

Toward Intention Discovery for Early Malice Detection in Cryptocurrency

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
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Crypto-Crime Volume is Tremendous


Total cryptocurrency value received by illicit addresses, 2017 - 2022

Child abuse material Ransomware Stolen funds Sanctions Terrorism financing
Scam Cybercriminal administrator Fraud shop Darknet market





Destination of Illicit Asset


Destination of funds leaving ransomware wallets, 2018–2022




Ideal Model



Most malice last for a short duration and cause damage if not be detected in the early stage.



Malice types are constantly evolving. Manually-engineered features for a specific type cannot be generalized to others.



Investors need to tell real creditable projects from frauds. Current models can hardly offer insights for their predictions.

Current Challenges

Current Challenges

Ineffective For Early Detection

Hack of Binance of May 7, 2019. The path through Chipmixer

All of the transactions from table 1 were made in the time period from 06:41 to 15:17 on 2019-06-13 UTC. Our algorithm allows to determine the relationship between deposit transactions and transactions withdrawing BTC from Chipmixer and belonging to the same entity that made the deposit transaction. Using our algorithm, we found transactions that hackers used to withdraw funds from Chipmixer.

January 22, 2021 02:20 JST


Jan 22, 2021

TOKYO -- Police in Japan have identified roughly 30 people for alleged involvement in illegal transactions stemming from 58 billion yen (\$530 million at the time) worth of NEM cryptocurrency hacked from the Coincheck exchange three years ago, Nikkei has learned.

The individuals have either been arrested or their cases have been referred to the prosecutors' office, according to a source familiar with the situation.

Jan 27, 2018

The 2018 attack on one of Japan's leading cryptocurrency exchanges rattled investors and prompted increased regulatory oversight of the industry.





(Limited Info / Scalability) Issues for GNN

Date Range: 2021-10-21 To 2022-06-18

Filter: All txs, All addresses

Current Challenges

Lack of Versatility




Most are based on interaction analysis with specific entities

Current Challenges

Lack of Interpretability


Labels	Amount	Risk
Exchange	0.3260 BTC \$13,040.00	LOW
Donation	0.3860 BTC \$15,440.00	LOW
Auction	0.9400 BTC \$37,600.00	LOW
Auction, NO KYC	0.6350 BTC \$25,400.00	MEDIUM
Gambling	0.1790 BTC \$7,160.00	MEDIUM
Darknet	0.3215 BTC \$12,900.00	HIGH




Investors need to tell real creditable projects from frauds.
Current models can hardly offer insights for their predictions.

Outline


Path & Feature Preparation




Feature Processing Status Proposal




Prediction with Survival Prob.



Asset Transfer Path





Asset Transfer Path



Intention Monitor

Intention Monitor




Status → Action → Intention

1. Liu, Can, et al. "Fraud transactions detection via behavior tree with local intention calibration." SIGKDD. 2020

2. Liu, Can, et al. "Intention-aware heterogeneous graph attention networks for fraud transactions detection." SIGKDD. 2021


Intention Monitor

Overview of Intention Monitor




How to propose status from temporal feature sequences?


Intention Monitor




Step-1 Feature Selection & Segmentation




Intention Monitor




Step-2 Segment Representation



Intention Monitor





Step-3 Status Proposal



Prediction with Survival Analysis

Predictor



$$f^p = \sum_{i=b^p}^{e^p} \alpha_i f_i, \quad \alpha_i = \exp(a_i) / \sum_{k=b^p}^{e^p} \exp(a_k),$$

$$a_i = W^a \tanh(W^{f,u}[f_i, u^p]),$$


$$F^p = \{\hat{f}^i\}_{i=1}^{p^*} = \text{Concat}(H_1^p, \dots, H_h^p, \dots, H_{N_h}^p)W^O,$$

$$H_h^p = \text{Softmax}\left(\frac{(QW_h^Q)(KW_h^K)^T}{\sqrt{d}}\right)VW_h^V,$$

$$\tilde{g}^i = W^g \tanh(W^{f,g}[g^i, \hat{f}^i]),$$

$$\tilde{u}^i = W^u \tanh(W^{g,u}[u^i, \hat{g}^i]),$$

Predictor



$$\hat{y}^t = S(t) * y^t + (1 - S(t)) * \hat{y}^{t-1}$$

$$y^p = \text{Sigmoid}(W^l * \bar{u}^p)$$

$$\bar{u}^p = Avg(\{\hat{u}^i\}_i^p)$$

$$\lambda_t = \ln(1 + \exp(W^{hz}\bar{u}^p)),$$

$$S(t) = \exp(-\sum_{k=1}^t \lambda_k),$$

...

Feature Sequence (in hour)

Segment Sequence (in segment)

Case Analysis

Case Analysis



Case Recap

Transaction e8b406091959700dbffCff30a60b190133721e5c39e89bb5fe23c5a554ab05ea

Txid	e8b406091959700dbffcff30a60b190133721e5c39e89bb5fe23c5a554ab05ea
Included in block	575013 (as a transaction number 138)
Time	2019-05-07 17:17:18
Sender	 Binance.com
Fee	0.01188 BTC (99.15 satoshis/byte)
Size	11982 bytes

Case Analysis

Sample Address Analysis




- (c)
- | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| F1: LT-BK-Max-Input-Num (Std) | F7: ST-BK-Min-output-Amt (Max) |
| F2: ST-BK-Min-Input-Num (Max) | F8: ST-BK-Hop-Length (Max) |
| F3: Life-time | F9: ST-FR-Height-Length (Std) |
| F4: Spend-Tx-Num (Full-Time) | F10: LT-FR-Min-Trust (Std) |
| F5: ST-BK-Path-Num | F11: LT-FR-Max-Input-Amt (Std) |
| F6: ST-BK-Hop-Length (Min) | |

Case Analysis

Sample Address Analysis

[0-0-9-5-0-9-0-0-0]



The hacker received 568 BTCs through 71 input TXs with no output.



At the 13th hour, it received 0.00008642 BTC.



At the 21st hour, it transferred out all its BTC.

Status 0

- Asset comes from a single source.
- No spend transaction.

Status 9

- The asset was obtained from a single source through a bunch of transitions.
- Each transition “peels” a certain amount off before passing it onto the receiver.

Status 5

- Still no spending transactions after the initial asset received from a single source at the early beginning.

Case Analysis




Based on the five transaction characteristics you provided, it is difficult to determine whether an address is classified as a "malicious" address without additional context or information.

However, some possible reasons why an address with these characteristics could be considered malicious include:

1. The single source of the asset may be associated with illicit activity, such as theft or fraud.
2. The lack of spending transactions could indicate that the asset is being hoarded for future illicit purposes, such as money laundering or financing illegal activities.
3. The "peeling" of a certain amount off each transition could be a way to obfuscate the source of the funds and avoid detection by authorities.
4. The fact that the asset was obtained from a single source through a series of transitions may be an attempt to distance the funds from their original illicit source.

It's important to note that without more information or context, it's impossible to definitively classify an address as "malicious." However, the transaction characteristics you provided do raise some red flags and may warrant further investigation.

Conclusion



- Illicit early detection is necessary in BTC system.
- Asset flow gives more information at an early stage.
- Intention motifs can profile suspicious patterns.

Thanks for Listening