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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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19 JUNE 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Tyura Tam launching of 18 June.

①

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iran--Tehran unwilling to make concessions to USSR for better relations.

②

Iraq--Kurdish tribal elements again clash with security forces near Iranian border.


③

Burma--Chinese Nationalist irregulars threaten aggressive action unless army ceases operations against them.

④

Kishi supporters in most key posts of new Japanese cabinet.

⑤



III. THE WEST

- ⑥ Adenauer planning to visit UK and France during July; wants meeting with Macmillan and De Gaulle during any Geneva recess.
- ⑦ Haitian opposition plans to step up terrorist activities.
- ⑧ Nicaragua--Castro promises money and troops to rebel leaders in exile.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

19 June 1959

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*USSR: The vehicle launched from the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range shortly after 0400 EDT, 18 June 1959, apparently failed after being air-borne for several minutes. It was probably a space vehicle attempt, possibly a lunar probe.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iran:

Tehran is continuing its firm posture toward Moscow and is dissatisfied with the attitude of its ambassador there. Acting Foreign Minister Sadr told the ambassador that his recommendation for an Iranian good-will mission to the USSR could only be considered after Moscow ceased its hostile propaganda.

Tehran is still unwilling to make any unilateral or substantial concessions in order to establish better relations.

(Page 3)

Iraq: Dissident Kurdish tribal elements are again clashing with Iraqi security forces in northeastern Iraq near the Iranian border. The local security officials estimate the strength of the "rebels" at 700 to 1,000 men armed with "rifles, machine guns, a mortar, and grenades." The government is preparing to use Barzani Kurds and other loyal Kurdish tribes to assist in overcoming the dissidents. As before, Iraqi officials suspect Iran of supporting this "rebellion."

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Burma: Burmese officials have received a threat in a letter from the commander of the Chinese Nationalist irregulars that his forces will undertake aggressive action in collaboration with dissident tribal groups unless the Burmese Army calls off its operations against the irregulars. The Burmese interpret this threat as a warning that the irregulars will support the Shan dissidents, now a poorly organized racial minority movement. The irregulars, however, might also be considering a renewal of joint operations with the Karen dissidents, Burma's most troublesome insurgent group.)

(Page 5)

Japan: Prime Minister Kishi has probably strengthened his control in the new cabinet announced on 18 June by appointing his supporters to most of the key posts. The inclusion of Hayato Ikeda, a top leader of the ruling Liberal-Democratic party who formerly opposed Kishi, will broaden support for Kishi's pro-US policies. The refusal of Ichiro Kono, an aspirant to the prime ministership, to accept a party or cabinet post leaves him as a rallying point for continued party factionalism.

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III. THE WEST

West Germany: Adenauer tentatively plans to visit Macmillan in London during July and probably De Gaulle in Paris shortly thereafter. He expects to ask De Gaulle to call a European "summit" meeting of the three leaders. Adenauer feels that the recess Bonn anticipates in East-West negotiations must be used to strengthen Western unity for the next and "most crucial" phase of negotiations.)

(Page 7)

Haiti: Haitian opposition groups are planning to step up terrorist activities in order to weaken further the regime of President Duvalier, who is still disabled from his recent heart attack. Although opposition groups remain divided, they have

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succeeded in conducting a series of bombings and other public disorders in recent days. The government feels itself trapped between Castro and Trujillo, and three top Haitian officials displayed "almost hysterical fear" while discussing the political situation with Ambassador Drew on 15 June.

(Page 8)

DK
Nicaragua: Nicaraguan rebel leaders in exile, chagrined over the failure of the invasions early this month by political moderates based in Costa Rica, have turned in desperation to Cuban Prime Minister Castro for assistance and also appear inclined to accept the support of pro-Communist revolutionary groups in the Caribbean area for a new effort against the Somoza regime. Castro promised financial assistance and Cuban troops to fight in Nicaragua.

(Page 9)

IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

DK
Outlook For West Africa Through 1960. NIE 70-59. 16 June 1959.

Soviet Tactics on Berlin. SNIE 100-7-59. 11 June 1959.

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

1. Shortly after 0400 EDT, 18 June 1959, the USSR launched a vehicle from the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range.

this was probably a space vehicle rather than a test ICBM.

2.

the vehicle left the launch pad and was airborne for several minutes. However, it apparently failed shortly thereafter as:

3. The type of space vehicle attempt cannot be determined with confidence. the time of day was not favorable for a Venus probe, but both time of day and date were satisfactory for a lunar shot. The time of day or time of month of course is not a consideration in the launching of an earth satellite vehicle. favor a lunar probe over an earth satellite vehicle primarily because of the coincidence of time.

4. The Soviet space-venture tally now stands as follows:

a. Three successful earth satellites (4 October and 3 November 1957; 15 May 1958).

b. One failure, after launch, of a probable earth satellite (27 April 1958).

c. One lunar probe (MECHTA - 2 January 1959).

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d. Three failures, after launch, of probable lunar probes (23 September, 11 October, and 4 December 1958).

e. The failure, after launch, of this possible lunar probe. (18 June 1959).

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Tehran Continues Firm Policy Toward Moscow

Ansari that no consideration could be given to his proposal for an Iranian good-will mission to be sent to Moscow until the USSR ceases its hostile propaganda.

Ansari on 9 June had asked to be informed at once of the Shah's decision on his recommendation regarding such a good-will mission, because he saw no other way to "end this radio brawl." Tehran, dissatisfied with Ansari's recommendations, told him to clarify [redacted] views are his own and which are the official views of the Soviet Government.

Commenting on Ansari's suggestion that such a mission should confirm the nonaggression provisions of the 1927 Soviet-Iranian treaty and reassure the USSR that Iran will not permit its territory to be used as a military base for another power, Sadr pointed out that the Shah has repeatedly announced that Iran would not allow such a base. Sadr asked whether Moscow is ready to agree with Iran that the controversial articles of the 1921 and 1927 Soviet-Iranian treaties are invalid, provided Tehran gives "acceptable" assurances that foreign bases would not be permitted in Iran. Sadr specifically defined a foreign base as an installation used by foreign troops and not subject to Iranian administrative regulations--a definition which is probably unacceptable to Moscow.

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Current Iraqi Developments

New clashes are taking place between dissident Kurdish tribal elements and Iraqi security forces in northeastern Iraq near the Iranian border. Baghdad is preparing to use Barzani Kurds and other loyal Kurdish tribes to overcome the "rebels," whose strength the local security officials estimate at 700 to 1,000 men armed with "rifles, machine guns, a mortar, and grenades." The northern headquarters of the Popular Resistance Forces at Kirkuk on 17 June directed all its posts near the Iranian, Turkish, and UAR frontiers "to be prepared for emergencies." As before, Iraqi officials suspect that the dissidents are receiving support from Iran.

In Baghdad, both Communist and anti-Communist elements are continuing to maneuver for position. The provincial governors whose 13-14 June conference there was attended by the directors general of police and security are reported to have stressed that Baghdad authorities should look to them--and not to local Communists--as the sole reliable source of information on security matters in their areas. The Communist press and leaders of Communist-run mass organizations countered on 16 June with calls for special and immediate vigilance to guard against "evil imperialist plots" to overthrow the government and kill Qasim.

Reconnaissance of the Baghdad area on 15 and 16 June by the US military attaché disclosed an unusual concentration of troops and equipment on the western, as well as the northern, outskirts of the city.

[redacted] these troops were shifted to the area for rehearsals and other preparations for a big anniversary parade on 14 July and not in anticipation of imminent trouble in the capital.

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Chinese Irregulars in Burma Threaten Military Action
Against Government

(The commander of the Chinese Nationalist irregulars in the Burma-Laos border area has threatened military counteraction against the Burmese Government in collaboration with tribal insurgents unless the Burmese Army ceases harassment of his forces. Burmese officials interpret this threat as a warning that the irregulars will support the Shan dissidents; the irregulars may also be considering renewed operations with the Karen insurgents.)

(In a letter to government authorities, the commander protested that the attacks on his forces which began on 9 May were a breach of an April 1956 agreement, purportedly reached between himself and the Burmese Army commander in Kengtung, permitting the Chinese irregulars to settle peacefully in the border area.)

(The Shan dissidents, estimated at about 3,000 men, constitute a loosely organized and poorly equipped guerrilla force, capable only of minor harassments in Kengtung State. With the support of the Chinese irregulars, however, they could become a serious problem for the Burmese Army.

Closer cooperation between the irregulars and the Karen National Defense Organization, currently receiving limited supplies and training from Taiwan, would also increase the military potential of this minority group which has been the Burmese Government's most troublesome insurgency problem.)

(Burmese Army spokesman Colonel Maung Maung has charged that both the irregulars and the Shan dissidents are armed with weapons of American manufacture and wear American-type uniforms. He has urged the United States to use its influence to stop the flow of supplies from Taiwan. In response to US representations, Nationalist Security Chief Chiang Ching-kuo stated recently that Taipei would discontinue supplies to the irregulars if the Burmese would cease their attacks.)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~New Japanese Government

Prime Minister Kishi appears to have strengthened his position by placing his supporters in most of the key positions of his new cabinet, while still providing for representatives from some of the major factions in his ruling Liberal-Democratic party. Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama and Finance Minister Eisaku Sato are the only holdovers in the cabinet, which will face an all-out fight with the Socialists over consideration of the US-Japan Security Treaty at the Diet session this fall.

The entry of Hayato Ikeda, a top leader of a party faction which previously opposed Kishi's leadership, will probably broaden support for Japan's policy of cooperation with the United States. Financial interests in Japan are generally pleased over the inclusion of Ikeda as minister of international trade and industry and view his appointment as a continuation of sound financial policies.

Kishi was unable to satisfy all party groups, and the refusal of Ichiro Kono--an aspirant to the prime ministership--to accept a party or cabinet post leaves him as a rallying point for continued party factionalism. Kono has publicly threatened that he will no longer cooperate with the government because Kishi refused to appoint him secretary general of the party. He could cause Kishi trouble over the revision of the security treaty and relations with Communist China by cooperating with the Socialists.

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III. THE WEST

Adenauer Attempting to Arrange European Summit Meeting With De Gaulle and Macmillan

(West German Chancellor Adenauer tentatively plans to visit London and probably Paris soon after the 1 July West German presidential election,

He will propose that President de Gaulle act as host for a "European summit conference" of the three powers. Adenauer feels strongly that Western unity must be strengthened for the next and "most crucial" round of talks with Moscow.)

During his visit to London, Adenauer will attempt to promote a settlement of UK-French differences on the British proposal for a free trade area. The German delegation at the Geneva conference also hopes that Adenauer will take the opportunity to ease the strains in British-German relations which were aggravated by Macmillan's trip to Moscow.)

(Adenauer probably wants to use these talks to regain some of the international prestige he lost as a result of his maneuvers with regard to the West German presidency.)

In recent public statements Adenauer indicated he would support De Gaulle's desire for a greater French role in NATO in return for French willingness to step up the pace of European economic cooperation, including the free trade area. He apparently fears that if these problems of NATO organization and European integration are not resolved, Moscow can exploit the situation to its advantage in summit talks.)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Haitian Opposition Groups Plan Increased Terrorism

Two opposition factions in Haiti are planning to step up terrorist activities against the shaky Duvalier regime. The two groups, followers of exiled political leaders Daniel Fignolé and Louis Dejoie, in recent weeks have staged bombings and other public disorders which aggravated the already unstable political situation.

The Duvalier government, dependent for survival on the President's secret police, has become increasingly unpopular during its year and a half in power. Opposition elements have been quick to exploit the confusion within the régime resulting from Duvalier's heart attack on 24 May, which will probably prevent his return to active politics for several more weeks. Although divided, the opposition may succeed in stirring up considerable unrest, and the armed forces, alienated by Duvalier's continuing efforts to undermine their power, cannot be relied upon to support the government.

Three top Haitian officials--including the chief of the secret police--while discussing the political situation with Ambassador Drew on 15 June, displayed "almost hysterical fear" that Haiti might be caught between its two hostile and more powerful neighbors, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Foreign Minister Mars requested that US naval vessels increase visits to Port-au-Prince to act as a deterrent to a possible invasion from abroad. [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~Nicaraguan Rebels Seek Cuban Assistance

Nicaraguan rebel leaders in exile are turning in desperation to Cuban Prime Minister Castro for assistance following the failure early this month of the invasion of Nicaragua by political moderates based in Costa Rica. Castro has promised \$100,000 to \$150,000 and "a large number of Cuban troops to fight in Nicaragua," according to a rebel emissary who returned to Costa Rica on 15 June from a hurried trip to Cuba.

[redacted] the Nicaraguan rebel leader who apparently sent the emissary to seek Castro's aid, had earlier told the Costa Rican foreign minister that he had launched the invasions without Cuban help since he felt Castro's terms would have made him a mere puppet. The American Embassy in Havana has become convinced that the Cuban Government is supporting revolutionary expeditions against the Nicaraguan and Dominican governments.

[redacted] appears inclined also to accept support from Communists and from pro-Communist revolutionary groups throughout the Caribbean. [redacted]

[redacted] asked Costa Rican Communist leader Manuel Mora to draft a document on the policies of a post-revolutionary Nicaraguan government. The Costa Rican Communist party resolved on 6 June to fully support the Nicaraguan revolution. Nicaraguan university students in Costa Rica [redacted]

[redacted] to be expecting a new revolutionary offensive in Nicaragua, this time with considerable Communist participation.

Nicaraguan armed forces chief Somoza told the American Embassy late on 17 June that he was expecting an attack by an armed band from Costa Rica early on 19 June. The leader of this band, Costa Rican revolutionary veteran Frank Marshall, has threatened to use force if Costa Rican President Echandi attempts to prevent the departure of his group for Nicaragua. On 18 June, Costa Rican units were preparing an attempt to compel this group to surrender. [redacted]

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Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

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The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

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The Secretary of the Interior

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The Secretary of Commerce

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Atomic Energy Commission

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National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

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