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SECURITY INFORMATION

14 August 1952

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
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FAR EAST

1. B-29 pursued by jets to within 200 miles of Tokyo:

An American B-29 on a reconnaissance mission over the Sea of Japan on the night of 12 August was pursued over a five-hour period by "from two to 20" unidentified

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
jet aircraft. Contact was terminated just north of Sado Island, some 20 miles off the northwestern coast of central Honshu, Japan's main island (see map).

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Comment: This represents the farthest that United States reconnaissance aircraft have been followed over the Sea of Japan. The break-off area is about 200 miles west of Tokyo and 400 miles southeast of Vladivostok.

On 6 August Soviet jets overflew the northwestern portion of the island of Hokkaido near Wakkanai in pursuit of a B-29. On August a B-29 was turned back by Soviet jet interceptors in the Hokkaido area.

2. Soviet pilots show reluctance to engage UN aircraft:

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many Soviet pilots were again reluctant to engage UN fighter aircraft. While the enemy air defense network shows a consistent determination to intercept UN planes, the pilots have not always been equally aggressive.


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This contrasts with the first week of August, when there was daily combat which ranged from the Yalu River to south of Pyongyang.

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
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Comment: United Nations fighter pilots probably destroyed 26 enemy aircraft and damaged 30 during the first two weeks of August.




3. Chinese Communist build-up on Indochina border suggested:



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three new Chinese Communist regiments attached to the 38th Division, 13th Army, in the area of China opposite northwestern Tonkin.

One has been positively identified
other two were revealed



these units may have been created from former security divisions in this general area and placed under the 13th Army's control. He considers it possible, however, that their regimental designations are a "cover" for recently arrived units.

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Comment: Three differently numbered regiments known to be subordinate to the 38th Division have previously been identified; elements of these reportedly crossed the Indochina border several weeks ago in the vicinity of Laokay. It is an additional possibility that the designations of these regiments have been changed for the purpose of deception.

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SOUTH ASIA

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4. Tibetan contact with Nepalese Communists confirmed:

[redacted] [redacted]
 confirm reports of the arrest of 14 Nepalese Communists on 30 July at Jumla, in north-western Nepal,

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[redacted] the 14 men were returning from Tibet, where they had been for consultation, presumably with Chinese Communists.

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[redacted] the Communists intend to develop operational bases in isolated areas of western Nepal.

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Comment: This is the first reliable report that Nepalese Communists have been in touch with Communists in Tibet. The terrain of Nepal is such that movements of this type are almost impossible to prevent.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

5. Rift between Mossadeq and Kashani widening:

[redacted] Ambassador Henderson reports increased disagreement between Prime Minister Mossadeq and Mullah Kashani, adding that in a bid to gain power, Kashani is trying to show that Mossadeq is helpless without him.

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The Ambassador believes that Mossadeq may be forced to ally himself with the Shah and perhaps the army in order to offset Kashani, who is supported by extreme nationalists and has occasionally accepted Tudeh assistance. Minister of Court Ala says that Mossadeq and the Shah are already cooperating.

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In a showdown, the Ambassador reports, Mossadeq would find himself in a difficult position, since the Tudeh and the Kashani faction control the street mobs.

Comment: The long-standing differences between Mossadeq and Kashani had been largely submerged since the beginning of the oil crisis in the common struggle against the British. The election of Kashani to the Majlis Presidency was undoubtedly a blow to Mossadeq, in that it increased the ambitious religious leader's political power.

6. Egyptian Embassy suggests press campaign to obtain American aid:

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The Egyptian Embassy in Washington suggested on 4 August that Egypt without delay undertake a press campaign in the United States urging American economic and military aid to the Nagib-Maher regime.

The Charge notes that current American press comment on developments in Cairo has been favorable; he suggests that the Egyptian Government encourage American correspondents in Cairo to send "appropriate" material to their papers.

Comment: Prime Minister Maher and members of the army group have previously intimated to American diplomats in Cairo that Egypt is interested in receiving aid.

7. France sets conditions for American troop increase in Morocco:

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France will not consider raising the ceiling on American troops in Morocco until "some sort of statement" on the Moroccan political situation has been negotiated and an agreement reached on the status of American troops in the area.

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The Foreign Ministry official who presented this position explained that the government needs a political statement to satisfy Parliament and public opinion.

Comment: Broader American support of French policies in return for base rights has long been a government objective and is a major Gaullist demand. Premier Pinay's concern for ratification of the EDC treaty has led him to court the Gaullist dissidents, who recently vowed to abide by General de Gaulle's foreign policy demands. The government can therefore be expected to increase its pressure on the United States for political commitments.

8. Greek Government coalition faces collapse:

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Two more Greek Liberal Party deputies have announced that they will no longer support the EPEK-Liberal coalition government, although they have not yet resigned from the party.

The government's parliamentary support is now reduced to 127, plus three independent leftists.

Papandreu, a Papagos supporter, told the US Embassy that he intended to call for the government to resign. A caretaker government is reportedly being considered.

Comment: The present coalition government is actually no longer in control because 130 votes constitute a majority. The future existence of the government now rests with a few leftists and the eight Communist EDA party deputies. The formation of a caretaker government under a neutral prime minister has been considered on occasion during the past several months.

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WESTERN EUROPE

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9. Trieste leader to confer secretly with Yugoslavs:

[redacted] Mario 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] Stocca, Trieste independentist leader, soon will
confer

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[redacted] possibly with Tito, at their invitation. Stocca is to meet them following a visit to Chancellor Figl and Cardinal Innitzer of Austria to discuss Austrian support for an independent Free Territory of Trieste.

Comment: Stocca is influential among Trieste independentist groups and is a non-Communist. In February 1952, Stocca and other Trieste independentists were received by Tito, who apparently discussed with them the proposal for a joint Yugoslav-Italian administration of the Free Territory which he later announced.

If the Yugoslav Government did, in fact, invite Stocca to meet with Kardelj, it is likely that Stocca is to be sounded out on a new Yugoslav move concerning Trieste.

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10. Allied request for additional trains to Berlin refused:

[redacted] East German railroad authorities have informed West German transport officials that heavy crop traffic on the Berlin-Marienborn train route precludes any increase in the number of trains to Berlin.

The US High Commissioner's office in Bonn states that this excuse is "unconvincing," and asserts that other routes are available for traffic between West Germany and Berlin.

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Comment: The Allies had asked the Soviet authorities for five additional daily trains to Berlin to compensate for the 1 August closing of the Rothensee canal lock. The request was referred to the East German authorities.

The canal normally carried 50,000 tons of coal monthly, and the trains are needed to assist in the stockpiling of coal in Berlin.

LATIN AMERICA

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11. Argentina suspends distribution of printed propaganda abroad:

Comment: This

is the first indicatio

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of a possible change in government policy following the death of Senora de Peron. Foreign Minister Remorino, the most pro-American cabinet member, may have taken the opportunity to re-examine Argentina's propaganda policy with the intention of modifying its anti-American line.

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