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7 January 1961

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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## DAILY BRIEF

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: Khrushchev stated at a reception in Moscow on 2 January that the Soviet party congress scheduled for February will be postponed until later in the year, and he attributed the postponement to the need to establish contact with the new US administration, according to the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow. Khrushchev allegedly said he did not expect to meet with the new US President until perhaps July. The Soviet leaders probably believe that the Chinese Communist challenge makes it imperative that the forthcoming party congress take unequivocal positions on doctrinal as well as foreign-policy questions, and that this will be impossible until the Soviet leaders have an opportunity to assess the character and likely moves of the new US administration. Khrushchev may also feel compelled to achieve some tangible success which can be used to demonstrate the validity and effectiveness of his foreign policy before committing the Soviet party to the kind of authoritative and long-range programs that are enunciated at party congresses. It is also possible that internal Soviet developments may be at least partly responsible for postponement of the party congress.

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Nigeria: The intensity of Nigeria's reaction to the third French nuclear test--illustrated by the severance of diplomatic relations with Paris on 5 January--imposes a further strain on the disposition of the Nigerian rulers to follow a moderate and basically pro-Western course. Nigerian attitudes toward the West, particularly the US, were already

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being affected by Western support for Kasavubu over Lumumba, who is regarded even by conservative Nigerians as the Congo's legitimate premier. Prime Minister Balewa's recent initial experience with the frustrations of the Algerian situation and Nigeria's exposure this fall, for the first time, to the prevailing currents in the Asian-African bloc at the UN may also be contributing to an erosion of Nigerian good will toward the West.

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Somali Republic: [An offer by Britain and Italy to establish a joint military advisory mission to train the Somali Army is meeting opposition from Somali defense officials, who favor UAR assistance for the new republic's embryonic military establishment. These officials recently told members of an Anglo-Italian negotiating team that lack of confidence in British and Italian support of Somali nationalist aspirations militated against the joint mission proposal. The Somali Army chief also said that the first shipment of weapons promised by Nasir was "being delivered now," and that UAR instructors were expected. Somali interest in acquiring military aid presumably has been heightened by recent clashes along the ill-defined border with Ethiopia.]

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Panama: Clashes between pro- and anti-Castro forces may break out soon in Panama City as a result of publication of the government's plan to declare the Cuban ambassador persona non grata for meddling in internal Panamanian affairs.

both pro- and anti-Castro factions were preparing rallies in the capital, and that goon squads supporting each faction were coming to Panama City from the Atlantic port of Colon. Panamanian security forces reportedly are on a semialert status.

Castro supporters in other Latin American countries may also stage demonstrations similar to the one which occurred in Uruguay on 5 January as a protest against Washington's break with Havana.

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### Nigerian Attitudes Toward West Adversely Affected

The intensity of feeling aroused in Nigeria by the third French nuclear test in the Sahara--reflected in the severance by Prime Minister Balewa's government on 5 January of diplomatic ties with Paris--imposes a further strain on the disposition of the leaders of Africa's most populous state to follow a moderate and essentially pro-Western course. France's two earlier tests also had evoked a strong popular and official reaction and were an important factor in the growth during the past year of sentiment for an "independent" foreign policy which would identify Nigeria closely with Africa-wide interests. The failure of leading Western nations--especially the US and UK--to react more vigorously to South Africa's suppression of native rioting last spring and to its subsequent refusal to abandon its apartheid policy have likewise damaged the general Western image in Nigeria. Such developments were effectively exploited by neutralist-inclined Nigerian elements even before the country became independent on 1 October.

More recently, the Congo situation, especially the arrest of Lumumba by Colonel Mobutu's forces in early December, has provoked unprecedentedly severe press criticism of the US, NATO, the "colonial powers," and the UN, which have been lumped together as instigators of a plot against the Congo's sovereignty. When such attacks were at their height last month the heaviest criticism was directed against the US, while the USSR appeared to gain prestige for its pro-Lumumba position. [While reaction on the official level was much more restrained, top Nigerian leaders--including generally conservative northerners--expressed to American officials strong criticism of Lumumba's arrest and the failure of the UN to insist on his release. Nearly all such Nigerians have little use for the erratic Congolese leader, but they nevertheless regard him as still the legitimate premier and appear to share the general public's increasing tendency to view him as the personification of Africa in its fight against "imperialism."]

Balewa's initial direct experience with the frustrations of the Algerian situation--he recently visited Tunis and London

in the apparent hope of playing some sort of mediatory role between France and the rebels--and Nigeria's exposure this fall, for the first time, to the prevailing currents in the Asian-African bloc at the UN may also have contributed to the apparent erosion of Nigerian good will toward the West.

[Meanwhile, Balewa's reported invitation to the Soviet ambassador in Ghana to visit Lagos on 11 January to discuss details regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations between Nigeria and the USSR suggests that the prime minister now feels he can no longer defer such action. At the time of Nigerian independence celebrations Balewa had rebuffed a bid by Soviet representatives for immediate relations and indicated to US Embassy officials a desire to avoid them as long as possible. Since then, there have been several additional formal Soviet requests for diplomatic ties.]

Somali Army Rebuffs Anglo-Italian Aid

[An offer by Britain and Italy to establish a joint military advisory mission to train the Somali Army is meeting opposition from Somali defense officials who favor UAR assistance for the new republic's embryonic military establishment. These officials recently told members of a joint Anglo-Italian negotiating team, which arrived in Mogadiscio in late December to discuss terms of a military assistance agreement, that lack of confidence in British and Italian support for Somali nationalist aspirations militated against accepting the joint mission proposal.]

[The Somalis reiterated their desire to limit the British and Italian role to rear-echelon training and implied they were considering UAR assistance for training the army's combat elements. The Somali Army chief told the mission that the first consignment of weapons promised by Cairo--presumably under the accords reached by Nasir and Prime Minister Abdirascid in Cairo last month--was being delivered and that UAR instructors were expected with the weapons.]

[Somali interest in acquiring military aid presumably has been heightened by a recent flare-up between Somalis and Ethiopian security forces in the disputed Haud region of eastern Ethiopia. Clashes occur sporadically throughout the year between tribes from both sides of the ill-defined border, especially during the seasonal migration of Somali herdsmen into Ethiopia in search of pasturage and water. The present difficulties may have been aggravated by Ethiopian preoccupation with border security in view of the recent abortive coup in Addis Ababa.]

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