HCP Vault Namespaces, Authentication, & Policies

October 2022

Agenda

1. Namespaces

2. Authentication

3. Policies

4. Next Steps

HCP Vault Path to Production

| Week 1	Week 2	Week 3	Week 4	Week 5
Vault Deployed	**Operational Considerations**	**Identity & Access Management**	**Secrets Management**	**Ready for Production!**
• Kick Off Webinar • Cloud Overview and Getting Started with HCP Vault	• Codify Vault Config, Telemetry, Monitoring,	• Namespaces, ACL Policies, Auth Methods	• How to consume Vault into applications	• Exit Ramp & Operational Readiness Checklist

Namespaces

Namespaces

Namespaces create "Vaults within a Vault" that enables you to provide Vault as a service in your organization.

Each namespace will maintain its own path structure. This allows you to delegate administration of policies and secrets management to teams while controlling the blast radius by isolating control within their namespace

Namespace Contents

Unique to each namespace

- Policies

- Secrets Engines

- Authentication Methods

- Tokens

- Identity Entities and Groups

Considerations

| Requirement	What to Consider
Organizational Structure	What is your organizational structure?
	What is the level of granularity across lines of businesses (LOBs), divisions, teams, services, apps that needs to be reflected in Vault's end-state design?
Self-Service Requirements	Given your organizational structure, what is the desired level of self-service required?
	How will Vault policies be managed?
	Will teams need to directly manage policies for their own scope of responsibility?
	Will they be interacting with Vault via some abstraction layer where policies and patterns will be templatized? For example, configuration by code, Git flows, the Terraform Vault provider, custom onboarding layers, or some combination of these.

Considerations

| Requirement	What to Consider
Audit Requirements	What are the requirements around auditing usage of Vault within your organization?
	Is there a need to regularly certify access to secrets?
	Is there a need to review and/or decommission stale secrets or auth roles?
	Is there a need to determine chargeback amounts to internal customers?
Secrets Engine Requirements	What types of secrets engines will you use (KV, database, AD, PKI, etc.)?

Using Namespaces

- Namespaces should be leveraged sparingly and primarily to delineate administrative boundaries

- Often many unnecessary namespaces get created by trying to replicate organizational structure

NAMESPACE: **usa-hq**

usa-hq/auth/ldap/*
usa-hq/mysql/*

NAMESPACE: **team_1**
usa-hq/team_1/kvv1/*

NAMESPACE: **team_2**
usa-hq/team_2/kvv1/*

NAMESPACE: **team_3**
usa-hq/team_3/kvv1/*

NAMESPACE: **team_4**
usa-hq/team_4/kvv1/*

...

Using Namespaces

- Instead of providing self-service by implementing many namespaces we recommend implementing an onboarding layer

- Shifting the administrative boundary from teams to the onboarding layer reduces the number of namespaces while enforcing a standard naming convention, secrets path structure, and templated policies

NAMESPACE: **usa-hq**

usa-hq/auth/ldap/*
usa-hq/mysql/*

NAMESPACE: **team_1**
usa-hq/team_1/kvv1/*

NAMESPACE: **team_2**
usa-hq/team_2/kvv1/*

NAMESPACE: **team_3**
usa-hq/team_3/kvv1/*

NAMESPACE: **team_4**
usa-hq/team_4/kvv1/*
...

NAMESPACE: **usa-hq**

usa-hq/auth/ldap/*
usa-hq/mysql/*
usa-hq/kvv1-team_1/*
usa-hq/kvv1-team_2/*
usa-hq/kvv1-team_3/*
usa-hq/kvv1-team_4/*
...

Best Practice

Namespaces for Teams and Groups

• **Engineering Org** (Namespace)

Members:
Security Team, Operations Teams, Engineering Manager

Namespace Specific Configuration:
Defined engineering member access
Defined engineering authentication mounts
Defined engineering secrets engines

Note: Vault supports namespaces within namespaces. By default there can always be a parent managed namespace that has rights to sub-namespaces, such as the Applications/User namespaces

Namespace per each Application

- **Application** (Namespace)

  Members:
  Alex Smith, Jennifer Johnson, Steve Stevens

  Namespace Specific Configuration:
  Defined member access
  Defined authentication mounts for AWS, Azure, and GCP systems
  Defined custom secrets engine

Getting Started with Namespaces

CLI

```
# Create namespace
> vault namespace create -namespace=admin/usa-hq


# Create child namespaces
> vault namespace create -namespace=admin/usa-hq/sales


# List namespaces from within admin namespace
> vault namespace list -namespace=admin


# List child namespaces for usa-hq namespace
> vault namespace list -namespace=admin/usa-hq


# Instead of CLI flag, environment variable can be used
> export VAULT_NAMESPACE="admin/usa-hq"
> vault namespace create sales
```

Getting Started with Namespaces

CLI

```
/
/admin/
/admin/bu-a/
    -    Secrets
    -    Policy
    -    Auth
    -    Tokens
/admin/bu-b/
    -    Secrets
    -    Policy
    -    Auth
    -    Tokens
/admin/bu-b/team-a/
         Secrets
    -    Policy
    -    Auth
    -    Tokens
```

Getting Started with Namespaces

API

```
# Create namespace
> curl --header "X-Vault-Token: <TOKEN>" \
--request POST \
https://<vault_addr>/v1/sys/namespaces/usa-hq


# Create child namespaces
> curl --header "X-Vault-Token: <TOKEN>" \
--header "X-Vault-Namespace: usa-hq" --request POST \
https://<vault_addr>/v1/sys/namespaces/sales
```

Authentication

Authentication in Vault

Vault supports integrating with trusted identity providers to validate user or machine supplied information to create a token tied to a pre-configured policy.

- If Vault is able to successfully validate the credentials, a Vault token will be returned that can then be used to access Vault.

- The token Vault returns is associated to a Vault policy that defines what access and capabilities the token can perform.

Human vs. Machine Authentication

Vault provides authorization and not authentication of users so you will need to integrate with a trusted Identity provider to authenticate and verify the client before access to Vault is granted.

- Multiple authentication methods can and should be used
- Human users should authenticate using a method that leverages an external identity provider
- Machine users should authenticate using AppRole or auth type that uses instance metadata to authenticate the machine such as AWS or GCP.

Human Auth	Machine Auth
GitHub	AppRole
LDAP/AD	AWS
OIDC	Azure
Okta	Google Cloud
Cloud IAM	JWT
Username & Password	Kubernetes
	RADIUS
	TLS Certificates
	Cloud Foundry

Vault Identity Recap

Entities & Groups

A **group** can have multiple entities as its members

Also, a **group** can have subgroups

Group Name: Accounting
Group ID: 0bfed703-f07d-2965…
Policies: **accounting**

A Vault client can be mapped as an entity

Entity Name: Bob Smith
Entity ID: bf23f85c-4e26-b…
Policies: **test**

Aliases:

ID: 7b0788d6-a259-6eb7-9…
Auth type: **LDAP**
Name: "bsmith"
Policies: test-admin, devops

ID: 7617592a-e737-2e9d-d…
Auth type: **Userpass**
Name: "bob"
Policies: base

An entity can have multiple aliases

Entity Name: HCP Billing
Entity ID: lw23p85c-2e9-b…
Policies: **billing**

Aliases:

ID: 6713592a-e737-2e9d-d…
Auth type: **AWS**
Role Name: "hcp-billing"
Policies: app

Group Name: Payment
Group ID: l273k85c-2e9-b…
Policies: **payment**

Aliases:

ID: 6713592a-e737-2e9d-d…
Auth type: **LDAP**
Name: "payment"
Policies: payment

Entities and Aliases

Map multiple user authentication schemes to a single entity to provide for more efficient authorization management

Entity is a representation of a single person or system used to login

Entity can have policies and metadata

Aliases is a mapping between an entity and auth methods

Entity

name: John Smith

entity_id: 404e57bc-a0b1-a80f-0a73-b6e92e8a52d3

Aliases

ID: 34982d9d-e3e-9ddb-9e9b-9241t9...
GitHub jsmith22

ID: 92308b08-4139-3ec6-7af2-8e98166b4e0c
LDAP (Active Directory) jsmith22@example.com

ID: a3b042e6-5cc1-d5a9-8874-d53a51954de2
LDAP (OpenLDAP) johnjsmith@dev-example.com

policy: accounting

path "secret/accounting_database" {
 capabilities = ["list", "read"]
}

metadata:

{
    "organization": "hashicorp",
    "region": "US-West"
}

Token and Policies

Entity

name: John Smith
entity_id: 404e57bc-a0b1-a80f-0a73-b6e92e8a52d3
policy: acct-manager

Aliases

ID: 34982d3d-e3ce-5d8b-6e5f-b9bb34246c31
GitHub jsmith22
Policy: acct-test

ID: 92308b08-4139-3ec6-7af2-8e98166b4e0c
LDAP (Active Directory) **jsmith22@example.com**
Policy: expense

ID: a3b042e6-5cc1-d5a9-8874-d53a51954de2
LDAP (OpenLDAP) johnjsmith@dev-example.com
Policy: accounting

Token inherits **capabilities** granted by both policies

expense   acct-manager

TOKEN

jsmith22@example.com

Member of this entity

3. Returns a token

1. Authenticate with LDAP account

2. Verify with LDAP

LDAP

Basic Workflow

Step 1: Enable auth methods

↓

Step 2: Configure each auth method

↓

Step 3: Create an Entity

↓

Step 4: Create the Entity Aliases

Organizational Structure

Organization is composed of people who belong in groups

Each group has a different set of resource that they manage

An individual may be a part of any number of groups

ACME Inc.

Accounting

Marketing

Finance

Procurement

Web

Billing

Identity Groups

Identity group maps multiple user entities to a group for authorization management at scale.

- Identity groups can have multiple entities as its members as well as subgroups

- Entities can be direct member of groups

- Inherit the policies of the groups they belong to

- Entities can be indirect member of groups

- Groups can have a set of policies and metadata inherited from the member entity or subgroups

Group: ACME Inc.

Group: Accounting

Entity: John Smith
name: John Smith

Entity: Mary Jones
name: Mary Jones

policy: accounting

Group: Finance

Entity: Ellen Wright
name: Ellen Wright

Entity: Frank Charles
name: Frank Charles

policy: finance

Group Hierarchical Permissions

Group: Security
Policy: SRE

Group Members:

Entity: John Smith
Policy: devops

Entity Aliases:

Username: jsmith
Policy: base

associated

TOKEN

base   devops   SRE

Token inherits capabilities granted by
the token itself **as well as** policies
attached to the entity and group

Entity, John Smith inherits the policy
assigned to the Security group

Identity Groups Aliases

- **Internal groups** are those groups manually created by the operators via API

- **External groups** are the groups which Vault infers and creates based on the group associations coming from the auth methods

- Identity **group alias** is a mapping between identity groups and groups in an third party authentication provider

  - If a user is a part of an external group (LDAP group), automatically adds the user to the identity group inheriting the policies and metadata

Group

group: testers
id: 61764951-db46-c153-d58c-208ab3e3bcc8

Aliases

LDAP group name: "qa_eng"
mount_accessor: auth_ldap_c48295fc

LDAP

bob@example.com
belong to **qa_eng** group

policy: qa_engineers

path "secret/test/*" {
 capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "delete", "list"]
}

Policies

Vault Policies

Role-Based Access Control

- Use policies to govern the behavior of the Vault clients

- Instrument Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)

- **Safeguard access** and secret distribution to apps

Vault Policies and Client Tokens

How it all fit together

- Every Vault client must authenticate with Vault to acquire a **client token**

- The client token has **policies attached**

- Use the client token to invoke Vault operations (e.g. read secrets)

Trusted platform

kubernetes

Verify the identity of App1

Verified ✓

{⚙} App1

HashiCorp
Vault

vault login

Return a client token for App1

Policies

Create & manage policies
Enable auth methods
Enable secrets engines
etc.

admin

Language of policies

- Policies are written in **HashiCorp Configuration Language** (HCL)

- Everything is **path**-based and corresponds to Vault API endpoints

  - Policies grant or deny access to certain **paths** and operations

- Empty policy grants **no permission**

Vault is **deny by default**

No policy = No authorization

Policies

`path`

```
path "<PATH>" {
  capabilities = [ <LIST> ]
}
```

Example path

```
http://VAULT_ADDR:8200/v1/auth/userpass/users/apps
```

Policies

`path`

`capabilities`

```
path "<PATH>" {
  capabilities = [ <LIST> ]
}
```

capabilities	HTTP Verbs
create	POST/PUT
read	GET
update	POST/PUT
delete	DELETE
list	LIST
sudo	
deny	

Root protected paths

The **sudo** capability must be provided for those root protected paths

Refer to the Tutorial

Root protected API endpoints

The following paths requires a root token or `sudo` capability in the policy:

Path	HTTP verb	Description
auth/token/accessors	LIST	List token accessor
auth/token/create-orphan	POST	Create an orphan token (the same as `no_parent` option)
auth/token	POST	Create a periodic or an orphan token (`period` or `no_parent`) option
pki/root	DELETE	Delete the current CA key (pki secrets engine)
pki/root/sign-self-issued	POST	Use the configured CA certificate to sign a self-issued certificate (pki secrets engine)
sys/audit	GET	List enabled audit devices
sys/audit/:path	PUT, DELETE	Enable or remove an audit device
sys/auth/:path	GET, POST, DELETE	Manage the auth methods (enable, read, delete, and tune)
sys/config/auditing/request-headers	GET	List the request headers that are configured to be audited
sys/config/auditing/request-headers:name	GET, PUT, DELETE	Manage the auditing headers (create, update, read and delete)

Jump to section ⌄   Show terminal ⌹   Docs ⬈   Forum ⌕   Bookmark ⌶

Policy Authoring Workflow

Discover the policy:

- gather secret requirements

- perform operations with Vault

- discovering the paths and the capabilities required

- define a policy

- test the policy

Three discovery techniques

- API documentation

- -output-curl-string

- Vault's audit logs

API docs

```
path "transit/encrypt/app1" {
  capabilities = [ "update" ]
}
```

Encrypt Data

This endpoint encrypts the provided plaintext using the named key.
This path supports the `create` and `update` policy capabilities as

▪ ▪▪ ▪▪ ▪▪ ▪▪ ▪▪▪ ▪▪ ▪▪ ▪▪ ▪

context parameter is empty or not). If the user only has `update`
capability and the key does not exist, an error will be returned.

app1

Method	Path
POST	/transit/encrypt/:name

update capability

CLI command flag

`-output-curl-string`

```
TERMINAL

$ vault policy read -output-curl-string test
```

default HTTP verb is GET

```
curl -H "X-Vault-Request: true" -H "X-Vault-Token:
$(vault print token)"
http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/sys/policies/acl/test
```

path

```
path "sys/policies/acl/test" {
    capabilities = [ "read" ]
}
```

Audit Log

A detailed log of every authenticated interaction.

- Time
- Requestor
- Request
- Response

```
$ cat log/vault_audit.log | jq -s ".[-1]"


$ cat log/vault_audit.log | jq -s ".[-1].request"
{
  "id": "70419a8b-d904-542b-fe48-61d8f869a0b7",
  "operation": "update",
  "mount_type": "transit
  ...
  "path": "transit/keys/app-auth",
  "remote_address": "127.0.0.1"
}
```

operation maps to capability

path

```
path "transit/keys/app-auth" {
    capabilities = [ "update" ]
}
```

TERMINAL

Example Scenario

Using transit secrets engine for data encryption/decryption

- Each application has its own encryption key

- Challenge:

  – The number of applications will grow

  – You cannot foresee the name of future applications to be developed

Policy Solutions

Using transit secrets engine for data encryption/decryption

Solution 1

```
path "transit/encrypt/*" {
    capabilities = [ "update" ]
}

path "transit/decrypt/*" {
    capabilities = [ "update" ]
}
```

Is it good enough?

Solution 2

```
path "transit/encrypt/app1" {
    capabilities = [ "update" ]
}

path "transit/decrypt/app1" {
    capabilities = [ "update" ]
}
```

Is this easy to scale and maintain?

- Trouble points:

  The policy is **too open**. App1 can access app4 encryption key.

- Trouble points:

  You have to write policies for each app.

ACL Templating

```
path "secret/data/{{identity.entity.id}}/*" {
    capabilities = ["create", "update", "read", "delete"]
}


path "secret/metadata/{{identity.entity.id}}/*" {
    capabilities = ["list"]
}
```

CODE EDITOR

- Use variable replacement in some policy strings with values available to the token

- Define policy paths containing double curly braces: **{{<parameter>}}**

Parameter	Description
identity.entity.id	The entity's ID
identity.entity.name	The entity's name
identity.entity.metadata.<<metadata key>>	Metadata associated with the entity for the given key
identity.entity.aliases.<<mount accessor>>**.id**	Entity alias ID for the given mount
identity.entity.aliases.<<mount accessor>>**.name**	Entity alias name for the given mount
identity.entity.aliases.<<mount accessor>>**.metadata.**<<metadata key>>	Metadata associated with the alias for the given mount and metadata key

Parameter	Description
identity.groups.ids.<<group id>>**.name**	The group name for the given group ID
identity.groups.names.<<group name>>**.id**	The group ID for the given group name
identity.groups.names.<<group id>>**.metadata.**<<metadata key>>	Metadata associated with the group for the given key
identity.groups.names.<<group name>>**.metadata.**<<metadata key>>	Metadata associated with the group for the given key

Token policies & Identity Policies

```
$ vault token lookup

Key                            Value
---                            -----
accessor                       yOMHJzMZ5Krz7BSrOtF2ZzC2
creation_time                  1622087787
creation_ttl                   768h
display_name                   userpass-bob
entity_id                      bf3ea189-61a1-d7...snip...
expire_time                    2021-06-28T<time_stamp>
explicit_max_ttl               0s
external_namespace_policies    map[]
id                             s.UYkAjU6ak70qwQ4OCmLP3uyT
identity_policies              [base]
issue_time                     2021-05-27T<time_stamp>
meta                           map[username:bob]
num_uses                       0
orphan                         true
path                           auth/userpass/login/bob
policies                       [default test]
...snip...
```

ACL Templating with Identity Entity Names

```
path "transit/encrypt/{{identity.entity.name}}" {

    capabilities = [ "update" ]

}


path "transit/decrypt/{{identity.entity.name}}" {

    capabilities = [ "update" ]

}
```

If the app name and key name do not match, you can store the key name as a metadata → {{identity.entity.**metadata.key_name**}}

ACL Templating with Identity Groups

```
CODE EDITOR

path "auth/ldap/groups/{{identity.groups.ids.fb036ebc-2f62-4124-9503.name}}" {
    capabilities = [ "update", "read"  ]
}


path
"secret/data/groups/{{identity.groups.names.education.metadata.product}}/*" {
    capabilities = [ "create", "update", "read", "delete" ]
}
```

- Identity **groups** are not directly attached to a token and an **entity** can be associated with <u>multiple</u> groups

- To reference a group, the **group ID** or **group name** must be provided

Vault UI

`hcp-root` policies

- `hcp-root` policy is the policy used for the admin token generated in the HCP control panel and used to access admin namespace.

- Admin tokens with the `hcp-root` policy are not the same as root tokens with the `root` policy

Associate policies

Upon successful authentication, the generated token will have the policies attached

```
# LDAP group, "sre" has "dev" & "ops" policies attached
$ vault write auth/ldap/groups/sre policies="dev, ops"
```

Next Steps

Tutorials

https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/tutorials

Step-by-step guides to accelerate deployment of Vault

Resources

- [Vault Namespace and Mount Structuring Guide](#)

- [Vault Authentication Tutorial](#)

- [Vault OIDC with Okta](#)

- [Vault OIDC with Azure AD](#)

- [Vault Policy Tutorial](#)

- [Templated Policies](#)

Need Additional Help?

Customer Success

Contact our Customer Success Management team with any questions. We will help coordinate the right resources for you to get your questions answered.

customer.success@hashicorp.com

Technical Support

Something not working quite right? Engage with HashiCorp Technical Support by opening a ticket for your issue at support.hashicorp.com.

Discuss

Engage with the HashiCorp Cloud community including HashiCorp Architects and Engineers

discuss.hashicorp.com

Next Steps

- Upcoming Schedule:

    ▼ Week 4 - Consuming HCP Vault webinar - Learn how to consume secrets from Vault in your apps and services

    ▼ Week 5 - HCP Vault closing session

Thank You