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1 June 1961


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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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1 June 1961

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

1 June 1961

## DAILY BRIEF

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**\*Dominican Republic:** The government of puppet President Balaguer was apparently still in power on 1 June following the assassination late on 30 May of Rafael Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic for the past 31 years. The assassination was apparently carried out by a group headed by retired army general, Juan Tomas Diaz, who has been in close contact with a pro-US, middle-of-the-road dissident civilian group. The longer the plotters delay in following up the assassination with a move to seize power, the greater the chances of a power struggle among military and civilian groups. Such an internal power struggle, if protracted, would enhance the opportunities of pro-Castro elements, both inside the country and in exile. During the past ten months pro-Castro groups inside the country have been strengthened by the dictator's own political machinations. Last week a high dissident source told the American Consulate that the officers involved in the plot hoped the US would have military strength available in the area in case a post-Trujillo government asks for assistance in controlling the internal situation.

General Diaz is reported to be in hiding in the interior as the police and units of the Dominican armed forces round up individuals believed to have been associated with him. The two active duty generals reported

to be involved in the plot, have evidently still made no overt move against the regime. The move to seize power that was to follow the assassination may have been frustrated, at least for the time being. Meanwhile, the late dictator's two sons have arrived in the Dominican Republic after

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a hastily arranged charter flight from Europe. The elder son, Rafael "Ramfis" Trujillo, Jr., is a general and a minister without portfolio and is believed, with his military associates, to have a core of fanatical support in the Air Force mobile infantry unit stationed near Ciudad Trujillo. This military unit, roughly equivalent to a US World War II regimental combat team, is likely to play an important part in any developing struggle for power. Also the two army brigades stationed in the capital city are commanded by relatives of the late dictator. The clique around "Ramfis" includes the de facto head of the hated Military Intelligence Service, John Abbes, who has been involved since 1957 in Trujillo's subversive operations in other Latin American countries. It also includes officials of Radio Caribe, whose pro-Castro and bitterly anti-US and anti-clerical diatribes over the past ten months have probably contributed to at least some degree of anti-US feeling among the Dominican people.


The NBC correspondent in Ciudad Trujillo reported late on 31 May that the capital city was quiet. (Information as of 0430 EDT)  

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Laos: Members of the Souvanna Phouma delegation in Geneva in the past few days have made several contacts with members of the royal government delegation. These approaches parallel recent indications of some friction in Xieng Khouang between the Kong Le and the Pathet Lao forces.)

(During the 31 May session of the newly established military subcommittee at Namone, the Pathet Lao seized the initiative by presenting several proposals for cease-fire ground rules, all of which were directed at activities of the royal government. One of these rules would require that government planes not violate territory held by the Pathet Lao or the Souvanna group. This would prevent support flights to the government's Meo units at Pa Dong. Political talks on 31 May were largely devoted to a reiteration of the long-established positions of the Pathet Lao and the Souvanna group on the policies to be pursued by a coalition government.

(The Communists continued shelling of Meo outpost positions around Pa Dong on the night of 30-31 May.

[redacted] plans for a new attack on Pa Dong would be drawn up after the receipt of "sufficient" supplies of ammunition. Elsewhere in the country, scattered ambush actions were reported.)


Bloc airlift operations into Laos were scheduled through 1 June. [redacted] NOFORN) (Backup, Page 1) (Map)

(The Watch Committee at its meeting on 31 May reached the following conclusion concerning Laos:)

Communist forces in Laos will continue their efforts to reduce the Meo guerrilla bases in Xieng Khouang Province, particularly Ban Pa Dong, where there are further indications of Communist preparations for intensified attacks. The Communists are refusing both at Geneva and in the talks at Ban Namone to agree to effective procedures for inspection by the International Control Commission, while they press for the formation of a Communist-dominated coalition government. The Communists have continued to improve their military position for a possible resumption of full-scale hostilities if negotiations should collapse.)

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Congo: [Foreign Minister Spaak of Belgium has informed Ambassador MacArthur that reports of unrest and anxiety among the Belgians in Katanga have aroused misgivings within the Belgium Government and furnished certain elements, presumably economic groups in Brussels with investments in the Congo, with ammunition to oppose his policies. Spaak emphasized that while he is prepared to withdraw Belgian military personnel as soon as possible from Katanga, there must be UN replacements acceptable to Katanga and with the capability of maintaining order. He indicated that a mass withdrawal of Belgian civilians and technicians might otherwise occur. If such a withdrawal occurred it would result in economic chaos in Katanga.] *no*

President Kasavubu's ideas on the reconvening of parliament in the Congo differ notably from Hammarskjold's. In contrast to Kasavubu, who appears willing to seek an accommodation with Katanga but not with Stanleyville, Hammarskjold has publicly stated that a meeting of parliament without representatives of both the Leopoldville and the Stanleyville governments "would not make sense." He added that the UN-controlled Kamina base in Katanga--the site desired by Gizenga for any meeting of parliament--would be a practical site.

Angola: Angolan rebels now have almost complete freedom of movement in the northern areas of the country, [redacted]

[redacted] The source says that the nationalist leaders of the Angolan People's Union (UPA) are aware that the Portuguese plan an offensive in the north during the dry season, which is just beginning, and the UPA hopes to spread the uprising to other areas to force the Portuguese to disperse their troops. The UPA, if unable to prevent Portuguese troops from reoccupying the northern region, reportedly plans to order the burning of coffee plantations in the north in August. The UPA hopes this would eliminate Lisbon's main economic incentive to maintain its present position in Angola.] *delete 1st P & last sent of backup*

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(and thereby induce the Portuguese to grant partial autonomy,  
 with full independence delayed for two or three years.)  
 (Backup, Page 3)

Albania-USSR: The USSR, temporarily at least, has considerably reduced the strength of its naval detachment based in Albania. Eight W-class submarines and a tender left Valona Bay on 26 May and are now nearing the Straits of Gibraltar. On the same day, several surface units based at Vlone were scheduled to enter the Black Sea, but this movement has not yet taken place. The submarines may be en route to the Baltic Sea, possibly for refitting or as part of a rotation with other submarines from the Baltic. The move, however, could indicate that a permanent reduction or the elimination of the Soviet base in Albania is under way either because of a Soviet reassessment of the strategic value of the base or because of deteriorating Soviet-Albanian relations. In a possibly associated development, two and possibly three Soviet naval transports recently remained in port for at least ten days in Albania, in contrast to the normal stay in port for such ships of only 4 to 5 days.

*no*

Iceland: The strikes which began in Iceland on 29 May remain confined largely to a number of Communist unions representing about one fourth of the approximately 30,000 members of the Communist-dominated Central Labor Federation. The Conservative - Social Democratic government apparently is holding firm in its determination not to permit wage increases which might undercut its economic stabilization program. A compromise wage proposal reportedly is being prepared by the state mediator for presentation to the workers on 3 June. Thus far, the operations of the US-manned NATO base at Keflavik have not been affected, although the Reykjavik waterfront is described as at a "standstill."

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## WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

- A. No change from last week.
- B. No change from last week.
- C. [REDACTED]
- D. **SOUTH KOREA:** The situation remains unstable in South Korea, and the military command relationships with CINCUNC are still untested. We have seen no evidence of North Korean military preparations to take advantage of the unsettled situation. *no*
- E. **IRAN:** The future of the Amini government, which is under pressure from left and right, faced with economic difficulties and possible labor unrest, and with the Shah not reconciled to any long-term relinquishment of his powers, seems uncertain at this time. The USSR, which has intensified its clandestine propaganda directed against the regime, may take advantage of this situation by beginning new diplomatic efforts to sever Iran's defense relationships with the West and will attempt to capitalize on any major unrest. *no*

CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE  
ON BERLIN SITUATION

The USIB has approved the following conclusions reached by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situation for the period 9 through 29 May 1961: *no*

- 1. Khrushchev stated to Ambassador Thompson on 23 May that he considers Berlin the main topic for discussion at Vienna. We do not feel, however, that he is setting the stage for a showdown.

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{with the President. Khrushchev's interest in negotiating a settlement is still evident. Nevertheless, in his conversation with Ambassador Thompson and in a similar talk with the West German ambassador last month Khrushchev implied a deadline of late 1961 or early 1962 for a final Soviet decision whether to go ahead with a separate treaty. However, he has been careful to avoid committing Soviet prestige to an exact schedule in public.]

[2. Khrushchev maintained his position that the USSR will sign a peace treaty with East Germany and transfer control over allied military access if no agreement can be reached. Khrushchev repeatedly emphasized his previous contention that as a consequence of a separate treaty, the West will not have free access without coming to terms with the East German regime.]

[3. The timing of the 23 May conversation was intended to make early negotiations an attractive alternative to the threatened conclusion of a separate peace treaty. Khrushchev's statements to Ambassador Thompson provide further evidence that Moscow intends to concentrate on obtaining Western agreement to an interim solution for Berlin. The ideas of a new summit meeting and further high-level negotiations have begun to appear in the Soviet propaganda build-up for the Vienna talks, and we expect that these themes will become more prominent.]

[4. While Khrushchev's remarks undoubtedly serve the Soviet Premier's tactical purposes in preparing for his talks with the President, they also point up his basic dilemma. On the one hand, Khrushchev's long-standing and repeated commitments to sign a separate treaty if he fails to obtain satisfaction from the West probably act as a form of pressure on the Soviet leader. On the other hand, despite Khrushchev's]

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[repeated expressions of skepticism regarding the West's willingness to resort to war over Berlin, his actions during the past two and one-half years suggest that he is not sufficiently certain what the Western response in a crisis would be and that he still prefers a negotiated solution.]

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The Situation in Laos

[Khamchan Pradith and Khampheng Boupha, members of the Souvanna Phouma delegation at Geneva, called unannounced at the residence of the leaders of the five pro-government political parties on 29 May.]

[the two Souvanna fol-  
lowers left the impression that they were looking for a way to  
break their ties with the Pathet Lao. Khampheng made two more  
visits, each time insisting that he and his colleagues were not  
Communists but neutralists and opposed to the Pathet Lao.  
Quinim Pholsena, leader of the Souvanna delegation, is also re-  
ported trying to get in touch with government delegates. The  
government delegation and the political party leaders are de-  
scribed as unanimous in their support of encouraging further  
contacts with the Souvanna group but are reluctant to proceed  
without the sanction of General Phoumi in Vientiane.)]

[it was the  
North Vietnamese who really controlled the province.]

[for three days prior to 29 May there was  
an almost constant stream of trucks, all closed, passing  
through Xieng Khouang town to a point a few miles south.]

[rumors were current in the town that these trucks con-  
tained North Vietnamese troops slated to participate in an at-  
tack on Pa Dong.)]

In connection with the military subcommittee established by the Namone conference, both Hanoi and Peiping have stated that it can submit a report on matters within its competence to the conference itself only after an agreement has been reached on the formation of a provisional government. Prior to that time, the subcommittee can submit "major pressing" cease-fire issues to the conference, but only with the unanimous consent of all three parties.

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Pathet Lao companies were participating in the attacks on Pa Dong. In addition there were two Kong Le companies, one company of anti-government Meos, and a "mixed company," which was not further described.

On 29 May there were 21 airlift and airlift-associated sorties, of which at least 11 were into Laos. On 30 May the total was 36, of which at least 15 were into Laos.

If this is true, it suggests that an airlift operation will be carried out between Hanoi and Canton. The fact that these transports are carrying only single crews and are not scheduled for a transfer flight to Peiping suggests that they are not returning to the USSR at this time. Eighteen Soviet LI-2s arrived in North Vietnam from the USSR in mid-January and were subsequently employed in airlift activity.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Angolan Nationalists' Future Plans

{The UPA's belief that a Portuguese operation against the terrorists is imminent}

[redacted] with the end of the rainy season, "the fields can be cleared of grass"--presumably by burning--and Portuguese military action will be facilitated. [redacted] Lisbon had at first underestimated the strength of the rebellion and indicated that the Portuguese are still not sure of the numerical strength of the terrorists. He also conceded that military operations were being hampered by ambushes.)

[redacted] the UPA plans to send its followers from the Congo into an area east of the present disturbances to make contact with sympathizers in central and southern Angola. The UPA leadership reportedly believes these areas are ripe for revolt and hopes to accomplish the southward infiltration by mid-July.)

{The UPA, whose headquarters are in Leopoldville, is still under harassment from Congolese officials. Kasavubu, whose Bakongo tribe inhabits the region, reportedly is opposed to the UPA, which is interfering with the Bakongos' ambition of uniting all ethnically related tribes on both sides of the border under Bakongo leadership. As a result, Congolese troops have interfered with the UPA's smuggling activities across the border and have arrested some UPA leaders.)

{UPA leader Holden Roberto reportedly admits that Angolan Africans are not ready for self-government and recognizes that the UPA leadership could not govern the area by itself. He allegedly would be willing to wait even longer than two or three years for independence, but he believes his followers would not agree to a longer delay. If Portugal agrees to his three-year timetable, Holden reportedly hopes to use the period to train)

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[UPA members for government positions. He apparently has no idea how to make certain that Portugal is guiding Angola toward independence, but he plans to consult with Tunisian President Bourguiba on this point.]

[Terrorist activity in northern Angola apparently is continuing, and outbreaks have occurred to the west of the area of main disturbances. [redacted] The commander of the Portuguese air units in Angola has admitted that air operations against the rebels will continue to be hampered by low ceilings. despite the ending of the rainy season.]

[redacted]

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