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20 March 1961

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DIA and DOS review(s)  
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Congo: Implementation of the Tananarive conference resolutions concerning the future structure of the Congo is likely to prove difficult, as almost every participant has a different idea as to what was decided. Ambassador Timberlake in Leopoldville also believes that many of these leaders fail to appreciate the need for obtaining international recognition and that among those who do, there is disagreement as to the steps necessary to achieve it. Prospects for a reconciliation with the Orientale regime on the basis of the new confederal formula have dimmed as a result of new and seemingly more categorical denunciations by Stanleyville authorities of the

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resolutions. [Nevertheless, Congolese factions represented at Tananarive and elements of the Gizenga regime--especially General Lundula--are likely to continue to engage in political maneuvering looking toward a possible rapprochement.]

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USSR - Geneva Talks: Soviet officials apparently are under instructions to take a pessimistic view of the prospects for the nuclear test ban talks, which resume on 21 March. Chief Soviet delegate Tsarapkin is reported to have told the Austrian ambassador in Moscow that Soviet reports from Washington were "not hopeful," and that no new moves could be expected from the Soviet side on the main issues. [In a separate conversation with Tsarapkin, the Canadian ambassador received an impression of Soviet indifference to a treaty. On the basis of talks with Soviet Embassy personnel in Paris, UK officials reported to London that Moscow may plan to raise the question of French adherence to an agreement. The American and British delegations feel this could be a tactical maneuver, probably to create pressure for early Western concessions. The British delegation also feels, however, that an early Soviet walkout is still a possibility.]

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Spain-Morocco: Madrid is taking a firm position in its dispute with Morocco over alleged frontier violations of the Spanish Sahara, including the recent abduction of 11 oil prospectors, and is reinforcing its troops there. Following a talk with General Franco, Spanish Army Minister Barroso told Ambassador Lodge, "We are going to have war with Morocco." Madrid seems to be convinced that the abduction of the men resulted from an aggressive Moroccan policy which includes inciting and organizing tribesmen for guerrilla fighting. Barroso's reference to war, following Spanish complaints to Morocco and the UN, is probably a tactical gesture to induce the US to put pressure on Morocco. However, release of the men will remove neither Madrid's suspicions of Moroccan intentions nor Spain's determination to maintain its position in the Sahara.

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(Map)

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Mali-USSR: The signing in Moscow on 18 March of an economic and technical cooperation agreement providing for a long-term Soviet credit of about \$44,000,000 marks the first time Mali

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has received a specific aid commitment from the bloc. The accord follows Peiping's agreement in principle earlier this month to provide long-term aid to Mali-- specifics of which are to be worked out when a Malian delegation visits Communist China later this year. Acceptance of the Soviet credit, which reportedly is to be utilized to finance mineral prospecting, construction of cement works, and navigational improvements on the Niger River, is in line with the avowed determination of Mali's Marxist-minded leaders to offset and reduce French influence in their country's economy. France this year is providing about \$12,000,000 in economic and technical aid.

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
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### Situation in the Congo

Following recent conversations in Leopoldville with delegates who attended the conference of Congolese leaders held between 8 and 12 March at Tananarive, Ambassador Timberlake concluded that the participants could be divided into three broad groupings in terms of their attitudes toward the future structure of the Congo. One group, of which Katanga's Tshombé and South Kasai's Kalonji are the spokesmen, consists of "confederalists" who favor giving each constituent state a veto power over the central authority--the concept written into the Tananarive resolutions. A second group, represented by Congolese President Kasavubu and other Bakongo tribal leaders, is made up of "federalists" willing to concede somewhat more authority to the central government.

A third group favors a still stronger central government with greater allowance for local autonomy than in the highly centralized system now legally in effect and still desired by Lumumba's political heirs. Timberlake cited Premier-designate Ileo, Equateur Province's Bolikango, and the Lumumbist President of Leopoldville Province, Kamitatu, as partisans of this third school of thought. The ambassador indicated his belief that while Tshombé's personality and financial resources carried the day at Tananarive, the representatives of the other views probably entered the "united front" with every intention of trying to modify the Tananarive resolutions at subsequent meetings.

At this stage, the problem of effecting a legal transition to the confederal arrangement is looming as a difficult one which could further jeopardize the new regime's chances of gaining international acceptance, especially among the more militant African states. Under the Congo's present law, such structural changes must be referred to the Congolese parliament sitting as a constituent assembly--a provision on which both the Gizenga regime and its international supporters can be expected to insist. This procedure is apparently envisaged by at least the more nationally minded Congolese leaders including Ileo[who, however, told Timberlake on 17 March that conditions were still not favorable to reconvening parliament.]

Tshombé, on the other hand, reportedly will have nothing to do with the assembly elected last year, though he is apparently

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willing to consider some type of referendum or election to sanctify the new system. The Tananarive resolutions themselves were cryptic on this transition problem, specifying only that the present central government's "mission" would end upon constitution of the projected new "coordinating organism."

Meanwhile, the continuing arrival of the brigade of combat troops which India has made available to the UN Command has been marked so far by a complete lack of incidents such as were predicted by the Tananarive conferees when they asked the UN last week to cancel the Indian reinforcements. Nevertheless, the UN is cautiously arranging for the Indian soldiers to be housed in outlying areas of Leopoldville, where they will be removed as much as possible from contacts with Congolese. According to the acting chief of staff of the UN Command, there are no present plans to deploy the troops beyond the Leopoldville area. [Earlier indications that at least some of the Indian troops might be assigned immediately to northern Katanga reportedly prompted Tshombé to state that in such an eventuality, "there will certainly be war"--meaning, presumably, clashes with his Belgian-led forces.]

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Spanish Reaction to Abduction of Oil Prospectors  
In Spanish Sahara

Spanish troop strength in the area, estimated at between 8,000 and 10,000, includes reinforcements of paratroops flown from Seville in six transport planes on 18 March, 1,000 Spanish foreign legionnaires moved from Villa Cisneros on the Spanish Sahara coast, and several hundred other troops dispatched from the Canary Islands. These moves are the "necessary steps" which Spain informed Rabat and UN Secretary General Hammarskjold on 17 March it had taken in order to be able to repel any attack on Spanish territory by Moroccan armed contingents concentrated near the Morocco - Spanish Sahara frontier.

On 18 March the counselor of the French Embassy in Rabat informed his American colleagues that according to a reliable source, the three Americans and the one Frenchman missing among the abducted men were at the Royal Moroccan Army's camp in the capital. The official expected the men would be "momentarily and magnanimously" released with suitable publicity. Failure to include the five Spaniards in such a gesture would sharpen the suspicion in Madrid that Morocco is preparing for military and political harassment of Spanish interests in the area, and might put strong pressure on Franco to order Spanish forces to retaliate.

In recent months Madrid has become increasingly worried over the effect political and economic instability in Morocco may have on Spain's African possessions. Although these territories have little economic value, the Spanish military set great store by the maintenance of Spain's "presence" in northwest Africa. Madrid is particularly apprehensive that the security of the whole area and of Spain as well will be seriously threatened when France and the US complete the scheduled turnover of their bases to the Moroccans.

Spain and France have continued to maintain close liaison regarding Moroccan developments, with particular emphasis on military aspects. Munoz Grandes, the chief of the Spanish High General Staff, visited Paris early in February, reportedly to put finishing touches to a new military accord between the two countries.

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