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3. JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER ASSERTS INEVITABILITY OF RECOGNIZING "TWO CHINAS"

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[Redacted]

Foreign Minister Shigemitsu told Ambassador Allison on 30 November that at some point the United States and Japan "would have to face facts"

and recognize "two Chinas." He stated that Japan would consider it a threat to its interests if Taiwan should fall into Communist hands, and suggested vaguely that a plebiscite would make clear the people's desire to remain in the free world.

In suggesting a continuous exchange of views on China, Shigemitsu said it was not too early to consider what would happen when Chiang Kai-shek dies. He said that unless prior thought is given to this problem, both Japan and the United States may be placed in a "most awkward" position.

Shigemitsu stated that Japan's closeness to continental China and its historical relations with the mainland made it impossible for Japan to maintain as aloof and uncompromising a posture as the United States might think desirable. He said that Japan had no intention or desire to trade in strategic items with Communist China, but that it hoped to expand trade in consumer goods.

Comment

Tokyo has long believed that a normalization of relations with the Communist bloc, particularly with Communist China, is necessary for Japan to achieve economic self-support and political power in Asia. Tokyo has increasingly encouraged unofficial business and cultural contacts with Communist China in an effort to accomplish a detente which will gain acceptance of the "two Chinas" principle by Peiping despite the latter's repeated rejection of the principle.

**4. EAST GERMAN LEADERS REPORTEDLY GOING
TO CHINA**

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[redacted] An East German delegation including Premier Grotewohl, party first secretary Walter Ulbricht, Foreign Minister Bolz and political officials of the Foreign Ministry will leave for Communist China on 5 December,

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[redacted] Richard Gyptner, the newly appointed East German ambassador to China, left for Peiping on 28 November to be on hand for the arrival of this delegation.

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Comment

Such a visit would probably be designed to enhance East Germany's prestige and at the same time to emphasize Soviet bloc support for Communist China. The two regimes might sign a treaty of friendship. East Germany is one of the most important Satellite suppliers of capital goods and technical assistance to China. (Concurred in by ORR)

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**5. USSR REQUESTS JORDAN TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS**

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The Soviet Union has asked Jordan to establish diplomatic relations,

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
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Comment

This Soviet overture to Jordan, following similar overtures to Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Libya, may find a favorable reception unless Jordan can obtain substantial military aid from Britain.

Egypt's arms deal with the Soviet bloc has been widely approved in Jordan. Jordan, feeling itself particularly exposed in the Arab conflict with Israel, also feels a need to increase its arms.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 1 December)

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No significant military activity has been reported in the last 24 hours. The American army attaché in Tel Aviv reports that Israel's "desperate attempt" to gain a favorable American decision to supply arms makes it very unlikely that Israel will undertake any retaliatory raids at present.

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Press reports that Syrian troops are massing on the Syrian-Israeli border probably result from routine troop rotation. Syrian chief of staff Shuqayr told the American army attaché in Damascus on 29 November that the frontier continued to be calm, and that if it remained so, he planned to continue his rotation of troops.

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Shuqayr also said that Syria and Lebanon continue to oppose suggestions--which he broadly hinted come from the Egyptian military attaché in Damascus--that Egyptian terrorists be allowed to operate from their territory.

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The Syrian chief of staff indicated that considerable progress had been made in the recent Syrian-Egyptian military talks in establishing the mechanism of the joint command and that a fairly detailed joint military plan on the use of troops had been drawn up. He also said that he and the Lebanese chief of staff had reached agreement on joint use of troops along the Syrian and Lebanese borders with Israel. Despite Shuqayr's apparent satisfaction over these talks, it is unlikely Syrian-Egyptian military capabilities have been significantly increased. The Syrian-Lebanese agreement merely formalizes existing arrangements.

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