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
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1. REPORTED PURGE IN SYRIAN ARMY

Reference:

[redacted] Fourteen Syrian officers have been arrested by Syrian military intelligence for complicity in the alleged American "plot," [redacted]

[redacted] Among those arrested were Major General Daghestani, army inspector general; Brigadier Mahmud Shawkat, commander of the Israeli front; and Colonel Faysal Atasi, commandant of the military academy. These three officers are prominent conservatives who have belonged to a group which urged that the army stay out of politics.

[redacted] Chief of Staff Nizam ad-Din is opposed to the purge and that army intelligence is attempting to oust him within the next two days. The prime minister announced late on 15 August that the Chief of Staff had "applied for retirement." One of two candidates mentioned for Nizam ad-Din's post is Col. Afif Bizri, reliably reported to be a Communist. The army is pressing for the reimposition of martial law, but this is being resisted by President Quwatli. The Egyptian attaché stated that "we are still trying to resolve the matter without creating a clash which might lead to a revolution!"

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2. YEMENIS FEAR CIVIL WAR OVER SUCCESSION

Comment on:

A widespread acceptance of the probability that civil war may break out over the choice of a successor to the ailing Imam was reported by the American consul in Aden after a recent trip to southern Yemen.

Anticipation of civil war has led to a revival in southern Yemen of separatist leanings, which have been given further impetus by rumors


The northern tribal chiefs traditionally have elected each new Imam, and refuse to recognize the Imam's designation of his son Badr as crown prince. The consul reports that most members of the Yemeni ruling class with whom he talked believed that Badr could not succeed to the throne without foreign help, and that the tribal leaders favored the Imam's brother, Prince Hassan, who heads the Yemeni delegation to the UN. The consul concludes that some movement undoubtedly is under way to reverse the present extension of Soviet influence in Yemen and to prepare the ground for the succession of Prince Hassan.

The consul also reports a widespread expectation of Egyptian, Soviet, or possibly Saudi intervention in support of Badr, who undoubtedly hopes to support his bid for power with newly received Soviet arms, assisted by Yemen's Soviet advisers. Meanwhile, Egyptian propaganda, portraying the USSR as the supporter of Arab independence, appears increasingly successful in convincing the mass of Yemenis that the Soviet arms and technicians are needed to resist British aggression on the Aden border.

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3. EGYPT REPORTEDLY SUGGESTING TUNISIA OBTAIN SOVIET WEAPONS



Comment It is not clear [redacted] whether Nasr is serving as intermediary for a direct delivery of Soviet arms to Tunisia or whether he contemplates making Soviet arms available from Egyptian stocks. In June, [redacted] Nasr was planning to offer Soviet arms to the Sudan.

Although Tunisian President Bourghiba is urgently seeking military supplies for Tunisia's small and ill-equipped security forces, he is unlikely at this time to agree to any such arrangement involving Soviet arms. On 8 August, however, after again sharply criticizing France for withholding military equipment from Tunisia and for bringing pressure on other potential suppliers, he warned that Tunisia will find arms "at any price."

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4. GREECE HOLDING DOOR OPEN TO TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE ON CYPRUS

Comment on:

Greek Foreign Minister Averoff is holding open the door to a tripartite conference on Cyprus in London next month, but it is unlikely that the Greek government will agree to attend without prior assurances which are largely unacceptable to Britain. Britain is, however, now willing to surrender sovereignty over Cyprus except for a small base area. Averoff replied on 7 August to the first British sounding by rejecting the idea of a tripartite conference as "quite inadequate" and involving "serious dangers." However, he hinted that Greece might accept a British invitation if London would support independence for Cyprus with a guarantee against a change in the island's status either for a 20-year period or by the consent of a majority of the UN or of NATO, or continuation of British sovereignty with a plebiscite after ten years.

The initial Turkish reaction to the British proposal was favorable, although the Turks also indicated a desire for a prior understanding with London and have not formally replied pending clarification of the Greek reaction. Ankara remains firmly committed to partition for Cyprus and appears to believe that London is bound to support its view; however, there is some indication that the Turks recognize the general lack of support for partition and are studying alternative solutions, including a three-power condominium and even guaranteed independence. Nevertheless, the Turks are certain to balk at any solution which is intended to leave the way open to the eventual union of Cyprus with Greece.

Despite the questionable prospects for a tripartite conference at present, the three governments appear to be approaching an area of agreement.

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5. AUSTRALIAN VIEWS ON INDONESIAN SITUATION

Comment on:

Australian officials see increasing momentum toward the fragmentation of the Indonesian state.

Factors in this development are the continuing political divergence of area army commanders and the central government, Communist electoral successes in Java which will probably harden the opposition of area commanders, and growing illegal trade in the non-Javanese provinces. Recent reports available to Australian officials indicate that the area army commanders are giving serious consideration to secession rather than to demands for increased local autonomy.

The extent of this fragmentation tends to be obscured by the gradual day-to-day drift of affairs, in the Australians' opinion. Regardless of the intention of the area commanders regarding secession, a de facto separation is rapidly becoming a reality.

The impression has been gained that the Australian government has decided to intervene if the Communists gain control in Java.

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6. BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA MAY PROPOSE RESOLUTION FOR A LATIN AMERICAN ATOMIC ENERGY CENTER AT ECONOMIC CONFERENCE

Comment on:

[redacted] the

president of the Argentine Atomic Energy Commission was enthusiastic about a proposed joint Argentine-Brazilian draft res-

olution on an atomic energy center for Latin America. The resolution may be presented at the Buenos Aires economic conference which opened on 15 August. The purpose would be "to give public demonstration of unity of views" in an attempt to defeat the US proposal to locate the center in Puerto Rico. The resolution would direct the special committee created by the Committee of Presidential Representatives to present a draft report within a short time on this subject, indicating the best location for the center.

[redacted]
Brazil planned to propose during the economic conference that the center be established in Brazil. The Committee of Presidential Representatives last spring "took note" of the problem and referred the matter to the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission for consideration "when, in its judgment, it is deemed desirable." [redacted]

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[Redacted]

Watch Report 367, 15 August 1957
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee

Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
 - B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral to the orbit in the immediate future.
 - C. Early deliberate initiation of hostilities by Israel or the Arab states is not probable. Although tensions continue between the Arab states and Israel and among certain Arab states themselves, these are not likely to lead to serious conflict in the immediate future.
- [Redacted]

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