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THE TAIWAN STRAIT

[redacted] (page 13)

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1. SUKARNO IMPOSES "GUIDED DEMOCRACY" BY DECREE

Comment on:

[Redacted]

President Sukarno's concept of "guided democracy" has been imposed on Indonesia by an emergency decree promulgated on 8 May. It was explained that parliamentary democracy had failed.

The law, signed by Sukarno two days previously, established a "national council" which will advise the government "with or without its consent." Sukarno will personally head the council, which will include "functional" representatives of all significant elements of society, including the Communist Party, and at least seven regional representatives.

This action climaxes Sukarno's efforts in the past six months to increase Communist influence in government. During that time he has frequently expressed his admiration for the bloc's organizational methods in promoting the interest of "the masses." The decree was issued shortly after the beginning of the state visit of Soviet president Voroshilov.

Sukarno's decision to go ahead with his plans despite the disaffection of most non-Javanese areas indicates that he has the support of the army chief of staff and of army units of Javanese extraction stationed throughout Indonesia. With the additional support of the small navy and air force, he undoubtedly expects to restore central control over the outlying areas.

[Redacted]

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2. JORDAN MAY DEFER REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF IRAQI TROOPS

[Redacted]

King Hussain and Deputy Premier Samir Rifai have been persuaded, at least temporarily, not to request entry of Iraqi troops as a means to force withdrawal of Syrian troops from Jordan, according to Ambassador Mallory in Amman. Hussain was persuaded on this course by Abdul Monem Rifai, former ambassador to Washington and brother of the deputy premier, who drafted a note which was delivered to Syria on 6 May stating that Syrian forces in Jordan had "exceeded their purposes" and requesting replacement of the leftist Syrian commander. While the note did not specifically ask the Syrians to withdraw, the language suggested further Jordanian moves if Syria did not desist from political activity in Jordan.

Comment

On 4 May, Deputy Premier Rifai told Ambassador Mallory that he desired to put pressure on Syria to withdraw its 3,000 troops from Jordan by requesting entry of Iraqi troops in accordance with the Iraqi-Jordanian treaty of 1947. The Syrians have asserted that their troops are at King Hussain's command. The decision on whether to withdraw, however, will probably be made by Nasr. [Redacted]

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3. CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS REPORTED BY HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA

Comment on:

In a note to the Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) on 8 May, Honduras charged Nicaragua with two serious violations on 7 May of the temporary cease-fire agreement which the special OAS committee had concluded with each government on 5 May. Nicaragua denied these charges and claimed that Honduras had itself violated the cease-fire by air attacks on two towns in the disputed area.

Honduras also charged that aircraft, pilots, and war materiel arrived in Nicaragua late on 6 May from the Dominican Republic in response to a Nicaraguan request. The arrival of this aid has not been confirmed. Nicaragua may have requested the Dominican Republic's military aid, which was reportedly offered to Nicaragua last October in the event of an emergency.

The OAS committee has only until the evening of 9 May to work out a mutually acceptable troop withdrawal plan if the deadline in the cease-fire agreement is to be met. President Somoza told the American ambassador on 7 May that he would not agree to withdrawal of Nicaraguan police and civil authorities from that portion of the disputed area which he considers indisputably Nicaraguan. He might, however, withdraw his troops from this area temporarily if the Hondurans agreed to retire to a line north of their present positions.

An 8 May broadcast in Honduras indicates that Hondurans are still being urged to register for military service. [redacted]

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**4. SOVIET SHIPMENTS TO EGYPT OF EQUIPMENT FOR
NUCLEAR PHYSICS LABORATORY**

Comment on: [Redacted]

A nuclear physics laboratory which the USSR has agreed to establish near Cairo will probably be completed on schedule in early 1958,

[Redacted] Unidentified apparatus and a "control desk" for the laboratory are to be delivered in July and August, and buildings to house the nuclear laboratory are to be completed "either in August or September."

The agreement under which the USSR is establishing the laboratory was signed in Moscow on 9 February 1956. Under a second agreement of 12 July 1956, the two governments agreed to "co-operate in nuclear physics research and peaceful applications of atomic energy." The USSR has already furnished some equipment, but has not yet shipped a promised small nuclear reactor of 2,000-kilowatt capacity.

Soviet scientists will probably be needed to direct laboratory operations for several years. Cairo cannot now furnish the necessary trained personnel, although 12 to 15 Egyptian students are being trained in nuclear sciences at the Moscow State University. [Redacted]

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5. CAIRO TO RETAIN CONTROL OF FEDAYEEN GROUPS IN JORDAN

Comment on:

Jordanian authorities have recently attempted to gain control of fedayeen groups in Jordan which have in the past operated against Israel under the direction of Egyptian and Syrian military intelligence but which King Hussain probably fears could be directed against himself.

Sharif Nasr, uncle of King Hussain, had offered the fedayeen groups increased pay if they "did not work for Egypt and Syria, but only for Jordan," and threatened those who refused to co-operate.

Egyptian authorities in Cairo instructed [redacted] that the fedayeen groups should continue to work for Egypt without any increase in pay since "the operation is patriotic rather than materialistic." Cairo added that some fedayeen should accept Sharif Nasr's offer in order to gain information on Jordan's intentions.

Hussain reportedly hopes to use subverted fedayeen in order to obtain intelligence on other groups which might be sent to stir up trouble in Jordan.

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6. CUBAN POLICE AND ARMY PERSONNEL IMPLICATED IN ANTI GOVERNMENT CONSPIRACY

A conspiracy against the Cuban government in which army personnel and police officers are involved has been discovered by the national police.

The discovery was made following the arrest of a police corporal. More arrests are expected.

The Cuban army is on an alert status because of insistent rumors that new revolutionary attempts will occur during May.

Comment Serious disaffection within the army, Batista's principal source of power, would constitute a real threat to the stability of the government, which has been weakened during recent months by its failure to control rebel action, sabotage, and continued scattered violence. At present, Batista retains control over the army, although disaffection within the ranks and among junior officers has been rumored for some time.

The most serious threat to Batista's control over the army occurred during April 1956, when a conspiracy by influential officers was nipped in the bud. Rumors persist that certain of those officers, now in prison, have maintained connections with civilian revolutionary groups determined to depose Batista.

7. ROJAS' "RE-ELECTION" MAY LEAD TO SHOWDOWN IN COLOMBIA

Comment on:

The Colombian political crisis appears near a showdown as President Rojas' hand-picked National Constituent Assembly convened on 8 May and voted his "re-election" for the 1958-1962 term.

The bulk of the armed forces appear to remain loyal to Rojas. Widespread rumors that discontent has spread to the military, however, have in part been substantiated by the fact that several high-ranking officers have recently expressed

sharp criticism of Rojas to American embassy personnel.

[redacted] a high-ranking army officer,

[redacted] recommended at a general staff meeting that Rojas be ousted; the officer said afterward he expected to be arrested momentarily.

[redacted] "Rojas' tenure now appears only a matter of hours."

Violence in the past two days has centered in the industrial city of Cali, where student demonstrations have resulted in 15 dead and 50 wounded. Banking, industrial, and commercial establishments have totally or partially closed down in the major cities, possibly as part of the opposition's tactics to oust Rojas by a general strike.

In a 6 May speech to the nation, Rojas indicated his determination to stand firm. He met with banking officials on 7 May, however, and reportedly discussed his resignation and departure from the country.

Communists are not believed to be playing any part in the widespread unrest.

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8. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT SEEN LIKELY IN ITALY

Comment on:

President Gronchi is not expected to name a premier-designate until after French president Coty's departure early next week. An exclusively Christian Democratic cabinet seems the most likely outcome of the cabinet crisis caused by Premier Segni's resignation on 6 May. Segni will probably be asked first to attempt to reconstitute a coalition government. While Gronchi would probably prefer a single-party Christian Democratic government to be drawn mainly from the left wing, it is unlikely that such a cabinet could win confirmation.

Since the Christian Democratic Party lacks a majority in parliament, it would have to draw support alternately from the right or left, depending on the issue. Chances for passage of controversial legislation or for anything more than a few months' tenure appear slim.

There is renewed speculation that the general elections, now scheduled for the spring of 1958, may be held this fall.

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9. GOVERNOR HARDING'S VIEWS ON A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT

[Redacted]

Governor Harding told the American consul in Nicosia on 6 May that the British are reassessing the value of Cyprus as a base in connection with their new defense plans, and said there is a limit--"say, two years"--to the length of time Britain can continue its direct rule on Cyprus under present conditions. Consul Courtney gained the impression that London is looking seriously at the possibilities of "inviting others" to share military facilities or even of withdrawing entirely.

Harding said that Turkish antagonism makes guaranteed independence impractical at present. He believes partition might work if carried out gradually--perhaps over a 10-year period--with the British meanwhile continuing to administer Cyprus.

Comment London regards partition as a possible last resort. In view of the difficulties involved, however, it apparently continues to hope that Ankara instead can be persuaded to accept guaranteed independence for Cyprus. If Britain withdraws from Cyprus, the Turks will undoubtedly move to occupy the island unless restrained. [Redacted]

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10. CHINESE COMMUNISTS GIVE THEIR VIEWS ON PROPER CONDUCT FOR COMMUNIST STATES

Comment on:



A Polish report of conversations held in Peiping last month between Chinese Communist leaders and the Cyrankiewicz delegation, recently printed in the highly authoritative Warsaw magazine Polityka,

indicates that the Chinese Communists have not budged from their previous positions on key questions relating to bloc affairs and that they are still confidently advancing their views as sound doctrine for the Communist world.

Peiping's leaders stressed the importance of resolving internal conflicts by convincing the people through argument rather than by applying wholesale repressive measures--except in instances where the "enemy" has intervened, as was the case in Hungary. On questions involving intrabloc relations, the Chinese made clear their view that solidarity is not the same as uniformity and reportedly declared that because every nation has its own peculiarities, experience gained in one country cannot be uncritically applied to another. The Chinese urged that differences between bloc countries be discussed privately within party channels rather than in open public debate.

In a press conference with Soviet correspondents on 4 May, Chou En-lai strongly reaffirmed Peiping's position that it is necessary to accept certain differences between the various socialist states in order to maintain bloc unity. Chou declared the guiding principle is for Communist states to be "at one in the main while differing in particulars." Chou commented, "We consider that it is not necessary for all socialist states to inevitably have 100-percent identity of views on all questions. This is impossible even inside one party!"

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~~SECRET~~**S U M M A R Y****10 April - 8 May 1957****THE TAIWAN STRAIT****Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
for the Taiwan Strait Problem**

1. There were no significant combat operations in the area during the period. [redacted]

2. The Yingtan-Amoy Railroad was officially opened to regular through traffic on 11 April. The Nanping-Foochow branch will not be completed this year, according to a Hong Kong Communist newspaper article, which stated that only one third of the distance to Foochow will be finished during 1957. [redacted]

3. Photography of 13 April disclosed the concentration of about 125 probable landing craft about 80 miles south of Shanghai, near Ningpo. Also disclosed in this general area was a small shipyard with 14 similar craft on the building ways. These craft seem to be of the type being built in Dairen which can carry 110 troops each. The craft are suitable for troop transport and resupply activities and for coastal amphibious operations against offshore islands. [redacted]

4. Chiang Kai-shek's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, is reliably reported to have said [redacted] that no Chinese Nationalist invasion of the mainland could take place in 1957. This remark is in line with a statement attributed to President Chiang Kai-shek before the Kuomintang central committee in March. The president is said to have declared the more advantageous time for attacking the mainland was "later rather than earlier," and that the opportune time might come within the next five or seven years. [redacted]

5. Peiping reacted to the announcement that Matador missiles would be stationed on Taiwan by renewing charges that the United States is planning to turn Taiwan into an aggressive atomic

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base. At the same time the Chinese Communists charged that the announcement reflected US alarm at the "profound response" on Taiwan to their "peaceful liberation" overtures. Peiping concluded that the US action would not "weaken even slightly the determination of the Chinese people to liberate Taiwan."

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
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TAIWAN STRAIT SITUATION

CHINESE COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND:

DESIGNATIONS	PRIMARY AIRFIELD CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT IN AREA WITH PREPARED RUNWAY GENERALLY 5000 FEET OR LONGER.	SECONDARY AIRFIELD AUXILIARY OR EMERGENCY BASES OR FIELDS OF LESSER IMPORTANCE. RUNWAYS GENERALLY LESS THAN 5000 FEET.	USABILITY			
			+	I	?	■
ACTIVE BASE FOR MILITARY & CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT. SOME BASES USED BY PISTON TYPES MAY BE USABLE BY JETS	●	▲	OPERATIONAL			
INACTIVE BASES CAPABLE OF USE BY AIRCRAFT	○	△	SERVICEABLE			
CURRENT STATUS UNDETERMINED			UNKNOWN			

* FIELDS NOT CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING SUSTAINED OPERATIONS AT PRESENT.

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