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27 July 1959

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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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27 JULY 1959

**I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**

USSR may mark time at Geneva pending outcome of Nixon-Khrushchev talks.


Soviet ICBM test on 25 July fails in flight.

**II. ASIA-AFRICA**

Chinese Nationalists anxious to resume escorted reconnaissance of mainland opposite Taiwan.

UAR remains conciliatory toward Iraq in public while strengthening covert contacts with anti-Qasim nationalists.

Ethiopian Foreign Ministry believes Emperor's visits to Cairo, Moscow, and Paris won added support on Somali issues.

**III. THE WEST**

(6) France--Debré considering military proposal to smash Algerian rebel bases in Tunisia.

(7) West Germany adamantly opposed to Western acceptance of any all-German commission proposal at Geneva.

(8) Belgian Finance Minister says Brussels cannot comply with NATO minimum force requirements.

**LATE ITEM**

(9) A new valid countdown in process at Tyura Tam.

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

27 July 1959

## DAILY BRIEF

*SIR AB*

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-Geneva: [Moscow will continue to "mark time for a few days" at Geneva in view of Khrushchev's recent absence and his current substantive discussions with Vice President Nixon beginning 26 July.]

*NO*

[the USSR would probably continue to insist on developing a "working form" of an all-German committee before agreeing to any interim Berlin solution, and reiterated that the Soviet delegation would present a new proposal "when the time is opportune!"]

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Soviet ICBM test failure: The valid countdown which began at the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range at 0200 GMT on 25 July apparently terminated at about 0955 GMT (0555 EDT) in the launching of an ICBM which failed in flight.

*NO*

There now have been 20 valid Soviet attempts to test-launch ICBMs. Of those, 12 have apparently been successful, four have failed in flight, and four have been canceled prior to firing. Two of these cancellations were probably due to poor range communications.

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

*NO*

Taiwan Strait: [In an apparent effort to test US reaction to resumed Nationalist aerial reconnaissance with fighter escort, the Chinese Nationalists on 23 July ordered their air force to photograph gun positions and airfields on the China mainland coast opposite the Chinmen Island area.] The order

[was later rescinded after a protest by American authorities. Ambassador Drumright believes Taiwan's growing restiveness over US restraints on aerial reconnaissance stems from a strong desire to obtain intelligence in areas opposite Taiwan, particularly in view of Khrushchev's remarks on missiles in China.] [redacted]  
 (Page 3)

*NO*  
UAR-Iraq: The UAR continues its conciliatory attitude toward the Qasim regime in public while strengthening its clandestine contacts with anti-Qasim elements in Baghdad. UAR strategy is to build up support among nationalist Iraqi elements while awaiting the outcome of Qasim's difficulties with the Communists. Cairo apparently hopes this struggle will ultimately weaken Qasim's position, and is advising the nationalists to preserve their assets until then. [redacted]

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*OK*  
Ethiopia: [The American adviser of the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry reports that Emperor Haile Selassie's recent visits to Cairo, Moscow, and Paris have won support for Ethiopia's position on the Somali border issue and its opposition to a Greater Somalia, which would incorporate part of Ethiopia. He also reports that the Ethiopians were pleased with Nasir's expressed willingness to end Cairo's press and radio attacks on Ethiopia and his switch on the Somali issue.] [redacted]  
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### III. THE WEST

*NO*  
France-Tunisia: [French Premier Debré is reported to have given a favorable hearing to a plan submitted by military leaders in Algeria to clean out Algerian rebel sanctuaries in Tunisia. No such broad plan is likely to be approved, however, unless the situation becomes much more irritating. The extensive campaign General Challe is currently undertaking against rebel bands scattered in the mountains of eastern Algeria is probably absorbing major French military attention.] [redacted]  
 [redacted]

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*No*  
West Germany: [Bonn political leaders expect a climax at Geneva next week and fear that domestic pressures may make it impossible for the Western powers, particularly London, to envisage a break-up of the conference over Moscow's demand for an all-German commission. Chancellor Adenauer is adamantly opposed to such a commission and Bonn plans to fight against acceptance, possibly even to the point of refusing to participate. On 22 July the cabinet rejected Foreign Minister Brentano's proposal to offer Poland and Czechoslovakia non-aggression pacts, with eventual diplomatic recognition implied.]

*No*  
Belgium: [Finance Minister Van Houtte says it will be impossible for Belgium to attain its goals under the NATO minimum essential force requirements or to comply fully with SHAPE recommendations for a 10-percent increase in the overall defense budget. Van Houtte is intent on balancing the budget, and fears that an attempt to impose additional taxes to meet budgetary needs would bring down the coalition. The anticipated Belgian default is typical of the situation in several other NATO countries.]

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#### LATE ITEM

*No*  
\*USSR: [A new valid countdown began at the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range at 2300Z 26 July (1900 EDT), 37 hours after culmination of the previous countdown. The countdown was proceeding with little delay as of 0130 EDT 27 July. Barring further delays, the launching should take place about 0630Z (0230 EDT). Present indications are that the launching will involve a test ICBM.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Moscow Marking Time at Geneva

[The Soviet leaders apparently are awaiting the results of private talks with Vice President Nixon before making any new move in the foreign ministers' conference.]

[in view of Khrushchev's recent absence from Moscow and the Vice President's visit, he foresaw no substantive developments in the conference "for some time" and that the conference would be "marking time for a few days."]

[In another reference to the Vice President on 22 July [ ] said "our people are ready to talk to him about everything." He said also that the Vice President will be told in Moscow that while the USSR is ready to discuss an interim agreement on Berlin, it will not be "pressured into terms." He added that the Western "bluff" on a break-off had not been taken seriously, in view of "indications from other Western delegations" that the negotiations would continue "at least another fortnight."]

[ ] has alleged on at least four separate occasions since 14 July that the Soviet delegation will present a new proposal "when the time is opportune." He asserted on 23 July that the USSR would probably continue to insist on developing a "working form" for an all-German committee before agreeing to any interim Berlin solution.]

[Instructions reportedly received by bloc journalists from the Soviet delegation at Geneva on 23 July suggest that during the coming week, Moscow will probably try to promote the impression that there has been a considerable degree of agreement on the Berlin issue, and thereby try to confine the discussions to the all-German committee question. The briefing also suggests]

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[that if no progress is made toward establishment of the committee, Moscow might try to turn the discussions to setting a date for a summit conference to which would be submitted a "common document noting the differences in points of view.]

[redacted] reports of a bloc summit meeting in Moscow "soon after Nixon's departure," remarking that it had been discussed prior to Khrushchev's trip to Poland. He said that while the original idea to make it a CEMA meeting had been broadened, he believed the emphasis would still be on economic matters.] [redacted]

[redacted]

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Chinese Nationalists Cancel Air Reconnaissance Order

[In an apparent effort to test American reaction, the Chinese Nationalist Ministry of Defense on 23 July issued an order to the Nationalist Air Force to conduct an escorted reconnaissance mission to photograph gun positions and airfields on the China mainland in the immediate vicinity of Chinmen Island. The order was canceled after an American protest.]

[Ambassador Drumright reports that the Chinese Nationalists have displayed a growing restiveness over the agreed restrictions on aerial reconnaissance activity over the mainland. The Nationalists appear genuinely concerned over Soviet Premier Khrushchev's references, in his talks with Averill Harriman, to rocket sites on the Chinese mainland, and are anxious to obtain full information on any such Chinese Communist capability. Minister of Defense Yu Ta-wei has informed Admiral Smoot, commander of the US Taiwan Defense Command, that the United States has a "moral obligation" to ensure that information is obtained on the alleged rocket sites.]

[At present, the Nationalists' standard reconnaissance aircraft is the RF-84F, which requires fighter escort. They have four supersonic RF-100s, however, and are scheduled to receive four high-performance RF-101s in August. Both of these types should be able to operate without escort, and a Nationalist request for permission to use them to photograph the coastal areas near Taiwan may be anticipated.]

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UAR Policy Toward Iraq

The UAR's public posture of conciliation with Iraq, outlined in Nasir's speech of 22 July, is being accompanied by continuing clandestine efforts to strengthen anti-Qasim elements in Baghdad. Nasir devoted a significant portion of his three-and-a-half hour Egyptian revolution anniversary speech to a denial of UAR ambitions in Iraq, and particularly disclaimed interest in union or federation. His controlled press and clandestine radios are generally limiting themselves to criticism of the activities of Iraqi Communists. He has also restrained the former Iraqi ambassador in Cairo, Faiq al-Samarrai, who hoped to lead an anti-Qasim campaign in exile.

At the same time, however, the UAR is continuing to furnish propaganda funds and facilities to anti-Qasim nationalist elements in Baghdad, and is giving financial assistance to families of imprisoned pro-UAR Iraqis. Clandestine contacts with these elements appear to be increasing, although no direct action against the Qasim regime seems to be contemplated in the near future. Cairo is advising the nationalists to conserve their assets in the hope that Qasim and the Communists will weaken each other in the course of their current conflict.

Cairo's public attitude has been favorably noted in Baghdad. Iraqi Foreign Minister Jawar has reportedly commented that "the UAR's position toward Iraq has improved noticeably," and reception of Nasir's speech was alleged to have been excellent. [redacted] the Iraqis "boldly listened to the broadcast." [redacted]

[large redacted area]

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## Ethiopia Gains Diplomatic Support From Emperor's Trip

Emperor Haile Selassie appears to have been successful in his recent visits to Cairo, Moscow, and Paris in gaining increased support for Ethiopia in its problems with its Somali neighbors. The boundary between Ethiopia and the UN trust territory of Somalia remains undemarcated despite eight years of international negotiation. Furthermore, Addis Ababa is increasingly concerned about the Greater Somalia movement, which proposes to unite 2,500,000 nomadic Somali tribesmen at the expense of a large slice of Ethiopian territory.

The Ethiopians were very pleased with Nasir's attitude, according to a high official in the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry. Past relations between the two nations have been tense because of Cairo's inflammatory radio broadcasts and activities among Somalia's Moslem tribesmen. Nasir reportedly agreed to end the press attacks, promised complete support at the United Nations for Ethiopia on the Somali issues, and agreed to give no support to the Greater Somalia movement. Ethiopia plans to test the new Egyptian attitude by sending a delegation to begin negotiations. Nasir's apparent about-face probably reflects his current desire for some kind of an accommodation with his African neighbors.

In Moscow, the Ethiopians also were promised support on Somali issues. They expect Moscow to raise the Greater Somalia problem as a springboard for an attack on British policy. The Ethiopian Foreign Ministry official said that the \$100,000,000 credit to Ethiopia is for 17 years at an interest rate of 2.5 percent, to be repaid in cash or commodities. The source also said Paris reiterated its opposition to a Greater Somalia and had offered to express support for Ethiopia on the frontier question. [redacted]

[redacted]

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### III. THE WEST

#### Belgian Default on Minimum Force Requirements Foreseen

[Finance Minister Van Houtte says Belgium will not be able to attain its goals under the NATO minimum essential force (MC-70) requirements, and "hopes" that Defense Minister Gilson, who is currently in Washington, will tell this to American military authorities. In a 23 July conversation with an American Embassy official in Brussels, Van Houtte said that, despite the recent improvement in the Belgian economy, it would be "politically and economically impossible" to comply with SHAPE recommendations for a 10-percent increase in the over-all defense budget. Van Houtte added that the Belgian public will not long accept the continued high cost of maintaining Belgian forces in West Germany, and he deplored the lack of progress toward integration of NATO forces which would reduce the defense burden on the smaller NATO countries.]

[The Social Christian - Liberal government is not likely to make an all-out defense effort. The Social Christians believe that they lost the 1954 elections on defense issues. In keeping with the party's campaign pledges during the 1958 campaign, the government is reducing the military service term, apparently in preparation for eventual replacement of compulsory military service with a voluntary system. Moreover, the Social Christians and the Liberals have frequently been at odds on social and economic issues, and Liberal leaders have made it clear they would desert the coalition if direct taxes are increased.]

[The Belgian situation typifies the trend among NATO countries toward reduced military efforts because of domestic problems, and highlights the chronic problem of the gap between national defense plans and NATO requirements. At a meeting of the NATO Council on 8 July when anxiety was expressed over new Danish defense proposals which in effect also abandoned MC-70 force goals, the Belgian representative showed concern lest this start a chain reaction. Most NATO countries accepted the MC-70 force requirements as a guide, but did not make commitments to meet them.]

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The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

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Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

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Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

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The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

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Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

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The Director

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The Director

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