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1. COMMUNIST "PEACE MANIFESTO"

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The main purpose of the "peace manifesto" issued on 22 November by the representatives of the Communist parties of 64 nations apparently was to prepare the ground for future Sino-Soviet bloc measures to offset the impact of the December NATO meeting. While the manifesto's denunciation of American foreign policy was considerably milder than the attacks in the communiqué of the 12 Sino-Soviet bloc parties published the same day, its central theme was the contrast between the Communist world's desire for peaceful co-existence and the aggressive designs of the NATO powers.

The manifesto expressed the "full confidence" of the Communists that "now it is possible to prevent war...because the world situation today is different and the balance of forces has changed." At the same time, however, it warned that the danger of a "monstrous and all-destroying war has not passed" because the "capitalist monopolies" continue to have a "vested interest in war."

The manifesto declared that the Communists have no "motive or reason for launching wars" and appealed to "all people of good will" to support a six-point peaceful coexistence program endorsing the major themes of Soviet foreign policy.

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2. THE CYPRUS SITUATION

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[Redacted]

On Cyprus, recent acts of violence may indicate the end of the eight-month period of relative peace. In addition to increasingly frequent acts of sabotage and attacks by EOKA on Greek Cypriot "collaborators," there are also indications that tension between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is growing. Recent leaflets distributed by EOKA and the Turkish Cypriot underground organization, VOLKAN, have been highly inflammatory.

The increased activity by EOKA is probably based on a desire to retain strict control over its members and over the Greek Cypriot population, the recent anti-EOKA successes of British security forces, and a belief that little is to be gained from the proposed UN debate on Cyprus. [Redacted] EOKA now has the capability of engaging in an active campaign of violence for a period of at least six months. [Redacted]

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3. MENDERES HAVING DIFFICULTY FORMING NEW
TURKISH CABINET

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[Redacted]

Failure to name a new Turkish cabinet nearly a month after the national election indicates that Prime Minister - designate Menderes is meeting substantial, unexpected opposition within his own party both as to government policy and membership of the cabinet. The dissension probably centers around Menderes' strong desire to take a tough approach toward the opposition and toward any future defectors from his own party. Twenty-five re-elected Democratic deputies are already reported to be considering resignation from the party. Menderes wants to be able to force such defectors completely out of the National Assembly.

The moderates, who are apparently blocking Menderes' attempts to form a new cabinet, may succeed in obtaining some seats in the cabinet and in gaining a temporary compromise aimed at party harmony. Once the government is formed, however, Menderes may be expected to assume firm control of the regime. Menderes and, to a lesser extent, President Bayar are angered over opposition attacks both during and since the election, and will make every effort to muzzle criticism outside the assembly. Menderes has already proposed that reporting on assembly proceedings be limited to the state-operated radio and the official Anatolia News Agency.

[Redacted]

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4. JAPAN SEEKS ASSOCIATION WITH NATO PROGRAMS

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The Japanese government has informed Ambassador MacArthur that it is prepared to participate in a program of greater free world cooperation and hopes

that means can be found to associate Japan with appropriate aspects of programs developed at the forthcoming NATO meeting. Japan has requested that the US-Japan security committee discuss methods by which this cooperation can be achieved.

Vice Foreign Minister Ohno said Tokyo must move cautiously and avoid "precipitous action," because of limitations imposed by the constitution; the special nature of US-Japan security relations, which are still subject to strong criticism; and, more immediately, the Diet elections next year.

The Kishi government, which has become increasingly concerned about the adequacy of its defense establishment, probably is interested primarily in any NATO summit agreement on distribution of modern weapons and exchange of military information. Conservative leaders and defense officials apparently are seriously considering a change from a military policy limited to defense of the home islands to one based on a deterrent force equipped with modern weapons.

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Although the government is giving favorable consideration to the procurement of ground-to-air and air-to-air guided missiles, it has provided no indication that it intends to relax its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons by either Japanese or American forces in Japan.

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5. ADENAUER CONCERNED OVER INCREASING COST
OF NATO COMMITMENT

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A member of the West German NATO delegation told a US delegate in Paris that Bonn's Annual Review submission was almost killed by Chancellor Adenauer when he heard that tax increases would be necessary to finance long-range plans. Bonn's NATO representative mentioned that the present military budget of \$2.64 billion would increase to \$3.6 billion in 1959 and to \$4.32 billion in 1960. Adenauer agreed to submit the plan only when advisers told him the 1959-60 figures were not firm.

The US NATO mission in Paris commented that beginning in 1958-59, Bonn's estimated defense contribution will be second only to the United States in its burden on the economy, reaching 9 percent of the gross national product in 1960 and making it increasingly difficult to balance the budget. The Bonn government has said that, while it plans to finance these defense expenditures from its own resources, it reserves the right to ask for external aid.

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