mobilisation and
	code 33120 for customs).
Decentralisation	Decentralisation processes (including political, administrative and
and support to	fiscal dimensions); intergovernmental relations and federalism;
${f subnational}$	strengthening departments of regional and local government, regional
${f government}$	and local authorities and their national associations. (Use specific
	sector codes for decentralisation of sector management and services.)

(continued)	Description
Category	Description
Anti-corruption	Specialised organisations, institutions and frameworks for the
organisations and	prevention of and combat against corruption, bribery,
institutions	money-laundering and other aspects of organised crime, with or
	without law enforcement powers, e.g. anti-corruption commissions
	and monitoring bodies, special investigation services, institutions and
	initiatives of integrity and ethics oversight, specialised NGOs, other
	civil society and citizens' organisations directly concerned with
	corruption.
Domestic revenue	Support to domestic revenue mobilisation/tax policy, analysis and
mobilisation	administration as well as non-tax public revenue, which includes work
	with ministries of finance, line ministries, revenue authorities or other
	local, regional or national public bodies. (Use code 16010 for social
	security and other social protection.)
Budget planning	Operation of the budget office and planning as part of the budget
0 1 0	process.
National audit	Operation of the accounting and audit services.
Debt and aid	Management of public debt and foreign aid received (in the partner
management	country). For reporting on debt reorganisation, use codes 600xx.
Local government	Financial transfers to local government; support to institutions
finance	managing such transfers. (Use specific sector codes for sector-related
	transfers.)
Other central	Transfers to non sector-specific autonomous bodies or state-owned
transfers to	enterprises outside of local government finance; support to
institutions	institutions managing such transfers. (Use specific sector codes for
Institutions	sector-related transfers.)
Legal and judicial	Support to institutions, systems and procedures of the justice sector
development	both formal and informal; support to ministries of justice, the interior
development	and home affairs; judges and courts; legal drafting services; bar and
	lawyers associations; professional legal education; maintenance of law
	and order and public safety; border management; law enforcement
	agencies, police, prisons and their supervision; ombudsmen;
	alternative dispute resolution, arbitration and mediation; legal aid
	and counsel; traditional, indigenous and paralegal practices that fall
	outside the formal legal system. Measures that support the
	improvement of legal frameworks, constitutions, laws and regulations
	legislative and constitutional drafting and review; legal reform;
	integration of formal and informal systems of law. Public legal
	education; dissemination of information on entitlements and remedies
	for injustice; awareness campaigns. (Use codes 152xx for activities
	that are primarily aimed at supporting security system reform or
	undertaken in connection with post-conflict and peace building
	activities.)
Justice, law and	Judicial law and order sectors; policy development within ministries
order policy,	of justice or equivalents.
planning and	
administration	
Judicial affairs	Civil and criminal law courts and the judicial system, including
o adiciai dilaiis	enforcement of fines and legal settlements imposed by the courts and
	operation of parole and probation systems.
	probation of partie and probation systems.

(continued) Category Description Ombudsman Independent service representing the interests of the public by investigating and addressing complaints of unfair treatment or maladministration. Democratic Support to the exercise of democracy and diverse forms of participation and participation of citizens beyond elections (15151); direct democracy civil society instruments such as referenda and citizens' initiatives; support to organisations to represent and advocate for their members, to monitor, engage and hold governments to account, and to help citizens learn to act in the public sphere; curricula and teaching for civic education at various levels. (This purpose code is restricted to activities targeting governance issues. When assistance to civil society is for non-governance purposes use other appropriate purpose codes.) Elections Electoral management bodies and processes, election observation, voters' education. (Use code 15230 when in the context of an international peacekeeping operation.) Legislatures and Assistance to strengthen key functions of legislatures/parliaments political parties including subnational assemblies and councils (representation; oversight; legislation), such as improving the capacity of legislative bodies, improving legislatures' committees and administrative procedures,; research and information management systems; providing training programmes for legislators and support personnel. Assistance to political parties and strengthening of party systems. Media and free flow Activities that support free and uncensored flow of information on of information public issues; activities that increase the editorial and technical skills and the integrity of the print and broadcast media, e.g. training of journalists. (Use codes 22010-22040 for provision of equipment and capital assistance to media.) Human rights Measures to support specialised official human rights institutions and mechanisms at universal, regional, national and local levels in their statutory roles to promote and protect civil and political, economic, social and cultural rights as defined in international conventions and covenants; translation of international human rights commitments into national legislation; reporting and follow-up; human rights dialogue. Human rights defenders and human rights NGOs; human rights advocacy, activism, mobilisation; awareness raising and public human rights education. Human rights programming targeting specific groups, e.g. children, persons with disabilities, migrants, ethnic, religious, linguistic and sexual minorities, indigenous people and those suffering from caste discrimination, victims of trafficking, victims of torture. (Use code 15230 when in the context of a peacekeeping operation and code 15180 for ending violence against women and girls.) Women's equality Support for institutions and organisations (governmental and organisations and non-governmental) working for gender equality and women's

#### Appendix D2: Broad Codings of Democracy

empowerment.

institutions

Local government

administration

strengthening local authorities.

Decentralisation processes (including political, administrative and

fiscal dimensions); intergovernmental relations and federalism;

Category	Description
Education	NA NA
Education, Level	The codes in this category are to be used only when level of
Unspecified	education is unspecified or unknown (e.g. training of primary school
-	teachers should be coded under 11220).
Basic Education	NA
Secondary	NA
Education	
Post-Secondary	NA
Education	
Government &	NA
Civil Society	
Government &	N.B. Use code 51010 for general budget support.
Civil	
Society-general	
Other Social	NA
Infrastructure &	
Services	
Communications	NA
Education policy	Education sector policy, planning and programmes; aid to education
and administrative	ministries, administration and management systems; institution
management	capacity building and advice; school management and governance;
_	curriculum and materials development; unspecified education
	activities.
Education facilities	Educational buildings, equipment, materials; subsidiary services to
and training	education (boarding facilities, staff housing); language training;
	colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc.
Teacher training	Teacher education (where the level of education is unspecified);
	in-service and pre-service training; materials development.
Educational	Research and studies on education effectiveness, relevance and
research	quality; systematic evaluation and monitoring.
Primary education	Formal and non-formal primary education for children; all elementary
	and first cycle systematic instruction; provision of learning materials.
Basic life skills for	Formal and non-formal education for basic life skills for young people
youth and adults	and adults (adults education); literacy and numeracy training.
Basic life skills for	Formal and non-formal education for basic life skills for young people.
youth	
Primary education	D1 d
equivalent for	Formal primary education for adults.
adults	Formal primary education for adults.
Early childhood	Formal primary education for adults.  Formal and non-formal pre-school education.
education	Formal and non-formal pre-school education.
education Secondary	
education Secondary education	Formal and non-formal pre-school education.  Second cycle systematic instruction at both junior and senior levels.
education Secondary education Lower secondary	Formal and non-formal pre-school education.
education Secondary education Lower secondary education	Formal and non-formal pre-school education.  Second cycle systematic instruction at both junior and senior levels.  Second cycle systematic instruction at junior level.
education Secondary education Lower secondary education Upper secondary	Formal and non-formal pre-school education.  Second cycle systematic instruction at both junior and senior levels.
education Secondary education Lower secondary education Upper secondary education	Formal and non-formal pre-school education.  Second cycle systematic instruction at both junior and senior levels.  Second cycle systematic instruction at junior level.  Second cycle systematic instruction at senior level.
education Secondary education Lower secondary education Upper secondary	Formal and non-formal pre-school education.  Second cycle systematic instruction at both junior and senior levels.  Second cycle systematic instruction at junior level.  Second cycle systematic instruction at senior level.  Elementary vocational training and secondary level technical
education Secondary education Lower secondary education Upper secondary education	Formal and non-formal pre-school education.  Second cycle systematic instruction at both junior and senior levels.  Second cycle systematic instruction at junior level.  Second cycle systematic instruction at senior level.  Elementary vocational training and secondary level technical education; on-the job training; apprenticeships; including informal
education Secondary education Lower secondary education Upper secondary education Vocational training	Formal and non-formal pre-school education.  Second cycle systematic instruction at both junior and senior levels.  Second cycle systematic instruction at junior level.  Second cycle systematic instruction at senior level.  Elementary vocational training and secondary level technical education; on-the job training; apprenticeships; including informal vocational training.
education Secondary education Lower secondary education Upper secondary education	Formal and non-formal pre-school education.  Second cycle systematic instruction at both junior and senior levels.  Second cycle systematic instruction at junior level.  Second cycle systematic instruction at senior level.  Elementary vocational training and secondary level technical education; on-the job training; apprenticeships; including informal

(continued)	
Category	Description
Advanced technical	Professional-level vocational training programmes and in-service
and managerial	training.
training	
STD control	All activities related to sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS
including	control e.g. information, education and communication; testing;
HIV/AIDS	prevention; treatment, care.
Public sector policy	Institution-building assistance to strengthen core public sector
and administrative	management systems and capacities. This includes macro-economic
management	and other policy management, co-ordination, planning and reform;
	human resource management; organisational development; civil
	service reform; e-government; development planning, monitoring and
	evaluation; support to ministries involved in aid co-ordination; other
	ministries and government departments when sector cannot be
	specified. (Use specific sector codes for development of systems and
	capacities in sector ministries.)
Public finance	Fiscal policy and planning; support to ministries of finance;
management	strengthening financial and managerial accountability; public
	expenditure management; improving financial management systems;
	budget drafting; inter-governmental fiscal relations, public audit,
	public debt. (Use code 15114 for domestic revenue mobilisation and
	code 33120 for customs).
Decentralisation	Decentralisation processes (including political, administrative and
and support to	fiscal dimensions); intergovernmental relations and federalism;
subnational	strengthening departments of regional and local government, regional
government	and local authorities and their national associations. (Use specific
	sector codes for decentralisation of sector management and services.)
Anti-corruption	Specialised organisations, institutions and frameworks for the
organisations and	prevention of and combat against corruption, bribery,
institutions	money-laundering and other aspects of organised crime, with or
	without law enforcement powers, e.g. anti-corruption commissions
	and monitoring bodies, special investigation services, institutions and
	initiatives of integrity and ethics oversight, specialised NGOs, other
	civil society and citizens' organisations directly concerned with
	corruption.
Domestic revenue	Support to domestic revenue mobilisation/tax policy, analysis and
mobilisation	administration as well as non-tax public revenue, which includes work
	with ministries of finance, line ministries, revenue authorities or other
	local, regional or national public bodies. (Use code 16010 for social
	security and other social protection.)
Tax collection	Operation of the inland revenue authority.
Budget planning	Operation of the budget office and planning as part of the budget
	process.
National audit	Operation of the accounting and audit services.
Debt and aid	Management of public debt and foreign aid received (in the partner
management	country). For reporting on debt reorganisation, use codes 600xx.
Administration of	Support to administration of developing countries' foreign aid
developing	(including triangular and south-south cooperation).
countries' foreign	

$\underline{(continued)}$	
Category	Description
National	Operation or support of institutions providing national monitoring
monitoring and	and evaluation.
evaluation	
Local government	Financial transfers to local government; support to institutions
finance	managing such transfers. (Use specific sector codes for sector-related
	transfers.)
Other central	Transfers to non sector-specific autonomous bodies or state-owned
transfers to	enterprises outside of local government finance; support to
institutions	institutions managing such transfers. (Use specific sector codes for
	sector-related transfers.)
Legal and judicial development	Support to institutions, systems and procedures of the justice sector, both formal and informal; support to ministries of justice, the interior and home affairs; judges and courts; legal drafting services; bar and lawyers associations; professional legal education; maintenance of law and order and public safety; border management; law enforcement agencies, police, prisons and their supervision; ombudsmen; alternative dispute resolution, arbitration and mediation; legal aid and counsel; traditional, indigenous and paralegal practices that fall outside the formal legal system. Measures that support the improvement of legal frameworks, constitutions, laws and regulations; legislative and constitutional drafting and review; legal reform; integration of formal and informal systems of law. Public legal education; dissemination of information on entitlements and remedies for injustice; awareness campaigns. (Use codes 152xx for activities
Justice, law and	that are primarily aimed at supporting security system reform or undertaken in connection with post-conflict and peace building activities.)  Judicial law and order sectors; policy development within ministries
order policy,	of justice or equivalents.
planning and	
administration	
Police	Police affairs and services.
Judicial affairs	Civil and criminal law courts and the judicial system, including enforcement of fines and legal settlements imposed by the courts and operation of parole and probation systems.
Ombudsman	Independent service representing the interests of the public by investigating and addressing complaints of unfair treatment or maladministration.
Prisons	NA
Democratic	Support to the exercise of democracy and diverse forms of
participation and	participation of citizens beyond elections (15151); direct democracy
civil society	instruments such as referenda and citizens' initiatives; support to
	organisations to represent and advocate for their members, to monitor, engage and hold governments to account, and to help citizens learn to act in the public sphere; curricula and teaching for civic education at various levels. (This purpose code is restricted to activities targeting governance issues. When assistance to civil society is for non-governance purposes use other appropriate purpose codes.)
Elections	Electoral management bodies and processes, election observation, voters' education. (Use code 15230 when in the context of an
	international peacekeeping operation.)

(continuea)	
Category	Description
Legislatures and	Assistance to strengthen key functions of legislatures/ parliaments
political parties	including subnational assemblies and councils (representation;
	oversight; legislation), such as improving the capacity of legislative
	bodies, improving legislatures' committees and administrative
	procedures,; research and information management systems;
	providing training programmes for legislators and support personnel. Assistance to political parties and strengthening of party systems.
Media and free flow	Activities that support free and uncensored flow of information on
of information	public issues; activities that increase the editorial and technical skills
	and the integrity of the print and broadcast media, e.g. training of
	journalists. (Use codes 22010-22040 for provision of equipment and
	capital assistance to media.)
Tax policy and	NA
${f administration}$	
support	
Other non-tax	Non-tax public revenue, which includes line ministries, revenue
revenue	authorities or other local, regional or national public bodies.
mobilisation	
Human rights	Measures to support specialised official human rights institutions and
	mechanisms at universal, regional, national and local levels in their
	statutory roles to promote and protect civil and political, economic,
	social and cultural rights as defined in international conventions and
	covenants; translation of international human rights commitments
	into national legislation; reporting and follow-up; human rights
	dialogue. Human rights defenders and human rights NGOs; human
	rights advocacy, activism, mobilisation; awareness raising and public
	human rights education. Human rights programming targeting
	specific groups, e.g. children, persons with disabilities, migrants,
	ethnic, religious, linguistic and sexual minorities, indigenous people
	and those suffering from caste discrimination, victims of trafficking,
	victims of torture. (Use code 15230 when in the context of a
	peacekeeping operation and code 15180 for ending violence against
	women and girls.)
Women's equality	Support for institutions and organisations (governmental and
organisations and	non-governmental) working for gender equality and women's
institutions	empowerment.

(convinuca)	
Category	Description
Ending violence	Support to programmes designed to prevent and eliminate all forms
against women and	of violence against women and girls/gender-based violence. This
girls	encompasses a broad range of forms of physical, sexual and
	psychological violence including but not limited to: intimate partner
	violence (domestic violence); sexual violence; female genital
	mutilation/cutting (FGM/C); child, early and forced marriage; acid
	throwing; honour killings; and trafficking of women and girls.
	Prevention activities may include efforts to empower women and girls;
	change attitudes, norms and behaviour; adopt and enact legal
	reforms; and strengthen implementation of laws and policies on
	ending violence against women and girls, including through
	strengthening institutional capacity. Interventions to respond to
	violence against women and girls/gender-based violence may include
	expanding access to services including legal assistance, psychosocial
	counselling and health care; training personnel to respond more
	effectively to the needs of survivors; and ensuring investigation,
	prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of violence.
Local government	Decentralisation processes (including political, administrative and
administration	fiscal dimensions); intergovernmental relations and federalism;
	strengthening local authorities.

(continuea)	
Category	Description
Facilitation of	Assistance to developing countries that facilitates the orderly, safe,
orderly, safe,	regular and responsible migration and mobility of people. This
regular and	includes: • Capacity building in migration and mobility policy,
${f responsible}$	analysis, planning and management. This includes support to
migration and	facilitate safe and regular migration and address irregular migration,
${f mobility}$	engagement with diaspora and programmes enhancing the
	development impact of remittances and/or their use for
	developmental projects in developing countries. • Measures to
	improve migrant labour recruitment systems in developing
	countries. • Capacity building for strategy and policy development as
	well as legal and judicial development (including border management)
	in developing countries. This includes support to address and reduce
	vulnerabilities in migration, and strengthen the transnational
	response to smuggling of migrants and preventing and combating
	trafficking in human beings. • Support to effective strategies to
	ensure international protection and the right to asylum. • Support to
	effective strategies to ensure access to justice and assistance for
	displaced persons. • Assistance to migrants for their safe, dignified,
	informed and voluntary return to their country of origin (covers only
	returns from another developing country; assistance to forced returns
	is excluded from ODA). • Assistance to migrants for their sustainable
	reintegration in their country of origin (use code 93010 for
	pre-departure assistance provided in donor countries in the context of
	voluntary returns). Activities that pursue first and foremost providers'
	interest are excluded from ODA. Activities addressing the root causes
	of forced displacement and irregular migration should not be coded
	here, but under their relevant sector of intervention. In addition, use
	code 15136 for support to countries' authorities for immigration
	affairs and services (optional), code 24050 for programmes aiming at
	reducing the sending costs of remittances, code 72010 for
	humanitarian aspects of assistance to refugees and internally
	displaced persons (IDPs) such as delivery of emergency services and
	humanitarian protection. Use code 93010 when expenditure is for the
	temporary sustenance of refugees in the donor country, including for
	their voluntary return and for their reintegration when support is
	provided in a donor country in connection with the return from that
	donor country (i.e. pre-departure assistance), or voluntary
	resettlement in a third developed country.
Social/welfare	Social legislation and administration; institution capacity building
services	and advice; social security and other social schemes; special
	programmes for the elderly, orphans, the disabled, street children;
	social dimensions of structural adjustment; unspecified social
	infrastructure and services, including consumer protection.
Social protection	Administration of overall social protection policies, plans,
and welfare services	programmes and budgets including legislation, standards and
policy, planning	statistics on social protection.
and administration	Statistics on books protocolon.
Social security	Social protection shemes in the form of cash or in-kind benefits to
(excl pensions)	people unable to work due to sickness or injury.
General pensions	Social protection schemes in the form of cash or in-kind benefits,
Soliciai pelisiolis	including pensions, against the risks linked to old age.
	merating pensions, against the risks finded to old age.

(continued)	
Category	Description
Civil service	Pension schemes for government personnel.
pensions	
Social services (incl	Social protection schemes in the form of cash or in-kind benefits to
youth development	households with dependent children, including parental leave benefits.
and women+	
children)	
Employment policy	Employment policy and planning; labour law; labour unions;
and administrative	institution capacity building and advice; support programmes for
management	unemployed; employment creation and income generation
	programmes; occupational safety and health; combating child labour.
Housing policy and	Housing sector policy, planning and programmes; excluding low-cost
${f administrative}$	housing and slum clearance (16040).
management	
Low-cost housing	Including slum clearance.
Multisector aid for	Basic social services are defined to include basic education, basic
basic social services	health, basic nutrition, population/reproductive health and basic
	drinking water supply and basic sanitation.
Culture and	Including libraries and museums.
recreation	
Statistical capacity	Both in national statistical offices and any other government
building	ministries.
Communications	Communications sector policy, planning and programmes; institution
policy and	capacity building and advice; including postal services development;
${\it administrative}$	unspecified communications activities.
management	
Communications	NA
policy, planning	
and administration	
Postal services	Development and operation of postal services.
Information	Provision of information services.
services	
Telecommunications	Telephone networks, telecommunication satellites, earth stations.
	t Radio and TV links, equipment; newspapers; printing and publishing.
media	
Information and	Computer hardware and software; internet access; IT training. When
communication	sector cannot be specified.
technology (ICT)	