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12 June 1961

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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
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
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*Turkey: [High-level personnel changes now occurring within the ruling Committee for National Union (CNU) and the Turkish armed forces are apparently part of a power struggle within the CNU over the role that body should play in the future and over the timing of a return to civil government. The CNU is the leading body of the military regime which ousted the Menderes government in May 1960. The changes have reportedly involved the ouster and subsequent reinstatement of the chief of the air force, Lt. Gen. Irfan Tansel, and the resignation of General Madanoglu, one of the leading members of the CNU, from his post as troop commander of the Ankara garrison. Several other top-level military changes are also apparently being made.]

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[General Tansel, in a possible overstatement of his case, claims to have the support of the commanders of the ground and naval forces and the gendarmerie, as well as support from the younger members of the CNU. He is apparently opposed by senior officers on the CNU. He told the US air attaché on 10 June that his group was in control and that he would direct Turkey "on the Western road to democracy." The CNU, following a meeting attended by the General Staff chief, issued a statement on 11 June playing down the significance of the personnel changes and declaring its determination to hold "democratic and honest elections" before 29 October, as previously announced.]

[The situation remains confused and a general interservice struggle for power could develop.]

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[in the event of a showdown, the navy and gendarmerie would support the army.] admitting the possibility of a major clash between elements of the army and air force, believe it is too soon for allegiances to have crystallized to a point where it can be assumed that either the air force or army would act as a unified service. Tansel's control of the air force, however, is probably firm as a result of major changes which he has made in his staff officers.]

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
[According to Tansel, some members of the CNU wanted to perpetuate strong military influence in the regime, even after]

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[] elections. He told the US air attaché that the CNU would continue to function but with no voice in military affairs. He noted that all CNU members would be allowed political careers following elections. Tansel claimed Madanoglu was on his way out and reiterated that the strength of the country now lay with the commanders of the military forces. When questioned regarding the status of the General Staff, Tansel remarked that it would function as before but under the control of the minister of defense.

The American Embassy tends to view Tansel's explanation as an oversimplification of the forces at work and believes there may well be more serious strains both within the CNU and within the armed forces.

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Congo: [] Gizenga, secretly and through an intermediary, has presented a plan to UN Secretary General Hammarskjold under which representatives of Gizenga and Kasavubu would attempt to work out an agreed basis for a meeting of parliament and formation of a new government. He suggested Lulubourg as a possible site for such discussions. Gizenga agreed to consider the post of deputy premier for himself but insisted on parity with Kasavubu in the number of cabinet posts. Under Gizenga's proposal, Kasavubu would cease to act as chief of state until cleared of complicity in the death of Patrice Lumumba. Dissatisfied with the help he has received from the Soviet bloc, Gizenga reportedly said he was willing to "cut loose from them and throw in his lot with the real African nationalists." Kasavubu can be expected to resist the proposals for parity in the cabinet and restrictions on his powers. The United Nations, however, is likely to bring pressure to bear on Kasavubu to enter such negotiations.]

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Brazil: Student unrest in Recife, capital of the state of Pernambuco in northeastern Brazil, has created a tense situation which could spread to other parts of the country and touch off nationwide political repercussions. Military forces in the area are on the alert; 400 to 600 troop reinforcements were airlifted to Recife from Rio de Janeiro on 7 June, and naval units--a cruiser and two destroyers--have also been ordered there. The unrest developed when the director of the Recife law school in early June refused to permit the mother of Cuban leader Che Guevara to speak on the university campus. The Brazilian Army is reported to have insisted on strong measures in Recife to prevent the unrest from threatening national security. President Quadros, already confronted with serious discontent among a segment of the officer corps, is taking a firm stand against the student agitators.

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South Korea: The dominant position of Major General Pak Chong-hui, strong man of the military regime, is emphasized by the announcement that he will head the standing committee of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR), which is expected to become the policy-making group in South Korea. The standing committee, established under the terms of an SCNR law announced on 9 June, will consist of the chairmen

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of seven committees covering the general areas of government administration and will probably handle most of the business of the somewhat unwieldy 32-man SCNR. Pak told the American chargé on 9 June that "things were going smoothly" now that Americans had a better understanding of the revolution and that he hoped to see a gradual "deepening" of relationships between South Korea and the United States.

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UAR-USSR: Other Arab states have joined the UAR in its dispute with the USSR, and Cairo radio on 10 June quoted Saudi Arabian, Lebanese, Yemeni, and Jordanian officials at an Arab League meeting in Cairo as expressing opposition to Soviet propaganda criticism of the UAR. A Baghdad newspaper and an Iraqi lawyers' association have also denounced Moscow's "intervention" in UAR and Iraqi affairs. Iraq has been an intermittent target of Moscow because of Prime Minister Qasim's suppression of local Communists. Soviet commentary on the dispute has been muted since 7-8 June, when the Moscow press reiterated the charge of UAR mistreatment of imprisoned Communists.

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Student Unrest in Northeastern Brazil

In addition to military precautions, Quadros sent his minister of education to Recife on 5 June with instructions to evict --with force if necessary--the striking students who had occupied university buildings there, an action which was carried out two days later. The minister was also instructed to demand that the students return to classes as a prerequisite to any consideration of their complaints. Moreover, during an interpellation about student unrest, the minister of justice advised Congress on 9 June that the government would uphold the law without compromise. Although Recife was reported relatively quiet yesterday, the strike was still unsettled and a number of students were still being held under arrest.

Quadros probably will take into account fully the attitude of the military in meeting any crisis in order not to further compound his current difficulties with the army. Friction between the President and the military was revealed most recently when Minister of War Denys resisted a presidential order to arrest Marshal Lott, defeated candidate in the 1960 presidential election. Lott had granted a press interview in which he sharply criticized Quadros personally and also the President's favorable policy toward Cuba.

There are indications that student sympathy strikes may break out in the neighboring state of Paraiba, in Sao Paulo, and possibly in other areas. Labor groups in Recife have considered supporting the strikers, and labor unions elsewhere may join, particularly the Communist and pro-Castro sectors under the influence of Vice President Goulart, an unprincipled politician and head of the Labor party who is at odds with Quadros.

The pro-Castro Peasant Leagues, headed by pro-Communist Francisco Juliao--who was recently in Cuba and visited the Sino-Soviet bloc in late 1960--have headquarters in Recife and can be expected to give some kind of support to the student strikes there. The leagues are pressing for radical agrarian reform in the economically depressed northeastern area of Brazil, which is frequently subject to drought.

The Recife unrest could become Quadros' first confrontation with the subversive potential of pro-Castro forces in the

country. Castro apparently considers the Brazilian Government, along with those of Ecuador and Mexico, his strongest supporters in the hemisphere to thwart the possibility of OAS joint action against his regime.

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