

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

12 December 1951

[Redacted]
Copy No.

3.5(c)

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

70
DOCUMENT NO.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: MR 70-2

DATE: 17-12-79 REVIEWER [Redacted]

3.5(c)

[Redacted]
3.5(c)

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[Redacted]
3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)


S U M M A R Y**FAR EAST**3.3(h)(2)
**NEAR EAST - AFRICA**3.3(h)(2)



5. Iranian nationalists again resort to violence to check opposition (page 5).

3.3(h)(2)

7. American Consul General in Libya concerned over British diplomatic action (page 6).

WESTERN EUROPE3.3(h)(2)


8. Spanish criticism of delays in US aid increases (page 7).

* * * *

3.5(c)


- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~


3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

3.5(c)

FAR EAST

3.3(h)(2)

- 3 -

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

- 4 -

~~TOP SECRET~~


3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

3.3(h)(2)

5. Iranian nationalists again resort to violence to check opposition: 3.3(h)(2)

National Front supporters of Prime Minister Mossadeq were responsible for most of the damage during the 6 December rioting in Tehran, in which 50 policemen and 150 civilians were

reportedly injured and two policemen killed. Despite National Front claims that Communists started the riots, the Communist-led demonstration was orderly until National Front groups attacked the demonstrators.

National Front hoodlums were also responsible for the random sacking of opposition and Communist newspaper offices which took place at the same time.

3.3(h)(2)

- 5 -


~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Comment: The Nationalist practice of combating opposition with violence becomes especially serious as elections near. It not only augurs ill for the "free" elections which Mossadeq has promised but sounds a warning of future policies should the National Front win an overwhelming victory.

3.3(h)(2)

*Libya*

3.3(h)(2)

7. American Consul General in Libya concerned over British diplomatic action:



The US Consul General in Tripoli has expressed his concern lest the first British Minister to independent Libya be Sir Alexander Kirkbride, Minister to Jordan for the past twenty years.

According to the Consul General, Kirkbride's appointment would confirm the worst suspicions of Moslem states that Britain plans to make "another Transjordan" out of Libya.

- 6 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

The Consul General points out that elections for the new Libyan parliament, which must ratify the American airbase agreement and also the British and French agreements, must be held according to the constitution by 22 February 1952. Kirkbride's appointment, he fears, will strengthen the hand of opposition elements and lessen the possibility that the new Libyan parliament will be controlled by persons favorable to Western interests.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: Recognition of the precarious political situation in Libya has resulted in the US and UK urging the advancement of Libya's independence date to 15 December. The US Legation in Jordan recently stated that Kirkbride had been ordered by the British Foreign Office to arrive in Libya by 14 December so that he might become the dean of the diplomatic corps.

WESTERN EUROPE

8. Spanish criticism of delays in US aid increases:

3.3(h)(2)

The US Ambassador in Madrid reports influential Spaniards are becoming increasingly impatient at the delays in American aid. Spanish officials, preoccupied with the country's tight dollar position, are annoyed that although the Export-Import Bank credits were authorized over a year ago, not all the 62.5 million dollars have yet been allocated. Moreover, they apparently resent the fact that other nations are already receiving allocations from 1952 Mutual Security Act funds, whereas in Spain only an economic survey has been made.

The Ambassador feels that, although the Spanish Government is partly at fault in the matter, further delay, coupled with the absence of information as to what Spain may expect, is detrimental to American interests and prestige.

Comment: Spanish expectations for aid were unjustifiably high. Government officials had apparently anticipated a free

- 7 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

hand in the use of Export-Import Bank credits. Among the chief causes of delay in execution of these credits have been the efforts of Spanish officials to obtain funds for government-controlled projects, frequently economically unsound as well as unacceptable under the Bank's policy of favoring private enterprise, and the failure of the Spaniards to submit adequate data to justify their requests.

3.3(h)(2)

- 8 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)