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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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3.3(h)(2)

**GENERAL**

3.3(h)(2)

**2. Italy and Japan agree to end state of war:**

[Redacted] Italy sent a note to Japan with the approval of the US, the UK and France, proposing that the state of war between the two countries be terminated, and that outstanding questions shall be negotiated in accordance with the principles of the Japanese peace treaty. The Japanese Government has agreed. Instruments of ratification will not be exchanged until the Japanese peace treaty comes

into force. Italy is anxious that its agreement with Japan be announced simultaneously with the signature of the multilateral treaty.

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**Comment:** Unlike India, which already has made a unilateral approach to the Japanese Foreign Office, Italy was not invited to participate in the San Francisco conference. This exclusion drew indignant comment from Italian Foreign Office officials, on the grounds that Italy broke relations with Japan in September 1943, became a co-belligerent with the allies in the following month, and declared war on Japan in July 1945. Losses to the Italian Government and to its nationals in Japan have been claimed to amount to 15 to 20 million dollars.

USSR

3.3(h)(2)

**Kirk sees Vishinsky on US citizens detained in Communist China:**

Ambassador Kirk talked with USSR Foreign Minister Vishinsky on 6 September about a Department of State message urging the governments of the USSR and ten other nations to intercede with Communist China on behalf of those US citizens imprisoned or forcibly detained in China.

Vishinsky remarked that the message had not been sent to the most important addressee, Communist China, stating that it was not necessary to have diplomatic relations in order to exchange direct messages. He believed that the US citizens in question were being given justice and said that inasmuch as this was a matter of Chinese internal affairs the Soviet Government "of course, could not intervene." However, the message would be considered.

Vishinsky complained about the US failure to recognize the "lawful" government of China and boasted that, without the presence of the American Seventh Fleet, the Chiang Kai-shek regime would be disposed of within an hour.

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## NEAR EAST

3.3(h)(2)

4. Opposition to Iran's prime minister gathers strength:

[Redacted]

The US Ambassador in Tehran states that an organized plan to force the resignation of Prime Minister Mossadeq is under way in Parliament's lower house. The ambassador adds that British-supported Seyyid Zia currently is favored as Mossadeq's successor, although Qavam is also being seriously considered.

Comment: Anti-Mossadeq forces have increased their activity with the approach of the pre-election adjournment of parliament. Believing that settlement of the oil problem is impossible while Mossadeq remains prime minister, and aware that the government has been strengthening its electoral position by placing its sympathizers in strategic positions in the provincial governments, members of the opposition are making an increased effort to replace Mossadeq before parliament adjourns.

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## WESTERN EUROPE



3.3(h)(2)

Soviet official expresses optimism on Austrian treaty prospects:

Austrian Chancellor Figl has informed the US Legation that in the course of a recent meeting with an unidentified Soviet official in Vienna the latter observed that the treaty problem is being studied and that chances for an agreement may be better after the San Francisco conference. The Soviet official refused, however, to elaborate further

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on the subject, remarking only that the Western powers and not the USSR have heretofore prevented agreement.

Chancellor Figl points out that the conclusion of a treaty with Japan and a contractual agreement with Western Germany will make the resumption of treaty negotiations a psychological necessity for the Austrians.

Comment: The optimistic observation of the Soviet official has the appearance of conversational forbearance rather than of firm policy commitment. However, Soviet authorities have recently demonstrated an increased sensitivity to Austrian popular opinion. After years of representations by the Austrian Government, the Soviet headquarters has within the last week released information concerning the fate of a number of Austrians deported to the Soviet Union and has promised that all such persons will now be permitted to communicate with their families in Austria.

3.3(h)(2)

8. Italians reluctant to accept present European Army plans:

Premier de Gasperi has informed the US Ambassador in Rome that it would be difficult to obtain parliamentary approval for Italian participation in an integrated European army such as

is now being considered at the Paris conference. The parliament would object not only to the loss of control over the Italian armed forces, which might be construed as unconstitutional, but also to the appropriation of Italian funds for expenditure by some other authority. De Gasperi added, however, that Italy is firmly dedicated to the principle of integration of Europe.

De Gasperi proposed the separation of the "political administration" of the European army from military command headquarters. He said a European army could then be created, with the question of the political administration of defense forces to be worked out later. In De Gasperi's opinion, assurances that Germany will make an adequate contribution to the defense of Europe constitute one of the most important elements for the prompt solution of the problem.

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Comment: De Gasperi probably wishes to place himself in the best bargaining position possible before the Ottawa conference and his projected talks with US officials in Washington. Also, he is hesitant to raise any additional controversial question in parliament at this time in view of his loss of prestige resulting from dissatisfaction with both his foreign and domestic policies.

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