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11 October 1951

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Copy No. 47

## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 18

NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

1. DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TG S C 2009

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: HS 70-2

DATE: 7-12-71 REVIEWER: 

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~**S U M M A R Y****USSR**

- 1. Jet fighters confirmed in the Soviet Maritime Province (page 3)**

**FAR EAST**

- 2. Presence of heavier Soviet-type tanks accepted in Korea (page 3)**
- 3. Caucasian troops again reported in North Korea (page 4)**
- 4. Withdrawal of Nationalist troops from Burma requires Thai or French cooperation (page 5)**

**NEAR EAST**

- 5. Security Council may further postpone meeting on Anglo-Iranian dispute (page 5)**
- 6. India's attitude toward the Anglo-Iranian dispute (page 6)**

3.3(h)(2)

**WESTERN EUROPE**

- 8. US Embassy comments on French cantonal elections (page 7)**

**LATIN AMERICA**

- 9. Comment on Argentine President's request for leave of absence (page 8)**

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3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

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3.5(c)

USSR

1. Jet fighters confirmed in the Soviet Maritime Province:



Photo-reconnaissance missions on 21 September confirm the presence of Soviet jet aircraft units in the Maritime Province and possibly Sakhalin. The photographs suggest the possibility that at least one complete jet

regiment is based near Sovetskaya Gavan, and that at least one unit on Sakhalin is also jet equipped. The possibility exists that conversion of other units of Soviet Far Eastern air arms may be well advanced. Since the Sovetskaya Gavan area is believed subordinate in strategic importance to Vladivostok, there is a strong probability that jets form the principal strength of air units based in that area.

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Comment:

It is now estimated that 190 jet planes of one type or another are stationed in that area, but the proportion of MIG-15's has not been established. These planes are in addition to the jets now operating in and from Manchuria, whether piloted by Russians, Communist Chinese or others.

Russian jet production now appears to be sufficient to supply fighters for units located in peripheral areas --including Satellites-- as well as for the protection of targets deep within the Soviet Union.

## FAR EAST

2. Presence of heavier Soviet-type tanks accepted in Korea:



On the basis of UN pilot sightings in the Pyongyang area since 1 October, the US Far East Command has accepted the presence in Korea of enemy armor heavier than the now-familiar T-34. Observing that these tanks

are probably organic to the Chinese Communist forces, FECOM states

- 3 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

that they are probably Joseph Stalin I's and II's rather than the new Joseph Stalin III. The possibility that the Joseph Stalin III may be employed for testing is not to be discounted entirely.

Comment: Although the Joseph Stalin I and II tanks --now superseded in the Soviet Army by the Joseph Stalin III-- mount a larger gun than their UN counterparts--122 mm, compared with 90 mm --their underpowered engines and the difficulties of the Korean terrain, will do much to counter their effectiveness. In sufficient number, however, these tanks will form an important addition to the lightly-armored Communist forces in Korea.

### 3. Caucasian troops again reported in North Korea:

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[redacted] learned from inhabitants of North Korea that 5,000 Caucasian troops (believed Russians) with 80 to 100 T-34 tanks were at Hamhung in late September. 3.3(h)(2)

During the same period "10,000 Caucasian mechanized troops equipped with tanks and heavy artillery were between Yangdok and Songchon" across the peninsula in northern Korea. On 28 September "600 European troops in Chinese Communist uniforms were moving from Pyongyang" southward.

Comment: While the figures in this report are probably exaggerated, it is further evidence of the considerable number of Soviet military personnel currently believed to be performing rear area functions in North Korea. These troops may total as many as 20,000.

The "Caucasians" referred to as operating tanks are probably Soviet military personnel delivering armor to the Chinese Communists and North Koreans.

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

4. Withdrawal of Nationalist troops from Burma requires Thai or French cooperation:

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The US Embassy in Rangoon reports that, although the Burmese Government would be "delighted" to have all Chinese Nationalist troops withdrawn from its territory, the withdrawal must be accomplished without

antagonizing the Chinese Communists. Thus, the troops would have to be conducted to the Thai or Indochinese border ostensibly as a retreat before the Burmese Army. The Embassy points out, however, that both the Thai and the French have been reluctant in the past to allow the entry of Nationalist forces into their territory.

Comment: The Thai might be persuaded to alter their position. The French, on the other hand, may be expected to insist on internment if the Chinese enter Indochina.

It may be inferred, however, from an apparently lessened Burmese concern over the presence of the Nationalist troops and from the absence of new reports of their depredations, that they are not now presenting the problem they did before their rout from Yunnan.

NEAR EAST

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5. Security Council may further postpone meeting on Anglo-Iranian dispute:

British UN delegate Jebb is seeking delay of the next UN Security Council meeting in order to ascertain whether Turkey, India and Yugoslavia would co-sponsor the draft resolution on the British-Iranian oil dispute recommended by the United States and Great

Britain. After he was informed that Brazil, India and the US would

- 5 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

prefer to postpone the meeting, Jebb agreed that if the necessary seven votes were obtained by 12 October he would inform London that he proposed to request a meeting for 15 October.

Comment: The draft resolution calls for early resumption of British-Iranian negotiations in accord with the principles of the International Court provisional measures, or alternatively for a mutually acceptable settlement consistent with the principles of the UN charter. Since India, Turkey and Yugoslavia apparently desire to see negotiations resumed, they may co-sponsor the resolution. Postponement of the Security Council meeting, however, may offer some hope for reaching a negotiated settlement.

#### 6. India's attitude toward the Anglo-Iranian dispute:

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A high Indian official has informed the US Charge in New Delhi that India approved Britain's step in taking the Iranian oil question to the UN Security Council. He also asserted that India had previously assured

Britain of its support for any Security Council move calling upon Iran to cancel the order expelling British nationals from Abadan. India could not, however, support a proposal upholding the International Court of Justice interim decision in detail, since India considers the latter to have been superseded by certain agreements reached during the course of Harriman's mediation efforts.

Comment: The International Court ruled that no measure should be taken to hinder the operations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and that the management of that company should continue to direct operations under a five-man Board of Supervision including members chosen by both Britain and Iran.

India's desire to insure regular delivery of its oil supplies, 95 per cent of which are imported, may outweigh its natural inclination to defend Iran's assertion of national sovereignty.

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

India might therefore be persuaded to vote for a resolution calling for negotiations leading toward the resumption of oil operations under some type of temporary management.

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## WESTERN EUROPE

### 8. US Embassy comments on French cantonal elections:

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The US Embassy in Paris cautions against any inference from press reports that the French cantonal elections held on 7 October clearly indicated important losses of popular support for the Communists or the

Gaullists. Elections were held in only half the cantons of France; none were held in the Paris region where both extremes are strong; and the Gaullists ran candidates in only about 40 percent of all the contests.

- 7 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

Nevertheless, the marked shift to the right in these elections will probably increase the government's reluctance to make concessions to induce the Socialists to re-enter the coalition.

Comment: Although the Communists received only about 24 percent of the popular vote, compared to their 26.5 percent in the June national elections, they are still the largest French party. Furthermore, the apparent sharp drop in the Gaullists' share of the popular vote as well as the strong showing of the right-wing parties in the present government, may make it expedient for the Gaullists to join later in a coalition government.

The Embassy has recently estimated that the long-term prospect is for a more rightist government, but believes the Pleven government is likely to remain in power through 1951 and that the majority of its members prefers to strive for the re-inclusion of the Socialists.

## LATIN AMERICA

### 9. Comment on Argentine President's request for leave of absence:

President Peron's announcement that he will ask a special session of Congress on 11 October to grant him leave of absence until after the 11 November elections may represent at least a temporary compromise with the armed forces.

[redacted] the armed forces planned to demand Peron's resignation and to replace the Peron-Quijano electoral slate with Colonel (retired) Domingo Mercante and ex-Foreign Minister Bramuglia. The present arrangement, whether dictated by the army or designed by Peron for tactical reasons, may encourage the armed forces to defer any decisions regarding Peron's ouster until after the elections have provided a gauge for his popular support.

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Peron's announcement did not indicate who would act as president during his absence. Legally the succession would be Vice-President Quijano, who is ill, and then Rear Admiral Alberto Teisaire, President pro tempore of the Senate.

- 8 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)