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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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2. USSR demands strategic commodities from Western Europe in return for Soviet grain:

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[Redacted]

The USSR delegate to the Economic Commission for Europe meeting has stated that Western European countries must be willing to export the same goods to the USSR as they did in 1949-1950 in order to maintain the level of East-West trade

of those years. The Soviet spokesman refused to specify Russian grain availabilities but stated that the 1949-1950 minimum of all Soviet goods could readily be increased, provided Western Europe was prepared to lengthen the list of exports or increase the quantities involved. The Western European countries had previously stated their requirements for bread and coarse grains.

The US observer at the meeting comments, and various Western European delegates concur, that the proposal and the manner in which it was delivered "bear the earmarks of a major Soviet trade and propaganda offensive."

Comment: The USSR is apparently participating in this meeting to gain information for bargaining in the hope of undermining the entire Western export control program.

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USSR**3. New Soviet Ambassador to North Korea:**


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
On 16 August, Izvestia identified V. N. Razuvayev as Soviet Ambassador to North Korea in a report of sixth anniversary celebrations in Pyongyang.

This is the first indication that former Ambassador T. V. Shtykov has been replaced.

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**FAR EAST**

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WESTERN EUROPE

7. Spain enlarges ban on sale of strategic materials to Soviet orbit: 3.3(h)(2)



The government representative on the newly-created Spanish wolfram control commission has informed US Embassy Madrid that the law requiring that certificates of ultimate destination accompany all applications for Spanish lead exports has now been extended to

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strategic metals and minerals, including wolfram. The official stated that the regulation is designed to prevent the transshipment of essential materials to the Soviet orbit. He also told the US Embassy recently that the time is ripe for a bilateral US-Spanish agreement for the purchase of Spanish wolfram.

Comment: The tightening of export controls and bid for US purchases of Spanish wolfram seem to indicate the failure of Spain's previous policy of holding out for the higher prices paid on the European market or of trying to force the US to satisfy Spain's demands for certain rare minerals needed for its special steels industry.

Only 15 tons of Spanish wolfram were shipped to the US in the past eighteen months. The Spanish government and wolfram producers now appear to be turning to a US contract as the best means to insure further development and the profitable operation of the wolfram mines.

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
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**LATIN AMERICA****9. Comment on Argentine electoral candidates, President and Senora de Peron:**

At a giant labor rally, President Peron and his wife, Evita, agreed to become the Peronista candidates for president and vice-president in the 11 November 1951 elections.

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This first firm declaration of Evita's electoral intentions will accelerate political maneuvering to dislodge the Perons.


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