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14 May 1960

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

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OK

Cambodia: US Ambassador Trimble views Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai's visit to Cambodia earlier this month as having a profound impact on Cambodia's international outlook. He feels that Cambodian leader Sihanouk, in effect, regards Chou's public pledges of Communist China's support for Cambodia, which Chou was careful to describe as "moral and political," as a guarantee of Cambodian national integrity, and accordingly will be more inflexible than ever in disputes with South Vietnam and Thailand. Continued efforts by these two countries to undermine Sihanouk may well influence Cambodia to abandon its policy of strict neutrality.

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OK

India: The Indian Communist party has postponed a showdown between its "moderate" leaders and hard-line extremists until a party congress is held in January 1961. The Communists' national council, having failed during its meeting from 6 to 12 May to resolve the bitter controversy over future party policy, appointed a balanced committee to formulate another draft program. [The radical "leftist" faction, encouraged by Peiping's hard-line Red Flag articles, has gained some ground recently but the "moderates," reflecting Moscow's views, have retained control. The party outwardly has closed ranks since last fall's open split on the Sino-Indian border dispute, but deep differences remain, especially over the degree of support to be given generally to Nehru.]

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
DAILY BRIEF

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LATE ITEM

*USSR: The US Embassy in Moscow considers that the public campaign in the USSR concerning the U-2 Plane incident has been "stepped up one notch." The keynote of the workers' protest meetings, now widely organized throughout the USSR, is the condemnation of the concept that there could be justification of US efforts to penetrate the "iron curtain" in the interests of the people. This program to create an "outraged" Soviet public appears designed to strengthen Khrushchev's hand in Paris against any Western efforts in summit negotiations to breach the basic assets of bloc secrecy.

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Cambodian Internal Outlook Following Chou En-lai Visit

The visit to Cambodia by Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai from 5 to 9 May, coming at a time of serious Cambodian - South Vietnamese friction, may have a far-reaching effect on Cambodia's international outlook, in the opinion of American Ambassador Trimble. While it made relatively little impact on the general public, except for the enthusiastic Overseas Chinese community, Chou made a deep and favorable impression on Cambodian leader Sihanouk, the royal family, and Cambodian officialdom.

The Chinese leader, who came to Cambodia to deepen Sihanouk's preference for a neutral foreign policy and to counterbalance American influence there, apparently was determined to achieve a maximum impact without making any formal commitment to protect Cambodia's borders. Chou En-lai on 8 May made no commitment beyond stating that it was "moral and political" support China was offering and cautiously added that any "other" kind would depend on the needs of Cambodia, the possibilities at Peiping's disposal, and conditions prevailing at the time.

Despite the innocuous joint communique ending the visit, Sihanouk probably looks upon Chou's oft-repeated public pledges of Communist China's support for Cambodia as a guarantee of Cambodian national integrity. Sihanouk, in his personal press organ, The Nationalist, commented on 7 May that the Cambodian people are convinced that Cambodia's escape from the "murder prepared by its neighbors" is due to the attitude of Communist China.

Sihanouk probably intends to use the threat of Chinese Communist support in disputes with South Vietnam and Thailand, and will be more inflexible than ever. In connection with current difficulties with South Vietnam over several offshore islands in the Gulf of Siam, Sihanouk's hand has been strengthened by Chou's tour of the area in a Cambodian gun-boat and his flat statement that they belong to Cambodia.

Whether Sihanouk abandons his policy of strict neutrality will depend largely on future South Vietnamese and Thai policy toward Cambodia. He has repeatedly warned that continued efforts by these countries to undermine him could push him "into the arms of the Chinese Communists."

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Indian Communists Fail To Resolve Party Split

Indian Communist leaders have again failed to resolve the deep division in their party between proponents of a moderate line and those favoring more radical tactics. The showdown expected during the national council's meeting from 6 to 12 May in Calcutta now has been put off until a full-scale party congress is held in January 1961. The council, recognizing its inability to reconcile the differences, has appointed a committee, representing both the moderates and the hard-line extremists, to "study" the problem further and formulate another draft resolution for discussion in January. The party meanwhile is to be guided by the moderate "Amritsar thesis" adopted in 1958, which emphasized a peaceful, parliamentary approach to power.

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Moderate General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh has been granted sick leave for three months, and E. M. S. Namboodiripad, former chief minister of Kerala, will act as party leader during this period. Namboodiripad has long been identified with the faction favoring parliamentary tactics, although he reportedly sided with the radical group in recent intraparty maneuvering.

Ideological confusion among the Indian Communists has been compounded by recent indications of similar differences between Peiping and Moscow. Extremist leaders--representing the "internationalist" viewpoint--have seized on Peiping's Red Flag articles to bolster their advocacy of a harder line, but the moderate faction enjoys the stronger advantage of support from the Soviet party.

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