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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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8 May 1959

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Iraq—Communists and government: After an initial cautious reaction to Qasim's rejection of their political demands on 30 April, the Communists now have renewed pressure for the return of political parties and for participation of Communist party representatives in the government. (Page 1)

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Jordan: Hazza Majalli's cabinet includes old-line politicians, with two holdovers from the Rifai government, as well as a new group of younger, less experienced men. King Husayn will probably attempt more direct control of government affairs than he did during the Rifai regime. [Both the King and Majalli are anxious to maintain a high level of American aid and have assured Chargé Wright that there will be no change in Jordanian policy.]

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Cambodia: Growing Sino-Soviet bloc influence in Cambodia is being abetted by the pronounced leftist influence in the Information Ministry. [During his recent visit to Cambodia, Ambassador Parsons expressed his concern to top Cambodian officials that the leftist trend in the press and other information media was gradually conditioning the people to accept Communist ideology.]

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### III. THE WEST

West Germany: [Heinrich Krone, who is one of Adenauer's top advisers, says the chancellor is satisfied with preparations for the Geneva meeting. Krone is much less concerned about hostilities over Berlin than he was several months ago and expects that the access problem will be solved by regarding the East Germans as, in some manner, "agents" of the USSR.]

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Austria: The 10 May parliamentary elections are likely to result in a cabinet shuffle in the People's party - Socialist coalition government which has ruled Austria since the war. DK No radical shifts in party strengths or Austrian policies are anticipated, but growing antagonism between the two parties may delay formation of a new government for some time.

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### IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Outlook for Pakistan. NIE 52-59. 5 May 1959.

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC No Back-up Material

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Communist Political Pressures on Iraqi Government

The Iraqi Communist party on 5 and 6 May renewed its demands for a return to a system of officially sanctioned political parties and for direct Communist party representation in the government. The majority of the present Iraqi cabinet is non-Communist; while the cabinet includes several pro-Communists, it contains no acknowledged representatives of the party itself.

The Communists' avowed aim is the establishment of a revived "united national front" which would also include the National Democratic party and the Kurdish United Democratic party. The Communist leaders are apparently certain that they would exercise real control of such a national front; they have even indicated willingness to include pliable remnants of the Baath and Istiqlal parties.

Premier Qasim told labor organizations on 30 April that Iraq was in a "transitional stage" and that the time had not yet come for the return of political parties. Even if political parties are not given official sanction for some time to come, the Communist leadership will probably obtain open cabinet representation in the near future. [Foreign Minister Jawad, a leader of the National Democrats, told the American ambassador on 4 May that Communist representation was likely, but added that any such appointments would be on the basis of "individual merit" and not party affiliation. Communists reported most likely to receive cabinet portfolios are Abd al-Qadir Ismail Bustani, Amir Abdallah, and Aziz Sharif, all of whom are central committee members and capable, experienced party professionals.]

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### New Cabinet in Jordan

The new Jordanian cabinet of Premier Hazza Majalli is unlikely to prove strong. It contains both old-line politicians, including two holdovers from the Rifai government, and a new group of younger, less experienced men. Majalli is foreign minister as well as premier. The Interior Ministry is headed by Wasfi Mirza, a close friend of the premier. The Defense Ministry is under a young lawyer, Anwar Nashashibi; Akif Fayiz, representative of the influential Bani Sakhr Bedouin tribe, remains minister of agriculture. [Both King Husayn and Majalli, anxious to maintain a high level of American aid, have assured the American chargé that there will be no change in Jordanian policy.]

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It is apparently King Husayn's intention to assert more direct control of government affairs than he did during the Rifai regime. Although the transition to the new government took place without incident, [Chargé Wright reports that general reaction to the new cabinet was less than enthusiastic in view of Majalli's reputation as a British protégé, and because of fear of increased instability. The absence of Rifai's firm hand may increase the opportunity for subversive activity, while Husayn's apparent intention to intervene more actively in government has aroused apprehension of still greater power for the army under the direction of the King.]

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The new government has publicly stated what appears to be an offer for a return to overtly correct relations with the UAR. In a policy statement on 7 May, Majalli declared twin aims of combating Communism and checking Zionism. "For the sake of these two principles," he added, "Jordan is prepared to put its hand in the hand of anyone who shows a sincere desire to follow the same road...." Cairo has commented on Majalli's appointment, however, as the replacement of an American puppet with a British puppet.

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Communist Influence Growing in Cambodia

[The increasingly apparent pro-Communist bias of the Cambodian press and other mass media, reflecting the pronounced leftist influence of the Information Ministry, is facilitating the steady growth of Sino-Soviet bloc influence in Cambodia. Cambodia now draws heavily on handouts supplied by international Communist news agencies. Recent editorials in influential newspapers have contained "straight Communist textbook material," according to the American Embassy in Phnom Penh. Peiping, meanwhile, has given Cambodia powerful transmitters, is training two Cambodian radio supervisors in China, and is sending several technicians to Cambodia.]

[The leftist trend has been accelerated recently by Communist exploitation of Cambodia's bitterness over Vietnamese and Thai involvement in plotting against the Sihanouk government, and Phnom Penh's attendant suspicion of American motives. In addition to an important asset in the person of crypto-Communist Secretary of State for Information Tim Dong, the Communists also benefit [redacted] the Cambodian bureaucracy.]

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### III. THE WEST

#### Many Changes in Austrian Government Expected to Follow 10 May Elections

The 10 May parliamentary elections seem likely to result in a number of changes in the People's party - Socialist coalition which has given Austria a stable government since 1945. The coalition probably will be re-established in some form, but interparty antagonisms have sharpened despite a somewhat lethargic campaign, and the negotiations for a new government are likely to be prolonged.

Post-election negotiations on a new cabinet will center on Chancellor Raab's demands for a less rigid coalition pact which would permit parliament to settle outstanding issues between the two parties by vote. If the People's party maintains its present parliamentary lead over the Socialists, it will be in good position to push these demands or even to force the Socialists from the government. Raab's bargaining position would be further enhanced if, as some observers anticipate, the small Liberal party now in the opposition should also score a comeback. The Nazi-tainted Liberals are pan-German in outlook, and in such a key role, would exert a highly disruptive influence.

In any case, some of Vienna's most experienced men are expected to leave the government. Minister of Interior Helmer, who established a reputation for fearless opposition to the Soviet occupation forces, has already announced his retirement. He is reported deeply indignant over the insistence by younger members of his Socialist party that he give up the Interior Ministry. Leopold Figl, of the People's party, a reliably pro-Western chancellor during much of the occupation period

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is similarly being pressed by his party to accept a provincial office. Changes are also expected in the justice, agriculture, and communications ministries.

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Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

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Atomic Energy Commission

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