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[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

FAR EAST

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3.3(h)(2)

4. Viet Minh admits discontent within its ranks (page 4).

EASTERN EUROPE

5. Rankovic visiting Western European countries (page 5).
6. US warns Yugoslavia of dangers in establishment of Albanian refugee committee (page 6).

WESTERN EUROPE

7. Franco's present position believed secure (page 6).

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
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GENERAL



3.3(h)(2)


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3.3(h)(2)



3.3(h)(2)



4. Viet Minh admits discontent within its ranks:



An official broadcast of 6 June by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) reproved its military "cadres" for not appreciating the obstacles to victory and for not understanding their close alliance with the world Communist

3.3(h)(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

movement for peace against the "imperialist warmongers." In the case of rank-and-file troops, a certain lack of combativeness was criticized.

Comment: On previous occasions, the central authorities of the DRV have indulged in "criticism and self-criticism." However, they have never before come so close to admitting the existence of discontent and war-weariness at the lower echelons and among the rank-and-file.

The admission that the source of discontent is the implementation of international Communist as opposed to nationalist policies is especially significant. Probably only a continuing suspicion of French intransigence on the issue of independence prevents large-scale defections from the Viet Minh.

3.3(h)(2)

EASTERN EUROPE

3.3(h)(2)

5. Rankovic visiting Western European countries:

[redacted] Yugoslav Minister of Interior Rankovic has left Belgrade on a vacation trip of several weeks to Switzerland, France, Belgium, Holland and the UK. Ambassador Allen in Belgrade had been

informed that Rankovic was urged to make the trip by leading Politburo members in the belief that he should become better acquainted with western life. Since Rankovic is generally regarded as responsible for the repressive measures of the regime, Allen believes that Tito also felt the visit would enable Western officials to form a better impression by meeting him, since he is personally affable and mild-mannered. Allen notes that Rankovic has been endeavoring recently to overcome the security police stigma.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: [redacted]

[redacted] Since the beginning of 1951 there have been numerous visits to the West by high-ranking Yugoslav visitors. These visits probably have several objectives: (1) to gain internal support for the regime among non-Communists by demonstrating the close association of the West with the present leadership; (2) to make the regime more palatable to the West by bringing Yugoslav leaders into direct contact with Western officials; and (3) to promote closer ties between Yugoslav Communism and Western Socialism.

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3.5(c)

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3.5(c)

6. US warns Yugoslavia of dangers in establishment of Albanian refugee committee:

3.5(c)

The Department of State has informed Ambassador Allen in Belgrade that the recent establishment of an Albanian refugee committee in Yugoslavia runs counter to basic US interests

in the area. The Department fears that this action may lead to a direct conflict of interests between Yugoslavia and the US. Ambassador Allen is instructed to point out to the Yugoslav Government that, if the activities of Albanian exiles in the West, as alleged by Yugoslavia, are likely to provoke a Soviet move against Yugoslavia, the danger is obviously much greater when such activity is sponsored by the Yugoslavs themselves. The US Government is therefore concerned over the possibility that Yugoslav creation of an Albanian exile organization may heighten tensions in the area.

Comment: As late as 12 June a Yugoslav Foreign Office official reiterated to Ambassador Allen his government's concern regarding Western support of resistance activities in Albania on the grounds that disturbances there would give Bulgaria an excuse to intervene under the Bulgarian-Albanian Mutual Assistance Pact.

WESTERN EUROPE

7. Franco's present position believed secure:

3.5(c)

The UK Foreign Office concurs in an estimate from the British Embassy in Madrid that Franco will remain in power much longer than his enemies predict and that if he is overthrown it will more likely be by a military junta than by his "ineffectual political opponents." The US Ambassador in Madrid agrees with this estimate and states that the diminution of the strike movement, along with the virtual certainty of good harvests and the hope of an additional Export-Import Bank loan for wheat, makes Franco's position seem firm.

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Comment: Continuation of Army support would enable Franco to remain in power indefinitely. The principal non-Communist opposition forces, aware that the peaceful change of regime they desire can be effected only by the Army, hope that the strike movement can be continued and that it can be made sufficiently effective to convince the Army that a change is essential. The net effect of the strike movement on Franco's political position is not clear at this time, but there is considerable evidence that the Church is becoming increasingly outspoken in its criticism of the regime, especially of its press and labor controls.

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