

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.3(h)(2)

3.5(c)

1 January 1957

Copy No. 131

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 14

NO CHANGE IN CLASS

 DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: HR 70-2

DATE: 12-27-71 REVIEWER: 2005

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03148912

Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03148912

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONTENTS

1. CESSATION OF EGYPTIAN-DIRECTED RAIDS INTO ISRAEL
PROPOSED [REDACTED] (page 3).
2. EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER FORESEES COOL US ATTITUDE TOWARD CAIRO REGIME [REDACTED]
(page 4).
3. SITUATION IN INDONESIA [REDACTED] (page 5).
4. LEFTISTS DOMINATE NEW SYRIAN CABINET [REDACTED]
(page 6).
5. DAMASCUS MAY ATTEMPT TO ABDUCT SYRIAN RIGHTISTS IN LEBANON [REDACTED] (page 7).
6. LAOTIAN CABINET APPROVES COALITION WITH PATHET LAO [REDACTED]
(page 8).

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1. CESSATION OF EGYPTIAN-DIRECTED RAIDS INTO ISRAEL PROPOSED

Comment

Israel has increased the publicity given these operations--probably to support its resistance to evacuation of eastern Sinai and the Straits of Tiran. Cessation of Egyptian-directed raids into Israel would undercut Israeli charges that Egypt has repudiated the cease-fire, and the Israeli demands that Egypt cease raids into Israel.

[redacted] since the outbreak of hostilities in Sinai indicate that Cairo has directed almost continuous fedayeen incursions into Israel. Cairo reaffirmed its intent to continue commando-type operations inside Israel [redacted] Syria and Lebanon on 17 December. Planned sabotage operations have taken place in the Haifa and Jerusalem areas and in the Negev.

The Egyptian fedayeen operations had previously been temporarily suspended to avoid political complications, only to be resumed later.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2. EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER FORESEES COOL US ATTITUDE TOWARD CAIRO REGIME

Egyptian foreign minister Fawzi and Ambassador Hussein in Washington apparently feel that the United States wants no "reconciliation" with Egypt and that it is going to apply "some pressure, particularly in regard to Suez." Fawzi told Hussein on 29 December he had begun to think of telling President Nasr he would return to Egypt since it did not appear he could accomplish anything constructive by remaining in the United States. Fawzi [redacted] does not approve of the present course of Egyptian foreign policy. [redacted]

Comment

Nasr does not appear to put much confidence in the judgments of either Fawzi or Hussein, but pessimistic reports from them on American policy toward Egypt are nevertheless likely to increase the Egyptian leader's easily aroused suspicions and make him more difficult to deal with.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3. SITUATION IN INDONESIA

Comment on:

Col. Simbolon, rebel leader in northern Sumatra, reportedly has retreated with upwards of a battalion of troops and artillery to the southeast of Medan, where the hilly terrain and sympathetic population are in his favor. He is in position to join forces with Lt. Col. Hussein, the dissident leader in central Sumatra. Hussein has just issued another defiant statement ordering his troops to disobey any orders from Djakarta.

Meanwhile, continuing unrest in Indonesia has caused President Sukarno to proclaim a "state of war and siege" in southern Sumatra. The governor there has suspended the forwarding of revenue to Djakarta and may be under increasing public pressure to dissociate himself still further from the central government.

In the Celebes, territorial commander Lt. Col. Samual reportedly has issued a statement confirming that territory's dissatisfaction with the central government. His comment that there are other than military means to express this dissatisfaction suggests that he is not yet prepared to follow the course of Simbolon and Hussein.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4. LEFTISTS DOMINATE NEW SYRIAN CABINET

Comment on:

The composition of the new Syrian cabinet announced on 31 December represents a victory for leftist, pro-Egyptian elements. The conservative members of the previous cabinet have been eliminated and only one

new rightist has been named. The conservative Populist Party, which holds the largest single bloc of seats in parliament, is not represented.

While Asali is the prime minister, the major power in the 11-man cabinet appears to be the extreme pro-Egyptian and leftist, Khalid al-Azm, who has been appointed minister of state and acting minister of defense. Four other ministers are Azm followers. Two ministers from the left-wing Arab Socialist Resurrection Party continue to hold the portfolios of foreign affairs and national economy. One Azm supporter, a minister of state, attended two World Peace Congresses.

The leftists may now call for a new election in order to eliminate conservative elements and obtain a "more representative" parliament. In foreign affairs, the trend toward close relations with Egypt and closer association with the Soviet bloc probably will be intensified, as will the present campaign against the Baghdad pact and the pro-Western government in Iraq.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5. DAMASCUS MAY ATTEMPT TO ABDUCT SYRIAN
RIGHTISTS IN LEBANON

Comment on:

A five-day "period of grace" given by the Syrian court-martial to those Syrians outside the country who were charged with "conspiracy against the security of the state" ended on 29 December. None of the 18 accused who had fled the country responded to the offer. All of them are to be tried in absentia early in January. According to a semi-official Egyptian news agency, posters appeared on Beirut buildings on 29 December asking Lebanon to surrender the accused Syrians residing there. Lebanon has not thus far responded to Syria's request to turn over the accused politicians.

rightist Syrian and Jordanian political refugees in Lebanon are under Egyptian surveillance.

~~SECRET~~

6. LAOTIAN CABINET APPROVES COALITION WITH PATHET LAO

Comment on: [redacted]

The entry of Pathet Lao representatives into the Laotian government appears to be assured as a result of an agreement signed by Premier Souvanna Phouma and Pathet chief Souphanouvong on 28 December. This agreement, which is highly favorable to the Pathet Lao, has already been accepted by the cabinet and probably will be approved by the National Assembly sometime before 10 January. Souphanouvong is leaving for Sam Neua on 1 January to consult with his colleagues, and their approval appears to be certain in view of the speedy announcement by Peiping, under a Hanoi date line, that agreement had been reached.

The agreement provides for a coalition cabinet and the establishment of the Pathets as a legal party, the restoration of the government's control over the disputed provinces, and the integration of Pathet forces into the royal army. The details of these vital matters, however, remain to be worked out by mixed political and military commissions, where the Pathets will be in the advantageous position of influencing negotiations from both sides of the table. Once in the government, moreover, they can also be expected to use their position to build political alliances and front organizations in preparation for the supplementary nationwide elections to be held in March to expand the legislature from 39 to 60 seats. [redacted]