

Computer networking in the real world

Mehul Motani NUS/ECE

How Pakistan took down the mighty YouTube with one simple advertisement



"On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog."

From cartoonbank.com.

Weakness in Internet Routing


- Lack of Origin Authentication
 - Who own the IP address?
 - Who sent the packet?
- Route Hijacking
 - An arbitrary node/router originates a route for a range of IP addresses it does not own
 - Route is advertised to its neighbors via BGP
 - Propagated to the entire internet
 - Traffic is diverted from original destination

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YouTube.com: 208.65.152.0/22



Pakistan blocks YouTube for 'blasphemous' content: officials

(AFP) - Feb 24, 2008

ISLAMABAD (AFP) — Pakistan has ordered all Internet service providers to block the YouTube website for containing "blasphemous" content and material considered offensive to Islam, officials said Sunday.

An inter-ministerial committee has decided to block YouTube because it contained "blasphemous content, videos and documents," a government official told AFP.

Other officials said the site had been blocked because it contained controversial sketches of the Prophet Mohammed which were republished by Danish newspapers earlier this month.

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
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Sunday, 24 February 2008 18:47:00 UTC

- Pakistan Telecom Advertises 208.65.153.0/24
- This was leaked to its ISP, PCCW (AS 3491)
- PCCW (AS 3491) advertised this route to its neighbors ...
- Recall YouTube is advertising 208.65.152.0/22
- What will happen?
 - Think of longest prefix matching!

[&]quot;The site will remain blocked till further orders," he said.

YouTube Availability



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Epidemic Spread

- 18:47:45 First evidence of hijacked route propagating in Asia, AS path 3491 17557
- 18:49:00 Several big trans-Pacific providers carrying hijacked route (9 ASNs)
- 18:49:30 All providers who will carry the hijacked route have it (total 97 ASNs)

20:07:25 UTC

- YouTube, AS 36561 advertises the /24 that has been hijacked to its providers
- Does this solve the problem?

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20:18:43 UTC

- AS36561 (YouTube) starts announcing 208.65.153.128/25 and 208.65.153.0/25.
- Because of the longest prefix match rule, every router that receives these announcements will send the traffic to YouTube.

20:59:39 UTC

 AS3491 (PCCW Global) withdraws all prefixes originated by AS17557 (Pakistan Telecom), thus stopping the hijack of 208.65.153.0/24

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Event Timeline

	1	
18:47:45	First evidence of hijacked route propagating in Asia, AS path 3491 17	7557
18:48:00	Several big trans-Pacific providers carrying hijacked route (9 ASNs)	
40 40 00		

18:48:30 Several DFZ providers now carrying the bad route (and 47 ASNs)

18:49:00 Most of the DFZ now carrying the bad route (and 93 ASNs)
18:49:30 All providers who will carry the hijacked route have it (total 97 ASNs)

20:07:25 YouTube, AS 36561 advertises the /24 that has been hijacked to its providers

20:07:30 Several DFZ providers stop carrying the erroneous route

20:08:00 Many downstream providers also drop the bad route 20:08:30 And a total of 40 some-odd providers have stopped using the hijacked route

20:18:43 And now, two more specific /25 routes are first seen from 36561

20:19:37 25 more providers prefer the /25 routes from 36561

18:47:00 Uninterrupted videos of Exploding iello

20:28:12 Peers of 36561 start seeing the routes that were advertised to transit at 20:07

20:50:59 Evidence of attempted prepending, AS path was 3491 17557 17557

20:59:39 Hijacked prefix is withdrawn by 3491, who disconnect 17557

21:00:00 The world rejoices ...

More Information on the YouTube Hijack

- http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9878655-7.html
- http://www.ripe.net/news/study-youtube-hijacking.html
- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IzLPKuAOe50
- http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=4344105

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Route Hijacking

- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IP hijacking#Public incidents
- Why does route hijacking happen?
 - 1. lack of origin authentucation
 - 2. misconfigured routers leaking unauthorized routes
 - 3. router update is on an "honor" system
 - 4. BGP was designed for efficiency, not security
- Can you prevent route hijacking?
 - Currently, the answer is NO.
 - Security is a major problem in the internet today.
 - We need good security policies and enforcement of those policies
 - Potential solutions: SecureBGP & Pretty Good BGP

How do countries block websites?

- http://news.asiaone.com/news/singapore/singapor e-block-access-overseas-gambling-sites
- Many ways to block websites:
 - 1. Use DNS to block lookups (Black Hole)
 - 2. Advertise false routes (redirect to another page)
 - 3. Block the range of IP addresses (Black Hole)
- Can you bypass blocks?
 - Don't do it. The Government knows what is good for your soul!!
 - Or if you really need to, use vpn

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Is this an isolated event?

- April 1997 Black Hole Routing
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AS_7007_incide
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- Here is what happened:

http://www.merit.edu/mail.archives/nanog/19 97-04/msg00444.html