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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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7 OCTOBER 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Another cargo of bloc arms arrives in Cuba; two more Soviet vessels carrying arms expected this month.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Japanese Communists avoid public alignment in Sino-Soviet dispute.

②

Laos--Souvanna Phouma sees King after conciliatory Vientiane radio appeal to Phoumi group; sentiment growing to move capital to Luang Prabang to escape Kong Le's influence.

③

Congo--Arrest of Lumumba adherents discredits Lumumba's claim to army loyalty outside Leopoldville.

④



Iraq--Clashes likely in Baghdad between Communists and Nationalists during student congress starting 8 October.

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III. THE WEST

Gaitskell retains support of Labor party's political and parliamentary arm in defense policy dispute.

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7 October 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet Bloc - Cuba: What is probably a further substantial shipment of bloc arms is being unloaded in Cuba from the Soviet vessel Sergi Kirov. [redacted]

[redacted] the ship departed the Black Sea port of Nikolaev on 3 September with more than 3,000 tons of "varied cargo" --a term recently used when military items were included. Its unloading in the port of Cabanas along the northern coast of Cuba--38 miles west of Havana--apparently is being conducted under strict security cover, including the prohibition of all flights in the area. The type of equipment involved is not yet known. Two other Soviet vessels--the Nikolai Burdenko and the Atkarsk--with military cargoes of approximately the same tonnage are scheduled to arrive in Cuba during October. [redacted]

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Japan: American officials in Tokyo believe that the behavior of the Japanese Communist party toward the Sino-Soviet dispute indicates a reluctance to become publicly involved because of close ties with both Peiping and Moscow; party publications have assiduously tried to give the impression that no dispute exists. They believe that the party, if forced to choose now, would declare in favor of Moscow's current interpretation of Communist theory and doctrine, but that over the longer range the orientation of the Japanese Communists will be influenced by their long and close sympathetic association with the Chinese party and by the special attraction exerted by the mainland throughout Japanese society. [redacted] (Page 1)

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Laos: Radio Vientiane, just prior to Premier Souvanna Phouma's departure for talks with the King in Luang Prabang on 6 October, issued a somewhat conciliatory appeal to leaders of Phoumi's Savannakhet Committee to assist the royal government in reaching "national concord." Meanwhile, the idea of moving the seat of the government to Luang Prabang is reportedly gaining increasing acceptance among leaders in Vientiane, including Souvanna. One reason for such a move,

would be to get out from under the immediate influence of Captain Kong Le. Transfer of the government to Luang Prabang, however, would not only leave Kong Le in undisputed possession of Vientiane, Laos' major administrative and economic center, but would also in effect be an admission that neither Souvanna nor his ranking military commander has any real control over him.

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Republic of the Congo: Mobutu's success in securing the arrest of pro-Lumumba leaders in Orientale Province by the army on 5 October appears likely to discredit Lumumba's claim that he commands the loyalty of army units outside Leopoldville. Lumumba on 27 September asked the UAR for arms for ten to fifteen thousand men, claiming that army units outside of Leopoldville were loyal to him rather than to Mobutu.

Although Orientale Province has been regarded as a Lumumba stronghold,

leaders of Lumumba's National Congo Movement (MNC) there were less experienced than those who followed Lumumba to Leopoldville, and that Congo Army units there were "almost leaderless."

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Iraq: Clashes between Communists and nationalists are likely during the Sixth Congress of International Students in Baghdad beginning 8 October. Baghdad security forces are

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taking stringent precautionary measures to head off trouble. The recent closure of several extremist newspapers is part of a general program of reducing friction between the opposing elements.

[redacted] where anti-Communist sentiment is strong, [redacted] a violent demonstration had taken place there on 6 October and that most of the city's shops were closed [redacted]

III. THE WEST

Britain: Although Hugh Gaitskell suffered a major defeat when the trade union-dominated Labor party conference rejected his pro-NATO policies, he retained the support of the party's political arm--representatives from its organization in individual constituencies. This fortifies his position as he faces the continuation of the left-wing challenge when the new session of Parliament opens in early November. Although the Labor party membership in Parliament is likely to reject or bypass the conference's endorsement of neutralism and to retain Gaitskell as leader, its effectiveness as an opposition to the Macmillan government will necessarily be further reduced.

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Japanese Communists Avoid Sino-Soviet Dispute

American officials in Tokyo believe that the Japanese Communist party (JCP) is reluctant to become publicly involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute because of close ties with both Peiping and Moscow. These officials consider that the JCP--if forced to choose now--would declare in favor of Moscow's current interpretation of Communist theory and doctrine. They feel that over the longer range, however, the orientation of the Japanese Communists will be influenced by their party's long and sympathetic association with the Chinese party and by the special attraction which the mainland exerts on Japanese society.

Prior to the meeting of Communist parties in Bucharest in late June, the JCP newspaper Akahata had urged readers to study the text of three statements of the Chinese thesis which had been reprinted on 5 June in the semimonthly organ of the JCP central committee, Sekai Seiji Shiryo. However, since JCP officials learned of the disagreement between the Soviet and Chinese delegates at Bucharest, the Japanese Communist press has published only those Chinese statements which support the Bucharest communique. In publishing excerpts from Khrushchev's speech at the Bucharest meeting, editors of Sekai on 10 July referred to it as giving the "position of the international Communist movement," and on 25 July they published editorials from both Pravda and People's Daily supporting the communique.

There are unconfirmed reports that JCP leaders delayed their support of the Bucharest communique until after Liu Ning-i, Chinese Communist party central committee member who visited Japan in late July, had assured them that his party "fully supported" the communique and that "there is no discord" between his and the Soviet parties.

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The Situation in the Congo

Mobutu's success in securing the arrest in Stanleyville of pro-Lumumba leaders in Orientale Province by the army on 5 October is his most notable show of strength outside the Leopoldville area. The arrest of three Lumumba adherents--including his half-brother--on charges of plotting a coup appears likely to discredit Lumumba's claim that he commands the loyalty of most army units outside Leopoldville.

Although Orientale Province has been regarded as a Lumumba stronghold,

leaders of Lumumba's National Congo Movement there were less experienced than those who follow Lumumba to Leopoldville, and that Congo Army units there were "almost leaderless."

On 27 September, Lumumba asked the UAR ambassador for light arms for 10,000 to 15,000 men, claiming that army units outside Leopoldville were loyal to him rather than to Mobutu. On 4 October, however, Cairo for the first time conceded the need for some form of official contact with Mobutu and instructed its ambassador in Leopoldville to designate an embassy officer "to examine (Mobutu's) attitude and watch his conduct.

the commander of the UAR troops in the Congo has been reprimanded by General von Horn, who accused him of "insolence and insubordination." Following the rebuke, the senior UAR officer in Leopoldville canceled his orders concerning the transfer of additional forces from Gomena to Leopoldville. Von Horn's reprimand was probably prompted by knowledge that the UAR contingent had failed to implement UN orders for the transfer of its Leopoldville company to Gomena.

a cargo of Czech aid to the Congo is scheduled to reach Matadi aboard a Portuguese ship between 6 and 8 October. The Czech Foreign Ministry, following Mobutu's expulsion of Communist diplomats

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from Leopoldville, has requested that the UAR embassy take charge of the cargo, pending instructions from Prague concerning its disposal. [redacted]

The activities of Soviet diplomatic personnel and cargo ships suggest that the USSR is marking time until the Congo situation clarifies. Diplomatic personnel evacuated from the Congo in mid-September are reported to be in Guinea "under wraps," although the former ambassador to the Congo is in Accra. Two cargo ships believed to be transporting equipment to the Congo have held their positions off the African coast since mid-September. [redacted]

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British Labor Party Prospects

Although Hugh Gaitskell suffered a major defeat when the trade union - dominated Labor party conference rejected his pro-NATO policies, he retained most of the support of the political arm of the labor movement. Some 80 percent of the local party constituency representatives voted with Gaitskell. This will fortify his position in the face of the left-wing group, which now will carry its attack against his leadership to the moderate Labor members of Parliament.

When the Parliamentary Labor party organizes early next month for the beginning of the new session of Parliament, a large majority of the 255 Labor members will probably vote for Gaitskell's re-election as party leader. Last June, when left-wing sniping against his leadership was already extensive, he won a vote of confidence, with 179 Labor Members of Parliament approving his leadership and only 7 opposing.

Faced with this line-up, the radicals are more likely to continue their agitation now on the unilateral nuclear disarmament issue than to make an immediate all-out effort to oust Gaitskell. In any case they are gaining representation in the top party hierarchy with the conference's election of Harry Nicholas, Cousins' principal assistant in the Transport and General Workers Union, as party treasurer. The left wing also supports Harold Wilson, chancellor of the exchequer in the "shadow" cabinet and the leading contender to succeed the late Aneurin Bevan as deputy party leader.

Even if Gaitskell is re-elected, his tenure as party leader will be more precarious. His prospects depend on the positions taken by moderate supporters such as George Brown and James Callaghan, who feel that his leadership has been inept and a major factor in the party's decline. In any event intensification of the rift over policy and leadership will further limit Labor's effectiveness as the parliamentary opposition:

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The Secretary of the Treasury

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

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