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GENERAL

1. Comment on Peiping's acceptance of Nehru's invitation to discuss Tibet:

[redacted] Peiping's announced acceptance of Prime Minister Nehru's invitation to discuss Tibetan matters is in contrast to the cool reception given previous Indian demarches on minor points of Sino-Indian friction. China's response appears to be part of a campaign, following the Soviet lead, to improve relations with certain non-Communist states. Other indications have been Peiping's recent insistence on the participation of "neutral nations" in the Korean political conference and the current invitation to chiefs of mission in Peiping to make a one-week tour of Manchuria.

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SOVIET UNION

2. Pravda treats Vyshinsky's UN speech cautiously:

[redacted] Ambassador Bohlen notes that the Pravda text of Vyshinsky's 15 October UN speech on Trieste fails to include his statement that the USSR would not countenance a Trieste solution without Soviet participation. The Pravda text did state that it is impossible to agree to a Trieste solution which bypasses and violates the peace treaty.

3.3(h)(2)

Bohlen believes this editing may indicate a Kremlin desire to conceal from the public a categorical statement on a point on which it may later back down.

Comment: Pravda's treatment of Vyshinsky's speech conforms to the restrained attitude on Trieste which has been noted in Soviet propaganda.

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FAR EAST

3. Deterioration of Japanese-Korean relations seen embroiling the United States:

[Redacted]

Japanese foreign minister Okazaki claims that the Japanese government is under increasing popular pressure to dispatch armed naval vessels to protect fishing operations in waters off Korea. He adds that possible ensuing hostile acts might seriously involve the United States, since American ships are used by both Japan and Korea.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: The breakdown in negotiations between South Korea and Japan on 21 October leaves relations between the two tenser than at any time since Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952. Both sides have sought on several occasions to have the United States mediate the dispute.

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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

5. Many Tudeh suspects believed gaining release by bribery:

[redacted] Many Iranians arrested for Tudeh or pro-Mossadeq sympathies are buying their way out of prison, the American embassy reported on 19 October. Some are using family position to gain release, and many others are paying off the military governor's office or prominent individuals capable of exerting influence.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: There have been previous reports that arrested Tudeh suspects were managing to regain their freedom.

The Tehran military governor faces the same problem that has made many previous crackdowns on the Tudeh ineffective--corruption in the police and gendarmerie.

6. Arabs plan to adopt stronger anti-Western line:

[redacted] Arab delegates to the United Nations have recommended to their governments that they adopt "a new manner" toward the United States, Britain and France with reference to the Palestine problem.

3.3(h)(2)

In view of the substantial and continued Western assistance to Israel, these powers should be considered as siding with Tel Aviv and accordingly "their opinion or mediation" should be rejected.

Arab tactics, [redacted] should also include an effort to keep other Arab complaints such as Syria's off the agenda and concentrate on the Israeli attack on the Jordanian village of Kibya.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: Charles Malik's stubborn insistence on 19 October that the UN Security Council address itself to the specific Israeli violation and not to the larger issues seems to reflect this recommendation. It probably foreshadows a bitter and intemperate Arab position in the forthcoming sessions.

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7. Saudi Arabia and Britain near agreement on arbitration terms in Buraimi dispute:

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Saudi Arabian and British negotiators are near agreement on the terms for arbitration of the Buraimi oasis dispute, according to the deputy foreign minister in Jidda.

The terms, to be announced in a joint communique, are said to include withdrawal of all forces by both sides and their replacement by a limited number of guards to maintain order. The arbitral group will be composed of five members, one British, one Saudi and three neutrals. Procedure for selection of neutral members has not yet been decided.

Comment: Agreement to mutual withdrawal of all forces represents a major concession by Saudi Arabia. The established Arab practice of haggling over details, however, may prove to be a major stumbling block at the last minute.

8. Iraqi prime minister will not officially receive Eric Johnston:

3.3(h)(2)

Iraqi prime minister Jamali said that he will not officially receive Eric Johnston during his Near East visit, according to the US ambassador in Baghdad. Jamali explained that reception of Johnston, known as a vice president of the consistently anti-Arab American Christian Palestine Committee, would make his position as prime minister untenable.

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EASTERN EUROPE

- ✓ 9. American charge warns against Trieste proposal unacceptable to Yugoslavia:

Any proposal for turning over Zone A to Italian civil administration under cover of United States and British troops is "demonstrably unacceptable" to the Yugoslav government, according to US charge Wallner in Belgrade. He emphasizes that the next proposal must be one which has a reasonable chance of acceptance by the Yugoslav government.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: The authoritative Yugoslav party organ Borba stated on 19 October that Italian occupation of Zone A, with or without troops, "is the same thing" and unacceptable to Yugoslavia.

French foreign minister Bidault has agreed with an Eden proposal to turn over the civil administration of Zone A while retaining American-British forces. An initially favorable response for this suggestion has been received from Italian officials.

WESTERN EUROPE

- ✓ 10. Pella indicates qualified willingness to participate in five-power Trieste talks:

Premier Pella suggested to Ambassador Luce on 20 October that the Trieste crisis might be eased by setting an early date for a meeting of an American-British-Italian commission to discuss how Zone A is to be transferred to Italy and by the simultaneous appointment of a five-power commission, including Yugoslavia, to discuss an agenda for a conference to be held at Tito's convenience. He also said that a date should be set now for the actual transfer of Zone A, which he believes should occur between three and six months from now.

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Pella was convinced that the Italian public would accept a gradual transfer and the holding of a five-power conference to discuss other problems, provided the dates were fixed now and action on the 8 October Anglo-American declaration had begun.

Comment: These modifications in the Italian position in no way meet Yugoslavia's minimum conditions for a five-power conference.

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