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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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2 JUNE 1958

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev accepts early talks on nuclear test ban controls but proposes inclusion of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

①

USSR official remarks "things might not be too bad" with De Gaulle regime.

②

Poles claim Moscow CEMA meetings placed no restrictions on their trade with West.

③

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Lebanon - Political maneuvering continues during military impasse.

④

Incidents increase on Israeli borders with Syria and Jordan.


⑤

Burma - Premier Nu determined to call general elections.

⑥

Ceylon airlifts troops to meet new communal rioting.

⑦



⑧ India faces further curtailment of Second Five-Year Plan.

⑨ Moroccans concerned over possible moves by French troops in Algeria.

⑩ Algerian junta leaders dissatisfied with new De Gaulle government.

III. THE WEST

⑪ France - De Gaulle installed as premier; cabinet contains only two ultrarightists, no military.

⑫ Finland gets \$125,000,000 credit and Satama Canal transit rights from USSR.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

2 June 1958

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

SDPAB
no

USSR - Nuclear ban talks: Premier Khrushchev's letter of 30 May accepts President Eisenhower's proposal that technical talks on nuclear test ban controls begin within three weeks, but seeks to maintain the parity principle as a precedent for summit talks by proposing that Poland and Czechoslovakia participate if Britain and France do. The letter also suggests the inclusion of India and possibly other countries, not named. Khrushchev seeks to maintain pressure on the West for a rapid halt in testing by insisting that the final report of the experts be made in three or four weeks, rather than the 60 days the President suggested as a goal.

yes

USSR - France: The counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Paris, perhaps voicing Moscow's real sentiments, has told an American official that "things might not be too bad" if De Gaulle came to power with the support of most of the assembly. His other remarks suggest that Moscow sees no advantage in violent Communist resistance to De Gaulle and does not believe the time is yet ripe for a popular front.

no

Soviet bloc Moscow meetings: Despite the USSR's efforts to tighten the bloc's economic structure at the recent meetings in Moscow, no restrictions were placed on Polish freedom of action to expand trade relations with the West, according to a high Polish Foreign Ministry official. The Poles also intend, he said, to continue developing closer

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economic ties with Belgrade, and the committees already established for this purpose will meet soon. He claimed that the Polish delegation to the Warsaw Pact political committee meeting had found several points to criticize in the communiqué and had worked for moderation in its drafting.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

no

Lebanon: Political maneuvering continues against the background of a military impasse. The UAR apparently is making increased efforts to regroup and reinforce the disorganized indigenous opposition forces, now weakened by factional bickering. The most serious military problem remains in southern Lebanon, where a UAR-supported force, estimated at up to 4,000 men, is reported gathering. Pending a major opposition victory or fragmentation of the Lebanese Army, the UAR-supported opposition appears willing to settle for any "compromise" proposals which would replace pro-Western government in Lebanon in stages over the next few months. (Page 2)

no

Israeli border incidents: A recent increase in the number of relatively serious incidents on the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Jordanian borders may be in large part a product of the general heightening of area tensions as a result of developments in Lebanon. The Israelis still do not appear to be contemplating any direct intervention of their own at this time. They might, however, adopt a more aggressive posture along their borders with Syria and Jordan in the hope of easing UAR pressure on the pro-Western Lebanese Government, whose preservation the Israelis believe is very much in their own interests.

yes

Burma: Prime Minister U Nu is determined to call for early general elections, which would probably be accompanied

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by widespread violence in rural areas and which in any case would lead to Communist parliamentary gains. Nu says he will take this action since he seems likely not to obtain a workable majority in the 5 June parliamentary vote to decide which of the warring factions of the ruling party will form a new government. There is a chance the army might intervene to prevent elections.

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No

Ceylon: The Bandaranaike government on 30-31 May airlifted strong military reinforcements to Tamil districts in the north and east to control fresh outbreaks of communal violence directed against government forces. The governor general and the inspector general of the police are convinced that Communists instigated some of the riots. The emergency powers invoked on 27 May appear to have restored order in the Colombo area. Bandaranaike will face heavy attacks during a special parliamentary session on 4 June from opposition groups for his failure to maintain order and from Singhalese extremists in his own coalition because he has ordered the suppression of Singhalese as well as Tamil extremists.

No

Indian financial crisis: The Indian Government is faced with a major financial crisis which may force it to further curtail its Second Five-Year Plan (1956-61), this time even more sharply. The government now estimates that there will be a \$617,000,000 deficit in India's balance of payments during the fiscal year ending 31 March 1959, after taking account of all assured foreign aid. India had only \$561,000,000 in foreign exchange on 1 April 1958, and must keep a minimum of about \$200,000,000 for working capital.

No

Morocco: No serious incidents involving French forces and Moroccan troops or civilians have yet occurred in Morocco, but tension remains high as a result of the recent developments in Algeria, and such incidents are a continuing possibility,

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especially in the northeastern province bordering Algeria. Moroccan authorities are deeply concerned that the French Army, even with De Gaulle in power, may undertake rash action leading to a reoccupation of Morocco.

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No

Algeria: Junta leaders in Algeria are apparently unhappy that De Gaulle's return to power was not accompanied by a more complete break with the "regime of parties" they have condemned. They probably intend to maintain pressure, at least through further organized demonstrations, for acceptance in Paris of their program to integrate Algeria's Moslems within a centralized French state. Local army leaders, who have recently tightened their control throughout the area, are unlikely openly to oppose any of De Gaulle's policies for the present.

III. THE WEST

*France: Premier De Gaulle's 15-man cabinet contains no military representatives and only two "Gaullists." Four key leaders--Socialist Guy Mollet, Popular Republican Pierre Pflimlin, Independent Louis Jacquinot, and Democratic Resistance Union leader Felix Houphouet-Boigny, a native West African--who were named ministers without portfolio, may constitute an "inner cabinet." The nomination as foreign minister of Maurice Couve de Murville, ambassador to Bonn and formerly to Washington, may be intended to reassure both capitals as to De Gaulle's foreign policy. De Gaulle is reliably reported deferring the selection of a minister for Algeria until he can investigate the situation there personally, and he may have postponed naming a minister of national defense for the same reason. De Gaulle may face early difficulties holding his 329 supporters together when he presents the specifics of his program, particularly on constitutional reform and Algeria, since at least some extreme rightists are already concerned lest he be too liberal.

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yes

Finland-USSR: The USSR, according to the communiqué issued on the conclusion of President Kekkonen's recent state visit to the Soviet Union, has agreed in principle to give Finland a credit of \$100-125,000,000 and to grant Finland transit rights on the lower half of the Saimaa Canal for 50 years. The two countries have also agreed to early negotiations for another five-year trade agreement for the period 1961-65. The Finns are apparently trying to convince the USSR that recent indications of Finnish interest in OEEC and liberalization of trade with the West do not indicate any intentions to jeopardize Soviet-Finnish trade relations.

(Page 10) (Map)

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet Official Comments on French Situation

Counselor Rogov of the Soviet Embassy in Paris, although critical of De Gaulle, told an American official on 29 May he thought "things might not be too bad" if De Gaulle were to come to power legally with the support of most of the assembly. This statement and his remarks about the "disastrous results" if De Gaulle should gain power forcefully and a civil war break out suggest that Moscow lacks confidence in the willingness of rank-and-file French Communists to fight, does not want the party to become isolated from the Socialists, and does not desire violent Communist resistance to De Gaulle under the present circumstances. Rogov said even the Communists do not really want a popular front because they realize the time is not yet ripe for it. Moscow probably believes the groundwork for a popular-front government can only be laid slowly, through joint political action with some or all of the Socialists under a De Gaulle government.

Another Soviet Embassy official has pointed out the necessity of distinguishing between Soviet global policies and the activities of a local Communist party, which must "protect its own position." Moscow has been careful not to jeopardize the chances of good relations with De Gaulle by rash statements. The Soviet Foreign Ministry's public statement on 30 May affirming noninterference in French internal affairs is the only prudent course the USSR could take after Voroshilov had been quoted as making critical remarks about De Gaulle.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Crisis in Lebanon

Political maneuvering continues against the background of a military impasse.

Factional bickering has weakened the disorganized indigenous opposition forces in several key centers of the Biqa Valley. Meanwhile, the initiative in regrouping, supplying, and directing opposition forces appears to be passing increasingly to the UAR--to the consternation of local opposition chiefs in southeastern Lebanon, some of whom now would negotiate with the government.

While sporadic action continues in the north, the most serious military problem remains in southern Lebanon, where a UAR-supported force estimated at up to 4,000 men is reported gathering. Rebel seizure of control in this area, including the ports of Tyre and Sidon, could inspire new rebel initiatives elsewhere and possibly set the stage for a local secession movement. The Syrian nationalist press has called for recovery of areas in northern, eastern, and southern Lebanon annexed from Syria by the French after World War I.

Pending a significant opposition military victory, or factional disintegration of the Lebanese Army, the UAR-supported opposition appears willing to settle for any "compromise" whereby pro-Western government in Lebanon would be replaced in stages over the next few months. One such "compromise" would involve installation of a "neutral" Moslem prime minister, approved by UAR and opposition leaders, while President Chamoun would be allowed to complete his term ending 23 September as a figurehead. The pro-UAR president of Lebanon's Chamber of Deputies, Adel Osseiran, claims support from opposition leaders for this purpose. Designation of army commander General Shihab to form a government might be approved by many opposition leaders, since the general is known to oppose Chamoun's re-election and to favor reaching an accommodation with Nasir. Chamoun, meanwhile, still appears determined to stand fast, and new cabinet developments are unlikely pending the outcome of the UN Security Council's consideration on 3 June of Lebanon's

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complaint against the UAR. Press reports from the Arab League meeting in Benghazi suggest that the UAR is attempting to have the problem referred to an Arab League committee if Lebanon will withdraw its complaint at the UN.

A major UAR-opposition goal, now that Chamoun's re-election appears forestalled, is to install a government committed to electing a legislature which would choose a successor to Chamoun favorable to the UAR. The opposition is in a position to threaten further rebellion unless the government accepts such a "peaceful" transition. UAR success with these methods in Lebanon would probably lead to their intensification elsewhere, particularly in Jordan and the Sudan.

The Egyptian Embassy in Beirut, meanwhile, on 31 May asked Cairo for authority to destroy the embassy's secret intelligence files, which presumably include ~~incriminating ma-~~ terial on UAR subversion in Lebanon.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Possibility of Early General Elections in Burma

Apparently unswayed by a threat from Deputy Prime Minister Kyaw Nyein that the army would move to prevent new national elections at this time, Prime Minister U Nu is reliably reported determined to call for early elections, regardless of the outcome of the 5 June parliamentary vote to decide whether his or Kyaw Nyein's faction of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League will form a new government. Nu anticipates winning a narrow victory in parliament, in which case he will take his time in calling for elections; if he loses, he will call for elections immediately.

Under the Burmese constitution, a prime minister who has been defeated on a question of confidence can either resign or ask the President to dissolve the parliament and call for new elections.

While Nu's decision to press for early elections is undoubtedly inspired by the hope that his non-Communist parliamentary support would be increased, it seems likely that the Communists would be the principal beneficiaries. The two warring factions of the AFPFL are themselves the major non-Communist political forces in Burma; a bitter electoral struggle between them, in which violence outside of Rangoon would be probable, would materially enhance the Communists' prospects for substantially increased representation in parliament.

Kyaw Nyein claims that General Ne Win, commander in chief of the Burmese armed forces, authorized him to send a message to Nu threatening that the army would step in if he called for elections after being defeated in parliament. Kyaw Nyein has apparently not yet succeeded in convincing Ne Win that he should take similar action if Nu wins the parliamentary vote. In the latter case, Ne Win would probably move only if convinced that to permit elections at this time would be courting the danger of a Communist victory.

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India Faces Major Foreign Exchange Crisis

The Indian Government is facing a major foreign exchange crisis which may force it to curtail the goals of the Second Five-Year Plan (1956-61) even more sharply than was done in 1957. The government now estimates there will be a \$617,000,000 deficit in the balance of payments during the fiscal year ending 31 March 1959, and a \$1.317 billion deficit for the last three years of the plan after taking account of all assured foreign aid. The enlarged deficit results chiefly from a lower and more realistic estimate of export earnings, particularly in view of the American recession and the slowdown in European economic growth.

India had only \$561,000,000 in foreign exchange reserves at the beginning of the present fiscal year on 1 April. Indian officials think the reserves can be reduced as low as \$210,000,000 for a short time. They believe, however, that the reserves must be at least \$420,000,000 at the end of the plan, as India must then allocate large sums for repayment of foreign loans.

Since Prime Minister Nehru and other Congress party leaders have committed their prestige on the successful fulfillment of the plan, any drastic cutbacks would place them in a vulnerable position in the 1962 elections.

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Situation in Morocco

Although French forces in Morocco have not been involved in any major incidents recently, tension has been high since the upsurge in Algeria on 13 May, and incidents could occur at any time. The situation is particularly difficult in the northeastern border province of Oujda, where there are many Algerian refugees, military installations, and sizable guerrilla bands controlled by the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). Although there appears little likelihood at present that the French would attempt to again take control of Morocco, the Moroccans, like the Tunisians, are obsessed by fears of a French reoccupation.

[redacted] his government was concerned whether even De Gaulle could control the French military.

The Moroccan Government has formally requested and will almost certainly continue to press for early evacuation of all 46,000 French troops, and the immediate withdrawal of elements deployed in the Algerian border area. Rabat, is attempting to establish control over French military movements in the Oujda region and has reportedly called for the "neutralization" of French airfields near the frontier.

The French-Algerian crisis has forged strong new ties between Morocco and Tunisia. The Tunisian ambassador in Rabat is now in almost constant contact with Moroccan Foreign Ministry officials, and Morocco's complete solidarity with Tunisia at the UN can be anticipated.

[redacted] Morocco may soon follow Tunisia's lead and initiate a new request for American military aid.

Recent developments have also persuaded the Rabat government that the FLN must be provided with increased financial and material support, [redacted]

[redacted] A pledge to this effect given FLN leaders at the

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Tangier conference of North African political parties in April, however, has apparently not yet been implemented and friction continues between Moroccan authorities and irregular elements on the one hand and FLN field units on the other in the disputed Algerian-Moroccan border region.

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III. THE WEST

Premier De Gaulle Forms New French Government

The composition of Premier Charles de Gaulle's new cabinet reflects his efforts to ensure himself broad support, particularly on the left, for his investiture vote. The 15-member body contains no military representative, and there is press speculation that De Gaulle himself may head the Ministry of National Defense, a move which would ensure healing of the breach between the government and the army in Algeria, which otherwise would find little comfort in the composition of the cabinet. Two cabinet appointees, Social Republican Senator Michel Debre, minister of education, and rightist author Andre Malraux, named to an unspecified ministerial or subministerial post, are the only two Gaullists among the 15.

An "inner cabinet" will apparently consist of De Gaulle and four nonextremist party leaders named as ministers of state without portfolio--Socialist Guy Mollet, Popular Republican Pierre Pflimlin, Independent Louis Jacquinot, and Felix Houphouet-Boigny, a native of West Africa affiliated with the center Democratic Resistance Union. According to Independent leader Antoine Pinay, who was named minister of finance and economic affairs, De Gaulle will govern during the National Assembly's "vacation" of six months, possibly extendable, with five or six committees dealing with such matters as finance, foreign affairs, and overseas territories.

The surprise appointment as foreign minister of Maurice Couve de Murville, ambassador to Bonn and formerly to Washington, seems designed to reassure both capitals on the score of France's alliances. According to Pinay, De Gaulle feels he must accept NATO, but wants the French military to have more say in NATO planning. He also favors the European community, but, according to Pinay, "built around France" rather than one in which France is an equal partner.

De Gaulle is expected to visit Algiers soon--possibly this week--and for the moment is apparently delaying


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appointment of a minister for Algeria. Pinay described De Gaulle's long-range views on Algeria as "rather extreme" and therefore probably not to be publicized immediately. These reportedly envision a federation of African states--including Algeria and West and Equatorial Africa--with the seat of government in Algiers. Rightists seem already disenchanted over his concession to the party system, and many of the extremists in Algiers are having second thoughts about his leadership.

De Gaulle may face early difficulties in holding together his 329-vote assembly majority when he demands power to redefine France's relationship with its possessions and when he asks for immediate revision of Article 90 of the constitution in order to expedite the reforms on which he has always insisted. His proposal to submit his reforms to a referendum will be popular with the public but not with the deputies.

Despite sporadic Communist outbursts on 1 June in Paris and several other cities, the loyalty of the security troops to the De Gaulle regime seems assured. Communist efforts to spark a popular front at this time are further handicapped by Moscow's cautious approach to the advent of De Gaulle. [redacted]

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Finland-USSR

The communiqué issued at the end of President Kekkonen's recent state visit to Moscow suggests that the Finns are trying to convince the USSR that Finland is determined to preserve its trade with the Soviet Union and that Finnish interest in joining OEEC does not imply any diminution in Soviet-Finnish trade. Indications of Finnish interest in OEEC and measures liberalizing trade with Western European countries have in recent months aroused Soviet suspicions.

According to the communiqué, the Finnish and Soviet leaders agreed that the two countries should soon start to negotiate the basic over-all trade agreement for the period 1961-65. Current trade is conducted on the basis of annual agreements negotiated within the framework of the Second Five-Year Agreement (1956-60).

The USSR has agreed in principle to make a long-term, low-interest loan of some \$100,000,000-\$125,000,000 to Finland in Soviet equipment, to be used for industrial development. Talks will begin after the Finnish Government makes specific proposals. In addition, the USSR agreed in principle to grant Finland transit rights on that portion of the Saimaa Canal crossing Soviet territory and to lease Finland sites for port facilities near Vyborg. Finnish interest in the Saimaa Canal has been more political than economic, since the Finns have hoped the USSR might cede back to Finland the territory to the west of the canal. During Kekkonen's visit, however, Khrushchev, in a public address, rejected territorial changes. The initiative in both the loan and canal cases was taken by the Finns. [redacted]

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