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9 April 1959


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
UNDECLASSIFIED
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CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2 2010
DATE: 4/10/80 REVIEWER:

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9 APRIL 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Chinese Communists move another infantry division to Tibetan area.



II. ASIA-AFRICA

Arab League fails in effort to reconcile UAR and Iraq.

Iraq asks IPC to build pipeline from Kirkuk to Persian Gulf; would lessen Iraqi dependence on line through Syria.

USSR continues to repatriate Kurds to Iraq.

Yemen - Group of army officers and tribal leaders plotting to get rid of Crown Prince Badr; Soviet diplomat warns Badr of conspiracies.

Pakistan - Ayub drafts outline for new constitution; envisages strong central government with himself as president.

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⑦ Cyprus - Makarios' concessions to former EOKA leaders may have damaged intercommunal confidence. Grivas, apparently with Greek Government's backing, involved in organizing new rightist party for Cyprus.



⑧ French seize Czech ship believed carrying arms to Morocco.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

9 April 1959

SIRAB

DAILY BRIEF**I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**

Communist China - Tibet: The recent movement of a Chinese Communist infantry division into the Tibet-Tsinghai border area suggests that although the revolt in the Lhasa region seems to have been suppressed, rebel activity elsewhere in the area continues to pose a problem to the Communists. This has been the first observed major deployment into the Tibetan border area since the recent uprisings in Lhasa. Communist troop strength in the Tibet Military Region is now estimated at 58,500. (For further comments on this subject, including an analysis of Chinese troop strength in the Tibetan area see the back-up on Page 1) (Map)

Watch Committee conclusion--Berlin: No significant changes bearing on the possibilities of hostilities.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Arab League: The political committee of the Arab League, in its communiqué issued on 7 April, has indicated that its efforts to reconcile the UAR and Iraq have failed. The meeting is reported to have been marked by considerable resentment against UAR efforts to use it merely as a sounding board for anti-Qasim propaganda. Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia, and Libya were not represented in the five-day session.

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Iraq: In a move designed to weaken Nasir's control over the 70 percent of Iraq's oil transport which moves through Syria, the strongly pro-Communist Iraqi minister of economy has told the Iraq Petroleum Company that his government wants the company to construct a pipeline from Kirkuk to the Persian Gulf. Although its position is becoming increasingly untenable, IPC probably will strongly resist this request in view of the costs involved and the government's probable intention eventually to nationalize the company. (Page 2)

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USSR-Kurds-Iraq: The USSR is continuing to repatriate to Iraq a number of Kurds, including some families, in a shipload of some 820 which is due to arrive at Basra about 18 April. Since the 14 July coup, Qasim has made a series of concessions to the 800,000-strong Kurdish minority and he can probably continue for the present to count on Kurdish support in the face of UAR threats to his regime. If Qasim should attempt to curb Iraqi Communists and loosen his ties with the bloc, Communist indoctrinated elements among the Kurds can be expected to join in any pressure tactics against Qasim and would probably renew agitation for an independent Kurdish state.

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***Yemen:** (An organized group of Yemeni army officers and northern tribal leaders reportedly plans to depose or assassinate Crown Prince Badr at the earliest opportunity. The group is reported to be conservative and xenophobic in outlook, and it is said to be aware that a general revolution in Yemen would be necessary if the Imam opposed their action against Badr.)

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Badr has been warned by the Soviet chargé in Cairo that there are plots against him. (Page 3)

Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc hostile action which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq. The situation in the area remains precarious, but a deliberate initiation of large-scale hostilities is unlikely in the immediate future.

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Iraq: The rapid progress of the Communists toward control of Iraq is continuing. Tension along the Syrian-Iraqi border has increased and incidents are likely.

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Pakistan: President Ayub has taken the first step toward returning the Pakistani Government to civilian hands, which he promised to do as soon as the army had "cleaned up the mess" left by politicians. Ayub has drafted an "outline" of a new national constitution envisaging a strong central government, a powerful presidency--which he expects to retain--and indirect elections to national offices. Although he recognizes the need for popular support, Ayub plans nevertheless to maintain firm control of the mechanism whereby the public participates in government.) (Page 4)


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Cyprus: Archbishop Makarios apparently made substantial concessions to former EOKA leaders in the selection of provisional cabinet ministers. By so doing, he has probably damaged intercommunal confidence.

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 It is also apparent

that former Greek Cypriot terrorist leader General Grivas is directly involved with the organization and activities of the new rightist Greek Cypriot political party EDMA which was formed on 1 April by former leaders of EOKA. The Greek Foreign Ministry appears to be intimately involved in furthering these activities. (Page 5)

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France-Morocco: French seizure on 8 April of a 580-ton cargo of Czech arms believed consigned to the Moroccan Government, but which France feared were destined for the Algerian rebels, seems certain to create new tensions in Morocco's relations with France. These arms may have been the second lot of materiel ordered by the Balafrej government last year after France had demurred on supplying all the materiel Morocco desired. Moroccans, following up informal approaches to the United States, may soon present a list of materiel desired from the United States. They are likely to interpret any delay in shipment as American support for France.)

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist China - Tibet

The Chinese Communist 11th Independent Infantry Division has deployed from its former station in Kansu Province to the Tibet-Tsinghai border area. Because of its experience in anti-guerrilla operations in southwest Kansu during 1958, the division may have been selected to reinforce the 18th Army in southeastern Tibet. Although there have been numerous reports that minor ground units have moved into dissident areas of West China, this is the first evidence that a major unit has moved.

This movement suggests that although the revolt in the Lhasa area has been suppressed, rebel activity elsewhere continues to pose a serious problem to the Communists.

Chinese Communist ground force strength for the Tibet Military District was estimated at 64,000 earlier this year. The figure was lowered under reappraisal. The additional division now is estimated to bring the total to 58,500. Forces in the adjoining military districts of Chengtu and Lanchou, which have large Tibetan minorities, are estimated at 59,600 and 82,000 respectively. [redacted]

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Petroleum Developments in Iraq

Despite disclaimers that it intends to nationalize the country's oil industry, Baghdad has made a number of moves consistent with eventual nationalization. Prime Minister Qasim recently stated that although plans for nationalizing the 23.75-percent French share in the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), had not been discussed, they would be in the future.

In a move designed to weaken Nasir's control over the 70 percent of Iraq's oil transport which moves through Syria, the strongly pro-Communist Iraqi minister of economy has told IPC that the government wants the company to construct a pipeline from the Kirkuk oil fields in northern Iraq to the Persian Gulf. Refusal could provide the Baghdad regime with a pretext for beginning the piecemeal nationalization of the oil industry.

At the American-operated but government-owned Dura refinery at Baghdad, Communist infiltration and the discharge of increasing numbers of American technicians have greatly increased the likelihood of fires and explosions. In any such event, mob violence against American employees appears likely.

Moscow is assisting in operating the Khanaqin oil concession relinquished by IPC last fall. There is no confirmation, however, of reports that Baghdad has granted Moscow an offshore concession in the Persian Gulf area also given up by IPC.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Possible Attempt to Overthrow Yemeni Crown Prince Badr

An attempt will be made by an organized group, composed predominantly of Yemeni army officers in Sana and northern tribal leaders, to depose or assassinate Crown Prince Badr shortly after his return from the UAR.

[redacted] Badr reportedly left Cairo for Yemen on 6 April. The post-Ramadan festivities, starting the night of 8 April and lasting for three or four days, could afford an opportunity for such an attempt. The conspiratorial group is said to represent conservative, strongly nationalist, and patrician interests who traditionally elect each new Imam and oppose the present Imam's designation of his son as crown prince. They reportedly hope to install the present Imam's brother, Prince Hasan, as either prime minister or Imam. The leaders of the conspiracy are aware that their plan must culminate in a general revolution if the Imam, as is likely, were to take strong counteraction to their planned attack on Badr.

[redacted] Increased unrest has been evident in Yemen in recent months. In December some officials and army officers suspected of disloyalty were arrested or reassigned, and additional security precautions were taken by the Imam and the crown prince.

On 28 March, [redacted] Badr informed the Imam that the Soviet chargé in Cairo had warned him against an alleged Anglo-American conspiracy to bring about a revolt in Yemen. Badr warned his father to take necessary precautions.

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[Redacted]
Pakistani President Ayub's Ideas for New Constitution

(Pakistani President Ayub is drafting an initial "outline" of a new constitution for Pakistan. He apparently considers his own leadership vital and intends to use his power as president of the present military regime to promulgate a constitution unilaterally at some unspecified time.)

(Ayub envisions a strong central government and a powerful, De Gaulle-type presidency. He intends to be president himself and maintain firm control of the government by limiting popular participation mainly to local matters. As yet undefined concepts, such as making the constitution "Islamic," and long-standing problems, such as the relationship between East and West Pakistan, will encounter divergent views within the military regime, and some compromises will be required.)

(Ayub may not intend to publicize his proposals until he considers that his martial-law regime has at least a minimum record of instituting reforms and improving governmental efficiency. At that time, he apparently intends to wage a brief propaganda campaign to gain public acceptance of a constitution. He expects to be assisted in this by a constitutional commission which will elicit reactions to the proposed constitution and which will help persuade the people to accept it.)
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Greek Cypriot Extremists Gain Influence

(Leaders of the former terrorist organization, EOKA, appear to be gaining a dominant role among Greek Cypriots. On 1 April they announced the establishment of a new rightist party, the United Democratic Reform Front (EDMA), and were able to persuade Archbishop Makarios to give them strong representation in the transitional cabinet.)

Despite his recent public pledge to end all political activity, former EOKA leader George Grivas personally secured the approval of Makarios for the establishment of the EDMA.

Grivas' followers put pressure on Makarios to nominate EOKA choices for the new cabinet, which will gradually assume responsibility from the British. Makarios apparently revised his original list of appointees following a meeting with former EOKA members, and placed well-known EOKA leaders in three of the seven posts controlled by the Greek Cypriots. The sympathies of some of the other nominees are apparently divided in primary allegiance between EDMA and Makarios.

(While Makarios continues to exert substantial influence, such broad concessions to EOKA will put a strain on the political truce prevailing among the Greek Cypriots. In contrast to EDMA's strong desire to counter strongly entrenched left-wing elements, Makarios appears anxious to retain at least surface unity among all Greek Cypriots, and reportedly has offered the Communists a fixed number of legislative seats in return for their support. He announced on 3 April that he was urging Governor Foot to end the ban on the Cyprus Communist party, AKEL. Makarios further said that he is including AKEL members in a 50-man consultative committee, which will advise the transitional cabinet. AKEL has the most experienced political organization on Cyprus, but appears to be playing a waiting game until non-Communist Greek Cypriots embroil themselves in contests for power.)

(The presence of youthful former EOKA terrorist leaders in important cabinet posts, including the Interior Ministry, can be)

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expected to cause Turkish Cypriot apprehension over their ultimate status. Despite [] expressions of intense displeasure at sitting down with young "EOKA thugs," the Turkish representatives are participating in the provisional cabinet.]

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THE PRESIDENT**The Vice President**

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

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