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TO: Qin Gang, PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs

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DATE: November 13, 2024

RE: Priority of Peace, Alternative Framework of Force

### **Summary**

In this memo, I'm going to talk about the policies I've developed. This policy framework emphasizes peaceful resolution of disputes with a backup of force. By prioritizing peaceful negotiations, China reduces hostility across the strait and gains international support. At the same time, displaying military strength deters "Taiwan independence" forces and external interference, demonstrating a firm stance on safeguarding territorial integrity. This policy is both flexible and strategic, promoting peaceful unification while showing a strong position when necessary, ultimately aiming to achieve peaceful unification.

### **Background**

The objective of this policy is to specify the time and manner of resolving the Taiwan question, to maximize the possibility of achieving cross-strait reunification through peaceful means, and to ensure the well-being of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait region. In the event that peaceful means fail, it reserves the right to resolve the issue by force and to create strong pressure through military deterrence to induce the Taiwan authorities to choose negotiation and cooperation, thereby ensuring national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Since the relationship between China and Taiwan is currently tense compared to before, China needs a new policy to face the current situation.

### **Policy options**

#### **1. 1949: Liberation by force**

After the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Kuomintang retreated to Taiwan. Initially, the PRC government planned to "liberate Taiwan" by force, but on June 21, Mao Zedong's telegram stated that "preparation for the occupation of Taiwan" was one of the key tasks for the time being, and on August 2, Mao Zedong re-emphasized the necessity of an attack on Taiwan and called for breaking the fear of cadres and making comprehensive preparations (Qu Dingguo, 2020). In the context of that time, Mao Zedong's attitude towards Taiwan was very clear, to resolve the conflict and liberate Taiwan by force. The liberation by force could directly realize the control of Taiwan in a shorter period of time. It would also prevent Taiwan from moving further in the direction of independence. But it would also cost a great deal of money and result in casualties and potential infrastructure damage, affecting the quality of life of people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Forceful action could generate hostility among the Taiwanese population and even affect their antipathy towards mainland China, which would not be conducive to post-reunification governance and social harmony.

#### **2. 2008-2016: Peaceful development of cross-Strait relations**

Cross-Strait relations deepened in 2008 when KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou was elected leader of Taiwan and put forward the 1992 Consensus. The mainland emphasized the "One China Principle" as the key to peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait and expressed its willingness to negotiate with the Taiwan authorities and people from all walks of life. Subsequently, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait signed the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) (author unknown, 2008), expanded cross-strait trade and investment, promoted cross-strait economic and cultural exchanges, and enhanced the mainland's international image. However, the peaceful development policy has mainly focused on the economic and cultural fields and has failed to solve cross-strait problems in the political area, which, coupled with the fact that the policy is too mild, has led to the fact that some mainlanders do not believe that peace can solve problems.

#### **3. 2016-present: Opposing "Taiwan Independence" and Integration Development**

In 2016, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Tsai Ing-wen was elected as the leader of Taiwan, and her failure to explicitly recognize the 1992 Consensus caused cross-strait relations to become tense. Currently, cross-strait relations are in the midst of a political game centered on the disputes between "Taiwan independence and anti-Taiwan independence," "rejection of unification and pursuit of unification," and "integration and development and counter-integration" (Sun Lan and Wang Jianmin, 2018). The mainland has demonstrated its attitude of safeguarding sovereignty through military and political crackdowns on "Taiwan independence" forces. At the same time, by strengthening economic cooperation and providing employment opportunities, it has made Taiwan's economy more dependent on the mainland's economy and promoted cross-strait economic integration. However, despite the economic benefits brought about by integration, it has failed to fundamentally change Taiwan's political identity with the mainland, as well as U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Straits has also made cross-strait unification relations more critical, which may swell the forces of Taiwan independence and increase the risk of tension in the region.

### **Policy Recommendation**

There are similarities between this policy and the third policy, but I think that the third policy's force deterrence is not strong enough to solve the problem of unification. I think that the deterrence by force should be strengthened, and forceful suppression must be used when necessary. The policy prioritizes peace, provides a framework for alternatives to force, and can enhance public support for the Government and the reliability of the policy. The policy demonstrates both the Government's willingness to resolve problems peacefully and its determination to safeguard its sovereignty. First, the policy's emphasis on peaceful development demonstrates China's desire to achieve cross-Straits reunification through negotiation, reduce cross-Straits animosity and gain international support, and reduce the risk of military conflict in the Taiwan Strait region. However, in order to demonstrate its determination to reunify, China must deter the forces of "Taiwan independence" by demonstrating its military power and making resistance to "Taiwan independence" seem futile. At the same time, it clearly conveys to the outside world China's zero-tolerance stance on safeguarding territorial integrity and its rejection of outside interference. The policy responds flexibly to changes in the situation in Taiwan: if Taiwan is willing to cooperate, China will promote peaceful negotiations; if the forces of "Taiwan independence" increase, China will take tough measures to safeguard its territorial integrity. The policy was more flexible in the current situation and would contribute to future cross-strait reunification.

### **Sources**

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2. Unknown Author (2008, January 16). 全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改《中华人民共和国劳动合同法》的决定 [Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Amending the Labor Contract Law of the People's Republic of China]. [https://www.gov.cn/jrzq/2008-01/16/content\\_859916.htm](https://www.gov.cn/jrzq/2008-01/16/content_859916.htm)
3. Lan Sun and Jianmin Wang (2018, May 24) 融合发展”与“反融合发展”成为两岸关系发展的新矛盾与新较量 “Integration and development” and “anti-integration and development” have become new contradictions and new rivalries in the development of cross-strait relations. <https://www.huaxia.com/c/2018/05/24/524798.shtml>

Word Count: 991