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
30 April 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

30 April 1960

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### DAILY BRIEF

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#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist China - Nepal: Chou En-lai left Katmandu on 29 April after a three-day visit during which he took every opportunity--including denial of any claim to the southern slopes of Everest--to increase Peiping's influence in Nepal and to make India appear intransigent in the border negotiations. Despite his efforts, the resultant treaty of peace and friendship with Nepal omits any prohibition on defense arrangements with third countries.

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Turkey: Student rioting has now occurred in at least  
eight Turkish cities following suppression of a student dem-  
onstration in Istanbul on 28 April.

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*ND*  
[ ] has termed the present situation critical and  
believes the government will be forced to resign.] Premier  
Menderes, however, gave no indication that he contemplates  
resigning and in a 29 April speech warned that "party fanatics"  
responsible for the demonstrations--an apparent reference  
to leaders of the Republican People's party--will receive swift  
punishment.

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(Map)

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[ ] Indonesia: Army encouragement of anti-Sukarno political  
activities, covertly instigated, reportedly has caused Acting  
President Djuanda to advise President Sukarno--now on a world  
trip--to reconsider his plan to install the recently appointed  
parliament this June.] [ ] (Page 6)

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*DK*  
Iraq: In a move which will hearten anti-Communist circles,  
the Qasim regime has released from prison a number of former  
royal regime army officers whose death sentences were com-  
muted last month. One was the popular Maj. Gen. Daghistani,  
former deputy chief of staff. There are rumors that former  
Foreign Minister Fadhil Jamali, who is seriously ill, and  
several other former royal regime politicians will be released  
shortly.

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Morocco: The Moroccan Government radio apparently  
intends to use Voice of America facilities to broadcast week-  
ly programs prepared in conjunction with the Algerian rebels]

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DAILY BRIEF

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[provisional government and addressed to "eastern Algeria." Early this year, Paris protested that granting Rabat time on VOA facilities--one of the concessions accorded Morocco during negotiations extending VOA operations until the end of 1963--would enable the Moroccans to expand broadcasting to Algeria and the east and consequently make trouble for France.] [redacted]  
(Page 8)

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### III. THE WEST

*NP*  
Cuba: The massive May Day rally in Havana seems certain to be primarily a concentrated attack on the US and on what remains of private enterprise in Cuba. Developments which the American Embassy considers likely include announcements of the nationalization of public services and of the reorganization of the labor movement under strict government control, statements that there must be some change in the status of the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, and calls for Puerto Rican freedom and Panamanian control of the Panama Canal. [redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Chou En-lai's Visit to Nepal

Communist China's Premier Chou En-lai left Katmandu on 29 April after a three-day visit during which he took every opportunity to increase Peiping's influence in Nepal. Stressing the advantages of closer economic cooperation, Chou characterized both Nepal and Communist China as "poor" nations which must help each other--"the Chinese Government is willing to give support within its capability for the construction of Nepal." Chinese aid, now totaling \$33,600,000, is "sincere, without any condition attached," Chou said. He proposed that some of these grant funds be used to build a road linking Tibet and Nepal.

Chou stressed that the Sino-Nepalese border problem could easily be settled in a manner "satisfactory to both sides." This attempt to make it appear that Nehru was the intransigent partner to the recent unsuccessful border talks in New Delhi was highlighted by Chou's denial that Communist China had any intention of claiming the southern slopes of Mount Everest.

Just before leaving Katmandu, Chou and Nepal's Prime Minister Koirala signed a treaty of peace and friendship omitting the clause on military nonalignment reportedly sought by the Chinese. The joint communique, however, did include expressions of sympathy and support for Afro-Asian nationalist movements. [Reportedly, Chou had attempted to get Nehru to do this in the joint Sino-Indian communique signed on 25 April, but the Indian prime minister refused. Chou, who intends these statements to make it appear that Peiping is lining up support for national liberation, also tried unsuccessfully to get Nehru to join him in a recommendation for an Afro-Asian conference.]

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Chou's irritation with the lack of progress in the Sino-Indian talks was reflected in his charge on 29 April that Nehru had been "unfriendly" when he told the Indian Parliament on 26 April that China had committed aggression in Ladakh. [REDACTED]

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
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### Student Demonstrations Spread in Turkey

Student rioting spread on 29 April to at least seven other cities after originating in Istanbul on the preceding day. Some of the most serious rioting occurred in the capital, Ankara, where several students were reported killed. Reports in Ankara indicate that Erzurum in eastern Turkey, site of Ataturk University, was also the scene of serious demonstrations. Other cities affected by the student demonstrations against the repressive policies of the Menderes government are Izmir, Adana, Trabzon, Sivas, and Sam-sun. Martial law, applied in Istanbul and Ankara on 28 April, may soon be imposed on the entire nation. Thus far, there has been no evidence that the riots have assumed an anti-American character.

Reports indicate that the demonstrators have been almost exclusively students, with the general public taking no active part in the rioting. The police have been the special target of the students, while detachments of soldiers sent to assist the police have usually been greeted as potential allies against the government. There have been no reports, however, of troops joining with the students.

Premier Menderes addressed the nation and called for calm on 29 April. He also denounced the "party fanatics" who have instigated the demonstrations--an apparent reference to the leaders of the opposition Republican People's party (RPP). The premier promised swift punishment for those responsible for the riots and stated his government's intention to preserve peace and tranquillity. A Ministry of Interior statement on the same day specifically blamed the RPP for instigating the demonstrations in Istanbul on the 28th.

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[redacted] the situation is critical and believes that the only solution is the resignation of the present government and the appointment of a new cabinet. [redacted] 70 percent of the military throughout Turkey now is sympathetic to the RPP.]

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[redacted] While there is no evidence at this time that Menderes is contemplating resignation, there is known to exist a faction within his [redacted]

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own Democratic party which opposes the government's recent repressive moves. Continued deterioration of the situation in the nation might lead to initiatives on behalf of this group for establishing some form of cooperation with the RPP.)

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### Pressures Mount in Indonesia

[Pressures by the army and anti-Communist political parties in Indonesia to prevent installation of President Sukarno's appointed parliament have reached the point of provoking exchanges between Djakarta and Sukarno, now midway on a two-month global tour. The 261-member parliament is approximately 25-percent Communist and was appointed by Sukarno in late March to replace the elected body he had dissolved earlier the same month.]

[Acting President Djuanda reportedly has advised Sukarno to reconsider his plan to install the parliament in June. ]

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[the President remains determined to install and maintain the new parliament until elections are held in 1962. Sukarno has reportedly sent back orders that "no principal measure" is to be taken before his return and that newspapers which are criticizing his policies should be banned. While the dailies have not been banned, ]

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[Army Chief of Staff Nasution, who is concurrently security minister, ordered the papers to cease criticism of Sukarno but continue antiparliamentary articles. Recent issues of the newspapers concerned tend to substantiate these reports.]

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[Army leadership has insisted that the recently formed coalition, the Democratic League, and the newspapers which support the league must take the initiative in opposing Sukarno. The league now is attempting to create regional opposition to the parliament. Army support of these activities, although covert, has become an open secret. Should pressures by the army and political parties prove insufficient to keep Sukarno from installing parliament in June, the President, in retaliation for army opposition, might further reduce Nasution's power or even dismiss him.]

[Although reports continue that the army will attempt a coup during Sukarno's absence or shortly after his return in ]

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[early June, army activities still appear primarily directed toward the limited parliamentary goal and toward preventing Sukarno from including Communists in a revised cabinet.]

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Moroccans Apparently Plan to Use VOA Facilities on Behalf  
Of Algerian Rebels

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[The director of Radio Maroc, the Moroccan Government's broadcasting facility, has informed an American newspaper reporter that his network will shortly begin to broadcast programs prepared in conjunction with the Algerian rebels' provisional government. These programs would total 21 hours weekly and be addressed to "eastern Algeria." Apparently these broadcasts are to emanate from the Voice of America's Tangier installation. Under the agreement of 31 December 1959 extending VOA relay operations in Morocco until the end of 1963, the Moroccan Government can use up to 80 hours of broadcast time weekly from the Tangier facilities; Moroccan broadcasts from VOA transmitters are expected to begin on 30 April.]

[Last January, the French Foreign Ministry protested the conclusion of the VOA operations agreement, pointing out that facilities accorded the Moroccans would enable them to expand broadcasting to Algeria and the east and thereby cause trouble for France.]

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### III. THE WEST

#### Prospects for Cuban May Day Rally

The mammoth May Day rally, planned to demonstrate overwhelming support for Fidel Castro, seems certain to be primarily a concentrated attack on the United States and on what remains of private enterprise in Cuba. Developments which the US Embassy considers likely include announcements of the nationalization of public services and of the reorganization of the labor movement under strict government control, statements that there must be some change in the status of the US Naval Base at Guatanamo Bay, and calls for Puerto Rican freedom and Panamanian control of the Panama Canal. Castro is expected to condemn strongly alleged US intervention in Cuba through political and economic pressures and "bombings."

Castro may also try a political gambit, such as setting a date to hold elections in order to deflect criticism of his dictatorial government. An announcement on May Day that diplomatic relations with the USSR will be resumed is considered by the embassy to be unlikely, [but ] reports that an "important" Cuban-Soviet announcement is planned for 8 May.]

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The US service attachés report that the Castro government for the first time is having to use strong-arm methods and threats to ensure large attendance at the rally. Government-controlled Radio Mambi is haranguing its listeners to be present to show the world that there "is a small nation ready to face up to the colossus of imperialism."

Organizers of a simultaneous large demonstration in Santiago, capital of western Oriente Province, have not yet stressed the anti-US campaign. However, the principle speaker at Santiago will be

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
Communist-oriented National Bank President Ernesto Che Guevara, who can be expected to attack the US. Since unrest in Oriente is reported to be increasing markedly because of the serious economic decline there, Guevara may announce some spectacular palliative or diversionary measures.

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Scientific Adviser to the President

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Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

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Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

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The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

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Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

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The Director

National Indications Center

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