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
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**1. BOURGES-MAUNOURY'S FALL SHARPENS
ECONOMIC AND ALGERIAN ISSUES**

Comment on:



The defeat of the Bourges-Maunoury government by a vote of 279 to 253 over the proposed basic statute for Algeria precipitates a political crisis in France at a time when the area of maneuverability for a prospective successor has been reduced to a minimum. The willingness of numerous conservative deputies to vote against the premier despite his plea for unity in the face of the pending UN discussion of Algeria emphasizes the weight of economic considerations in this vote.

Rightists' apprehensions that the government's proposal would lead to the secession of Algeria had intensified in the past week, despite the premier's efforts to meet objections. Pressure from the strong agricultural interests which are firmly opposed to Bourges-Maunoury's price controls swayed enough Independent and Peasant deputies who might otherwise have abstained.

By disavowing the Algerian policy strongly backed by the Socialists, the Independents and Peasants have widened the breach dividing the moderate forces in the Assembly. Without Communist support, no government is likely to be formed over the objections of the Independent and Peasant bloc, and President Coty's nomination of a candidate will be governed by this circumstance. Continuing pressure from labor and farmers for relief from Finance Minister Gaillard's anti-inflation drive may hasten a compromise, and a new government may be able to obtain support for the Algerian statute provided it eases unpopular anti-inflation measures.

President Coty has formally refused to accept Bourges-Maunoury's resignation and will probably

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wait until he can name a premier-designate. He had reportedly begun consultations on a possible new government before the Algerian debate but announcement of his decision will be delayed by the formalities incident to the opening of the new session of the Assembly on 1 October.

Ex-premier and Socialist leader Guy Mollet has been regarded as a possible replacement for Bourges-Maunoury since the time the latter took office less than four months ago. Another prospective candidate is ex-Gaullist and former governor of Algeria Jacques Soustelle who played a major role in rallying rightist opposition to the Algerian statute. Ex-premier René Plevén and Education Minister René Billeres, both representatives of center parties which might become the nucleus of a compromise coalition, have also been mentioned.

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**2. SAUD SEEKS TO REASSURE KING HUSSAYN ON
DAMASCUS VISIT**

King Saud,

[redacted] sought to reassure Jordan's King Hussayn regarding the purposes of Saud's visit to Damascus. Saud explained he had asked Syrian officials to treat his stay as "personal," not official, and said he hoped it might be "of some good in persuading the extremists to modify what they are doing, limiting their excesses and bringing about good behavior, if we can do that." The King also said he hoped to show the Syrians "the right way so that communism will not penetrate into the Arab countries."

Comment

The communique issued by Saud when he left Damascus on 26 September, stating that "Syria can never in any case constitute a danger to any of its neighbors," is being acclaimed by the Syrian and Egyptian press as a major defeat for American policy. Whatever the real intentions of Saud and Iraqi Prime Minister al-Ayyubi, the immediate effect of their visits in Damascus has been to lend prestige to the Syrian regime and to make the Jordanian government appear more isolated.

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3. FRICTION AMONG THAI ARMY COUP GROUP LEADERS SEEN

The American attaché in Bangkok, in assessing the recent Thai army coup, foresees that friction may develop among the top levels of the new ruling clique. He indicates that in any new struggle for power, General Prapat, Bangkok garrison commander and newly appointed minister of interior, is in a good position to emerge as a strong contender in his own right. The attaché notes that several of Prapat's friends and relatives also hold key posts.

Comment Although Marshal Sarit is presently in firm control of the Thai government, stability in Thailand over the long run will probably depend on his ability to keep his ambitious subordinates in line.

Prapat, who has long been associated with Sarit, is considered one of the most able and ambitious officers in the Thai army. His rise, under Sarit's protection, has been rapid, and prior to the coup he was reputed to be the man who actually ran the army.

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4. DISSIDENT INDONESIAN LEADERS REPORTEDLY COORDINATING PLANS

Dissident regional commanders in Indonesia have drawn up a joint plan for further opposition to the central government, [redacted]

[redacted] They plan to call on Djakarta to proclaim a national anti-Communist policy and dismiss army chief Nasution. The dissident groups have agreed on mutual military assistance in the event of an attack by Djakarta against any one of them.

Lt. Col. Hussein of Central Sumatra will use his current visit to East Indonesia to coordinate these plans with Lt. Col. Sumual, the dissident leader in that area.

Comment There have been increasing indications that the recent national round-table conference called by Sukarno to compose the differences between Djakarta and the provinces may, in fact, have hardened the dissidents' attitude toward the central government. Hussein has been particularly outspoken in this regard, saying that the conference was only "for show."

Coordination among the scattered opposition commanders heretofore has been spotty, but recent reports indicate that they are unified in their determination to extract significant concessions from Djakarta.

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5. INDONESIAN CHIEF OF STAFF MOVES TO PLACATE REGIONAL LEADERS

Comment on:

Two recent events suggest that Indonesian army chief Nasution may now be attempting to placate dissident provincial leaders in hope of modifying their demands that he resign. On 28 September, Lt. Col. Gintings, the pro-Djakarta commander in northern Sumatra, arrested Lt. Col. Macmour, a pro-Communist regimental commander, and two subordinates for their activities against anti-Djakarta elements in the area. Macmour's supporters, both in his command and in the Communist-led civilian defense corps he has armed, have the capability of reacting forcefully. These arrests [redacted] have been ordered by Nasution without President Sukarno's knowledge. On the same day, Nasution installed Maj. Somba, a close collaborator of Lt. Col. Sumual in East Indonesia, as commandant of a new military command there.

Nasution's actions would appear to be a blow to Sukarno. Until now, Nasution's behavior has been that of a loyal supporter of the President. [redacted]

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