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Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000420001-9

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000420001-9

25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

South Africa: [Albert Luthuli, the president of the African National Congress and the most influential African nationalist in South Africa, appears to be dying as a result of the harsh treatment he received after his arrest on 30 March,]

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[The death or permanent incapacitation of Luthuli, who had exercised a restraining influence over African extremists, would provide Africans throughout the country with a rallying symbol for further action against the government. Regardless of Luthuli's condition, serious disorders may occur if Africans provoke police retaliation by heeding nationalist appeals to begin a week-long stay-at-home campaign on 19 April.]

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Sudan: [Dissension within the top leadership of the Abboud military regime is growing, as each of the several factions tries to line up army and civilian supporters. The regime's unpopularity has increased, partly as a result of strong pressures by influential political and religious leaders for a return to civilian government.]

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[It seems doubtful that all five regional army commanders would support the regime in the event of a showdown.]

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Greece: [The recent announcement that Turkish Prime Minister Menderes and Soviet Premier Khrushchev will exchange visits this summer has created difficulties for the Greek Government, according to Foreign Minister Averoff. Opposition groups, both left and right, are again denouncing the "inflexible" foreign policy which has left Greece almost alone in its opposition to the USSR's economic and cultural offensive. Thus the government may decide /]

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[it must make some dramatic move toward improving relations
with the bloc.]

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III. THE WEST

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Cuba: Fidel Castro seems intent on making the May Day rally in Havana a demonstration of strong support for his regime not only by the Cuban masses but also by public sentiment throughout the hemisphere. Evidently aware of the cool attitude of most Latin American governments, he is trying to show hemisphere support by inviting numerous political figures who are out of office but have widespread reputations as liberal or "anti-imperialist" leaders. [The Cuban Communist party is taking a leading part in preparations for the rally, and almost 100 representatives from Communist China and Soviet bloc countries are expected to participate.]

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18 Apr 60

DAILY BRIEF

iii

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25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000420001-9

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000420001-9

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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South African Native Leader Reported Dying

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[Albert Luthuli, the president of the African National Congress and the most influential African nationalist in South Africa, appears to be dying as a result of the harsh treatment he received from the police after his arrest on 30 March.]

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[Luthuli is almost the only African nationalist whose prestige extends throughout South Africa. His program has been moderate, emphasizing peaceful reform. He has favored the creation of an African-dominated state, with non-African minority rights constitutionally guaranteed. Although government-imposed restrictions have hindered his activities, he has heretofore acted to restrain African extremists. His death or permanent incapacitation would provide Africans throughout the country with a rallying symbol for further action against the government.]

[Regardless of Luthuli's condition, serious disorders may occur if Africans provoke police retaliation by heeding nationalist appeals to begin a week-long stay-at-home campaign on 19 April.]

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The Sudanese Situation

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[The possibility of a sudden move to change or overthrow the Abboud military regime in the Sudan is growing. Dissension within the Supreme Military Council--the top governing body--has become acute, as each of its several factions tries to line up army and civilian support.]

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[Influential political and religious leaders have sustained their pressures for a rapid return to civilian government, and the Supreme Council members have been unable to agree on how to deal with them.]

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[The head of the Ansar religious sect, which could probably muster several thousand partially armed tribesmen in an emergency, has warned the government that action against him would force "drastic counter-measures."] []

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[It seems doubtful that the regime can count on support of all five regional army commanders in the event of a full-scale showdown.] []

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Greek Government Faces Increasing Pressure to Improve Relations With USSR

[The announcement on 12 April that Turkish Prime Minister Menderes and Soviet Premier Khrushchev will exchange visits has caused the Greek Government more domestic difficulties than it had anticipated, according to Greek Foreign Minister Averoff. The opposition press, both the far left and the anti-Communist center, is again attacking the government's "inflexible" foreign policy. Several non-Communist political leaders have denounced the government for permitting Greece to become isolated in its opposition to the Soviet bloc's economic and cultural offensive. Liberal party leader Venizelos has seized the opportunity to announce that he has accepted a month-old Soviet invitation to visit the USSR.]

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[The USSR has alternately used the "carrot and the stick" in attempting to "normalize" its relations with Greece, and late last year the Soviet ambassador in Athens vainly attempted to arrange an exchange of visits between Karamanlis and Khrushchev.]

[Athens is "resentful and unhappy" over Ankara's precipitate announcement of the visits and its omission of the fact that Menderes will visit Athens before going to Moscow.]

[Averoff has told the American ambassador that Athens must soon decide if it will "fall in line" and abandon its resistance to a detente. Thus Athens may decide to make some dramatic move to improve its relations with the bloc.]

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III. THE WEST

Plans for Cuban May Day Rally

Fidel Castro seems determined to make the May Day rally in Havana a demonstration of strong support for his regime not only by the Cuban masses but also by public sentiment throughout the hemisphere and by the Sino-Soviet bloc.

A parade by the armed forces and militia units is planned to show Cuba's capacity to repel the foreign invasion Castro officials insist is being plotted by "imperialism." [Previous plans for a march of a million workers are rumored to have been abandoned because of a bitter fight within the Cuban Labor Confederation (CTC) over the government's endorsement of efforts to purge non-Communist leaders. The Cuban Communist party has taken advantage of this situation to usurp CTC responsibility for organizing the May Day celebration, hoping thus to strengthen its influence with Castro and within the CTC.]

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Delegations invited from other Latin American countries include liberal leaders--many of them widely respected--who recently signed a "statement of solidarity with the Cuban Revolution." Their presence would be used to demonstrate support by nonofficial hemisphere groups and to offset the coolness of most Latin American governments toward Castro and their concern over his rejection of the Rio de Janeiro Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

[Castro will also probably attempt to attract to Havana a large number of the prominent liberals and leftists from all Latin American countries and the United States who have been invited to Maracay, Venezuela, from 21 to 26 April to attend the scheduled conference of the Inter-American Association for the Defense of Democracy and Freedom--a meeting which is supported by Venezuelan President Betancourt's regime. Those invited to the Maracay conference include eight former chiefs of state and other influential]

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000420001-9

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000420001-9

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[political leaders and government officials, several of whom have long been considered unfriendly toward the US.]

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[redacted] Along with 73 Soviet visitors and other bloc delegations, the Chinese will probably be given a prominent place in the demonstration.

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The American Embassy in Havana is convinced the rally will have a strong anti-US and Communist-line flavor.

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