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19 February 1959


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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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19 FEBRUARY 1959

**I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**

Khrushchev reaffirms tough line on Berlin.

Peiping stung by Western criticism; publicizes defense of communes.

JAEIC evaluates Soviet general's remarks about nuclear weapons.



**II. ASIA-AFRICA**

UK, Greek, and Turkish foreign ministers hold emergency sessions to avert breakdown of Cyprus negotiations.

Morocco - King's two-week trip abroad may lead to further instability.

Guinea responding to bloc diplomatic and economic overtures.

Cambodia - Defensive precautions being taken by Sihanouk's and Dap Chhuon's forces; Chhuon hopes for peaceful solution.

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

19 February 1959

## DAILY BRIEF

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR: In his speech at Tula on 17 February, Khrushchev adopted a defiant attitude toward the Western powers' determination, reaffirmed in their notes of 16 February, to uphold by all appropriate means their communications with West Berlin. He repeated previous public warnings that "if anybody should start shooting, this would mean the beginning of war." Khrushchev's tough line on negotiations suggests the USSR will promptly carry out its announced intention to transfer control over Allied access and sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany if the West rejects Soviet proposals on Berlin and a German treaty. His favorable reference to Senator Mansfield's proposal for direct negotiations between East and West Germany underscores Moscow's effort to confront the West with a choice between measures carrying a serious risk of war or concessions which would erode the Western position on Berlin and German reunification.

(Page 1)

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Communist China: Peiping radio has broadcast two recent articles from the party's leading newspaper and theoretical journal with the stated purpose of refuting US and other Western criticism of the commune program. This and similar articles in the past indicate the degree of Peiping's sensitivity to adverse international reaction to this program. The commune system continues to receive a very bad press throughout Asia, with the exception of Cambodia. While the Chinese Communist party's December plenum modified some of the extremes of the program, such as measures affecting family life and personal property, Peiping intends to push the development of communes in 1959.

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USSR: The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee believes the Soviet fission weapons yields reported to the Swedes by General of the Army Popov--2, 5, 10, 20, and 50 kilotons--probably do not represent the full spectrum available to the Soviet military forces. Further, it is believed the Soviet thermonuclear stockpile certainly contains a selection of yields ranging from 200 kilotons to eight megatons, rather than a single thermonuclear weapon as Popov implied.

*-ngan*

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

*M*

Cyprus: Emergency meetings of the British, Greek, and Turkish foreign ministers dealing with the Cyprus issue are being held in London to avert complete breakdown of negotiations following the "dramatic quarrel" between Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and Archbishop Makarios. This split, plus delays and disruption resulting from the crash of the Turkish prime minister's plane, has caused a serious loss of momentum in the talks which opposition elements in all areas will probably attempt to exploit. A formal break between Karamanlis and Makarios would cause Karamanlis serious political difficulty in Greece.]

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Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet hostile action which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East, particularly in Iran and Iraq. The situation in the area remains precarious, but a deliberate initiation of large-scale hostilities is unlikely in the immediate future.

*M*

Iran: Current tensions between Iran and the USSR can be expected to continue and, with the signing of the Iranian-US bilateral agreement, to increase to a point short of direct military action.

*pk*

Morocco: King Mohamed V plans to be away from Morocco from 20 February through 5 March. He will visit Corsica and Madagascar. At a time when the country is embroiled in a political contest between factions of the ruling Istiqlal party, his absence will invite more instability.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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Guinea - Soviet bloc: Guinea appears to be responding to the Soviet bloc's campaign to establish diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties with the independent states of West Africa. Sekou Touré's government signed a trade and payments agreement with a visiting Soviet trade mission on 13 February, and is in the process of concluding new arrangements with several Eastern European satellites. A Bulgarian ambassador has reportedly already presented his credentials in Conakry. [ ] (Page 6)

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Vietnam  
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Cambodia: [Stringent security measures have been imposed by disaffected General Dap Chhuon at his headquarters in Siem Reap, and similar defensive precautions are being taken by the Sihanouk government in the Phnom Penh area. Meanwhile, accusations by South Vietnam of border raids by Cambodian troops may be groundwork for Vietnamese diversionary action along the frontier intended to coincide with Chhuon's internal move against Sihanouk, which had been tentatively set for mid-March. Chhuon, however, apparently still hopes to avoid bloodshed by reaching a peaceful solution with Sihanouk which would curtail Communist influence in Cambodia.] [ ] (Page 7)

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DAILY BRIEF

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Khrushchev Defies West on Berlin

Khrushchev's speech at Tula on 17 February underscored Moscow's current efforts to confront the Western powers with a choice between risking war to enforce their right of access to Berlin or making concessions which would erode their position on Berlin and German reunification. The Soviet premier adopted a defiant attitude toward the West's intention, reaffirmed in the notes of 16 February, to "uphold by all appropriate means" its communications with Berlin.

Khrushchev said Soviet troops in East Germany are not there to play games and repeated previous public Soviet warnings that "if anybody should start shooting, this would mean the beginning of war." (

Khrushchev also sought to discourage any belief that Western access to Berlin could be maintained by an airlift if the land routes are closed. He asserted that East Germany would obtain full sovereignty by the conclusion of a peace treaty and would vigorously rebuff any encroachment on its territory by land, air, or water. This formulation seems to imply that a separate treaty might be speedily concluded either prior to or simultaneous with the transfer of access controls to the East Germans.

Khrushchev's tough line on negotiations with the West suggests that if the West rejects the Soviet proposals regarding Berlin and a peace treaty signed by both German governments, the USSR will promptly carry out its announced intention to transfer the controls and sign a separate treaty with East Germany. He ridiculed the Western formula of "no concessions without counterconcessions" and said, "We... have nothing to concede. We made our proposals without bargaining."

Moscow's apparent belief that its threatening posture on Berlin will force the West to move toward at least de facto recognition of East Germany was reflected in Khrushchev's

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favorable reference to Senator Mansfield's proposal for direct negotiations between the two German governments on unification of both Berlin and Germany.

Khrushchev concluded his speech with a sharp attack on the Shah of Iran for breaking off his negotiations on a nonaggression pact with the USSR. His statement that the USSR will "see to it that the people of Iran understand our attitude correctly" probably foreshadows an intensified Soviet propaganda campaign aimed at discrediting the Shah's regime. [redacted]

[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~JAEIC Statement of 17 February 1959

{A [redacted] military delegation which visited the Soviet Union last November was informed by General of the Army M. M. Popov that the Soviet Army possessed five types of nuclear weapons: a two-kiloton artillery shell, a five-kiloton rocket projectile for close support, and bombs yielding 10, 20, and 50 kilotons for tactical employment by Soviet Tactical Air Force units equipped with the TU-16.}

{The Long Range Air Force was said to have a thermonuclear weapon "in the megaton range" in addition to smaller bombs. The [redacted] delegation inferred that their hosts had been instructed to make the visit worthwhile without disclosing any classified or order-of-battle information.}

{During a visit to the Soviet Union in July 1957, [redacted] the firing by the Soviet Army of two half-kiloton nuclear artillery shells. An Austrian military delegation visited the Soviet Union in October. These invitations to foreign military observers indicate a Soviet campaign to impress neutral nations with the nuclear capabilities of Soviet military forces.}

{The possession of nuclear artillery shells is estimated to be well within the capability of the Soviet Union. No tests of such devices have been identified in the nine-year history of the Soviet weapons testing program, but such low-yield tests could well have escaped detection. The yields of the fission weapons described to the Swedes probably did not include all those available to the Soviet military forces, and the Soviet thermonuclear stockpile certainly contains a selection of yields ranging from approximately 200 kilotons to eight megatons. The [redacted] delegation was given no information on the availability of nuclear weapons for air defense or other applications.} [redacted]

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Cyprus Situation

{An emergency meeting at the foreign ministers' level was called in London on the evening of 18 February to prevent the threatened collapse of the conference seeking agreement on the terms for an independent Cyprus. The urgent meeting follows reports that Archbishop Makarios has broken with the Greek Government and no longer accepts the Cyprus agreement reached between Athens and Ankara on 11 February. The future of the conference now depends on Makarios, as Britain, Greece, Turkey, and the Turkish Cypriots have agreed on the terms for a settlement. Failure to secure the archbishop's approval would eliminate hope for a solution at present and could lead to a renewal of the struggle on Cyprus. The possibility cannot be precluded that Makarios is maneuvering for further concessions, which would also enhance his political stature in both Cyprus and Greece.}

{Makarios' opposition to the agreement appears concentrated on the terms providing for British base rights on Cyprus, and the right of Britain, Greece, and Turkey to intervene if Cypriot independence is threatened. There may also be problems in London regarding the timing and method of execution of the agreement, the degree of Turkish Cypriot participation in the government, and the question of whether or not Cyprus will remain within the British Commonwealth. Makarios' advisers reportedly are pressuring the archbishop to submit any plan for Cyprus' future to a plebiscite on the island.}

{If the London conference fails to achieve a settlement of the Cyprus issue because of Makarios' objections, an open break between the Greek Government and the Cypriot Ethnarchy is virtually certain. Karamanlis recently stated that regardless of the results in London, Greece intends to maintain cordial relations with Turkey, will order the return of the Greek NATO contingent withdrawn from Izmir last June, and will announce withdrawal of further support for the Greek Cypriot cause.}

{A final break between Karamanlis and Makarios would have serious consequences on the Greek political scene, with both Communist and nationalist opposition parties demanding the government's resignation. Karamanlis' ability to survive would depend on the loyalty of the members of his own party in the Chamber of Deputies, where he enjoys a small majority.}

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[Redacted]

Moroccan King May Revisit Corsica and Madagascar

{King Mohamed V plans to leave Morocco on 20 February for a 12-day visit to Corsica and Madagascar. The King has long planned a "sentimental journey" to Madagascar, where he was imprisoned by France during the greater part of his 26-month exile in 1953-1955. At a time when the country is embroiled in a bitter political contest between factions of the ruling Istiqlal party and tribal disorders in north and central Morocco have not been quelled, his absence will invite more instability.}

{Unless the situation worsens drastically, the King probably will proceed with the trip, returning before the month-long Moslem fast of Ramadan beginning about 11 March. As during other royal absences from the country, the crown prince probably will remain in Morocco to serve as regent. Because he became embroiled in difficulties on the two earlier occasions when he was regent--a tribal uprising two years ago and the opening of the offensive by Moroccan irregulars against the Spanish enclave of Ifni in western Morocco in November 1957--his authority may this time be drastically curtailed.}

The King [Redacted] hopes De Gaulle will invite him to stop in Paris on his return from Madagascar. Such an invitation, in the King's view, would provide an excellent opportunity for the two leaders, together with President Bourguiba of Tunisia who has publicly expressed a wish for consultations with De Gaulle, to discuss a solution of the Algerian rebellion. [Redacted]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Guinea Increasing Ties With Soviet Bloc

Guinea appears to be responding favorably to Soviet bloc efforts to expand diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with independent states of West Africa.

Guinea was recognized by most Communist regimes soon after it became independent last October. Its first direct contact with the bloc was a trade and cultural accord last fall with East Germany. This was followed by a "general protocol" with Czechoslovakia envisaging trade relations and "economic and scientific technical cooperation"--terminology which has in the past sometimes meant the extension of bloc credits.

More recently Guinea received a commercial delegation from Poland and signed a formal trade and payments agreements with the USSR on 13 February which provides for an exchange of coffee, bananas, and other agricultural products for Soviet-manufactured and -processed goods.

Meanwhile, a Guinea delegation, including leftist Interior Minister Keita, has been accorded red-carpet treatment in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland this month. In East Berlin, the visiting Africans discussed implementation of the trade and cultural agreement and were promised a new gift radio transmitter. In Prague, where they were received by President Novotny, they apparently agreed to an exchange of diplomatic representatives in the "immediate future" and also to the establishment in Conakry of a permanent Czech trade delegation.

A Bulgarian ambassador who arrived in Conakry late in January apparently was the first chief of mission to present his credentials and may thus be dean of the local diplomatic corps.

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~~SECRET~~Showdown May Be Near in Cambodia

[The break between Premier Sihanouk and General Dap Chhuon, disaffected military commander in northwestern Cambodia, is causing increased security precautions on both sides. Chhuon, who is readying a move against Sihanouk with the active support of South Vietnam, has established checkpoints around his headquarters at Siem Reap and is no longer permitting visits by government officials without prior clearance. These moves parallel security measures already taken in the Phnom Penh area on orders from Sihanouk, who is unsure of Chhuon's strength. Chhuon apparently still favors a peaceful compromise solution with Sihanouk to avoid bloodshed, but their divergent views on the Communist threat to Cambodia militates against this.]

[A key question is the attitude of General Lon Nol, opportunistic chief of staff of the Cambodian armed forces. In addition to this assignment, Lon Nol has been named defense minister in Sihanouk's reshuffle of his cabinet on 18 February. The cabinet changes apparently are part of Sihanouk's spreading witch hunt against officials suspected either of collusion with antigovernment elements or of being too inept to cope with the "present delicate situation."]

[In accusing Cambodia of border raids, South Vietnam may be laying the ground for some diversionary action along the frontier to coincide with Chhuon's internal move, tentatively set for mid-March. There has also been some evidence of sabotage and terrorist acts in Cambodia, intended to create confusion preceding the coup. Reports have been received of a rash of kidnapings and holdups in the countryside, as well as expert sabotage of construction equipment on the new highway from Kompong Som Bay to Phnom Penh.]

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Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

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The Secretary of the Air Force

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Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

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Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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The Director

**Atomic Energy Commission**

The Chairman

**National Security Agency**

The Director

**National Indications Center**

The Director

**United States Information Agency**

The Director

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