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3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)

4 February 1956

Copy No.

103

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 14
NO CHANGE IN CLASS
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C 2010
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 11 Jan 80 REVIEWER: _____

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Approved for Release: 2019/10/21 C03157478



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1. HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET PLANNERS TO LEAVE FOR BURMA SOON

Comment on:

the USSR has decided to send a high-level team of industrial and economic experts and planners to Rangoon in the

near future.

The high-level nature of this delegation indicates that Moscow intends to move rapidly to give substance to Bulganin's and Khrushchev's promises of extensive co-operation in developing Burmese industry and agriculture.

The proposed visit is the result of party secretary Khrushchev's statement [redacted] [redacted] that economic experts and planners would be dispatched to do the "spade work" in advance of the proposed visit of Soviet leaders Mikoyan, Kaganovich and Saburov to Burma.

Representatives of GUES have formalized specific agreements with Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, and it is likely that their visit to Rangoon would have the same purpose.

Moscow's haste to formalize offers made less than two months ago is probably designed not only to enhance Soviet influence in Burma but to impress other countries in the area with Soviet ability to dispense economic aid with dispatch. [redacted] (Prepared by ORR)

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2. BURMA MAY ASK US FOR LARGE-SCALE ASSISTANCE

A spokesman for Minister of Industries Kyaw Nyein has informally sounded out the American ambassador in Rangoon regarding the possibility of large-scale American financial assistance "for political purposes." He suggested that this aid might take the form of a loan, which he hoped could be substantially written off. Kyaw Nyein was said to be thinking in terms of \$200,000,000, but his emissary indicated that \$50,000,000 would be "very helpful."

Comment Although this approach is primarily aimed at exploiting American concern over Burma's increasing economic ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc, it probably also reflects the desire of an important element in the Burmese government to achieve some balance between Soviet and Western participation in Burma's development program.

Prior to Bulganin's and Khrushchev's dramatic offers to Burma during their December visit to Rangoon, the Burmese government had on several occasions hinted a desire for a resumption of American aid--provided it could be made to appear as trade rather than aid.

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3. BONN TO PROTEST ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR ZORIN

West German foreign minister Von Brentano has drafted a sharp letter to Soviet ambassador Zorin complaining that Zorin is exceeding the bounds of normal diplomatic practices.

Cabinet minister Strauss, who gave this information to American representatives in Bonn, declared that Zorin has embarked on an extensive program of visiting industrial plants and establishing contacts with Bundestag deputies. Moreover, Zorin has suggested to industrialists that they pressure the Bonn government for a trade treaty with Moscow and has criticized the Bonn government to his diplomatic colleagues.

Comment It is probable that the early conclusion of a Soviet-West German trade agreement is one of Zorin's principal objectives. Since his arrival in Bonn last December, Zorin has stressed in his talks with Foreign Ministry officials and in public statements the favorable prospects for developing economic and cultural relations.

The West German ambassador to Moscow is not expected to take up his post before 1 March. On 3 February, a TASS broadcast complained of unfavorable West German press articles about the Soviet embassy in Bonn and alluded to a West German design to "destroy what the chancellor himself found necessary to speak up for in Moscow."

THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 3 February)

Nothing of significance to report.

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