


~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003400080001-5

25X1



9 November 1957

25X1

Copy No. 138

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 8
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 1-4-80 REVIEWER

25X1

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25X1



State Dept. review completed

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003400080001-5

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003400080001-5

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003400080001-5

25X1A

25X1A

CONTENTS

- nc 1. RENEWED MOB ACTION EXPECTED IN INDONESIA

25X1A

- no 2. LARGE-SCALE GOVERNMENT PARTY COERCION SEEN
POSSIBLE IN PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS

25X1A

- ok 3. MALAYAN COMMUNIST TERRORISTS OFFER TO SUR-
RENDER

25X1A

25X1A

- no 4. YEMENI CROWN PRINCE BADR'S VISIT TO LONDON

25X1A

- nc 5. DIFFICULTIES IN IRANIAN-BRITISH RELATIONS

[Large rectangular redacted area]

25X1

9 Nov 57

25X1A

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 2

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003400080001-5

1. RENEWED MOB ACTION EXPECTED IN INDONESIA

25X1A

The second phase of Indonesia's drive to "regain" Netherlands New Guinea (West Irian) is scheduled to start 10 November, a national holiday commemorating the beginning of Indonesia's military struggle for independence.

Inflammatory demonstrations and destructive mob action which may involve Westerners are likely. The minister of information announced some days ago that this phase will be "executed more

fiercely." Although moderate forces in Indonesia have spoken against excesses and have warned that care should be taken to prevent mob action, the police and army are reported not to be taking any extraordinary precautions. The campaign is apparently building toward the General Assembly debate on the subject, which will take place sometime after 18 November when the third phase of the drive will be activated.

The Communist party is trying to capitalize on the West Irian drive and is being aided in its efforts by its influence in the government and by President Sukarno's own emotional preoccupation with the issue. The party's secretary general recently proposed either armed action against New Guinea or seizure of Dutch interests in Indonesia if Indonesia fails to get the area through UN action. He emphasized expropriation as allowing not only the army but all elements of Indonesian society to participate in the effort.

Sukarno has in general tried to link the West Irian issue with the need for nationwide economic development and national unity, apparently believing he can use the

25X1A

emotionalism generated by the West Irian drive to develop loyalty to Djakarta. Although he has left the more inflammatory statements to his subordinates, he stated on 7 November that if UN results are unfavorable, Indonesia will take action "which will startle the world." [redacted]

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

**2. LARGE-SCALE GOVERNMENT PARTY COERCION SEEN
POSSIBLE IN PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS**

[Redacted]

The final days of the Philippine election campaign have been marked by bitter countercharges and sporadic outbursts of terrorism. Although Nacionalista candidate President Garcia is still widely believed to have an edge over his opponents, an upset is possible if the elections on 12 November are free. Despite current indications that the Commission on Elections and the constabulary are making efforts to ensure clean elections, traditional patterns of political coercion and fraud are expected to develop.

A source close to President Garcia has told the American embassy in Manila that victory for Garcia, and possibly also for his running mate Laurel, Jr., will be virtually assured through last-minute bribery and intimidation. The US embassy fears that blatant illegal efforts could well provoke bloodshed of serious proportions.

25X1A

25X1A

**3. MALAYAN COMMUNIST TERRORISTS OFFER
TO SURRENDER**

25X1A

[Redacted]

Malayan Prime Minister Abdul Rahman reported on 8 November that the Communist terrorists have agreed in principle to surrender and thus end the nearly ten years of "emergency" in Malaya. According to press reports, Rahman received a letter on 12 October from Communist Secretary General Chen Ping calling for a preliminary meeting aimed at obtaining a "just and fair agreement" and stating he expected that "agreement can be reached."

Although it has long been evident that the Communists wish to abandon guerrilla warfare and concentrate their resources on subversion, they have demanded recognition of their party and guarantees against detention or investigation of terrorists who lay down their arms. Now, however, since Malayan independence has further isolated the Communists from the masses by removing the party's main propaganda weapon, Chen Ping may feel that he must retreat from these demands.

Despite the government's apparent optimism that this will bring an end to the "emergency," there is still likely to be a wide initial divergence between the positions of the two sides. The Communists, however, probably believe that settlement at this time, even if it involved considerable sacrifice, might provide a considerable boost to their goals of promoting neutralism in Malaya, achieving recognition of Red China, and undermining the UK-Malaya Defense Treaty by appearing to remove any need for Commonwealth troops in the Federation.

[Redacted]

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

4. YEMENI CROWN PRINCE BADR'S VISIT TO LONDON

25X1A

[Redacted]

Britain's plan to give Yemeni Crown Prince Badr the "red-carpet treatment" during his 10-day visit to London beginning on 9 November is presumably intended to facilitate future relations with him in the event he is chosen as the present Imam's successor. A Foreign Office official's statement on 7 November that Britain's underlying purpose in the talks is to detach Yemen from its pro-Soviet orientation suggests that London now feels the long-standing Anglo-Yemeni animosity may actually be reduced, with consequent advantages for British interests elsewhere in the Arabian peninsula. London is also developing contacts with Prince Hassan, the other principal contender to the throne.

The British appear somewhat more optimistic than formerly that the talks will have beneficial results. They are especially anxious to set up a procedure for investigating incidents along the Yemen - Aden Protectorate frontier. Hoping that implementation of the 1951 agreement providing for border demarcation can now be agreed upon, London is prepared to accept the present border despite recent Yemeni encroachments. London is also willing to carry out technical assistance provisions of the 1951 agreement by sending a few technicians to Yemen and training some Yemenis in Britain. Britain's capacity for maneuver is limited, however, by commitments to sheiks in the Aden Protectorate.

The Imam has actively promoted the visit for the purpose of enhancing the prestige of the crown prince. There is reason to believe, however, that the Imam might maneuver his way out of any commitments undertaken by Badr.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

5. DIFFICULTIES IN IRANIAN-BRITISH RELATIONS

25X1A

Britain has rebuffed the Shah in his efforts to discuss cooperation in the Persian Gulf, and will turn down Iran's long-standing request for destroyers. This will block the Shah's plan to expand Iran's influence in the Persian Gulf through cooperation with Britain and increased naval prestige.

Although an agreement was reached in principle with the British in late September to discuss Persian Gulf questions, the later British restrictions on the talks would make them meaningless from the Iranian point of view. The Shah reacted angrily to these limitations. Britain said the discussions could not include sovereignty over Bahrein, the establishment of an Iranian consulate in Kuwait, or the designations "Persian Gulf" versus "Arabian Gulf." Furthermore, Britain insists that Iran acknowledge Kuwait sovereignty over Farsi Island, occupied by Iran since 1956.

The London Foreign Office has instructed the British ambassador to Iran to explain to the Shah that the costs of an initial destroyer would have to be met from Iranian funds and that its crew would have to be trained by the British navy. The American ambassador in London has been informed that Britain hopes this will end its discussions with Iran concerning the supplying or selling of a destroyer.

25X6

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003400080001-5

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003400080001-5