


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1. THE SITUATION IN JORDAN

Comment on:

King Hussain has approved additional measures to strengthen the administration of martial law by appointing two martial-law courts with extraordinary powers and six military governors to administer the country's principal regions. The military governor general of Jordan has, meanwhile, ordered dissolution of all National Guidance Committees, which functioned as front organizations for the four left-wing nationalist parties which dominate the legislature. Parliamentary immunities were reported abolished on 27 April, and some leftist deputies are reported to have been among the several hundred individuals detained. The curfew was lifted throughout the day for the first

time on 29 April in Amman and other cities. It may be relaxed further to permit the celebrations from 1 to 3 May observing the end of Ramadan.

The king's decree suspending the extraordinary session of the legislature will permit the present cabinet of Ibrahim Hashim to function, postponing the requirement for a vote of confidence until the ordinary session in November.

While tightening his hold on Jordan, King Hussain moved to reduce the appearance of discord among Arabs.

Jordan's border with Syria was opened on the morning of 29 April. The joint communique, issued following Hussain's meeting with King Saud in Riyadh, merely reaffirmed adherence to the principles of Arab solidarity. Nevertheless, it

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represents a victory for Hussain.

Hussain had presented Saud with evidence of Syrian and Egyptian efforts to overthrow the Jordanian monarchy, and Saud has recently expressed displeasure over Egyptian intrigue in both Jordan and the Saudi kingdom.

a "Free Jordan Army" is being organized in Syria under former army chief of staff Nuwar.

According to Ambassador Mallory, stability in Jordan depends on "the mortal existence of one young man, without whom the country would promptly become a shambles."

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**2. SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT ON JORDAN**

The Soviet Foreign Ministry statement of 29 April on Jordan is chiefly a call for Arab cohesion against "imperialist intrigues" and an effort to encourage Syrian and Egyptian attempts to undermine King Hussain's position. A comparatively mild recapitulation of recent Soviet propaganda on Jordan, the statement avoids direct personal criticism of Hussain or the Hashim government.

The declaration censures the Western powers, the "United States above all." It also singles out Israel and Iraq for criticism and reflects Moscow's concern over the possible disruption of the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian pact.

In conclusion, the Soviet Foreign Ministry warns of possible "dire consequences" and calls the dispatch of the US Sixth Fleet an "overt military demonstration against the Arab east which is further aggravating the situation." However, there is no suggestion of any specific Soviet counteraction.

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3. ISRAELI-SYRIAN BORDER INCIDENTS INCREASING

Israeli armed forces are engaged in continuing provocative activity along the Syrian border, according to information from UN truce team personnel in Syria. On 26 April the third dangerous incident in two days occurred on the northeastern shore of Lake Tiberias when the Israelis directed machine gun and 120-mm. mortar fire against a Syrian frontier post. UN

observers were endangered by fire from both sides; the Israelis, however, demonstrated an especially belligerent attitude toward UN personnel and refused to accept a message from the chief of the Israeli-Syrian mixed armistice commission telling them to stop provocative maneuvering.

Comment

Tension in the areas along the Israeli-Syrian border around Lake Tiberias and Lake Hula has increased considerably during the past month. The Syrian Foreign Ministry has expressed irritation with a report by the UN truce team that new bridge construction by the Israelis in the demilitarized zone south of Hula is presumably for civil purposes, and has threatened to take this issue to the UN Security Council.

A number of incidents have also occurred on the Israeli-Jordanian border, but the Israelis appear to be playing these down for the moment in line with their stated desire to do nothing to embarrass King Hussain's efforts to strengthen his position. There have been very few incidents of any significance along the Gaza strip border where the UNEF is participating in border patrols. General Burns, the UNEF commander, recently stated, however, that the Israelis are engaged in a systematic attempt to discredit UNEF despite the absence of any fedayeen terrorist activity.

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4. POSITION OF KEY ANTILEFTIST OFFICERS IN SYRIAN ARMY STRENGTHENED

[Redacted] Three antileftist Syrian army officers have been reassigned to more influential command positions in what seems to be the beginning of a second round of transfers to counter leftist influence in the army, [Redacted]

[Redacted] General Daghestani reportedly has been moved to dual command of the Damascus and Qatana garrisons; Col. Bashir Tabaa to command of the brigade at Baniyas; and Col. Mahmud Shawkat to replace Daghestani at the Israeli front. [Redacted]

Comment

These men are believed to be members of the "Damascene officers" group which supports Chief of Staff Nizam al-Din and President Quwatli against both the Sarraj and Nufuri officer factions. The transfer of Daghestani to command of both the Damascus and Qatana troops would strengthen the control of the chief of staff over them and, consequently, weaken proleftist influence. There have been previous reports that a second round of transfers was planned following the recent detente between the various factions. President Quwatli and Nizam al-Din may be taking advantage of the Jordanian situation to better their position inside Syria.

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5. INDONESIA PREPARING TO WELCOME VOROSHILOV

Comment on:

Indonesian officials are preparing for a 19-day visit by Kliment Voroshilov, titular head of the Soviet state, who will arrive in Indonesia on 6 May accompanied by a large delegation. Voroshilov's tour will be limited to areas of Indonesia which are under Djakarta's control--Java, Bali, and North Sumatra. A special committee is trying to match the variety of entertainment, mass meetings, and speeches which the Soviet Union lavished on President Sukarno last year.

Sukarno probably hopes Voroshilov's visit will popularize the Soviet Union in Indonesia and reduce resistance to the \$100,000,000 Soviet technical aid agreement which was signed in September 1956 but has never been submitted to the Indonesian parliament for ratification. The government has wished to avoid an acrimonious parliamentary debate and also has been unsure as to how to fit the \$100,000,000 into its development program with adequate safeguards. Sukarno and the central government, however, are now eager for additional funds to finance projects in the disaffected provinces and are therefore likely to be less wary about the terms on which they accept Soviet aid. There are also strong indications that the government may approach the United States for more aid.

Meanwhile, army headquarters reportedly has almost completed its preparations to intensify the drive against anti-Sukarno and antigovernment "subversives" throughout the country. Any attempt to extend the drive to the leaders of the autonomous provinces--particularly Sumatra--would probably precipitate open conflict.

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