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24 May 1956

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DOCUMENT NO. 52

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CLASS. CHANGED TO: NS-3

NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2025

AUTH: HR-70-2


DATE: 18-7-69 REVIEWER:

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002500520001-6

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002500520001-6

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1. EXPRESSIONS OF OPEN DISSIDENCE AMONG
CZECH STUDENTS

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Czechoslovak university students are increasingly expressing their grievances against the Communist regime.

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Charles University students last week shouted antiregime slogans, including one obviously protesting Communist subservience to the USSR. Students at another university in Prague physically attacked a rector who had warned them to disband their protest meeting.

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In a student parade on 20 May, the first permitted since 1948, marchers carried signs informing onlookers that "We are young but remember a lot" and "We hope that the governing of your affairs is returning to your own hands." The students were kept in small groups, were accompanied by party activists, and were watched by unusually large numbers of uniformed police on the streets.

Comment

The dissidence openly expressed in Poland, Hungary and, to a lesser extent, in Czechoslovakia has heretofore been primarily voiced by party intellectuals and has been treated by the regimes as largely an internal party problem. The population at large has generally adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude. Evidence that open dissidence is growing among students, who are extensively propagandized by the party, may foreshadow a spread of such activity to other informed elements of the public.

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**2. SOVIET MISSION CHIEF PRESSES FOR OFFICIAL
JAPANESE RECOGNITION**

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[Redacted]

Serge Tikhvinsky, chief Soviet representative in Tokyo, has indicated that any negotiations between his mission and the Japanese government, related to fishery or other issues, cannot begin until Japan recognizes the mission.

Moscow has previously shown itself unwilling to deal with private Japanese interests and has attempted to build up extensive official contacts which will make Japanese refusal to normalize relations appear increasingly pointless.

The Japanese government, under the necessity for making arrangements which will safeguard Japanese fishing during the season now under way, will probably undertake official negotiations with the Soviet mission. This in turn probably will encourage Tokyo's acceptance of the "Adenauer formula" for resuming normal diplomatic relations with Moscow prior to a peace treaty.

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3. RHEE DENOUNCES VICE-PRESIDENT-ELECT TO
US CHARGE

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[REDACTED]

President Rhee, in a conversation with American chargé Strom, has excoriated Vice-President-elect Chang Myon, linking him with an alleged Communist conspiracy to elect Chang president in 1952. Strom observes that while it is not clear what action Rhee will take, he gave no indication of a willingness to co-operate with Chang.

Comment President Rhee usually takes the line that his political opponents are either pro-Communist or pro-Japanese.

The South Korean vice presidency is largely a ceremonial position, and it would be possible for President Rhee to isolate Chang from governmental affairs. Should they fail to reconcile their differences, however, Chang's position as Rhee's possible successor might prompt Rhee to attempt to remove him from the succession, possibly by constitutional amendment.

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**4. EAST PAKISTAN BUDGET REJECTION PROLONGS
PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL CRISIS**

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The opposition Awami League's success in getting the East Pakistan Assembly to reject the budget presented by the United Front government on 22 May will probably force President Mirza to resort to direct

rule of the province. This was done for a year in 1954, but under the new constitution Mirza can exercise direct rule for only a few months. During this time he will have to organize a new coalition government for East Pakistan, which may increase the likelihood that H. S. Suhrawardy, national leader of the Awami League, will become prime minister of Pakistan.

The upset in East Pakistan will probably delay a decision on changes in the central leadership. Consequently, the visit to Communist China of the present prime minister, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, now scheduled for 2 June, may be further postponed.

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