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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

20 April 1952



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1) DECLASSIFIED

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
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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



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~~TOP SECRET~~**SUMMARY****GENERAL**

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FAR EAST

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~~TOP SECRET~~**GENERAL**

1.

comments on Soviet policy in Europe and Asia:

3.3(h)(2)

Two interviews granted by Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky and Deputy Minister Zorin to members of the diplomatic corps in Moscow are reported [redacted] as revealing Soviet policy in Europe and Asia.

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

Zorin reportedly told [redacted] that the time is ripe to bring about the unity of Germany and that if the Western Powers let this opportunity slip away, it will not soon come again. While it was not clear what Zorin intended, [redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] that the USSR may expect the West to turn down its present German proposals, in which event it will incorporate East Germany into the Soviet Orbit and offer coexistence in Europe. [redacted] that this tactic might insure the temporary quiescence that the Soviet Union wants in Europe to be ready to meet any eventuality in Asia.

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

In a separate interview with the [redacted] Vyshinsky said that he believed that a Korean settlement is possible, but that the question of peace still would not be resolved in Asia because the United States is preparing to expand the conflict there.

3.3(h)(2)

FAR EAST2. North Korea purchases large number of trucks from USSR:

3.3(h)(2)

Nearly 2,000 trucks are being imported by North Korea from the USSR, according to [redacted]

[redacted] The North Korean mission in Moscow is instructed to open letters of credit for a Soviet export trust in payment for $2\frac{1}{4}$ -ton and 4-ton trucks and other motor vehicles.

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Comment: [redacted] indicate the continuing high level of logistical support given North Korea by the Soviet Union.

3.3(h)(2)

The Far East Command estimated late in 1951 that the Communists had been able to keep nearly 10,000 vehicles operational, despite losses of nearly 32,000 vehicles since the beginning of the war.

3. Top Chinese official in Tibet reportedly intends to visit India:

[redacted] General Chang Ching-wu, senior Chinese representative in Tibet, intends to visit India to discuss with Prime Minister Nehru plans for a "most-favored-nation trade treaty" with Tibet and to request "increased" exports of grain, cloth and construction materials from India.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: There has been no high-level contact between India and Tibet since the Chinese occupation of Tibet in autumn 1951. Chang's visit could prepare the way for a discussion of all aspects of Indo-Tibetan relations.

Chang's immediate mission, however, may be to ease a serious food shortage reported in Tibet. India, which probably cannot supply much food, may agree to cooperate in expediting shipments of Chinese commodities sent via Calcutta.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

4. [redacted]

internal deterioration in Egypt:

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] The Egyptian monarchy may soon collapse, if measures are not taken now to counteract the recent "dangerous" turn in the internal situation, [redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] The ferment in the Army and the growing trend against King Farouk are particularly disturbing to palace and cabinet officials, who have admitted the seriousness of the situation.

3.3(h)(2)

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A person very close to the King has stated that the trend against Farouk would become more grave if he should make his customary European visit this year. The King, however, is not adopting any serious measures, [redacted] but "continues his old life like a man sure of his own wisdom and destiny."

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: King Farouk does not enjoy the full respect and confidence of his people. While his dismissal of the WAFD, his insistence on negotiations with Britain and his action in quelling the January riots in Cairo have added somewhat to his international stature, there is no evidence that his position inside Egypt has improved.

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] Army ranks, however, may gradually be affected by popular discontent and widespread anti-British sentiment.

5. Syria willing to accept 500,000 more Arab refugees:

[redacted] Syria is willing to resettle 500,000 Arab refugees in addition to those already there, according to the Chief of State, Colonel Selo. Colonel Shishakli had previously intimated that he would welcome this opportunity for economic development.

3.3(h)(2)

Colonel Selo urged an agreement integrating Syrian plans for a \$200,000,000 development program with the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) projects. He also made it clear that in view of the political risks involved in accepting the refugees and in spite of the economic advantages, Syria would welcome any additional funds for general economic development which UNRWA could secure.

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
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Comment: Acceptance of Arab refugees along with sizable economic assistance would enable the Shishakli-Selo regime to build a larger, more powerful Syria.

Successful resettlement of so many refugees would be a major step toward the solution of one of the Near East's most pressing problems. Other Arab states are likely to be uncooperative on the resettlement project and insist that the refugees be returned to their Palestinian homes.

LATIN AMERICA

6. Political disturbances in Ecuador:



The political situation in Ecuador is tense and rumors of a pending revolution are persistent,

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

A minor incident occurred in Quito on 18 April when university students shot at and burned an effigy of presidential candidate Velasco Ibarra. This resulted in unfounded rumors that the revolution had started.

Comment: The February announcement of Velasco Ibarra's candidacy and his return on 1 March from exile in Argentina have upset earlier predictions that the presidential contest would be a "fairly normal one."

Velasco is scheduled to arrive in Quito on 22 April on his campaign tour, which has already resulted in violence. Communist leaders are reported to be organizing shock troops in Quito in preparation for Velasco's arrival, and Communist and Socialist students are actively engaged in propaganda campaigns against him. Should the expected disturbances in Quito reach serious proportions, it is possible that the ambitious Minister of Defense might stage a preventive coup "to protect" Ecuador from further bloodshed and from possible rule of the twice deposed ex-president Velasco.

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7. Revolution reportedly planned for Venezuela:

Gustavo Machado, a high Communist leader, and Valmore Rodriguez, spokesman for the Democratic Action Party, were on the Colombian-Venezuelan frontier with a large shipment of arms which they planned to deliver to the area around Maracaibo on 18 April.

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] the Government was setting up an extensive water blockade and land patrols. The Chief of the National Security Forces in the capital, however, indicated that he had no knowledge of any planned disturbances.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: Police precautions may be merely a routine follow-up on the government's 9 April announcement that the outlawed Democratic Action Party had planned disturbances for 19 April and 5 July. The Maracaibo oil area was not affected by the Democratic Action's uprisings last October.

The present report implies full-scale Communist-Democratic Action collaboration which would be a new factor in current Venezuelan politics. It is not certain whether the meeting and collaboration of these two leaders -- if true -- would imply mere harassing or strike tactics in the Maracaibo oil area or would herald country-wide disturbances.

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