


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
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Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003400220001-9

25X1A

CONTENTS

25X1

4. GOMULKA DISAPPOINTED IN TALKS WITH MAO TSE-TUNG

25X1A

5. SITUATION IN INDONESIA

25X1A

ok 6. INDIA SEES FOOD GRAIN IMPORTS OF 3,000,000 TONS
ANNUALLY OVER NEXT FEW YEARS

82 7. TURKISH CABINET FORMED AFTER MONTH DELAY

25X1A

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003400220001-9

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003400220001-9

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4. GOMULKA DISAPPOINTED IN TALKS WITH
MAO TSE-TUNG

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[REDACTED]

During a three-hour bilateral talk with Gomulka in Moscow, Mao Tse-tung took a "hard" line in favor of Communist orthodoxy, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The Polish delegation was deeply disappointed, and relations with the Chinese Communists are now cool, [REDACTED]

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In his talks with Gomulka, Mao probably reiterated Peiping's warnings against tendencies in Communist states toward modification of basic Marxist-Leninist doctrine and toward the development of foreign policies not in harmony with over-all bloc interests.

Early this year, Gomulka seemed to feel he would have Peiping's support for a more independent line. [REDACTED]

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27 Nov 57

25X1A

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 6

25X1A

5. SITUATION IN INDONESIA

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The opening of the national development conference in Djakarta on 25 November--the second attempt by the central government to bring the regional leaders into agreement--was marked by the absence of any representative from Central Sumatra, although dissident leaders from other provinces attended. Lt. Col. Hussein, military

commander of that area, was quoted as saying that further discussions with Djakarta are useless as long as "fundamental questions" remain unsolved. Those questions are known to involve greater autonomy for the provinces, restoration of effective cooperation between Hatta and Sukarno, and a settlement of "army problems." Hussein and other Sumatran leaders had said earlier that regional representatives in general would present stiff demands at the conference and were prepared to torpedo the meeting, which they foresaw as ineffective at best and potentially harmful to their interests.

The conference is meeting in an atmosphere made tense by the government's continuing efforts to arouse national feeling over the West Irian issue. With the vote in the UN General Assembly approaching, President Sukarno has just reiterated to Ambassador Allison that Indonesia would have to take some action if its national desires are not recognized in some manner by either the UN or the Dutch. He asserted that this action would take the form of "moral violence, perhaps economic violence, but not physical violence." Sukarno told Allison that "only America can really help--don't throw away the ball to the Russians!"

Despite reports that he is becoming worried by the growth of Communist strength and influence in Indonesia, Sukarno does not yet appear willing or able to forsake Communist support.

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6. INDIA SEES FOOD GRAIN IMPORTS OF 3,000,000 TONS
ANNUALLY OVER NEXT FEW YEARS

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[Redacted]

An Indian food grain inquiry committee reported to parliament on 19 November that India probably will have to import up to 3,000,000 tons of food grains annually for the next few years to make up its shortage between supply and demand and to raise reserve stocks from 1,500,000 to

2,000,000 tons. Such imports would require an outlay of about \$300,000,000 in foreign exchange each year.

Noting that food grain production would probably increase by only 10,300,000 tons instead of the planned 15,500,000 during the Second Five-Year Plan period (1956-61), the committee estimated that by 1961 production would be 77,000,000 tons while the demand--spurred by development expenditures and increased consumption--would reach 79,000,000 tons. The committee also noted that existing stockpiles had been insufficient to meet emergency needs. Furthermore, it found that per capita consumption per day had declined from 18.1 ounces in 1954 to 17.1 in 1956, and it expected that 1957 figure to be about the same as in 1956. Since harvests in 1955 and 1956 were good, the annual population increase of 5,000,000 persons is presumably responsible for this drop.

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7. TURKISH CABINET FORMED AFTER MONTH DELAY

The membership of the Turkish cabinet announced on 25 November indicates that Prime Minister Menderes has emerged from his intra-party struggle over government policy and personalities with his control somewhat shaken. Both the government and opposition parties have grievances carrying over from the October elections and are apparently ready for a showdown concerning their future roles.

The new cabinet contains two thirds of the previous ministers and includes the controversial Fatin Rustu Zorlu as minister of foreign affairs. Fevzi Ucaner, at one time commander of the Turkish air force, was the only former top-level military leader to receive cabinet appointment.

If opposition criticism intensifies, Menderes and other extremists in his party may undertake drastic measures against the press and the political opposition.

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