

Approved For Release 10/27/2014 : CIA-RDP97B00975A004400250001-5

**TOP SECRET**

*Ed.*

25X1

11 April 1959

25X1

Copy No. C 62

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO.  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

1. DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: MR 7

DATE: 4.14.80 REVIEWER: [redacted]

*25-*

2010

25X1

25X1

State Dept. review completed

Approved For Release 10/27/2014 : CIA-RDP97B00975A004400250001-5

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400250001-5

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400250001-5

25X1

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

11 April 1959

### DAILY BRIEF

25X1

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

**USSR:** In assessing Soviet policy as the foreign ministers' conference approaches, Ambassador Thompson concludes that Moscow's principal objective is to gain Western acceptance of the Eastern European status quo, to be symbolized by some sort of recognition of East Germany.

**OK** As for Adenauer's decision to assume the presidency, Thompson suggests that Soviet leaders will see this as providing opportunities for exploitation of those West German political forces willing to "dicker" with Moscow and the East German regime.

25X1

25X6

25X1

25X1

*mco*  
Pakistan-India: The Pakistani Air Force on 10 April shot down an Indian Canberra jet bomber near Rawalpindi in northern West Pakistan. Karachi states the aircraft was intercepted well inside Pakistani territory and ignored several warnings to land. The two-man Indian crew reportedly escaped with injuries. The action is likely to produce sharp political repercussions, including mutual recrimination and heated press comment. The incident probably will retard current efforts to negotiate a settlement of the canal waters dispute.

25X1

25X6

Uruguay: The governing executive council is considering breaking diplomatic relations with the USSR. Leaders supporting a break point to Argentina and Mexico's recent ouster of Soviet diplomats accused of promoting Communist agitation, and they cite similar activities in Uruguay. The death on 8 April of majority party chief Herrera, who feared a break would prejudice Uruguay's increasingly important trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc, will probably lessen opposition to such a move.

OK

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400250001-5

25X1

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Ambassador Thompson's Views on Soviet Position in Negotiations

[Ambassador Thompson believes the USSR's principal objective in forthcoming negotiations will be to achieve a result which will amount to Western acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe, to be symbolized by some sort of recognition of East Germany. He suggests the USSR, in trying to accomplish this, will seek to inflict as much damage as possible on Western prestige and unity.]

[In Thompson's view, the USSR precipitated the Berlin crisis in order to overcome Western resistance to top-level conferences and to exert pressure on a very vulnerable Western position. He suggests that if the Soviet leaders succeed in obtaining Western acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe and East Germany, they may agree to a new Berlin arrangement which will provide the West with an "improved title" for remaining in West Berlin and with better defined access rights.]

[The ambassador warns that failure to reach agreement on Berlin will lead, at a minimum, to more active Soviet probing and pressures on Allied and, eventually, West German access to Berlin. While Thompson does not believe Khrushchev is under any compelling domestic pressure to produce a victory, he emphasizes that the Soviet premier is in "deadly earnest" in "aiming a fatal blow at Western pretensions to challenging the existing boundaries of the Soviet empire!" At the same time, the ambassador continues to believe there will be a strong Soviet desire to avoid letting matters get out of hand.]

[As for Soviet tactics at the foreign ministers' conference, Thompson suggests that the Soviet representative, after stating Moscow's established positions on a German peace treaty and Berlin, may put forward "fall-back" positions on individual articles of the Soviet draft treaty, the specifics of the free-city plan, and the temporary or provisional exclusion of Czechoslovakia and Poland from the conference. Moscow's essential]

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400250001-5

11 Apr 59

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400250001-5

"sticking point," however, will be over agreement to any Western proposals which do not give substantial de facto recognition to East Germany.]

Thompson feels the Soviet leaders believe Adenauer's decision to seek the presidency has injected new elements of fluidity into the situation which will provide opportunities for Soviet exploitation of West German groups which may be willing to abandon the West's long-standing policy on reunification and "dicker" with the USSR and East Germany.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400250001-5  
11 Apr 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2

25X6

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400250001-5

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400250001-5

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400250001-5

### Possible Repercussions of Indo-Pakistani Airplane Incident

The shooting down of an Indian Canberra jet bomber over West Pakistan on 10 April will almost certainly renew the mutual mistrust and suspicion which both Karachi and New Delhi have shown a desire in recent months to diminish. The major immediate result of the incident may be to make more difficult the settlement of the Indo-Pakistani canal waters dispute, which is under negotiation with the assistance of the World Bank.

The press in Pakistan seems likely to play up the "aggressive" attitude shown by Indian military forces in flying over Pakistan, while the Indian press will note Pakistan's "aggressive" attitude in shooting down an unarmed plane. Political leaders may also try to capitalize on the issue to secure tactical advantages or maintain a propaganda position.

If the Pakistani Air Force used American-supplied jet fighters to shoot down the Canberra, New Delhi's long-standing claim that American military aid to Pakistan might well be used against India will be strengthened. Similarly, Pakistan may also claim that the incident shows its continued need for strong armed forces with up-to-date equipment. Both governments, however, may try to prevent the incident from interfering seriously with over-all relations.

The incident is also likely temporarily to draw the attention of the Indian public and government away from Communist China's suppression of the Tibetan revolt. Without it, feeling might have been maintained at a higher pitch as the Dalai Lama makes his way toward New Delhi.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X6

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400250001-5

**Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400250001-5

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400250001-5

### Uruguay Considers Breaking Relations With USSR

Uruguay's governing executive council is considering breaking diplomatic relations with the USSR, [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Some officials of the National party, which came to power on 1 March, have expressed concern over the extent of Communist influence in Uruguay and over the large staffs in the five bloc diplomatic missions in Montevideo. The Communists thrived under the lengthy incumbency of the last ruling party.

The view previously voiced by some National party members of the council that Uruguay's serious financial problems make bloc trade necessary for the short run may have lost some support with the death on 8 April of the ruling party chief, Dr. Herrera, who reportedly feared a break would prejudice the increasingly important Sino-Soviet bloc trade.

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400250001-5

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400250001-5

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400250001-5

**TOP SECRET**