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28 September 1955

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
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
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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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State Dept. review completed

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1. SOVIET OFFICIALS DISCUSS PRESIDENT'S BLUEPRINT PROPOSAL

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[Redacted]

An adviser to the Soviet representative on the UN Disarmament Subcommittee told American officials on 23 September that the USSR did not reject President Eisenhower's Geneva "blueprint" and aerial flight proposals and said "our attitude is positive." He used passages from Molotov's speech before the UN General Assembly to illustrate that the USSR was still earnestly studying the proposals, but indicated that the USSR would like to have more details on how the plan would operate.

The Soviet official also indicated that while he could understand why the United States was reserving its position regarding the abolition of nuclear weapons, the USSR was disturbed by the American reservation regarding conventional force levels. He insisted that the United States intended to revise these upward.

Soviet officials present at the meeting denied that the USSR was principally concerned with force levels and bases and declared that establishing a "legal basis" for the proscription of atomic weapons was still the important thing. In arguing that adoption of the Soviet 10 May inspection plan was necessary to guard against concentration of forces, one Soviet spokesman contended that a surprise blow could never be decisive, either now or in 100 years.

Comment

These remarks appear to indicate a more favorable attitude toward some form of President Eisenhower's proposals than Bulganin's letter, which only stated that they were still under consideration. Bulganin's strongest criticism of the President's proposals was that they failed to meet the main problem of ending the arms race because they did not include reduction of either conventional forces or atomic weapons.

The Soviet leaders have consistently defended their 10 May proposals regarding "control posts" by contending that modern war, including the necessary follow-up to any surprise blow, requires drawing into action armies of many millions and enormous quantities of equipment.

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3. ANTI-AMERICAN CAMPAIGN IN SOUTH KOREA INTENSIFIED

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President Rhee appears to be making a deliberate effort to promote Korean suspicion and dislike of the United States, according to Ambassador Lacy in Seoul. This is suggested by recent bitter attacks by Korean officials who have used "lies and innuendos" in misrepresenting American policies.


Recent charges include allegations that the United States intends to wreck the South Korean economy, that American businessmen are "carpetbaggers and smugglers," that a secret American agreement exists which would eventually return Korea to Japanese domination, and that the United States is prepared to barter Korean independence for a momentary relaxation of world tension.

Comment

These attacks reflect an attempt by Rhee to force the United States to substitute Rhee's objectives in Korea for its own. Rhee's exploitation of strong Korean nationalist feelings has brought about a deterioration of American prestige. One consequence is a growing threat to the position of pro-American Korean officials.

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