

25X1



19 June 1957

25X1

Copy No.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 47
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

1) DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: HAL 02

DATE: 26 Dec 79 REVIEWER:

25X1

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25X1



~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003100470001-5

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003100470001-5

25X1A

CONTENTS

1. PEIPING RELEASES OFFICIAL VERSION OF SECRET MAO SPEECH [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1

2. MOCH RESISTS SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST SUSPENSION PROPOSAL [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1

3. JAPANESE UNITED ON KISHI MISSION TO US [REDACTED]
(page 10).

25X1A

4. JAPAN RESENTS SOUTH KOREAN STALLING ON DETAINEE EXCHANGE [REDACTED]

25X1A

5. PAKISTAN SEEKS UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON KASHMIR ON 8 JULY [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1A

6. NEW IRAQI PRIME MINISTER [REDACTED]

7. GREEK PRIME MINISTER CONTEMPLATING VISIT TO EGYPT [REDACTED]

25X1A

[REDACTED] 25X1A

1. PEIPIING RELEASES OFFICIAL VERSION OF SECRET
MAO SPEECH

25X1A

[Redacted]

The text of Mao Tse-tung's 27 February speech released by Peiping on 18 June was described as being "based on the verbatim record." In the interests of intrabloc harmony, Mao seems to have edited out certain passages and made some additions, with a view to minimizing differences in doctrinal viewpoints between the Chinese and other Communists.

References to Hungary in the speech reflect the sharp impression the East European disorders made on the Chinese. Those disorders may have been the primary stimulus to Mao's introspections on the so-called contradictions in Chinese society. As previously stated in press articles appearing in Communist China and other countries, Mao stressed that these contradictions were in the main "nonantagonistic" and could therefore be resolved by education and persuasion rather than by terror.

Despite this promise of a softer hand, the text just released by Peiping shows that Mao was far from sounding any retreat from Communist principles. By and large, he supported Moscow's viewpoint on Hungary, laying the major blame for last fall's events on "domestic and foreign counterrevolutionaries." He justified past terrors employed by the Chinese Communists as necessary to the times, although he admitted that excesses had been committed in condemning innocent people. The underlying mood of the speech is one of unbounding confidence in the socialist system, which Mao called "far superior" to other systems.

In the course of his analysis, Mao revealed that considerable segments of the Chinese population are dubious about Communist tenets and policy. He admitted that some intellectuals are reluctant to accept Marxism-Leninism, but urged

25X1A

that they be given opportunities to work "as long as they comply with the requirements of the state." Referring to cynicism among Chinese students, Mao observed wryly, "Marxism, once all the rage, is not so much the fashion now." After discussing popular complaints concerning the hard lot of the peasants, Mao promised that the amount of grain taxes and state grain would be stabilized over the next few years. He confessed that student and worker strikes had taken place in China last year and that there had also been some "disturbances" among the peasants.

Mao accepted the principle that Marxism could be criticized in China and affirmed his faith in the policy of letting different schools of thought contend. But criticism was acceptable only if it came from friendly quarters; proper punishment was to be meted out to those who "deliberately put forward unreasonable demands...or spread rumors to create trouble."

Perhaps as a counter to the anti-Soviet overtones in unofficial versions of Mao's speech, the official text closed with a tribute to the Soviet Union. While urging that the Chinese learn from all countries, socialist and capitalist, he declared that the "main thing is still to learn from the Soviet Union."

25X1A

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003100470001-5

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003100470001-5

25X1A

3. MOCH RESISTS SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST SUSPENSION PROPOSAL

25X1A

25X1A

French disarmament delegate Jules Moch's speech to the UN Disarmament Subcommittee on 17 June reflected his private statement that "the West was beaten" on the nuclear test suspension issue and that test cessation must be tied to other measures before the West is forced to accept suspension of tests without other accompanying disarmament measures.

Moch told the subcommittee that he was "wary of excessive optimism" about the new Soviet position. He recalled the short-lived optimism which prevailed after the USSR announced to the UN General Assembly in October 1954 its acceptance of the Anglo-French plan of 11 June 1954 as a basis for negotiations. Moch emphasized that controls must be effective and should cover seven general categories, including ground and aerial control, mobile inspection teams, and cessation of manufacture of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

Moch has taken the position that he desires iron-clad controls in order to open up prospects for complete nuclear disarmament, thereby forestalling reported nationalist pressures in France to begin manufacture of nuclear weapons. The possibility exists, however, that his position may rather be an effort to block any agreement until France becomes a nuclear power.

19 June 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin
25X1A

Page 7

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003100470001-5

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003100470001-5

25X1A

6. JAPANESE UNITED ON KISHI MISSION TO US

25X1A

Prime Minister Kishi succeeded in gaining the support of all elements in Japan, including even the Socialists, for his trip to the United States, according to the American embassy in Tokyo. He was careful, however, not to arouse anticipation of immediate concessions and changes of policy by the United States. The embassy notes that there is a real sense of national pride that Kishi will be given a top-level welcome and be treated as the leader of a "first-class nation."

Editorials in the press have repeatedly emphasized that Japan's desire for "adjustments" and "greater independence" in relations with the United States does not mean that it seeks to loosen ties of friendship and co-operation between the two nations. While there is apprehension that Japan's deteriorating foreign exchange position may make Kishi especially vulnerable to American pressure, particularly on the build-up of defense forces, anti-American comment has been at a minimum.

The embassy believes that unless Kishi can present evidence on his return that he was taken more seriously than his predecessors and that an adjustment of relations is coming, both Kishi and American interests face difficulties.

19 June 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 10

25X1A

25X1A

7. JAPAN RESENTS SOUTH KOREAN STALLING ON DETAINEE EXCHANGE

25X1A

[Redacted]

Japan bitterly resents South Korea's failure to carry out an agreement at this time on the mutual release of detainees and the resumption of negotiations on an over-all settlement, the American embassy in Tokyo reports. It feels Seoul has used unfair tactics in exploiting Japanese anxiety for an early settlement to extract maximum concessions and in using detained Japanese fishermen as hostages to force recognition of the Rhee Line. Kishi said on 14 June that Tokyo had granted the "maximum possible concessions" and that unless agreement is reached now, a settlement may be postponed for six months or a year.

Comment

Kishi and the Korean ambassador reached a tentative agreement last week on the exchange of detainees and resumption of negotiations for an over-all settlement. President Rhee, however, has delayed a decision on the agreement, possibly to avoid giving Kishi a political victory before he left for the United States. Although the outlook for an early exchange of detainees appears favorable, Rhee is under no pressure to reach, and probably does not desire, an over-all settlement with Japan.

19 June 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 11

25X1A

8. PAKISTAN SEEKS UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON KASHMIR ON 8 JULY

25X1A

Pakistan, which previously seemed prepared to wait until next fall to raise the Kashmir question again in the United Nations, now is seeking a

Security Council meeting by 8 July, according to statements made by Foreign Minister Noon to British foreign secretary Lloyd. Karachi has already prepared a draft resolution it would like to see adopted by the Security Council. The resolution, which stresses demilitarization of Kashmir, induction of a plebiscite administrator, and the holding of a plebiscite, is unacceptable to the British in its present form and would be rejected out of hand by India. British officials, however, are divided as to how far their government should go in supporting Pakistan.

25X1A

By pressing for an early meeting of the Security Council on the Kashmir question, Pakistani leaders probably hope to exert pressure on the British to support their arguments if the issue is raised during the Commonwealth prime ministers conference which begins on 26 June. The Pakistani government may also hope in this way to increase international criticism of India for obstructionist tactics even though it may not anticipate any real action by the United Nations before next fall.

25X1A

9. NEW IRAQI PRIME MINISTER

25X1A

25X1A

Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, former prime minister and first Iraqi ambassador to the US, has completed the formation of a cabinet to replace that of Nuri Said which resigned on 8 June, according to press reports from Baghdad.

Ali Jawdat, one of Iraq's conservative elder statesmen, is on good terms with both Nuri and Crown Prince Abd al-Ilah and will probably carry forward Nuri's policies, but with a greater emphasis on co-operation with the United States. The replacement of Nuri will facilitate collaboration between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and other anti-Nasr Arab countries.

25X1A

19 June 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 13

25X1A

25X1A

**10. GREEK PRIME MINISTER CONTEMPLATING VISIT
TO EGYPT**

25X1A



Greek prime minister Karamanlis told Ambassador Allen on 16 June that Egyptian president Nasr would shortly invite him to visit Egypt and that he had also received a tentative invitation from the Sudan. Karamanlis says he has received several indications that Nasr is feeling increasingly isolated and may be seeking a rapprochement with the West through Greece.

Queen Frederika is displeased with the prospect of Karamanlis visiting Egypt; she feels that Nasr is not to be trusted. To offset such a visit, she is trying to persuade King Paul to visit Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan.

Comment

While Karamanlis' evident interest in visiting Egypt is probably motivated primarily by his desire to enhance Greek prestige in the Middle East, he probably also believes such a visit would further Western interests there. Greek leaders have long resented and sought to counter Turkey's aggressive diplomacy in the area.

The queen may believe that a Greek royal visit to the Arab monarchies would further enhance Greek prestige among the Arabs, as well as maintain the prestige of the royal family vis-a-vis the prime minister. [Redacted]

25X1

19 June 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 14

25X1A

