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2 June 1961


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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2 June 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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*Dominican Republic: The appearance of unity and stability being maintained by President Balaguer and the diverse elements that formed the government and the military and political machines of the late dictator is probably a facade. *delete last 3 IPs.* The rivalries and jealousies among Trujillo's underlings, which only occasionally came to the surface during his lifetime, are deepseated and almost certain to weaken the regime in the near future. While members of the Trujillo family and those high officers most intimately associated with the dead dictator now feel they have no recourse but to stand or fall together, other high officials, military as well as civilian, recognize the hostility to the Trujillo regime that has been engendered among important segments of the Dominican population. These officials may well become convinced that their future would be better served by an alliance with the anti-Trujillo dissident elements. The 31 years of Trujillo rule, however, have left a legacy that severely hampers any immediate transition toward democratic government.

The American Consulate reported on 1 June that the capital city is being patrolled by heavily armed military and police units and that the general attitude of the people there is a compound of suppressed excitement, fearful apprehension, and grim satisfaction that Trujillo is dead. The consul also notes that there has been a wave of panic buying of food in the capital. While reports of developments outside the capital are scanty, the consulate reports some indications of violence in the traditionally dissident interior region known as the Cibao.

International Reaction: Bloc comment on the Trujillo assassination has been limited. A Moscow English-language broadcast on 1 June quoted the State Department announcement of the event and described the Trujillo regime as "a fascist dictatorship based on military force and the assistance extended to the

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regime by the United States." The broadcast added that Trujillo had recently heightened repression of his opposition and had imprisoned thousands of persons.

Reaction in Latin America was generally one of satisfaction. A representative comment was that of Chilean Foreign Minister Ortuzar, who told newsmen that the assassination was a "natural end that awaits all dictators... who make a mockery of the rights and freedoms of man." In Haiti, the reaction was one of alarm as the government reinforced its border guards and mobilized the President's special militia. In Cuba, comment in the Castro-controlled press stressed the hope that the dictator's death would mean the "liberation" of the Dominican people, who now have "a magnificent opportunity to recover their freedom." [redacted]


In Venezuela, where President Betancourt was the target of an almost successful assassination attempt mounted by Trujillo last year, the Chamber of Deputies unanimously passed a resolution of solidarity with the Dominican people. President Betancourt told the American ambassador on 31 May that his government had set aside air and naval forces and is prepared to send troops to the Dominican Republic if coordinated hemisphere military action is requested to help in maintaining internal order there. A high-ranking Venezuelan intelligence officer confided to the American naval attaché on 31 May that he is working with the Venezuelan interior minister in an effort to prevent the return to the Dominican Republic of Communists and "radicals" among the Dominican exiles living in Venezuela. He added that the Venezuelan Government is prepared to give assistance in the form of money and transportation to "desirable" Dominican exiles who want to return. [redacted]

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Laos: General Phoumi, [redacted]

[redacted] has agreed to meet with Souvanna and Souphanouvong in Phnom Penh. The exact date for this encounter between the three Laotian leaders has not yet been set.

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[redacted] and is under the impression that Souvanna and Souphanouvong are going to Geneva soon and want to talk with Phoumi beforehand.]

[In talks with the ICC at Xieng Khouang on 31 May, Souvanna is reported to have agreed to consider permitting the establishment of an ICC team at Pa Dong provided Vientiane undertakes to send only non-munition items to Pa Dong and the Lao Army withdraws all reinforcements sent in after the truce. Phoumi has indicated to the ICC that he might agree to the proviso on supplies if there is an ICC team supervising the activities of the other side. He would consider withdrawing the reinforcements, however, only after ICC enforcement arrangements were put into effect and working well.]

[Moderate artillery shelling of government Meo positions in the Pa Dong area continued during the night of 31 May - 1 June.]

Bloc airlift operations into Laos were scheduled through 2 June. [redacted] (Backup, Page 1) (Map)

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

*Sino-Soviet Bloc: Moscow and the East European satellites continue to portray the Vienna meeting as a generally favorable development which could serve as a point of departure for further negotiations. In the past week, however, a note of caution has been injected.

[redacted] East German propaganda directive, for example, instructs East German editors to report on the meeting without arousing "illusions of any kind about results or adjustments" of positions. [redacted] Soviet spokesmen have taken an optimistic line in public and are apparently under instructions to treat the meeting as an opportunity to lay the groundwork for an accommodation of Soviet and American positions on key East-West issues. Peiping's initial editorial comment gives minimum endorsement to the meeting as "new proof of the USSR's sincere desire" for peace, but maintains its line of harsh denunciation of US policies. While implying reservations regarding the advisability of such a meeting, the editorial published in People's Daily on 1 June suggests that Peiping is adhering to the apparent understanding, reached at the November conference of Communist leaders, to refrain from openly attacking another top-level meeting between Khrushchev and the President.

OK

*USSR-Albania: [redacted]

Tirana has expelled the Soviet military attaché and an unknown number of Soviet military experts in retaliation for the USSR's expulsion of the Albanian military attaché and Albanian naval students studying in the USSR.

[redacted] This development, along with the previously reported departure on 26 May of 8 W-class Soviet submarines from the Vlone naval base, suggests that all Soviet military forces may be leaving Albania.

No

[redacted] the four submarines and one tender remaining in Vlone were turned over earlier to the Albanians. The Soviet action follows the Albanian

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show trial which began on 15 May and which resulted in the execution on 31 May of Albanian Rear Admiral Sejko. The proceedings at this trial were implicitly critical of Soviet policies.

BOLIVIA: [President Paz Estenssoro and top government officials were reported on 31 May] as being in agreement on staging a fake coup on or about 2 or 3 June. The fake coup is to be blamed on Communists, members of the dissident wing of the government party, and the rightist opposition. Arrests are to include key Communist agitators in the largest tin mine, certain pro-Castro Bolivians, and rightist leaders as well. Paz is reported to believe that such decisive action is his only chance to survive and to receive adequate US aid.]

(Backup, Page 3)

Iran: [An undersecretary of the Iranian Foreign Ministry has expressed to the American ambassador his serious concern over the growing neutralist sentiment and pressure for withdrawal from CENTO among influential Iranians. Members of Prime Minister Amini's government reportedly want the new regime to withdraw its public support for CENTO, but Amini and the Shah are holding firm.]


[CENTO has "become a symbol of Iranian subservience to foreigners" and that public opinion "from right to left was unanimous on this score." According to the Swedish ambassador in Tehran, Soviet Ambassador Pegov recently said that the USSR would demand Iran's withdrawal from CENTO and the abrogation of the 1959 bilateral defense agreement with the US as a price for improving relations. Amini told the American ambassador, however, that Pegov had made no such demand in a conversation on 29 May.]

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2 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page

Congo: Gizenga's control over Kivu Province appears threatened by tribal opposition to the provincial government appointed by the Stanleyville regime. The American Embassy in Leopoldville reports that ten Kivu politicians, including two provincial ministers, have been arrested for "anti-government" activities. Gizenga appears anxious to conciliate the dissidents, and has, [redacted]

[redacted] sent a special emissary to Kivu. Nonetheless, the re-emergence of overt opposition is embarrassing to Gizenga and could induce some undecided deputies to support Kasavubu on the issue of convening parliament in Leopoldville. [redacted] (Backup, Page 4) (Map)

USSR-UAR: Moscow has followed up Khrushchev's reported criticism of Nasir last month to a UAR parliamentary delegation with a Pravda article on 31 May which attacks two UAR government-controlled newspapers for "slanderous statements" against the Soviet Union and socialism. Soviet leaders are apparently displeased by Nasir's suppression of local Communists, his recent moves toward improving relations with the US, and his initiative, together with Tito, in arranging the projected neutralist summit conference. Moscow has so far apparently confined itself to propaganda pressures. Regular Soviet military deliveries to the UAR are continuing [redacted]

UAR: Nasir, [redacted], told his chief lieutenant in Damascus, Syrian Executive Council Chairman Abd al-Hamid Sarraj, that the UAR's policy at present is "not to create political difficulties with our neighbors" and that "any action taken must be according to plan." Sarraj was specifically instructed to "give an opportunity to the nationalists in Jordan who have not been allowed to act with freedom since 1957." [redacted]

Sarraj, whose tendency to act on his own in clandestine activities has troubled Nasir since formation of the UAR in 1958. Sarraj, however, has been almost indispensable to Cairo in controlling Syrian intelligence and security affairs. [redacted]

(Backup, Page 5)

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South Africa: The failure of the three-day non-white general strike, called by the Communist-dominated National Action Council (NAC) to protest South Africa's accession to republic status on 31 May, is a further demonstration of the difficulties facing any attempt to organize a mass protest movement in the Union. In the view of the American Embassy, the efforts to get the strike under way were plagued by a lack of non-European unity and by African indifference to abstract issues such as the controversy over establishment of a republic. Moreover, the NAC's propaganda build-up gave the government ample time to build up its security forces and to arrest or restrict the activities of most of the strike leaders. In the near future, outbreaks are likely to be the spontaneous result of local grievances, aggravated by such factors as panic action on the part of police, rather than the outcome of nationwide calls for demonstrations.

OK

African Labor Conference: The pan-African labor conference held from 25 to 30 May in Casablanca confirmed the lack of unity among African trade union leaders, while providing fresh evidence of the determination of representatives from Ghana and Guinea to exert leadership and curtail Western influence in Africa. Pressure by these elements and the unwillingness of the conference chairman, Morocco's top labor leader, to permit the conference to fail completely resulted in the formal creation of an All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF), whose member unions must disaffiliate from other international labor federations within ten months. This action, however, followed the withdrawal from the conference of nearly all affiliates of the Western-sponsored International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), which represents dominant labor groups in East, Central, and North Africa. The permanent governing board of the AATUF has a preponderance of members from the radical "Casablanca group" of African states.

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(Backup, Page 6)

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Mexico: Communist-led student demonstrations, similar to those which followed the April landings in Cuba and led to violence in several Mexican cities, have broken out again in Puebla, about 74 miles southeast of Mexico City. A pro-Castro group, which has dominated the University of Puebla for at least a month and aroused strong church and other anti-Communist reaction, reportedly abandoned the administration buildings on 27 May--probably under pressure from the Lopez Mateos government. However, on 29 May the group issued a manifesto proclaiming "the Socialist Republic of Puebla" and announcing that this was "the first step" toward establishment of a "26th of July Movement" in Mexico. [redacted] (Backup, Page 8)

OK

The Soviets had earlier acknowledged that they lost contact with the Venus probe vehicle about 21 February.

A scientist at the Moscow planetarium announced on 1 June that a communiqué will be issued on this matter "some day soon." [redacted]

[redacted]

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The Situation in Laos

[redacted] at the Namone political talks, government tactics there will be to listen to the proposals of the Souvanna Phouma group and the Pathet Lao, to ask for explanations, and generally to take the posture of a "judge" willing to listen but under no obligation to adopt the views of political "dissidents."

At the 31 May session, the government delegation held that its own policies had been approved by the assembly and the King and that proposals made by the other two groups should be examined to determine whether they fit into this constitutional framework. Earlier in the session the Pathet Lao had made the following proposals: new general elections under the 1957 electoral law; the gradual unification of the armed forces of all political factions; the prohibition of all foreign military bases with the exception of Seno, granted to the French in the 1954 Geneva accords; disavowal of SEATO's protective umbrella; the withdrawal of all foreign troops; and the repeal of any international agreements contravening neutrality.

[redacted] reports have been received by the Meo garrison at Pa Dong that from 28 to 30 May about 100 enemy trucks carrying North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist troops moved from Xieng Khouang to Ban Ta Viang in preparation for an attack on Pa Dong. A similar report of the movement of trucks along the Xieng Khouang - Ban Ta Viang road was provided independently [redacted]

[redacted] Other reports indicate that North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist troops were brought into the Plaine des Jarres as replacements for those who had completed four months duty in Laos. Additional North Vietnamese troops may have been brought in to bolster attacks against the Meos, which thus far have been relatively unsuccessful, but the involvement of Chinese Communist combat troops is less likely.]

[redacted] Xuan Thuy, deputy leader of the North Vietnamese delegation at Geneva, recently told a

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[non-Communist journalist that fighting at Pa Dong and elsewhere in Laos "will end only when the Geneva conference ends."]

On 31 May there was a total of 25 airlift-associated sorties, of which ten were into Laos. The Soviet AN-12 en route to North Vietnam from the USSR arrived at Haiphong on 31 May. A Soviet AN-10 transport--similar in most respects to the AN-12--left Irkutsk for Peiping on 1 June. The purpose of this flight is not known, and it cannot yet be determined whether it is in connection with Laos.

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~~SECRET~~Bolivia

[The Bolivian Foreign Ministry informed US Embassy officials in La Paz on 29 May that the government planned to begin a nationwide crackdown on Communists on 30 May. The Bolivians state that such a plan would facilitate compliance with the International Monetary Fund's requirement that Bolivia increase its domestic gasoline price. United States aid of \$650,000 monthly has been withheld since 1 April until Bolivia meets this requirement, but Bolivian officials assert this step would be politically explosive and subject to Communist exploitation. The American chargé in La Paz reported early on 31 May that all evidence available to the embassy indicated that the repression of Communists had not begun. The plans for an anti-Communist crackdown may have evolved into the projected fake coup.]

[A program for free world aid to the tin mines on which Bolivia's economy depends is scheduled to get under way in early July. The program is a cooperative effort by West Germany, the United States, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Paz has previously indicated an interest in keeping delays in the program to a minimum. Soviet aid to Bolivia has thus far been impeded by the Bolivian Government's repeated postponements since January of the visit to the USSR of a Bolivian economic mission to work out plans for use of the Soviet credit offer of \$150,000,000 made in late 1960.]

[Paz apparently believes that labor agitation and strikes in the mines will decrease when progress in mine rehabilitation is evident. Communist agitation in the tin mines received a sharp setback in early May when Vice President Lechin, who has been under Communist attack, was re-elected executive secretary of the Miners' Federation after a strong defense of the projected cooperative effort for free world aid to the mines.]

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~~SECRET~~Gizenga Facing Dissidence in Kivu Province

[redacted] opposition to the Kivu provincial government of Adrien Omari is led by the provincial ministers of agriculture, education, and health, who are supported by a group of about 35 provincial deputies. The extent to which their dissatisfaction stems from political factors as well as tribal rivalries is unclear. According to the American Embassy in Leopoldville, the ten dissident leaders known to have been arrested by Omari include a leader of the dominant Bashi tribe, two provincial deputies, and the mayor of a commune as well as the three provincial ministers.

[redacted]

In late May, Gizenga sent a conciliation mission to Kivu in an effort to placate restive Bashi tribesmen by replacing four incumbent ministers with Bashis. In apparent contravention of Gizenga's go-slow policy, however, Omari continued efforts to subdue his tribal opposition.

[redacted] Gizenga strongly criticized Omari for obstructing his efforts to reach a settlement in Kivu. [redacted] Press reports from Bukavu indicated disillusionment on the part of the dissidents at the failure of the Leopoldville government to send aid or otherwise support their position.

In Leopoldville, unconfirmed reports that Kasavubu plans to name the able Cyrille Adoula as premier probably reflect discussion within the Leopoldville government of means of winning over moderate deputies for the forthcoming session of parliament. The president of the chamber of deputies--formerly a supporter of Gizenga--has indicated his willingness to accept Leopoldville as the locale for a meeting of parliament, and has characterized Adoula as an acceptable choice as premier in place of Joseph Ileo.

[redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~Nasir Instructs Sarraj on UAR Good-Neighbor Policy

Nasir's [redacted] is concerned over Sarraj's propensity for independent action. The Lebanese civil war, the aftermath of the Iraqi revolution, and the assassination of Jordan's Prime Minister Majalli last August were situations in which Sarraj probably played an active role.

Nasir's recent relatively cordial exchange of letters with King Husayn and his abstention from comment on Husayn's marriage reflect at least a temporary desire to avoid a revival of the bitterness that had previously marked UAR-Jordanian relations. In this context, a warning to Sarraj was probably called for, [especially inasmuch as Nasir has reportedly been told by Jordanian exiles that the Syrian strongman has developed his own plans of action against Husayn.] [redacted]

Sarraj's recent arrest--for unstated reasons--of a Jordanian, whom Nasir subsequently ordered released.

Nasir's preoccupation with affairs outside the Arab world, such as the Congo, the proposed neutralist conference, and East-West relations, has coincided with the relative lull in the UAR's activities among its neighbors. As in the past, this could change abruptly. [redacted]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Pan-African Labor Federation Established

Controversy both on and off the floor over the affiliation issue was the dominant feature of the confused six-day meeting. Contrary to earlier indications of what their strategy would be, the representatives from Ghana and Guinea displayed no inclination as the conference progressed to moderate their insistence on a non-affiliation clause--a demand clearly aimed at the ICFTU. This stand was backed by Mali's labor organization. Spokesmen for most of the ICFTU affiliates, led by Tunisia's Ahmed Tlili and Kenya's Tom Mboya, fought for the right of "dual" affiliation.

In this situation, the leaders of the principal Algerian and Moroccan unions, who share the neutralist outlook of the Ghanaians and Guineans on most other issues but wish to preserve their ICFTU ties, made strenuous efforts to develop a compromise formula. When this proved impossible, Morocco's Mahjoub Ben Seddik, the chairman and dominant personality of the conference, allowed the Ghana-Guinea position, modified only by the provision of the ten-month "grace" period, to be written into the charter adopted "unanimously" by the rump session. The Algerians likewise associated themselves with the AATUF on this basis. Despite this decision, both Ben Seddik, who has demonstrated his opportunism in the past, and the leader of the Algerian union approached an ICFTU representative after the conference to request a "more dynamic" ICFTU program in Africa; Ben Seddik is also reported to have told an African associate that he did not plan to disaffiliate his union from the ICFTU.

Ben Seddik appears to have circumscribed somewhat the ability of the Ghanaians and Guineans to use the new organization to advance their pan-African ambitions by having Casablanca accepted as both the headquarters of the AATUF and the site of its next general conference. Moreover, he managed to secure for himself the key position of chairman of the AATUF's permanent secretariat. Other members named to this group are from Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Algeria, the UAR, Morocco,

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and Kenya--Mboya having been included without his knowledge or permission at the insistence of Ben Seddik, who had endeavored earlier in the conference to associate himself with the Kenyan leader. Except for still dependent Kenya, the secretariat is thus made up exclusively of labor leaders from the six "Casablanca group" countries.

For the present, Ben Seddik appears to be in a position to exert paramount influence over the fledgling organization --a situation which is reportedly already distressing the leaders of Ghana and Guinea. Nevertheless, the mere existence of the AATUF on the terms accepted at least in principle by Ben Seddik represents a distinct gain for the Ghana-Guinea approach to pan-Africanism. It will be difficult for any of the approximately 20 African ICFTU affiliates, which are already sensitive to charges of being "stooges of imperialism" and saboteurs of African unity, to remain outside the AATUF.

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Pro-Castro Demonstrations by Mexican Students

Mexican public universities, like those in most of Latin America, are "autonomous" or independent of direct government control, and students take frequent advantage of this wide latitude for irresponsible political activity. In this setting, Communist-led minorities have become powerful in several Mexican universities. Known Communists from the University of Michoacan led a mob which on 17 April destroyed the cultural institute in Morelia sponsored by the Mexican and United States governments. The Mexican Government is investigating reports that at least one of the students was with Soviet Embassy officials in Morelia on 16 April. Demonstrations in Mexico City in late April--at which fellow-traveling former President Lazaro Cardenas exhorted the crowd to active support of Castro--were organized by Communist and leftist students at the National University.

There has been little evidence of Communist influence at the University of Puebla until recently, when radical students capitalized on an internal struggle over the choice of a rector and over university "reforms." After a long strike and destructive attacks by armed students on the more moderate colleges within the university, the leftists succeeded on 9 May in electing a rector and in obtaining almost all their demands for other changes. Local authorities evidently continued to recognize the former rector, a moderate, and the leftists barricaded themselves in certain university buildings, declaring their candidate to be the rector. Business and Catholic Action organizations have staged counterdemonstrations against the agitators, and one student group has charged that the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City supports and controls the leftists. Several anti-Communist groups have petitioned President Lopez Mateos for federal intervention.

The Mexican Government seldom acts against student demonstrations unless serious violence threatens, and Lopez Mateos is particularly averse to the use of force so close to congressional elections scheduled for July. However, the earlier concessions have evidently emboldened the Puebla agitators. Their

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reported withdrawal from the university and the governor of Puebla's refusal to allow their demonstration on 29 May probably animated their propaganda attacks on the Catholic Church and the army and their threats of a Castro-like revolt.

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