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DOCUMENT NO. 34
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGES TO: TS S D
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HQ 18-2
DATE: 5 JUN 1980 REVIEWER: [REDACTED]

10 December 1959

3.3(h)(2)

Copy No. C DD3.5(c)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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10 DECEMBER 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Four Soviet submarines in English Channel probably bound for Albanian base. ①

Soviet, Chinese Communist propaganda takes divergent lines on President's trip. ②



Peiping uses former Nationalists released from prison to advance defection campaign. ③

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Japan--Government move to extend Diet session may spark crisis in parliament. ④

Laos--Phoui plans to reshuffle government and ask new vote of confidence. ⑤

Start of elections in Belgian Congo marked by renewed tribal violence. ⑥



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

10 December 1959

DAILY BRIEF*SIRAB***I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC***ND*

Soviet Submarines: Four Soviet "W"-class submarines, escorted by a minesweeper of the T-43 class, left the Baltic on 5 December and were last reported approaching the English Channel. Their most likely destination is the Soviet submarine base in Valona Bay, Albania, where they would replace or augment four other "W"-class submarines which, with an Atrek-class submarine tender, have been stationed there since 31 August 1958. Other evidence indicates that the USSR intends to maintain a permanent submarine base in the Mediterranean. [] (Page 1)

OK

USSR-China: Sharply divergent press and radio treatment by Moscow and Peiping of the President's trip reflects the frictions and policy differences between the two regimes. Moscow is giving the President's activities reasonably factual and favorable news coverage. Peiping, on the other hand, is taking an openly hostile attitude, bitterly attacking the trip as an effort to "sell a false peace." The Chinese charge that "Eisenhower is merely using peace as a ruse in an effort to gain time to expand his own military strength in order to push aggression and war policy." []

ND

Communist China - Taiwan: Peiping will exploit its release from prison on 4 December of 33 "war criminals"--including 30 former Chinese Nationalist officials--to suggest to Kuomintang officials that Peiping will be "lenient" with "compatriots" who defect to the Communist cause. On 5 December, Peiping beamed a special broadcast to Taiwan directing the attention of Nationalist military and government officials to the release of the prisoners. [Chiang Ching-kuo believes the prisoners' release] []

[Peiping is preparing what he considers a "large-scale political offensive."] []

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Japan: A crisis is possible within a few days in the Japanese Diet when the government moves to extend the current Diet session to ensure ratification of the South Vietnam reparations agreement. Leftists have made the agreement a major parliamentary issue, complaining that it ignores Hanoi's claims.

(Page 3)

Laos: Premier Phoui plans to reshuffle his government and seek a fresh vote of confidence from the National Assembly in a special session to be held some time this month. His critical remarks to the press concerning the aims of the young reformists have already excited new bitterness. These developments may upset the precarious compromise recently reached between Phoui and the reformist elements over the assembly's tenure and the timing of new elections.

Hanoi's protest to Vientiane on 9 December charging incursion by Laotian troops into North Vietnam is moderate in tone and does not suggest imminent reprisals by the Communists. Hanoi has also recently charged infiltration across the border by Lao "spies" [and has apparently reacted by tightening controls along the border.]

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Watch Committee Conclusions: Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeopardize US interests exist in Southeast Asia and particularly in the Middle East. In Iraq, Qasim is apparently again favoring the Communists; this may in turn spur anti-Communists to further attempts to overthrow his regime. Although many elements of continuing danger exist in Laos, the situation there appears relatively quiet for the time being.

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Belgian Congo: The beginning of local elections in the Congo has been followed by renewed tribal violence in the interior. A state of emergency was declared in the Luluaburg area following tribal clashes which resulted in the death of about 15 natives on 7 December. Deep-seated animosity between two tribes may have been intensified by the failure of one tribe to join in boycotting the elections. Negotiations between Belgian authorities and African nationalist leaders designed to end the boycott have thus far been fruitless, and Belgian authorities fear further violence during the election period, which runs through 27 December.

(Page 5) (Map)

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Four Soviet Submarines Possibly En Route to Albania

Four Soviet "W"-class submarines escorted by a mine-sweeper of the T-43 class left the Baltic on 5 December and were last reported approaching the English Channel. Their most likely destination is the Soviet submarine base in Valona Bay, Albania, where four other "W"-class submarines and an Atrek-class submarine tender have been stationed since 31 August 1958.

The submarines could arrive in Albania about 20 December to replace or augment the four now there. [redacted]

Other evidence indicates that the USSR intends to maintain a permanent submarine base in the Mediterranean. [redacted]

[redacted] extensive Soviet harbor construction activity in Albania since 1957 has included the development of a submarine base at Pasha Liman, in Valona Bay. In addition, [redacted]

[redacted] the Soviet Black Sea Fleet submarine broadcast may be used to support operations of Soviet submarines based in Albania. [redacted]

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Peiping Continues Efforts to Undermine Taiwan Morale

Peiping's release from prison of 30 Kuomintang "war criminals"--announced on 4 December--is another step in the regime's long-term effort to convince Chinese Nationalist officials that Peiping will be "lenient" with "compatriots" who choose to defect to the Communist cause. On 5 December--one day after the release of the ex-Nationalists--Peiping beamed a special broadcast to Taiwan directing the attention of Kuomintang military and government officials to the release of the prisoners. An earlier broadcast had reiterated Premier Chou En-lai's offer for cooperation in the unification of the fatherland and had invited "patriotic" Chinese on Taiwan to "return to the mainland and see the situation for yourselves."

[Chiang Ching-kuo, Nationalist China's security chief,] he regarded the release of the Nationalist prisoners as an "extremely significant" move which foreshadowed a "large-scale political offensive" against Taiwan. [] he had received intelligence reports, said to be from "very reliable" agents, which supported his belief. One of these referred to a renewed Communist attempt to hold negotiations in Hong Kong with Wu Chung-hsin, a senior Nationalist statesman and adviser to President Chiang Kai-shek.]

[Periodic Communist attempts to arrange negotiations through Hong Kong intermediaries with high-level Nationalist officials and to bring about their defection have been unsuccessful. Nevertheless, Chiang felt that the release of the prisoners was a "cunning" move on the part of the Communists which contained many traps for Taiwan. Steps have already been taken to watch the activities of the relatives of the released prisoners.]

[Chiang also believes that some American prisoners may be released as part of the current amnesty. Peiping considers the five Americans being held in Chinese prisons useful as political hostages, however, and their release would seem to be almost entirely dependent upon some improvement in Sino-American relations.]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Parliamentary Crisis Threatens in Japan

An anticipated Socialist move to block, possibly by force, a government motion to extend the current extraordinary session of the Japanese Diet may result in a parliamentary crisis within a few days. A similar motion in November 1958, intended to permit passage of a bill to strengthen police powers, led to an outbreak of violence on the Diet floor.

The proposed extension would enable the government to overcome Socialist efforts to prevent ratification of the reparations agreement with South Vietnam, Japan's last major reparations program. The regular Diet session, scheduled to begin on 29 December, could then expedite the government budget for the fiscal year beginning in April and speed ratification of the newly revised US-Japanese Security Treaty.

The Socialists have been unable to arouse popular feeling against the reparations agreement, which they claim ignores French control of Indochina in World War II as well as possible complications with North Vietnam. Their position is considerably weaker than a year ago, because of election losses, a party split, and public indignation over excesses in recent leftist demonstrations at the Diet. Nevertheless, the Socialists are expected to introduce a motion in the Diet against the security treaty to coincide with a renewal of leftist demonstrations on 10 December. In their frustration, they could again resort to extreme measures in the Diet.

The ruling Liberal-Democratic party (LDP) is offering the Socialists a compromise--elimination of an LDP motion banning demonstrations in the vicinity of the Diet in exchange for Socialist permission to allow the reparations agreement to come to a vote without an extended session. Indications are that the Socialists will not accept the compromise offer. [redacted]

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Political Developments in Laos

[Laotian Premier Phoui plans an early reshuffle of his cabinet and will seek a fresh vote of confidence from the National Assembly in a special session to be held some time this month. This step is presumably intended by Phoui to place his government on as sound a legal basis as possible during the period from 25 December, when the assembly's mandate will technically expire, until the next elections, now tentatively scheduled for April.]


The convocation of a special assembly session may be viewed as a gratuitous affront, however, by the King and certain leaders of the reformist Committee for Defense of National Interests (CDNI), who view the present assembly with considerable distaste. An assembly session this month would also probably require the presence of Prince Souphanouvong and other Neo Lao Hak Zat leaders, who now are awaiting trial and who could be expected to use the session as a forum for pro-Communist propaganda.

Most of the CDNI leaders and their army supporters have gone along with Phoui in supporting the compromise solution devised last week on the questions of the assembly's tenure and the timing of general elections. The principal CDNI dissenter has been Foreign Minister Kamphan Panya, who continues to refuse endorsement of the compromise formula. Phoui now is hinting that he may attempt to demote Kamphan when he shuffles the cabinet.]

[Any such attempt, coupled with the call for a special assembly session, might be construed by the CDNI as sufficient provocation to justify countermoves, thus upsetting the precarious compromise agreement. The CDNI is already annoyed over Phoui's charges to the press, after the settlement had been reached, that the CDNI had dictatorial aims.]

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Election Issue Stimulates Tribal Violence in Belgian Congo

The beginning of local elections in the Congo has been followed by renewed violence between Baluba and Lulua tribesmen in the interior. A state of emergency has been declared in the Luluaburg area following clashes on 7 December which resulted in about 15 deaths. An outbreak between the same tribes resulted in over 40 deaths in mid-October.

While animosity between the two tribes is deep-seated, the recent violence appears to have been prompted in part by controversy over the local elections, which are viewed by Brussels as a first step leading toward Congolese independence in about four years. [The Lulus are identified with political groups which oppose the holding of the elections and which are boycotting them on the grounds that Brussels has failed to provide adequate assurances concerning the Congo's political evolution. The elections are scheduled to run through most of December, and Congo authorities fear further violence.]

Negotiations in Brussels between Belgian officials and leading Congolese nationalists, aimed at ending the boycott, have broken down, and nationalist representatives are expected shortly to return to Leopoldville. Some Belgian officials, however, still hope that an accommodation will be reached with the Congolese leaders. The Socialists, who have withheld support of the government's Congo policy, have supported Congolese demands for a round-table conference, and pressure from them could result in some concessions to the nationalists. []

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