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~~TOP SECRET~~**GENERAL**

1. **Norway and Denmark still planning opposition to Greek-Turkish NATO membership:** 3.3(h)(2)
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[Redacted]

Foreign Minister Lange now intends at Ottawa to oppose NATO membership for Greece and Turkey but will finally vote for such membership if all

other members do. The Norwegians, however, reportedly believe Denmark is prepared to veto membership if supported by one other country, presumably Norway or the Netherlands. US Ambassador Bay points out that should the Danes solicit Norwegian support for a veto, Lange would be placed in a difficult position.

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WESTERN EUROPE

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3. Tito would welcome meeting with Austrian Foreign Minister:

The Yugoslav Minister in Vienna has informed Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber that Marshal Tito would welcome a meeting in Yugoslavia some time before 15 October. The proposed discussion would cover boundary questions, trade relations, anti-Soviet tactics, and mutual defense. Gruber refused to commit himself to the meeting before consultation with other Austrian cabinet ministers. The US Legation in Vienna is strongly opposed to the discussion and has considered an attempt to discourage Gruber from undertaking the trip.

Comment: An Austro-Yugoslav defense arrangement, if it is included as a subject of conversation, appears premature in the absence of an Austrian army, and might cause an adverse Soviet reaction. Since the USSR apparently has not considered the Austrian treaty negotiations apart from the Soviet position vis-a-vis Yugoslavia, any Austrian move suggestive of friendship for the Titoist cause might jeopardize further the possibility of a four-power settlement in Austria. In view of well-known Austrian antipathy for Yugoslavia, particularly along the border areas, it is somewhat doubtful that moves toward closer relations between the two countries would be universally popular at this time on the Austrian side.

4. Soviet interference in local administration disturbs Austrian government. 3.3(h)(2)

Foreign Minister Gruber has advised the US Legation in Vienna that continued Soviet interference in local administrative and judicial matters has forced the Austrian Cabinet to complain once more to the Soviet High Command. Describing Soviet meddling as "perhaps growing worse," Gruber stated that, in the absence of corrective measures, his government would be compelled to raise the issue in parliament and to protest to the Allied Council.

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Comment: Wide publicity has been given to Soviet unilateral interferences by the Austrian press in recent weeks. The objectionable actions usually consist of an assumption of police powers by local commanders, countermanding of Austrian directives, and intervention in court proceedings. While demonstrating some sensitivity to Austrian protests, Soviet authorities have not heretofore been willing to sacrifice immediate objectives -- or to discipline local commanders -- for the sake of good public relations.

5. Adenauer indicates anxiety over Allied talks on Germany:

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West German Chancellor Adenauer has indicated that he is most concerned over the Washington talks on Germany's new status and its defense role. He stressed that his whole future and that of his government coalition are at stake. The chancellor's emissary, in a talk with the US Deputy High Commissioner, asserted that rifts were appearing in the coalition and that the

chancellor was being criticized for going too far to meet Allied wishes. The chancellor, therefore, was particularly anxious that an agreement acceptable to the German public be reached in Washington.

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Comment: Adenauer has been forced, partly by the intransigent Social Democratic attitude, into a position where, in order to sell rearmament to the German people and to the parliament, he must present the rearmament issue in conjunction with some sort of Allied agreement restoring German sovereignty. Although the details of the Foreign Ministers' agreements on Germany are not yet clear, the Washington accord appears to have answered many of the government's conditions.

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