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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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GENERAL

1. Comment on departure of Soviet diplomats:

The recall during the past few weeks of numerous high-ranking Soviet diplomats, including Vyshinsky and the ambassadors to London, Paris and Washington, suggests that high-level talks may soon be held in Moscow on outstanding international issues. The talks would probably cover the current difficulties in East Germany and Eastern Europe, Korea and other Far Eastern subjects, Balkan policy, and general tactics for breaking Western solidarity.

There are indications that the Kremlin still desires a Korean armistice followed by a Far Eastern political conference. The USSR will probably make every effort to exploit US-UK-French differences over such problems as the status of Formosa and the recognition of and UN membership for Communist China.

The simultaneous presence in the USSR of the Soviet representatives to Turkey, Iran, Greece, and Yugoslavia suggests that discussions on Balkan policy may also be scheduled.

[redacted] 3.3(h)(2) [redacted]

FAR EAST

2. Possible Rhee successor criticizes American armistice efforts:

[redacted]

In a private mid-June conversation with American officials in Pusan, Yi Pomsok severely criticized American willingness to conclude an armistice and said he believed that the Communist "peace offensive" in Korea was a cover for further aggression.

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Yi stated that the early June mass demonstrations were "genuine expressions of the popular will" and added that Rhee was "duty bound" to respect the people's demands which on the truce question coincided with the government's position.

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Comment: Yi, who is now in the United States, holds no official position in the South Korean government, but is generally considered to be second only to Rhee in political power. His observations on public sentiment conflict with reports from Ambassador Briggs; the fact that he makes them tends to show the unanimity with which most articulate Korean leaders oppose a truce. The mere replacement of Rhee, therefore, would not necessarily change South Korean opposition.

3. South Korean ambassador proposes pact similar to US-Japan security treaty:

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<u>Comment:</u>	Yang was	3.3(h)(2)
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informed by his government that it was seeking a mutual security pact with the United States, presumably to bind the United States to immediate armed defense of South Korea in case of a future attack. Yang may have learned that such a treaty is now out of the question and that Rhee must settle for a more general commitment.

The US-Japan security treaty authorizes American forces to be stationed "in and about" Japan to "contribute to the maintenance" of Far Eastern peace and security, but it contains no automatic commitment for the United States to defend Japan.

4. Chiang Kai-shek to refrain from public support of Rhee's position:

	Chiang Kai-shek told the American ambassador in Taipei on 1 July that he had refrained from publicly supporting Syngman Rhee's position, despite Chinese Nationalist and South Korean pressure on him to do so, because he believed it "most important" to preserve American-South Korean solidarity.	3.3(h)(2)
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The generalissimo said that any future statement on his part would emphasize that it is vital for the United States and South Korea to remain on good terms and that he favors a security pact between the two countries. He added that Rhee would be "unreasonable" to ask for more than such a pact.

Comment: Chiang's silence has probably been motivated by a desire not to harm his own relations with the United States. He is believed to oppose a Korean truce on the grounds that Nationalist prospects for recovering the mainland depend on expanded hostilities. Rhee almost certainly believes that the great volume of Nationalist comment favoring his position reflects Chiang's private views.

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EASTERN EUROPE

6. American embassy considers reports of Czech resistance exaggerated:

[redacted]

The American embassy in Prague considers 3.3(h)(2) that Western newspaper reports have exaggerated the seriousness of the present conditions in Czechoslovakia. While rumors of much unrest in Moravia continue, the embassy has no reports of overt acts or organized passive resistance. Moreover, embassy officers who were in Pilsen on 27, 28 and 29 June found the situation normal and saw no evidence that a Soviet MVD division had been brought in.

The embassy believes the recent stringent labor measures adopted by the government are the result of long-standing economic difficulties, particularly absenteeism. These difficulties have been aggravated by the sullen mood of the population resulting from the currency reform on 30 May.

Comment: Similar sensational reports of violence in Poland and Hungary, as an aftermath of the East German riots, are not confirmed by observations of US officials in the area. Popular unrest is widespread, but the only evidence that any Satellite government has taken extraordinary precautions against possible uprisings was a security police alert in Czechoslovakia on 18 June.

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