


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
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State Department review completed

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1. AMBASSADORS APPRAISE VIEWS OF ISRAELI CABINET

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The American and British ambassadors in Tel Aviv appraise the attitude of Israeli prime minister Ben-Gurion and the majority of his cabinet as including the following elements:

(1) No settlement with the Arabs is possible for a long time. The Israelis are convinced that the Arabs, from their present position of strength, desire at best a type of settlement which would merely facilitate the subsequent destruction of Israel.

(2) Israel distrusts Anglo-American moves for a settlement, because it feels Western strategic interests will "load the dice" heavily against Israel. The Israelis also believe the West underestimates Egypt's expansionist tendencies.

(3) Any intervention, if it occurred at all, would come too late to protect Israel, particularly against air bombardment.

(4) Militarily, the Israelis are confident they could defeat an Arab attack within the next few months or contain it until the end of the year if Soviet arms are not effectively absorbed by Egypt. They now believe, however, that even a military victory would give them only a temporary respite, and have shelved the idea of initiating a preventive war. They nevertheless may react strongly against Arab terrorist tactics or continued "breaches" of the armistice agreement, even at the risk of war.

(5) Israel wants neither war nor an arms race. It does, however, want sufficient arms to protect itself during an initial period of attack until outside assistance could become effective.

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2. FRANCE ASKS NATO FOR STATEMENT SUPPORTING TROOP TRANSFERS TO ALGERIA

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The French have asked the North Atlantic Council to consider issuing a public statement of political support for French troop transfers to Algeria. (These transfers have been at the expense of France's NATO commitments in Western Europe.) The French stressed the necessity to demonstrate NATO solidarity in an area recognized by military authorities as necessary to NATO's strategic interests. They hope for a decision by 27 March.

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Ambassador Perkins reports that the Belgian, German and Italian representatives were initially favorable to this request, which involves a new departure for NATO. The British Foreign Office feels committed not to oppose the French. The Netherlands, Norway and Denmark felt their governments would need to give careful consideration to the implications of such a statement. Canada and others indicated they were awaiting instructions.

Comment

Among the many problems this request presents is whether to categorize the Algerian situation as a French internal or a NATO security concern. There is sympathy in NATO for the French predicament, but some members wish to avoid any action that might provide a precedent on other issues, such as Cyprus and Goa.

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4. USSR BEGINS ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON JAPAN AS
LONDON TALKS BREAK OFF

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Suspension of the Japanese-Soviet treaty talks in London has been followed promptly by a Soviet move to force Japan into concluding a peace treaty through economic pressure.

25X1A The USSR announced a decree on 21 March restricting salmon fishing in the North Pacific "until conclusion of a suitable agreement with interested countries." Both sides have agreed that a definitive agreement on settling the fisheries problem will be incorporated as an annex to the treaty, but the USSR will not discuss the annex until the treaty itself is agreed upon.

About 90 percent of last year's Japanese salmon catch came from the area that has now been restricted by the Russians. Japanese fishing interests, which exert a powerful influence on the Hatoyama government, will probably press for a resumption of the Japanese-Soviet peace talks and for concessions to Moscow.

The Soviet move, however, may not provoke a strong official reaction. Influential Japanese leaders recently expressed the view that the Japanese people are accustomed to Soviet intransigence, and implied that, far from being able to act like a great power, Japan was too weak even to protect Japanese fishing activities from depredations arising from South Korea's unilaterally imposed Rhee line.

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5. SOVIET TWIN-JET TRANSPORT FLIES TO LONDON

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[REDACTED]

A CAMEL (TU-104), the Soviet Union's first twin-jet passenger aircraft, carrying Soviet security chief Ivan Serov, arrived in London on 22 March. Strict security precautions were imposed while the aircraft refueled prior to its return to Moscow.

This trip marked the first appearance of the CAMEL outside of the USSR and the first indication that this aircraft is ready for operational use. The CAMEL was first seen in the July 1955 Air Day show in Moscow. Since that time no more than two such planes have been observed simultaneously.

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[REDACTED] the TU-104 was being used for limited express flights to the Far East and would be introduced into regular passenger service this spring. [REDACTED]

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7. NORTH KOREA MAY BE ADOPTING
COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP



The first indication that the Soviet-endorsed principle of collective leadership may be applied to a Far Eastern Satellite has been noted in recent North Korean broadcasts. Heretofore the North Korean home radio has consistently accompanied its evening broadcast with the slogan, "Long live Marshal Kim Il-sung, the respected and beloved chief of the Korean people." Since 19 March this slogan has been omitted.

Soviet influence is paramount in North Korea, and the recent emphasis on collective leadership in the USSR is likely to have repercussions in North Korea. Kim was installed as premier by the USSR in 1948, and North Korean propaganda has long shown him a deference much like that which was accorded Stalin in the USSR. Omission of the slogan hailing Kim is not believed to be an indication that he is in political disfavor.

Propaganda from Communist China and North Vietnam has continued to give special attention to the personal leadership of Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh. No Far Eastern Communist country has mentioned the Kremlin's recent denunciation of the "cult of the individual" or Khrushchev's speech criticizing Stalin.

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