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5 April 1951

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*15 April 1951*  
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Office of Current Intelligence

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~~TOP SECRET~~**GENERAL****1. Western delegates in Paris disagree over Soviet proposal of 30 March:**

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At a meeting of the Western delegations on 3 April, the chief of the UK delegation indicated a willingness to accept the Soviet proposal of 30 March that the NATO and US bases be included in the agenda, while the chiefs of the French and US delegations asserted that the West could not accept the proposal. After discussion, the UK delegate remained opposed and stated he would consult London on the matter. It was agreed, however, that (a) the Western powers would ask Gromyko for a "further reply" on the new complete agenda presented by the West on 2 April, (b) possible Western counter-moves would be considered, such as the proposal for an item on "Soviet support of armed aggression," and (c) the delegates would consult their governments to determine whether they are ready to oppose the latest Soviet proposal to the point of a deadlock. On 2 April, the chief of the US delegation reported he was considering such counter-proposal items as the Soviet military alliance system and the stationing of troops outside the USSR.


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
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## Correction to

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The first sentence of the Comment in article 4, page 5,  
should read:

No B-45's were reported to be in the area at the  
time of the sighting.

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## 4. Possible Soviet jet bomber sighted over northeast Korea:

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On 29 March a twin-jet bomber, silver in color, was observed traveling at 400 miles per hour over northeastern Korea west of Songjin. According to field comment, the plane resembled a US B-45 jet bomber and may have been a "Soviet type 27 aircraft."

Comment: <sup>No</sup> B-45's were reported to be in the area at the time of the sighting. This is the first reported sighting of an enemy jet bomber in Korea. The Soviet "type 27" aircraft is believed to be the first jet bomber produced in numbers in the USSR. Although it appears to have been designed as a light bomber, it could be used for close support of ground troops.

## 5. Views of former UK Charge in Peiping:

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In a conversation with the US Consul General in Hong Kong, the former UK Charge in Peiping, who is now en route to England, reportedly stated that (a) fear of US intentions toward China was an important factor in Chinese intervention in

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Korea, (b) the USSR will come to Peiping's aid if Chinese territory is attacked, and (c) Peiping will not reduce its terms for a Korean settlement -- although heavy Chinese losses may lead to an undeclared cease-fire restoring the situation prevailing before June 1950. With respect to Sino-Soviet relations, the UK Charge noted that Soviet personnel "are not much in evidence" in Peiping, and maintained that Peiping is unlikely to submit to Russian dictation but that Western pressure is forcing the Peiping regime into increasing dependence on the USSR.

Comment: The former Charge's views are largely in accord with the UK's China policy, which has been explicitly based on the premise that Western hostility to Peiping would force the regime into an unnatural dependence on the USSR. In recent months, as British belief in the solidarity of the Sino-Soviet alliance has grown, the primary consideration of British policy in the Far East has been the desire to avoid an all-out war with China.

Indochina

#### 6. Chinese Communists again cross border:

3.3(h)(2)

The US Military Attaché in Hanoi has learned that on 1 April Chinese Communist forces crossed the China-Indochina border at Buong Nam Cuong in estimated battalion strength and by the evening of 2 April were attacking the border post of Phong Tho (approximately ten air miles within Indochina). French Commander-in-Chief de Lattre has asked the Military Attaché to keep this information secret until it can be determined whether the troops are Chinese Communist regulars.

Comment: Smaller forces of Chinese Communists have made two other border crossings in this area in recent months. One was believed to be a reconnaissance mission; the other involved an attack on a small French outpost. This crossing is the deepest Chinese Communist penetration into Indochina yet reported.

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~~TOP SECRET~~7. Burma shows concern over problem of Kuomintang troops:

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The Burmese Commander-in-Chief has informed the US Military Attaché in Rangoon that some 3,000 Kuomintang soldiers who took refuge in the border state of Kengtung last summer are moving northward to the Wa states (also along the Sino-Burmese border). According to the US Charge in Rangoon, it is likely that Chinese Communist forces

opposite Wa and Kengtung (numbering about 4,000 to 5,000) are aware of this movement. The US Charge comments that Burmese Government officials have long been concerned over this problem, fearing that the presence of these units in Burmese territory might provoke Chinese Communist forces to cross the border or to demand that the units be disarmed. In case of a Chinese Communist protest or demand for Burmese action, the Burmese Government might appeal to the UN in order to avoid committing forces to the task of rounding up the Kuomintang troops.

Comment: The Burmese Commander-in-Chief, whose troops were committed to containing insurgents in other areas, was concerned when Kuomintang remnants entered Burma last summer. At that time, the Burmese Government sought, through US liaison, to obtain an order from Taipei authorities instructing the Kuomintang commander either to surrender to the Burmese or evacuate Burmese territory. Taipei subsequently issued an evacuation order, which was ignored. The Burmese have been reluctant to request UN action because they have not wished to publicize the issue for fear of Chinese Communist reactions.

## EASTERN EUROPE

8. Czech Ambassadors not to return to Washington, London and Paris: 3.3(h)(2)

On 3 April, the US State Department was notified informally that Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United States, Vladimir Outrata, would not return to Washington. According to the US Embassy, London, the furniture of Rudolph Bystricky, Czechoslovak Ambassador to Great Britain, has

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been removed from his residence. An un-confirmed report stated that the Ambassador's family will leave London shortly. The US Embassy in Prague has been reliably informed that Dr. Adolf Hoffmeister, Czechoslovak Ambassador to France, will not return to Paris and that his family is expected to arrive in Prague shortly.

Comment: The above named Czech Ambassadors are three of a larger group of Czech diplomatic representatives abroad that was recalled to Prague in mid-February, about a week prior to the official public denunciation of former Foreign Minister Clementis as an agent of French intelligence. All of these diplomats have now either defected, as did the Czech Ambassador in New Delhi and the Czech First Secretary in Bern, or have been relieved of their assignments. Since these men were either friends of Clementis or appointed to their posts during Clementis' tenure as Foreign Minister, it is likely that the recalls are associated with the current purge in Czechoslovakia.

## WESTERN EUROPE

### Opponents predict defeat of Schuman Plan in French Assembly:

3.3(h)(2)

In a conversation with a representative of the ECA Mission to France, two key industrialists and a prominent Socialist deputy have expressed strong antagonism to the

draft Schuman Plan treaty. The Socialist and one of the industrial leaders -- the First Vice-President of the powerful National Employers' Association -- declared that the Assembly would not ratify the treaty. The other industrialist -- the leading spokesman for the French steel industry -- bitterly criticized the French Government on the grounds that it was the only European government "maligning" its own steel industry; his bitterness was also directed at the US, because he felt that Monnet's repeated "threat" of the withdrawal of US financial aid had induced the delegations to support and initial the present treaty draft.

Comment: This report is the clearest indication to date that French industrialists will attempt to prevent ratification of the Schuman Plan treaty. It is doubtful whether the Socialist deputy's opposition to the treaty is shared by a majority of his party's

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bloc in the Assembly. The line-up for and against the treaty in the Assembly cannot be determined until the Foreign Ministers of the participating countries resolve several basic issues at the conference opening in Paris on 12 April. If this conference is prolonged for several weeks and if elections are scheduled for June, French ratification of the treaty will be in doubt until early summer.

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