Machine-Checked Semantic Session Typing

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Syntax

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S ::=  A.S  | ?A.S | end | ...
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Type example

?Z. **!**Z. end

Usage

c: chan S

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
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Syntax Usage $c: \operatorname{chan} S$ $S := \underbrace{!A.S}_{?A.S} |$ Rule example $\operatorname{end}_{| \dots} F, (x: \operatorname{chan} (!A.S)), (y:A) \vdash \operatorname{send}_{| x} y: 1 \dashv \Gamma, (x: \operatorname{chan} S)$ Type example



Problems

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- ▶ No way to type check safe use of exclusive resources

$$\lambda c. (\text{recv } c \mid\mid \text{recv } c) : \text{chan } (?Z.?Z. \text{end}) \multimap (Z \times Z)$$

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3. Lack of mechanised soundness proofs for session type systems

- Few results exist for simpler systems
- None exist for more expressive systems

Key Idea

Semantic typing

Semantic typing [Milner, Ahmed, Princeton PCC project, RustBelt project]

- ▶ Type system defined in terms of language semantics
- Modernly defined in terms of a program logic
- Expressivity and soundness inherited from underlying logic
- Allows manually proving safe yet untypeable programs

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Semantic typing using **Iris**

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Actris [Hinrichsen et al. POPL'20]

- ▶ **Dependent separation protocols:** Logical protocols inspired by session types
- Mechanised in Coq, with tactic support

A semantic type system is defined in terms of the language semantics

► **Types** defined as predicates over values

A semantic type system is defined in terms of the language semantics

Types defined as predicates over values Type \triangleq Val \rightarrow iProp

Using Iris's iProp implicitly threads the heap:

- ▶ similar to Type \triangleq Val \rightarrow Heap \rightarrow Prop
- but also handles step-indexing and user-defined ghost state

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$$\mathsf{Z} \triangleq \lambda \, \mathsf{w}. \, \mathsf{w} \in \mathbb{Z}$$

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$$A_1 \times A_2 \triangleq \lambda \ w. \ \exists w_1, w_2. \ (w = (w_1, w_2)) * (A_1 \ w_1) * (A_2 \ w_2)$$

Iris's separation conjunction $(P \ast Q)$ states that P and Q hold for disjoint parts of the heap

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- ► **Type** Iris's weakest precondition (wp e {Φ}):
 - ▶ captures that safe e and $\forall v. e \longrightarrow^* v$ then Φv
 - ▶ safe *e* means "execution of e does not go wrong"
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$$\models e : A \triangleq \mathsf{wp} e \{A\}$$

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Semantic Session Types

Session types as a new type kind:

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Session type-inspired protocols for functional correctness

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	Dependent separation protocols	Session types
Example	$(x:\mathbb{Z})\langle x\rangle\{True\}.!(y:\mathbb{Z})\langle y\rangle\{y=x+2\}.$ end	? Z. ! Z. end
Usage	c ightarrow prot	c : chan S

Semantic Session Types

Session types as dependent separation protocols (iProto):

Dependent separation protocols:

Example: $?(x:\mathbb{Z})\langle x\rangle\{\mathsf{True}\}.!(y:\mathbb{Z})\langle y\rangle\{y=x+2\}.$ end

Usage: $c \rightarrow prot$

Rule:

```
\Gamma, (x: \operatorname{chan} (?A. S)) \models \operatorname{recv} x : A \dashv \Gamma, (x: \operatorname{chan} S)
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Proof:

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Lemma ltvped_recv Γ x A S :
  \Gamma !! x = Some (chan (<??> TY A; S))%lty \rightarrow
  \Gamma \models \text{recv } x : A = \text{ctx\_cons } x \text{ (chan S) } \Gamma.
Proof.
  iIntros (H\(\text{\text}\) (tx_lookup_perm) "!>".
  iIntros (\sigma) "H\Gamma /=". rewrite {1}H\Gammax /=.
  iDestruct (ctx_ltyped_cons with "H\Gamma") as
     (c H\sigma) "[Hc H\Gamma]".
  rewrite H\sigma.
  wp_recv (v) as "HA".
  iFrame "HA".
  iApply ctx_ltyped_cons; eauto with iFrame.
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- Substructural resources are handled using **Iris**
- Message-passing is handled using **Actris**

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- Substructural resources are handled using Iris
- Message-passing is handled using **Actris**
- Mechanised in Coq using the Iris Proof Mode

Contributions

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3. Mechanised soundness proof of our results

- ► We mechanised it in Coq: https://gitlab.mpi-sws.org/iris/actris/-/tree/cpp21
- ▶ By building on top of Iris and Actris frameworks and libraries
- ► Stable artifact: https://zenodo.org/record/4322752

