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**Office of Current Intelligence****CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**~~TOP SECRET~~

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## FAR EAST

1. Foreign policy differences loom as obstacle to Japanese conservative merger:

Fundamental foreign policy differences between Prime Minister Hatoyama and the opposition Liberals led by former prime minister Yoshida and former deputy prime minister Ogata have recently become serious enough to hamper efforts for a merger of the conservative parties.

In Ambassador Allison's opinion, Hatoyama genuinely believes that "one-sided" dependence on the United States is not in Japan's best interests and that ties must be established with the Sino-Soviet bloc to achieve a balance. Hatoyama told the Diet on 10 May that he was determined to conclude talks with the USSR in order to further world peace and would not sacrifice these hopes to achieve a conservative merger.

Spokesmen for both Yoshida and Ogata have made it equally clear that Japan's survival depends on maintaining the closest possible ties with the free world, and that Hatoyama's "two-faced" policies are jeopardizing its relationship.

Comment: While Hatoyama continues to emphasize Japan's basic ties with the United States, it is clear that his objective is to demonstrate to the Japanese people and to his own party that they can have their cake and eat it too.

Important elements in Hatoyama's party apparently have doubts as to the advisability of the premier's foreign policy. Presumably, however, they will not take the initiative to repudiate the policy until Soviet and American reactions are apparent.

## SOUTHEAST ASIA

2. Viet Minh reported willing to be patient on unification:

Two Viet Minh delegates at the Bandung conference denied that the Viet Minh would fight its way south if elections were not

held in 1956, [redacted] One of the delegates said, "Unlike the Americans, we have plenty of patience and we can wait."

The Viet Minh officials, as well as Wilfred Burchett, the London Daily Worker's correspondent who was present, said the United States would make every effort to delay the elections. Burchett added that this was one election that could be held on the British model since the Communists would have no trouble winning it.

Comment: Viet Minh propaganda repeatedly insists the terms of the Geneva agreement must be strictly adhered to and lays chief blame on the United States for alleged attempts to sabotage the agreement.

Apart from frequent assurances that Vietnam will indeed be unified, the Viet Minh in its propaganda has not threatened the use of force.

#### NEAR EAST - AFRICA

3.

[redacted] attack on Iranian religious minority:

Comment: The anti-Baha'i campaign, unless checked, could easily spread to other religious minorities and even be used by nationalist agitators against the government.

[Redacted]

the Baha'i, probably numbering a few thousand active members, has been hard put even to maintain its existence as an organization.

The campaign may be an attempt by the strong reactionary religious elements to regain political power which they lost some 20 years ago during the reign of the previous Shah.

[Redacted]

## WESTERN EUROPE

4. French Communists may gain some Socialist support for united action:

[Redacted]


The French Communist Party is increasingly persistent in calls for unity of action with the Socialists, despite vigorous rebuffs by top Socialist leaders, and the American embassy in Paris doubts if Socialist Party organizations on a local level can indefinitely resist these appeals.

Communist leader Duclos called on 9 May for an early meeting of the two parties to consider a program of opposition to the laws for government aid to church schools. This may be a Communist attempt to prevent co-operation between the Socialists and the Popular Republicans and at the same time to bid for Radical Socialist support.

Comment: The Communist overture to the Socialists on 18 April for mutual support in the cantonal elections had some success on the local level.

The Communists are emphasizing economic and social issues to regain support lost through the party's concentration on Soviet foreign policy interests, especially opposition to German rearmament. The renewed pressure on the Socialists may also be designed, however, to counteract Mendes-France's attempt to establish the basis for a left-of-center coalition majority in the next National Assembly.

5. Spanish high commissioner in Morocco reportedly to seek showdown with Franco:




**Comment:** There have been several recent reports that Franco intended to recall Garcia Valino for his anti-French activities in Morocco as a result of pressure from the French government.

Since he currently holds the second most important position in the Spanish regime, Garcia-Valino may avoid a showdown by accepting the position of chief of the high general staff, which would put him in line to assume the regency when Franco decides to step down. His removal from the Moroccan post would improve French-Spanish relations. His resignation from the army, however, might create internal difficulties for Franco because of his prominence and popularity with the armed forces and with the monarchists.

#### LATIN AMERICA

6. Rumors of revolutionary activity in Costa Rica continue strong:



a coup might take place in San Jose, that important revolutionary elements had already firmly established themselves on an off-shore island, and that other activities will develop near the Panamanian frontier with "strong and decided support" from the Venezuelan government.

Comment: For the past month there have been rumors of another revolutionary movement, with covert Venezuelan support, against the administration of Costa Rican president Figueres.

Venezuela is known to have given some support to the unsuccessful attempt of last January and to remain hostile to the Figueres regime, but the current rumors have not been substantiated.

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#### 7. Comment on combined Soviet bloc military command:

The Warsaw agreement of 14 May provides for creation of the much-publicized combined military command for the USSR and its East European Satellites.

The location of the headquarters at Moscow and the appointment of Konev as commander will provide firm Soviet control over its day-to-day operations. Creation of a permanent staff, composed of representatives of the general staffs of the participating countries, will be an administrative improvement over the present Soviet system of bilateral control over Satellite military activities. The text obscures, however, an apparently unwieldy command relationship among Konev and the Satellite defense ministers, each of whom will act as or appoint a deputy to Konev.

The agreement implies that not all Soviet bloc military units will be allocated to "the complement of the joint armed forces." A provision for the disposition of forces in

the territory of participating countries "in accordance with the demands of mutual defense" is probably the expected legal justification for indefinite retention of Soviet forces in East Europe.

East Germany's release from providing armed forces to the joint command until an unspecified future date is probably motivated by a desire not only to avoid furnishing immediate justification for West German rearmament but also to be in a position to continue strenuous objections to it. Also the formal creation of an East German army would have dashed German hopes for unification, and probably would have created an unnecessary obstacle to possible direct negotiations between East and West Germany.

The failure to announce officially the creation of an East German army is probably intended as another hint that Moscow is interested in entering into negotiations for a settlement of the German problem.

The dovetailing of recent Soviet tactics on Austria, Germany, and Yugoslavia reflects a major effort to encourage Western speculation that the present Soviet leaders want a neutral belt which would include Germany. [redacted]

