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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~TOP SECRET~~



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
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## 1. THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION (as of 0100 EDT)

Fighting is continuing in Budapest as of 0600 Budapest time (0100 EDT) 27 October and has spread to at least one other city and probably several more. Budapest radio admitted during the evening of the 26th that armed groups had started riots and were causing disorder in Szolnok.

[redacted] a radio station in south-central Hungary late on the 26th called for the people in eight localities in the Pecs area to co-operate with military and police forces "wearing the Kossuth rosette"-- a traditional symbol of Hungarian nationalism. This suggests that sizable numbers of Hungarian military forces now may be supporting the anti-Communist rebels.

In contrast to claims of victory issued daily by the regime during the first three days of the fighting, the Presidential Council announced a new amnesty for all those "fighting either in formations, groups, or singly"



who surrendered their arms by 2200 on the 26th. The curfew, which the government reinstated on 26 October in order to wage "a general attack against the rebels," was to be extended through 27 October. In addition, [redacted] telephone contact had again been broken off with Budapest.

The government of Imre Nagy apparently has been unsuccessful in asserting central authority and Nagy's prestige is reported declining rapidly. In a desperate effort to garner popular support, Nagy promised to negotiate with the USSR for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops by 1 January and to form a new popular front government immediately. Budapest Radio had indicated on the morning of the 26th that the new government would be formed in a few hours, but a later broadcast said that it would be established during the evening of the 26th or the morning of the 27th. [redacted]

[redacted] Nagy is having difficulty recruiting prominent former minority leaders, including former Smallholders Secretary General Bela Kovacs and Social Democrat Ana Kethely, to participate in a new regime.

Encouraged by the weakness of the government in Budapest, workers throughout the country have begun to press for extensive changes, and a general strike seems to be in effect in several cities. At least two regional governments, seemingly acting independently of the central regime, have been formed in the provinces--the Workers Committee of Greater Miskolc and the Workers and Soldiers Council of Szolnok. These committees, which for the moment still appear dominated by "national Communists," have called a general strike until the government implements all their demands which include the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Hungary, a new liberal government and satisfaction for their economic complaints.

In Budapest, the National Trade Union Council and an unidentified writers' group, apparently acting independently, levied a set of demands which, in effect, complemented the Miskolc workers' demands.

[redacted] ground, air, and naval units in eastern Europe and the western USSR have been alerted. Altitude restrictions have been imposed on the air route between Moscow and Budapest, probably to facilitate high priority flights between the two capitals. [redacted]

## 2. NEW LARGE-SCALE MOBILIZATION IN ISRAEL

New Israeli mobilization on a "very large scale," with an extensive call-up of reservists, civilian vehicles and construction equipment, probably indicates preparation for a limited objective action against Egypt or Jordan, with full capability to exploit any Arab response. Prior to these new call-ups, Israeli strength had been increased to about 100,000.

The main weight of the new troop and vehicle movements has been southward from Tel Aviv. Very heavy concentrations of troops and materiel have been reported southeast of Tel Aviv, and in the Southern Command, where a build-up of armor was previously reported. Earlier in the week Israeli troop activity increased in forward areas near the Jordanian frontier, and extensive laying of field communication wire was reported.

[redacted] all Israeli military units are on a standby alert. Mobilization of personnel has been sufficient to curtail industrial activity.

The American embassy reports that the mobilization resembles that which occurred before the El Auja raid in November 1955. An embassy officer was also advised by an Israeli official to cancel week-end trips and stockpile food supplies.

An Israeli strike against Egypt would ostensibly be in retaliation, not only for the recent Egyptian mining of two military vehicles in the El Auja area, which resulted in three dead and 27 wounded, but also for a series of recent incursions by Egyptian-directed terrorists from

Egypt, Syria and Jordan. In the most recent such incident on 25 October, a terrorist was killed near the Gaza strip by Israeli security forces four kilometers inside their border.

Israel is also prepared for possible action against West Jordan if Iraqi or other Arab forces enter Jordan.

\* \* \* \* \*

Members of the Watch Committee have individually examined reports received since their last meeting concerning Israeli military and associated developments. They generally agree that the likelihood has increased of major Israeli reprisals, probably against Egypt in the near future. It is believed that the present Israeli mobilization, though on a large scale, is not a full mobilization, and therefore Israel does not intend that this action lead to general hostilities although it is preparing to meet the possibility of broader action.



**3. IRAQ REPORTED DISTRIBUTING ARMS IN SYRIA  
FOR LATE OCTOBER COUP**

[redacted] Iraq is distributing arms among Druze tribes in southern Syria as part of an Iraqi plan to execute an antileftist coup in Syria in late October, [redacted]

[redacted] The reported Druze role is to neutralize Syrian army units in that area.

[redacted] Iraqi agents are in contact with elements of the rightist Syrian Social Nationalist Party and certain conservative Syrian politicians.

**Comment**

A possible Iraqi-sponsored coup against leftist elements in Syria has been repeatedly reported since last June. If arms are actually being distributed to dissident elements, the rightists may be about to move.

French agents and Syrian leftists have also been reported in contact with the Druze. The Druze are reported to be increasingly restive, hostile to the present Syrian government, and disappointed that Iraq has taken no action in Syria to overthrow the government. In this situation it seems likely that a number of different groups may be trying to win them over. [redacted]

#### 4. SOVIET ATOMIC EXPLOSION REPORTED IMMINENT

[redacted] [redacted]  
[redacted]

Khrus-

shchev had revealed [redacted] that  
the USSR would set off an atomic explosion within the "next  
few days." Khrushchev's statement was made in connec-  
tion with an exposition on Soviet desire to ban atomic tests.  
He added that in the absence of an agreement to ban tests,  
the USSR had no choice but to continue its tests.

Comment

If a Soviet test is imminent, it possibly  
will occur in the northwestern USSR on  
the periphery of the Barents Sea. There has been some  
evidence of nuclear weapons program interest in and about  
the area of the Kola Peninsula since mid-September.

[redacted]

## 5. SINGAPORE RIOTS

Communist-led rioting--with extensive property damage and some casualties--is continuing in Singapore. Matters may be complicated by efforts of some Chinese secret societies and criminal elements to exploit the situation.

The police have dislodged student strikers from school grounds where they have been barricaded for the past two weeks. The latest information suggests that the students' organization is collapsing. Troops of the local army garrison have taken up stations to assist in preserving order, and police and army reinforcements from Malaya have been ordered to Singapore.

Chief Minister Lim has appealed to the schools to return to their role of institutions of peaceful Chinese culture rather than continue as pawns in a political campaign. This may reduce the rising antagonism among Singapore Chinese based on the belief that the government is attacking Chinese culture. A successful solution of the school issue would encourage the government to press its anti-Communist campaign, and there are already indications that it is moving against the political elements of Communist-front "cultural" organizations.

## 6. ARAB STATES PROTEST FRENCH ACTION IN ALGERIA

The Arab world is reacting strongly to the capture by the French on 22 October of five Algerian leaders of the Front of National Liberation (FLN).

Tewfik el-Madani, FLN leader in Cairo on 23 October exhorted the Algerian Army of Liberation over the Cairo radio to continue the battle "more energetically and determinedly than before."

Strong protests have been made to France by most members of the Arab League. Its political committee has cabled a protest to the secretary general of the United Nations and a special meeting of the Arab League's council considered the situation on 25 October. The Jordanian Chamber of Deputies has demanded the recall of Jordan's ambassador to France.

Anti-French demonstrations have occurred in Amman, where the French ambassador has requested government protection, and in Tripoli, where crowds demonstrated enthusiastically outside the Egyptian and Soviet embassies. Libyan, Iraqi and Saudi Arabian officials have requested American intercession to obtain the release of the captives. A group of Iraqi deputies requested Pakistan and India to use their good offices.

The French chargé in Tunis claims to be receiving no instructions from Paris and believes the situation is very serious for all French residents, though somewhat better than for French residents in Morocco.

A government spokesman in Paris expects an interval "little better than an armed truce" for

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two or three months. He told American embassy officials the French intend to use this interval to advance a political settlement in Algeria in order not only to solve the Algerian problem, "at least temporarily," but also to renew friendly relations with the Moroccans and Tunisians.

**7. PLOT AGAINST COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT REPORTED**

The Colombian government is greatly concerned over a possible coup, which reportedly has the support of a group  
[redacted]  
within the military [redacted]

[redacted]  
there is a movement of significant proportions to unseat President Rojas. The leaders of the present movement are not identified. Any substitute military regime would probably continue to be pro-US.

The Rojas regime has leaned increasingly on the military in recent months since its other support has eroded rapidly. The military has remained loyal to the government, although dissatisfaction has been reported among junior officers. However, only the air force endorsed the "Third Force," the recent unsuccessful government effort to organize popular support.

Rojas' unexpected convocation on 11 October of the National Constituent Assembly, the sole constitutional element of his regime, has injected an element of controversy and uncertainty in the situation, in part because of the critical speeches of opposition deputies during the initial meetings.

## 8. EAST EUROPEAN REACTION TO HUNGARIAN DEVELOPMENTS

The Satellite press generally has minimized developments in Hungary, while popular reaction has been sympathetic in Poland and Rumania.

The Czechs called public meetings at all levels which have publicized pledges of loyalty to the party and inseparable friendship with the Soviet Union, culminating in a similar politburo decree of 25 October.

"things were just as they should be" in Hungary and Poland--that it was up to the people to determine what is necessary in the process of democratization.

the Polish central committee sent a congratulatory message to the Hungarian central committee praising the Hungarian moves toward de-Stalinization.

The Satellite press reaction has generally followed Moscow's lead in noting only briefly that disturbances have developed in Hungary, "where counter-revolutionary forces attempted to overthrow the regime." These forces were described as local and isolated groups of anti-socialists who are being stimulated by imperialist forces of the West. Only the Czechs and Poles have received


fairly detailed descriptions of the actual events, and only the Czechs have been told of the anti-Soviet nature of the revolt and of the intervention of Soviet troops to quell it.

Public reaction has been sympathetic in the few instances thus far registered. Groups of Poles demonstrated on 24 October in front of the Hungarian embassy and then headed for the Soviet embassy but were stopped by tear gas. Two groups sent telegrams of support to Hungarian youth and writers' groups, according to the Polish press.

Hungarian students in Cluj, Rumania, have gone on strike as a reaction to Hungarian events, demanding cultural autonomy and better Hungarian minority representation in Rumania's affairs.

Yugoslav reaction has been one of satisfaction with the changes in the Hungarian regime. The Yugoslavs have decried only the fact that liberalization measures were not taken early enough to avoid armed conflict. They say Hungary can solve its present problems only through continued recognition of the workers' demands and further democratization. They describe the armed revolt as the work of irresponsible individuals which has been seized upon by anti-socialists.

## 9. POLISH SOURCES COMMENT ON GOMULKA



### Comment

The removal of seven members of the politburo on 21 October probably eliminated most if not all of the persons Gomulka regarded as Soviet agents. In addition, the first secretaries in the provinces of Szczecin, Bydgoszcz and Cracow have resigned since Gomulka's ascendancy, and the Polish Trade Union Federation announced that its presidium would resign "in the near future." These actions all suggest that Gomulka is moving rapidly to strengthen his position.

Gomulka probably made many enemies among party functionaries during his dictatorial reign as secretary general before his purge in 1948. These persons, as well as others who were associated with Stalinist elements in the party, will now probably be replaced by people considered more trustworthy by Gomulka.

## 10. REPORTED DISSATISFACTION IN BURMESE ARMY

The Burmese army's capability to restore and maintain law and order, which has been steadily improving in the past few years, may be seriously affected by increased political interference in the assignment of its personnel. The American army attaché in Rangoon has received a number of reports of dissension among army officers, who resent War Office insistence that they join the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, the government coalition party. Officers who refuse to join, as well as those who are not "pure" Burmans, are allegedly being relegated to less important posts and in some cases separated from the army.

The Burmese Socialist Party, the dominant element in the government coalition, has for some time been cautiously attempting to gain more effective political control over the army and to place more Burmans in key positions. An acceleration of this process could seriously weaken the army's leadership, especially since many of its ablest officers are either Anglo-Burman or belong to ethnic minority groups.

General Ne Win, the commander in chief, who has generally sought to keep politics out of the military, appears to be taking little interest in army affairs since his return from abroad last month. Several reports suggest he is "on his way out!"

**THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION**  
**(Information as of 1700, 26 October)**

The American embassy in Amman points out that Jordanian chief of staff Nuwar signed the military agreement with Egypt and Syria on 24 October without permission of the cabinet and that it has not been ratified by parliament. The under secretary of the Jordanian Foreign Ministry commented that Nuwar seems to consider himself a government apart. It is possible, however, that Nuwar's failure to obtain approval may be deliberate, to enable the government to claim that the agreement is invalid should it desire to do so at some future date.

The American military attaché in Amman reports that Syria's gift of heavy weapons to Jordan includes 60 Bren gun carriers and eight prewar model French 105-mm. howitzers. The attaché in Damascus has also observed anti-tank artillery there being readied for Jordan's use. Egypt presented the Jordanian air force with five Vampire jet fighters on 25 October.

the presence in mid-October of an unusually large number of tanks in areas west of Alexandria. Thirty-four Sherman and T-34 tanks were observed there, together with four self-propelled guns, and a number of additional T-34's arrived from Cairo on 17 October.

observed 70 armored personnel carriers moving toward the city from the armored concentration area near Giza and has also seen 60 tanks in the canal zone. These are the first tanks reported in the zone.