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GENERAL

1. Western delegates at Paris still divided on vital questions:

At a 6 April meeting of the Western delegates at the Paris Conference, UK delegate Davies proposed a rephrasing of the armament item if Gromyko refused to accept the present

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Western version. French delegate Parodi, agreeing with US delegate Jessup, objected to this on the ground that the UK rewording subordinated the level of armaments to the reduction of armaments. Parodi stressed that concessions should be mutual, and suggested the possibility of giving in to the Soviet demand that German demilitarization be the first sub-item if, in return, the USSR would agree to consider the level of armaments ahead of the reduction of armaments.

Parodi, reporting that he had been authorized to accept a reference to Trieste in the sub-item on treaty fulfillment under item one, suggested that the West submit a new proposal early next week. The three delegates received the impression at the 5 April meeting that the USSR would not press its item on the North Atlantic Treaty and bases, but agreed that they were not yet in a position to formulate a counter-proposal to it.

USSR

2. Comment on Tass denial that Soviet troops are in Manchuria:

A 6 April Moscow radio broadcast states that the Tass news agency has been authorized to deny reports appearing in the US press to the effect that Soviet troops are being concentrated in Manchuria.


Soviet propaganda media do not usually react so quickly to foreign press reports. This reaction suggests that the USSR wishes to refute promptly any suggestion that it is preparing for more direct involvement in the Korean conflict. The presence of Soviet

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military personnel in Manchuria, particularly of air and technical advisers, is confirmed. There is no firm evidence, however, indicating that Soviet military units are in Manchuria, except for those units stationed at Soviet bases in the Dairen-Port Arthur area.

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FAR EAST


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**NEAR EAST****5. Comment on the recent border incidents between Israel and Syria:**

Tension remains high along the Syrian-Israeli border as a result of the 5 April bombing of Arab houses in the frontier zone southeast of Lake Tiberias. The Israeli bombing action followed an Israeli-Syrian border clash of the previous day when several Israeli policemen were killed. The latest outbreaks aggravated a dispute of several weeks' standing between the two countries over Israel's right to drain land in the central demilitarized sector just south of Lake Hule. In the last few days the UN Security Council has received: (a) an Israeli protest against Syria, (b) a Syrian demand for Security Council action on the border incidents, and (c) a cabled report from the UN Truce Commission at Jerusalem accusing Israel of violating the armistice agreement in the Lake Hule region!

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The development of formal hostilities between Israel and Syria is not anticipated at the present time, particularly since both the Israeli and Syrian Prime Ministers have indicated their opposition to such an eventuality. Three factors make the current situation more serious, however, than that following previous Israeli-Arab border incidents: (a) a strong nationalist sentiment in Israel which hinders any Israeli concessions to Syria, (b) the instability of the Syrian government and the ambition of Syrian Army colonels who may contemplate military action to strengthen their own influential positions, and (c) the growing resentment of the Arab States generally toward Israel that has resulted from the latest border incidents.

EASTERN EUROPE

6. Greek proposal to partition Albania reported:

In a 4 April conversation with US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade,

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[redacted] declared a Yugoslav Politburo member had told him that a Greek proposal had been made to Yugoslavia on the "highest level" for the possible division of Albania between Greece and Yugoslavia. When Ambassador Allen expressed disbelief, [redacted] revealed that this information had been confided to him in the "most frank conversation he had ever had with a Yugoslav official either before or since 1941." Allen suggests that possibly Greek Prime Minister Venizelos countered the recent Yugoslav demarche regarding Greece's course of action in case of a satellite attack on Yugoslavia by referring to the "future" of Albania.

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Comment: The Greeks have traditionally entertained aspirations for Northern Epirus (Southern Albania). It is possible that they attempted to sound out the Yugoslavs regarding a partitioning of Albania. Such a suggestion would certainly further arouse Yugoslav fears of foreign intervention in Albania and may partially explain recent reports in the Yugoslav press charging that Greece and Italy are interfering in Albania.

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WESTERN EUROPE

7. Improved Berlin transport situation:

URGENT

US authorities in Berlin report no major Soviet harassing measures against water, rail, and highway movements between Western Germany and West Berlin. The

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Soviets have now apparently agreed to sign the recent agreement with the British on Berlin water transportation and most inter-zonal canal traffic is flowing freely, although the Rothensee locks remain closed for repairs. Rail movements have been normal. Truck traffic is also fairly normal, although the Soviets on several occasions held traffic at their main check-point until a back-log accumulated. They then released all vehicles at once and, when these vehicles converged on the British check-point, took news-reel pictures showing the contrast between free traffic on the Soviet side and the back-log at the British border.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

Comment: The present situation represents a considerable improvement. Sporadic harassing of Allied traffic by the Soviets and East Germans increased during early March, resulting in British-Soviet talks on the water traffic situation and a tightening of Allied restrictions on East German barges in West Berlin.

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9. Italian Communists plan new tactic in peace campaign:

In his speech at the Communist Party congress, Italian Communist leader Togliatti declared that the problem now facing Italy was not neutrality but peace and independence from foreign intervention and that the Italian Communist Party was seeking above all to achieve this objective.

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Togliatti's speech indicates that he and Moscow believe the Italian Communist Party can operate effectively by continually posing as the "party best capable of rallying the majority of the population in favor of peace." The Embassy anticipates, therefore, that the Italian Communists will use "independence" propaganda to cover their campaign of pacifism and military defeatism -- which is calculated eventually to cause serious strikes. The Embassy believes that the fact that the major conference speech on labor matters was delivered by Longo, rather than by the head of the Communist-dominated General Labor Confederation, emphasizes the subordination of the labor confederation to over-all Italian Communist Party policy.

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