## NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE

## CS2107 — INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION SECURITY

(Semester 2: AY 2017/18)

Time Allowed: 2 Hours

## INSTRUCTIONS TO STUDENTS

- 1. Write your Student Number only. Do not write your name.
- 2. This assessment paper contains **FIVE** questions and comprises **FIFTEEN** printed pages.
- 3. Answer ALL questions.
- 4. Write your answer within the given box in each question.
- 5. This is an Open Book assessment.

Student Number:					
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Question	Full Marks	Marks	Remark
Q1	20		
Q2	15		
Q3	15		
Q4	15		
Q5	15		
Total	80		

Q1.	froi	marks] Multiple Choice Question. Mo in the public domain, e.g. wiki, blogger, s ice. Mark your answers on the provided ans	tandards, etc. Give the most appropriate
	(1)	During your job interview, the interviewer was probably referring to:	mentioned "SOC level-2". The interviewer
		a. The area outsides SR1 in School of Com	aputing.
		b. Design decision on system-on-a-chip sec	urity
		c. Second level security analysis guided by	$separation-of-concerns\ principle.$
		d. Higher level tasks in a security operating	g center.
	(2)	Eve, unlike the malicious Mallory, is a pass	sive attacker who can only messages.
		a. replay	c. spoof
		b. sniff	d. drop
	(3)		form a massive connected network. The de- requests, overloading the sites and effectively
		a. Mirai	c. Heartbleed
		b. Superflish	d. WannaCry
	(4)	Suppose an organization decides to have a equivalent security, what would be the size	256-bit key for symmetric key. To achieve of the hash digest?
		a. 128	c. 384
		b. 256	d. 512

(5)	A(n) is a hole or flaw in a softwar yet, usually because such flaw is still unkn	re program for which there is no patch or fix
		iown to the software vehicor.
	a. CVE	c. zero-day vulnerability
	b. privilege escalation	d. exposure
(6)	Which of the following statements on collis	sion is most appropriate?
	i. It is believed that SHA3 does not have	e collision and thus is collision-resistant.
		sage having the same SHA1 digest and thus
	iii. There are infinite number of collisions	in SHA3, but none have been found yet
		and and thus pre-image can be easily com-
(7)		wn to the communicating entities, and all each entity. Hence, our product achieves
	a. end-to-end encryption	c. perfect secrecy
	b. forward secrecy	d. semantic security
(8)		ftware code that is installed on a person's ccept or even be made aware of the software
	a. zero-day vulnerability	c. malware
	b. drive-by download	d. backdoor
	are attacks on systems that use to attacker spoofs the victim's IP address and known to respond to that type of request. the response to the victim's IP address.	
	a. Renegotiation attacks	c. Reflection attacks
	b. Name resolution attacks	d. Man-in-the-middle

(10)	A can perhaps best be defined as any attack based on information gained from
	the physical implementation of a cryptosystem, rather than brute force or theoretical
	weaknesses in the algorithms.

a. side-channel attack

c. XSS

b. amplification attack

- d. TOCTOU
- (11) Alice was using the free open (i.e. without protection such as WPA) wifi in a cafe to login into IVLE (over https) and read news in http://www.bbc.com. Bob was also in the cafe sitting in the far corner. Bob could obtain:
  - a. Alice's IVLE password and information in answer (b).
  - b. The fact that Alice visited IVLE and information in (c).
  - c. The fact that Alice visited http://www.bbc.com.
  - d. None of the above.
- (12) Alice was using her home wifi (protected by WPA2), and login into IVLE (over https) and read news in http://www.bbc.com. Bob was a neighbour next door. Bob could obtain:
  - a. Alice's IVLE password and information in answer (b).
  - b. The fact that Alice visited IVLE and information in (c).
  - c. The fact that Alice visited http://www.bbc.com.
  - d. None of the above.

(13	sensitive and non-sensitive, and employee ganization A adopts Bell-LaPadula, where	A and B classify documents into two types: s into two classes: trusted and untrusted. Oreas organization B adopts Biba in controlling in which organization a trusted employee is its?
	<ul><li>a. Both A and B.</li><li>b. A only.</li></ul>	c. B only. d. None.
(14)	Consider the same setting in question (13 ployee is permitted to read a sensitive doc	3). In which organization an untrusted emuments?
	a. Both A and B.	c. B only.
	b. A only.	d. None.
(15)	Consider the same setting in question (13) is permitted to write to a non-sensitive doc	. In which organization a trusted employee cuments?
	a. Both A and B.	c. B only.
	b. A only.	d. None.
16)	Consider the same setting in the previous trusted employee is permitted to write to a	question (13). In which organization a unsensitive documents?
	a. Both A and B.	c. B only.
	b. A only.	d. None.

(17) (Access Control) Consider the permission and ownership of the following Unix files.

-rwx---r-x 1 root staff 10 Mar 10 01:00 p1
-rws---r-x 1 bob year1 10 Mar 10 01:00 p2
-rw----- 1 bob year1 10 Mar 10 01:00 d1.txt
-rw----- 1 root staff 10 Mar 10 01:00 d2.txt

Suppose user alice executes p1, the respective real UID and effective UID of the process is:

a. root, root

c. alice, root

b. root, alice

d. alice, alice

(18) Referring to question (17). Suppose user alice executes p1, the process has read permission to the following file(s):

a. d1.txt and d2.txt

c. d2.txt only

b. d1.txt only

d. none.

(19) Referring to question (17). Suppose user alice executes p2, the respective real UID and effective UID of the process is:

a. bob, bob

c. alice, bob

b. bob, alice

d. alice, alice

(20) Referring to question (17). Suppose user alice executes p2, the process has read permission to the following file(s):

a. d1.txt and d2.txt

c. d2.txt only

b. d1.txt only

d. none.

CS2107

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100	(5 marks) Consider the method that uses encryption. Suppose the user has entered
	password $p$ and the stored ciphertext is $c$ , describe the verification process. What the main difference from the hashing method?
	the main difference from the maning method.

	1, 01113 0110 11130	one will be r	narked).			
	s) A user posted This answer re	eceived mixed	d comments	from the co	mmunity, wit	h some su
ported i	and some reig		C TOURS	apport ic.	CITC CITC DCC	
	and some rejected and some rej		using only	the method	you recomme	
	and some rejecting both is more		using only	the method	you recomme	
			using only	the method	you recomme	
			using only	the method	you recomme	
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(Hint: DNS).				
				4
(3 marks) Expla	in why the above	attack would not	work on IVLE.	
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Q3. [15 marks] Consider the setting in the Multiple Choice Question Q1(11). Here, Alice was

(c)	(6 marks) In addition, Bob knew that Alice's Lenovo laptop still had Superfish root
(	certificate installed. Of course, Bob was very familiar with the Superfish attack and
	had all published information on the attack, such as the public key, private keys in-
,	volved. Describe how Bob could steal Alice's IVLE password.

Q4. [15 marks] (Secure Programming) Bob is implementing a mobile cashless payment system. The following steps are carried out to complete a transaction: (1) The customer uses the mobile phone to scan the Merchant's 2D barcode which carries a message m. (2) The mobile phone displays m and prompts the user. (3) If the customer clicks the "ok" button, the amount of money indicated in m will be transferred to the merchant.

The message m should be one of the two forms:

```
"Cash x.y onlyg" or "Freeg"
```

where x and y are sequences of numeric characters, and 'ø' represents the null character (i.e. value 0). For e.g. m can be "Cash \$1302.30 onlyø". Below is the C program snippet that performs the transaction.

```
unsigned char m [100];
L1:
L2:
       unsigned char s [200];
       unsigned int x,y;
L3:
       READ\_QRCODE(m); //read a 100-byte sequence from 2D barcode and store them in m.
L4:
L5:
       x= E_DOLLAR(m); //extract x from m.
L6:
       y= E_CENTS (m); //extract y from m.
L7:
       strcpy (s, m);
L8:
       strcat (s, " :)");
L9:
       DISPLAY (s); // display the message on mobile phone.
L10:
       if (x > 300)
I.11:
          {
               {\tt HANDLE\_ERROR(x);} // No transfer of more than $300 allowed
L12:
       else if (CONFIRM())
                                   // true if user clicks on the ok button.
L13:
               TRANSFER ( 100*x+y);}
                                              // transfer (100*x+y) cents to merchant
```

## Remarks:

- i. Routines with capitalised names (e.g. TRANSFER()) are correctly and securely implemented.
- ii. The 2D barcode's payload is a 100-byte sequence where each byte can be of any value (including non-printable ASCII).
- iii. The routine E\_DOLLAR (m) searches for the first occurrence of the character '\$' in m, and then converts subsequent consecutive numeric characters into an integer. If there is no occurrence of '\$' or no succeeding numeric character, value 0 is returned. Similarly, the routine E\_CENTS (m) searches for the first occurrence of the character '.' in m, and returns the succeeding integer. It also returns 0 if there is no occurrence of '.' or no succeeding numeric character. E.g. when m is asdfeea\$123.051asdf, then x is 123 in L5 and y is 51 in L6.

Desc	ribe how to display a maliciously crafted 2D barcode to achieve the following.
	(5 marks) Potentially crash the process. Which line in the program snippet causes
	this vulnerability?
2010 20	
	(5 marks) The mobile phone displays "Free :)", and yet if the user clicks on "ok",
	\$1.50 will be transferred to the merchant.
(a)	(5 marks) The message displayed indicates an amount less than \$500 (or even free),
(6)	but if the user clicks "ok", \$500 will be transferred to the merchant.
	but if the user cheeks ok , \$500 will be transferred to the merchant.

Q5. [15 marks] Bob implemented a single-signed-on web-based grading system for CS210	7.
After the lecturer has logged-in, an authentication token will be stored as cookie. The	
cookie is of the format:	
userid : ddmmyy : hhss : s	
where $\mathbf{ddmmyy}$ and $\mathbf{hhss}$ is the date and time of last login session, and $s$ is the SHA	.3
digest of the string userid: ddmmyy: hhss. E.g. a cookie could be	
Alice:030418:1400:dkdowkdhfuwADksdjusijehs	
The token will also be stored in the server. Subsequently, for any http(s) request sent by the	ne.
lecturer, the authentication token will be automatically sent as cookie. The server accept	
if the cookie matches the stored token.	5000
(a) (5 marks) Explain why the above authentication is insecure	
(a) (5 marks) Explain why the above authentication is insecure.	
(b) (4 marks) Give a way to fix the problem in the previous question.	
	- 1

c)	(6 marks) When the lecturer wants to modify the grade of a student, say changing
	Bob's grade to 55, the following request will be sent.
	https://cs2107.com/modify?lecturer=Alice&student=Bob&grade=55
	Consider the secure system that has been fixed in question 4(b). Bob wants to mali-
	ciously change his grade to 100. Suggest a method to achieve that.

- End-Of-Paper -