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17 August 1960

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

North Korea - South Korea: Premier Kim Il-sung on 14 August proposed a loose federation of North and South Korea in an apparent effort to take the propaganda initiative from the new South Korean regime, which has indicated support for UN-supervised elections to reunify the peninsula. Khrushchev can be expected to dramatize Communist proposals for a Korean settlement when he visits Pyongyang in early October. The Communists will attempt to use South Korea's rejection of the federation idea as grounds for charges that Seoul is responsible for the continued division of Korea.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

The Congo: Secretary General Hammarskjold, who has rebuffed Lumumba's demand for withdrawal of non-African UN contingents from the Congo, is calling an early meeting of the Security Council. He is expected to request a council ruling

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concerning his opinion that the UN force cannot be used on Lumumba's behalf to subdue Katanga. The action by Leopoldville police on 16 August in detaining for investigation several hundred Europeans--including UN personnel--suggests that as he develops his own police force Lumumba may attempt even greater harassments in dealing with the UN and his political opponents. Later on the 16th Lumumba decreed martial law over the entire country for a period of six months.

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*South Korea: Newly elected South Korean President Yun probably will nominate former Vice President Chang Myon for prime minister following the House of Representatives' rejection of Kim To-yun, the President's first selection for the post. However, the narrow margin of Kim's defeat--three votes less than the simple majority necessary for confirmation--suggests that a government headed by Chang would have tenuous support. Chang, titular chief of the majority Democratic party, controls a little less than half of his party's two-thirds majority in the powerful 233-seat lower house. 6K

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Kim Il-sung Calls for Federation of North and South Korea

Keynoting a "liberation day" celebration in Pyongyang, North Korean Premier Kim Il-sung on 14 August attempted to take the propaganda initiative on Korean reunification from the new South Korean Government, which has indicated support for UN-supervised peninsula-wide elections.

Kim called for elections "without outside intervention" and suggested an interim North-South federation in which a "supreme national committee" with representatives from both sides would work out economic and cultural cooperation. Such cooperation, Kim said, would help to solve South Korea's "economic catastrophe." Kim also suggested that North and South Korea each reduce its troop strength to "100,000 or less." Implicit in the premier's speech was Pyongyang's usual insistence on withdrawal of US forces from South Korea before "peaceful unification" can be achieved.

A South Korean Democratic party spokesman has publicly rejected the North Korean proposal, and on 15 August acting Prime Minister Huh Chung termed it "another rehash of a worn-out propaganda tactic." Pyongyang probably now will attempt to exploit this rejection in efforts to make Seoul appear responsible for continued division of Korea.

Khrushchev, who has accepted an invitation to visit Pyongyang in early October, can be expected to provide dramatic publicity on Communist proposals for a Korean settlement. He also may use this visit to amplify Moscow's position in the current Sino-Soviet dispute, just before a high-level meeting of Communist parties which may be held in Moscow in conjunction with the USSR's Bolshevik Revolution celebration.

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The Situation in the Congo

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Secretary General Hammarskjold, who has rebuffed Lumumba's demand for the withdrawal of non-African UN contingents from the Congo, is calling an early meeting of the Security Council. [He has indicated that should Lumumba formally request the withdrawal of non-African contingents he would recommend the withdrawal of the UN force in its entirety.]

[Hammarskjold has interpreted the UN resolution of 9 August as meaning that the UN command in the Congo could not be used on behalf of the central government, as in any move to subdue Katanga. He will request a ruling on this interpretation at the Security Council meeting.]

The action by the Leopoldville police on 16 August in detaining for investigation several hundred Europeans--including UN personnel--suggests that as he develops his own security forces Lumumba will increase his harassment of both the UN and his political opponents. An estimated 400 to 500 Europeans were detained for document checks after Lumumba charged that Belgian officials still in Leopoldville were avoiding arrest by wearing UN arm bands.

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Meanwhile, Ghanaian President Nkrumah--who together with Guinea's Sékou Touré has warmly supported Lumumba's cause--may be moving to dissociate himself somewhat from Lumumba's extreme position regarding Katanga.

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According to Ghana radio, Nkrumah is giving "active consideration" to an invitation from President Tshombé to visit Katanga and see conditions there. In Monrovia, President Tubman has stated that Nkrumah now agrees with him that an African "summit" meeting scheduled for Leopoldville from 25 to 30 August is not required, and that any meeting there could be held on the ministerial level.

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Selection of South Korean Prime Minister

Newly elected South Korean President Yun Bo-sun probably will nominate former Vice President Chang Myon for prime minister following the House of Representatives' rejection on 17 August of Kim To-yun, the President's first selection for the post. Under the constitution, if the President's second nominee is rejected, the lower house selects the prime minister whose election then requires only a plurality of votes. The President must announce his second choice within five days and the house must act upon his recommendation in not less than 24 hours and not more than 48 hours.

Kim's defeat by a narrow margin of only three votes suggests that a government headed by Chang would have a tenuous majority. Chang, titular chief of the Democratic party, controls slightly less than half of the party's two-thirds majority in the powerful 233-seat lower house. Kim, leader of the party's right-wing faction, has strongly opposed any compromise with Chang's followers and at times he has appeared to favor a party split.

Chang has stated that if he becomes prime minister he would select a broadly representative cabinet, which would include members of both factions and presumably independents. Early press reports indicate that Kim was defeated after a group of independents rejected his answers to a list of questions which they submitted to him and Chang. Should most of the 44 independents in the lower house act as a unified group they might exercise the balance of power between the nearly evenly divided pro- and anti-Chang factions of the majority party.

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