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17 March 1961

[Redacted]
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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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[Redacted]
State Dept. review completed

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Cambodia - South Vietnam: Cambodian - South Vietnamese relations have again become strained over the issue of alleged ill treatment of the Cambodian minority in South Vietnam. In a 14 March speech, Prince Sihanouk charged that South Vietnam was treating its Cambodian minority as second-class citizens and again raised Cambodian territorial claims against South Vietnam.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Portugal: Prime Minister Salazar is consulting government leaders on "remodeling" the Portuguese cabinet next week.

[redacted] informed the US Embassy of this development believes the premier is responding to pressures exerted on him by the Portuguese military. Salazar is probably also reacting to international criticism of Portugal's rule in Africa. The anticipated changes suggest that the new cabinet will be more ready than the present one to make some modifications in Portuguese policy.

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SELECTED INTELLIGENCE 25X1
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Situation and Prospects in the West Indies: Domestic Political Scene, the Economy, and Foreign Policy Especially Toward UK and US. U.S.I.B. NIE 87.1-61. 14 March 1961.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Morocco May Resume Campaign for Territorial Expansion Southward

King Hassan II may view the activities of Military irregulars in the western Sahara as a means not only of implementing policy but also of diverting attention within Morocco from his inaction regarding constitutional reform.

Morocco's claims to Spanish-controlled Ifni, Spanish Sahara, Mauritania, and the western portion of the French-governed Algerian Sahara province of Ain Sefra, were asserted by Istiqlal party leader Allal el-Fassi immediately after independence was obtained five years ago. The party apparently encouraged raids on European establishments by marauding nomads, and in the fall of 1957 tribesmen and Moroccan irregulars attacked the Spanish garrisons in Ifni and in northern Spanish Sahara. Since then the Moroccan Army has occupied the outlying areas of Ifni. Spain transferred to Morocco in April 1958 a substantial strip of northern Spanish Sahara, now known as the territory of Tarfaya. Concerted Spanish and French military counteraction quashed irregular activities farther south.

The captured oil prospectors were operating in a concession granted by Spain to the United Oil Company, an American firm. [redacted]

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[redacted] armed men had been infiltrated from Morocco into Mauritania by way of Spanish Sahara to create internal disturbances there when the UN General Assembly reassembled.

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Cambodian Refugees From South Vietnam

The relations between Cambodia and South Vietnam have deteriorated further since a Saigon daily, Saigon Mai, broke a press truce between the two countries and launched a series of inflammatory anti-Cambodian articles in early February. Prince Sihanouk, who is always suspicious of Vietnamese intent, is convinced that this attack was government inspired. He appears to have seized upon the refugee problem as justification for a retaliatory move. This problem is primarily the result of unsettled conditions in southern Vietnam and the clashes between the government forces and Communist guerrillas.

Prince Sihanouk's speech, however, went further than to denounce the Diem government's treatment of its Cambodian minority and raked up the whole issue of Cambodia's claims to the former French colonial area of Cochinchina, South Vietnam's southernmost region. He castigated the French colonial rule both for having consistently sacrificed Cambodian territory to Vietnamese interests and for having failed to protect minority rights when the territory was turned over to the Vietnamese in 1954. His statement that the United Nations, concerned with the welfare of tens of thousands of Europeans in Africa, should be even more concerned with the mistreatment of the several hundred thousand Cambodians in Vietnam is the first public suggestion that he is seeking UN intervention in the dispute with Diem.

The US Embassy in Phnom Penh suggests that Sihanouk may have been attempting to forestall leftist elements from making political capital of these areas of Cambodian discontent. Regardless of his intent, however, this outburst from the chief of state threatens to destroy the slow progress toward rapport which had been under way over the past year.

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Salazar to "Remodel" Portuguese Cabinet25X1
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[redacted] told embassy officials that General Botelho Moniz, minister of defense, "comes out of the reshuffle stronger than ever." [Moniz, who claims to have the backing of 90 percent of the military, has been pressing Salazar since the Santa Maria episode in January and the February disturbances in Angola to make changes in Portuguese policies in Africa or risk the loss of military support of the regime. Moniz has reportedly felt for some time that the military might be forced "to take matters into their own hands."]

The events in January and February have also emboldened the civilian opposition in Portugal. In early February, in an unprecedented action, Salazar permitted the President to receive three members of the opposition who presented a formal request for political concessions. Salazar has also felt it was necessary for the opposition to "let off some steam" in the controlled press. Mounting international criticism of Portugal, particularly as regards its African policies, and the realization that Portuguese Africa has been selected as a target for special attack by anti-colonialist countries in the UN may also have led Salazar to believe he must at least make gestures in the direction of change.

The most significant change slated appears to be a shift in the Ministry of the Presidency. The holder of this position is generally regarded as the most likely successor to Salazar, and the present incumbent, Theotonio Pereira, is an ultraconservative dedicated to continuing Portugal on the path chosen by Salazar. The reported new appointee to this key post, Dr. Marcello Caetano, is probably the most respected and popular figure in Portuguese politics. As a former minister for the overseas areas, he is familiar with the basic problems at issue and is reported to have become more liberal in his views in recent years. He and Moniz have political foes in common and could be expected to work well together. Moniz

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may have also achieved a victory in getting his supporters into the Overseas Ministry, and into the three military ministries.

Pereira is slated to take over the Foreign Ministry. The present foreign minister, Marcello Mathias, would return to his previous post as ambassador in Paris.

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The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

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Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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The Director

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The Director

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The Director

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The Director

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