


# Data Analysis for Economics

## à Modern Introduction

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Course homepage: [jiamingmao.github.io/data-analysis](https://jiamingmao.github.io/data-analysis)



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# Data Analysis

*“What’s in a name? that which we call a rose,  
By any other name would smell as sweet.” – Juliet*

Machine Learning → Statistics → Econometrics

- Along this spectrum, the focus moves from prediction and pattern discovery to inference about causality and the underlying mechanisms that generate the observed data.


# Road Map

1 Statistical Learning

2 Causal Inference

# Road Map

Thematically, we follow the journey of a hero determined to seek knowledge from data, who departs the *forest of ignorance*,




# Road Map

... and journeys to the *realm of patterns*, where patterns in data are discovered and used to make predictions,



## Road Map

... along the way he encounters the false prophets of *correlation equals causation*,



# Road Map

... and then arrives at the *land of causality*, where people are serious about whether any two sets of observed phenomena are linked causally,



# Road Map




... from where our hero finally reaches the *mount of scientific discovery*, where the mechanisms that generate the observed phenomena are investigated in the hope of attaining true knowledge about the world.



# Statistical Learning

- Given variables  $x$  and  $y$ , how do we characterize the statistical relationship between the two?
  - $p(x, y)$  : joint distribution of  $x$  and  $y$
- Oftentimes, we may not be interested in characterizing the full joint distribution  $p(x, y)$ . Instead, we are interested in predicting the value of  $y$  based on observed  $x$ .
  - We want to find a function  $f(x)$  for predicting  $y$  given values of  $x$ .

# Statistical Learning



Advertising and Sales

# Statistical Learning

Let

$$y = f(x) + e$$

, where  $e$  is an error term.

What is the function  $f$  that produces the **best** prediction of  $y$  given  $x$ ?


- Depends on how we measure “best.” Common choice: minimizing the expected L2 loss<sup>1</sup>  $E[(y - f(x))^2] \Rightarrow f(x) = E[y|x]$ .
- $f(x) = E[y|x]$  is the **target function** that we want to learn<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>Also commonly called the **mean squared error (MSE)**.

<sup>2</sup>**Learning** is also called **estimation**. We will use the two terms interchangeably.


# Learning f



$$\hat{f}(x = 4) = \text{Ave}(y|x = 4)$$

## Learning f

- Typically we have few if any data points at a specific value of  $x$ .
- One solution: relax the set of  $x$  over which  $y$  is averaged.



$$\hat{f}(x = 4) = \text{Ave}(y | x \in \mathcal{N}(x = 4))$$

, where  $\mathcal{N}(x)$  is some neighborhood of  $x$ .



## Learning f

- When  $x$  is multi-dimensional, i.e.  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_p)$ , nearest neighbor averaging can work well for small  $p$  and large  $N^3$ .
- Nearest neighbor methods can be lousy when  $p$  is large, because neighbors tend to be far away in high dimensions.
  - ▶ This is called the **curse of dimensionality**.

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<sup>3</sup> $N$  : the number of data points, i.e.  $N$  is the size of the training data.

# Learning f




Nearest neighbor and the curse of dimensionality


# Learning f

- **Parametric methods** of estimating  $f(x)$  assume a specific functional form.
  - ▶ Linear regression:  $\hat{f}(x) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \cdots + \beta_p x_p = \beta' x$
- **Nonparametric methods** do not make explicit assumptions about the functional form of  $f(x)$ .
  - ▶ Nearest neighbor averaging is a nonparametric method.


A linear model  $\hat{f}_L(X) = \hat{\beta}_0 + \hat{\beta}_1 X$  gives a reasonable fit here



A quadratic model  $\hat{f}_Q(X) = \hat{\beta}_0 + \hat{\beta}_1 X + \hat{\beta}_2 X^2$  fits slightly better.




# Learning f




Age, Education and Income: True  $f$

# Learning f




Age, Education and Income: Linear Fit

# Learning f



Age, Education and Income: Thin-plate Spline Fit (Smooth)

# Learning f



Age, Education and Income: Thin-plate Spline Fit (Rough)  
Here  $\hat{f}$  fits the data perfectly:  $\hat{f}(x)$  contains not only  $f(x)$  but also  $e$ .  
This is a case of *overfitting*.

## Assessing the Goodness of Fit

- Let  $\mathcal{D}_{TR} = \{(x_1, y_1), \dots, (x_N, y_N)\}$  denote the data on which we estimate  $f$ . This is called **training data**.
- We can assess how well  $\hat{f}$  fits the training data by calculating the **training error**:

$$ERR_{TR} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{D}_{TR}} (y_i - \hat{f}(x_i))^2$$

- However, what we are really interested in is how well  $\hat{f}$  predicts previously unseen data.



## Assessing the Goodness of Fit

- To this end, we can apply  $\hat{f}$  to a set of **test data**,  $\mathcal{D}_{TE} = \{(x_1, y_1), \dots, (x_M, y_M)\}$ , and calculate the **test error**:

$$ERR_{TE} = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{D}_{TE}} (y_i - \hat{f}(x_i))^2$$



- When  $M \rightarrow \infty$ ,  $ERR_{TE} \rightarrow \underbrace{E \left[ (y - \hat{f}(x))^2 \right]}_{\text{prediction error}}$ .

# Assessing the Goodness of Fit





Left: true  $f$  (black), linear fit (orange), smoothing spline fits (blue & green).  
Right: training error (grey), prediction error (red),  $\text{Var}(e)$  (dashed).

# Assessing the Goodness of Fit






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# Assessing the Goodness of Fit



Left: true  $f$  (black), linear fit (orange), smoothing spline fits (blue & green).  
Right: training error (grey), prediction error (red),  $\text{Var}(e)$  (dashed).

# Assessing the Goodness of Fit



Bias-variance trade-off for the three examples

# The Bias-Variance Trade-off

When  $f(x) = E(y|x)$ , for any estimate  $\hat{f}$  of  $f$  and  $\hat{y} = \hat{f}(x)$ ,

$$\begin{aligned}E[(y - \hat{y})^2] &= E\left[\left(f(x) - \hat{f}(x)\right)^2\right] + \underbrace{\text{Var}(e)}_{\text{Irreducible}} \\&= \text{Var}(\hat{f}(x)) + [\text{bias}(\hat{f}(x))]^2 + \text{Var}(e)\end{aligned}$$

, where  $\text{bias}(\hat{f}(x)) \equiv E[f(x) - \hat{f}(x)]$ .

# The Bias-Variance Trade-off

- $\text{Var}(\hat{f})$  refers to the amount by which  $\hat{f}$  would change if we estimated it using a different training data set.
- As a general rule, as we use more flexible methods, bias ( $\hat{f}$ ) will decrease and  $\text{Var}(\hat{f})$  will increase.
  - ▶ More flexible methods tend to have higher variance because they follow the data more closely. Thus changing any of the data points may cause the estimate  $\hat{f}$  to change considerably.


# The Bias-Variance Trade-off

- As the flexibility of the estimation method increases, we observe a monotone decrease in the training error and a U-shape in the prediction error.
- This is due to the **bias-variance trade-off**: as we increase the flexibility of the estimation methods, the bias tends to initially decrease faster than the variance increases. Then at some point increasing flexibility has little impact on the bias but starts to significantly increase the variance.


# The Bias-Variance Trade-off

- The bias-variance trade-off is a trade-off because it is easy to obtain a method with extremely low bias but high variance (e.g., by drawing a curve that passes through every single training observation) or a method with very low variance but high bias (by fitting a horizontal line to the data). The challenge lies in finding a method for which both the variance and the bias are low.
- **Overfitting** refers to the case in which a less flexible model would have yielded a smaller prediction error.


# The Bias-Variance Trade-off




# From Shallow to Deep Learning



# From Shallow to Deep Learning




# From Shallow to Deep Learning




# From Shallow to Deep Learning

Simple Neural Network



● Input Layer


Deep Learning Neural Network




● Hidden Layer

● Output Layer

# From Shallow to Deep Learning



# Causal Inference




# Causal Inference

- Learning  $p(x, y)$  or  $E[y|x]$  tells us nothing about whether there exists a causal relationship between  $x$  and  $y$ .
- **Causal inference** is concerned with the following questions:
  - ① Does  $x$  have a causal effect on  $y$ ? If so, how large is the effect?  
**(causal effect learning)**
  - ② If a causal effect exists, what is the mechanism by which it occurs?  
**(causal mechanism learning)**


# Correlation does not imply Causation

User uploaded activity for Auto Sales NSA (corrected) and United States Web Search activity for indian restaurants  
 $(r=0.7848)$



Auto Sales and Search for Indian Restaurants. Source: [Google Correlate](#)

# Correlation does not imply Causation



## Russell's Chicken

Bertrand Russell<sup>a</sup> told the following cautionary tale of the perils of not understanding causal mechanisms:

*A chicken infers, on repeated evidence, that when the farmer comes in the morning, he feeds her. The inference serves her well until Christmas morning, when he wrings her neck and serves her for dinner.*

---

<sup>a</sup>Russell (1912), via Deaton and Cartwright (2018).

# Seeing vs. Doing

The do operator:

$$\text{do}(x = a) : \text{set } x = a$$

---

- Barometer readings are useful for predicting rain:

$$\Pr(\text{rain} \mid \text{barometer} = \text{low}) > \Pr(\text{rain} \mid \text{barometer} = \text{high})$$

- But hacking a barometer won't change the probability of raining:

$$\Pr(\text{rain} \mid \text{do}(\text{barometer} = \text{low})) = \Pr(\text{rain} \mid \text{do}(\text{barometer} = \text{high}))$$

# Seeing vs. Doing

- Doing: if  $x$  has a causal effect on  $y$ , then we can change  $x$  and expect it to cause a change in  $y$ .
- Seeing: If  $x$  is correlated<sup>4</sup> with  $y$  but does not have a causal effect on  $y$ , then we can only observe the correlation without the ability to change  $y$  by manipulating  $x$ .
- Holland (1986): “*No causation without manipulation.*”

---

<sup>4</sup>We use the term “correlation” in its broad sense to mean statistical dependence (association).

# Causal vs. Statistical Predictions

- **Causal prediction:** What will  $y$  be if I set  $x = a$ ?
  - ▶  $E[y|\text{do}(x = a)]^5$
- **Statistical prediction:** What will  $y$  be if I observe  $x = a$ ?
  - ▶  $E[y|x = a]$

---

<sup>5</sup>Assuming we minimize the expected L2 loss in prediction.


## Hospitalization and Health

Average health (assigning a 1 to poor health and a 5 to excellent health) contrasting those who have been an inpatient in the past 12 months and those who have not (tabulated from the 2005 NHIS):

Group	Sample Size	Mean health status	Std. Error
Hospital	7774	3.21	0.014
No Hospital	90049	3.93	0.003

- 
- Q1: what is the expected health status of someone who has received hospitalization? (statistical prediction)
  - Q2: what will my health status be if I receive hospitalization? (causal prediction)

# Advertising and Sales



- Q1: what is the expected sales of a company with a given amount of TV ad spending? (statistical prediction)
- Q2: how much will my sales increase if I increase my TV ad spending by a certain amount? (causal prediction)

# Causal Effect Learning

In the simplest sense,

Causal effect learning = Statistical learning with  $E [y|do(x)]$  as the target function or  $p(y|do(x))$  as the target distribution.

# Causal Effect Learning

- To learn  $f(x) = E[y|\text{do}(x)]$ , perhaps the simplest way is to “just do it”.
- Let  $a$  be a possible value of  $x$ . Randomly select individual units, set their  $x = a$ , and observe the resulting  $y$ . In this way, we can generate data from  $p(y|\text{do}(x))$ .
  - ▶ This is in essence what a **randomized experiment** does.
- A nonparametric estimator for  $f(x)$  is then

$$\hat{f}(x = a) = \text{Ave}(y|x = a)$$

## Randomized Experiment

- Consider  $x \in \{0, 1\}$ . Suppose we are interested in learning the causal effect of  $x = 1$  on  $y$ .
- Given a set of experimental units, a **randomized controlled trial (RCT)** randomly selects a subset of individual units – call them the **treatment group** – to receive  $x = 1$ , and assign  $x = 0$  to the rest of the experimental units – called them the **control group**.

## Randomized Experiment

Using the experimental language,  $x$  is called **treatment** and  $y$  is called **outcome**. The **average treatment effect (ATE)** is defined as

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ATE} &= E[y|\text{do}(x=1)] - E[y|\text{do}(x=0)] \\ &\stackrel{[1]}{=} E[y|x=1] - E[y|x=0] \end{aligned}$$

, where [1] follows because randomized experiment generates data from  $p(y|\text{do}(x))$ , therefore  $E[y|x] = E[y|\text{do}(x)]$ .

For data generated by randomized experiments, correlation = causation.

# Randomized Experiment

## The Design of Experiments

By

Sir Ronald A. Fisher, Sc.D., F.R.S.

Honorary Research Fellow, Division of Mathematical Statistics, C.S.I.R.O., University of Adelaide; Foreign Associate, United States National Academy of Sciences; and Foreign Honorary Member, American Academy of Arts and Sciences; Foreign Member of the Swedish Royal Academy of Sciences, and the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters; Member of the Pontifical Academy; Member of the German Academy of Sciences (Leopoldina); formerly Galton Professor, University of London, and Arthur Balfour Professor of Genetics, University of Cambridge.



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# Observational Studies

- For many problems, RCTs are impossible or impractical to run:
  - ▶ ethical reasons
  - ▶ cost and duration
  - ▶ high-dimensionality
- How do we learn  $E[y|\text{do}(x)]$  from observational data?

# Observational Studies

- For observational data, correlation no longer implies causation. Consider the example of hospitalization and health: the fact that hospitalization is associated with worse health outcomes may not be due to the adverse effect of hospitalization on health, but to the fact the people with worse health received hospitalization in the first place. This is called **self-selection effect** or **self-selection bias**.
- Self-selection bias is a central concern to causal inference based on observed socio-economic data generated by individual choices.
- When individuals choose their own treatments (*self-selection*), those who choose to receive a treatment can be *systematically* different than those who choose not to, leading to a correlation between treatment and outcome that is not due to direct causation.

# Causal Model


- To learn causal effects from observational data, we need an understanding of the **causal mechanism** that generates the data<sup>6</sup>.
- Causal mechanisms are described by causal models. A **causal model** for a set of random variables  $\{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$  is a model that specifies the joint distribution  $p(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ , as well as the causal relationships governing  $\{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ .
- **Causal diagrams** are graphs that can be used to represent causal relationships and therefore describe our **qualitative** knowledge about a causal mechanism.

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
<sup>6</sup>In fact, as we will learn, such understanding is also necessary for interpreting and using experimental results. Without an understanding of – or making assumptions on – the underlying causal mechanism, any causal effect estimate is meaningless!

## Causal Diagrams

For example, suppose we see a boa constrictor that looks like this:



Our theory of the causal mechanism that leads to the boa constrictor looking like this is that it has just swallowed a baby elephant:



## Causal Diagrams

How do we represent our theory? We can write out a full causal model:

$$\log h^e \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 0.1), \log \ell^e \sim \mathcal{N}(0.5, 0.1), \log \ell^b \sim \mathcal{N}(1.5, 0.2)$$


$$a | \ell^e, \ell^b, \ell^b > \ell^e \sim U(0, \ell^b - \ell^e)$$

$$y \stackrel{[1]}{=} \begin{cases} h^e \mathcal{I}(a \leq x \leq a + \ell^e) \mathcal{I}(E = 1) & \ell^e < \ell^b \\ 0 & \ell^e \geq \ell^b \end{cases}$$


, where [1] is a **structural equation** with the *causal* meaning that the variable on the left is determined by the variables on the right,  $y$  is the height of the boa constrictor,  $x$  is the distance along the body of the boa constrictor from its head,  $(h^e, \ell^e)$  are respectively the height and length of the baby elephant,  $\ell^b$  is the length of the boa constrictor, and  $E \in \{0, 1\}$  is the event that the boa constrictor has swallowed the elephant.

# Causal Diagrams


Or we can draw a causal diagram:




# Basic Patterns of Causal Relations



(a) Mediation




(c) Mutual causation



(b) Mutual dependence


Basic patterns of causal relationships among three variables

## Association and Causation



- $L$  has a causal effect on both  $A$  and  $Y$ .  $A$  does not have a causal effect on  $Y$ .  $A$  depends on  $L$  and on *no other causes* of  $Y$ .
- $L$  is called a **common cause** to  $A$  and  $Y$ .
- $A$  and  $Y$  are **associated**: having information about  $A$  improves our ability to predict  $Y$ , even though  $A$  does not have a causal effect on  $Y$ .
- E.g.,  $A$  : carrying a lighter;  $Y$  : lung cancer;  $L$  : smoking

## Association and Causation




- Both  $A$  and  $Y$  have a causal effect on  $L$ .  $A$  does not have a causal effect on  $Y$ .
- $L$  is called a **common effect** of  $A$  and  $Y$ .
- $A$  and  $Y$  are **independent**.
- E.g.,  $A$  : family heart disease history;  $Y$  : smoking;  $L$  : heart disease

# Association and Causation



- $A$  and  $Y$  are **conditionally independent** after conditioning on  $B$  and  $L$ , even though they are marginally associated in both graphs.
- E.g. (left),  $A$  : smoking;  $B$  : tar deposits in lung;  $Y$  : lung cancer

## Association and Causation



- $A$  and  $Y$  are **conditionally associated** after conditioning on  $L$  and  $C$ , even though they are marginally independent.
- E.g. (right),  $A$  : family heart disease history;  $Y$  : smoking;  $L$  : heart disease;  $C$  : taking heart disease medication

# Association and Causation

In summary, there are three structural reasons why two variables may be associated:

- ① One causes the other<sup>7</sup>
- ② They share common causes
- ③ The analysis is conditioned on their common effects<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> either directly or through mediating variables, i.e. there exists an open causal path that connects the two variables.

<sup>8</sup> or the consequences of the common effects.

# Confounding

- When two variables share common causes, they are correlated even if they do not cause each other. This makes it harder for us to learn the causal effect one has on the other. We call this problem **confounding**. The common effects are called **confounders**.
- Self-selection bias is an important type of confounding. Consider treatment  $x$  and outcome  $y$ . When  $x$  is selected based on the values of  $z$ , if  $z$  also has a causal effect on  $y$ , then  $z$  is a confounder and there is self-selection bias.

# Learning $E[y|do(x)]$

- Therefore, to learn the causal effect of  $x$  on  $y$ , we can condition on their common causes<sup>9</sup>, while avoiding to condition on any of their common effects.
  - ▶ Conditioning on common causes make two variables independent if they do not have causal effects on each other.
  - ▶ Therefore, any association between two variables after their common causes have been conditioned on should be due to causation.

---

<sup>9</sup>When we condition on a variable, we also say we **control for** the variable.

# Learning $E[y|\text{do}(x)]$

- Let  $z$  be the set of common causes of  $x$  and  $y$ , then

$$p(y|\text{do}(x), z) = p(y|x, z)$$

$$p(y|\text{do}(x)) = \sum_z p(y|x, z) p(z)$$

$\Rightarrow$

$$E[y|\text{do}(x), z] = E[y|x, z]$$

$$E[y|\text{do}(x)] = \sum_z E[y|x, z] p(z)$$

# Smoking and Child Birthweight

- Want to know: the effect of mother's smoking behavior on child birthweight.
- Problem: age ( $A$ ) is a potential confounder, since mothers' smoking behavior ( $S$ ) varies by age and age directly affects child birthweight ( $W$ ).
- Solution<sup>10</sup>:

$$E[W|\text{do}(S), A] = E[W|S, A]$$


$$E[W|\text{do}(S)] = \sum_A E[W|S, A] p(A)$$

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
<sup>10</sup>We can, for example, fit a linear model to  $E[W|S, A]$ :

$$E[W|\text{do}(S), A] = E[W|S, A] = \beta_0^S + \beta_1^S A$$

# Smoking and Child Birthweight



# Smoking and Child Birthweight



# Structual Estimation

In the econometrics literature, causal models based on **economic theory** are referred to as **structural models**. Their estimation is called **structural estimation**.

- Structural models use economic theory to specify the *functional form* of causal relationships.
- They are a type of *scientific models*.

# Structual Estimation

## Scientific vs. Statistical Model

If you want to predict where Mars will be in the night sky<sup>a</sup>, you may do very well with a model in which Mars revolves around the Earth. You can estimate, from data, how fast Mars goes around the Earth and where it should be tonight. But the estimated model does not describe the actual causal mechanisms.

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<sup>a</sup>This example is taken from Shalizi (2016).

# Auction



First-price Sealed-bid Auctions for Identical Goods

# Auction

## Model

- $N$  risk-neutral bidders
- Independent private value  $v_i \sim i.i.d. F(.)$
- Each bidder knows her own  $v_i$  and the distribution  $F$ , but not the  $v_i$  of others
- Observed bids are the Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome of the game

⇒ Equilibrium bidding strategy:

$$\begin{aligned} b_i &= v_i - \frac{1}{F(v_i)^{N-1}} \int_0^{v_i} F(x)^{N-1} dx \\ &= v_i - \frac{1}{N-1} \frac{G_N(b_i)}{g_N(b_i)} \end{aligned}$$

, where  $G_N(.)$  and  $g_N(.)$  are the c.d.f. and p.d.f. of the bid distribution.

# Auction

## Structural Estimation

- ① For each auction<sup>a</sup>, nonparametrically estimate  $G_N(\cdot)$  and  $g_N(\cdot)$  from observed bids  $\{b_1, \dots, b_N\}$ .
- ② For each bidder, calculate

$$\hat{v}_i = b_i + \frac{1}{N-1} \frac{\hat{G}_N(b_i)}{\hat{g}_N(b_i)} \quad (1)$$


- ③ Use  $\hat{v}_i$  to nonparametrically estimate  $F(\cdot)$
- ④  $\hat{F}(\cdot)$  can be used to predict the winning bid in an  $N$ -bidder auction:

$$E[\max\{b_i\}] = E \left[ \max \left\{ v_i - \frac{1}{\hat{F}(v_i)^{N-1}} \int_0^{v_i} \hat{F}(x)^{N-1} dx \right\} \right]$$


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<sup>a</sup>See Guerre et al. (2000).

# Auction



# Auction




## Auction

- Here, there is no confounding between  $N$  (the number of bidders) and  $b_{\max}$  (the winning bid). Hence
$$f(N) \equiv E[b_{\max} | \text{do}(N)] = E[b_{\max} | N].$$
- The learning problem is to learn  $f(N)$  from data. Here, theory helps specify the functional form of  $f(N)$  and therefore serves as a **model selection** mechanism.
- Theory also helps us to learn the values of the bidders (equation (1)) by specifying the functional form of the mapping from  $\{v_i\}$  to  $\{b_i\}$ .

# Monopoly

A monopoly firm's pricing and sales in different geographical markets

Data: price, sales, average income, population for each market



# Monopoly

## Model: Demand

In each market  $m$  with population  $N_m$  and mean income  $I_m$ , consumers choose between the monopoly product and an outside good. Individual utilities are given by:

$$U_{i0}^m = \epsilon_{i0}^m \quad (2)$$

$$U_{i1}^m = \beta_0 + \beta_1 I_m - \beta_2 p_m + \epsilon_{i1}^m$$

, where  $(U_{i0}^m, U_{i1}^m)$  are respectively the indirect utilities of the outside good and the monopoly product, and  $\epsilon_{ij}^m \sim \text{Gumbel}(0, 1)$ .

(2)  $\Rightarrow q_m \sim \text{Binomial}(N_m, \pi_m)$ , where

$$\pi_m = \frac{\exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 I_m - \beta_2 p_m)}{1 + \exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 I_m - \beta_2 p_m)}$$

# Monopoly

## Model: Supply

For each market  $m$ , given demand  $q_m(p)$ , the monopoly firm chooses  $p$  to maximize:


$$\max_p \{p \times q_m(p) - c(q_m(p))\} \quad (3)$$

, where  $c(q)$  is the firm's cost function.

(3)  $\Rightarrow$

$$c'(q_m) = p_m + [q'_m(p_m)]^{-1} q_m \quad (4)$$

# Monopoly



Estimated marginal cost and demand curves  
for a market with median income and population

# Monopoly

- Here, theory helps us to learn the marginal cost function of the monopoly firm as well as the consumer utility function.
- Using the estimation results, we can conduct **welfare analysis** and make **normative statements**.
  - ▶ For example, calculating the total deadweight loss due to monopoly.

## Counterfactual Simulation

- One of the benefits of learning a structural model is that it allows us to predict the effect of a completely new treatment – a treatment that has never been observed before.
  - ▶ If in the observed data,  $x_j$  is always equal to 0, what would be the effect of  $\text{do}(x_j = 1)$ ?
- Because structural estimation learns an entire structural model, once we have learned a model with variables  $\{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ , we can use it to generate data  $\mathcal{D} = \{(x_{i,1}, \dots, x_{i,j-1}, x_{i,j} = a, x_{i,j+1}, x_{i,n})\}$  from the *post-intervention* distribution  $p(x_1, \dots, x_n | \text{do}(x_j = a))$  for any hypothetical manipulation  $\text{do}(x_j = a)$ . This is called **counterfactual simulation**.

# Counterfactual Simulation

## The Road Not Taken By Robert Frost

TWO roads diverged in a yellow wood,  
And sorry I could not travel both  
And be one traveler, long I stood  
And looked down one as far as I could  
To where it bent in the undergrowth;

Then took the other, as just as fair,  
And having perhaps the better claim,  
Because it was grassy and wanted wear;  
Though as for that the passing there  
Had worn them really about the same,

And both that morning equally lay  
In leaves no step had trodden black.  
Oh, I kept the first for another day!  
Yet knowing how way leads on to way,  
I doubted if I should ever come back.

I shall be telling this with a sigh  
Somewhere ages and ages hence:  
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—  
I took the one less traveled by,  
And that has made all the difference.



# Counterfactual Simulation



What if Chuji Qu never visited Liu's Village?

# Counterfactual Simulation



Or Caesar never crossed the Rubicon?

# Monopoly

What happens if the government imposes a 20% sales tax on the company?

After tax:

Δ Consumer Surplus: -27.83%  
Δ Total Surplus: -27.95%

Tax incidence:

Consumer: 26.65%

# Dynamic Structural Model

- In a changing environment, with new information arriving each period, individual are **forward-looking** when making decisions: choices are made partly based on expectations of the **future**.
- Decisions are also often influenced by the **past**. Since it can be costly to transition from one state to another, payoffs to different choices are often **history-dependent**: our past partly shapes our future.
- In dynamic models, treatment effects can be **time-varying** and it's often useful to distinguish between **short-run** and **long-run** effects.

# Dynamic Structural Model

## Negative Political Advertising

- Candidate decides whether to go negative based on polling<sup>a</sup>.
- Going negative affects future polling, which in turn, affects future negative advertising decisions.
- Outcome: final voteshare.


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<sup>a</sup>This example is taken from Blackwell (2015).

# Dynamic Structural Model

## Negative Political Advertising (cont.)


Static (single-shot) causal inference:



# Dynamic Structural Model


## Negative Political Advertising (cont.)

Dynamic causal inference:




# Crop Supply

Data: crop price and percentage of cropland cultivated in a county for  $t = 1, \dots, T$



# Crop Supply



# Crop Supply

## Model


- At the beginning of each period  $t$ , each field owner decides whether or not to plant the crop in the current period.
- The decision is based on observed period- $t$  price as well as expectations of future prices.
- If a field has not been cultivated for  $k$  periods, then in order to (re)-cultivate it, the farmer needs to pay a one time cost  $c(k)$ .
- Farmers have **rational expectation**: their expectations of future prices are unbiased conditional on the information they have.
  - ▶ Here we assume that crop prices follow an AR(1) process, which is known to the farmers.

# Crop Supply

## Counterfactual Simulation:

- How would crop supply change in response to changes in crop prices if farmers are **myopic**: if they are not forward-looking?
- How would crop supply change in response to changes in crop prices if farmers are **static**: if they are neither forward-looking, nor subject to any re-cultivation costs, so that planting decisions are made entirely based on current prices?

# Crop Supply



# Crop Supply

- In general, if we are interested in the effect of  $x$  on  $y$ , but  $x$  is self-selected based on expectations of  $y$ , then without any measures of such expectations, the causal effect cannot be nonparametrically identified and we need to rely on theory to specify how expectations are formed.
- Here, farmers take crop prices as given and decide whether or not to plant<sup>11</sup>. Models like this are called **dynamic discrete choice models**.
- If prices are endogenous – if farmers' planting decisions affect equilibrium prices<sup>12</sup> – then we need to model both crop supply and crop demand. Such models are called **dynamic general equilibrium models**.

---

<sup>11</sup>This is a reasonable assumption since we are looking at a single county.

<sup>12</sup>For example, if we look at all the farmers in a country or in the world.

# Structual Estimation

- Successful structural models have the potential to deliver better predictive performance than statistical models trained on single data sets<sup>13</sup>, because their parameters can be learned from a combination of data from various sources that share the same underlying causal mechanisms.
  - ▶ Apples falling down trees and the earth orbiting around the sun both inform us of the gravitational constant.
  - ▶ Individuals' investment behavior and career choices can both inform us of their degrees of risk aversion.

---

<sup>13</sup>Think of quantum mechanics!

# Acknowledgement I

Part of this lecture is adapted from the following sources:

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