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
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
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
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1. INDICATIONS SUGGEST LAUNCHING OF SECOND SOVIET SATELLITE IS IMMINENT



a second earth satellite launching by the USSR is imminent. It is considered possible, but less likely, that this evidence presages the test launching of an intercontinental ballistic missile.



The second Soviet satellite probably will be more extensively instrumented than the first, and may transmit some signals on the agreed IGY frequency of 108 megacycles.

2. ANOTHER SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST OFF NOVAYA ZEMLYA

[REDACTED] another Soviet nuclear explosion occurred at 0654 GMT on 10 October off the south-western tip of Novaya Zemlya.

Comment

This is the fourth Soviet nuclear test in the Novaya Zemlya area since the Soviet announcement of 2 September warning all Soviet and foreign vessels and planes that this area would be restricted from 10 September to 15 October. The announcement said ships and aircraft would be carrying out exercises with the actual use of various types of modern arms in conjunction with a plan to test the combat readiness of the Northern Fleet.

3. FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS

Comment on:

Prospects for a prolonged government crisis in Paris appear to have been increased by Rene Plevén's failure to line up a coalition. The Paris press now sees no way out of the "impasse," and there is open talk of new elections which might permit one party to win enough National Assembly seats to form a stable government. The 1956 elections, however, demonstrated the unlikelihood of such an outcome without prior electoral reform, and no such reform can be undertaken by a caretaker government.

There is speculation that President Coty may now call on a center Popular Republican or a Radical Socialist, but an early second attempt by Mollet is increasingly likely. His chances are estimated by some observers to be dimmer now than at the beginning of the crisis, since his party's position has hardened following a renewal of Independent attacks on the Socialist economic program.

Nevertheless, the parties are under growing pressure to end this crisis, and the possibility of a quick resolution of differences to form at least a temporary coalition cannot be ruled out. Clamor for "a call to General de Gaulle" is increasing, and, although the assembly is not yet in a mood to consider this seriously, party leaders may well be fearful of the possible appeal a national figure like the general could give to Plevén's program of national union and a political truce.

4. BELGRADE CONSIDERS ZHUKOV'S VISIT "MOST SIGNIFICANT"

Comment on:

The routine publicity Yugoslavia has accorded the visit of Soviet Defense Minister Zhukov does not correspond with Belgrade's private assessments.

Publicly the Yugoslavs have treated the visit as mere reciprocation for the trip of the Yugoslav minister of defense to the USSR last June. Yugoslavia's Acting Foreign Secretary Bebler told an American congressman visiting Belgrade on 8 October, however, that the forthcoming talks between Tito and Zhukov at a vacation site in Slovenia will be "most significant."

According to Bebler, Tito hopes to cover a wide range of problems dealing with East-West relations as well as Yugoslav-Soviet relations. Contrary to previous Yugoslav contentions that the West has overestimated Zhukov's role, Bebler described Zhukov as second only to Khrushchev in the Soviet hierarchy, and argued that as a stabilizing force within the USSR, Zhukov's position augurs well for the ascendency of the more "liberal" elements led by Khrushchev. According to this Yugoslav view, although the present Soviet leadership is "far from perfect," the trend is in the right direction and must be encouraged since the victory over strong "Stalinist" opposition in the upper bureaucracy is "far from final."

In another effort to allay Western suspicions over the growing accommodation between Belgrade and Moscow, Bebler declared that differences between Soviet and Yugoslav policy would be made evident at the Yugoslav party congress despite the probability of Soviet annoyance. In the meantime, he said, his government does not intend to quarrel with the USSR over "minor" differences.

5. CONTINUING SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA

Comment on:

[Redacted] Damascus is exploiting fully Soviet promises to provide, on credit, military goods to meet all Syria's needs.

[Redacted] Damascus instructed its mission in Moscow to increase from 500 to 1,500 the order for "bazookas," probably 82-millimeter antitank launchers. At the same time, Damascus indicated readiness to send to Moscow immediately Syrian air force personnel slated for training in the IL-28 jet bombers and "night-flying" MIG-17 jet fighters which were ordered only last month along with a wide range of rush orders for additional naval craft, artillery, small arms, and ammunition. Most of this materiel, except the aircraft, has already arrived in Syria.

Between 150 and 200 Soviet military personnel are now in Syria instructing in the use and maintenance of Soviet equipment.

6. THE TUNISIAN ARMS PROBLEM

Tunisia's efforts to obtain arms and equipment from Western sources are still blocked by the continuing political crisis in Paris. President Bourguiba has said his country can wait only until "the beginning of November," and if Western materiel is not forthcoming by that time he will probably feel compelled to turn elsewhere. Czechoslovakia has reportedly offered arms to Tunisia, and Cairo is to make a small shipment soon.

Shortly before the Bourges-Maunoury government was overturned on 30 September, Paris indicated French arms might be made available if new talks with Tunis on major outstanding problems developed satisfactorily. Bourguiba has insisted, however, that any new discussions must be divorced from the arms question.

Meanwhile, other potential Western suppliers are under strong French pressure not to supply arms until a new French government can be installed. Italy, apparently the only country which had agreed to supply arms to Tunisia during the short interval last month before France withdrew its approval for such shipments, now is endeavoring to delay further negotiations with the Tunisians but has refused to give Paris a firm commitment.

Tunisia assured American officials that the Egyptian gift shipment will be only a "token" quantity of Western arms, but there is still no indication of the precise size, nature, or date of arrival of the Cairo materiel.

[redacted] the offer was originally extended in August but was not accepted until September when Tunis asked the Egyptians to announce the offer "in order to apply pressure on America and the Western countries."

7. PAKISTAN'S PRESIDENT MIRZA WEIGHING DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL OF PRIME MINISTER

Comment on:

Pakistan's President Mirza is faced with a critical decision as a result of a threat made by leaders of his Republican party on 10 October that they will resign their government posts and withdraw their majority support of the central government coalition unless he dismisses Prime Minister Suhrawardy. The Republicans are incensed over Suhrawardy's recent attacks on their party during a tour of West Pakistan.

If Mirza refuses to submit to the wishes of his own Republican party, he could lose his only significant political following and thus destroy his chances to continue as President after the national elections planned for November 1958. If he dismisses Suhrawardy, the resulting political instability would almost inevitably force Mirza to suspend parliamentary government and rule by decree. Without the support of a responsible cabinet, it is unlikely that he could cope with Pakistan's growing economic problems. Such a failure, combined with the stigma of dictatorial rule, probably would also end his political career eventually.

Suhrawardy reportedly arrived back in Karachi for a showdown with Mirza on 10 October. His recent inclination to cooperate with Suhrawardy suggests that Mirza will decide that he cannot afford to accede to the Republican demand, and will try to work out some form of compromise between Suhrawardy and the Republican leaders.

ANNEX

**Watch Report 375, 10 October 1957
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee**

Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral to the orbit in the immediate future.
- C. Unstable conditions and tensions stemming from developments concerning Syria, in particular the deployment of major Turkish forces on Syria's frontiers, continue to create possibilities for conflict in the Middle East. Continuing border incidents and Turkish military maneuvers on the Syrian border scheduled for mid-October combine to make this period particularly tense.