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23 July 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

23 July 1960

### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-Iran: In a 19 July note apparently more friendly than threatening, Khrushchev reiterated to the Shah the Soviet position that Iran must agree to ban all foreign bases and troops before relations can be improved; in addition he offered economic aid. The Shah is considering giving formal assurances to the Soviet Union that Iran will not be used as a base for reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union and that he will not allow foreign missile bases in the country. The Shah is under heavy pressure from neutralist-minded Iranian politicians as well as constant Soviet propaganda and may feel he must make some gesture to ease his position.

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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Republic of the Congo: Premier Lumumba's apparent satisfaction with the UN resolution calling for the "speedy" withdrawal of Belgian troops in the Congo appears based on an assumption that the UN will also force Belgium to evacuate its bases in the Congo, including those in Katanga. Should Belgian forces carry out their stated intention of withdrawing only to their bases, the volatile Lumumba will probably request UN and possibly Soviet aid in forcing a total evacuation. Continued tension in the Congo interior, where Ethiopian units of the UN force have failed to protect Belgian nationals, suggests that the Belgians will move slowly in yielding their security functions. In Katanga, Belgian aircraft have attacked--presumably with the knowledge of Premier Tshombé--a marauding Force Publique band numbering 250.

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
25X1 [ ] Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: As a result of unrest in the Congo, the government of the white-dominated Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is increasingly concerned over the possible intensification of African nationalism within the Federation. A number of African nationalists have been arrested by Southern Rhodesian authorities, processions in Salisbury have been banned for three months, and federal army and police reserves have been called up. African strikes and demonstrations in Salisbury, which lasted two days before being brought under control, may lead the Southern Rhodesian and federal governments to clamp down even further. Activities of hitherto moderate African leaders reflect disillusionment with the multiracial approach and may lead them to shift to a more radical approach along racial lines. [ ]

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25X1 [ ] Morocco-France: The Moroccan Government has categorically rejected France's offer to evacuate French bases in Morocco by the end of 1964 and insists on the end of 1962 as the terminal date, according to French Ambassador Parodi in Rabat. Prodded by increasingly sharp criticism of foreign bases by both the rightist and leftist press, the King and crown prince are likely to intensify efforts to bolster the prestige of their government by obtaining commitments from both France and the United States to withdraw forces by the end of 1962. [ ]

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### III. THE WEST

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Britain-Iceland: Britain is making a new attempt to get Iceland to enter negotiations on the dispute over Iceland's 12-mile fishing limit. Feeling in Iceland has been aggravated by several violations in late June and early July of the British Trawlers' Federation three-month ban on fishing inside this limit. A member of the Icelandic cabinet earlier privately stated that Iceland would leave NATO if British naval vessels return to the disputed waters after the truce expires on 13 August. London is skeptical how long British trawler skippers can be restrained from entering disputed waters without some progress toward negotiation.  
25X1 [Redacted]

Soviet Note to Iran

Khrushchev has taken a new tack to resolve the impasse in Soviet-Iranian relations over Tehran's defense arrangements with the United States. On 19 July he sent a note--which was apparently "more friendly than threatening"--to the Shah reiterating Moscow's position that Iran must agree to ban all foreign bases and troops before "normal" relations between the two countries can be restored.

Khrushchev suggested that this could be achieved by an exchange of assurances between Iran and the USSR that no third country would be allowed to use, construct, or maintain military bases or to station armed forces on the territory of either party. Such an agreement, he said, would result in Soviet assistance, including joint economic projects, and probably increased aid from the United States as well. He has previously indicated that the USSR has no objection if Iran--like Afghanistan--takes aid from both sides.

The Shah is considering giving formal guarantees to the Soviet Union that Iran will not be used as a base for reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union and that he will not allow foreign missile bases in the country, according to Foreign Minister Abbas Aram. The Shah has already made both of these pledges publicly at various times. If the Shah's reply is as limited as indicated by Aram, it will probably be unacceptable to the USSR.

Despite heavy pressure from neutralist-minded Iranian politicians and constant Soviet propaganda and attempts to influence opposition leaders, it seems unlikely that the Shah will take any steps which would seriously jeopardize his standing with the West, but he may feel he must make some gesture to ease his position.

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Lumumba Seeking Complete Belgian Withdrawal From Congo

Premier Lumumba's apparent satisfaction with the UN resolution calling for the "speedy" withdrawal of Belgian troops in the Congo appears based on an assumption that the UN will also force Belgium to evacuate its Congo bases and withdraw from the "independent" province of Katanga. Brussels, however, continues to oppose sending any UN troops to Katanga, where Belgian forces are stationed with the approval of Premier Tshombé. In addition, Belgian Premier Eyskens reiterated on 22 July that Belgium's occupation of its Congo bases "is guaranteed and authorized by treaty." The treaty in question, although initialed on 29 June, has not been ratified by either country.


Should Belgian forces carry out their stated intention of withdrawing only to their bases, the mercurial Lumumba will probably request UN and possibly Soviet aid in forcing a total evacuation. Lumumba's departure for New York on 22 July to address the UN was reportedly prompted by his desire to spell out his charges of Belgian aggression in the Congo in a world forum.

Tension continues high in the Congo interior. At Stanleyville, Ethiopian units of the UN force have refused to protect Belgian nationals and reportedly have joined in some depredations. In Katanga, Belgian aircraft and troops have attacked--presumably with the knowledge of Premier Tshombé--a marauding Force Publique band numbering about 250. In view of the continuing clashes, Brussels can be expected to move slowly in yielding responsibility for internal security. [Belgian Foreign Minister Wigny stated on 21 July--prior to the UN resolution--that Brussels would consider order re-established only after disorders had ceased and "public services and technical facilities" had been restored.]


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### [ Rhodesian Government Fears Spread of Congo Unrest ]

[ As a result of unrest in the Congo, the government of the white-dominated Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is increasingly concerned over the possible intensification of African nationalism in the Federation. In an apparent effort to head off increased nationalist activity, authorities in Southern Rhodesia arrested three leaders of the principal African political party in Salisbury on 19 July. When Africans organized protest demonstrations on 20 July--including a general strike which was 70 percent effective and an attempt by more than 2,000 Africans to march to the center of town--the Southern Rhodesian Government arrested several other leading Africans and banned all processions in the area for three months. Despite the mobilization of army and police reserves, the unrest continued through 21 July. On 22 July Prime Minister Whitehead stated that 181 Africans had been arrested. ]

[ Whites in the Federation have watched the African take-over of the Congo with growing apprehension. The obvious sympathy of most African nationalists with the Lumumba government, coupled with the fear that Africans in the Federation may draw moral and material support from Congolese sources, may lead the Europeans to increase the stringency of the controls over African political activities. Southern Rhodesia, where 220,000 of the 300,000 whites are concentrated, is likely to take the lead in the clamp-down, which may be further intensified as a result of the recent demonstrations in Salisbury. ]

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Moroccan-French Negotiations Stalled on Evacuation Issue

[ The negotiation of outstanding Moroccan-French problems, which was resumed in June after the installation of the King's government, is again stalled on the issue of the evacuation of French forces. The Moroccan Government, according to French Ambassador Parodi in Rabat, has categorically rejected France's offer to evacuate all French bases in Morocco by the end of 1964. Rabat insists that the end of 1962 be the terminal date for French withdrawal. France has about 20,000 army, navy, and air force personnel in Morocco. During informal approaches to the United States regarding the possibility of advancing the date agreed on for the evacuation of American forces from Morocco, the end of 1963, both Foreign Minister M'Hammedi and Crown Prince Moulay Hassan have suggested that American forces be pulled out before December 1962. ]

[ Within the past two months both the rightist and the leftist press in Morocco has become increasingly more unfriendly toward the United States--as well as toward France--on the air-base issue. In an editorial published on 19 July entitled "After U-2, RB-47 Affair," the rightist French-language weekly Al-Istiqlal notes that countries allowing American bases might well get the impression of taking enormous risks for nothing. "When it comes down to it," Al-Istiqlal added, "Americans might well see in the near future serious disintegration in their system of external defenses, and we cannot forget we shelter American U-2 and RB-47 bases in Morocco." ]

[ In the face of such prodding, the King's government--already dedicated to the early evacuation of all foreign troops--is likely to intensify efforts to bolster its prestige by obtaining commitments from both France and the United States to withdraw their forces by the end of 1962. Since early June, most Spanish forces apparently have been withdrawn. ]

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British-Icelandic Fishing Dispute

Britain is making a new attempt to get Iceland to enter negotiations on the dispute over Iceland's 12-mile fishing limits. London denies Reykjavik's right to establish such limits unilaterally, and feels obliged to provide naval protection to its trawlers operating on "the high seas." Nevertheless, the Macmillan government finds the issues annoying rather than critical, recognizes the inherent threat to Iceland's cooperation with NATO, and hopes to end the dispute short of complete capitulation.

Britain now has indicated its willingness to negotiate on the basis of Iceland's 1958 proposal for a 12-mile fisheries limit, with a period of three years for phasing out historic rights and revising certain base lines. Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd has sent a personal letter to Prime Minister Thors to press this proposal.

While there is some opinion within Iceland's Conservative - Social Democratic government in favor of opening negotiations with Britain, the majority probably holds that such a move would not be accepted by the public at this time in view of the continued agitation by Communists and other extremists. The strategy of these groups apparently is to embarrass the government and discredit Iceland's membership in NATO by insisting that the US defense force intervene and protect Iceland from "aggression."

In May, Iceland's justice minister told a member of the US Embassy that Iceland would withdraw from NATO if British naval vessels again entered the 12-mile zone. Feelings in Iceland have been aggravated by several violations in late June and early July of a British Trawlers' Federation three-month ban on fishing inside the 12-mile limit, instituted to provide a quiet period for negotiations to start. In one case an Icelandic vessel fired live shells through a British trawler's funnel.

Although no incidents have occurred since 15 July when the trawler owners accepted government advice to forcefully renew their instructions not to enter the disputed waters, the truce expires on 13 August. The Macmillan government may be expected to encourage an extension, but the Foreign Office is skeptical how long the current lull can last without some progress toward negotiation.

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