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FAR EAST

1. Burmese to defer UN appeal on Chinese Nationalist troop issue:

3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted]

Burma has agreed to defer an appeal to the UN regarding Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma, pending the reaction to its proposals that the US persuade Taipei to recall Nationalist General Li Mi to Taiwan and to order his troops to leave Burma or surrender for internment. Burma also wants the US to ask Thailand to stop arms smuggling and to prevent the use of Thai airstrips by planes which the Burmese assume are supplying the Nationalists.

The US Embassy in Rangoon believes that the possibility still exists that Burma's army commander, General Ne Win, with the collaboration of the newly-appointed Burmese Ambassador to Peiping, might attempt a covert arrangement giving the Chinese Communists a free hand to deal with the Nationalists.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: [Redacted] the Chinese Nationalist forces are in the process of disintegration, thus tending partially to resolve the international problems that their presence in Burma has created.

WESTERN EUROPE

3.3(h)(2)

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3.3(h)(2)

3. French seek US assurances of noninterference in North African internal affairs: 3.3(h)(2)

The French Foreign Office, "deeply stirred" by the "official treatment" accorded Tunisian nationalist leader Bourghiba on his current visit to the US, has approached the American Embassy in Paris for written assurance of US noninterference in North African internal affairs.

3.3(h)(2)

Foreign Minister Schuman and President Auriol are personally aroused over the question, and the cabinet has refused clearance for a US Military Survey Mission to proceed to Tunis. Meanwhile, this mission has met delaying tactics and firm demands from the Resident General in Algiers for exact details of the survey proposal in that area. 3.3(h)(2)

Comment:

Despite assurances to Schuman that the US was not anxious to have the Moroccan question discussed in the UN, the Foreign Office in Paris [redacted] have remained deeply distrustful of the US attitude toward the nationalist movement in North Africa. These French suspicions cloud the outlook for a rapid working out of US-French air base arrangements and US acquisition of further military facilities in North Africa.

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3.3(h)(2)

5. French reportedly see value of German divisions:

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] Although the French Government realized that only full-strength German divisions would be of any military value, it believed that its resistance to the idea put France in a good bargaining position in negotiations with the US. These sentiments were reportedly expressed by the French NATO Deputy [redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: There have been indications for some months that the French would not insist on a strict limitation of the size of national units in the European Defense Forces, and recently the government agreed to abide by SHAPE's decision on the minimum size considered compatible with military needs. However, France does not envision German divisions that would be completely self-sufficient fighting units.

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3.3(h)(2)

6. Dutch seek to delay revision of Dutch-Indonesian agreement:

The Dutch Ambassador to the US has stated that, although his government recognizes the Union Agreement with Indonesia "as dead," the present cabinet, which negotiated the Dutch-Indonesian agreements, finds it difficult to agree to a revision at this time.

Any tactic designed to delay consideration of this question until the Dutch elections in the spring of 1952 must, moreover, avoid any suggestion of a "Netherlands willingness to revise" the Union Agreement. The ambassador suggested that the initiative for a delay should come from Indonesia, possibly from Vice President Hatta, and added that "Dutch interests would not necessarily be harmed" by such action.

Comment: It is probable that the Dutch are convinced of their inability to achieve a compromise and are seeking US support to prevent Indonesia from taking unilateral action. Also, the present government may fear a cabinet crisis if the Indonesian question, which has been relatively quiescent, is not injected into domestic politics.

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