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24 May 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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South Korea: Major General Pak Chong-hui, actual leader of the military revolt, informed General Carter Magruder, United Nations commander, on 23 May that the new government desires to return its armed forces to UN control. He added, however, that security considerations in Seoul currently prevent compliance with orders of the United Nations Command that troops removed from the combat area during the coup be returned to their positions.

[Besides wanting to retain in Seoul troops on whom he can rely, Pak's temporizing may be the result of a split within the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. The split is apparently between a moderate group led by Lieutenant General Chang To-yong, army chief of staff and head of the new cabinet, and a larger group, led by Pak and Marine Corps Commandant Kim Yun-kun, which is attempting to expand its military control over all aspects of national life. There are reports of dissatisfaction among army colonels who, along with General Pak, planned and executed the coup but who were subsequently denied cabinet posts in favor of general officers who joined the revolt belatedly.]

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Mass arrests continue, including those of high military officers and the speaker of the house of representatives, Kwak Sang-hun, who returned to Korea on 22 May from a visit to Washington. Official efforts to marshal student and veterans' demonstrations in favor of the new government have met with unenthusiastic response. [] (Backup,

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DAILY BRIEF

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25X6 Afghanistan-Pakistan: Pakistan Air Force planes continue to bomb hostile concentrations in Pakistan near the Afghan border.

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Pakistan continues to be confident of its ability to handle the situation in the border area following the 20 May attacks, which were apparently launched by Afghan special forces disguised as tribesmen and supported by dissident local tribesmen. Kabul continues to deny that its forces were directly involved in the 20 May attacks, attributing these entirely to local Pushtoon tribesmen resisting Pakistani Government "oppression." [REDACTED]

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24 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page

Yugoslavia: As a result of adverse weather, Yugoslavia's winter wheat harvest will fall substantially short of the approximately 4 million tons needed to meet domestic requirements. According to the American Embassy, Belgrade will request that the US supply 700,000 tons of wheat--beyond the 200,000 tons already granted--between now and the end of the year and may ask for an additional 600,000 tons to tide it over until the 1962 harvest. Failure to obtain this wheat would further complicate Yugoslavia's already difficult adjustment to the far-reaching economic reform which is being put into effect. Belgrade will in any event suffer political embarrassment, since regime leaders boasted after the good harvest in 1959 and the average harvest in 1960 that this, among other economic successes, proved the superiority of its economic system over [redacted] that of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

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
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Colombia: Rural violence, long endemic in Colombia, has increased during the past several months, with over 1,000 known to have been killed since January 1961. This breakdown of civil order has been accompanied by public lack of confidence in the courts, the police, and even the army as means of protection in the affected rural areas. Communist and pro-Castro agitation has periodically encouraged the violence, which is now on the increase in important coffee growing regions. This rural instability is accompanied by a political impasse as the governing coalition is unable to agree on procedures for the presidential election next May. [redacted] (Backup, Page 9) OK

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South Korean Situation

[Elements of the 5th and 12th Infantry Divisions, which had been serving as reserve units on the northern border, and three field artillery battalions from the Sixth Corps, also in the same area, were withdrawn to the Seoul area shortly after the coup on 16 May. These units, plus rear-area marine and army airborne forces which actually carried out the coup, remain in or near the city. American military observers point out that the withdrawal of these forces has seriously weakened the combat front, particularly in regard to artillery support.]

[The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) has arrested two additional brigadiers, one a front-line division commander, and three colonels. Thus far, however, the SCNR has dealt leniently with Second Army Commander and former Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Choe Kyong-nok, who did not support the coup and temporarily blocked a military takeover in the city of Taegu. Choe has been relieved of command and ordered to proceed unescorted to army headquarters in Seoul.]

The nationwide crackdown continues; military tribunals have been established throughout the country to handle "murder, arson, and rebellion, disturbances, and other criminal cases" except those which were being processed by civilian courts. Reserve legal officers have been recalled to the army, presumably to try such cases. Reserve medical officers who were released prior to completion of military service also have been recalled. The SCNR has issued an order authorizing the suspension of newspapers and other publications, and one unconfirmed report indicates that 75 of the nation's 110 newspapers have been closed. Radio listeners are reported turning to Pyongyang broadcasts for "uncensored news."

President Yun Po-sun, according to his personal secretary who talked with an American Embassy officer on 22 May, believes that a return to civilian authority is imperative and that the longer the junta remains in power, the worse it will be for the South

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Korean Army. Yun sees long military rule increasing factionalism in the army and further weakening military discipline. He believes that there should be a return to civilian authority within a maximum of six months under a strong presidential system, but claims he is not thinking of himself as a candidate.

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Situation in Colombia

As part of the effort to re-establish civilian rule after the military dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla (1953-57), Colombia passed a constitutional amendment in 1958 providing for long-term collaboration between the Liberal and Conservative parties in a "National Front." This requires the two parties to alternate in the presidency and otherwise to maintain parity in all elective and appointive offices until 1974.

Since President Lleras Camargo is a Liberal, the joint candidate for president in the May 1962 election must be a Conservative, but the law does not specify how he shall be nominated. The Liberal party, which won a majority of the popular vote in the 1958 congressional elections, wants an equal voice in choosing the candidate, while the right wing of the Conservative party, led by former President Laureano Gomez, insists that the nomination is a Conservative prerogative. This impasse has continued since late 1960, and both inter- and intraparty antagonisms are becoming increasingly bitter--a factor which has impeded congressional action on such important legislation as the government's program for agrarian reform. The Liberal Revolutionary Movement, a dissident Liberal faction which has evidenced some pro-Castro and Communist sympathies, is planning to run its own presidential candidate in protest against the National Front system.

A semi-anarchy characterized by outbreaks of indiscriminate murder has prevailed in many rural areas since constitutional government broke down in 1948; it is conservatively estimated that over 250,000 people have died by violence in this period and that some 1,500,000 peasants have been displaced. The violence is not attributable to any single cause; it springs from a complex of agrarian grievances, regional rivalries, and sharp party antagonisms. The centers of violence shift from time to time and at present seem to be located in the agriculturally rich departments of Cauca and Valle, which are important coffee-growing regions.

Rural unrest decreased markedly in the first two years of President Lleras' term, but Colombian Army figures for the first four months of this year list 1,038 deaths by violence as

compared with 892 for the same period in 1960. The army commander in chief, motivated partly by a desire to deflect criticism from the army for permitting this resurgence of violence, publicly attributed it to party antagonisms over the approaching elections and warned that state-of-siege powers in the departments concerned might have to be broadened. Subsequently, Lleras banned all political activity there for an indefinite period.

Colombian political observers noted that, for the first time since Rojas' overthrow, the military were "suggesting" a course of action to political leaders. Rojas, following his release from government detention, has started making political speeches again, and some politicians are disturbed by his re-emergence; the US Embassy in Bogota, however, does not consider him a serious threat to the regime at this time. The National Civil Registry last week deprived Rojas of all prerogatives of citizenship.

There have also been rumors of plans for a coup by pro-Castro elements; the Bogota police have frustrated several bombing attempts in the past two weeks; and on 19 May the government indicated its concern over subversive activities by announcing the initiation of an army investigation of such activities.

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