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
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
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2. COMMUNIST CHINA RENEWS BID TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

Chinese Communist premier Chou En-lai recently told a visiting group of local Japanese officials that China would welcome a Japanese government delegation to Peiping to discuss restoring diplomatic relations. Chou also suggested that talks on repatriation of Japanese nationals be moved from Geneva to Peiping or Tokyo.

Radio Peiping also announced on 17 October an "agreement" with the head of the Japanese Diet delegation now in China which called for closer Sino-Japanese trade and cultural relations, freer travel, protection of nationals residing abroad, and the exchange of permanent trade missions with diplomatic status.

Comment

The Chinese Communists are taking advantage of the relaxation of international tensions to intensify their efforts to establish de facto relations with Japan and convince the large number of visiting Japanese of their peaceful intentions. The cumulative effect of the Japanese visits is likely to reduce Japanese sentiment supporting rearmament and the continuance of American bases in Japan, as well as to generate further pressure on the government for a rapprochement with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

There are indications that Tokyo will await the results of the foreign ministers' conference at Geneva before considering any major change in its policy on cultural and trade relations with Peiping. Japan's continued recognition of Taipei presumably precludes full diplomatic relations with Peiping for the foreseeable future.

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3. FRENCH-SPANISH RIFT OVER MOROCCO WIDENING

[Redacted]
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American officials in Paris report that Foreign Minister Pinay and the Spanish ambassador had a stormy session on 17 October over Madrid's publication of its 15 October note to Paris protesting the anti-Spanish press and radio campaign in France.

The chief spokesman for the French Foreign Ministry believes that the stiffer line taken by the Spanish ambassador in talks over the past two weeks indicates that Spain intends to continue its anti-French attitude for some time.

Comment

Freewheeling military commanders in both French and Spanish Morocco have been largely responsible for the resurgence of ill feeling, but the retention of the strongly anti-French Garcia-Valino as high commissioner of Spanish Morocco indicates that Madrid is bent on continuing a pro-Arab policy.

French charges that Spain is aiding the Moroccan rebels and Spanish pressure for consultation on reforms will probably continue to worsen relations between the two countries.

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BIWEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October-19 October 1955

THE FORMOSA STRAITS

**Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
for the Formosa Straits Problem**

1. Military activity in the area was marked by the first Chinese Nationalist success against Chinese Communist jet fighters and by the first Communist shelling of an island in the Matsu group.

A clash between four Nationalist F-86's and at least five Communist jet fighters near Nanchishan on 15 October resulted in the loss of one of the Communist aircraft.

Communist shelling of Kaoteng, northernmost island in the Matsus, was light, and apparently has been fired either for registration or harassment. A total of 49 rounds was fired at Kaoteng on 7, 11 and 14 October. The latest analysis of photographs shows that between May and August the Communists increased the number of occupied artillery positions on the Peiling Peninsula, opposite the three main islands of the Matsu group, from 16 to 32. An earlier report that the Communists shelled Peikantang in the Matsus on 26 April has been discounted as erroneous.

2. Two additional Chinese Communist airfield construction sites in the area were discovered during the period. This brings to nine the total number of airfields in the Formosa Straits area to be worked on this year, only three of which are considered serviceable.

One of the newly observed sites is near Huian, about 50 miles northeast of Amoy, and the other is near Huiyang, midway between Canton and Swatow. The locations of these two sites and the one recently detected near Liencheng, 175 miles west of Foochow, suggest an effort to establish additional airfields to provide for greater operational flexibility in the area immediately opposite Formosa. No firm estimate of the completion date for the Huian and Huiyang fields is as yet available.

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4. Another Chinese Communist railway construction division has been identified as working on the rail line from Yingtan to Amoy, making a total of at least eight such divisions engaged in the work. According to Peiping's Five-Year Plan, the Chinese Communists were scheduled to complete only 270 miles of the 400-mile Amoy line by the end of 1957. Since the Five-Year Plan goals were formulated, however, the Chinese Communists have continued to assign more railway construction units to the project, and have declared that the line will be completed "ahead of schedule."

5. Chinese Communist propaganda on international subjects during the past two weeks increased somewhat in hostility. Peiping repeatedly accused the US of obstructing the Geneva talks, and of seeking to build up Japanese military strategy, in order to promote further "aggression" in the Far East. Comment on Formosa, which remained at a low level, reiterated Peiping's previous formulation--that the question of "liberating" Formosa is a purely internal affair, and that only "US aggression" is a subject for international negotiation.

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19 OCTOBER 1955
FORMOSA STRAITS SITUATION

Primary roads _____
Secondary roads _____

NAUTICAL MILES
0 50 100 150
STATUTE MILES
0 50 100 150

— Railroad
+++++ Proposed railroad

PRIMARY
SECONDARY

- ▲ OPERATIONAL
- ▲ SERVICEABLE
- ▲ UNKNOWN
- UNDER CONSTRUCTION


USABILITY

- + MIG-15, MIG-17, TU-4, IL-28
- | TU-2, IL-10, LA-9/11, LI-2, ETC.
- UNKNOWN
- * FIELDS NOT CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING SUSTAINED OPERATIONS AT PRESENT.

NATIONALIST AIRFIELD

DESIGNATIONS

- PRIMARY: CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT IN AREA, WITH PREPARED RUNWAY GENERALLY 5000 FEET OR LONGER.
- SECONDARY: AUXILIARY OR EMERGENCY BASES, OR FIELDS OF LESSER IMPORTANCE, RUNWAYS GENERALLY LESS THAN 5000 FEET.
- OPERATIONAL: ACTIVE BASE FOR MILITARY & CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT, SOME BASES USED BY PISTON TYPES MAY BE USABLE BY JETS.
- SERVICEABLE: INACTIVE BASES CAPABLE OF USE BY AIRCRAFT
- UNKNOWN: CURRENT STATUS UNDETERMINED.

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