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4 November 1960

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 4
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S O
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 10/10/1980 REVIEWER:

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Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C02977805



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
4 NOVEMBER 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet desire to avoid resuming disarmament negotiations at this time again indicated by remarks of Soviet UN delegate. ①

East Germans harass truck traffic from West Berlin, in effect claiming right to decide what West Berlin can produce for export without violating four-power agreements against military production. ②

Chinese Communists discuss arrangements with UAR for transit of Chinese military aid to Algerian rebels. ③




II. ASIA-AFRICA

Nehru minimizes possibility of any early settlement of Sino-Indian border problem. ④

Communist guerrilla attacks in South Vietnam now spread to area previously quiescent. ⑤

Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk orders government to extend recognition to Mongolia. ⑥

Situation in Laos. ⑦



III. THE WEST

⑧ Castro regime reportedly supplying Guatemalan leftists with money, with arms aid planned; "Havana representative" of movement said to be former Guatemalan President Arbenz.

LATE ITEM

⑨ Early departure for Moscow of at least four bloc delegations suggests that inter-party discussions of Sino-Soviet dispute will precede October Revolution anniversary celebrations beginning 6 November.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

4 November 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-UN: [Soviet UN delegate Zorin's negative stand in his recent private exchange with Ambassador Wadsworth provides further evidence that the USSR is not interested in resuming disarmament negotiations, at least not until after a new United States administration is installed. Moscow's present objective is to induce the uncommitted nations to bring pressure on the West to accept Soviet disarmament proposals as the basis for negotiations. Efforts by neutralist delegations, led by India, to work out a compromise UN resolution have created a situation which makes it difficult and embarrassing at this stage for the bloc delegates to carry out Khrushchev's threat to walk out of the UN disarmament debate if Soviet proposals are not accepted as the basis for discussion.]

[*A Soviet official has indicated to a member of the US delegation in New York that the bloc will seek to amend the draft resolution being circulated by India to include provisions for establishing a new 15-nation committee and specific directives for the committee to work out a treaty on complete and general disarmament. He warned that if these amendments are not accepted, the bloc will withdraw from the debate.]

(Page 1)

Berlin: The East Germans are attempting to assert a right to determine arbitrarily what types of materials can be shipped from West Berlin, and thereby indirectly claiming the right to decide what exports can be manufactured in West Berlin without violation of four-power agreements prohibiting military production in the city. The East Germans have instituted a campaign of harassment against trucks en route from West Berlin to West Germany with electrical and electronic equipment--one of West Berlin's most important

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exports--claiming that this is "war material." At least four trucks have recently been detained at the Babelsberg checkpoint outside West Berlin; the cargoes of two were confiscated and one other was allowed to proceed only after payment of a fine. East German authorities subjected officials of one firm to long interrogations and demanded to inspect the records of the firm's shipments over the past six months.

Communist China - Algeria: [The Chinese Communists have been discussing with UAR authorities arrangements for Chinese military aid to the Algerian rebels to pass through UAR territory,

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[] Cairo is not entirely pleased over the prospect of increased Chinese influence among the Algerian rebels, but feels compelled to cooperate because of its own support for them. Peiping is eager to assist Algerian rebel efforts to obtain international support and reportedly promised rebel Premier Ferhat Abbas, during his visit to China last month, "total and unconditional aid." [] (Page 2)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

India-China: []

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South Vietnam: A series of recent attacks by Communist guerrillas on government installations in the central highlands region of South Vietnam indicate that the guerrillas now are striking in considerable force in this previously quiescent area. Sketchy reports suggest that the strikes were made by bands of up to 300 mountain tribesmen from the Lao-tian border area under cadres infiltrated into South Vietnam through Laos from Communist North Vietnam. The spread of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam, which was sharply intensified earlier this year in the southern delta provinces, will add to the military and political pressures on the Diem government.

(Page 4) (Map)

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Cambodia-Mongolia: Cambodian Chief of State Prince Sihanouk, currently in France, has directed his government to extend recognition to Mongolia before he pays a state visit there in December.

Sihanouk has proposed that either the Cambodian ambassador in Peiping or the one in Moscow also be accredited to Ulan Bator. Mongolia has tried hard in recent years to erase the impression that it is nothing more than a Soviet colony, and has been particularly anxious to gain foreign recognition. The only other free-world countries now recognizing Mongolia are Burma, Guinea, India, and Indonesia.

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Laos: Premier Souvanna is reported to have taken fresh steps to induce Prince Souphanouvong, leader of the Neo Lao Hak Sat, the Pathet Lao's political front, to come to Vientiane for peace talks. This action may have been prompted by the recently formed Committee for Neutrality and National Unity,

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with which both Souvanna and Souphanouvong are associated. Souvanna may feel that he and Souphanouvong can come to terms on the broad outline of a unification agreement that will guide the negotiating teams meeting in Vientiane.

III. THE WEST

Cuba-Guatemala: [The Castro regime is giving financial assistance and intends to provide weapons to the Guatemalan Communist party and a Communist-infiltrated Guatemalan revolutionary group.]

"Che" Guevara, with the approval of Fidel and Raul Castro, is said to have given the Guatemalan groups \$15,000 last month on the condition that the Guatemalan Communists play the leading role in the revolution. Former Guatemalan President Arbenz, now in Cuba, is to be the "Havana representative" of the movement. The goal is the destruction of the Guatemalan Army and the arming of the "masses," as in Cuba.

IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding two weeks)

Outlook for India Over Next Few Years: Likely Political and Economic Developments, Military Capabilities, and Foreign Relations. NIE 51-60. 25 October 1960.

Outlook for Iraq: Stability of the Qasim Regime in View of Qasim's Failure to Solve Political and Economic Problems; Weakness of the Opposition; and Foreign Policies. NIE 36-2-60. 1 November 1960.

Problems Affecting the North Atlantic Alliance: Factors Likely to Challenge Basic Concepts and Arrangements of NATO During the 1960s and Concepts Most Likely to Be Challenged. NIE 20-60. 1 November 1960.

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LATE ITEM

*Communist Bloc: The departure for Moscow of at least four top-level bloc delegations by 3 November, together with indications that Khrushchev returned from his vacation on 3 November, suggests that a round of party discussions on the Sino-Soviet dispute will precede the October Revolution anniversary celebrations which begin on 6 November. Bilateral talks were held by Khrushchev with various bloc delegations prior to the fortieth anniversary celebrations in November 1957, and again before last February's major meeting of bloc leaders in Moscow. Soviet presidium member Polyansky has indicated that as of 29 October the Soviet leadership had not decided to hold a full-scale meeting of the bloc delegations, although all bloc parties had been invited to send representatives to the anniversary celebrations. The Chinese have not yet indicated how high-ranking a delegation they will send.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Soviet Disarmament Tactics

Soviet UN Delegate Zorin's negative stand in his private exchange with Ambassador Wadsworth on 1 November provides further evidence that the USSR is not interested in resuming disarmament negotiations, at least not until after the new United States administration is installed, and that Moscow's present objective is to induce the uncommitted nations to press the West to accept Soviet disarmament proposals as the basis for discussions. Zorin termed Wadsworth's statement on American policy "unfortunate and discouraging" and insisted that the USSR's plan for complete and general disarmament offered the only way to solve real problems. He said the US proposal to terminate the production of nuclear weapons would only create false illusions and could not lead to progress.

Efforts by Afro-Asian neutralist delegations, led by India, to work out a compromise disarmament resolution have created a situation which makes it difficult and embarrassing at this stage for bloc delegations to carry out Khrushchev's threat to walk out of the UN disarmament debate if the Soviet position is not accepted as the basis for discussion.

A member of the Soviet UN delegation has indicated privately that the Indian draft resolution offers the only possible hope for agreement and that the bloc will seek to amend it to include provisions for establishing a 15-nation committee and specific directives for the committee to work out a treaty on complete and general disarmament. He warned that if these amendments are not accepted, or if the Indian resolution with Soviet amendments fails, the bloc will withdraw from the debate and wait for a special session of the General Assembly to reconsider disarmament next spring. In a recent talk with Ambassador Thompson, First Deputy Premier Kosygin insisted that this proposal for a special session was not a propaganda maneuver but a serious bid to "give a push" to disarmament negotiations.

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Peiping Explains Possibilities of Extending Military Aid
To Algerian Rebels

Communist China has been discussing with the UAR means of sending military assistance to the Algerian rebels across UAR territory.

the UAR, although disturbed over the prospect of increased Chinese influence among the rebels, feels compelled to cooperate because of its own support for the Algerians. [UAR fears are shared by the Moroccan and Tunisian governments, which, according to officials of these governments, have been asked to facilitate passage of materiel and some personnel.]

Moderate rebel Premier Abbas, although reported personally reluctant to accept Communist aid, attended Peiping's National Day celebrations last month to impress the West that the rebels were determined to take aid from any source. The Algerians now seem firmly committed to accept Communist assistance, which Abbas claims "can significantly alter the context" of the struggle. The Chinese desire to expand their influence in the rebel movement, and Mao Tse-tung is said to have promised Abbas "total and unconditional" aid.

[] the USSR was sending military assistance to the rebels through Egypt across Libya. This statement followed the USSR's recent shift from a cautious attitude toward the Algerian rebellion to a pro-insurgent position involving de facto recognition and statements by Khrushchev promising "all possible assistance."

Previous assistance to the Algerian rebels from Communist bloc countries has apparently been limited to \$5,000,000 worth of assistance from Communist China in January 1959 in the form of funds and possibly small amounts of military equipment and an undetermined amount of aid from Czechoslovakia in the form of World War II surplus arms. In addition, the USSR and East European countries have supplied rebel refugees in Morocco and Tunisia with relief supplies, given scholarships to Algerian students, and provided hospitalization for small numbers of wounded rebel personnel.

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
Nehru Rejects U Nu's Offer to Help Resolve Sino-Indian Dispute

Prime Minister Nehru reportedly has rejected an offer by Burmese Premier U Nu to assist in bringing about a solution of India's border dispute with Communist China. The Indian leader, however, welcomed Nu's planned visit to New Delhi on 11 November. Nehru, in explaining his action, minimized the possibility of an early settlement of the Sino-Indian border question, stressing that the problem is not as simple as Rangoon's dispute with Peiping was and emphasizing that Indian public opinion will not support any territorial concessions to China. He observed that he does not expect the issue to be resolved during his lifetime.

Nu's offer of assistance is said to have been contained in a letter to Nehru written shortly after the Burmese premier had returned from a trip to Peiping where he signed an agreement resolving the long-standing Sino-Burmese border dispute. He attributed to Chou En-lai a statement of China's desire to see the dispute with India settled. Peiping probably hopes that U Nu's satisfaction with the Sino-Burmese compromise will make him an effective advocate of some compromise solution of the disputed Sino-Indian border area.

Nehru's private remarks to Nu are consistent with recent public statements designed to prepare Indian public opinion for a long struggle. Indian and Chinese border experts will arrive in Rangoon during the next few days for their third and final round of meetings to write their report detailing each other's border claims and documentation. Little is expected to come of these sessions, and it is doubtful that either side will press for higher level discussions before early 1961. [redacted]

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Communist Guerrillas Active in Central Highlands of South Vietnam

Recent guerrilla attacks on South Vietnamese government installations in the highlands of central Vietnam indicate that the Communists now are striking in a considerable force in this region, which previously has been relatively secure. Although details are sketchy, a number of attacks apparently were made between 20 and 25 October against military outposts and road construction camps in Kontum and Pleiku provinces near the Laotian border, with diversionary actions occurring in Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh provinces to the east. The guerrillas, who were driven off by local militias reinforced by regular army and paratroop battalions, reportedly were operating in bands of up to 300, consisting chiefly of mountain tribesmen from the border region. They are believed to have operated under cadres infiltrated through Laos from North Vietnam.

There is no evidence, however, to substantiate initial reports from some South Vietnamese officials that the attacks were a large-scale incursion by regular North Vietnamese forces crossing Laos. The Diem government may have exaggerated evidence of North Vietnamese involvement in the hope of charging Hanoi with violations of the 1954 truce agreement and justifying its position that military needs to meet the Communist guerrilla threat require the postponement of political and social reforms. The North Vietnamese have clearly shown in the past few months that they intend to increase both violence and political agitation in the South. Hanoi, however, has denied Saigon's claim that North Vietnamese troops entered the South from Laos, charging that this "Western fabrication" was intended as an excuse for South Vietnamese intervention in Laos.

The spread of guerrilla activity to central Vietnam places an increasing burden on local security forces as well as on the army, which has over the past year been partially diverted from border defense to meet the stepped-up Communist warfare in the southern delta provinces near Saigon. Deteriorating security may also be taken by Diem as evidence of the need for maintaining authoritarian control, thus adding to growing dissatisfaction with his regime.

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Cambodia to Recognize Mongolia

Prince Sihanouk, Cambodian chief of state who is visiting Ulan Bator from 5 to 8 December, has instructed his government to recognize the Mongolian People's Republic.

Sihanouk desires that the Mongolian Government be informed of the recognition before his arrival there en route from Moscow to Peiping. He has proposed that either the Cambodian ambassador in Peiping or the ambassador in Moscow be accredited to Ulan Bator but has stated that he would prefer the Moscow ambassador, Khim Tit, who is concurrently the Cambodian minister to Poland.

From the Cambodian point of view, recognition of Mongolia at this time is merely a housekeeping detail intended to clarify relations prior to Sihanouk's visit. At this time Phnom Penh exchanges diplomatic representatives with four bloc countries--the Soviet Union, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

Cambodia will become the fifth free-world nation to recognize Mongolia, joining India, Indonesia, Burma, and Guinea. Mongolia was virtually a Soviet colony during Stalin's lifetime, but in recent years has moved toward greater independence in bloc and world affairs. The Mongolians have been particularly anxious to acquire diplomatic recognition from non-Communist countries as a status symbol of independence. Like the other Asian satellites and Communist China, the Mongolians are concentrating their effort on the new African republics and the Asian neutrals who might be expected to support a bid for membership in the United Nations. Cuba, which has recognized all the Asian Communist regimes except Mongolia, probably will add Ulan Bator to its list in the not-too-distant future.

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