Opening the Black Box Appendix

These are the statistical appendices for **Opening the Black Box of International Aid: Understanding Delivery Actors and Democratization** by Caroline Dunton and Jack Hasler.

For questions or comments on these appedices, please contact Jack Hasler at jhasler@gwu.edu.

Appendix A1: Donor Countries

DonorName	Mean_Aid	Min_Recipients	Max_Recipients
Australia	765.35	27	83
Austria	104.41	72	96
Belgium	191.99	56	95
Canada	402.62	55	106
Czech Republic	10.35	57	67
Denmark	170.20	3	76
Estonia	2.72	15	17
Finland	75.56	34	89
France	1152.72	90	110
Germany	1787.63	83	112
Greece	46.40	14	79
Hungary	17.52	77	87
Iceland	5.39	6	9
Ireland	131.24	51	78
Italy	101.53	33	96
Japan	854.07	46	111
Korea	219.92	82	100
Latvia	0.42	6	6
Lithuania	1.75	17	24
Luxembourg	56.12	43	59
Netherlands	322.58	1	76
New Zealand	36.80	16	52
Norway	372.02	82	90
Poland	66.43	57	78
Portugal	88.17	34	47
Slovak Republic	3.63	30	41
Slovenia	4.13	14	24
Spain	365.42	76	95
Sweden	395.49	54	97
Switzerland	154.36	52	85
United Kingdom	1525.80	88	100
United States	4481.07	91	109

Appendix A2: Recipient Countries

RecipientName	Mean_Aid	Min_Donors	Max_Donors
Afghanistan	1768.24	25	27
Albania	76.95	7	24
Algeria	97.68	6	20
Angola	59.79	7	20
Argentina	33.49	6	22
Armenia	43.37	4	22
Azerbaijan	25.09	5	21
Bangladesh	271.68	5	25
Belarus	43.30	6	26
Benin	69.69	6	21
Bhutan	12.95	4	15
Bolivia	112.40	8	24
Botswana	80.72	4	16
Brazil	170.59	9	27
Burkina Faso	114.29	8	20
Burundi	49.89	7	23
Cabo Verde	47.63	5	14
Cambodia	145.48	6	25
Cameroon	116.45	6	21
Central African	9.66	3	13
Republic			
Chad	15.47	4	12
Chile	32.49	7	23
China (People's	641.94	7	28
Republic of)			
Colombia	242.43	8	24
Comoros	8.72	2	6
Congo	16.37	5	17
Costa Rica	14.37	4	18
Cote dIvoire	117.72	17	19
Croatia	27.69	8	19
Democratic	206.56	13	24
Republic of the			
Congo			
Djibouti	18.71	4	10
Dominican	43.42	3	17
Republic			
Ecuador	52.96	7	21
Egypt	178.50	7	26
El Salvador	63.61	6	22
Equatorial Guinea	6.04	2	9
Eritrea	8.16	4	15
Fiji	26.63	2	10
Former Yugoslav	43.20	7	24
Republic of			
Macedonia			
Gabon	21.10	4	12
Gambia	5.00	4	18
Georgia	78.49	6	24

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RecipientName	Mean_Aid	Min_Donors	Max_Donors
Senegal	143.56	8	23
Sierra Leone	47.65	4	21
Solomon Islands	136.91	2	9
Somalia	126.27	17	19
South Africa	509.43	9	27
South Sudan	181.14	18	20
Sri Lanka	63.50	6	23
Sudan	203.01	7	22
Suriname	10.59	3	10
Swaziland	28.41	2	16
Syrian Arab	33.62	4	12
Republic			
Tajikistan	31.04	5	21
Tanzania	439.02	8	23
Thailand	59.58	5	25
Timor-Leste	78.70	5	17
Togo	23.45	6	18
Trinidad and	1.12	2	10
Tobago			
Tunisia	109.12	6	23
Turkey	162.34	7	25
Turkmenistan	5.14	2	12
Uganda	376.37	9	27
Ukraine	174.21	6	29
Uruguay	9.03	5	19
Uzbekistan	34.59	4	22
Venezuela	22.13	7	20
Yemen	101.88	5	22
Zambia	278.96	6	21
Zimbabwe	153.91	7	25
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Appendix B1: ECM Model


One of the things you can test for with an error correction model is endogeneity resulting from reverse causality. This is possible if we believe countries are likely to systematically change their method of delivering aid and how much they give based changes in a country's level of democracy. The following ecm model should have coefficients that are 0 for all but the lagged dependent variables. Some are significantly different from 0, which suggests that some endogeity may be present. Intuitively, this makes sense because aid will be allocated partially based on existing levels of democracy.

Here we only present the ECM model for Polyarchy model since those results are the most robust, but ECMs for the other Models can be produced upon request.

Table 2:

		I	Dependent varia	ble:	
	NGO	IGO	CORP	DONOR	RECIP
lag_ngo	0.574*** (0.006)				
lag_igo		0.300*** (0.008)			
lag_corp			0.449*** (0.030)		
lag_gov_d				0.661*** (0.006)	
lag_gov_r					0.527*** (0.007)
lag_poly	0.039*** (0.009)	0.022** (0.010)	-0.0003 (0.005)	0.024** (0.012)	0.035*** (0.011)
lag_gdp	0.00001*** (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00000^{***} (0.00000)	0.00001* (0.00000)	$0.00000 \\ (0.00000)$
lag_pop	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000^{***} (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000^{***} (0.000)	$0.000 \\ (0.000)$
lag_urban	0.006*** (0.002)	0.005^{***} (0.002)	0.009*** (0.001)	0.024*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.002)
lag_fdi_d	-0.0005 (0.0004)	-0.001^* (0.0005)	-0.0005^{**} (0.0002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.001)
lag_fdi_r	-0.00004 (0.0002)	0.001** (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.001^{**} (0.0003)
diff_poly2	0.049*** (0.011)	0.056*** (0.012)	-0.009 (0.006)	0.015 (0.014)	-0.0003 (0.014)
$diff_gdp$	0.00002*** (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00002*** (0.00000)	0.00001*** (0.00000)
diff_pop	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	$0.000 \\ (0.000)$	$0.000 \\ (0.000)$	-0.000 (0.000)
diff_urban	-0.007 (0.011)	0.002 (0.012)	0.010* (0.006)	0.029** (0.013)	0.002 (0.013)
Observations R ²	17,935 0.396	17,935 0.091	17,935 0.024	17,935 0.471	17,935 0.289
Adjusted R^2 F Statistic (df = 11; 15332)	0.294 914.583***	-0.063 139.237***	-0.142 34.312^{***}	0.381 1,240.844***	0.168 566.705***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01




Appendix C1: Other Types of Democracy Measures


For space reasons, the egalitarian and deliberative measures in VDem were not included in the main results, but they are presented here. They provide even stronger support for our theory.

Table 3: All VDem Results

		e 5: All VDelli	Dependent variable	 le:	
	Electoral	Liberal	Participatory	Deliberative	Egalitarian
Donor Gov	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Target Gov	-0.008^*	-0.006^*	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
NGO	0.011***	0.007^{*}	0.008**	0.003	0.008**
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
IGO	0.016***	0.007^{*}	0.011***	0.012***	0.011***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Corporation	-0.027***	-0.020**	-0.023***	-0.026***	-0.019**
•	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Other	-0.005	-0.004	-0.005^*	-0.003	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
$\log(\text{GDP})$	0.015**	-0.003	0.002	-0.007	-0.006
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Urban	-0.006***	-0.007^{***}	-0.005***	-0.009***	-0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log(Population)	0.006	0.136***	0.029	-0.027	-0.024
J(1)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.026)
fdi_d	-0.0003	-0.0003**	-0.0002^*	-0.0004**	-0.0002**
_	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
fdi_r	-0.001***	-0.001***	0.0001	-0.0004*	-0.001***
	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)
lagpoly	0.708***				
	(0.005)				
laglib		0.780***			
O		(0.005)			
lagpartip			0.788***		
OI I			(0.005)		
lagdelib				0.809***	
.0				(0.005)	
lagegal					0.750***
0-0					(0.005)
Observations	20.722	20.722	20.722	20.722	20.720
R ²	20,732 0.510	20,732 0.584	$20,732 \\ 0.572$	$20,732 \\ 0.618$	$20,732 \\ 0.538$
Adjusted R ²	0.433	0.518	0.505	0.558	0.465
F Statistic (df = 12; 17923)	1,553.428***	2,092.978***	1,993.361***	2,411.653***	1,736.199***

Note:








Table 4:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby	Model
1	Rec Gov v NGO	9.506	0.002	0.010	0.011	Electoral
2	Rec Gov v IGO	15.450	0.0001	0.001	0.002	Electoral
3	Rec Gov v Corp	3.073	0.080	0.082	0.216	Electoral
4	Donor Gov v NGO	4.180	0.041	0.082	0.127	Electoral
5	Donor Gov v IGO	8.731	0.003	0.013	0.014	Electoral
6	Donor Gov v Corp	5.561	0.018	0.055	0.067	Electoral
7	NGO v Corp	11.131	0.001	0.005	0.006	Electoral
8	IGO v Corp	13.511	0.0002	0.002	0.003	Electoral

Table 5:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby	Model
1	Rec Gov v NGO	5.882	0.015	0.076	0.083	Liberal
2	Rec Gov v IGO	6.471	0.011	0.066	0.079	Liberal
3	Rec Gov v Corp	2.413	0.120	0.195	0.327	Liberal
4	Donor Gov v NGO	2.949	0.086	0.195	0.267	Liberal
5	Donor Gov v IGO	3.452	0.063	0.195	0.229	Liberal
6	Donor Gov v Corp	3.885	0.049	0.195	0.212	Liberal
7	NGO v Corp	7.800	0.005	0.042	0.060	Liberal
8	IGO v Corp	7.686	0.006	0.042	0.060	Liberal

Table 6:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby	Model
1	Rec Gov v NGO	6.194	0.013	0.046	0.046	Participatory
2	Rec Gov v IGO	10.151	0.001	0.009	0.010	Participatory
3	Rec Gov v Corp	4.697	0.030	0.060	0.094	Participatory
4	Donor Gov v NGO	3.545	0.060	0.060	0.162	Participatory
5	Donor Gov v IGO	6.948	0.008	0.042	0.046	Participatory
6	Donor Gov v Corp	6.396	0.011	0.046	0.046	Participatory
7	NGO v Corp	11.691	0.001	0.004	0.007	Participatory
8	IGO v Corp	13.549	0.0002	0.002	0.005	Participatory

Table 7:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby	Model
1	Rec Gov v NGO	5.946	0.015	0.074	0.080	Egalitarian
2	Rec Gov v IGO	9.022	0.003	0.019	0.025	Egalitarian
3	Rec Gov v Corp	2.848	0.092	0.183	0.284	Egalitarian
4	Donor Gov v NGO	2.411	0.120	0.183	0.327	Egalitarian
5	Donor Gov v IGO	4.669	0.031	0.112	0.111	Egalitarian
6	Donor Gov v Corp	4.834	0.028	0.112	0.111	Egalitarian
7	NGO v Corp	8.581	0.003	0.020	0.025	Egalitarian
8	IGO v Corp	9.834	0.002	0.014	0.025	Egalitarian

Table 8:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby	Model
1	Rec Gov v NGO	1.552	0.213	0.426	0.661	Deliberative
2	Rec Gov v IGO	8.050	0.005	0.032	0.047	Deliberative
3	Rec Gov v Corp	4.509	0.034	0.135	0.147	Deliberative
4	Donor Gov v NGO	0.107	0.744	0.744	1	Deliberative
5	Donor Gov v IGO	4.004	0.045	0.136	0.165	Deliberative
6	Donor Gov v Corp	6.886	0.009	0.043	0.047	Deliberative
7	NGO v Corp	7.363	0.007	0.040	0.047	Deliberative
8	IGO v Corp	11.969	0.001	0.004	0.012	Deliberative

Appendix C2: Freedom House

As stated in the paper, VDem was chosen for its comprehensive appraoch and clear rating guidelines while polity was chosen for its ubiquity in the discipline. Freedom House can be somewhat more opaque in its ratings which are based on expert answers to questions rather than a cohesive overview. That said, they are still a useful robustness check to make sure our results are not dependent on a particular rating of democracy.


The scales for civil liberties, political rights and status come from Freedom House inverted relative to the other two and the other measures used in our paper (a lower score means more democratic). For consistency and ease of interpretation, we invert them back. As such, all but the rule of law model suppo our argument to some degree. This is not surprising as our coding as "democratic purpose" excludes some types of aid that might be targetted at rule of law, such as aid to police forces and prisons.


These results are all extrememly small because of the minimal amount of variation found in most freedom house scores, which means that most of each dependent variable is explained by including it's lagged form as an independent variable.

Table 9: All Freedom House Results

		$Dependent\ va$	riable:	
	Civil Liberties	Political Rights	Rule of Law	Status
Donor Gov	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Target Gov	0.000***	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
NGO	0.000	0.000***	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
IGO	0.000	0.000^{*}	0.000	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Corporation	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
•	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Other	0.000	-0.000**	-0.000**	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
$\log(\text{GDP})$	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	-0.000**
08(021)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Urban	-0.000***	-0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
-	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log(Population)	-0.000***	-0.000***	0.000***	-0.000
8(c. o.b. a)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
fdi_d	-0.000	-0.000^*	0.000^{*}	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
fdi r	0.000**	-0.000***	-0.000	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
lag_cl	1.000*** (0.000)			
lag_pr		1.000***		
		(0.000)		
lag_rol			1.000***	
			(0.000)	
lag_status				1.000***
				(0.000)
Observations	18,656	18,656	18,656	18,656
R^2	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Adjusted R ²	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000

Note:





pvals




Table 10:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby	Model
1	Rec Gov v NGO	3.635	0.057	0.453	0.597	Civil Liberties
2	Rec Gov v IGO	0.744	0.388	1	1	Civil Liberties
3	Rec Gov v Corp	3.520	0.061	0.453	0.597	Civil Liberties
4	Donor Gov v NGO	0.254	0.615	1	1	Civil Liberties
5	Donor Gov v IGO	0.360	0.549	1	1	Civil Liberties
6	Donor Gov v Corp	2.532	0.112	0.558	0.597	Civil Liberties
7	NGO v Corp	2.207	0.137	0.558	0.597	Civil Liberties
8	IGO v Corp	2.845	0.092	0.550	0.597	Civil Liberties

Table 11:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby	Model
1	Rec Gov v NGO	2.742	0.098	0.684	1	Political Rights
2	Rec Gov v IGO	0.118	0.731	1	1	Political Rights
3	Rec Gov v Corp	0.921	0.337	1	1	Political Rights
4	Donor Gov v NGO	5.256	0.022	0.175	0.476	Political Rights
5	Donor Gov v IGO	0.794	0.373	1	1	Political Rights
6	Donor Gov v Corp	0.746	0.388	1	1	Political Rights
7	NGO v Corp	1.689	0.194	1	1	Political Rights
8	IGO v Corp	1.049	0.306	1	1	Political Rights

Table 12:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby	Model
1	Rec Gov v NGO	1.122	0.289	1	1	Rule of Law
2	Rec Gov v IGO	0.206	0.650	1	1	Rule of Law
3	Rec Gov v Corp	1.161	0.281	1	1	Rule of Law
4	Donor Gov v NGO	1.281	0.258	1	1	Rule of Law
5	Donor Gov v IGO	0.238	0.625	1	1	Rule of Law
6	Donor Gov v Corp	1.175	0.278	1	1	Rule of Law
7	NGO v Corp	0.740	0.390	1	1	Rule of Law
8	IGO v Corp	0.954	0.329	1	1	Rule of Law

Table 13:


	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby	Model
1	Rec Gov v NGO	0.190	0.663	1	1	Status
2	Rec Gov v IGO	0.911	0.340	1	1	Status
3	Rec Gov v Corp	2.103	0.147	0.882	0.943	Status
4	Donor Gov v NGO	0.879	0.349	1	1	Status
5	Donor Gov v IGO	5.851	0.016	0.125	0.339	Status
6	Donor Gov v Corp	1.411	0.235	0.940	1	Status
7	NGO v Corp	1.853	0.173	0.882	0.943	Status
8	IGO v Corp	2.680	0.102	0.711	0.943	Status

Appendix C3: Polity


Table 14: All Polity Results

	Dependent variable:
	Polity
Oonor Gov	0.005
	(0.004)
Carget Gov	-0.002
	(0.005)
IGO	0.009**
	(0.005)
GO	0.007
	(0.005)
forporation	0.031
	(0.040)
ther	-0.008**
	(0.004)
g(GDP)	0.021**
	(0.009)
rban	-0.010***
	(0.002)
g(Population)	0.310***
	(0.041)
li_d	-0.0002
	(0.0002)
li_r	-0.0004
	(0.0003)
gpolity	0.569***
	(0.006)
bservations	18,499
\mathbb{Z}^2	0.345
djusted R ²	0.231
<i>L</i>	* <0.1. ** <0.05. ***

Note:










Table 15:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby	Model
1	Rec Gov v NGO	2.487	0.115	0.918	1	Polity
2	Rec Gov v IGO	1.661	0.198	1	1	Polity
3	Rec Gov v Corp	0.666	0.414	1	1	Polity
4	Donor Gov v NGO	0.521	0.470	1	1	Polity
5	Donor Gov v IGO	0.180	0.671	1	1	Polity
6	Donor Gov v Corp	0.442	0.506	1	1	Polity
7	NGO v Corp	0.298	0.585	1	1	Polity
8	IGO v Corp	0.350	0.554	1	1	Polity

Appendix C4: Including all types of donors

These results include all donors in the original CRS data, not just country donors. The most significant inclusion is organizations that use their own money as opposed to being delivery method for money from a country. Since these organizations will almost always use themselves, these results are biased in favor on the organizations and our hypotheses.

A remarkable result here is that all types of actors, even recipient governments positively increase democracy except for corporations, which still decrease it. NGOs and IGOs, however, are still better than those governments at delivering democratization outcomes.





Table 16: Main Results

	1	Dependent vari	able:
	Electoral	Liberal	Participatory
Donor Gov	0.020***	0.018***	0.013***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Target Gov	0.010***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
NGO	0.017***	0.011***	0.012***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
IGO	0.020***	0.011***	0.012***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Corporation	-0.026***	-0.025***	-0.018***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Other	0.007***	0.005***	0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$\log(\text{GDP})$	0.008***	-0.004***	-0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Urban	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.002***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
log(Population)	-0.102^{***}	0.008	-0.027^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
fdi_d	-0.0002**	-0.0004***	-0.0003***
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
fdi_r	-0.001^{***}	-0.001^{***}	-0.0001**
	(0.0001)	(0.00005)	(0.00005)
lagpoly	0.612***		
	(0.001)		
laglib		0.706***	
		(0.001)	
lagpartip			0.702***
			(0.001)
Observations	377,257	377,257	377,257
\mathbb{R}^2	0.414	0.506	0.489
Adjusted R ²	0.407	0.500	0.483

Note:






Table 17:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	31.810	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
2	Rec Gov v IGO	85.686	0	0	0
3	Rec Gov v Corp	137.904	0	0	0
4	Donor Gov v NGO	1.785	0.182	0.363	0.564
5	Donor Gov v IGO	0.017	0.897	0.897	1
6	Donor Gov v Corp	157.981	0	0	0
7	NGO v Corp	174.424	0	0	0
8	IGO v Corp	209.500	0	0	0

Table 18:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	27.725	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
2	Rec Gov v IGO	31.375	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
3	Rec Gov v Corp	152.277	0	0	0
4	Donor Gov v NGO	11.491	0.001	0.001	0.002
5	Donor Gov v IGO	14.776	0.0001	0.0002	0.0004
6	Donor Gov v Corp	203.644	0	0	0
7	NGO v Corp	185.668	0	0	0
8	IGO v Corp	190.986	0	0	0

Table 19:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	34.232	0	0	0.00000
2	Rec Gov v IGO	49.996	0	0	0
3	Rec Gov v Corp	105.995	0	0	0
4	Donor Gov v NGO	0.540	0.463	0.925	1
5	Donor Gov v IGO	0.422	0.516	0.925	1
6	Donor Gov v Corp	121.936	0	0	0
7	NGO v Corp	142.173	0	0	0
8	IGO v Corp	152.227	0	0	0


Appendix C5: Analysis by Recipient-Year


Aggregating by recipient pools together variation that might exist on the donor level. By using the dyad level, however, we may be artifically increasing the importance of recipients that receive aid from numerous sources. As a robustness check, we aggregate by the recipient in the models below. The results generally also support our argument, that less fungible sources like NGOs and IGOs increase democratization more.

Table 20: Main Results

	Dependent variable:				
	Electoral	Liberal	Participatory		
Donor Gov	0.004	-0.001	0.004		
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)		
Target Gov	0.001	0.003	0.003		
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)		
NGO	0.016	0.015	0.010		
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.009)		
IGO	0.021**	0.014^{*}	0.014^{*}		
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.007)		
Corporation	-0.030^{**}	-0.024**	-0.022**		
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.009)		
Other	-0.010	-0.011	-0.005		
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)		
$\log(\text{GDP})$	-0.019	-0.027	-0.030		
	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.022)		
Urban	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003		
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)		
log(Population)	-0.247^{**}	-0.099	-0.123		
	(0.126)	(0.102)	(0.097)		
fdi_r	-0.003***	-0.002^*	-0.001		
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)		
lagpoly	0.676***				
	(0.019)				
laglib		0.743***			
		(0.018)			
lagpartip			0.748***		
			(0.018)		
Observations	1,438	1,438	1,438		
R^2	0.519	0.583	0.578		
Adjusted R ²	0.470	0.540	0.535		
Note:	*p	o<0.1; ** p<	0.05; ***p<0.01		

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


Table 21:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	1.134	0.287	0.574	0.891
2	Rec Gov v IGO	2.523	0.112	0.449	0.488
3	Rec Gov v Corp	4.599	0.032	0.160	0.174
4	Donor Gov v NGO	0.488	0.485	0.574	1
5	Donor Gov v IGO	2.092	0.148	0.449	0.537
6	Donor Gov v Corp	6.922	0.009	0.057	0.062
7	NGO v Corp	7.009	0.008	0.057	0.062
8	IGO v Corp	10.259	0.001	0.011	0.030

Table 22:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	1.177	0.278	0.716	0.756
2	Rec Gov v IGO	1.312	0.252	0.716	0.756
3	Rec Gov v Corp	4.936	0.026	0.158	0.178
4	Donor Gov v NGO	1.388	0.239	0.716	0.756
5	Donor Gov v IGO	2.624	0.105	0.421	0.458
6	Donor Gov v Corp	4.555	0.033	0.164	0.178
7	NGO v Corp	7.440	0.006	0.045	0.069
8	IGO v Corp	8.535	0.003	0.028	0.069

Table 23:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	0.424	0.515	1	1
2	Rec Gov v IGO	1.143	0.285	1	1
3	Rec Gov v Corp	4.835	0.028	0.139	0.152
4	Donor Gov v NGO	0.210	0.647	1	1
5	Donor Gov v IGO	1.071	0.301	1	1
6	Donor Gov v Corp	6.506	0.011	0.075	0.117
7	NGO v Corp	5.554	0.018	0.111	0.134
8	IGO v Corp	8.058	0.005	0.036	0.098

Appendix C6: Effect of All Aid on Democratization

In this appendix, we consider all ODA on democratization outcomes, not just aid intended to democratize a country. It still excludes military and other aid excluded from the OECD's ODA defintion, but includes a large amount of aid intended to assist developing countries in other ways.

The results are rather suprising. NGOs and IGOs are still better than corporations, but they have a slightly negative effect on democracy. Donor governments have similar results, but the recipient governments are associated with an increase in democracy. More work is needed to understand why this is. The non-democratization aid included here comes from a wide variety of sectors, including a lot of aid aimed at infrastructure assistance.





Table 24: Main Results

		Dependent vario	able:
	Electoral	Liberal	Participatory
Donor Gov	-0.002***	-0.001***	0.00005
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Target Gov	0.002***	0.001***	0.003***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)
NGO	-0.001^{***}	-0.001^{***}	-0.0003
	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
IGO	-0.001**	-0.0001	0.0002
	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Corporation	-0.006^{***}	-0.007^{***}	-0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Other	-0.002^{***}	-0.001^{***}	-0.001^{***}
	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
$\log(\text{GDP})$	0.015***	-0.007^{***}	-0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Urban	-0.007^{***}	-0.006***	-0.005***
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
log(Population)	-0.065^{***}	0.042***	-0.022^{***}
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
fdi_d	-0.0001^{***}	-0.0002^{***}	-0.0001**
	(0.00004)	(0.00003)	(0.00003)
fdi_r	-0.001^{***}	-0.0003***	0.0004***
	(0.00005)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)
lagpoly	0.623*** (0.001)		
laglib		0.710***	
		(0.001)	
lagpartip			0.721*** (0.001)
Observations	1,029,240	1,029,240	1,029,240
\mathbb{R}^2	0.423	0.507	0.509
Adjusted R ²	0.421	0.505	0.507

Note:






Table 25:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	142.221	0	0	0
2	Rec Gov v IGO	64.109	0	0	0
3	Rec Gov v Corp	129.549	0	0	0
4	Donor Gov v NGO	2.448	0.118	0.118	0.320
5	Donor Gov v IGO	3.624	0.057	0.114	0.177
6	Donor Gov v Corp	37.174	0	0	0
7	NGO v Corp	47.524	0	0	0
8	IGO v Corp	46.470	0	0	0

Table 26:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	55.817	0	0	0
2	Rec Gov v IGO	8.360	0.004	0.008	0.012
3	Rec Gov v Corp	155.666	0	0	0
4	Donor Gov v NGO	2.918	0.088	0.088	0.238
5	Donor Gov v IGO	15.499	0.0001	0.0002	0.0003
6	Donor Gov v Corp	82.040	0	0	0
7	NGO v Corp	100.054	0	0	0
8	IGO v Corp	114.566	0	0	0

Table 27:


	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	135.354	0	0	0
2	Rec Gov v IGO	51.295	0	0	0
3	Rec Gov v Corp	153.225	0	0	0
4	Donor Gov v NGO	2.762	0.097	0.193	0.300
5	Donor Gov v IGO	0.119	0.730	0.730	1
6	Donor Gov v Corp	71.531	0	0	0
7	NGO v Corp	65.292	0	0	0
8	IGO v Corp	68.262	0	0	0


Appendix C7: Effect of Broader Dem Aid Coding on Democratization

Table 28: Main Results

		Dependent varial	ble:
	Electoral	Liberal	Participatory
Donor Gov	0.0005	-0.0003	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Target Gov	-0.003	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
NGO	0.010**	0.006	0.008**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
IGO	0.013***	0.005	0.011***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Corporation	-0.029^{***}	-0.022**	-0.022^{***}
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Other	-0.005	-0.005^*	-0.005^*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
$\log(\text{GDP})$	0.022***	-0.001	0.005
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Urban	-0.005^{***}	-0.006***	-0.005^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log(Population)	-0.096***	0.046*	-0.031
	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.027)
fdi_d	-0.0002	-0.0003^{**}	-0.0002^*
	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
fdi_r	-0.001^{***}	-0.001***	-0.0001
	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
lagpoly	0.654***		
	(0.005)		
laglib		0.744***	
		(0.005)	
lagpartip			0.736***
•			(0.005)
Observations	22,588	22,588	22,588
\mathbb{R}^2	0.467	0.551	0.537
Adjusted R ²	0.386	0.484	0.467
F Statistic ($df = 12; 19629$)	1,430.460***	2,009.544***	1,898.059***

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


Table 29:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	4.179	0.041	0.109	0.127
2	Rec Gov v IGO	6.175	0.013	0.065	0.070
3	Rec Gov v Corp	5.379	0.020	0.082	0.089
4	Donor Gov v NGO	2.588	0.108	0.109	0.293
5	Donor Gov v IGO	4.381	0.036	0.109	0.127
6	Donor Gov v Corp	6.643	0.010	0.060	0.070
7	NGO v Corp	11.129	0.001	0.006	0.009
8	IGO v Corp	11.958	0.001	0.004	0.009

Table 30:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	2.296	0.130	0.519	0.564
2	Rec Gov v IGO	1.971	0.160	0.519	0.581
3	Rec Gov v Corp	4.410	0.036	0.179	0.194
4	Donor Gov v NGO	1.432	0.231	0.519	0.719
5	Donor Gov v IGO	1.184	0.276	0.519	0.751
6	Donor Gov v Corp	5.224	0.022	0.134	0.161
7	NGO v Corp	8.068	0.005	0.036	0.075
8	IGO v Corp	7.296	0.007	0.048	0.075

Table 31:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	2.856	0.091	0.182	0.283
2	Rec Gov v IGO	5.525	0.019	0.083	0.082
3	Rec Gov v Corp	5.742	0.017	0.083	0.082
4	Donor Gov v NGO	2.129	0.145	0.182	0.393
5	Donor Gov v IGO	4.766	0.029	0.087	0.105
6	Donor Gov v Corp	6.438	0.011	0.067	0.081
7	NGO v Corp	10.370	0.001	0.009	0.014
8	IGO v Corp	11.989	0.001	0.004	0.012


Appendix C8: Effect of Narrow Dem Aid Coding on Democratization

Table 32: Main Results


	$Dependent\ variable:$		
	Electoral	Liberal	Participatory
Donor Gov	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Target Gov	0.002	0.001	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
NGO	0.016**	0.009^{*}	0.013**
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
IGO	0.011^{*}	0.001	0.009^{*}
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Corporation	-0.010	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Other	0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
$\log(GDP)$	0.035***	0.005	0.013^{*}
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Urban	-0.006^{***}	-0.007^{***}	-0.005^{***}
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log(Population)	-0.130^{***}	0.034	-0.069**
	(0.042)	(0.034)	(0.033)
fdi_d	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0002
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
fdi_r	-0.001^{***}	-0.001**	-0.0001
	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
lagpoly	0.630***		
	(0.006)		
laglib		0.724***	
		(0.006)	
lagpartip			0.717***
			(0.006)
Observations	16,320	16,320	16,320
R^2	0.442	0.533	0.514
Adjusted R^2	0.347	0.454	0.432
F Statistic (df = 12 ; 13957)	920.223***	1,326.202***	1,231.389***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01



Coefficient Raw Tests



Coefficient Holm Corrected Tests




Table 33:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	1.813	0.178	0.958	0.968
2	Rec Gov v IGO	0.881	0.348	1	1
3	Rec Gov v Corp	0.435	0.510	1	1
4	Donor Gov v NGO	4.415	0.036	0.285	0.749
5	Donor Gov v IGO	3.309	0.069	0.482	0.749
6	Donor Gov v Corp	0.083	0.774	1	1
7	NGO v Corp	1.978	0.160	0.958	0.968
8	IGO v Corp	1.329	0.249	0.996	1

Table 34:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	1.042	0.307	1	1
2	Rec Gov v IGO	0.00001	0.998	1	1
3	Rec Gov v Corp	0.314	0.575	1	1
4	Donor Gov v NGO	2.691	0.101	0.807	1
5	Donor Gov v IGO	0.428	0.513	1	1
6	Donor Gov v Corp	0.064	0.800	1	1
7	NGO v Corp	1.272	0.259	1	1
8	IGO v Corp	0.321	0.571	1	1

Table 35:

	tests	chi2	pvals	adjustedholm	adjustedby
1	Rec Gov v NGO	2.257	0.133	0.798	0.789
2	Rec Gov v IGO	1.050	0.306	0.980	1
3	Rec Gov v Corp	0.390	0.532	1	1
4	Donor Gov v NGO	4.645	0.031	0.249	0.677
5	Donor Gov v IGO	3.214	0.073	0.511	0.789
6	Donor Gov v Corp	0.096	0.757	1	1
7	NGO v Corp	2.123	0.145	0.798	0.789
8	IGO v Corp	1.351	0.245	0.980	1

Appendix D1: Narrow Codings of Democracy

Category	Description
Public sector policy	Institution-building assistance to strengthen core public sector
and administrative	management systems and capacities. This includes macro-economic
management	and other policy management, co-ordination, planning and reform;
	human resource management; organisational development; civil
	service reform; e-government; development planning, monitoring and
	evaluation; support to ministries involved in aid co-ordination; other
	ministries and government departments when sector cannot be
	specified. (Use specific sector codes for development of systems and
	capacities in sector ministries.)
Public finance	Fiscal policy and planning; support to ministries of finance;
management	strengthening financial and managerial accountability; public
_	expenditure management; improving financial management systems;
	budget drafting; inter-governmental fiscal relations, public audit,
	public debt. (Use code 15114 for domestic revenue mobilisation and
	code 33120 for customs).
Decentralisation	Decentralisation processes (including political, administrative and
and support to	fiscal dimensions); intergovernmental relations and federalism;
subnational	strengthening departments of regional and local government, regional
government	and local authorities and their national associations. (Use specific
	sector codes for decentralisation of sector management and services.)
Anti-corruption	Specialised organisations, institutions and frameworks for the
organisations and	prevention of and combat against corruption, bribery,
institutions	money-laundering and other aspects of organised crime, with or
	without law enforcement powers, e.g. anti-corruption commissions
	and monitoring bodies, special investigation services, institutions and
	initiatives of integrity and ethics oversight, specialised NGOs, other
	civil society and citizens' organisations directly concerned with
	corruption.
Domestic revenue	Support to domestic revenue mobilisation/tax policy, analysis and
${f mobilisation}$	administration as well as non-tax public revenue, which includes work
	with ministries of finance, line ministries, revenue authorities or other
	local, regional or national public bodies. (Use code 16010 for social
	security and other social protection.)
Budget planning	Operation of the budget office and planning as part of the budget
	process.
National audit	Operation of the accounting and audit services.
Debt and aid	Management of public debt and foreign aid received (in the partner
management	country). For reporting on debt reorganisation, use codes 600xx.
Local government	Financial transfers to local government; support to institutions
finance	managing such transfers. (Use specific sector codes for sector-related
	transfers.)
Other central	Transfers to non sector-specific autonomous bodies or state-owned
transfers to	enterprises outside of local government finance; support to
institutions	institutions managing such transfers. (Use specific sector codes for
	sector-related transfers.)
	,

Category	Description
Legal and judicial	Support to institutions, systems and procedures of the justice sector,
development	both formal and informal; support to ministries of justice, the interior
development	and home affairs; judges and courts; legal drafting services; bar and
	lawyers associations; professional legal education; maintenance of law
	and order and public safety; border management; law enforcement
	agencies, police, prisons and their supervision; ombudsmen;
	alternative dispute resolution, arbitration and mediation; legal aid
	and counsel; traditional, indigenous and paralegal practices that fall
	outside the formal legal system. Measures that support the
	improvement of legal frameworks, constitutions, laws and regulations;
	legislative and constitutional drafting and review; legal reform;
	integration of formal and informal systems of law. Public legal
	education; dissemination of information on entitlements and remedies
	for injustice; awareness campaigns. (Use codes 152xx for activities
	that are primarily aimed at supporting security system reform or
	undertaken in connection with post-conflict and peace building
	activities.)
Justice, law and	Judicial law and order sectors; policy development within ministries
order policy,	of justice or equivalents.
planning and	
administration	
Judicial affairs	Civil and criminal law courts and the judicial system, including
	enforcement of fines and legal settlements imposed by the courts and
	operation of parole and probation systems.
Ombudsman	Independent service representing the interests of the public by
	investigating and addressing complaints of unfair treatment or
	maladministration.
Democratic	Support to the exercise of democracy and diverse forms of
participation and	participation of citizens beyond elections (15151); direct democracy
civil society	instruments such as referenda and citizens' initiatives; support to
	organisations to represent and advocate for their members, to
	monitor, engage and hold governments to account, and to help
	citizens learn to act in the public sphere; curricula and teaching for
	civic education at various levels. (This purpose code is restricted to
	activities targeting governance issues. When assistance to civil society
	is for non-governance purposes use other appropriate purpose codes.)
Elections	Electoral management bodies and processes, election observation,
	voters' education. (Use code 15230 when in the context of an
	international peacekeeping operation.)
Legislatures and	Assistance to strengthen key functions of legislatures/ parliaments
political parties	including subnational assemblies and councils (representation;
	oversight; legislation), such as improving the capacity of legislative
	bodies, improving legislatures' committees and administrative
	procedures,; research and information management systems;
	providing training programmes for legislators and support personnel.
N. 1. 1.0 G	Assistance to political parties and strengthening of party systems.
Media and free flow	Activities that support free and uncensored flow of information on
of information	public issues; activities that increase the editorial and technical skills
	and the integrity of the print and broadcast media, e.g. training of
	journalists. (Use codes 22010-22040 for provision of equipment and
	capital assistance to media.)

Category	Description
Human rights	Measures to support specialised official human rights institutions and mechanisms at universal, regional, national and local levels in their statutory roles to promote and protect civil and political, economic, social and cultural rights as defined in international conventions and covenants; translation of international human rights commitments into national legislation; reporting and follow-up; human rights dialogue. Human rights defenders and human rights NGOs; human rights advocacy, activism, mobilisation; awareness raising and public human rights education. Human rights programming targeting specific groups, e.g. children, persons with disabilities, migrants, ethnic, religious, linguistic and sexual minorities, indigenous people and those suffering from caste discrimination, victims of trafficking, victims of torture. (Use code 15230 when in the context of a peacekeeping operation and code 15180 for ending violence against women and girls.)
Women's equality	Support for institutions and organisations (governmental and
organisations and	non-governmental) working for gender equality and women's
institutions	empowerment.
Local government	Decentralisation processes (including political, administrative and
${f administration}$	fiscal dimensions); intergovernmental relations and federalism;
	strengthening local authorities.

Appendix D2: Broad Codings of Democracy

Category	Description
Education	NA
Education, Level	The codes in this category are to be used only when level of
Unspecified	education is unspecified or unknown (e.g. training of primary school
-	teachers should be coded under 11220).
Basic Education	NA
Secondary	NA
Education	
Post-Secondary	NA
Education	
Government &	NA
Civil Society	
Government &	N.B. Use code 51010 for general budget support.
Civil	
Society-general	
Other Social	NA
Infrastructure &	
Services	
Communications	NA
Education policy	Education sector policy, planning and programmes; aid to education
and administrative	ministries, administration and management systems; institution
${f manage ment}$	capacity building and advice; school management and governance;
	curriculum and materials development; unspecified education
T. 1	activities.
Education facilities	Educational buildings, equipment, materials; subsidiary services to
and training	education (boarding facilities, staff housing); language training;
	colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc.
Teacher training	Teacher education (where the level of education is unspecified);
Educational	in-service and pre-service training; materials development.
research	Research and studies on education effectiveness, relevance and quality; systematic evaluation and monitoring.
Primary education	Formal and non-formal primary education for children; all elementary
1 imary education	and first cycle systematic instruction; provision of learning materials.
Basic life skills for	Formal and non-formal education for basic life skills for young people
youth and adults	and adults (adults education); literacy and numeracy training.
Basic life skills for	Formal and non-formal education for basic life skills for young people.
youth	1 of the first for former education for basic me sains for young people.
Primary education	Formal primary education for adults.
equivalent for	
adults	
Early childhood	Formal and non-formal pre-school education.
education	r
Secondary	Second cycle systematic instruction at both junior and senior levels.
education	V
Lower secondary	Second cycle systematic instruction at junior level.
education	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Upper secondary	Second cycle systematic instruction at senior level.
education	
Vocational training	Elementary vocational training and secondary level technical
	education; on-the job training; apprenticeships; including informal
	vocational training.
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(continued)	
Category	Description
Higher education	Degree and diploma programmes at universities, colleges and
	polytechnics; scholarships.
Advanced technical	Professional-level vocational training programmes and in-service
and managerial	training.
training	
STD control	All activities related to sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS
including	control e.g. information, education and communication; testing;
HIV/AIDS	prevention; treatment, care.
Public sector policy	Institution-building assistance to strengthen core public sector
and administrative	management systems and capacities. This includes macro-economic
management	and other policy management, co-ordination, planning and reform;
	human resource management; organisational development; civil
	service reform; e-government; development planning, monitoring and
	evaluation; support to ministries involved in aid co-ordination; other
	ministries and government departments when sector cannot be
	specified. (Use specific sector codes for development of systems and
D 11' C	capacities in sector ministries.)
Public finance	Fiscal policy and planning; support to ministries of finance;
management	strengthening financial and managerial accountability; public
	expenditure management; improving financial management systems;
	budget drafting; inter-governmental fiscal relations, public audit,
	public debt. (Use code 15114 for domestic revenue mobilisation and
Decentralisation	code 33120 for customs).
	Decentralisation processes (including political, administrative and
and support to subnational	fiscal dimensions); intergovernmental relations and federalism;
	strengthening departments of regional and local government, regional and local authorities and their national associations. (Use specific
government	sector codes for decentralisation of sector management and services.)
Anti-corruption	Specialised organisations, institutions and frameworks for the
organisations and	prevention of and combat against corruption, bribery,
institutions	money-laundering and other aspects of organised crime, with or
	without law enforcement powers, e.g. anti-corruption commissions
	and monitoring bodies, special investigation services, institutions and
	initiatives of integrity and ethics oversight, specialised NGOs, other
	civil society and citizens' organisations directly concerned with
	corruption.
Domestic revenue	Support to domestic revenue mobilisation/tax policy, analysis and
mobilisation	administration as well as non-tax public revenue, which includes work
	with ministries of finance, line ministries, revenue authorities or other
	local, regional or national public bodies. (Use code 16010 for social
	security and other social protection.)
Tax collection	Operation of the inland revenue authority.
Budget planning	Operation of the budget office and planning as part of the budget
	process.
National audit	Operation of the accounting and audit services.
Debt and aid	Management of public debt and foreign aid received (in the partner
management	country). For reporting on debt reorganisation, use codes 600xx.
Administration of	Support to administration of developing countries' foreign aid
${f developing}$	(including triangular and south-south cooperation).
countries' foreign	
aid	

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or support of institutions providing national monitoring
tion.
ransfers to local government; support to institutions
such transfers. (Use specific sector codes for sector-related
o non sector-specific autonomous bodies or state-owned
outside of local government finance; support to
s managing such transfers. (Use specific sector codes for
ed transfers.)
institutions, systems and procedures of the justice sector, and informal; support to ministries of justice, the interior affairs; judges and courts; legal drafting services; bar and ociations; professional legal education; maintenance of law and public safety; border management; law enforcement olice, prisons and their supervision; ombudsmen; dispute resolution, arbitration and mediation; legal aid l; traditional, indigenous and paralegal practices that fall formal legal system. Measures that support the nt of legal frameworks, constitutions, laws and regulations; and constitutional drafting and review; legal reform; of formal and informal systems of law. Public legal dissemination of information on entitlements and remedies e; awareness campaigns. (Use codes 152xx for activities imarily aimed at supporting security system reform or
in connection with post-conflict and peace building v and order sectors; policy development within ministries
r equivalents.
rs and services.
riminal law courts and the judicial system, including t of fines and legal settlements imposed by the courts and of parole and probation systems.
at service representing the interests of the public by and addressing complaints of unfair treatment or stration.
the exercise of democracy and diverse forms of
on of citizens beyond elections (15151); direct democracy
s such as referenda and citizens' initiatives; support to
ns to represent and advocate for their members, to agage and hold governments to account, and to help rn to act in the public sphere; curricula and teaching for tion at various levels. (This purpose code is restricted to argeting governance issues. When assistance to civil society governance purposes use other appropriate purpose codes.)
nanagement bodies and processes, election observation, cation. (Use code 15230 when in the context of an al peacekeeping operation.)
(

(continued)	
Category	Description
Legislatures and	Assistance to strengthen key functions of legislatures/ parliaments
political parties	including subnational assemblies and councils (representation;
	oversight; legislation), such as improving the capacity of legislative
	bodies, improving legislatures' committees and administrative
	procedures,; research and information management systems;
	providing training programmes for legislators and support personnel.
	Assistance to political parties and strengthening of party systems.
Media and free flow	Activities that support free and uncensored flow of information on
of information	public issues; activities that increase the editorial and technical skills
	and the integrity of the print and broadcast media, e.g. training of
	journalists. (Use codes 22010-22040 for provision of equipment and
	capital assistance to media.)
Tax policy and	NA
administration	
$\mathbf{support}$	
Other non-tax	Non-tax public revenue, which includes line ministries, revenue
revenue	authorities or other local, regional or national public bodies.
${f mobilisation}$	
Human rights	Measures to support specialised official human rights institutions and
	mechanisms at universal, regional, national and local levels in their
	statutory roles to promote and protect civil and political, economic,
	social and cultural rights as defined in international conventions and
	covenants; translation of international human rights commitments
	into national legislation; reporting and follow-up; human rights
	dialogue. Human rights defenders and human rights NGOs; human
	rights advocacy, activism, mobilisation; awareness raising and public
	human rights education. Human rights programming targeting
	specific groups, e.g. children, persons with disabilities, migrants,
	ethnic, religious, linguistic and sexual minorities, indigenous people
	and those suffering from caste discrimination, victims of trafficking,
	victims of torture. (Use code 15230 when in the context of a
	peacekeeping operation and code 15180 for ending violence against
	women and girls.)
Women's equality	Support for institutions and organisations (governmental and
organisations and	non-governmental) working for gender equality and women's
institutions	empowerment.

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Category	Description		
Ending violence	Support to programmes designed to prevent and eliminate all forms		
against women and	of violence against women and girls/gender-based violence. This		
girls	encompasses a broad range of forms of physical, sexual and		
	psychological violence including but not limited to: intimate partner		
	violence (domestic violence); sexual violence; female genital		
	mutilation/cutting (FGM/C); child, early and forced marriage; acid		
	throwing; honour killings; and trafficking of women and girls.		
	Prevention activities may include efforts to empower women and girls;		
	change attitudes, norms and behaviour; adopt and enact legal		
	reforms; and strengthen implementation of laws and policies on		
	ending violence against women and girls, including through		
	strengthening institutional capacity. Interventions to respond to		
	violence against women and girls/gender-based violence may include		
	expanding access to services including legal assistance, psychosocial		
	counselling and health care; training personnel to respond more		
	effectively to the needs of survivors; and ensuring investigation,		
	prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of violence.		
Local government	Decentralisation processes (including political, administrative and		
administration	fiscal dimensions); intergovernmental relations and federalism;		
	strengthening local authorities.		

(continued)	
Category	Description
Facilitation of	Assistance to developing countries that facilitates the orderly, safe,
orderly, safe,	regular and responsible migration and mobility of people. This
regular and	includes: • Capacity building in migration and mobility policy,
responsible	analysis, planning and management. This includes support to
migration and	facilitate safe and regular migration and address irregular migration,
mobility	engagement with diaspora and programmes enhancing the
mobility	development impact of remittances and/or their use for
	developmental projects in developing countries. • Measures to
	improve migrant labour recruitment systems in developing
	countries. • Capacity building for strategy and policy development as
	well as legal and judicial development (including border management)
	in developing countries. This includes support to address and reduce
	vulnerabilities in migration, and strengthen the transnational
	response to smuggling of migrants and preventing and combating
	trafficking in human beings. • Support to effective strategies to
	ensure international protection and the right to asylum. • Support to
	effective strategies to ensure access to justice and assistance for
	displaced persons. • Assistance to migrants for their safe, dignified,
	informed and voluntary return to their country of origin (covers only
	returns from another developing country; assistance to forced returns
	is excluded from ODA). • Assistance to migrants for their sustainable
	reintegration in their country of origin (use code 93010 for
	pre-departure assistance provided in donor countries in the context of
	voluntary returns). Activities that pursue first and foremost providers'
	interest are excluded from ODA. Activities addressing the root causes
	of forced displacement and irregular migration should not be coded
	here, but under their relevant sector of intervention. In addition, use
	code 15136 for support to countries' authorities for immigration
	affairs and services (optional), code 24050 for programmes aiming at
	reducing the sending costs of remittances, code 72010 for
	humanitarian aspects of assistance to refugees and internally
	displaced persons (IDPs) such as delivery of emergency services and
	humanitarian protection. Use code 93010 when expenditure is for the
	temporary sustenance of refugees in the donor country, including for
	their voluntary return and for their reintegration when support is
	provided in a donor country in connection with the return from that
	donor country (i.e. pre-departure assistance), or voluntary
	resettlement in a third developed country.
Social/welfare	Social legislation and administration; institution capacity building
services	and advice; social security and other social schemes; special
POL A LOCE	programmes for the elderly, orphans, the disabled, street children;
	social dimensions of structural adjustment; unspecified social
G • 1	infrastructure and services, including consumer protection.
Social protection	Administration of overall social protection policies, plans,
and welfare services	programmes and budgets including legislation, standards and
policy, planning	statistics on social protection.
and administration	
Social security	Social protection shemes in the form of cash or in-kind benefits to
(excl pensions)	people unable to work due to sickness or injury.
General pensions	Social protection schemes in the form of cash or in-kind benefits,
-	including pensions, against the risks linked to old age.

Description	
Pension schemes for government personnel.	
Social protection schemes in the form of cash or in-kind benefits to	
households with dependent children, including parental leave benefits.	
Employment policy and planning; labour law; labour unions;	
institution capacity building and advice; support programmes for	
unemployed; employment creation and income generation	
programmes; occupational safety and health; combating child labour.	
Housing sector policy, planning and programmes; excluding low-cost	
housing and slum clearance (16040).	
Including slum clearance.	
Basic social services are defined to include basic education, basic	
health, basic nutrition, population/reproductive health and basic	
drinking water supply and basic sanitation.	
Including libraries and museums.	
Both in national statistical offices and any other government	
ministries.	
Communications sector policy, planning and programmes; institution	
capacity building and advice; including postal services development;	
unspecified communications activities.	
NA	
Development and operation of postal services.	
Provision of information services.	
Telephone networks, telecommunication satellites, earth stations.	
Radio/television/print Radio and TV links, equipment; newspapers; printing and publishing. media	
Computer hardware and software; internet access; IT training. When	
sector cannot be specified.	