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23 May 1951

[Redacted]  
Copy No. CI-9

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

84

DOCUMENT NO.  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

11 DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C

NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2009

AUTH: HR 70

DATE 12-15-78 REVIEWER: [Redacted]

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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
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**SUMMARY****FAR EAST**

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**NEAR EAST**

4. Egypt and Jordan concerned over Iraq's air assistance to ~~Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria~~  
Syria (page 5).

**EASTERN EUROPE**


5. Alleged US hostile activity linked to Oatis case (page 6). ~~Czechoslovakia, US~~

**WESTERN EUROPE**

6. French want to delay German defense agreements (page 6). ~~France, Germany~~

**LATIN AMERICA**

7. Prospects for Brazilian military aid to Korea favorable ~~Brazil, Korea~~  
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
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**FAR EAST**

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## NEAR EAST

4. Egypt and Jordan concerned over Iraq's air assistance to Syria:

[Redacted]

US Ambassador Caffery in Cairo reports that top Egyptian officials have expressed their concern over Iraq's dispatch of planes and troops to Syria. Moreover, several of the officials believe (a) that the British were behind the Iraqi move, and (b) that this action was a step in the

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direction of a British-sponsored Syria-Iraq union. At the same time, US Charge Fritzlan in Amman reports that the Jordanian Prime Minister indicated his surprise over Iraq's dispatch of air assistance to Damascus and his belief that the move was unwise as long as the Syrian-Israeli border dispute is under consideration of the UN Security Council.

Comment: Egyptian allegations that the UK is responsible for Iraq's recent dispatch of air assistance to Syria are apparently false in view of the fact that the UK urged Iraq not to send any military aid to Damascus and then urged Syria to get rid of the Iraqi planes it had received. The Egyptian charges probably resulted (a) from Egypt's concern that Iraq's air assistance to Damascus might serve as a means for promoting an Iraq-Syria union and (b) from the Egyptian belief that Iraq could not attain such a union without British support. Jordan's concern over Iraq's aid to Syria, on the other hand, is probably due, not to the fear of a "Greater Syria," which King Abdullah has long favored, but to the Jordanian fear that such a union might occur under the aegis of Iraq rather than Jordan.

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## EASTERN EUROPE

5. Alleged US hostile activity linked to Oatis case:

[Redacted]

The most recent Czechoslovak note regarding the imprisonment of US press correspondent Oatis states that the Czechoslovak Government

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"sees no reason for the Oatis case, which is under the consideration of the appropriate Czechoslovak judicial authorities, to be the subject of any further discussion." The Czechoslovak Government arrives at this conclusion because of allegedly malevolent and untruthful American broadcasts "that the Prague government is willing to release American AP correspondent Oatis from prison if the broadcasts of station Free Europe will be stopped." In a follow-up note the Czechoslovak Government protests the increase of hostile activity carried out by the United States against "peace-loving" Czechoslovakia, specifically citing the activity of Radio Free Europe as well as an alleged penetration of the Czechoslovak-Bavarian border by a US military group on 4 May.

Comment: Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Siroky had previously reiterated to US Ambassador Briggs that "US-sponsored" emigre broadcasts as well as the alleged border incident formed an unpropitious atmosphere for further discussion of the Oatis case. The strongly worded note against Radio Free Europe suggests that the Czechoslovak Government may attempt to force the US into prohibiting these broadcasts in return for Oatis' release.

## WESTERN EUROPE

6. French want to delay German defense agreements:

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German Affairs Director Sauvagnargues of the French Foreign Office has indicated that

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objections and misgivings of a policy nature may delay a decision on the contractual relations now under discussion between the Germans and the Western allies. Sauvagnargues believes that the draft declaration to be submitted to Bonn approximates too closely an eventual peace treaty, and that the formulation of Western intentions should not be discussed with the Germans. The question of German sovereignty is still the major French preoccupation in connection with the contractual arrangements, and the French are concerned lest the presence of Western forces in Germany be dependent on German consent, whether implied or explicit. Sauvagnargues prefers not to go beyond a general statement of intention now in order to avoid a detailed declaration which would "discount" the effect of the contemplated arrangements.

Comment: The French Foreign Office wants to avoid disclosing the Allied position too soon, because the French have been anxious to obtain first a German proposal on contractual arrangements to serve as a basis for a tripartite statement on the question of sovereignty. The French believe that the Germans will make their military contribution depend less on Allied political concessions than on a build-up of Allied strength in Germany.

## LATIN AMERICA

### 7. Prospects for Brazilian military aid to Korea favorable:

[redacted]

General Goes Monteiro, Chief of Staff of the Brazilian Armed Forces, has advised US Ambassador Johnson that he is certain that the Brazilian

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Foreign Office proposal to send a mission to Korea would be "useful." Ambassador Johnson feels as a result of the conversation that, in the General's mind, the sending of the mission has been decided, and that the General agrees that the mission must be followed by "concrete action."

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