See [PF] 4.1, 4.2, 4.3

Lecture 8: Web Security

8.1 Background

8.2 Security issues and threat models

8.3 Vulnerabilities in the “secure” communication channel (TLS/SSL)

8.4 Misleading web user (UI/visual-based attacks)

8.5 Cookies and the same-origin policy

8.6 Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks

8.7 Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks

8.8 SQL Injection

8.1 Background

Evolution of the Web

1989: Tim Berners-Lee invented the Web, and the first browser

1993: Mosaic browser released

1994: HTML 2.0 released, Netscape Navigator released

1995: new tags emerged in HTML, Microsoft IE released

1997: HTML 3.2 published, added Java applets and scripting

1998: Netscape open-sourced Mozilla Suite

1999: HTML 4.01 published

2008: Google Chrome released

2008: First draft of HTML 5

2014: HTML5

Overview of HTTP: A Web-Page Access Process



(4) render (including running **some scripts** in the HTML file)

1. User clicks on a **URL/"link"**, for example `luminus.nus.edu.sg/`
2. A **HTTP request** is sent to the server (with any in-scope **cookies** included)
3. Server constructs and include a **"HTML file"** inside its **HTTP response** to the browser (possibly with **set-cookie headers**)
4. The browser **renders the HTML file**, which describes the layout to be rendered and presented to the user, and any cookies are stored in the browser

Notes: To **view (the raw form of)** the HTML file sent from the server to the browser:
(in Firefox) right-click a page, choose **"View page source"**; (in Chrome) View→Developer→**"View Source"**.
Note that there are many occurrences of the tag "`<script>`", which marks the beginning of a **script**.

Sub-Resources of A Web Page

- A HTML page may contain ***sub-resources*** (e.g. images, multimedia files, CSS, scripts) including from **external/third-party** websites
- When parsing a page with sub-resources, browser also contacts the **respective server** for each sub-resource
- A **separate HTTP request** for **every single file** on a page: since each file requires its own HTTP request



A Closer Look into an *Interactive* Query-Page Example

1) Browser visits **Google Search page** (`www.google.com.sg`).
   A HTML file ***H*** is sent by the server to the browser.
   The browser renders ***H***.



2) Browser user enters the search **keywords** "CS2017 NUS"

3) The browser, by running *H*, constructs a **query**, for instance:
   https://www.google.com.sg/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=CS2107+NUS

4) Note that additional information is added as **URL parameters**.
   This info is useful for the server's query processing.
   The info could even be in the form of (Java)**script**.

5) The server constructs a **reply**.
   (Notice that in some cases, the reply **contain substrings** sent in Step 3.)

HTTP Request and Response Messages

- Note that various **request** and **response header fields** are used (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_HTTP_header_fields)

```
GET / HTTP 1.1
Host: www.example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/…
...
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 13 Oct2011
Server: Apache/1.3.41
Content-Type: text/html
...
```

HTTP Request and Response Formats

- **HTTP Request** contains:
  - ***Request line***, e.g.: `GET /test.html HTTP/1.1`
  - ***Request headers***, such as:
    ```
    Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, */*
    Cookie: theme=light; sessionToken=abc123;
    ```
  - An empty/blank line
  - An optional message body

- **HTTP Response** contains:
  - ***Status line*** containing *status code* & *reason phrase*, e.g.:
    `HTTP/1.1 200 OK`, `HTTP/1.0 404 Not Found`
  - ***Response headers***, such as:
    ```
    Content-Type: text/html
    Content-Length: 35
    Set-Cookie: theme=light
    Set-Cookie: sessionToken=abc123; Expires=Wed, 09 Jun 2021 10:18:14 GMT
    ```
  - An empty/blank line
  - An optional message body

Web Client and Server Components

- **Client-side** components:
  - Hypertext Markup Language (**HTML**): webpage **content**
  - Cascading Style Sheets (**CCS**): webpage **presentation**
  - **JavaScript**: webpage **behavior**, making pages “active” (interactive and responsive), i.e. *client-side dynamic web pages*

- **Server-side** components:
  - **Web server**: nowadays a **scripting language** is typically used as well, e.g. PHP, for *server-side dynamic web pages*
  - **Database server**: interaction between web server and database server via **SQL**

JavaScript for “Active” Pages

- Example of **JavaScript** in HTML:
  ```
  <script type="text/javascript"> document.write('Hello World!');
  </script>
  ```
- What **can JavaScript do** in a browser?
  - **Write a text** into an HTML page:
    ```
    document.write("<h1>" + studentname + "</h1>")
    ```
  - **Read and change HTML elements**:
    ```
    var doc = document.childNodes[0];
    ```
  - **React to events**, such as when a page has finished loading or when a user clicks on an HTML element:
    ```
    <a href="someURL.html" onclick="alert('User just clicked me!')">
    ```
  - **Validate user data**, e.g. form inputs
  - **Access cookies**!
    ```
    var doccookie = document.cookie;
    ```
  - Interact with the server, e.g. using ***AJAX*** (***A**synchronous **J**ava**S**cript **A**nd **X**ML*)

PHP: A Popular Server-Side Scripting Language

- **PHP**: a widely used, free server scripting language for making server-side **dynamic** web pages
- Sample PHP page:

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<body>

<?php
echo "My first PHP script!";
?>

</body>
</html>
```

Three-tiered Web Applications with Database Server



8.2 Security Issues and Threat Models

Complications of Web Security: Browser's Operations

Complications due to browser's operations:

- Browsers run with the **same privileges** as the user: the browsers therefore can access the **user's files**
- At any particular instance, **multiple servers** (with different domain names) could provide the content: **access isolation** among sites is thus required
- Browsers support a **rich command set** and **controls** for content providers to render the **content**
- For enhanced functionality, many browsers support ***plugins***, ***add-ons***, ***extensions*** by third parties (Note: the definitions and differences of plugins, add-ons, extensions may not be clear & depends on the developers)

Complications of Web Security: Browser's Usage

Complications due to browser's usage:

- Browsers keep **user's info & secrets**:
  e.g. stored in (permanent) cookies
- Users could **update content** in the server:
  e.g. forum, social media sites,
  where names are to be displayed
- More and more users' **sensitive data** is stored
  in the web/cloud
- For PC, the browser is becoming the **main/super application**:
  → in some sense, **the browser "*is*" the OS**

Threat Model 1: Attackers as Another *End Systems*



- In this scenario, the attackers are just another ***end systems***
- Examples:
  - A **malicious web server** that lures the victim to visit it
  - A **malicious web client** who has access to the targeted server

Attacker Types in Threat Model 1

- **1A: *Forum poster***:
  - The weakest attacker type
  - A **user** of an existing web app
  - **Doesn't** register domains or host application content

- **1B: *Web attacker***:
  - Owns a **valid domain & web server** with an SSL certificate
  - Can **entice** a victim to visit his site, e.g.:
    - Via "Click Here to Get a Free iPad" link
    - Via an advertisement (no clicks needed)
  - **Can *not*** intercept/read traffic for other sites
  - The most **commonly-assumed** attacker type. *Why?*

Threat Model 2: Attackers as *Network Attackers*



- Here, the attacker has **access** to exchanged network packets (at the IP layer)
- Example: a **malicious café-owner** who provides the free WiFi services in our previous examples

Attacker Types in Threat Model 2

- **2A:** ***Passive network attacker*:**
  - Eve who can **passively eavesdrop** on network traffic, but cannot manipulate or spoof traffic
  - Can **additionally act** as a web attacker

- **2B:** ***Active network attacker*:**
  - Mallory who can launch **active attacks** on a network, e.g. **MiTM**
  - Can **additionally act** as a web attacker
  - The **most powerful** threat model
  - Yet, it is **not** generally considered to be capable of **presenting valid certificates** for HTTPS sites that are not under his control: *Why not?*

Web Attacks and Classification

- Yet, it can be **difficult** to clearly classify web attacks
- Many attacks uses a **combination** of other attacks
- This lecture describe some **web attacks** and relevant common **protection mechanisms**

8.3 Attacks on the “Secure” Communication Channel (TLS/SSL)

HTTPS

Review

- **HTTPS** protocol:
  - HTTPS = HTTP + TLS/SSL
  - Netscape SSL 2.0 [1993] ... TLS 1.3 [2018]
- Provisions a ***secure channel***, which establishes between 2 programs a **data channel** that has **confidentiality**, **integrity** and **authenticity**, against a computationally-bounded “network attacker”
- How does HTTPS work?
  - Ciphers negotiation
  - Authenticated key exchange (AKE)
  - Symmetric key encryption and MAC

Attacks on a Secure Channel by a MiTM

- Two **pre-conditions** of a MiTM attack:
  - The attacker is a MiTM in between the browser and web server
  - The attacker is able to sniff & spoof packets at the TCP/IP layers
- Note that if the connection is HTTPS, such MiTM is **unable** to compromise both confidentiality & authenticity, ***unless***:
  - Web user accepts a **forged certificate** or a **rouge CA**
- Yet, this might not be the case when **there exist vulnerabilities** in the **protocol's design** or **implementation**
- We have already covered some **HTTPS attacks**:
  re-negotiation attack, FREAK attack, Heartbleed
  (attack on protocol design or implementation)
- Other well-known attacks (*not required in this module*):
  BEAST attacks (attack on cryptography)

8.4 Misleading Web User (UI/Visual-based Attacks)

URL (Uniform Resource Locator)

- A **URL** consists of a few **components** (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniform_Resource_Locator):
  1. Scheme
  2. Authority (a.k.a. the hostname)
  3. Path
  4. Query
  5. Fragment

- Example:
  http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-302477.html?query=computer%20security#12



Question: Why the URL is typically displayed with **two levels** of intensity?

URL: Misleading Delimiter

- Suppose there is ***no*** clear **visual distinction** between the hostname and path of a URL
- The supposed “**delimiter”** that separates hostname & the path can actually be a character **in the hostname or path**

```
www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-302477.html?query=computer%20security
```

Hostname

path

- Example: a malicious website’s hostname that contains the targeted hostname followed by a character resembling the **delimiter “/”** (e.g. www.wiley.com.lwiley.in/Section/id-302477.html)
- Another example: nuslogin.789greeting.co.uk (from phishing email)
- The displayed different intensities could help user **spot** the attack

Address Bar Spoofing

- **Address bar** is an important browser’s component to protect: the ***only* indicator** of what URL the page is actually rendering
- *What if the address bar can be “modified” by a webpage?*
- An attacker could trick the user to **visit** a malicious URL ***X***, while making the user **wrongly believe** that the URL is ***Y***
- A poorly-designed browser may allow attacker to achieve the attack

Address Bar Spoofing: Example

- In the early design of some browsers, a webpage could render objects/pop-ups in **an arbitrary location**
- This allows a malicious page to ***overlay*** **a spoofed address bar** on top of **the actual address bar**
- Current versions of popular browsers have mechanisms to prevent this issue
- Yet, a recent attack, e.g. **Android Browser All Versions - Address Bar Spoofing Vulnerability - CVE-2015-3830** (https://www.rafaybaloch.com/2017/06/android-browser-all-versions-address.html)

8.5 Cookies and the Same-Origin Policy

Remark:
The same-origin policy (SOP) is **not** an attack, but is a protection mechanism to protect cookies.

Cookies

- A ***HTTP cookie***:
  - Is a piece of textual data that is set **by a web server**, and sent in an HTTP response's "**Set-Cookie**" header field
  - Consists of a **name-value pair**
  - Can be used to indicate a **user preference**, shopping cart content, a server-based ***session identifier***, etc.
- Cookies are stored on the user's browser while the user is browsing
- Whenever the user revisits the website (i.e. submit another HTTP request), the browser **automatically** sends all "**in-scope" cookies** to the server in its HTTP request's "**Cookie**" header field
- (*Optional*) **In-scope** cookies: cookies set by the ***"same-cookie" origin***, i.e. the "origin" of the cookies (Note: the scheme/protocol checking *may* be optional, *see later*)

Viewing Cookies



In **Firefox**:

- Right-click → View Page Info → Security → View Cookies; or
- Tools → Web developer → Developer toolbar → Storage

In **Chrome**: chrome://settings/content/cookies

Cookies: Usage

- There are **a few types** of cookie, such as:
  - ***Session cookie***: deleted after the browsing session ends
  - ***Persistent cookie***: expires at a specific date or after a specific length of time
  - ***Secure cookie***: can only be transmitted over **HTTPS**

  See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie#Terminology
- Note: the checking on scheme in the "same origin" for cookies is **optional**, except for **secure cookies** which strictly require HTTPS

- ***Question***: How can cookie be really useful to web apps?
- Since HTTP is **stateless**, there is a need to keep track of a **web session**
- Cookie is commonly used to **set** & **indicate** a ***session ID*** in "*token-based" web authentication* scheme

Token-based Authentication and Cookie

- To ease a web user's tedious task of repeated logins, many websites use "***token-based" authentication***:
  1. After a user *U* is **authenticated** (for e.g. **password verified**), the server sends a value ***t***, known as the **token**, to *U*
  2. In subsequent connections, whoever presents the **correct token** is thus **accepted** as the authentic user *U*

- **Remarks**:
  - A token can identify a ***session***: hence, the token is also called ***session ID* (SID)**
  - A token typically has an **expiry date** for a **limited** session lifetime
  - In web applications, a token is often stored in a **cookie**
  - Using **cookie** is a better approach than attaching the SID as a **URL-encoded parameter** or as a **form field**, but it has its own issues too

Token-based Authentication: Diagram



(1) Authentication challenge (e.g. asking for password)

(2) Authentication response that involves the user

(3) Server sends a token ***t***, and Browser keeps the token ***t***

(4) Browser presents the token ***t*** with HTTP request, and Server verifies the token ***t***

Note: We assume that the **communication channel is secure**: it is done over HTTPS (with server being authenticated) and the HTTPS is free from vulnerabilities.

Choices of Token and Storage Requirement

- A token ***t*** needs to be **random** and sufficiently **long**
- Suppose token ***t*** is a **randomly chosen number**, then the server has to keep a **table** storing all issued tokens
- To **avoid** storing the table, one could use:
  - (**Insecure**) The cookie is some meaningful information concatenated with a **predictable *sequence number***

    E.g. ***t*** = "alicetan:16/04/2015:128829"
  - (**Secure**) The cookie consists of **two parts**: a randomly chosen value or meaningful information like the expiry date; and concatenated with the **Message Authentication Code (MAC)** computed using the server's secret key

    E.g. ***t*** = "alicetan:16/04/2015:adc8213kjd891067ad9993a"

Choices of Token and Storage Requirement

- For both methods, when the server finds out that the token is ***not*** in the correct format or MAC, the server **rejects** the token
- The **first** method is **insecure***:* an attacker, who knows how the token is generated (e.g. by observing its own token), can **forge it**
- This illustrates the weakness of "security by obscurity": a wrong assumption that attackers don't know the format
- The **second** method is **secure**: it relies on the security of MAC

Scripts & Same-Origin Policy (SOP): Browser Access Control

- A **script** running in the browser could access **cookies** (and also webpage's objects)
- Important question: **which *scripts* can access what *cookies*?**
- Due to security concern, browser employs the following ***Same-Origin Policy*** **access control**
- The **script** in a webpage *A* (identified by its URL) can access **cookies** stored by another webpage *B* (identified by its URL), only if both *A* and *B* have the **same *origin***
- ***Origin*** is defined as the combination of: **protocol, hostname, and port number**
- The above is simple and thus seemingly safe
- However, there are a number of possible **complications**

Same-Origin Policy (SOP): Some Complications

- Example of **origin determination rules**:
  URLs with the same origin as http://www.example.com
  (from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Same-origin_policy)

Compared URL	Outcome	Reason
http://www.example.com/dir/page2.html	Success	Same protocol, host and port
http://www.example.com/dir2/other.html	Success	Same protocol, host and port
http://username:password@**www.example.com**/dir2/other.html	Success	Same protocol, host and port
http://www.example.com:**81**/dir/other.html	Failure	Same protocol and host but different port
https://www.example.com/dir/other.html	Failure	Different protocol
http://**en.example.com**/dir/other.html	Failure	Different host
http://**example.com**/dir/other.html	Failure	Different host (exact match required)
http://**v2.www.example.com**/dir/other.html	Failure	Different host (exact match required)
http://www.example.com:**80**/dir/other.html	Depends	Port explicit. Depends on implementation in browser.

- **Limitation:** there are many ***exceptions***, and also exceptions of exceptions: very confusing and thus prone to errors
- An example: unlike other browsers, **Microsoft IE** does ***not*** include the port in the calculation of the origin, using the **Security Zone** in its place
  (See https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/ieinternals/2009/08/28/same-origin-policy-part-1-no-peeking/.)

8.6 Cross Site Scripting (XSS) Attacks

Reflected (Non-Persistent) XSS Attack: Background

- In many websites, the client can enter a string ***s*** in the browser, which is to be sent to the server
- The server then responses with a HTML that also **contains *s*,** which is then rendered and displayed by the client's browser
- Examples:
  - Enter a wrong address: http://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/nonsense_test



Reflected (Non-Persistent) XSS Attack: Background

- Search for a book in library: http://nus.preview.summon.serialssolutions.com/#!/search?q=hehehe

- Important question: what if the string ***s*** contains a **script**?
  - Example: http://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/<script>alert(“hehehe!”);</script>



- Note that the attack above **won’t** work if the server performs **HTML (entity) encoding**: replaces the special character < with `<`

Reflected (Non-Persistent) XSS Attack: The Attack

1. The attacker tricks a user to **click** on a URL,
   which contains the target website and a malicious script ***s***
   (For example, the link could be sent via email with "click me",
   or a link in a malicious website.)
2. The request is **sent to the server**
3. The server constructs a **response HTML**: the server doesn't check the request carefully, and its response **contains *s***
4. The browser renders the HTML page, and **runs** the script ***s***



Why is This an Attack?

- A script can be a **benign** script
- However, a **malicious** script could (among others):
  1. Deface the original webpage
  2. Steal cookies
- Recall the same-origin policy:
  Because the script comes from the ***target* web server**,
  it ***can* access cookies** previously sent by the web server
- This is an example of **privilege escalation**:
  a malicious script coming from the attacker has the privilege
  of the web server and read the latter's cookies
- The attack above exploits the **client's trust of the server**:
  the browser believes that the injected script is from the server

Stored (Persistent) XSS

- The script ***s*** is **stored** in the target web server
- For instance, it is stored in a **forum page**:
  the attacker is a **malicious forum poster**
- Another example: **Samy XSS worms** on Myspace.com,
  where Samy became a friend of 1M users in less than 20 hours!
  (See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samy_(computer_worm))
- **More dangerous** than reflected XSS attacks:
  - The malicious script is **rendered automatically**,
    without the need to lure target victims to a 3rd-party website
  - The victim-to-script ratio is **many:1**

Stored (Persistent) XSS



XSS Attacks: Summary

- What is **XSS** in short?
  - "A type of **injection attack** on web apps,
    whereby a **forum poster** or **web attacker** attacks **another web user** by causing the latter run a (malicious) script from the former in the **execution context** of a page from **an involved web server**, thus subverting the Same Origin Policy”
- The attack works by exploiting **the victim's trust of the involved server**:
  - In reflected XSS:
    the web server that **returns** a page reflecting the injected script
  - In persistent XSS:
    the web server that **stores** a page containing the injected script

Defenses

- Most defense rely on mechanisms carried out in the **server-side**:
  - The server **filters and then removes/sanitizes** any malicious script in a **HTTP request** while constructing its response page
  - The server **filters and then removes/sanitizes** any malicious script in a **user's post** before it is saved into the forum database
- Some example techniques:
  - Script filtering
  - Noscript region:
    do not allow JavaScript to appear in certain region of a webpage.
- However, this defense is ***not*** a fool-proof method
- To additionally detect **reflected XSS attack**, some browsers employ a **client-side** detection mechanism: e.g. **XSS auditor**

8.7 Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Attacks

CSRF Attack: *With* the Victim Clicking on a URL

A.k.a. "**sea surf**", ***session riding***

An attack **example** (***with*** the victim clicking on a URL):

- Suppose a client Alice is **already** authenticated by a target website *S*, say www.bank.com, and *S* accepts an **authentication-token cookie**
- The attacker Bob tricks Alice to **click** on **a URL** of *S* e.g. in a phishing email, which maliciously **requests** for a service, say transferring $1,000 to Bob:

  www.bank.com/transfer?account=Alice&amount=1000&to=Bob
- Alice's cookie will also be **automatically sent** to *S*, indicating that the request comes from already-authenticated Alice
- Hence, the transaction will be **carried out** by *S*

(For more details, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery.)

CSRF Attack: *Without* the Victim Clicking on a URL

A **web attacker** can perform a CSRF attack ***without*** any victim user's UI actions

An attack **example** (***without*** the victim clicking a URL):

- Again, suppose Alice is **already** authenticated by a target website *S* (www.bank.com), and *S* accepts an authentication-token cookie
- **Alice visits the attacker's site**, whose page contains the following:
  <IMG SRC="www.bank.com/transfer?account=Alice&amount=1000&to=Bob" WIDTH="1" HEIGHT="1" BORDER="0">
- Alice's browser issues **another HTTP request** to obtain the image
- Alice's cookie will also be **automatically sent** to *S*
- Hence, the transaction will be **carried out** by *S*

CSRF Attacks

- What is the **CSRF** in short?
  "A type of **authorization attack** on web apps,
  whereby a **web attacker** attacks **a web user** by issuing
  a **forged request** to **a vulnerable web server** ‘on behalf’ of
  the victim user”

- The attack disrupts the **integrity** of the victim user’s session

- This is, in a way, the reverse of XSS:
  it exploits **the server’s trust of the client**
  (the server believes that the issued request is from the client)

Defense

- *Question: How do you prevent CSRF attacks?*
- The real cause:
  the forged request is indeed issued by the victim user's **browser**, but ***without*** the user's real intention or knowledge
- Therefore:
  - The **SID/authentication-token cookie** that is automatically sent by the browser to the server is ***insufficient***
  - There should be an additional measure to tell the server that the user **really issues** a transaction
- *Any good yet simple security measure?*
- How about ensuring that the user's transaction does come **from a transaction page** sent by the server to the user? (Note that the user must be previously authenticated)

Defense

- CSRF is **relatively easier** to prevent compared to XSS
- ***Anti-CSRF token*** :
  - The server also issues an *anti-CSRF token*, which is an **extra *dynamic* information**, to a user's transaction page
  - When submitting his/her transaction request, the user must also include this token: it indicates that the user transacts **from the page**
  - The attacker, who didn't previously receive the transaction page from the server, **can't** include the token in its forged requests: *why not?*
- In the considered attack scenario, Alice transaction's **HTTP request** must **include** the server's sent anti-CSRF token:
  - In the request's **URL**: www.bank.com/transfer?account=Alice&amount=1000&to=Bob& **CSRFtoken=xxk34n890ad7casdf897e324**
  - As a HTTP request **header field**
  - As a ***hidden form field*** (in a HTTP's POST request)

8.8 SQL Injection

Scripting Language and Security

- A key concept in computer architecture is the **treatment of "code" (i.e. program) as "data"**
- In security, mixing "code" and "data" is potentially **unsafe**: many attacks inject malicious code as data, which then gets executed by the target system!
- We will consider a well-known ***SQL injection (SQLI) attack***
- ***"Scripting" languages*****:** programming languages that can be "***interpreted***" by another program during runtime, instead of being compiled
- Well-known examples: JavaScript, Perl, PHP, **SQL**
- Many scripting languages allow the "script" to be **modified while being interpreted**: this opens up the possibility of injecting malicious code into the script!

SQL and Query

- **SQL** is a *database query language**
- Consider a database (which can be viewed as a **table**):
  each **column/field** is associated with an *attribute*, e.g. "name"

name	account	weight
bob12367	12333	56
alice153315	4314	75
eve3141451	111	45
petter341614	312341	86

- This query script

  `SELECT * FROM client WHERE name = 'bob'`

  searches and returns the **rows** where the name matches 'bob'

- The scripting language also allows **variable**:
  e.g. a script may first get the user's input and stores it in the variable `$userinput`, and subsequently runs:

  `SELECT * FROM client WHERE name = '$userinput'`

*See https://www.sqltutorial.org/ for a SQL tutorial

SQL Injection: Example

- In this example, the database is designed such that the **user name is a secret**: hence, only the authentic entity who knows the name can get the record
- Now, an attacker can pass the following as the input:

  `Bob’ OR 1=1 --`

  That is, the variable `$userinput` becomes

  `Bob’ OR 1=1 --`
- The interpreter, after seeing this script

  `SELECT * FROM client WHERE name = ’$userinput’`

  simply substitutes the above to get and execute:

  `SELECT * FROM client WHERE name = ’Bob’ OR 1=1 --’`
- Note: "`--`" is interpreted as **the start of a comment**
- The interpreter runs the above and return ***all*** the records!

Other Web Attacks and Terminologies

- ***Drive-by download***
- ***Web bug*** (a.k.a. *web beacon, tracking bug, page tag*)
- ***Clickjacking*** (User Interface redress attack)
  See https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Clickjacking
- ***Click fraud***

Question: Could **merely visiting** a malicious website (for e.g. by clicking on a phishing email) make a web user become a subject to web attacks?

Click Fraud: A Fake-Click Enterprise

The police reportedly seized almost 350,00 SIM cards,
21 SIM card readers, and 9 computers.



Source: https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/43yqdd/look-at-this-massive-click-fraud-farm-that-was-just-busted-in-thailand

Summary & Takeaways

- Browser interacts with multiple entities
- Various web client and server components involved
- Cookies and its usage as authentication token
- The Same-Origin Policy
- Various web attacks: XSS, CSRF, SQL Injection