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18 March 1961

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
INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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
18 March 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

18 March 1961

DAILY BRIEF

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[Laos: The Soviet ambassador in Bangkok used the occasion of special audience with the Thai King on 11 March to convey a warning from Moscow against Thailand's becoming involved in the internal affairs of its neighbors. The ambassador indicated that the USSR was pleased with its relationship with Thailand and "hoped it would continue." The King and top Thai officials were annoyed over this approach, which they considered improper.]

[Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces are continuing their pressure on government forces both north of the Phou Khoun junction and south of Xieng Khouang. In the former area, forward elements of government forces reportedly were under fire from 105-mm. artillery on 17 March, possibly signaling a new enemy push there. Laotian Army troops in the vicinity of Ban Ta Viang were withdrawing on 17 March toward Tha Thom.]


Congo:

[the Stanleyville regime's emissary to Moscow has claimed that "the comrades are ready to furnish us the planes which we need." "It now remains to settle the problem with the African countries."]

[The continuing refusal of Sudan and other neighboring territories to grant transit rights and the lack of aviation fuel in Stanleyville will make it difficult to use aircraft in a sustained program of support for Gizenga.]

[the UAR believes Gizenga's position is "hopeless" and expects his effort to collapse momentarily. However, Cairo reportedly will continue to give moral support to the Stanleyville regime "to prove"]

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[UAR policy is consistent," despite a desire to reduce its direct involvement with Gizenga. No significant new deterioration in Gizenga's position has been reported by other sources, although his situation has been precarious for some time.] [] (Backup, Page 1) (Map)

Communist China: Chinese Communist representatives recently asked the National Hydrocarbons Agency (ENI) of Italy to send petroleum chemists and "other technical assistance," claiming they needed this help because of the Russian withdrawal of technicians last August. Peiping is also apparently planning to use specialists from France and Sweden in the installation of equipment purchased from these countries.]

[] (Backup, Page 2)

No

Afghanistan-USSR: A visit by a Soviet team in early March to southwest Afghanistan near the Iranian border suggests that Afghanistan is continuing negotiations on a technical level for Soviet assistance to build a new diversion dam in the lower Helmand River valley. These negotiations have apparently been under way since last spring. This project, estimated at \$10,000,000, would probably be included in the Second Five-Year Plan which begins next September. Such an undertaking would bring Soviet construction activity into the southwest corner of the country for the first time. It could divert some of the personnel and resources of Afghanistan's Helmand Valley Authority now being used to develop the more promising upper Helmand, where American assistance has been used for some years to construct irrigation dams and canals.

[]
Backup, Page 3) (Map)

OK

*Angola: Portuguese officials in Lisbon estimate that thousands of natives were involved in the disturbances which began in Angola on 15 March; they believe the number of white casualties to be extremely high. The attackers are reported to have

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[redacted] cut some road communications, forcing the Portuguese to airlift special troops to critical areas in the north. The attacks were launched from the Congo, apparently directed by the non-Communist Angolan People's Union (UPA). According to earlier reports, the UPA had planned to open a series of terrorist raids against white-owned plantations in mid-March. Lisbon recently reinforced its military and security forces in Angola to a strength of about 10,000. The all-Portuguese units, totaling approximately 900 troops, have been concentrated along the Congo border and in the exclave of Cabinda.] [redacted] (Backup, Page 4)


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Republic of the Congo



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~~TOP SECRET~~Situation in the Congo

[redacted] a Malian ambassador to Gizenga's regime had arrived in the UAR and would soon proceed to Stanleyville. [redacted]

[redacted] Cairo, as part of an apparent effort to disengage itself from Gizenga, is discouraging its neutralist associates from sending diplomatic representatives to Stanleyville. [redacted] contacts with Gizenga be carried out through Stanleyville's Cairo mission--a course which may also be followed by the Malian emissary.

Factionalism apparently is continuing among Gizenga's lieutenants. [redacted] Bernardin Diaka, a Stanleyville official who is representing Gizenga in Kivu Province against the wishes of the local authorities, reports that the radio in Bukavu is broadcasting propaganda in the name of Anicet Kashamura, a Communist sympathizer. Kashamura was the principal figure in the Kivu government until he was brought back to Stanleyville and placed under house arrest.

[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~Communist China Seeking Western Technicians

[A recent report that four Chinese petroleum engineers are currently studying pipeline methods at the ENI plant in Milan indicates that ENI is already extending some technical assistance to the Chinese. Earlier contacts between ENI and Peiping have been largely unproductive. Mattei, president of ENI, went to China in December 1958 but was unable to interest the Chinese in offers to sell equipment or to supply technical aid. A Chinese mission inspected ENI installations in Italy in April 1959 and purchased some steel pipe but apparently refused to consider the possibility of ENI technical assistance. In view of ENI's previous interest in this field, it seems unlikely that Mattei would refuse a Chinese request for technical aid now.]

[Peiping has also agreed to have Swedish engineers construct a long-distance communications network in China under a recently signed contract with a Stockholm firm. China has relied previously on Hungary and East Germany for both equipment and technical aid in the advanced communications field.]

In addition, at least four French engineers are now in China advising on the operation and maintenance of electric locomotives which the Chinese purchased from a French firm. The French technicians are reportedly instructing large classes of trainees in Paochi, where some of the locomotives are already in service on the Paochi-Chengtu line.

Whatever the outcome of current Sino-Soviet talks on future economic relations, the willingness of the Chinese to use Western technicians, together with observed shifts in their trading pattern, suggests that Peiping is trying to ease the impact of the withdrawal of Soviet technicians and is probably not eager to return to heavy dependence on Soviet equipment and technical aid.

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
~~SECRET~~Afghans Seeking Soviet Aid for Dam Project

Afghanistan first accepted economic assistance from the USSR in 1953, when the latter built the much-publicized grain elevator and bakery in Kabul and began paving the streets of the Afghan capital. In 1955 the Afghans accepted a \$100,000,000 line of Soviet credit under which a number of transportation and power projects are being built. Afghanistan has also received about \$100,000,000 worth of Soviet arms. Total Soviet economic and military assistance extended to Kabul now amounts to over \$250,000,000. During 1960 an estimated 1,600 Soviet technicians and advisory personnel worked on economic development projects in Afghanistan.

Although Soviet economic assistance activity in Afghanistan continued to expand in 1960 as more projects passed from the planning to the construction stage, no new major projects have been authorized since last spring. Afghan-Soviet agreements on new projects apparently await the completion of the draft of the Afghan Second Five-Year Plan. Kabul apparently expects Moscow to provide several hundred million dollars worth of assistance under the plan.

The new diversion dam would be used for irrigation and flood control. Since it would increase Afghanistan's ability to hold back and utilize water when the Helmand River is low, Iran's concern over lack of an agreement with Afghanistan on division of the Helmand waters will increase when construction work begins. Tehran probably would regard the new project as aimed at forcing it to accept what it regards as an unsatisfactory distribution of the waters. [redacted]

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Terrorist Attacks in Angola

Africans in Angola, who outnumber the whites there 4,300,-000 to 200,000, have been increasingly excited by the progress being made by other African territories toward independence. They have formed two emigré nationalist organizations--the UPA with headquarters in Leopoldville and the pro-Communist African Revolutionary Front for the Independence of Portuguese Colonies (FRAIN), which is based in Conakry, Guinea. FRAIN, which has devoted much of its attention to Portuguese Guinea, has received active support from Guinea's President Sekou Touré; but Portuguese Guinea appeared quiet as of 14 March.

Led by Roberto Holden--an exiled Angolan also known as Jose Gilmore--UPA reportedly planned its attacks to coincide with the UN Security Council debate on Angola in an attempt to focus world attention on the rising public discontent in Portuguese Africa. [the dissidents received some weapons--including 25 machine guns and 150 grenades--from Tunisians in the Congo, who may also have provided some training]

Portuguese authorities can be expected to move ruthlessly against these infiltrations. Recent army reinforcements from Portugal include two companies of commando-type troops, which arrived in Luanda in February. Following last year's mutiny of Congolese troops against their Belgian officers, the Portuguese began with steps to increase the ratio of white troops to Africans. They have also sought to exploit the traditional hostility between northern and southern Angolans by assigning troops from the south to northern units and vice versa.

Although born in Angola, Holden has spent most of his life in the Congo. His last visit to Angola--in 1956--was cut short when he learned of Portuguese plans to arrest him. Holden claims to be a moderate and to have advised UPA against resorting to terrorist tactics. He claims that while he was a delegate to the January 1960 meeting of the All-African Peoples' Conference in Tunis, he spurned an offer by officials of FRAIN to combine forces with UPA. As a result,

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[redacted]
the two organizations have reportedly become bitter rivals. Holden, who has been lobbying at the UN, informed an American official in New York on 16 March that he hopes to set up a government-in-exile in Leopoldville or Brazzaville to offset Guinean influences on FRAIN at Conakry.] [redacted]

S/S

[redacted]
Portuguese officials have repeatedly alleged that the disorders in their African territories are Communist inspired and instigated from outside. If Lisbon heeds the advice of its ambassador in Washington, these claims will be emphasized more than ever. Ambassador Fernandes informed his Foreign Ministry on 6 March that "the only card which we can play with any hope of success is that of Communist penetration in our territories," since "arguments of friendship and alliance... are deceptive." "But this would be of value," he said, "only if actually proved." Fernandes said that in view of "the attitude of the United States in its foreign policy, especially with regard to self-determination and independence," only the Communist factor would be powerful enough to "contribute to stopping the trend begun by this administration in the colonial field." [redacted]

[redacted]

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The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

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The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

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