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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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23 SEPTEMBER 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Launching of new Soviet space vehicle
may be imminent.

①

USSR reportedly offering Bolivia credits
for tin-extraction and -refining equipment

②

North Vietnamese premier indicates con-
fidence that Diem government in South
Vietnam will be toppled.

③

II. ASIA-AFRICA

HammarSKJOLD plans private talks with
Nasir and Husayn; hopes thereby to ease
UAR-Jordan crisis.


④

Libyan King may undertake major shake-
up in government as dissatisfaction
mounts with Kubar cabinet.

⑤

Soudanese leaders move to recognize
Mali Federation split and rename Soudan
the Republic of Mali, paving way for ad-
mission into UN; also declare country
"freed of all political obligations vis-a-vis
France."


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⑦ Situation in Laos.

⑧ Situation in the Congo.

III. THE WEST

⑨ JAEIC statement on forthcoming French
nuclear weapons tests.~~TOP SECRET~~

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

23 September 1960

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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: A continuing high state of readiness for the launching of a space vehicle or missile is indicated in activities associated with the Tyura Tam test range and in the present wide-dispersal in the Pacific of the four Sibir range-instrumentation ships. The deployment of the Sibirs suggests support for an ESV/space venture rather than for an ICBM launching. The fact that the ships have not changed their positions significantly during the past week indicates increasing likelihood of a launch within the next few days. Possible space operations which are estimated to be within Soviet technical capabilities and which could be expected to provide significant propaganda advantage to Khrushchev at the UN include: (a) recovery of a man, or anthropoid ape, from orbit; (b) another lunar shot; and (c) a Mars probe. The possibility of manned suborbital flights from Tyura Tam into the vicinity of one of the Sibirs also cannot be excluded.

(See map on reverse of page)


USSR-Bolivia: Bolivian Senator Mario Torres, who is also secretary general of the politically powerful mine workers' federation, has returned from the USSR saying he has a Soviet offer of credits for tin-extraction and -refining equipment, according to a Havana radio announcement. Similarly, Radio Moscow reports that Khrushchev told Bolivia's representative at the UN, "You have a lot of tin; we might buy it and supply you with extraction and refining equipment." A genuine Soviet offer of tin-mining equipment and a refinery would be more attractive to Bolivia's leftist government than would any other possible aid offer at this time.

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**CURRENT DEPLOYMENT OF SIBIR CLASS
SOVIET MISSILE RANGE INSTRUMENTATION SHIPS**



NOTE: With exception of one ship uprange in January
tests all SIBIRS deployed in impact areas.

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Vietnam:

[redacted] recent events in Laos will be repeated in South Vietnam. Although Dong allegedly said war would be used "if necessary," he seemed convinced that political dissatisfaction in the South is strong enough to topple President Diem. Diem is in fact facing a growing danger from peasant unrest and increasing criticism of his leadership and complaints about his authoritarian rule, as well as from Communist guerrilla activities.

[redacted] *MD*

Hanoi is not relying on guerrilla tactics alone, but expects a coup that would bring in a government willing to negotiate with the Communists. In recent speeches, North Vietnamese officials have indicated willingness to join forces with any non-Communist dissident elements in the South.

[redacted] (Page 3)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Jordan-UAR: [UN Secretary General Hammarskjold hopes to mitigate the Jordan-UAR crisis by undertaking private talks in New York with Nasir and King Husayn.]

[redacted] Hammarskjold intends to emphasize to Nasir the dangers inherent in continued subversion and terrorism and to suggest that Nasir, as a conciliatory gesture, transfer Jordanian political exiles from Damascus to Cairo and keep them under surveillance. Both Jordan and the UAR will be asked to cease their propaganda warfare. Hammarskjold apparently hopes the threat that Husayn will take his case against the UAR to the General Assembly will be persuasive to Nasir.]

[redacted] *MD*

[redacted] (Page 4)

Libya: King Idris is expected soon to accept the proffered resignation of Prime Minister Kubar and to undertake a major shake-up of the federal cabinet. Dissatisfaction with the Kubar administration has increased, particularly in urban areas, and

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is focused on the issue of corruption among high-level officials. In response to a petition signed by a majority of the members of parliament, Idris has ordered parliament to reconvene in extraordinary session on 3 October to discuss the latest scandal connected with government financing of the Fezzan road project.]

(Page 6)

Mali: The decision of Soudanese leaders to recognize the dissolution of the Mali Federation--from which Senegal seceded last month--and to rename Soudan the Republic of Mali paves the way for the early admission into the UN of both Senegal and Mali. Soudanese leaders apparently became convinced of the necessity of abandoning the legal fiction that the federation still existed when the UN General Assembly on 20 September held Mali's application in abeyance while admitting 13 other African states. A special congress of Soudan's only political party--postponed from last weekend to await the UN's action--yesterday formally noted the federation's end "as a territorial entity." The congress also declared Mali "freed of all political obligations vis-a-vis France"--a statement which suggests the Soudanese intend to implement their earlier threat to withdraw from the French Community.

(Page 7)

***Laos:** Vientiane's claim that its troops have wrested control of Paksane from General Phoumi's forces appears confirmed

Phoumi's troops have withdrawn to form a new defense line some 20 miles east of that town. Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum flew to Bangkok on 22 September for consultations with Thai Premier Sarit, possibly involving an urgent appeal for increased assistance in the light of the military reverses at Paksane. Commentary by Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi on the Laotian crisis is seeking to create an ominous atmosphere without, however, threatening direct bloc intervention.]

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***Congo:** The continuing instability in the Congolese Army was shown on 22 September when several hundred unarmed troops marched on Col. Mobutu's home at Camp Leopold II

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and had to be dispersed by the police. They were protesting the irregularity of their pay rather than expressing political dissatisfaction.

Several African nations are continuing their activities on behalf of Lumumba. [] an Air Ghana aircraft had arrived at Leopoldville late on 21 September presumably to whisk Lumumba away. []

President Sekou Touré has approved President Nasir's proposals for African pressure on the UN Command. []

Cairo's local representative wants a plane sent to Leopoldville with 50 paratroopers and maintenance personnel, ostensibly for the purpose of training the troops. The envoy believes it would be possible to carry out a quick operation--possibly to get Lumumba out of Leopoldville.

The Katanga government, [] is adopting a more conciliatory attitude toward the UN following a recent exchange of recriminations. President Tshombé will withdraw his troops from the area in central Katanga affected by Baluba tribal disorders. Authorities reportedly have also agreed to permit UN troops to act as guards on board trains and at railroad stations in the affected area.] []

III. THE WEST

JAEIC Statement on Forthcoming French Nuclear Weapons Tests: [Recent information indicates that preparations are now well under way for a second series of French nuclear weapons tests to take place in November-December 1960 at Reggane, Algeria. It is believed there will be about two tests in this period, and French officials have indicated that these will be primarily for the purpose of developing tactical-type weapons. It has been reported that these tests will be tower shots, the first at a height of 50 meters.] *No*

[There have been numerous reports that the French also are planning underground tests. A new site suitable for underground testing is being prepared in granite formations in the]

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[Hoggar area, about 220 miles southeast of Reggane. It is believed that the first underground test could occur in or about April 1961.]

IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Likelihood and Consequences of the Developments of Nuclear Capabilities by Additional Countries and Time Estimates for Such Development. NIE 100-4-60, 20 September 1960.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Key Bolivian Labor Leader Reports Soviet Credit Offer for Tin Exploitation

Mario Torres, a Bolivian senator and secretary general of the politically powerful mine workers' federation, has returned from the USSR saying he has a Soviet offer of credits for tin-extraction and -refining equipment, according to a Havana radio announcement. Radio Moscow reported on the same date that Khrushchev told Bolivia's United Nations representative, "You have a lot of tin; we might buy it and supply you with extraction and refining equipment."

Similar overtures by Soviet officials are often made in conversation with foreign representatives and usually do not indicate a firm trade or aid offer but only a gesture within the framework of the over-all Soviet economic offensive. Tentative Soviet offers of economic aid to Bolivia for mineral and petroleum exploitation have been reported since 1957. The current probes may indicate that Moscow is testing the reaction of the new Bolivian government toward closer economic and political relations with the USSR.

A genuine Soviet offer of tin-mining equipment and a tin refinery within Bolivia would probably be more attractive to Bolivians generally than any other possible offer. Tin makes up more than half of Bolivia's exports. Almost all its tin must be refined in Britain in a smelter in which the former owners of the Bolivian mines have a part interest, and a percentage of the return on tin is regularly applied as payment for the nationalized mines, although many Bolivians believe that the owners have already been fully recompensed.

Current estimates of Soviet tin imports, production, and consumption indicate that purchases from Bolivia would be motivated by political aims. The USSR is not completely self-sufficient in tin, but through the use of substitutes and more efficient use of its tin supplies it could satisfy its internal demands. By importing from Communist China it now meets

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East European requirements for tin and sells some to the free world for hard currency. There is no indication that Moscow is looking for additional sources of tin imports at present, and such imports would be required only in the event of a virtual elimination of imports from Communist China.

A Bolivian newspaper opposing the administration reported that the foreign minister had informed the press on 19 September that Bolivia would soon send an ambassador to Moscow but that the appointee had not yet been selected. Bolivia and the USSR, in an exchange of notes between the two governments in 1946, agreed to establish diplomatic relations but the agreement has never been implemented. The new Bolivian President had stated in late August that Bolivian law provided for the establishment of an embassy in Moscow--through a congressional fund allocation in October 1959--and that his government intended to "carry out the laws." Bolivia now has no missions in the bloc, and the Czech Legation is the only resident bloc mission in La Paz.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~North Vietnamese Foresee Coup in South Vietnam

[North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong]

recent events in Laos will be repeated in South Vietnam. While the [redacted] tone was belligerent and he allegedly said war would be used "if necessary" to oust President Diem, he appeared convinced that political unrest in the South now is so widespread that the government will be toppled and that a coup will bring in elements willing to negotiate with the Communists.]

[Although the intensification of guerrilla activity since the beginning of 1960 has not posed an immediate threat to the South Vietnamese Government, President Diem faces the twofold danger of a gradual extension of Communist control in the countryside, where peasant discontent is widespread, and of increasingly articulate complaints about his leadership and his authoritarian tendencies from labor, youth, intellectual, and refugee circles in Saigon. This opposition is not well organized and its leaders are non-Communist, but there is a possibility that such groups might stage public protests which Communist infiltrators would exploit. A leader of a political opposition group recently reported that Communist agents had approached him with offers of assistance in overthrowing Diem and establishing a neutral government.]

[At the North Vietnamese party congress earlier this month, Le Duan, Ho Chi Minh's top lieutenant in party affairs, called for a broad united front in the South. Le Duan, himself long associated with guerrilla activities below the 17th parallel, said that Hanoi would join with any forces--whether Communist or not--opposed to Diem. Hanoi's "broad united front" probably will take the form of coordinating guerrilla activities with the anti-Diem efforts of disaffected elements in an effort to further the major North Vietnamese objectives--removal of US influence and "reunification" of Vietnam under a Communist regime.]

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~~TOP SECRET~~Hammarskjold Will Attempt to Mitigate Jordan-UAR Crisis

[UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, who welcomes King Husayn's decision to come to the UN in New York with his grievances against the UAR, hopes to prevent the Jordan-UAR crisis from reaching the General Assembly. This he hopes to accomplish by undertaking private talks with Nasir and UAR Foreign Minister Fawzi before Husayn arrives, according to UN representative Spinelli in Amman. The secretary general will subsequently see Husayn, who expects to arrive in New York about 3 or 4 October. The King is reliably reported to have ordered his troops along the Syrian border not to take any provocative action while he is at the UN.]

[Hammarskjold apparently will propose that both Jordan and the UAR cease their propaganda warfare immediately. In addition, he intends to impress on Nasir the dangers to Middle Eastern stability of continued attempts at subversion and terrorism and will suggest that Jordanian political exiles involved in such activities be transferred from Damascus to Cairo and kept under surveillance as a conciliatory gesture. While the secretary general apparently hopes that Nasir will be amenable to some compromise, his implied assumption of UAR responsibility for Jordanian Prime Minister Majalli's assassination probably will be offensive to Nasir, who is unlikely to agree to a detente which does not involve equally conciliatory measures by Jordan.]

[Hammarskjold reportedly will attempt to divert Husayn's attention from the Jordanian request for extradition from the UAR of the men accused of assassinating Majalli because of the legal complications of this problem. The King probably would accept Hammarskjold's over-all proposals if Nasir accepted them.]

[Husyan wants to establish direct contact with Nasir in New York; Hammarskjold has already discussed this with Fawzi with results described as "encouraging but preliminary." The King presumably will want to meet with President Eisenhower during his visit, and, according to the UK ambassador in Amman]

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[has expressed a desire to stop off in London for talks with UK officials.]

[Meanwhile, Jordanian arrangements for the assassination of Syrian Minister of Interior Sarraj apparently have gone awry.

[the man presumably hired for this job "whom we had all trusted. vanished with the money, pistol, and explosives."]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Shake-up Expected in Libyan Government

Dissatisfaction with the present Libyan government has increased, particularly in urban areas, and is focused on corruption among high-level officials. Such corruption is not new in Libya, but recent examples of it have been especially flagrant and may lead to dismissal of the government. Among them have been bribes to officials in connection with the awarding of oil concession areas, land speculation on the basis of tip-offs by government personnel, and a new facet of the scandal connected with government financing of the Fezzan road project.

This latter affair has caused considerable criticism in the press, and [a majority of the membership of the Libyan parliament signed a petition requesting King Idris to call an extraordinary session.] The King, who in July had sent a letter to government officials ordering action to stamp out corruption, has responded to the petition by ordering parliament to reconvene in special session on 3 October to discuss the Fezzan road project.

The King is expected soon to accept the resignation proffered by Prime Minister Kubar more than six weeks ago and to undertake a major shake-up of the federal cabinet. Many prominent politicians--such as ex-Prime Minister Ben Halim--who might ordinarily be considered possible replacements for Kubar now are likely to be ruled out because they too have been implicated in unsavory dealings. The King may name, as new prime minister, Sheik Abd al-Hamid Dibani, the minister of justice who has occasionally been acting prime minister. Dibani has previously served as judge in the Shari courts, as president of the Cyrenaican Executive Council, and as Supreme Court Justice; he is widely respected as a scholar and religious leader and has been a vigorous defender of the government's policies against the attacks of a minority bloc in the parliament. []

[]

[]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Soudan Adjusts to Dissolution of Mali Federation

Soudan's political leaders decided on 22 September, at a special congress of the country's only political party, to acknowledge the dissolution of the Mali Federation and accept separate membership in the international community for Soudan as the Republic of Mali. The Soudanese thus abandoned further efforts to sustain the legal fiction that the federation still existed despite Senegal's secession last month and its subsequent recognition by France and a number of other states.

The decision appears to clear the way for the early admission to the UN of both Senegal and Mali. The General Assembly's postponement earlier this week of action on Mali's pending application--approved by the Security Council last summer when the federation became independent--was apparently the decisive factor influencing the Soudanese to alter their position.

Declaring the Mali Republic "free of all political obligations to France," the party congress also served notice that Premier Modibo Keita's government intends to regard as void the French-Mali cooperation accords negotiated last spring. Although this position does not preclude the possibility that some new arrangements might eventually be concluded, it does raise serious doubts about Mali's continued membership in the French Community. More specifically, it suggests that the Keita regime may soon demand the evacuation of the four bases and [approximately 4,400] troops which France maintains in Soudan under the old accords and regards as important to the containment of the Algerian rebellion. Keita, who is under strong pressure from Soudanese extremists anxious to assist the Algerian rebels, reportedly stated earlier this month that recognition of Senegal by France would lead to an all-out effort--including a resort to the UN if necessary--to force the eviction of the French troops.

[On the other hand, Keita indicated to special American representative Yost in Bamako on 21 September that, while future cooperation with the French would be limited, it would]

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[not cease entirely. He also said his country does not intend to fall under the "trusteeship" of Guinea, although it would seek "acceptable arrangements" with Conakry.]

Toward Senegal, however, Keita's regime apparently intends to maintain a hard and vindictive policy aimed at the eventual overthrow of President Senghor and his followers. Keita told Yost that economic ties between Senegal and Soudan--upon which Senegal's economy is more dependent than is Soudan's--would remain severed as long as the present leaders of Senegal remain in power.] [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~The Situation in Laos

[Radio Vientiane's claim that troops loyal to the Souvanna Phouma government have captured Paksane, about 75 miles east of the capital, would appear confirmed]

[General Phoumi, leader of the Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee, had had a force of about three battalions in Paksane awaiting orders to march on Vientiane. An engagement between the Phoumi forces and Vientiane troops took place on 20 September and apparently further clashes occurred the next day.] [the Phoumi forces were withdrawing eastward and planned to establish a new defense line at the Ca Dinh River.]

[Phoumi's military reverse may have been responsible for his sudden trip to Bangkok, accompanied by Prince Boun Oum, on 22 September for consultations with Thai Premier Sarit. Sarit has become increasingly open in his expressions of sympathy for the Savannakhet group, and Phoumi may hope to extract more material support from his uncle.]

In their continuing commentary on the Laotian crisis, Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi have sought to create an air of foreboding about the situation without, however, issuing any threats of direct bloc intervention. Hanoi on 19 September charged the United States with "instituting a civil war" which could be transformed into an "international conflagration." The broadcast further stated that the Laotian situation was "a direct threat to the security" of North Vietnam and that "the Vietnamese people cannot remain indifferent." On 21 September, Moscow issued a statement charging "crude interference" by the United States and SEATO and remarking that the "Soviet Union is attentively watching the courageous struggle waged by the peoples of Laos." All three Communist states seem to confine the "struggle" to the Laotian people and bitterly denounce what they term "US instigation" of "intervention" by Thailand and South Vietnam.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**THE PRESIDENT****The Vice President**

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

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