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1 October 1959


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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1 OCTOBER 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR continues substantial relaxation of jamming of VOA broadcasts to USSR after Khrushchev's departure from US.

Communist China assumes reasonable attitude in border negotiations with Burma.

Khrushchev's Peiping speech suggests Soviet dissociation from tougher Peiping policies in interest of detente with West.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

UAR continues preparations to take advantage of possible Iraqi crisis.

UAR - Chinese Communist relations further strained by speech of Syrian Communist in Peiping.


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**III. THE WEST**

⑥ France invites Algerian rebel requests for clarification of De Gaulle proposals.

⑦ Latin American Communist leaders assemble in Peiping; may confer with Chinese officials on new plans.

⑧ Cuba--Fidel Castro concerned over growing difficulties.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

1 October 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

SIRAB

NO

USSR: The substantial relaxation of jamming of Voice of America broadcasts to the USSR has continued since Khrushchev's departure from the United States. Jamming of VOA broadcasts intended for Eastern European audiences, however, has continued. [In a talk with US officials on 15 September in Washington, Yuri Zhukov, chairman of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, said this relaxation was an "experiment" to see whether the VOA would cease "pursuing the cold war."] [redacted]

(Page 1)

Communist China - Burma: [redacted]

NO

[redacted] Peiping, aware that its reputation as a "friendly neighbor" has suffered considerably from the dispute with New Delhi over the Sino-Indian border, is anxious to avoid charges of recalcitrance in talks on the Sino-Burmese border problem. In the mildest exchange between the two governments in recent months, a Chinese Foreign Ministry official [redacted] expressed to the Burmese ambassador Peiping's hope that the Burmese would agree to meet either in Peiping or Rangoon to begin negotiations. The official said that Peiping could not accept Ne Win's border "package plan" outright, but that it was "very close to the mark" and negotiations would undoubtedly "achieve results." [redacted] (Page 2)

OK

***USSR - Communist China:** Soviet Premier Khrushchev's emphasis on peaceful coexistence in his 30 September speech in Peiping is apparently designed to convey the impression to the West that he intends to maintain the atmosphere of detente by dissociating the USSR from Peiping's harder foreign policy line. His remarks that "we must do everything possible to

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preclude war" and that "we should not attempt to test the stability of the capitalist system by force" vary markedly in tone from recent Chinese Communist pronouncements. Both Khrushchev and Soviet party presidium member Suslov, who spoke in Peiping on 28 September, reflected Moscow's continuing reluctance to endorse Communist China's current economic policies, although they made the usual affirmations of Soviet support and friendship. Both speakers avoided any reference to China's commune program and to the "leap forward," and Suslov's extended praise of Soviet industrial and agricultural technology appears to be an indirect suggestion to the Chinese that they would profit by adhering more closely to the USSR's methods in these fields.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

NO

UAR-Iraq: The UAR appears to be continuing its preparations to take advantage of a possible crisis in Iraq, [redacted] Nasir's key man in UAR planning on Iraq, Col. Abd al-Majid Farid, has been called from Damascus to Cairo "because of a very important matter." He has asked the UAR agent in Baghdad to gather information on the existence of a reserve transmitter at Radio Baghdad and is consulting with the UAR press attaché in Beirut. The UAR is making available to Syrian Interior Minister Sarraj rifles and large quantities of ammunition which could be used in a move against Qasim.

[redacted] Iraqi military governor Major General Abdi has been "closeted" in his home and that the Communists have informed Qasim of others allegedly plotting against him.

OK delete last sentence of #71

UAR - Communist China: The already strained relations between the UAR and Communist China will deteriorate further as a result of the 28 September speech in Peiping by Khalid Bakdash, refugee Syrian Communist. Bakdash, speaking at the

1 Oct 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

~~TOP SECRET~~

Chinese Communist tenth anniversary celebration, attacked the UAR's anti-Communist policies. Peiping has repeatedly shown its irritation with Cairo's anti-Communist campaign and with UAR criticism of Chinese action in Tibet. The UAR press has reprimanded the Chinese Communist Government for allowing Bakdash's attack, and the UAR Foreign Ministry has delivered a formal protest to the Chinese ambassador in Cairo.

Cairo ordered the Syrian Interior Ministry to boycott the anniversary celebrations at the Chinese Consulate in Damascus.
(Page 3)

Watch Committee conclusions: [Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeopardize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Iran.]

Laos: [Dissident activity has remained at a low level. The dissidents, however, with probable North Vietnamese assistance continue to have the objective of establishing themselves in a strong position which they could use as the basis for political bargaining or for the expansion of military operations.]

Middle East: [Mounting tensions in Iraq have increased the possibility of early attempts to assassinate or overthrow Qasim. Whether successful or not, such moves might well be followed by anarchy or civil war between nationalist and Communist forces. Under these circumstances, direct UAR involvement in Iraq, with a consequent increase in the danger of broader hostilities in the area, is possible.]

III. THE WEST

France-Algeria:

if the Algerian rebel government "officially" asks clarification of

1 Oct 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

certain aspects of De Gaulle's 16 September proposals, the French Embassy would transmit the requests to De Gaulle in "greatest secrecy." [redacted] De Gaulle's cease-fire offer of October 1958 still stood and that the embassy is ready to issue laissez-passer to any leaders of the rebel provisional government desiring to go to Paris to discuss such a cease-fire.] [redacted] (Page 4)

NO

Latin America - Communist China: [The top leaders of the Argentine, Brazilian, and Venezuelan Communist parties, who are in Peiping for the Chinese tenth anniversary celebration, each spoke at the formal opening ceremonies. The presence of these and other prominent Latin American Communist leaders provides an opportunity for Chinese officials to discuss with them new tactical plans in furtherance of Chinese objectives in Latin America, and to review accomplishments since the last meeting of Latin American leaders in Peiping early this year. The Chinese, who are seeking to increase their role in the guidance of Latin American Communists, have stepped up their cultural and propaganda activity in the area in 1959.] [redacted] (Page 5)

OK

Cuba: Prime Minister Fidel Castro's attack of 28 September on press and other critics of his revolutionary program revealed a concern over his increasing difficulties. His high praise of "Che" Guevara, whom he placed in charge of industrial planning, may reflect awareness of the distrust which many responsible Cubans feel for Guevara, who is generally regarded as pro-Communist. Castro may react vigorously to editorials on 29 September in leading Havana dailies which claim that freedom of the Cuban press is limited. [redacted] (Page 6)

1 Oct 59

DAILY BRIEF

iv

~~TOP SECRET~~

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR Continues Selective Jamming

[Monitoring of Voice of America transmissions to the USSR reveals that the selective relaxation of Soviet jamming has continued since Khrushchev's departure from the United States. Jamming of all broadcasts to the Eastern European satellites has continued. During the period 25-29 September, 88 percent of Russian-language broadcasts, 86 percent of Latvian, 92 percent of Lithuanian, and 54 percent of Estonian were audible.]

[In a talk with US officials in Washington on 15 September, Yuri Zhukov, chairman of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, said this relaxation of jamming was an "experiment" to see whether the VOA would cease "pursuing the cold war." He expressed hope that the US could halt transmissions by such anti-Soviet stations as Radio Baikal and Radio Free Russia and said if this were done the USSR would stop jamming altogether. He warned, however, that if results were "negative," jamming would be resumed.]

[Zhukov further said the Soviet Government was also prepared to enter into reciprocal agreements which would increase the circulation of Amerika and USSR magazines, open reading rooms in Moscow and New York public libraries, and implement the article in the US-Soviet exchange agreement concerning radio-television exchanges on political subjects.]

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Peiping Anxious to Improve Relations With Rangoon

A Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry official told the Burmese ambassador [] that Peiping wants to improve its relations with Rangoon and hopes the Burmese will agree to border negotiations. In the mildest exchange between the two governments in recent months, the Chinese official said that, while Peiping could not accept Ne Win's "package plan" for a border solution outright, it was "very close to the mark" and he did not doubt that negotiations could "achieve results." This display of moderation suggests that the Chinese, aware their reputation as "friendly" neighbors has suffered considerably from the Sino-Indian border dispute, are anxious to start working-level talks with the Burmese. Even if such negotiations are prolonged, as they are likely to be, the Chinese would hope to avoid charges of recalcitrance.

The Chinese official, who was replying to a Burmese aide-memoire which apparently dealt with major problems in relations, indicated another step to improving "friendship" would be for the Burmese to return the defector, Liu Ping-yi, to Chinese custody. The Chinese spokesman did not repeat the blustering demands for Liu and the strong objections to his Rangoon trial which marked earlier Chinese talks with the Burmese ambassador.

Burma's package proposal for a border settlement was originally offered on a "take it or leave it" basis. Prime Minister Ne Win [] indicated that if it was rejected by the Chinese, boundary negotiations would be broken off. Peiping's position [] may, however, be sufficiently encouraging to cause Ne Win to reconsider and agree to further explorations of the Chinese position. Ne Win is due to retire from the prime ministership after the national elections early next year. He would undoubtedly like to have a border settlement as one more feather in his cap before his resumption of full-time military duties. []

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Cairo Protests Anti-UAR Speech Made in Peiping

UAR President Nasir, [who last week described his relations with the USSR as in a "downward trend,"] now is involved in a dispute with Communist China. On 28 September, refugee Syrian Communist leader Khalil Bakdash, speaking at Peiping's tenth anniversary celebration, severely criticized UAR policies. The UAR chargé, who represented his government at the celebration, walked out of the meeting, and the UAR Foreign Ministry promptly summoned the Chinese Communist ambassador in Cairo and delivered a formal protest. While it is not expected that Cairo will carry official action any further, the UAR press has taken up the incident, caustically reprimanding the Chinese for allowing Bakdash to speak. This is likely to elicit propaganda reaction from Peiping and result in further deterioration in relations between the two countries. [Cairo has meanwhile ordered the Syrian Interior Ministry to boycott the 1 October celebrations in the Chinese Consulate in Damascus.]

Peiping's displeasure with Nasir stems from his anti-Communist campaign and from the conviction that the UAR is trying to undermine Communist China's position among the Afro-Asian neutrals. Along with the USSR and other members of the bloc, Peiping joined in the exchange of recriminations with Cairo touched off by Nasir's attack on local Communists last winter. The UAR-Chinese dispute focused specifically on relations between the two countries when Cairo criticized Chinese action in Tibet.

In May, Communist China made an effort to patch up the situation by muting its own propaganda, but UAR commentary on Tibet continued, and since mid-July the Chinese have periodically attacked Cairo's policies. Recently, the UAR representative on the Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Council reportedly took issue with his Chinese counterpart over the Sino-Indian border dispute.

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III. THE WEST

De Gaulle Using Tunis As Channel to Algerian Rebels

[French Ambassador Gorse in Tunis, though not under "formal instructions," has informed Tunisian Defense Secretary Ladgham that if the Algerian rebel government "officially" seeks clarification through the Tunisian Government of certain aspects of De Gaulle's 16 September proposals for Algeria, the French Embassy will transmit the request in "greatest secrecy" to De Gaulle. The French counselor of embassy, who informed US officials of this on 28 September, said Gorse told Ladgham that De Gaulle's October 1958 offer of a cease-fire still stood, and that the embassy was ready to issue a laissez-passer to any rebel leader desiring to go to Paris to discuss a cease-fire. The counselor said this was of the utmost sensitivity and emphasized that if certain French Army circles learned of this the whole process might be endangered.]

[Denying that the 16 September proposals were a French maneuver to get through the United Nations debates, Gorse told Ladgham that De Gaulle's offer could not be modified and "obviously there could be no political negotiations," but France stood ready to make its intentions regarding all aspects of the program "fully understood." The Algerian rebels, according to a press report, have indicated that if France would agree to negotiate, they might not press their claim to be the legal Algerian government. Any rebel representatives who would go to Paris under such an arrangement would represent only the FLN.]

[Paris, in line with its policy of nonrecognition of the provisional Algerian government, is officially ignoring the rebel response of 28 September. The European settlers in Algeria view the rebel response as flatly negative.]

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Key Latin American Communist Leaders Gather in Peiping

[The presence of several prominent Latin American Communist party leaders at the Chinese tenth anniversary celebrations provides an opportunity for them to discuss with Peiping officials new tactical plans in furtherance of Chinese objectives in Latin America and to review their accomplishments since the last such meeting in Peiping early this year. Luiz Carlos Prestes, Victor Codovilla, and Jesus Faria, top officials of the Brazilian, Argentine, and Venezuelan parties respectively, spoke at the opening ceremony. Key representatives of the Colombian, Cuban, Uruguayan, Ecuadoran, Chilean, Panamanian, and Costa Rican Communist parties are also in Peiping, along with a number of non-Communist political, congressional, and cultural figures from several Latin American countries.]

[The Chinese, who are seeking to increase their role in the guidance of Latin American Communists, have registered some successes in the program they outlined to the representatives of 12 Latin American parties who met in Peiping after the 21st Soviet party congress in early 1959. These plans included increased Latin American travel to China, the training of Latin American Communists in China, and the development of a Chinese propaganda network in Latin America. Subsequently, a Chinese journalist delegation visited four Latin American countries, and the official New China News Agency has opened a branch in Havana and reportedly hired correspondents in Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela. Latin American travel to China during the first six months of 1959 far surpassed the total for all of 1958.]

[None of the 20 Latin American nations has diplomatic relations with Communist China. Cuba, however, recently became the first Latin American nation since 1952 to abstain in a United Nations General Assembly vote on the question of Chinese UN representation.]

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Status Report on Cuba

Fidel Castro's preoccupation with growing economic problems which threaten the realization of his reform program have heightened his marked sensitivity to criticism and his reliance on trusted companions from active revolutionary days. This was particularly evident in his TV appearance on 28 September. Castro made prolonged attacks on Havana dailies which have questioned government actions and on the decision of the Inter-American Press Association to discuss whether freedom of the press exists in Cuba. Havana's leading newspaper, Diario de la Marina, which has Catholic and conservative backing, did not back down under the attack but charged editorially on 29 September that press freedom is limited by the revolutionary government in many ways short of censorship. It was, surprisingly, joined by other independent papers, in the first such strong and open exception to Castro's words since the revolutionary victory on 1 January.

In the same speech Castro emphasized his great reliance on "true revolutionaries," naming among others "Che" Guevara, whose strident anti-Americanism and suspected pro-Communism add to the general suspicion of him among Cubans. Castro announced that a government program for industrial planning would be headed by Guevara and that although private investment would be accepted, outside help was not really needed. A reference to "investigation" of two large US-owned nickel and cobalt plants at Moa Bay and Nicaro indicated that the government hopes to increase its income from them but has not yet decided by just what means.

Castro's drastic solutions are only complicating the economic problems arising from his reform program. [redacted] tested source reports that the Cuban Government will economize by reducing the army from its present 30,000-35,000 to 15,000 "select and trusted" troops. Discharges already made are causing much discontent because unemployment is unusually high. [redacted]

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

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