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25 November 1958

Copy No. C 60

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

I DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO:

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: MP 702

DATE: 1480

REVIEWER: [Redacted]

27

2010

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Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232648

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25 NOVEMBER 1958

**I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**

USSR steps up economic pressure on  
Finland.

(1)

**II. ASIA-AFRICA**

Sudan - Shifts of power may be taking  
place in military regime.

(2)



Burma - Regime plans crackdown on  
Communists.

(3)

**III: THE WEST**

Cuba - Possibility of junta take-over  
increases as rebel successes continue.

(4)

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

25 November 1958

## DAILY BRIEF

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*51 RAB*  
*NO*

USSR-Finland: The USSR has stepped up its economic pressure on Finland by canceling all orders with three important Finnish suppliers. This is the most serious move in the two-month-old Soviet campaign to topple Finland's coalition government. [redacted] (Page 1)

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Sudan: [redacted]

*ND*

It remains unclear who is actually exercising control within the military regime, where shifts of power may be taking place. Dissatisfaction on the part of some army officers and influential civilian leaders remains a source of potential instability and internal difficulties. [redacted] (Page 2)

*DK*

Burma: The army and police are reported planning an extensive roundup of pro-Communist political leaders and possibly some associates of former Premier U Nu. Allegations of a conspiracy to assassinate General Ne Win and other top military leaders, which were included among the reasons advanced by the army for its take-over in September, would be used again to justify the arrests. [redacted] (Page 4)

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### III. THE WEST

*DK*

Cuba: Government troops have been unable to contain rebel activity in Oriente Province or to break rebel blockades which have cut off Santiago, Guantanamo, and other cities. Rebel forces have also disrupted transportation and communications in Camaguey and Las Villas provinces and increased antigovernment activities in westernmost Pinar del Rio Province. Continued rebel successes could lead to an attempt to establish a civilian and military junta which would try to negotiate a solution of the crisis.

(Page 5) (Map)

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DAILY BRIEF

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### USSR Intensifies Pressure on Finland

The USSR has intensified its two-month-old economic campaign against Finland in an effort to topple the present coalition government. Moscow has canceled orders for ships, paper, and other materials "not yet boxed for delivery" from three important Finnish suppliers. This step will aggravate the already severe unemployment which threatens the life of the coalition.

The USSR has twice postponed the opening of trade talks, and Soviet officials in Moscow told the Finns in early November that Moscow would not supply the stockpile items which the Finns are willing to take to reduce the ruble balance.

The intensified Soviet pressure could lead to a partial reorganization of the five-party Fagerholm coalition government in an attempt to assure the USSR that Finland does not intend to expand its economic ties with the West at the expense of its trade with the Soviet bloc. One wing of the Agrarian party, as well as President Kekkonen, feels that the formation of a new government with which the USSR will deal is of vital necessity. Other Finns, however, believe that such interference in Finnish domestic affairs violates the 1948 Treaty of Friendship and must be resisted. Unless the Finns can develop alternative markets with Western assistance, a reorganization probably cannot be avoided.

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Sudanese Situation

The power structure of the Sudanese regime and the amount of real authority wielded by General Ibrahim Abboud remain unclear. Some reports suggest former Prime Minister Khalil may have lost direction of the movement in the course of a compromise between a group of junior officers and the senior officers involved in a plan sponsored by Khalil for a military take-over. There is evidence that the junior officers were not satisfied with the results of the 17 November coup and may seek to make changes in the new regime. This group may have been responsible for the removal of Major General Ahmad Abd al-Wahab, who had worked closely with Khalil, from his position as assistant commander in chief of the army. Wahab, minister of interior in the new cabinet, was succeeded in the army command by Brigadier General Hasan Bashir Nasir, who is considered strictly nonpolitical.

Members of the generally pro-UAR National Unionist party, the major opposition to Khalil's former government, are said to have lost their initial suspicion that the coup was instigated by Khalil and his Umma party. They now feel that although they are not represented in the new government, their chances of eventually gaining positions of influence are good. Leaders of the Umma party, on the other hand, have been reported disappointed over the failure of the new government to assume a more pro-Umma aspect.

The UAR's decision to recognize the Abboud government promptly was made by President Nasir, despite a contrary recommendation by his political advisers [redacted]

[redacted] Nasir [redacted] ignored [redacted] re-reports that the coup appeared to be directed by "imperialists," stating that he knew Brigadier General Hasan Bashir Nasir would have had nothing to do with it in such a case. [redacted]

[redacted] the UAR subsequently received information [redacted] in Khartoum that Khalil had

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been working for a coup but that "Abboud, in conjunction with Hasan Bashir Nasir and some of the other officers, relying upon the support of junior officers, exploited the coup to remove Abdullah Khalil."

Cairo has openly praised the army's action, but its official attitude still appears to be somewhat cautious. No real steps have been taken toward improving the previously strained UAR-Sudanese relations, although Abboud has several times stated his intention to do so and even added that he would visit Cairo at the "earliest opportunity." [redacted]

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
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
Burma--Roundup of Opposition Elements Planned

Burmese army and police authorities are reported ready to launch an extensive roundup of opposition elements, including the Communist leaders of the National United Front, the People's Comrade party, and the Youth Front, and possibly well-known leaders of former Premier U Nu's faction of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL). The arrests will be based on charges of involvement in an alleged conspiracy to assassinate General Ne Win and other top military leaders last September. This plot is said to have been one of the reasons for the army's take-over that month.

The police reportedly will produce a witness to testify that Bo Min Gaung, home minister in the U Nu government, planned to use Union Military Police elements to carry out the assassinations. The extent of Communist complicity in the alleged plot is not specified. Other political associates of U Nu, including former Deputy Premier Thakin Tin, who enjoys sizable support among Burma's peasants, may also be arrested. The Ne Win regime would probably stop short of seizing U Nu himself, although this possibility has been suggested.

Arrests of well-known Communist leaders would be accepted by Burmese public opinion as in line with Ne Win's promised drive to eliminate threats to internal stability. The detention of Bo Min Gaung and other U Nu cohorts would be more controversial, and would expose the army-backed Ne Win regime to charges of favoritism for the rival faction of the AFPFL led by former Deputy Premiers Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein.


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### III. THE WEST

#### Cuba--Government Position Deteriorating

The success of the Cuban rebel attacks in Oriente Province and the increase in rebel activities in three other provinces have again demonstrated the Batista government's inability to contain the revolutionary opposition.

In Oriente, rebels have blockaded Santiago and several other important cities, disrupting transportation and communications and cutting off supplies. Unemployment in Santiago is increasing as business establishments are forced to curtail operations or close down. Some of Oriente's industries which contribute substantially to Cuba's economy--such as the Texaco refinery outside Santiago and the US-Government-owned Nicaro nickel installation on the north coast--are taking large losses and may eventually be forced to halt operations. There is also fear that rebel activities will endanger Oriente's sugar and coffee industries.

This threat to Cuba's prosperous economy and the prospect of continued political deterioration as rebel activities expand may precipitate action by a civilian political group which plans to co-operate with some military leaders in establishing a governing junta.

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