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1 August 1951

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

31
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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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GENERAL

3.3(h)(2)

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USSR

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6. French considering repatriation of Chinese Nationalist internees in Indochina. (page 6).

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GENERAL

3.3(h)(2)

2. Soviet "peaceful coexistence" policy considered likely:

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[Redacted]

The US Embassy in London suggests the possibility that the USSR will now seek a period of "peaceful coexistence" in which to increase its own strength while the West is weakened by unpreparedness, complacency, or economic crises. Recalling the precedent of Soviet policies in the 1920's and 1930's, the embassy characterizes the coexistence policy as a middle road between a "genuine general retreat" and an imminent showdown with the West.

The USSR may even, for the time being, refrain from further local aggressions through Satellites, since the risk of thereby precipitating a general conflict may be greater than the USSR cares to incur.

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The embassy considers that a renewed attempt to achieve an Austrian Treaty should be used to test the new Soviet protestations of a desire to cooperate.

Comment: The only evidence of a possible change in Soviet foreign policies, aside from a professed willingness to settle the Korean War, lies in the trade and cultural fields, but activities in these fields have not so far involved any real concessions on the part of the Soviet Government. They have coincided with a rather sharp shift in Soviet propaganda, apparently designed to persuade susceptible non-Communist governments that a costly Western alliance against the Soviet Union is no longer necessary.

USSR

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
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FAR EAST



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6. French considering repatriation of Chinese Nationalist internees in Indochina:

The French Foreign Office appears to be receding from its opposition to the repatriation to Formosa of Chinese Nationalist troops interned in Indochina,

Nationalist Minister in Paris.

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Although emphasizing that General de Lattre and the next French Cabinet must approve any decision regarding the internees, a Foreign Office official hinted to a US Embassy official that it might be possible to repatriate a few groups and then await the Chinese Communist reaction.

Comment: The Chinese Nationalist Government has been attempting periodically during the past two years to obtain permission for the internees to leave Indochina for Formosa. The French, however, have firmly refused all requests, fearing that the proposed action might provide the Chinese Communists with a pretext for intervening in Indochina.

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The above message is the second report during the past week that the French position in this matter has been relaxed.

NEAR EAST

3.3(h)(2)

EASTERN EUROPE8. Impressive mass attendance at Cardinal Sapieha's funeral:

3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted]

The immense power of the Polish Catholic Church was demonstrated on 27 July when nearly a million persons attended the funeral rites for Cardinal Sapieha, despite Communist warnings against absenteeism and suppression of information concerning the rites.

The fervor of the public's mass demonstration derived from the fact that Sapieha symbolized, for the Polish people, national and spiritual independence. Polish Primate Wyszynski's funeral oration indicated that the Church, while not seeking open conflict with the government, was determined to resist, with the firm backing of the mass of the Polish people, any further Communist incursions into the spiritual life of the country.

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The US Embassy in Warsaw comments that, in death, the Cardinal made his most crucial contribution to the unity and strength of the Polish Catholic Church's struggle against Communism.

Comment: Cardinal Sapieha was nationally revered as the spiritual leader of the Catholic Church in Poland. Because of his great age (he was 86 when he died), he stepped aside several years ago so that Archbishop Wyszynski, who was younger and stronger, could become Poland's Primate.

WESTERN EUROPE

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10. Austrian Foreign Minister looks with favor upon reopening of treaty talks:

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Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber has welcomed the US suggestion that negotiations be resumed on the Austrian treaty, on the grounds that the continuity of four-power treaty efforts should not be interrupted altogether. He believes that there is not at present any urgency for a meeting of the deputies, but that it might be important to hold a session in September, depending on developments of the next few weeks.

Comment: In June of this year Gruber hoped for agreement on the Austrian treaty at a Big Four meeting, and therefore regarded the deputies' sessions as unnecessary. Now, with no prospect of a Big Four meeting, Gruber has changed his attitude.

11. Soviet motives in Berlin trade restrictions:

3.3(h)(2)

US officials in Berlin feel that the success of Soviet restrictions on Berlin trade, which were originally related to immediate problems, may have influenced the USSR to continue the

restrictions as a means to wider economic and political objectives. These officials foresee a tenacious Soviet campaign to retain and develop the present harassing restrictions, and estimate that the USSR could resist the effect of present and proposed Allied economic countermeasures for another two months. If, however, broader objectives appear feasible, the USSR would be willing to persist much longer.

Comment: The use of a limited air lift to relieve the large backlog of stalled goods is in prospect, and some commercial air freight shipments on a small scale have already been made. Nevertheless, a firm Allied stand on the issue continues to be delayed by French reluctance to extend present countermeasures for fear that the "bluff would be called" by the USSR. Present countermeasures now include the refusal to approve the new interzonal trade pact and the institution of partial embargo of shipments to East Germany. French officials fear that Allied countermeasures will so discourage the USSR over the possibility of a restoration of normal trade that it will be willing to incur the economic loss involved

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in the imposition of a blockade.

The East German economy would be seriously harmed by a considerable extension of the present partial embargo of key goods from West Germany, because, under normal trade conditions, the legally authorized trade has always provided an excellent cover for illegal shipments that have benefited the East.

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12. Norway-Netherlands atomic energy collaboration:



The joint Norway-Netherlands experimental uranium pile at Kjeller, Norway, was operated for the first time on 30 July.

Comment: Operation of this experimental uranium pile represents the first major technical achievement by the Norway-Netherlands Joint Commission. The contract for the project was officially signed on 12 April 1951.

Because this is strictly an experimental pile and its plutonium output will be negligible, it can provide only for the production of radioactive isotopes for tracer and medical use, and will have no military implications.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Report of Articles Submitted 1 - 15 August 1951

I. Summary

133 articles submitted
 23 articles rejected
 100 articles published

Of those submitted 3 not recorded

Of the 130 recorded:

1 was received before 1200
 3 were received between 1201 and 1300
 3 were received between 1301 and 1400
 42 were received between 1401 and 1500
 14 were received between 1501 and 1529
 67 were received after 1530

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 NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: HR TO 2

DATE: 10/27 REVIEWER

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II. Detailed report

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Published</u>			<u>Rejected</u>	
	<u>Article #</u>	<u>Submitted</u>	<u>By</u>	<u>Submitted</u>	<u>By</u>
1 Aug	1	after 1530/31	W	1015/31	E
	2	after 1530/31	S		
	3	after 1530/31	S		
	4	after 1530/31	E		
	5	after 1530/31	E		
	6	after 1530/31	E		
	7	1115/31	E		
	8	-----/31	S		
	9	after 1530/31	W		
	10	after 1530/31	W		
	11	after 1530/31	W		
	12	after 1530/31	W		
2 Aug	1	after 1530/1	W	after 1530/1	W
	2	after 1530/1	E	after 1530/1	E
	3	after 1530/1	E		
	4	1430/1	E		
	5	after 1530/1	E		
	6	after 1530/1	E		
	7	after 1530/1	E		
	8	after 1530/1	S		
	9	after 1530/1	W		
	10	1450/1	W		

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
<u>Issue</u>		<u>Published</u>		<u>Rejected</u>	
	<u>Article #</u>	<u>Submitted</u>	<u>By</u>	<u>Submitted</u>	<u>By</u>
3 Aug	1	after 1530/2	W	1455/2	W
	2	after 1530/2	W	1520/2	W
	3	1440/2	E		
	4	after 1530/2	E		
4 Aug	1	1525/3	E		
	2	after 1530/3	E		
	3	1520/3	E		
	4	---/3	E		
	5	1500/3	E		
	6	after 1530/3	S		
	7	1500/3	S		
	8	after 1530/3	S		
	9	1500/3	W		
	10	1500/3	W		
5 Aug	1	1430/4	E	1430/4	W
	2	after 1530/4	E	1430/4	E
	3	1430/4	E	1425/4	E
	4	1430/4	E	1430/4	E
	5	1430/4	E	1430/4	E
	6	1430/4	E		
	7	1500/4	E		
	8	1415/4	E		
7 Aug	1	1500/6	E		
	2	after 1530/6	E		
	3	1500/6	E		
	4	after 1530/6	S		
	5	1400/6	S		
	6	after 1530/6	S		
8 Aug	1	after 1530/7	S		
	2	1500/7	S		
	3	1500/7	S		
	4	1445/7	S		
	5	after 1530/7	S		
9 Aug	1	1430/8	S	after 1530/8	E
	2	1500/8	S		
	3	after 1530/8	S		
	4	1324/8	S		
	5	1523/8	S		
	6	after 1530/8	S		
	7	after 1530/8	S		
	8	after 1530/8	S		
	9	after 1530/8	S		
	10	1254/8	S		

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<u>Issue</u>	<u>Article #</u>	<u>Published</u>	<u>Rejected</u>	
		<u>Submitted</u>	<u>By</u>	<u>Submitted</u>
10 Aug	1	after 1530/9		after 1530/9
	2	after 1530/9		1418/9
	3	after 1530/9	S	after 1530/9
	4	after 1530/9	S	after 1530/9
	5	after 1530/9	E	
	6	1510/9	E	
	7	1420/9	E	
	8	after 1530/9	S	
	9	1410/9	W	
	10	1430/9 after 1530/9**	S	
11 Aug	1	after 1530/10	RR	
	2	1505/10	RE	
	3	1505/10	EE	
	4	after 1530/10	EE	
	5	after 1530/10	WE	
	6	after 1530/10	WE	
	7	after 1530/10	SS	
	8	after 1530/10	W	
12 Aug	1	1430/11	W	
	2	1310/11	S	
	3	1228/11	EE	
	4	1426/11	EE	
	5	1216/1240/11	EE	
	6	after 1530/11	EE	
	7	1430/11	EW	
	8	1430/11	WW	
	9	1430/11	WW	
	10	1430/11	WW	
14 Aug	1	after 1530/13	E	1516/13
	2	after 1530/13	E	after 1530/16
	3	after 1530/13	E	
	4	after 1530/13	E	
	5	after 1530/13	E	
	6	after 1530/13	SW	
15 Aug	7	1516/13		
	1	----/14		after 1530/14
	2	after 1530/14	E	1430/14
	3	after 1530/14	E	after 1530/14
	4	1510/14	E	1525/14
	5	1515/14	S	1525/14
	6	1515/14	SS	after 1530/14
	7	1430/14	SW	
	8	1525/14	WW	
	9	1430/14	WW	

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