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24 August 1959


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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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24 AUGUST 1959

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC


Khrushchev assures Nasir he will make no Middle Eastern agreements with President Eisenhower behind Nasir's back; agreement on additional Soviet arms for UAR expected shortly.

Ulbricht meeting with Khrushchev; East German officials allegedly fear Khrushchev will concede too much on Germany.

Hanoi broadcasts charge Saigon with involvement in Laotian situation and carry Laotian Communist call for realignment of Laotian foreign policy and for coalition government.

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Nehru wishes to visit Tehran after a scheduled three-day visit to Kabul in mid-September.



⑤ Iraq--US Embassy doubts that anti-Communists or Communists feel strong enough for coup now, but more incidents of violence could force the hand of either.

⑥ Ethiopia--Assassination of Haile Selassie reportedly planned for 24 August.

#### III. THE WEST

⑦ De Gaulle, in talks with UN Secretary General, ruled out political negotiations with Algerian rebel premier and gave no indications of major change in France's Algerian policy.

⑧ British-Maldivian negotiations at an impasse over terms for key RAF base on southernmost atoll.

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

24 August 1959

## DAILY BRIEF

SIRAB

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

**USSR-UAR:** [A personal letter from Khrushchev to Egyptian President Nasir on the forthcoming trip to the United States was delivered on 15 August by the Soviet chargé in Cairo, ] The Soviet premier explained the purpose of his exchange of visits with President Eisenhower and offered assurances that he would make no agreements behind Nasir's back. Khrushchev asked for Nasir's views on probable American proposals for the Middle East and expressed fear that President Eisenhower would suggest an arms embargo for the area, opposition to which would place the USSR in an awkward position.]

N<sup>o</sup> Negotiations now are in progress in Moscow concerning the supply of additional arms to the UAR, and an official agreement is expected to be concluded shortly.

**USSR-East Germany:** [East German party leader Ulbricht, who is conferring with Khrushchev at the Black Sea resort at Sochi on current strategy, fears that the Soviet leader may not hold to previously agreed positions on Germany and Berlin, ]

N<sup>o</sup> Therefore, Ulbricht "intends to stay as close as possible" to Khrushchev to keep him from wavering and may remain in the USSR until the Soviet leader leaves for the United States. Other East German officials also have expressed concern that Khrushchev may concede too much during his talks with the President. An East German party plenum scheduled for late August has been postponed pending Ulbricht's return.]

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**Laos:** A statement broadcast from Hanoi on 21 August, but attributed to a spokesman of the Laotian Communist front, calls for the government to realign its pro-Western foreign policy and

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to set up a coalition government with Communist participation. North Vietnamese propaganda attempting to show that Saigon is intimately linked with the Laotian crisis suggests that Hanoi is concerned over the possibility that South Vietnam has secretly agreed to send military aid to Laos.

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

India-Afghanistan-Iran: Prime Minister Nehru is to visit Kabul from 14 to 17 September and,

has indicated his desire to visit Tehran for three days immediately thereafter. This trip, which appears to be at Nehru's initiative, probably reflects Nehru's increasing concern over Communist long-range intentions in Asia. Greatly irritated by Peiping's actions in Tibet and along India's Himalayan border, Nehru now may be undertaking a personal study of the relations of Afghanistan and Iran with the USSR.

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Iraq: The US Embassy reports a continuing atmosphere of acute tension in Baghdad as a result of Qasim's efforts to "maintain the balance" between the Communists and anti-Communists. The American ambassador doubts that either anti-Communist army officers or Communist party leaders are sure enough of their chances of success to attempt a coup against Qasim under present circumstances. New eruptions of violence might, however, force the hand of either side.

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there have been incidents in Sulaymaniyah Province on the eastern border but on nothing like the scale reported by UAR propaganda.

possibility of major Communist-perpetrated disturbances in the city of Karbala south of Baghdad during a 24-26 August Shiite religious festival there and have also reported a sharp influx of Communists into Baghdad.

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DAILY BRIEF

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**\*Ethiopia:** [An attempt may be made to assassinate Emperor Haile Selassie on 24 August when he returns to Addis Ababa from his two-month trip abroad.]

[ ] The Ministry of Internal Affairs has drawn up a long list of persons to arrest should any trouble develop. This report of an assassination plan may be related to earlier reports of plotting by a group opposed to the agreements signed by the Emperor in Moscow and Prague. Death or incapacitation of the Emperor would probably set off a prolonged period of instability in Ethiopia.]

### III. THE WEST

**France-Algeria:** [During UN Secretary General Hammarskjold's recent visit to France, De Gaulle gave no indication that he plans any major change in France's Algerian policy. He also ruled out negotiations for a political settlement with Premier Abbas of the Provisional Algerian Government, explaining that Abbas is without a mandate to represent the Algerians and is too weak to control or lead them. Premier Debré, who took a considerably tougher line during the 31 July talks with Hammarskjold, stated that if the UN interfered with France on the Algerian question, France might have to walk out of the General Assembly.]

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**UK-Maldives:** [The present impasse between Britain and the government of the Maldives--over terms governing British use of a key RAF base being completed on Gan Island in southern-most Addu Atoll--could aggravate Britain's relations with India and Ceylon and provide an issue for international Communist propaganda. Britain is prepared to repulse any effort by the government of the Maldives to suppress dissidents who control Addu Atoll and provide workers for the base.]

(Page 5) (Map)

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DAILY BRIEF

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Situation in Laos

A Hanoi broadcast of 21 August, attributed to a spokesman of Laos' Communist front Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ) party, called for the creation of a coalition government with Communist participation, the realignment of Laos' pro-Western foreign policy, and a return to the privileged position secured through the negotiations between the Communists and the royal government which culminated in the unification settlement of November 1957. By taking this extreme position, the NLHZ is creating a climate in which its proscription as a political party is almost inevitable. Its line also suggests that the NLHZ is preparing to abandon legal political activity in favor of guerrilla warfare.

[Reports point to intensified Communist partisan operations in northern Laos, especially in Sam Neua Province and areas of eastern Luang Prabang Province adjacent to Sam Neua.] The press states that infiltration in Vientiane Province has forced the government to abandon several posts. The scale of operations appears to be smaller than is suggested by the reports, however.

North Vietnam has markedly increased its accusations that South Vietnam is actively involved in the Laotian crisis, suggesting concern over the possibility that Saigon has secretly agreed to give military aid to Laos. Specifically Hanoi accuses Saigon of training anti-Communist terrorists for the Laotian Government and sending advisers to help the army, and claims that a decision now has been reached to dispatch troops from South Vietnam. At the very least Hanoi probably is worried that Saigon will utilize the present crisis to increase its influence in Laos.

In another development, [ ] has reported rumors circulating in Hanoi that Premier and Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong left North Vietnam for Communist China around 17 August to meet President Ho Chi Minh, who has been in China since early August, and to confer with Peiping's leaders about the Laotian situation. Such action would indicate the Communists' pressing need for close policy coordination at this time. [ ]

[ ] As a VIP flight left Hanoi for Peiping on 18 August, and as Dong has not been reported attending any public function during the last week, the report may be true. [ ]

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Nehru to Visit Kabul and Probably Tehran

The Iranian Embassy in New Delhi informed Tehran on 19 August that Indian Prime Minister Nehru would pay an official visit to Kabul from 14 to 17 September and wished to visit Tehran for three days thereafter. The embassy strongly urged that Nehru be invited to Iran, partly to view conditions in the country and partly because world opinion would probably consider a visit by such an outspoken opponent of the Baghdad Pact an indication that Nehru is changing his viewpoint.

As suggested by the Iranian Embassy, Nehru's trip may well be motivated by his irritation over Peiping's recent behavior in Tibet and along India's Himalayan border. He may desire to study the relationships of states having common borders with the USSR. Nehru's visit to Kabul should provide him with a valuable insight into the extent of Afghanistan's economic and military dependence on the USSR and give him an opportunity to describe India's recent experiences with the Chinese. In Iran, the Shah, who will almost certainly postpone a projected visit to Jordan in order to receive Nehru, is well equipped to discuss Soviet border tactics as well as Communist subversive activities.

Should Nehru also meet with Pakistani President Ayub in early September, as was suggested on 22 August by both the Indian and Pakistani press, Nehru might well return from his trip at the end of the month with a more sympathetic understanding of the area's problems. This could be reflected in Indian diplomatic actions in Southeast Asia and at the Afro-Asian economic conference now scheduled to be held in Colombo next December.

The Shah will probably welcome Nehru's visit in the hope that it will bolster his prestige at home and abroad. The Shah may also ask Nehru's assistance in convincing Afghanistan of the dangers of close association with the Soviet bloc and in urging Kabul to reach a settlement of the current Afghan-Iranian dispute over distribution of the waters of the Helmand river.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Continuing Tension in Iraq

The US ambassador reports a continuing atmosphere of apprehension in Baghdad. Some Western diplomats describe the present situation, which has resulted from Qasim's efforts to "maintain the balance" between Communists and anti-Communists, as the most explosive since the 1958 revolution which brought Qasim to power.

There have been persistent reports of coup planning by both the Communists and a group of high-placed anti-Communist army officers. The American ambassador believes that Qasim's recent actions have cost him reliable supporters in both camps but doubts that either side has wide enough support and great enough confidence of the outcome to attempt a coup under present circumstances. The Ambassador points out that Qasim has shown shrewd ability to retrieve difficult situations in the past and thinks that he may well do so again. Security arrangements in Baghdad appear to be routine, according to the embassy, and there are fewer guards around the Defense Ministry, where Qasim has his office, than for some time past.

Nevertheless, new major eruptions of violence between Communist and anti-Communist elements might force one side or the other to choose between sacrifice of its present power position or a precipitate attempt to seize control of the government. Violent incidents have continued to occur sporadically in several parts of the country and any one of these might abruptly develop into major proportions.

[redacted] major disturbances this week in the city of Karbala south of Baghdad and have also reported a large influx of Communists into Baghdad as a result of enforcement of anti-Communist measures in several of the provinces.

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### III. THE WEST

#### Paris Shows No Signs of Changing Algerian Program


[President de Gaulle told UN Secretary General Hammarskjold on 31 July that he has no definite plan for a "final solution," of the Algerian question. He said he was willing to accept whatever solution "evolved" as long as it was based on a "democratic" decision. He ruled out any negotiations on political matters with Provisional Algerian Republic Premier Abbas, explaining that Abbas has no mandate to represent the Algerians and is too weak to rule them if given an opportunity. De Gaulle said he had made his policy clear and saw no reason to restate it.]

[The French cabinet is scheduled to review the Algerian question 26 August, the day before De Gaulle leaves for a three-day visit to the area. Socialist leader Mollet told an American official on 20 August that De Gaulle has a "liberal and farsighted outlook" on Algeria and is only seeking the means of putting his point of view over to his cabinet, the army, the people, and the UN.]

[Premier Debré, on the other hand, took a much tougher line in his conversation with Hammarskjold. He stated that if the UN General Assembly interfered with France on Algeria, France might have to "cease its cooperation" with the General Assembly. Hammarskjold understood that the threatened walk-out would not extend to the Security Council or the UN as a whole.]

[Recently there have been indications that Paris intends to prepare a strong case for the UN debate. Such an approach would undoubtedly lead to renewed insistence that France's allies give their full support.]

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[ ]

### Complete Impasse Reached in British-Maldivian Relations

[Relations between Britain and the Maldives, a British-protected sultanate 400 miles southwest of Ceylon, have reached an impasse over the terms governing Britain's use of the air base under construction on Gan Island. This base, a key RAF staging post and an important link between the Middle East-African area and Singapore-Australia, is located in Addu Atoll, one of the three southern atolls which were taken over by a secessionist movement in March.]

[Two of the three atolls were recaptured in early August, and the British now have informed the Maldivian Government that they are prepared to resist by force any effort to recapture Addu Atoll from the rebels, who provide labor on the air base. A 50-man RAF detachment from Aden is replacing a 100-man army contingent flown in from Singapore in early August when local British officials feared trouble. The Maldivian Government, which earlier charged Britain with instigating the revolt, has rebuffed British offers of mediation, and the prime minister has refused to negotiate further about the base.]

[A Commonwealth Relations Office official has shown a complacent attitude toward any possible repercussions, knowing that work on the base can continue. Britain's use of force to prevent a government from restoring its rule to territory Britain acknowledges it rightfully controls could nevertheless aggravate its relations with India and Ceylon and be readily exploited by international Communist propaganda.]

[ ]

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

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