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8 May 1961

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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Congo: Foreign Minister Bomboko's statement on 7 May that the Leopoldville government plans to try Tshombé for treason will heighten tension among his followers in Katanga, who are already concerned regarding possible UN moves to disarm Tshombé's armed forces. An official of the Katanga government has alleged to the American consul that the UN is preparing an "offensive" against Katanga, and warned that the Elisabethville government would sabotage key mining installations rather than permit them to be turned over to the central government.

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HammarSKJOLD has previously indicated that he hoped to appoint a committee to assume Dayal's functions, possibly after his return to Leopoldville for a token period)

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USSR: Khrushchev's remarks on the international situation during a 6 May speech in Yerevan were apparently intended to assure the US that recent events in Laos and Cuba have not damaged long-term prospects for the improvement of Soviet-US relations. According to Ambassador Thompson, the Soviet premier laid strong emphasis on the need for discussion of substantive matters in bilateral disarmament negotiations with the US. Khrushchev referred to talks which were to take place "soon" on the disarmament question and asserted that Moscow was preparing for these talks with "complete seriousness." Turning to the recent events in Cuba, Khrushchev called upon Cuba and the US to "live like good neighbors," and in generally restrained remarks on the situation commented that the USSR would like to look "optimistically" on the future course of Cuban-American relations. Khrushchev reiterated that Moscow desires a genuinely independent and neutral Laos. He made clear his view that an improvement in relations with the US depended not only on the outcome of disarmament negotiations but on the settlement of the Berlin and German problems as well. He repeated standard demands for a reorganization of the United Nations, but called

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for nations to settle outstanding differences both bilaterally and through the UN. [redacted] 25X1

USSR: Party Secretary Frol Kozlov, by many indications the second-ranking man in the Soviet leadership, has been out of public view since mid-April. There has been no official explanation for his absence. The most important event he missed was the May Day celebration, which traditionally brings the top leaders out in full force. Mikhail Suslov, the other leading party secretary under Khrushchev, was the ranking party official at several Moscow functions during the latter part of Khrushchev's April vacation. [redacted]

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Japan: [redacted] Foreign Minister Kosaka has renewed Tokyo's request that a tripartite council be established to handle matters concerning Japan, the United States, and the Ryukyu Islands. Kosaka claims that such a council would undercut leftist agitation in Okinawa and forestall attempts by the political opposition in Japan to make the Okinawan issue a public controversy prior to Prime Minister Ikeda's visit to Washington in June. The US high commissioner for the Ryukyus comments, however, that establishing the council is likely to stimulate agitation for further concessions to reversionist forces in Okinawa and Japan. It seems likely that Japan's role in Ryukyu affairs will be raised in Ikeda's discussions during his visit here.

[redacted] 25X1

[redacted] (Backup, Page 4)

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[redacted] 25X1

\*Iran: Ali Amini, appointed Prime Minister of Iran on 6 May, has asked the Iranian public for time and an end to demonstrations to permit him to put his plans for social and economic reforms into effect, but he made no specific promises in his first public statement. The American Embassy in Tehran reports that Amini demanded from the Shah the right to name nearly all cabinet ministers and insisted on the formation of a special court to try cases of corruption. Amini announced that the Majlis would not be dissolved, although this was reported also to have been a condition for his acceptance of the prime ministership.

Amini may have a period of calm to try his programs, but the success of public protests in toppling the last two prime ministers makes it likely that he will face the same challenge unless he can move rapidly enough to satisfy at least the minimum of popular expectations.

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Japan Seeks Broader Role in Ryukyuan Affairs

[The US-Japanese peace treaty acknowledges Japan's residual sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands but authorizes the United States to exercise exclusive authority there for an indefinite period. Since 1952, Tokyo has maintained a small, quasi-consular agency in Naha, Okinawa's capital city.]

[Discontent among the Okinawans was first manifest in 1956 when a Communist was elected mayor of Naha during a period when there was considerable resentment against US procedures in acquiring land for military purposes. Although land acquisition is not now a problem, it awakened reversionist sentiment in both Japan and the Ryukyus, and the Japanese have not diverted their attention from the Ryukyuan question.]

[The Kishi government initiated moves for a greater Japanese role in Ryukyuan affairs in 1958. Tokyo has been permitted to provide technical and economic assistance on a project-by-project basis and to engage in teacher-training programs. The Government of the Ryukyu Islands, an indigenous structure operating with limited powers granted by the US high commissioner, has been promoting Tokyo's cause.]

[The high commissioner indicates that Okinawan support for reversionist activities has been somewhat greater recently, possibly due to Ryukyuan hopes in connection with Ikeda's visit to Washington. He believes it desirable to expand consultation with the Japanese on purely technical matters but doubts that this would satisfy reversionist elements.]

[In Japan, the moderate Democratic Socialist party (DSP) is introducing a bill in the Diet which would authorize seats for nonvoting representatives from the Ryukyus. The DSP, which heretofore has taken an equivocal position on the Okinawan question, is supporting Ryukyuan demands for increased autonomy for popular election of the Ryukyuan chief executive --he is at present appointed by the high commissioner--and for transfer of administrative jurisdiction from the Department of Defense to the Department of State. Symptomatic of the]

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[apparently closer liaison between Japanese and Ryukyuan political elements is an exchange of parliamentary delegations which is being undertaken.]

[The Ikeda government prefers, for domestic political reasons, not to adopt a firm stand against reversionist agitation and may consider that an easier solution, consistent with the ultimate Japanese objective of regaining administrative control over the Ryukyus, is to seek concessions from US authorities.]

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Amini Appointed Prime Minister of Iran

Ali Amini was recalled from his post as Ambassador to the United States in 1958 under suspicion of complicity in a plot against the Shah. Since that time he has come to be identified as an opponent of the Shah's regime, and the decision to appoint him as prime minister is a measure of the effect that the three days of rioting had on the Shah. Amini has had wide experience since he entered government service in 1932, particularly in economic and financial affairs. He is certainly more able than either of his two immediate predecessors, Eqbal and Sharif-Emami. He has made no secret in the last two years of his ambition to be prime minister and to give that office genuine authority independent of the Shah. Amini has stated, however, that there is no alternative to the institution of the monarchy. He believes that the Shah could be a strong force in any responsible government, but that in order to preserve his position, the Shah must work in the background.

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[Amini will probably have considerable support, at least initially. The anti-Shah National Front reportedly will give Amini a chance to prove himself, but it believes he will not succeed because he will not be able to resist the Shah and will not have military support. Amini reportedly will appoint General Timur Bakhtiar to a high post in the army, however, and he has implied that Bakhtiar will run the army for him.]

In his first statement on foreign affairs, Amini said that he proposes to improve relations "especially with neighboring countries," and intends to respect the provisions of CENTO.

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