



# CYREX

## Penetration Test Report



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## **Executive summary**

### **Penetration test**

Cyrex was contracted by JigStack to conduct a penetration test in order to determine its exposure to a targeted attack. All activities were conducted in a manner that simulated a malicious actor engaged in a targeted attack against the scope with the goals of:

- Identifying if a remote attacker could penetrate the scope its defences.
- Determining the impact and possibility of a security breach.

Efforts were placed on the identification and exploitation of security weaknesses that could allow a remote attacker to gain unauthorized access to organizational data. The attacks were conducted with all levels of access that a general internet user would have.

As JigStack provided Cyrex the source code, we can label this kind of test as a white box penetration test. Cyrex was granted access to the application with all regular user privileges.

### **Regression test**

With the regression testing we make sure the vulnerabilities discovered during the penetration test are patched in a correct manner and no other vulnerabilities have been introduced during the patching process.

What follows is a conclusion concerning the overall security maturity of the application and the tested vulnerability types.

We are confident that the penetration test and this report helps the customer to raise its security of the Gallery web platform to a higher level, this by enforcing the principles of confidentiality, integrity and availability.





## Conclusion

### Overall

Cyrex determined that the overall security maturity of this application is great and will meet the risk appetite of any end user. All suggested patches were implemented in a correct manner but more importantly the application and smart contracts were tested and validated thoroughly by Cyrex' application security experts.

### Architecture

As the Gallery API is developed with Prisma and the front-end application is programmed in React, the application has a basic level of security present within the frameworks it is built on. These frameworks have security implementations baked into their functionalities, mitigating common security pitfalls during development and enforcing the security maturity of the application by design.

### Smart Contracts


Cyrex did not discover any vulnerabilities within the smart contract. Usage of the industry validated ERC721 standard and limited custom functionality, makes the smart contract secure. Any functionality within the contracts has been manually reviewed on a source code level by our security engineers.

### Security Controls

User input is one of the main injection points for malicious end-users for any application, the Gallery has applied various server-side validations for the endpoints its payloads. These validations are handled in an effective and secure manner whenever the endpoints are tampered with. In this way, malicious payloads are rendered useless and will not affect the system or its data.

Next to this, all access controls are in place, in this way end-users cannot elevate their user rights (permissions). This means users are not able to gain access to data or perform actions they are not eligible for. A significant number of possible scenarios and use cases have been tested and we can state that it is not possible for a user to unintentionally view or modify data of another user. In this way, the end-user's data remains confidential and integer at all times.





Layered security is implemented in the application, which is the recommended security best-practice for any application, meaning whenever a new vulnerability would be exploited it will not impact the end-user as much as it potentially could, or it will be a lot harder for a malicious actor to determine a new vulnerability within the target scope.





## Scope of test

Cyrex performed a penetration test on the Gallery web application, its API and accompanying smart contracts, this test was performed starting the 22<sup>th</sup> of June 2021 up till and including the 24<sup>th</sup> of June 2021, multiple rounds of regression testing were executed afterwards, resulting in a fully patched application by the 26<sup>th</sup> of August 2021.

The following smart contracts were thoroughly tested as part of the scope:

- StakGallery

During the penetration test, strict protocols, guidelines and a unique workflow have been followed. Different frameworks were integrated into this process flow which are in line with the ethical hacking procedures. The process involved an active analysis of the application for any weaknesses, technical flaws or vulnerabilities.

During the entire penetration testing life cycle, Cyrex performed the following actions in order to determine security issues within the application:

1. Analysis and testing of different endpoints
2. Tampering of different parameters within those requests
3. Identification of potential injection points, security flaws and vulnerabilities
4. Exploitation to provide Proof of Concept (PoC)

We are confident the maturity level of the application meets the security requirements of any end user; therefore, the application can be publicly exposed and be put into a production environment.

We want to thank JigStack for putting trust in our knowhow and expertise concerning ethical hacking specific to applications.



## Fixed vulnerabilities

This section lists all the vulnerabilities that Cyrex determined to be successfully fixed within the scope of this sanity and regression test.

ID	Title
G001	Password hashes exposed in the /users endpoint
G002	Password hashes exposed in the /artists endpoint
G003	Password hash leaked in JWT
G004	User enumeration
G005	Time-based user enumeration
G006	Edit another user's auction without being an admin
G007	(Dis)approve any user
G008	Edit any user's profile
G009	Mint any NFT
G010	Edit any artist without being an admin
G011	Create admin user without being an admin
G012	Block/approve any user's NFT
G013	Lack of account validation status
G014	Logout does not invalidate JWT
G015	Artists control auction_hash parameter in /auction/new
G016	Negative NFT royalty allowed
G017	Artist controls eventHash value
G018	Negative base price allowed
G019	Lack of "artist" field validation on /nfts/new



## Tested Vulnerability Types

The application has been tested for the following types of vulnerabilities:

### Remote Code Execution (RCE)

In computer security, arbitrary code execution (ACE) is an attacker's ability to execute arbitrary commands or code on a target machine or in a target process. An arbitrary code execution vulnerability is a security flaw in software or hardware allowing arbitrary code execution. The ability to trigger arbitrary code execution over a network (especially via a wide-area network such as the Internet) is often referred to as **remote code execution** (RCE).

On its own, an arbitrary code execution exploit will give the attacker the same privileges as the target process that is vulnerable. For example, if exploiting a flaw in a web browser, an attacker could act as the user, performing actions such as modifying personal computer files or accessing banking information, but would not be able to perform system-level actions (unless the user in question also had that access).

### SQL Injection

A SQL injection attack consists of insertion or "injection" of a SQL query via the input data from the client to the application. A successful SQL injection exploit can **read** sensitive **data** from the database, **modify** database **data**, execute administration operations on the database, recover the content of a given file present on the DBMS file system and in some cases issue commands to the operating system.

SQL injection attacks are a type of injection attack, in which SQL commands are injected into data-plane input in order to affect the execution of predefined SQL commands.

The main consequences of SQL Injection vulnerabilities are:

- Loss of confidentiality, since the database generally holds sensitive data.
- No limitation to authentication
- No limitation to authorization and privileges
- Loss of integrity due to modification of data







## Access Control Flaws

Within the application's core security mechanisms, access controls are logically built upon authentication and session management. The application needs a way of deciding whether it should **permit** a given request to perform its attempted action or access the resources that it is requesting.

Access controls are a **critical defence mechanism** within the application because they are responsible for making these key decisions.

When they are defective, an attacker can often:

- Compromise the entire application
- Take control of administrative functionality
- Access sensitive data belonging to every other user.

Broken access controls are among the most commonly encountered categories of web application vulnerabilities.

## Brute Force Attacks

A brute force attack can manifest itself in many different ways, but primarily consists in an attacker configuring predetermined values, making requests to a server using those values, and then analysing the response. For the sake of efficiency, an attacker may use a dictionary attack or a traditional brute-force attack.

Brute-force attacks are often used for attacking authentication and discovering content/pages within a web application. These attacks are usually sent via GET and POST requests to the server. In regard to authentication, brute force attacks are often mounted when an account lockout policy is not in place.





## Cross-Site Scripting

XSS is a vulnerability that lets an attacker control some of the content of a web application. By exploiting a Cross Site Scripting, the attacker can target the web application users.

By performing an XSS attack an attacker is able to:

- Modify the content of the site at run-time
- Inject malicious contents.
- Steal the cookies, thus the session, of a user.
- Perform actions on the web application as if it was a legitimate user.
- ...

A vulnerable web application is what makes XSS attacks possible.

XSS vulnerabilities happen when a web application uses **unfiltered user input** to build the output content displayed to its end users.

This lets an attacker control the output HTML and JavaScript code, thus attacking the application users.

## Broken Authentication

Confirmation of the user's identity, authentication, and session management are critical to protect against authentication-related attacks. There may be authentication weaknesses if the application:

- Permits automated attacks such as credential stuffing, where the attacker has a list of valid usernames and passwords;
- Permits brute force or other automated attacks.
- Permits default, weak, or well-known passwords, such as "Password1" or "admin/admin".
- Uses weak or ineffective credential recovery and forgot-password processes, such as "knowledge-based answers", which cannot be made safe.
- Uses plain text, encrypted, or weakly hashed passwords (see A3:2017-Sensitive Data Exposure).
- Has missing or ineffective multi-factor authentication.
- Exposes Session IDs in the URL (e.g., URL rewriting).
- Does not rotate Session IDs after successful login.
- Does not properly invalidate Session IDs. User sessions or authentication tokens (particularly single sign-on (SSO) tokens) aren't properly invalidated during logout or a period of inactivity.





## Information Disclosure

Applications can unintentionally leak information about their configuration, internal workings, or violate privacy through a variety of application problems. Applications can also leak internal state via how long they take to process certain operations or via different responses to differing inputs, such as displaying the same error text with different error numbers.

Web applications will often leak information about their internal state through detailed or debug error messages. Often, this information can be leveraged to launch or even automate more powerful attacks.

## Denial of Service (DoS)

The **Denial of Service (DoS)** attack is focused on making a resource (site, application, server) unavailable for the purpose it was designed. There are many ways to make a service unavailable for legitimate users by manipulating network packets, programming, logical, or resources handling vulnerabilities, among others. If a service receives a very large number of requests, it may cease to be available to legitimate users. In the same way, a service may stop if a programming vulnerability is exploited, or the way the service handles resources it uses.

Sometimes the attacker can inject and execute arbitrary code while performing a DoS attack in order to access critical information or execute commands on the server. Denial-of-service attacks significantly degrade the service quality experienced by legitimate users. These attacks introduce large response delays, excessive losses, and service interruptions, resulting in direct impact on availability.

## Business Logic Flaws

Most security problems are weaknesses in an application that result from a broken or missing security control (authentication, access control, input validation, etc. ...). By contrast, business logic flaws are ways of using the legitimate processing flow of an application in a way that results in a negative consequence to the organization.





## Unrestricted File Upload

Uploaded files pose a significant risk if not handled correctly. The consequences of unrestricted file upload can vary, including complete system takeover, an overloaded file system or database, forwarding attacks to back-end systems, client-side attacks or simple defacement, dependent on what the application does with the uploaded file and especially where it is stored.

The impact of this vulnerability is high, supposed code can be executed in the server context or on the client side. The likelihood of detection for the attacker is high. The prevalence is common. As a result, the severity of this type of vulnerability is high.

## Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

In a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attack, the attacker can abuse functionality on the server to read or update internal resources.

The attacker can supply or modify a URL which the code running on the server will read or submit data to, and by carefully selecting the URLs, the attacker may be able to read server configuration such as AWS metadata, connect to internal services like http enabled databases or perform post requests towards internal services which are not intended to be exposed.

## Improper Session Validation

In order to keep the authenticated state and track the users progress within the web application, applications provide users with a session identifier (session ID or token) that is assigned at session creation time and is shared and exchanged by the user and the web application for the **duration** of the session

Session termination is an important part of the session lifecycle. Reducing to a minimum the lifetime of the session tokens decreases the likelihood of a successful session hijacking attack. This can be seen as a control against preventing other attacks like Cross Site Scripting and Cross Site Request Forgery. Such attacks have been known to rely on a user having an authenticated session present. Not having a secure session termination only increases the attack surface for any of these attacks.

A secure session termination requires at least the following components:

- Availability of user interface controls that allow the user to manually log out
- Session termination after a given amount of time without activity (session timeout).
- Proper invalidation of server-side session state





## Security Misconfigurations

Security misconfiguration can happen at any level of an application stack, including the network services, platform, web server, application server, database, frameworks, custom code, and pre-installed virtual machines, containers, or storage. Automated scanners are useful for detecting misconfigurations, use of default accounts or configurations, unnecessary services, legacy options, etc

Such flaws frequently give attackers unauthorized access to some system data or functionality. Occasionally, such flaws result in a complete system compromise.

The business impact depends on the protection needs of the application and data. Attackers will often attempt to exploit unpatched flaws or access default accounts, unused pages, unprotected files and directories, etc to gain unauthorized access or knowledge of the system.

## Open Redirect Flaws

Open redirect is a security flaw in an app or a web page that causes it to redirect users to potentially malicious URLs

When apps and web pages have requests for URLs, they are **supposed verify that those URLs are part of the intended pages domain**. Open redirect is a failure in that process that makes it possible for attackers to steer users to malicious third-party websites. Sites or apps that fail to authenticate URLs can become a vector for malicious redirects to convincing fake sites for identity theft or sites that install malware.

Normally, redirection is a technique for shifting users to a different web page than the URL they requested. Webmasters use redirection for valid reasons, such as dealing with resources that are no longer available or have been moved to a different location.

## Improper Input Validation

Input validation is a frequently used technique for checking potentially dangerous inputs in order to ensure that the inputs are safe processing within the code, or when communicating with other components. When software does not validate input properly, an attacker is able to craft the input in a form that is not expected by the rest of the application. This will lead to parts of the system receiving unintended input, which may result in altered control flow, arbitrary control of a resource, or arbitrary code execution.

It is important to emphasize that the distinctions between input validation and output escaping are often blurred, and developers must be careful to understand the difference, including how input validation is not always sufficient to prevent vulnerabilities, especially when less stringent data types must be supported, such as free-form text.





## Path Traversal Attacks

A path traversal attack (also known as directory traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the web root folder. By manipulating variables that reference files with dot-dot-slash (../) sequences and its variations or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system including application source code or configuration and critical system files.

## JSON Injection

JSON injection occurs when data enters a program from an untrusted source, or the data is written to a JSON stream.

Applications typically use JSON to store data or send messages. When used to store data, JSON is often treated like cached data and may potentially contain sensitive information. When used to send messages, JSON is often used in conjunction with a RESTful service and can be used to transmit sensitive information such as authentication credentials.

The semantics of JSON documents and messages can be altered if an application constructs JSON from unvalidated input. In a relatively benign case, an attacker may be able to insert extraneous elements that cause an application to throw an exception while parsing a JSON document or request. In a more serious case, such as ones that involves JSON injection, an attacker may be able to insert extraneous elements that allow for the predictable manipulation of business-critical values within a JSON document or request. In some cases, JSON injection can lead to cross-site scripting or dynamic code evaluation.





## XML Injection

XML injection manipulates or compromises the logic of an XML application or service. The injection of unintended XML content and/or structures into an XML message can alter the intended logic of an application, and XML Injection can cause the insertion of malicious content into resulting messages/documents.

With a successful XML Injection attack, the attacker can steal the entire database, or can even log in as the administrator of the website.

## SMTP Header Injection

SMTP header injection vulnerabilities arise when user input is placed into email headers without adequate sanitization, allowing an attacker to inject additional headers with arbitrary values. This behaviour can be exploited to send copies of emails to third parties, attach viruses, deliver phishing attacks, and often alter the content of emails. It is typically exploited by spammers looking to leverage the vulnerable company's reputation to add legitimacy to their emails.

This issue is particularly serious if the email contains sensitive information not intended for the attacker, such as a password reset token.

## Re-entrancy Attacks

A reentrancy attack can occur when you create a function that makes an external call to another untrusted contract before it resolves any effects. If the attacker can control the untrusted contract, they can make a recursive call back to the original function, repeating interactions that would have otherwise not run after the effects were resolved.

There are two main types of reentrancy attacks: single function and cross-function reentrancy.

### Single function reentrancy attack

This type of attack is the simplest and easiest to prevent. It occurs when the vulnerable function is the same function the attacker is trying to recursively call.

### Cross-function reentrancy attack

These attacks are harder to detect. A cross-function reentrancy attack is possible when a vulnerable function shares state with another function that has a desirable effect for the attacker.





## Over- & Underflow Attacks

The uint overflow/underflow, also known as uint wrapping around, is an arithmetic operation that produces a result that is larger than the maximum above for an N-bit integer, or produces a result that is smaller than the minimum below for an N-bit integer.

Like mileage counters in cars, integers expressed in computers have a maximum value and once that value is reached they simply turn back to the beginning and start at the minimum value. Similarly, subtracting 4 from 3 in an unsigned integer will cause an underflow, resulting in a very large number.

## Block Gas Limit

The block gas limit is Ethereum's way of ensuring blocks don't grow too large. It simply means that blocks are limited in the amount of gas the transactions contained in them can consume. Put simply, if a transaction consumes too much gas it will never fit in a block and, therefore, will never be executed.

This can lead to a vulnerability that we come across quite frequently: If data is stored in variable-sized arrays and then accessed via loops over these arrays, the transaction may simply run out of gas and be reverted. This happens when the number of elements in the array grows large, so usually in production, rather than in testing. The fact that test data is often smaller makes this issue so dangerous since contracts with this issue usually pass unit tests and seem to work well with a small number of users. However, they fail just when a project gains momentum and the amount of data increases. It is not uncommon to end up with unretrievable funds if the loops are used to push out payments.

## Frontrunning

Potential frontrunning is probably the hardest issue to prevent on smart contracts. Frontrunning can be defined as overtaking an unconfirmed transaction. This is a result of the blockchain's transparency property. All unconfirmed transactions are visible in the mempool before they are included in a block by a miner. Interested parties can simply monitor transactions for their content and overtake them by paying higher transaction fees. This can be automated easily and has become quite common in decentralized finance applications.

