

~~TOP SECRET~~

EJ

20 March 1959

3.3(h)(2)

Copy No. C 63

3.5(c)

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 6  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X  
1. UNCLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE 4/14/80 REVIEWER: [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03160623




Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03160623

20 MARCH 1959

**I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**


Khrushchev strikes moderate pose at press conference; accepts proposal for foreign ministers' meeting on 11 May.

JAEIC statement on previously unreported Soviet nuclear explosion.

**II. ASIA-AFRICA**

Turkish foreign minister emphasizes support for Iraqi regime; warns of strong Turkish reaction if Nasir intervenes.

Nepal - Prospect of one-party government gives promise of reduced instability for near future.

**III. THE WEST**

- ⑤ Adenauer asserts willingness to extend de facto recognition to East German regime in return for maintenance of status quo in Berlin.
- ⑥ Former Costa Rican President Figueres planning moves against Caribbean dictatorships.

**LATE ITEMS**

- ⑦ Geneva - USSR agrees to US article on duration of nuclear test cessation treaty.
- ⑧ Tibet - Dalai Lama reported fleeing and seeking asylum in India.

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

20 March 1959

## DAILY BRIEF

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*ok - being ad  
a legal item*

USSR: Khrushchev attempted to create an impression of moderation and restraint in his press conference on 19 March, which apparently was intended as a response to President Eisenhower's address to the nation on 16 March. The Soviet premier's remarks, timed to coincide with Prime Minister Macmillan's arrival in Washington, asserted that Western sentiment favoring negotiations "confirms the realism and timeliness of Soviet proposals." He promised to consider any "reasonable" Western counterproposals, declared his readiness to accept a foreign ministers' meeting on 11 May, but reiterated clearly his preference for an immediate summit conference. Khrushchev evaded a direct reply when asked if the USSR would refrain from any "concrete political actions" regarding Berlin in view of President Eisenhower's statement about a possible summit meeting this summer. He reaffirmed Moscow's intention to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany if the West rejects the Soviet proposal for a treaty with both German states.

USSR - Nuclear test: The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee issued the following statement on 19 March 1959:

*ok -  
being ad  
a legal item*

A review and detailed analysis of geophysical records and radiochemical data from the US Atomic Energy Detection System has revealed evidence of a previously unreported Soviet nuclear explosion at about 1010:45 hours GMT on 21 October 1958, in the vicinity of the Novaya Zemlya test site. Signals now have been reported from six electromagnetic

stations. A preliminary estimate indicates that the yield was probably less than five kilotons.

This makes a total of seventy-four Soviet nuclear tests detected to date. [redacted]

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

*PLD*

\*Turkey-Iraq: [Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu, in separate talks with the British and American ambassadors on 16 March, emphasized Turkey's support of the Qasim government. He warned that Turkey's reaction would be "strong and immediate," implying even armed intervention, if Egypt takes "positive action"--either direct or indirect--against Iraq. Turkey has given Qasim assurances of its support.]

(Page 1)

*OK*  
*2nd P-*  
*lines 5 & 6*  
*change to*  
*together appear*  
*to be willing*  
*about 25/70*

Nepal: With half the results announced in Nepal's first national election, the Nepali Congress party, moderately socialist with neutralist foreign policy views, seems assured of gaining a majority in the new parliament. The Communist party has won only one seat so far. A single-party government should at least initially reduce the chronic instability Nepal has experienced since the overthrow of the Rana oligarchy in 1950-51. [redacted]

(Page 3)

## III. THE WEST

*PLD*

West Germany: [Chancellor Adenauer has told party officials that he is willing to extend de facto recognition to the East German Government, provided that the status quo in Berlin can be maintained. He based this major potential change in West German policy on Bonn's need to avoid negotiations on disengagement and to gain time to work out some broad solution of East-West problems. Adenauer apparently is willing to permit dealings between the Western powers and East German officials on access to Berlin in return for a guarantee of continued free access.] [redacted] (Page 4)

OK Caribbean area: Former Costa Rican President José Figueres, during his current trip to Cuba, will probably try to dissuade Castro from actions that would increase Communist capabilities in the area, and seek Castro's help for his own plans for ousting the regimes in Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. He and his ally, Venezuelan President Betancourt, are deeply concerned over Castro's demagoguery and his predilection for supporting pro-Communist groups of revolutionaries in his crusade against dictatorships. [redacted]  
 (Page 5)

#### IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Threats to the Stability of the US Military Facilities Position in the Caribbean Area and Brazil. SNIE 100-3-59. 10 March 1959. [redacted]

The Outlook for Jordan. NIE 36.3-59. 10 March 1959.  
 [redacted]

Chinese Communist Intentions and Probable Courses of Action in the Taiwan Strait Area. SNIE 100-4-59. 13 March 1959. [redacted]

Berlin. SNIE 100-2/1-59. 17 March 1959. [redacted]

#### LATE ITEMS

*M* \*USSR - Nuclear test talks: [In an abrupt reversal, the USSR has agreed at the Geneva talks to the American draft article on the duration of a nuclear test cessation treaty. The Soviet leaders probably believe this demonstration of willingness to make concessions in important East-West negotiations will increase pressure on the West to agree to Soviet terms for talks on Berlin and a German peace treaty. Moscow remains in disagreement with Western views on voting and inspection procedures]

and the staffing of inspection posts. Following Prime Minister Macmillan's talks with Khrushchev, British officials indicated their belief that the USSR will make no concessions on its insistence on veto powers in the proposed control commission except possibly as part of a "package deal" at a summit meeting.

*M*

\*Tibet: [The Dalai Lama fled Lhasa on 17 March and has requested asylum in India through the Indian consul general in Lhasa.]

From the Indian political officer in Sikkim. As of 13 March the Dalai Lama was under protective custody of Tibetan rebels in Lhasa whose cause he is believed to be supporting, according to intercepted messages. Should he succeed in reaching India or Bhutan, Peiping may be expected to exert pressure on Nehru to reject the Dalai Lama's request. While Nehru would be reluctant to jeopardize his relations with Peiping by offering asylum, he probably would not refuse the Dalai Lama permission to remain at least temporarily in India.]

20 Mar 59

DAILY BRIEF

iv

~~TOP SECRET~~

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC  
(No Back-up Material)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Turkey Supports Qasim in Struggle with UAR

[Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu informed the American ambassador on 16 March of Turkey's conviction that Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim is not under Communist domination and that he now wants help from the West to maintain Iraq's independence. Zorlu added that Turkey could not remain disinterested if the UAR now or later makes a move against Iraq.]

[Zorlu stated even more emphatically that Turkey's reaction to any UAR move would be "strong and immediate," leaving the implication that Turkey might even take military action. Zorlu left the distinct impression that the Turks would react to either an armed attack by the UAR or an internal revolt with attributable UAR support.]

[In previous Middle East crises the Turks, seeing the potential threat to their southern border, have threatened military intervention. Since they are dependent on US logistical support to sustain any extensive military operations, however, they would probably not commit Turkish forces without prior consultation. The Turks have a total of approximately 70,000 troops in the vicinity of the Syrian border, half of whom are gendarmerie subject to absorption into the army in wartime.]

[The chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Rustu Erdelhun, began a long-planned visit to Iran on 14 March. Military discussions probably will seek to coordinate the Turkish]

~~TOP SECRET~~

and Iranian response to any future UAR moves against Iraq. In contrast to the Turkish attitude, which has given Qasim the benefit of every doubt and discounted indications that he is under Communist domination, Iran has taken a hostile view of the Qasim government.

For several months Turkey, Iran, and Israel have been exchanging intelligence on the Middle East, and Turkey's strong anti-UAR position probably reflects the Israeli conviction that Nasir is the principal threat in the Middle East.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Nepali Congress Leads in National Elections

The moderate socialist Nepali Congress is maintaining such a sizable lead in Nepal's first national elections--being held between 18 February and 3 April--that it now seems assured of winning a majority and forming the first government under the new constitution.

Results for about half the parliament's 109 seats have been announced to date. The Nepali Congress has won 38 of the 55 seats declared, or 69 percent. The other two major political parties, the rightist Gurkha Parishad and former Prime Minister K. I. Singh's United Democratic party, each appear to be winning less than 15 percent of the seats. The Communist party has won only one seat so far, and has little support in areas where polling has yet to be completed.

The Nepali Congress is the country's oldest, largest, and best-organized party. The country-wide support it is receiving probably is a result of its reputation as leader of the rebellion against the autocratic Rana regime in 1950-51. The party leader, B. P. Koirala, is likely to be called on by King Mahendra to form a government.

King Mahendra, who reportedly had been attempting to divide political party strength evenly, may find a Nepali Congress government--supported by a clear majority and a popular mandate--harder to control than previous cabinets. Mahendra, however, retains ultimate power under the constitution promulgated in February, and internal dissension in the Nepali Congress is likely to make cabinet unity difficult.

The Indian Government apparently has backed the Nepali Congress as offering the best prospect for the stable and progressive government New Delhi feels is essential to protect its special interest in Nepal and to limit Chinese Communist influence. [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

### III. THE WEST

#### Adenauer Willing to Extend De Facto Recognition to East Germany

[Chancellor Adenauer informed the executive committee of his party's Bundestag faction on 19 March that he is willing to extend de facto recognition to the East German Government providing that in negotiating this concession the status quo in Berlin can be maintained and contacts between East and West Germany can be increased. He based his policy change on the need to gain time to settle broad East-West problems and to avoid East-West negotiations on disengagement. Adenauer said that this move would probably be interpreted as an abandonment of unification, but that the only way to achieve unity within the framework of a general detente is to stabilize the present situation. Adenauer called for and received firm party support for these views.]

[In a probable move to force Adenauer's hand on the unification question, the opposition Social Democratic party (SPD) has presented a new proposal on unification and European security which combines features of the Rapacki Plan and some elements of a German confederation. This proposal would provide for three stages in reunification, beginning with a planning committee of East and West Germans and ending with free elections of an all-German government four years later.]

[The new moves by Adenauer and the SPD may both be tactical maneuvers directed toward two state elections in April, which will be the first since the beginning of the Berlin crisis. Both parties are attempting to appeal to a growing demand in West Germany for some new approach to the problems of Berlin and German reunification.]

~~SECRET~~

## Anti-Communist Costa Rican Vies With Castro for Leadership Of Drive Against Dictators

Fidel Castro appears to be meeting with competition for leadership of the drive against Latin American dictatorships. Former Costa Rican President José Figueres, just back from long consultations with his close ally, Venezuelan President Betancourt, has told the American ambassador that he intends to head the revolutionary effort against the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. He also appears deeply involved in plans to oust Dominican dictator Trujillo.

Figueres and Betancourt, both long-time foes of Latin American dictators, share a deep concern over Castro's demagoguery and his support for pro-Communist groups of Nicaraguan and Dominican revolutionaries. During his current visit in Havana, Figueres is expected to attempt to dissuade Castro from activities that would increase Communist capabilities in the area and to seek Castro's support for his own revolutionary efforts.

Figueres' National Liberation party (PLN) has prepared a public statement reaffirming its position in support of democratic movements dedicated to ousting dictators, but taking a strong stand against movements that would include Communists. Representatives of the PLN, Betancourt's Democratic Action party, and the Peruvian APRA party are scheduled to meet on 6 April, probably in the Costa Rican capital, and are expected to issue a similar statement, modified if necessary by the results of the Figueres-Castro talks. [redacted]

[large rectangular redacted area]

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**THE PRESIDENT****The Vice President**

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

**The Treasury Department**

The Secretary of the Treasury

**The Department of State**

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

**The Department of Defense**

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

**The Department of the Interior**

The Secretary of the Interior

**The Department of Commerce**

The Secretary of Commerce

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**

The Director

**Atomic Energy Commission**

The Chairman

**National Security Agency**

The Director

**National Indications Center**

The Director

**United States Information Agency**

The Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~