

~~TOP SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION~~

6 January 1953

3.5(c)

Copy No. 58

## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. *4*  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: HR 70-2

DATE *ADec29* REVIEWER: *289*

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~**S U M M A R Y****GENERAL**

1. Madame Pandit seeks Arab support for Communist China's admission to UN (page 3).
2. Polish official suggests Britain mediate US-Soviet differences (page 3).

**FAR EAST**

3. Northward move of Chinese Communist troops reported (page 4).

**SOUTHEAST ASIA**

4. Burmese leaders consider abandoning strict neutrality (page 4).

**NEAR EAST - AFRICA**

5. Soviet official exerting pressure against Iranian nationalization of Caspian fisheries (page 5).
6. Prominent Lebanese seek to prevent withdrawal of Point IV program (page 5).

**WESTERN EUROPE**

7. Austrian Foreign Minister eager for new treaty approach (page 6).

\* \* \* \*

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

## GENERAL

1. Madame Pandit seeks Arab support for Communist China's admission to UN:

The American Embassy in Beirut has heard that Madame Pandit, who is touring the Near East, is urging Arab countries to support Communist China's admission to the United Nations. Her argument allegedly is that a China friendly to the Arab-Asian bloc would exercise the veto power in its favor.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: Madame Pandit may actually be seeking support for an Arab-Asian approach to the UN on this matter. The Arab states have to date displayed no great interest, however, and a joint approach in the near future seems improbable.

2. Polish official suggests Britain mediate US-Soviet differences:

A Polish Foreign Ministry official informed the British Ambassador in Warsaw that only Britain was now in a position to mediate between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Polish official declared that more importance should be attached to Stalin's reply to Reston's questions, and inquired whether Prime Minister Churchill's visit to the US had been affected by this interview.

3.3(h)(2)

The British Ambassador concluded that the approach was Soviet-inspired in order to give the impression that the USSR would welcome a mediation effort by Churchill.

Comment: The Polish official may simply have been probing for information on Churchill's mission. The approach, however, could be the beginning of a new Soviet diplomatic maneuver designed to promote disagreement between the US and Britain.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## FAR EAST

3. Northward move of Chinese Communist troops reported:

[redacted] Some 20,000 troops stationed in the Hupeh Military District left Hankow for the north on 20 November,

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] a Chinese Communist motor regiment left the city for the northeast on 25 November.

3.3(h)(2)

No Chinese Communist army has been noted departing from Korea during this period.

## SOUTHEAST ASIA

4. Burmese leaders consider abandoning strict neutrality:

[redacted] the Burmese cabinet now believes its policy of neutrality may be futile. Home

3.3(h)(2)

Defense Minister Ba Swe and Minister of Industry Kyaw Nyein share his concern over the threat of communism and agree to the necessity of requesting American aid in the event of a Chinese Communist invasion.

~~TOP SECRET~~


3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Comment: This report is the strongest indication to date of a fundamental change in the thinking of top Burmese policy makers. The three officials dominate the Burmese Government, and all have heretofore been strong advocates of strict neutrality.

#### NEAR EAST - AFRICA

**5. Soviet official exerting pressure against Iranian nationalization of Caspian fisheries:**




The Soviet managing-director of the Soviet-Iranian Fisheries in October directed that Iranian employees overheard discussing the proposed nationalization of the industry be discharged,

Two Iranian engineers are being paid by the management to make speeches against nationalization among fishery workers.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: This is the first report indicating that Moscow is making indirect efforts to prevent nationalization. A report in December indicated that another Soviet tactic to guard against Iranian nationalization of the fisheries might be to negotiate a new short-term agreement.

**6. Prominent Lebanese seek to prevent withdrawal of Point IV program:**



Many prominent Lebanese have assured the American Embassy in Beirut of their determination to prevent the withdrawal of the Point IV aid from Lebanon on 15

3.3(h)(2)

January. They are aroused by the approaching deadline, fixed because of Lebanese lack of cooperation and particularly because of the Foreign Minister's efforts to end the program.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Comment: The Lebanese President may issue a last-minute statement to forestall complete withdrawal of Point IV aid. Nevertheless, the fact that pro-West Lebanese have shown such complete misunderstanding of an antagonism toward the program underscores the difficulties it faces in the area.

## WESTERN EUROPE

### 7. Austrian Foreign Minister eager for new treaty approach:

3.3(h)(2)

Foreign Minister Gruber believes the time is right to call for a new meeting of the Austrian treaty deputies. Despite the probable failure of such a meeting, he considers that it would pave the way for a Foreign Ministers' discussion at which Russian terms for a settlement might be ascertained.

Gruber states that he is pleased with the outcome of the recent UN debate and with his private discussions with Gromyko. He reports, Gromyko indicated that the Trieste question is not "really a bar to further negotiations on Austria."

Comment: With the Austrian elections only two months away, Gruber's expressed optimism may stem from a desire on the part of the government to impress the electorate with intensive efforts to obtain a state treaty.

The latest Soviet note sent on 27 September made new negotiations contingent on withdrawal of the short treaty draft and left it clear that discussions would have to include the question of Trieste. The Russians have long held that an Austrian settlement is dependent on Western fulfillment of treaty obligations with respect to Trieste.

~~TOP SECRET~~