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
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1. SECOND MEGATON-YIELD NUCLEAR TEST BY
USSR NEAR NOVAYA ZEMLYA

[redacted] [redacted]
[redacted] a large explosion occurred at 0900 GMT (0500 EDT) on 6 October in the vicinity of Novaya

Zemlya. [redacted]

Comment Since April the Soviet Union has been testing nuclear weapons alternately at the Semipalatinsk proving ground and off the east coast of Novaya Zemlya. The two earlier Soviet nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya occurred on 7 September and 24 September and yielded approximately 25 kilotons and four megatons, respectively.

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2. ADDITIONAL DATA CONCERNING SOVIET EARTH SATELLITE

Analysis of available data, indicates that the Soviet earth satellite probably was launched at about 1930 GMT on 4 October from Tyura Tam, some 50 miles east of Novokazalinsk in the Turkistan Military District. The Soviet announcement was apparently made after the satellite had made its first orbit of the earth. Observations indicate that the TASS announcements regarding the orbital axis of 65 degrees to the equatorial plane and the orbital time of one hour and 36.2 minutes are substantially correct. The satellite is radiating signals on the announced frequencies of 20,005 and 40,002 megacycles, those on the latter frequency being extremely weak. The extent and nature of additional satellite instrumentation have not been firmly established, although there are some indications that data-transmitting signals have been detected.

No additional information regarding specific satellite characteristics, other than that disclosed in Soviet announcements, is presently available. There is no firm reason to doubt the announced characteristics at this time except possibly for the weight, which may be about 165 pounds rather than the announced 185 pounds.

The launching of a satellite of this weight would require a launching vehicle approaching ICBM proportions.

Some of the technical advantages to be gained from even a modestly instrumented satellite include: complete check of the launching vehicle and procedures, complete exercise of ground surveillance and data-gathering and handling equipment and related procedures, substantiation of orbital calculations, data on drag at high altitudes, and the gathering of signal propagation and ionospheric data.

3. SITUATION IN WARSAW (Information as of 1800 EDT,
6 October 1957)

The government still has the situation under control in Warsaw and appears determined to maintain its position concerning the demands made by the students. It continues to act with restraint but at the same time is not risking any spread of the student unrest.

Regime militia and security forces continued to act with dispatch to break up demonstrations over the week end. Numerous resolutions from workers groups and from the official student

youth group condemning the student demonstrations have been publicized, indicating that the party control mechanism remains effective. The Warsaw press has adopted a restrained and reasonable attitude toward the students, and while condemning them, is carefully not inflammatory in its articles and editorials.

The students apparently have been unable to attract any significant popular support for their position. During the rioting on the evening of 4 October, bystanders expressed disapproval of student excesses and lack of discipline. No worker support has been forthcoming for the students, although they were reported on 5 October by the American embassy to be negotiating with factory workers, whose disposition was not to participate. The rioting on 5 October was not joined in by the students, but was precipitated by young teen-agers and brawling townspeople who did not seem to be politically motivated.

The only known support for the students so far was a resolution passed by the Association of Journalists on 4 October calling for a lifting of the ban on

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Po Prostu, the student journal. A number of unconfirmed reports have been received by the embassy that students in other cities are preparing to engage in sympathy demonstrations.

A five-man student delegation met on 5 October with a government commission appointed the day before which included officials of the Ministry of Higher Education and the rector of the Polytechnical University, which has been closed "until the situation improves." Another meeting was also held the same day by Gomulka and other high government officials with 50 leaders of the Warsaw and provincial press. The outcome of these meetings is not known. [redacted]

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4. EARLY CONVOCATION OF SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS POSSIBLE

The American embassy in Moscow suggests that Khrushchev may call a party congress before the theoretically mandatory date of early 1960 in order to elect a new enlarged central committee.

An editorial in the latest issue of Problems of CPSU History discusses the activities of the "antiparty group" and includes extravagant definitions of the role of the central committee. It lauds earlier expansions of the committee as having "great significance... in the formation of a strong Leninist directing core."

The embassy believes it is virtually certain that some criticism or at least lack of support of Khrushchev must have developed in the early stages of the June plenum. If this antipathy continues he might consider it wise to convene a party congress in order to elect a fully reliable central committee. The ostensible reason for its convocation might be to consider the new Seven-Year Plan.

Comment Several recent reports allege that Khrushchev continues to face opposition within the higher echelons of the party. An attempt by Khrushchev again to pack the central committee would probably compel any such opponents either to conform or muster forces against him. Recent Soviet successes with the ICBM and earth satellite will probably boost Khrushchev's domestic popularity and at least temporarily strengthen his position in dealing with any dissidents.

5. POLISH PROPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR BAN IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY

According to the Norwegian UN delegate, the statements in the General Assembly by the Polish and Czech delegates on 2 October that if the two German states should agree to pro-

hibit the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons on their territories, Poland and Czechoslovakia would "take the same action," may cause the West considerable embarrassment unless a convincing response is developed. Ambassador Lodge notes that the proposal contains nothing essentially new, but has been greeted with such interest by other delegations that it cannot be ignored.

Comment The West German government's press chief has stated that the proposal is unlikely to reduce world tension and noted that such an agreement between states which do not produce nuclear weapons makes little sense. The opposition Social Democrats, however, term the Polish proposal a "suggestion of importance."

The Polish and Czech proposals probably have the dual purpose of bringing pressure on the Bonn government on the nuclear arms issue and generating interest in Soviet proposals for a European collective security system. Soviet disarmament proposals since March 1956 have called for the creation of a European zone of limitation and inspection of armaments, covering the two German states and undefined adjacent countries, in which nuclear weapons would be prohibited. Soviet spokesmen have contended that such a zone would facilitate agreement on disarmament, European security, and a general political settlement.

These latest proposals are also in line with the East German proposal of 27 July for a confederation of the two German states, endorsed by Khrushchev during his visit to East Germany in August, which included a prohibition of the storage and production of nuclear weapons in both parts of Germany.

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6. USSR INTENSIFIES PRESSURE ON ISRAEL

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko warned Israeli Foreign Minister Meir on 30 September, in a conversation she described as "frightening," that relations between the two countries could not be improved as long as Israel remains subservient to "aggressive policies" in the Middle East. She told a member of the American delegation, "We do not scare easily, but, frankly, after that conversation I am very scared." Since the first public report of the substance of Gromyko's warning was by Cairo radio, the warning was probably made largely for its propaganda effect in the Arab states.

Gromyko's threats also reflect the USSR's concern for protecting the Syrian regime. His conversation reiterates Soviet Ambassador Abramov's warning to Mrs. Meir immediately prior to her departure for New York on 9 September, in which he took her sharply to task for Israel's "aggressive posture" and warned Israel to avoid "provocative moves" against Syria.

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7. YUGOSLAVS TO POSTPONE RECOGNITION OF EAST GERMANY

[redacted] Belgrade has postponed its plans for early de jure recognition of the

East German government because of extreme concern over the anticipated adverse Western reaction. As a compromise, the Yugoslavs will undertake government-to-government commercial negotiations and will weigh Western reactions.

The French government reportedly approached the Yugoslav delegation at the United Nations and informed it that recognition of East Germany would be considered an unneutral act. [redacted]

Comment

Yugoslav recognition of East Germany probably would cause Tito severe difficulties regarding Yugoslav trade with West Germany and would increase suspicion of his continued independence of Moscow. Belgrade has recently shown concern about its relations with the West.

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8. FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS

Comment on:

Despite ex-premier Guy Mollet's failure to get Independent backing in an attempt to form a new cabinet, the French political crisis has probably been shortened as a result of his efforts. Mollet seemed to feel he had narrowed discussions to the primary question of necessary and stringent financial measures to shore up the national economy. The next candidate, presumably Rene Pleven, will probably try to convince the Independents that an austerity program must at least be given lip service.

Speculation on a possible return to power by General de Gaulle will be intensified. An important factor in Mollet's willingness to make the first attempt to form a new government was probably Socialist party apprehensions in this regard. [redacted]

[redacted] supporters of De Gaulle had brought about Bourges-Maunoury's downfall and that De Gaulle is working toward a coup. [redacted] the Socialist belief that the recall of De Gaulle would lead to rank-and-file Socialists cooperating with the Communists, despite Socialist party leaders' desire to prevent it.

De Gaulle's advisers are reported at present to be split into two main groups, one pressing him to act now, the other arguing that the moment is premature.

The crisis has reportedly strengthened the view of labor that prices will be forced upward, but for the moment the unions seem willing to mark time. If the crisis is prolonged, however, and prices continue to rise, the labor situation could deteriorate rapidly. [redacted]

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9. STATE OF SIEGE IN ARGENTINA

Comment on:

The 30-day state of siege imposed on the Argentine capital and surrounding Buenos Aires Province on 5 October was probably designed to prevent new Peronista-Communist labor disorders and possibly also to quiet reported military fears that the Aramburu regime is too lenient with its political enemies.

One report states that the preventive arrest of some 250 "antidemocratic" labor leaders was undertaken independently by General Curanta, chief of the State Intelligence Service, on 4 October and was then hastily legalized by proclaiming the state of siege. Some Peronista-influenced unions that participated in the partially successful general strike of 27 September are still defying a government back-to-work order, and incidents of sabotage in the communications system have been reported.

[redacted] a courier of the "Peronista High Command" arrived in Buenos Aires from Chile on 26 September with instructions for widespread demonstrations on 17 October, and the government may now have learned of these plans.

A government spokesman told the press that the action was aimed exclusively at "defending the normal development of the government's political plan" leading up to general elections in February. Some observers believe the Peronistas' now hope the military will oust Aramburu, call off the elections, and demonstrate its inability to restore democratic government.

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**10. SYRIAN ARMY LEADERS BIZRI AND SARRAJ
VISIT KING SAUD**

Comment on:

Chief of Staff Bizri and G-2 chief Sarraj of the Syrian army embarked secretly on 2 October for Rivadh to see King Saud.

[redacted] the Egyptian commander-in-chief of the Arab Joint Command had agreed to the visit, but opposed a Saudi proposal to employ former Syrian officers in Saudi Arabia unless they were approved by the Egyptian military attaché in Damascus.

Saud presumably desires to continue his efforts to exert a moderating influence on the Syrian leaders in the hope of preventing them from moving too close to the USSR. At the same time, he may be endeavoring to provide jobs outside of Syria for moderate officers who were ousted in the August "coup." He has employed for the past five years Col. Fawzi Silaw, former chief of state under Syrian dictator Shishakli. Bizri and Sarraj probably are seeking to enhance their own positions by appearing to be in King Saud's good graces.

King Hussayn on 5 October sent his aide-de-camp and a palace official to Riyadh on a previously scheduled trip to present Hussayn's views on the Syrian situation and to warn King Saud against the course of events in Syria. Whether Saud timed the Bizri-Sarraj visit to coincide with that of Hussayn's emissaries is not known, but Saud may feel that a personal meeting between them would be a step toward bettering Arab unity.

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11. THAI MARSHAL SARIT REPORTED ILL

[Redacted]

The possibility that Field Marshal Sarit may be physically unable to exercise firm control over the ruling military junta in Thailand is suggested by Interior Minister Prapat's announcement on 1 October that Sarit is ill and confined to his home. In

making his statement, Prapat revealed to the public for the first time that the armed forces chief is suffering from cirrhosis of the liver.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] This chronic disease is likely, however, to force Sarit to give up close direction of affairs, thus undermining his efforts to keep Prapat and others of his ambitious and contending followers in line.

Prapat, a leading contender to succeed Sarit, may possibly have revealed the nature of Sarit's illness to the public as the first step in contesting his chief's fitness to be Thailand's de facto ruler.

[Redacted]