


Overview of IT Security

Key IT Security Goals Fundamental CIA triad:

- **Confidentiality** - Ensuring data is only accessible to authorized users
- **Integrity** - Ensuring data is not modified in an unauthorized way
- **Availability** - Ensuring systems and data are accessible when needed



Security Control Frameworks

Security frameworks provide structured approaches to implementing security controls:

- **CIS Controls** - Prioritized set of actions to protect organizations
- Controls are typically organized in implementation groups based on difficulty and impact
- Focus on preventing the most common attack vectors first

Types of Security Measures

Security measures can be categorized based on their focus:

- **Preventive** - Block threats before they occur (firewalls, access controls)
- **Detective** - Identify when a breach has occurred (IDS, audit logs)
- **Corrective** - Mitigate damage after an incident (backups, incident response)

Business Continuity Management and Disaster Recovery for maintaining availability:

- **Recovery Plan** - Detailed procedures for recovering from incidents
- **Recovery Tests** - Regular testing of recovery procedures
- **Redundancy** - Duplicate systems, power supplies, and network connections
- **Offline backups** - Protection against ransomware and other threats

Introduction to Security and Cryptology


Cryptography Goals Cryptography aims to achieve four fundamental security properties:

- **Confidentiality** - Information is only accessible to authorized parties
- **Integrity** - Information has not been altered in an unauthorized way
- **Authenticity** - Origin of information can be verified
- **Freshness/Non-repudiation** - Information is current and sender cannot deny transmission

These goals align with the broader CIA triad of information security but add authentication and non-repudiation.


Model der Kommunikation und Verschlüsselung

Kommunikationsmodell



- **Alice** sendet eine Nachricht an Bob. Dabei sollen die oben genannten Ziele, confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, non-repudiation und freshness erfüllt werden.
- **Bob** empfängt die Nachrichten von Alice. Er will überprüfen können, dass die Ziele eingehalten wurden.
- **Eve** ist ein Attacker. Sie kann Nachrichten mitlesen, aber sie nicht verändern.
- **Mallory** ist ein anderer Attacker. Er kann Daten sowohl mitlesen als auch verändern. Er kann auch Nachrichten abfangen und später weitersenden, oder ganz verwerfen. Er kann auch neue Nachrichten generieren.
- **Trent** ist eine Drittperson/Instanz, welcher sowohl Alice und Bob vertrauen. Trent unterstützt Alice und Bob bei der sicheren Kommunikation.

Model der Verschlüsselung Um eine vertrauliche Kommunikation zu erreichen, werden Nachrichten vor dem Senden verschlüsselt und nach dem Empfangen wieder entschlüsselt.




- **Plaintext (Klartext):** Der Plaintext ist der Text, so wie er geschrieben, respektive gelesen werden kann. Er wird mit dem Buchstaben "p" abgekürzt.
- **Ciphertext (Verschlüsselter Text):** Der Ciphertext ist der Text, welcher durch die Verschlüsselung entsteht. Er wird mit dem Buchstaben "c" abgekürzt.
- **Encryption (Verschlüsselung):** Die Verschlüsselung macht aus dem Plaintext den dazugehörigen Ciphertext. Dazu wird ein Schlüssel verwendet. Die Verschlüsselung kann wie folgt angegeben werden: $c = E[k](p)$. Der Verschlüsselungsalgorithmus selbst ist öffentlich bekannt und kann von allen analysiert werden, um mögliche Schwachstellen zu finden.
- **Decryption (Entschlüsselung):** Die Entschlüsselung macht aus einem Ciphertext den dazugehörigen Plaintext. Dazu wird ein Schlüssel verwendet. Die Entschlüsselung kann wie folgt angegeben werden: $p' = D[k](c)$. Der Entschlüsselungsmechanismus ist öffentlich bekannt und kann von allen analysiert werden, um mögliche Schwachstellen zu finden.
- **Key (Schlüssel):** Nur mit dem richtigen Schlüssel, kann eine Nachricht richtig entschlüsselt werden. Je nach Art der Verschlüsselung wird derselbe Key für die Verschlüsselung und die Entschlüsselung verwendet (Secret Key Kryptographie) oder es werden unterschiedliche Schlüssel verwendet (Public Key Kryptographie). Damit die Verschlüsselung sicher ist, muss der Schlüssel, welcher für die Entschlüsselung gebraucht wird, geheim bleiben.

Encryption Encryption is a transformation from P (plaintexts) to C (ciphertexts) under control of some key, chosen from K (key space). The idea is to have a whole family of transformations, where each key gives a different transformation.

- $c = E(k, p) = E_k(p)$
- $p = D(k, c) = D_k(c)$

Each transformation must be reversible. It follows that $|C|$ can not be smaller than $|P|$. Meistens: $P = C$.



Attacktypen auf Kryptosysteme Auf was hat Attacker Zugriff?

- **Ciphertext-only attack** - Zugriff auf Ciphertext, aber nicht auf Plaintext oder Schlüssel.
- **Chosen-ciphertext attack** - kann Ciphertexte generieren und diese entschlüsseln lassen. bekommt entweder den zum gewählten Ciphertext gehörenden Plaintext (daraus evtl. Rückschlüsse auf den verwendeten Schlüssel) oder Teilinformationen wie 'Verschlüsselung konnte durchgeführt werden / nicht durchgeführt werden'
- **Known-plaintext attack** - kennt sowohl Teile des Plaintext als auch dazugehörigen Ciphertext.
- **Chosen-plaintext attack** - kann Plaintexte wählen, welche er verschlüsseln lassen will. Erhält dazugehörigen Ciphertext: daraus Rückschlüsse auf andere Plaintexte oder gar Schlüssel
- **Brute-force attack** - Der Attacker probiert alle möglichen Schlüssel aus, bis er den richtigen gefunden hat (Plaintext erscheint sinnvoll)

Grundsätzlich können alle Verschlüsselungsalgorithmen mittels brute-force Attacken geknackt werden. Ein wichtiges Evaluationskriterium eines Verschlüsselungsalgorithmus ist also, wie lange eine solche brute-force Attacke im Durchschnitt benötigt. Dieser Anzahl sagt man auch kryptographischer Work Factor.

Cryptographic Work Factor

Work Factor The number of times it takes to come upon the correct key is called (cryptographic) work factor.

- Work factor (WF) = average number of keys to try
- Work factor is usually given in bits: $\log_2(n)$, $n = \text{key space size}$

Entropy of Cryptographic Keys

Cryptographic keys are typically created with random generators, so they can be considered as elements of a random variable.

What's the entropy of a key with 128-bit?

- Independent with equal probability: $128 \cdot 1 = 128$ bits
- Dependent with unequal probability: $p(0) = 0.25, p(1) = 0.75 \rightarrow 128 \cdot 0.81 \approx 104$ bits

Information-theoretically secure Intercepting a ciphertext tells you nothing about the plain

Secret Key Cryptography

Perfect Secrecy and One-Time Pad

Perfect Secrecy A cryptographic system has perfect secrecy if for all possible plaintexts p and ciphertexts c :

$$P[p|c] = P[p]$$

This means that observing the ciphertext provides no information about the plaintext.

Limitations of One-Time Pad

- Key must be as long as the message
- Key must be completely random
- Key must be pre-shared securely
- Key can only be used once

Entropy Entropy is maximal if all outcomes are equally likely

$$H = \sum_{i=1}^n p(i) \cdot \log_2 \left(\frac{1}{p(i)} \right)$$

$$H_{\text{binary}} = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{1}{n} \log_2(n) = \log_2(n)$$


Relation between entropy and work factor

Work Factor \approx entropy, key size = max. entropy \approx max. work factor

Computationally secure Work factor \approx key entropy


Electronic Code Book (ECB) Mode simplest mode each block encrypted independently

- $C_i = E_K(P_i)$ for each plaintext block P_i
- **Major weakness:** Identical plaintext blocks produce identical ciphertext blocks
- Patterns in plaintext remain visible in ciphertext
- **Use case:** Almost never - only for single blocks or random data




Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode Each plaintext block is XORed with the previous ciphertext block before encryption:

- $C_i = E_K(P_i \oplus C_{i-1})$, $IV = C_0$
- **Advantages:** Identical plaintext blocks produce different ciphertext
- **Disadvantages:** Sequential encryption, padding oracle attacks possible
- **Use case:** File encryption, legacy TLS




Counter (CTR) Mode Converts block cipher into stream cipher by encrypting a counter:

- $C_i = P_i \oplus E_K(IV + i)$
- **Advantages:** Parallel encryption/decryption, no padding needed
- **Disadvantages:** CNT must never repeat with same key
- **Use case:** High-performance apps, disk encryption




Output Feedback (OFB) Mode Creates keystream by repeatedly encrypting the previous output:

- $O_i = E_K(O_{i-1})$, $C_i = P_i \oplus O_i$, with $O_0 = IV$
- **Advantages:** No padding needed, self-synchronizing
- **Disadvantages:** Sequential operation, no integrity protection
- **Use case:** Stream-oriented transmission (rarely used today)




Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) Authenticated encryption mode combining CTR mode with Galois field multiplication:

- Provides both confidentiality and authenticity
- $C_i = P_i \oplus E_K(IV + i)$, plus authentication tag
- **Advantages:** Parallel operation, built-in authentication, high performance
- **Use case:** Modern TLS, IPsec, wireless protocols



Stream Ciphers Stream ciphers encrypt data bit-by-bit or byte-by-byte:

- No need to wait for complete blocks
- Generally faster than block ciphers
- Most historical stream ciphers are broken (RC4, A5/1, A5/2)
- ChaCha20 is the current standard for stream ciphers



Modern Symmetric Encryption

Modern Cipher Properties Since perfect secrecy is impractical, modern ciphers aim for computational security:


- Publicly known algorithms
- No known practical attacks
- Work factor $> 2^{128}$
- Use standardized implementations only

Overview of AES Modes AES can operate in different modes to handle messages longer than a single block (16 bytes):

- **Confidentiality-only modes:** ECB, CBC, CFB, OFB, CTR
- **Authenticated encryption modes:** GCM, CCM, OCB
- Each mode has different security properties and use cases

Block Ciphers Block ciphers encrypt fixed-size blocks of data:

- Require padding for messages not multiple of block size
- Use modes of operation for longer messages
- Examples: DES (insecure), Triple-DES (legacy), AES (current standard)




Mode Selection Guidelines Choose AES modes based on requirements:

- **Never use ECB** - except for single blocks
- **Use GCM** - when you need both encryption and authentication
- **Use CBC** - for compatibility with legacy systems (with HMAC for authentication)
- **Use CTR** - when you need parallel processing and will add authentication separately
- **Avoid OFB/CFB** - unless specifically required by legacy protocols

Public Key Cryptography

Key Distribution Challenge Secret key cryptography faces significant scalability issues:


- Keys must be exchanged securely before communication
- Difficult to establish keys with unknown parties
- n users require $\frac{n(n-1)}{2}$ key pairs for complete connectivity
- Key management complexity grows quadratically



Public Key Principles

Public Key Cryptography Uses mathematically related key pairs for encryption and decryption:

- **Public Key** - Known to everyone, used for encryption
- **Private Key** - Known only to owner, used for decryption
- Keys mathematically related: $D(E(M)) = M$
- Private key cannot be feasibly computed from public key



Diffie-Hellman Protocol

Setup

Alice and Bob agree on public parameters:

- Large prime p
- Generator g of the multiplicative group \mathbb{Z}_p^*

Key Generation

- Alice chooses private a , computes $A = g^a \mod p$
- Bob chooses private b , computes $B = g^b \mod p$
- They exchange A and B publicly
- Shared secret: $S = B^a = A^b = g^{ab} \mod p$

Alice	Public	Bob
a	g, p	b
$A = g^a \mod p$	A, B	$B = g^b \mod p$
$SA = (g^b)^a \mod p$		$SB = (g^a)^b \mod p$

RSA Cryptosystem Based on the computational difficulty of factoring large numbers:

- Public Key: (n, e) where $n = p \cdot q$ (product of large primes)
- Private Key: (n, d) where $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}$
- Encryption: $c = m^e \mod n$
- Decryption: $m = c^d \mod n$


Hash Functions and Message Authentication

Cryptographic Hash Function A function that takes arbitrary-length input and produces fixed-length output:

- **Efficient computation** - Fast to compute
- **Preimage resistance** - Hard to find input for given output
- **Collision resistance** - Hard to find two inputs with same output
- **Pseudo-random output** - Small input changes cause large output changes


Digital Signatures vs. MACs

- **MACs**: Fast, require shared secret, provide authentication
- **Digital Signatures**: Slower, use public keys, provide non-repudiation
- Signatures enable verification by anyone with the public key
- MACs only verifiable by parties with the shared secret



Message Authentication Code (MAC) Combines hash functions & secret keys for message integrity:

- Detects unauthorized message modifications
- Provides authentication of message origin
- Requires shared secret key between sender and receiver
- HMAC is the most common MAC construction




HMAC Construction

Hash-based Message Authentication Code:

$$\text{HMAC}(K, M) = H((K \oplus \text{opad}) || H((K \oplus \text{ipad}) || M))$$


- Uses nested hash function calls with key padding
- Secure (if with cryptographic hash functions)
- Resistant to length extension attacks



Authenticated Encryption

Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Combines encryption and authentication in a single operation:

- Provides both confidentiality and integrity protection
- Uses counter mode encryption with Galois field authentication
- Widely supported in TLS and other protocols
- Efficient implementation in hardware and software



Digital Certificates

Digital Certificates A digital certificate is a signed statement by a trusted third party (Certificate Authority) that a certain public key belongs to a certain entity (person, organization, or system). Certificates are used to authenticate public keys, not the entities themselves.

Authentication of Public Keys

The fundamental problem certificates solve is how to reliably distribute public keys in an insecure network:

- Without certificates, it's difficult to know if a public key truly belongs to the claimed entity
- Certificates bind identities to public keys through the endorsement of a trusted third party
- The binding is authenticated through cryptographic signatures

Certificate Types

TLS Certificates:

Domain Validation (DV) - Validates domain ownership only
Organization Validation (OV) - Validates domain ownership and organization details

Extended Validation (EV) - Provides the highest level of validation

Code signing certificates - Authenticate software and files

Client certificates - Identify individual users or machines

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) PKI is the framework that manages digital certificates:

- **Certificate Authorities (CAs)** - Issue and manage certificates
- **Registration Authorities (RAs)** - Verify identities before certificate issuance
- **Certificate stores** - Store trusted root certificates
- **Revocation systems** - Handle certificate invalidation

X.509 Standard X.509 certificates are described in ASN.1 notation and typically encoded using DER (Distinguished Encoding Rules).

X.509 Certificate Fields

Version - Certificate format version (v1, v2, or v3)

Serial Number - Unique identifier assigned by issuing CA

Signature Algorithm ID - Algorithm to sign the certificate

Issuer Name - X.500 Distinguished Name of issuing CA

Validity Period - Start and end dates for certificate validity

Subject Name - X.500 Distinguished Name certif. owner

Subject Public Key Info - public key& algorithm identifier

Extensions - Additional fields (e.g., key usage)

Certificate Signature - The digital signature created by CA

Certificate Chains Certificates form chains of trust:

- **End entity certificates** - Used by servers, clients, or devices
- **Intermediate CA certificates** - Issued by root CAs to intermediate CAs
- **Root CA certificates** - Self-signed certificates from trusted root authorities

To verify a certificate, each certificate in the chain must be validated up to a trusted root.


Certificate Validation Process Certificate validation follows a simple chain of trust:

- Each certificate's issuer must match the next certificate's subject
- Each certificate's signature must be verifiable by the next certificate's public key
- The chain must end with a trusted root certificate
- Certificate must be within its validity period and not revoked

Root Certificate Trust

Root certificates are the foundation of trust in PKI:

- Root certificates are pre-installed in operating systems and browsers
- They're the ultimate trust anchors that enable the validation of all other certificates
- The security of PKI depends on the protection of root CA private keys



Certificate Revocation and Transparency

Certificate Revocation process of invalidating a certificate before its expiration date, typically due to:

- Compromise of the associated private key
- Change in the certificate owner's status
- Cessation of operation by the certificate owner

Certificate Revocation Mechanisms

- **Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)** - Lists of revoked certificates published by CAs
- **Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)** - Protocol for real-time certificate status checking
- **OCSP Stapling** - Server includes pre-fetched OCSP response during TLS handshake
- **OCSP Must-Staple** - Requires OCSP stapling for a certificate to be considered valid
- **Browser-Summarized CRLs** - Browser vendors compile and compress CRLs for distribution to browser instances

Revocation Checking Methods

- **CRLs**: Download revocation list from CA and check certificate serial number
- **OCSP**: Real-time query to CA for specific certificate status
- **OCSP Stapling**: Server pre-fetches OCSP response and includes it in TLS handshake

Each method has trade-offs between performance, privacy, and reliability.

Certificate Transparency Certificate Transparency (CT) is a framework designed to detect and prevent the fraudulent issuance of certificates:

- Publicly auditable logs of all issued certificates
- Monitors check logs for suspicious certificates
- Browsers require evidence that certificates are logged
- Helps detect malicious or mistakenly issued certificates

Transport Layer Security (TLS)

Transport Layer Security (TLS) TLS is a cryptographic protocol designed to provide secure communication over a computer network. It provides:

- **Confidentiality** - Protection against eavesdropping
- **Integrity** - Detection of message tampering
- **Authentication** - Verification of communicating parties
- **Protection against replay attacks** - Prevention of message reuse

TLS is the successor to Secure Sockets Layer (SSL).

TLS Protocol Stack

TLS Protocol Layers TLS consists of multiple protocol layers:

- **TLS Record Protocol** - The base layer that defines packet format
- **Handshake Protocol** - Negotiates cryptographic parameters and authenticates parties
- **Alert Protocol** - Communicates errors and warnings
- **Application Data Protocol** - Transmits encrypted application data
- **Change Cipher Spec Protocol** - (Deprecated in TLS 1.3, retained for backward compatibility)

TLS Protocol Phases TLS operates in three distinct phases:

- **Handshake** - Establishes cryptographic parameters and authenticates parties
- **Data Exchange** - Transfers protected application data
- **Connection Teardown** - Securely terminates the connection

TLS 1.3 Handshake Goals The TLS 1.3 handshake accomplishes several goals:

- Negotiate cryptographic algorithms
- Perform Diffie-Hellman key exchange
- Generate handshake keys for encryption of subsequent messages
- Authenticate the server (and optionally the client)
- Verify message integrity during the handshake
- Generate keys for data encryption

TLS Record Protection Application data is protected within TLS records:

- Data is fragmented into manageable chunks
- Each fragment is encrypted and authenticated using AEAD ciphers
- A sequence number is included in the authentication to prevent replay attacks
- TLS records include headers that are not encrypted but are authenticated

TLS Session Resumption Session resumption allows clients to reconnect to servers more efficiently:

- Avoids the computational cost of public key operations
- Reduces the number of round-trips required
- In TLS 1.3, uses pre-shared keys (PSKs) derived from previous connections
- Server provides NewSessionTicket messages containing ticket data
- Client can use this ticket in future connections

TLS Building Blocks TLS 1.3 relies on several cryptographic building blocks:

- Strong block ciphers (AES, ChaCha20)
- Authenticated encryption modes (GCM, CCM, Poly1305)
- Diffie-Hellman key exchange (including elliptic curve variants)
- Public key authentication with certificates
- Cryptographic hash functions for key derivation (HKDF)

TLS 1.3 Handshake Process Initial Exchange

- Client sends ClientHello message with:
 - Supported TLS versions
 - Supported cipher suites
 - Supported key exchange groups
 - Client's key shares for preferred groups
- Server responds with ServerHello message:
 - Selected TLS version
 - Selected cipher suite
 - Server's key share for selected group

Key Derivation

- Both parties compute shared secret using Diffie-Hellman
- Handshake keys are derived using HKDF with the shared secret
- All subsequent handshake messages are encrypted

Server Authentication Server sends...

- Certificate message with certificate chain
- CertificateVerify with signature over handshake transcript
- Finished message with MAC over handshake transcript

Client Verification Client...

- validates server certificate
- verifies server's signature in CertificateVerify
- verifies server's Finished message
- sends its own Finished message

Application Data

- Both parties derive application data keys
- Encrypted application data can be exchanged

TLS Connection Termination

TLS provides a secure mechanism for terminating connections:

- Uses close_notify alerts to signal completion of data transmission
- Prevents truncation attacks where an attacker prematurely terminates a connection
- Both parties should send close_notify alerts before closing the underlying TCP connection

Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)

DTLS is an adaptation of TLS for datagram transport protocols like UDP:

- Based on TLS with minimal modifications for unreliable transport
- Uses explicit sequence numbers to handle packet reordering
- Implements message loss detection and retransmission for handshake messages
- Provides optional replay detection for application data
- Current version is DTLS 1.3 (RFC 9147)

Layer 2 Security

Security at Different OSI Layers

- **Physical Layer (Layer 1)** - Quantum cryptography, physical isolation
- **Data Link Layer (Layer 2)** - IEEE 802.1X, WLAN security (WEP, WPA, WPA2, WPA3), MACsec
- **Network Layer (Layer 3)** - IPsec
- **Transport Layer (Layer 4)** - TLS, QUIC
- **Application Layer (Layer 7)** - PGP, S/MIME, Signal, WhatsApp

Layer Selection Tradeoffs

Higher Layer Security:

- Easier to deploy (often included in applications)
- Typically provides end-to-end protection
- Less generally applicable (often optimized for specific applications)

Lower Layer Security:

- More difficult to deploy (may require kernel, router, or switch modifications)
- Often provides only hop-to-hop protection at layer 2
- More generally applicable (protects all protocols above it)

Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)

Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) framework for authentication that supports multiple authentication methods:

- Provides a flexible authentication mechanism
- Designed to be transport-independent (can run over various protocols)
- Allows network access control without knowledge of each individual user
- Supports numerous authentication methods via different EAP types

EAP Packet Format EAP packets have a simple structure:

```
1 struct eap_packet {
2     uint8_t code;           // Request (1), Response (2), Success (3), Failure (4)
3     uint8_t id;             // Used to match requests and responses
4     uint16_t length;        // Total length of the EAP packet
5     uint8_t type;           // When code=1,2: authentication method type
6     uint8_t data[];         // Type-specific data
7 };
```

EAP Authentication Methods EAP supports numerous authentication methods with varying security properties:

- **EAP-MD5** - Simple challenge-response mechanism (insecure, no mutual authentication)
- **EAP-TLS** - Uses TLS protocol with client certificates (strong security)
- **EAP-TTLS** - Tunneled TLS without requiring client certificates
- **PEAP** - Microsoft's Protected EAP, similar to EAP-TTLS
- **EAP-FAST** - Cisco's Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling

Current recommendation is to use EAP-TLS when possible.

IEEE 802.1X Port-Based Access Control

IEEE 802.1X port-based network access control:

- Controls access to a network by authenticating devices before allowing network access
- Prevents unauthorized access through publicly accessible network ports
- Uses EAP for authentication
- Provides centralized VLAN assignment based on authentication

802.1X Components

- **Supplicant** - The client device requesting network access
- **Authenticator** - The network device (switch, access point) controlling port access
- **Authentication Server** - Typically a RADIUS server that validates user credentials

Security Limitations of 802.1X While 802.1X provides significant security benefits, it has limitations:

- Man-in-the-middle attacks are possible when an attacker inserts themselves between a legitimate device and the switch
- An attacker could monitor traffic by creating a bridge between the legitimate device and the switch
- Once initial authentication is complete, the ongoing session is not continuously verified
- These limitations are addressed in 802.1X-2010 with the use of MACsec

MACsec IEEE 802.1AE (Media Access Control Security)

- Data confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity on layer 2 (Ethernet)
- Protection for all data including DHCP, ARP, and higher layer protocols
- Security for both physical and virtual links between devices
- Line-rate encryption in hardware implementations

WLAN Security

WLAN Security Challenges

- No physical cable requirement for packet sniffing
- Signals extend beyond physical boundaries
- Difficult to control who can attempt to connect
- Need for strong encryption and authentication

Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) OG security standard for 802.11 networks:

- Shared key between all clients and the access point
- Uses RC4 stream cipher with 40 or 104-bit keys
- Uses a 24-bit Initialization Vector (IV)
- Includes a CRC-32 checksum for integrity checking

WEP Security Flaws

- Small IV space (24 bits) leads to inevitable IV reuse
- Weak key scheduling algorithm in RC4
- CRC-32 is not cryptographically secure for integrity protection
- No protection against bit-flipping attacks
- No replay protection
- No per-user/per-session keys

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) interim solution while waiting for 802.11i (WPA2):

- Introduced the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)
- Provided per-packet key mixing
- Added message integrity code (Michael)
- Implemented a frame counter to prevent replay attacks
- Available in personal (PSK) and enterprise (802.1X) modes

Network Security

Network Segmentation dividing a computer network into smaller, isolated segments:

- Increases operational performance by containing traffic
- Limits damage from cyber attacks to specific segments
- Protects vulnerable devices by isolating them
- Reduces the scope of compliance requirements
- Protects against insider threats

Typical Network Segments

DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) - Hosts public-facing services

Server Network - Hosts internal servers and applications

Client Network - Hosts employee workstations

Guest Network - Hosts visitor devices with limited access

IoT Network - Hosts Internet of Things devices

Industrial Network - Hosts industrial control systems

Admin Network - Hosts administrative systems and tools

Zero Trust Challenges

- Single points of failure in policy enforcement
- Potential for accidental or malicious misconfigurations
- Vulnerability to denial-of-service attacks
- Difficulties with encrypted traffic visibility
- Lack of protection against credential theft

MACsec Operation MACsec operates by:

- Encrypting the payload of Ethernet frames between adjacent devices
- Adding a SecTAG to identify the keys and provide packet numbering
- Integrity Check Value (ICV) based on GCM-AES
- Providing hop-by-hop protection where each device on the path decrypts and re-encrypts the data

WPA2 (IEEE 802.11i) complete implementation of the IEEE 802.11i standard:

- Introduced Counter Mode with CBC-MAC Protocol (CCMP)
- Based on AES encryption (replacing RC4)
- Provides stronger authentication, integrity, and confidentiality
- Retained TKIP only for backward compatibility
- Available in personal (PSK) and enterprise (802.1X) modes

WPA/WPA2 Operation

• Authentication Phase:

- WPA-Personal: Uses pre-shared key (PSK)
- WPA-Enterprise: Uses 802.1X and EAP with a RADIUS server

• Key Exchange Phase:

- Establishes pairwise transient keys for unicast traffic
- Establishes group keys for broadcast/multicast traffic
- Implements key rotation to prevent attacks

WPA3 latest Wi-Fi security standard:

- Introduces Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) to replace WPA2-Personal PSK
- Provides forward secrecy
- Protects against offline dictionary attacks
- Includes enhanced protection for enterprise networks
- Improves encryption for public networks with Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE)

Packet Filtering Firewalls control traffic flow between network segments:

- Examine packet headers to make filtering decisions
- Apply rules based on source/destination addresses, ports, and protocols
- Operate at the network and transport layers of the OSI model
- Form the foundation of network security architecture

Firewall Rule Management

- New Request** - Submission, approval, design, testing, deployment, validation
- Operation** - Monitoring, audits, reports
- Recertification** - Regular review of existing rules
- Decommissioning** - Removal of unnecessary rules

Without proper management processes, firewall rule sets tend to grow uncontrolled and become difficult to understand.

Next Generation Firewalls (NGFW) additional features:

- Deep Packet Inspection** Examines packet contents
- Application Awareness** IDs/controls traffic by application
- Intrusion Prevention** Detects and blocks network attacks
- Antivirus/Anti-malware** Scans traffic for malicious content
- Sandboxing** exec suspicious files in isolated environments
- Threat Intelligence** inc. external information about threats

Host-Based Firewalls additional layer of protection:

- Operate directly on individual devices
- Protect against threats that bypass network firewalls
- Filter traffic based on local policies
- Examples include Windows Defender Firewall, Linux nftables, and macOS firewall

Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) combine several capabilities to secure endpoints:

- Monitoring:** Anomaly detection, vulnerability scanning, integrity checks
- Protection:** Host-based firewall, antivirus, app control
- Investigation and Response:** device isolation, user session termination, change rollback, evidence collection

Web Application Firewalls (WAF) protect web applications from attacks:

- Examine HTTP/HTTPS traffic at the application layer
- Protect against OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), SQL Injection, Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
- Require TLS termination to inspect encrypted traffic
- Deploy in front of web servers

Firewall Benefits and Limitations

Benefits: Block unwanted traffic before it enters protected networks, Centralize access control, Hide internal network structure

Limitations: Primarily perimeter protection (assumes threats are external), Cannot prevent internal threats, Basic packet filtering cannot detect application-layer attacks, Cannot protect against allowed protocols misuse

Secure Web Gateway (SWG) protect users from web-based threats:

- URL filtering to block malicious sites
- Data Loss Prevention (DLP) to prevent sensitive data exfiltration
- TLS inspection to examine encrypted traffic
- User and application control

Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB) provide security controls for cloud services:

- Shadow IT discovery** ID unauthorized cloud service usage
- Cloud usage control** Set access rights to cloud services
- Data leakage prevention** ctrl data sharing in cloud services
- Anomaly detection** Alert on unusual behavior patterns

Implementation methods:

- API scanning - Directly interfaces with cloud providers
- Forward proxy - Controls outbound access to cloud services
- Reverse proxy - Intermediates between users and cloud services

Network Detection and Response (NDR) monitor network traffic to detect and respond to threats:

- Establish baseline network behavior
- Detect anomalies that may indicate attacks
- Analyze potential incidents to identify true positives
- Automatically respond to confirmed threats

Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) collect and analyze security events:

- Aggregate logs from multiple sources
- Correlate events to identify attack patterns
- Provide a centralized dashboard for security monitoring
- Generate reports for compliance and security analysis

Security Orchestration Automation and Response (SOAR) extend SIEM capabilities:

- Automate security response with playbooks
- Integrate with multiple security tools
- Orchestrate complex security workflows
- Enhance incident response with automation

Basic nftables Commands

```
1 # Create a table
2 nft add table inet filter
3 # Create a chain in the table
4 nft add chain inet filter input { type filter hook input priority 0 \; policy drop \; }
5 # Add a rule to the chain
6 nft add rule inet filter input tcp dport 22 accept
7 # List the ruleset
8 nft list ruleset
9 # Delete a rule (using its handle)
10 nft delete rule inet filter input handle 4
11 # Flush a table (delete all chains and rules)
12 nft flush table inet filter
```

Port Scanning discover available services on a network:

- Identifies open ports on target systems
- Helps determine running services and potential vulnerabilities
- Used by both attackers for reconnaissance and administrators for security testing
- Most commonly performed using tools like nmap

Basic Port Scanning with nmap

```
1 # Scan a single host for common ports
2 nmap 192.168.1.1
3 # Scan specific ports
4 nmap -p 22,80,443 192.168.1.1
5 # Scan an entire subnet
6 nmap 192.168.1.0/24
```

netfilter/nftables netfilter is a mechanism that allows to access the packets in the network stack to analyze, modify, extract, and delete them.

- Hooks that are called at different points during packet processing

nftables is a packet classification and mangling framework that runs on rulesets that are applied to the packets

- Table** Container for specific type of package
- Chain** Container with rules for a specific hook
- Hook** Called at different points of processing
- Priority** Lowest priority first until rule is accepted
- Policy** Default behaviour
- Rule** Classification + Action
- Classification** What packets does a rule apply to
- Action** What to do with the packet

nftables Rules

```
1 # Drop all packets going to IPv4 address 8.8.8.8
2 ip daddr 8.8.8.8 drop
3 # Accept all packets coming on interface eth2
4 iifname eth2 accept
5 # Accept all IPv6 packets carrying TCP
6 ip6 nexthdr tcp accept
```

nftables Framework nftables is a packet classification and filtering framework in Linux:

- Replaces the legacy iptables framework
- Part of the Linux kernel since version 2.4
- Provides packet filtering, network address translation, and packet mangling
- Configured using the nft command-line tool

nftables Architecture

- Tables** - Group chains for a specific packet type (address family)
- Chains** - Group rules and attach to hooks in the network stack
- Rules** - Define matching criteria and actions for packets
- Expressions** - Match packet properties (addresses, ports, etc.)
- Actions** - Determine what happens to matching packets (accept, drop, reject, etc.)

Virtual Private Networks

Introduction to VPNs

Virtual Private Network (VPN)

A VPN is a private network created within a public network infrastructure:

- Private** - External parties cannot read or modify transmitted data
- Virtual** - Privacy is achieved through cryptography, not dedicated links
- Creates an encrypted tunnel between endpoints
- Allows secure access to resources across untrusted networks

VPN Use Cases

Common VPN use cases include:

- Connecting remote offices or branches to a main corporate network
- Allowing partner organizations limited access to internal resources
- Enabling remote employees to securely access company resources
- Protecting privacy when using public Wi-Fi networks
- Bypassing geographical restrictions on content

VPN Core Concepts

Key VPN characteristics include:

- VPNs connect networks (or a host to a network), not just individual hosts
- VPN endpoints (gateways) establish and maintain the secure tunnel
- Internal hosts typically require no special configuration
- Traffic is encrypted between VPN endpoints
- VPNs often hide internal addressing with NAT

VPN Protocols

VPN Protocol Types

Several protocols are commonly used to implement VPNs:

- **IPsec** - IP Security protocol suite operating at the network layer
- **OpenVPN** - SSL/TLS-based solution running at the application layer
- **WireGuard** - Modern, high-performance VPN protocol
- **Proprietary protocols** - Vendor-specific implementations


IPsec VPNs

IPsec Components

IPsec consists of several components:

- **Authentication Header (AH)** - Provides authentication and integrity (rarely used)
- **Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)** - Provides encryption, authentication, and integrity
- **Internet Key Exchange (IKE)** - Handles key exchange and security association negotiation
- **Security Associations (SA)** - Parameters for secure communication

ESP provides confidentiality, authentication, and integrity protection for IP packets. It operates at the network layer and can protect entire IP packets in tunnel mode or just the payload in transport mode.



IPsec vs. TLS Comparison

IPsec and TLS differ in several key aspects:

- **Layer** - IPsec works at the network layer, TLS at the transport/application layer
- **Protection scope** - IPsec protects all IP traffic between hosts, TLS protects specific application connections
- **Implementation** - IPsec requires kernel integration, TLS runs in user space
- **Configuration** - IPsec typically requires more complex configuration

IPsec Modes

IPsec operates in two primary modes:

- **Transport Mode:**
 - Protects the payload of the IP packet
 - Original IP header remains intact
 - Typically used for host-to-host communications
- **Tunnel Mode:**
 - Protects the entire original IP packet
 - Encapsulates the original packet in a new IP packet
 - Typically used for network-to-network (gateway-to-gateway) VPNs
 - Hides internal IP addressing from eavesdroppers

OpenVPN

OpenVPN Architecture

OpenVPN's architecture includes several key components:

- **Virtual network interfaces** (TUN/TAP) to capture and inject network traffic
- **SSL/TLS library** for authentication and key exchange
- **Control channel** for management communication
- **Data channel** for encrypted user traffic
- **Configuration system** for defining connection parameters

OpenVPN Protocol Features

OpenVPN offers several protocol features:

- Can operate over UDP (default, port 1194) or TCP
- Uses SSL/TLS for authentication and key exchange
- Implements reliability mechanisms when using UDP
- Employs OpenSSL for cryptographic operations
- Supports various authentication methods:
 - Pre-shared static keys
 - Certificate-based authentication
 - Username/password authentication
 - Multi-factor authentication

WireGuard

WireGuard Architecture WireGuard's architecture focuses on simplicity:

- Operates at the network layer (Layer 3)
- Implements a "cryptokey routing" concept
- Uses public key authentication
- Always employs perfect forward secrecy
- Maintains a simple, stateless design

WireGuard Features Key features of WireGuard include:

- **Simplified cryptography** - No cipher negotiation, uses fixed set of modern algorithms
- **Fast handshake** - 1-RTT handshake under normal circumstances
- **Clean, minimal codebase** - Easier to audit and more secure
- **Connection-less design** - No persistent connection state
- **Stealth operation** - No response to unauthenticated packets
- **DoS mitigation** - Cookie challenge mechanism
- **Seamless roaming** - Maintains connections across network changes

Comparing VPN Protocols

Protocol Comparison IPsec, OpenVPN, and WireGuard have different characteristics:

- **IPsec:**
 - Pro: Widely supported, mature standard
 - Pro: Hardware acceleration in many devices
 - Con: Complex implementation and configuration
 - Con: May be blocked by restrictive firewalls
- **OpenVPN:**
 - Pro: Cross-platform compatibility
 - Pro: Runs in user space
 - Pro: Works well through firewalls (can use TCP port 443)
 - Con: Slower performance than IPsec and WireGuard
- **WireGuard:**
 - Pro: Superior performance and simplicity
 - Pro: Modern cryptography by default
 - Pro: Small, auditable codebase
 - Con: Less mature than alternatives
 - Con: Fixed cryptographic algorithms

VPN Deployment Scenarios

Site-to-Site VPN Site-to-site VPNs connect entire networks:

- Connect branch offices to headquarters
- Connect partner organizations' networks
- Implemented using VPN gateways at each location
- Transparent to end users
- Typically always-on connections

Remote Access VPN Remote access VPNs connect individual users to a network:

- Enable employees to work remotely
- Allow access to internal resources from outside
- Implemented using VPN client software on user devices
- Often use dynamic IP addressing with virtual addresses
- Typically on-demand connections

User Authentication

Access Control Components

Access Control Framework

Access control systems typically involve four key components:

- **Identification** - Claiming an identity (e.g., username)
- **Authentication** - Proving the claimed identity (e.g., password)
- **Authorization** - Determining what the authenticated identity may do
- **Accounting/Auditing** - Recording what actions were performed

Authentication Fundamentals

Authentication is the process of verifying that a claimed identity is genuine:

- Establishes trust in the identity claim
- Serves as the foundation for access control
- Must be completed before authorization
- Should be resistant to impersonation attacks

Authentication Factors

Authentication Factors

Authentication is based on three fundamental factors:

- **Something you know** - Knowledge factors (passwords, PINs, security questions)
- **Something you have** - Possession factors (physical tokens, smart cards, mobile devices)
- **Something you are** - Inherence factors (biometrics - fingerprints, face, voice)

Additional factors sometimes considered include:

- **Somewhere you are** - Location factors (GPS, network location)
- **Something you do** - Behavior factors (typing patterns, gestures)

Password-Based Authentication

Password Security Challenges

Password-based authentication faces several significant challenges:

- **Human memory limitations** - Difficult to remember strong, unique passwords
- **Password reuse** - Users often use the same password across multiple sites
- **Password sharing** - Accounts accessed by multiple people
- **Password theft** - Phishing, keylogging, and data breaches
- **Brute force attacks** - Systematic guessing of passwords

Secure Password Storage

Password Hashing

Password hashing is a one-way transformation to securely store passwords:

- Converts passwords into fixed-length strings that cannot be reversed
- Allows verification without storing the actual password
- Must use cryptographic hash functions designed for security
- Should be combined with salting and key stretching

Salting Passwords

Salting is adding random data to passwords before hashing:

- Prevents use of precomputed tables (rainbow tables) for cracking
- Forces attackers to crack each password individually
- Salt should be unique per user and sufficiently long (64-128 bits)
- Salt is stored alongside the hash in the password database

Key Stretching

Key stretching increases the computational work needed to compute password hashes:

- Applies the hash function repeatedly (thousands or millions of times)
- Increases the time needed for brute force attacks
- Can be adjusted as hardware becomes faster
- Implemented in specialized password hashing functions

Password Hashing Functions

Modern password hashing functions are designed specifically for password storage:

- **bcrypt** - Based on Blowfish cipher, includes salt and cost factor
- **PBKDF2** - Password-Based Key Derivation Function, configurable iterations
- **Argon2** - Winner of the Password Hashing Competition, memory-hard function
- **scrypt** - Memory-hard function designed to be resistant to hardware acceleration

These functions are preferable to general-purpose cryptographic hash functions for password storage.

Multi-Factor Authentication

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)

Multi-factor authentication combines at least two different authentication factors:

- Requires factors from different categories (know, have, are)
- Significantly increases security compared to single-factor authentication
- Mitigates risks of compromised passwords
- Widely recommended for sensitive systems and accounts

Common MFA Methods

Popular implementations of multi-factor authentication include:

- **One-Time Passwords (OTP):**
 - Time-based (TOTP) - Generated from a shared secret and current time
 - HMAC-based (HOTP) - Generated from a shared secret and counter
 - SMS-based - Codes sent via text message (less secure)
- **Push Notifications** - Authentication requests sent to mobile applications
- **Hardware Security Keys** - Physical devices using FIDO/U2F standards
- **Biometric Verification** - Fingerprint, face, or voice recognition

MFA Attack Vectors

Despite its strength, MFA can still be vulnerable to certain attacks:

- **Real-time phishing** - Intercepting and forwarding authentication in real-time
- **SIM swapping** - Taking control of a victim's phone number for SMS-based MFA
- **MFA fatigue** - Bombarding users with authentication requests until they approve
- **Malware on endpoint devices** - Capturing authentication data locally
- **Social engineering** - Tricking users into bypassing MFA protections

MFA Fatigue Countermeasures

- To counter MFA fatigue attacks, several approaches can be used:
- **Number matching** - Displaying a number on login screen that must be entered in authenticator
 - **Geographic context** - Showing location information of the login attempt
 - **Device context** - Showing device information of the login attempt
 - **Request limiting** - Restricting the number of authentication requests
 - **Suspicious activity detection** - Identifying unusual patterns

Passwordless Authentication

Passwordless Authentication

- Passwordless authentication eliminates passwords in favor of stronger alternatives:
- Based on public key cryptography and digital certificates
 - Typically combines possession and inherence factors
 - Eliminates password-related vulnerabilities
 - Improves user experience by removing password entry

FIDO2/WebAuthn

- FIDO2 is a set of standards for passwordless authentication:
- Combines WebAuthn (web authentication standard) and CTAP (client-to-authenticator protocol)
 - Uses public key cryptography for authentication
 - Supports various authenticator types:
 - Platform authenticators (built into devices)
 - Roaming authenticators (external security keys)
 - Protects against phishing through origin binding
 - Private keys never leave the authenticator

Authentication Protocols

Authentication Protocols

- Authentication protocols define the messages and procedures for user authentication:
- Standardize authentication across different systems
 - Can be direct (authenticating directly to service) or indirect (using a third party)
 - Often establish session keys for secure communication
 - May support various authentication methods

Direct vs. Indirect Authentication

- There are two fundamental approaches to authentication:
- **Direct Authentication:**
 - User authenticates directly to the service
 - Service has all information needed to authenticate users
 - Credentials are configured on each service
 - Example: Local login on a server
 - **Indirect Authentication:**
 - Authentication delegated to a central authority
 - Service trusts the authentication decisions of this authority
 - Credentials are managed centrally
 - Examples: RADIUS, Kerberos, SAML, OpenID Connect

Single Sign-On (SSO)

Single Sign-On (SSO)

- Single sign-on enables users to authenticate once and access multiple services:
- Reduces the number of authentication events
 - Centralizes credential management
 - Improves user experience
 - Enhances security by reducing password fatigue
 - Can implement consistent security policies across services

SSO Implementation Approaches

- SSO can be implemented using various protocols:
- **Kerberos** - Primarily for on-premises environments (e.g., Active Directory)
 - **SAML** - Web-based SSO between different organizations
 - **OpenID Connect** - Modern protocol for web and mobile applications
 - **OAuth 2.0** - Authorization framework often used with OpenID Connect

OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect

OAuth 2.0

- OAuth 2.0 is an authorization framework (not authentication):
- Enables third-party applications to access resources without sharing credentials
 - Uses tokens to grant limited access to resources
 - Defines various authorization flows for different scenarios
 - Standardized in RFC 6749

OAuth 2.0 Roles

- OAuth 2.0 defines four key roles:
- **Resource Owner** - Entity that grants access (typically the user)
 - **Client** - Application requesting access to resources
 - **Resource Server** - Server hosting the protected resources
 - **Authorization Server** - Server issuing access tokens

OpenID Connect (OIDC)

- OpenID Connect is an identity layer built on top of OAuth 2.0:
- Adds authentication functionality to OAuth 2.0
 - Provides user profile information
 - Uses JSON Web Tokens (JWT) for identity tokens
 - Enables social login and federated identity

OpenID Connect Terminology

- OpenID Connect introduces specific terminology:
- **Relying Party (RP)** - Application that wants to verify user identity
 - **OpenID Provider (OP)** - Service that authenticates users
 - **ID Token** - JWT containing user identity information
 - **Userinfo Endpoint** - API for retrieving additional user information
 - **Claims** - Pieces of information about the user

SAML

Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)

- SAML is an XML-based framework for exchanging authentication and authorization data:
- Primarily used for web-based SSO
 - Enables cross-domain identity and access management
 - Separates identity provider from service provider
 - Current version is SAML 2.0

SAML Components

- SAML defines several core components:
- **Assertions** - XML documents containing authentication statements
 - **Protocols** - Rules for requesting and receiving assertions
 - **Bindings** - Methods for transporting assertions over different protocols
 - **Profiles** - Combinations of assertions, protocols, and bindings for specific use cases

SAML vs. OpenID Connect

- SAML and OpenID Connect differ in several ways:
- **Format** - SAML uses XML, OIDC uses JSON
 - **Platform support** - SAML for web only, OIDC for web, mobile, and APIs
 - **Complexity** - SAML more complex, OIDC simpler to implement
 - **Age** - SAML older and more established, OIDC newer
 - **Token size** - SAML assertions larger than OIDC ID tokens

Kerberos

Kerberos Components

- Kerberos involves several key components:
- **Principals** - Users, services, or systems that participate in authentication
 - **Key Distribution Center (KDC)** - Central authentication server consisting of:
 - Authentication Service (AS) - Verifies user identities
 - Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) - Issues service tickets
 - **Realm** - Administrative domain of a KDC
 - **Tickets** - Cryptographically protected credentials:
 - Ticket-Granting Ticket (TGT) - Used to request service tickets
 - Service Ticket - Used to access specific services

Kerberos Authentication Process

Initial Authentication

- User logs in and sends username to Authentication Service
- AS checks if user exists in database
- AS sends back data encrypted with user’s key (derived from password)
- Client decrypts this using the user’s password
- Client extracts Ticket-Granting Ticket (TGT) and session key

Service Ticket Acquisition

- When user needs to access a service, client contacts Ticket-Granting Service
- Client sends TGT and an authenticator encrypted with session key
- TGS verifies TGT and authenticator
- TGS issues service ticket and new session key for the client-service communication

Service Access

- Client presents service ticket to the service
- Client also sends a new authenticator encrypted with client-service session key
- Service decrypts ticket and authenticator
- Service verifies authenticator contents (timestamp within allowed skew)
- Service grants access if verification succeeds

Kerberos Security Properties

Kerberos provides several security properties:

- **No password transmission** - Passwords never sent over the network
- **Limited ticket lifetime** - Tickets expire after a defined period
- **Mutual authentication** - Both client and server can verify each other
- **Replay protection** - Timestamps prevent reuse of authentication messages
- **Key distribution** - Session keys established for secure communication

Cross-Realm Authentication

Kerberos supports authentication across different administrative domains:

- Enables federated identity across organizations
- Requires trust relationship between realms
- Uses a hierarchical trust model or direct cross-realm keys
- Allows users from one realm to access services in another

Federated Authentication

Federated Authentication

Federated authentication enables identity verification across organization boundaries:

- Allows users to authenticate with their home organization
- Enables access to resources in partner organizations
- Eliminates need for multiple accounts and credentials
- Maintains security boundaries between organizations
- Examples include academic federation (SWITCHaai) and enterprise federations

Shibboleth

Shibboleth is a system for federated identity management:

- Based on SAML
- Separates authentication from authorization
- Preserves privacy by limiting attribute sharing
- Widely used in academic and research communities
- Components include:
 - Identity Provider (IdP) - Authenticates users
 - Service Provider (SP) - Protects resources
 - Discovery Service - Helps users find their home organization

Shibboleth Authentication Flow

Resource Access Request

- User attempts to access a protected resource
- Service Provider determines resource requires authentication
- SP redirects user to Discovery Service

Identity Provider Selection and Authentication

- User selects their home organization from the Discovery Service
- User is redirected to their Identity Provider
- User authenticates with their home organization credentials

Assertion Generation and Validation

- IdP generates a SAML assertion containing authentication statement
- IdP may include additional user attributes (depending on configuration)
- Assertion is cryptographically signed and optionally encrypted
- User’s browser posts the assertion to the Service Provider

Resource Access

- SP validates the assertion’s signature
- SP extracts user identity and attributes
- SP makes authorization decision based on attributes
- SP grants access to the resource if authorized

Authorization

Introduction to Authorization

Authorization Authorization is the process of determining whether an authenticated entity is permitted to perform a requested action:

- Follows successful authentication
- Controls access to resources and operations
- Implements security policies
- Enforces principle of least privilege

Fundamental Building Blocks Authorization systems consist of three core components:

- **Access Control Model** - Conceptual framework defining how access decisions are made
- **Security Policy** - Rules defining who can access what resources
- **Security Mechanism** - Technical implementation enforcing the security policy

Security Policy Drivers Security policies are influenced by multiple factors:

- **Business Drivers** - Efficiency, usability, operational requirements
- **Security Drivers** - Risk management, threat mitigation, data protection
- **Regulatory Drivers** - Legal compliance, industry standards

Access Control Models

Major Access Control Models Three primary access control models dominate modern systems:

- **Discretionary Access Control (DAC)** - Access decisions made by resource owners
- **Mandatory Access Control (MAC)** - Access decisions enforced by system policy
- **Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)** - Access based on user roles within an organization

Additional models include:

- **Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)** - Access based on attributes of users, resources, and environment
- **Rule-Based Access Control** - Access based on predefined rules
- **Relationship-Based Access Control (ReBAC)** - Access based on relationships between entities

Discretionary Access Control (DAC)

Discretionary Access Control

DAC is an access control model where the resource owner controls access rights:

- Resource owners determine who can access their resources
- Owners can delegate access control to others
- Access rights can be transferred between users
- Most common model in general-purpose operating systems

DAC Implementation Methods

DAC is commonly implemented through two main mechanisms:

- **Access Control Lists (ACLs):**
 - Lists of permissions attached to objects
 - Each entry specifies subject and allowed operations
 - Efficiently answers "who can access this object?"
- **Capabilities:**
 - Unforgeable tokens owned by subjects
 - Each token grants specific access rights
 - Efficiently answers "what can this subject access?"

DAC Advantages and Disadvantages

DAC offers certain benefits and limitations:

- **Advantages:**
 - Flexible and intuitive for users
 - Simple to understand and administer
 - Enables fine-grained access control
- **Disadvantages:**
 - Vulnerable to Trojan horse attacks
 - Cannot enforce system-wide security policies
 - May lead to uncontrolled information flow
 - Prone to privilege creep over time

UNIX/Linux File Permissions

Standard UNIX Permissions

UNIX-style file permissions implement a simple form of DAC:

- Each file/directory has an owner and group
- Permissions divided into three categories:
 - Owner (user) permissions
 - Group permissions
 - Others (world) permissions
- Each category can have read (r), write (w), and execute (x) permissions
- Represented as 9 bits, often shown in octal notation (e.g., 755)

UNIX Permission Interpretation

Permission bits have different meanings for files and directories:

- **For Files:**
 - Read (r) - View file contents
 - Write (w) - Modify file contents
 - Execute (x) - Run file as a program
- **For Directories:**
 - Read (r) - List directory contents
 - Write (w) - Create, delete, or rename files within directory
 - Execute (x) - Access files and subdirectories (traverse)

Special Permission Bits

UNIX systems have additional permission bits for special purposes:

- **Setuid bit (4000)** - When set on executable files, the program runs with the permissions of the file owner
- **Setgid bit (2000):**
 - On executable files: Program runs with the permissions of the file's group
 - On directories: New files inherit the directory's group
- **Sticky bit (1000)** - On directories, files can only be deleted or renamed by their owner (commonly used on /tmp)

Access Control Lists (ACLs)

POSIX ACLs

POSIX Access Control Lists extend standard UNIX permissions:

- Allow specifying permissions for multiple users and groups
- Maintain backward compatibility with standard permissions
- Include:
 - Minimal ACLs - Equivalent to standard permissions
 - Extended ACLs - Additional users/groups with specific permissions

ACL Components

POSIX ACLs consist of several entry types:

- **Owner entry** - Permissions for the file owner (user::rwx)
- **Named user entries** - Permissions for specific users (user:alice:rwx)
- **Group owner entry** - Permissions for the file's group (group::rwx)
- **Named group entries** - Permissions for specific groups (group:developers:rwx)
- **Other entry** - Permissions for everyone else (other::rwx)
- **Mask entry** - Maximum permissions for named users/groups and group owner

Mandatory Access Control (MAC)

Mandatory Access Control

MAC is an access control model where a system-wide policy determines access rights:

- Access decisions enforced by the system, not resource owners
- Based on security labels assigned to subjects and objects
- Security policy defined by system administrators
- Users cannot override or modify access controls

MAC Implementations

Modern operating systems implement various forms of MAC:

- **SELinux (Security-Enhanced Linux):**
 - Developed by NSA
 - Label-based access control
 - Fine-grained policy control
 - Used in Red Hat/Fedora distributions
- **AppArmor:**
 - Path-based access control
 - Simpler configuration than SELinux
 - Used in Ubuntu/SUSE distributions
- **Windows Mandatory Integrity Control:**
 - Introduced in Windows Vista
 - Based on integrity levels (Low, Medium, High, System)
 - Prevents lower integrity processes from modifying higher integrity resources

MAC vs. DAC Comparison

MAC and DAC differ in several key aspects:

- **Control:**
 - DAC - Resource owners control access
 - MAC - System policy controls access
- **Policy Management:**
 - DAC - Distributed management
 - MAC - Centralized management
- **Security Assurance:**
 - DAC - Lower, vulnerable to user errors
 - MAC - Higher, enforces system-wide policy
- **Complexity:**
 - DAC - Simpler to implement and understand
 - MAC - More complex, requires specialized knowledge

Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)

Role-Based Access Control

RBAC is an access control model based on user roles within an organization:

- Users are assigned to roles based on job responsibilities
- Permissions are assigned to roles, not directly to users
- Users acquire permissions through role membership
- Standardized in INCITS 359-2004

RBAC Components

RBAC consists of four main components:

- **Users** - Entities that need access to resources
- **Roles** - Collections of permissions representing job functions
- **Permissions** - Approved operations on protected resources
- **Sessions** - Mappings between users and their activated roles

RBAC Security Principles

RBAC supports several important security principles:

- **Principle of Least Privilege** - Users have only the permissions needed for their job
- **Separation of Duties** - Critical operations require multiple users
- **Data Abstraction** - Permissions defined at higher levels than individual objects

Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)

Attribute-Based Access Control

ABAC is a flexible access control model based on attributes:

- Access decisions based on attributes of:
 - Subjects (users, applications)
 - Resources (data, services)
 - Actions (read, write, execute)
 - Environment (time, location, security level)
- Uses policies that combine attributes with logical rules
- More dynamic than traditional RBAC
- Can implement complex, context-aware policies

ABAC vs. RBAC

ABAC extends beyond traditional RBAC:

- **Flexibility:**
 - RBAC - Predetermined access based on roles
 - ABAC - Dynamic access based on multiple attributes
- **Granularity:**
 - RBAC - Role-level permissions
 - ABAC - Fine-grained, attribute-based decisions
- **Context Awareness:**
 - RBAC - Limited environmental context
 - ABAC - Rich environmental attributes (time, location, etc.)
- **Policy Expression:**
 - RBAC - Role-permission assignments
 - ABAC - Complex boolean logic combining attributes

Zero Trust Security Model

Zero Trust

Zero Trust is a security model that assumes no implicit trust for any entity:

- Eliminates the concept of trusted internal networks
- Requires continuous verification for all access requests
- Applies least privilege access controls
- Inspects and logs all traffic
- Focuses on protecting resources rather than network segments

Zero Trust Principles

Key principles of the Zero Trust model include:

- **Verify explicitly** - Always authenticate and authorize based on all available data points
- **Use least privilege access** - Limit user access with Just-In-Time and Just-Enough-Access
- **Assume breach** - Minimize blast radius and segment access
- **Identity-based security** - Identity becomes the primary security perimeter
- **Continuous monitoring** - Collect and analyze data continuously