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30 January 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

30 January 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Tunisia: If France has not indicated by 8 February its willingness to negotiate a withdrawal of forces from Bizerte, the Tunisian Government probably will attempt to seal off the French base and possibly take the issue to the UN Security Council. President Bourguiba may also be considering seeking American good offices in this problem.

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*OK*


Belgian Congo: Brussels' announcement on 28 January that the transfer of sovereignty for the Belgian Congo will extend well beyond the promised 30 June date for "independence" could bring a suspension of current round-table talks in Brussels. The Belgian statement was immediately rejected by a spokesman for the African nationalists, who demanded that the Congo receive "all the prerogatives of sovereignty... without any reservation." The leader of the influential Abako party has called for the formation of a Congo provisional government, and may attempt to carry out his repeated threat to set up an "independent" state in the lower Congo area.

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
Afghanistan: The government's efforts to bring about social reform and economic development with army backing is causing increasing tribal opposition. Kabul has had to use troops on

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several occasions in the past year to maintain control in southeastern tribal areas. In recent weeks, government control has reportedly been challenged along some roads in tribal territory south of Kabul, and royal family efforts to enlist support against dissident elements reportedly have failed.] [REDACTED]

\*Japan: Prime Minister Kishi is seriously considering dissolving the Diet in early February and calling for national elections on the issue of ratification of the new US-Japanese security treaty. Kishi's supporters in the ruling Liberal-Democratic party, believing that Kishi is at the zenith of his power while the Socialists are disorganized and divided, see an opportunity for a major victory which would extend the prime minister's tenure. In making his decision, however, Kishi must consider important difficulties, including strong resistance from the LDP's financial backers and from rival party leaders who are anxious to replace him.7 [REDACTED]

### III. THE WEST

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## LATE ITEM

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\*Algeria-France (as of 0200 30 January 1960): De Gaulle's tough reaffirmation of his self-determination policy for Algeria, accompanied by a direct command to the army to restore order, throws down the gauntlet to the insurgents and wavering army forces. The decision of army leaders--especially that of the key paratroop officers--will probably be determined by the way authorities in Algeria implement De Gaulle's statement that "there may be various ways whereby the law can be enforced." De Gaulle's pronouncement has infuriated the insurgents in Algiers, who probably now believe that only by the overthrow of the Fifth Republic can a "French Algeria" be assured.

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[redacted] For a detailed account of developments, see Page 8.  
(Status Report)

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[redacted]

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[redacted] 25X1

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Tunisia Seeks to Induce France to Negotiate Bizerte

#### Base Issue

[President Habib Bourguiba's warning to France in his 25 January speech that he intends to press for the evacuation of the French base at Bizerte was designed to make Paris--before his 8 February deadline--reverse its stand that the Bizerte issue is not negotiable, according to Bourguiba's foreign policy adviser. Bourguiba is reported to be willing to permit a phased withdrawal of troops over a period of six to ten months.]

[The adviser reported that if France did not meet this deadline, the Tunisians would try to seal off the base with roadblocks and other harassing tactics. Tunis probably would also attempt to have the issue placed before the UN Security Council. In 1958 the Security Council debated two Tunisian complaints of French aggression on Tunisian soil. Such efforts might incite violent incidents and a new crisis in Tunisian-French relations. The American ambassador in Tunis believes Bourguiba may be hoping that the United States might play a good-offices role on the Bizerte question, as it did in conjunction with the United Kingdom in the spring of 1958.]

[Pressures have been building up within the Tunisian Government for several months to hold the discussions provided for by the exchange of notes on 17 June 1958 in which France agreed to evacuate its forces from other bases. Although Bourguiba has at least twice offered to permit the French to retain Bizerte if they would conclude an Algerian settlement, no formal discussions have occurred. Tunis asked French]

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[Ambassador Boegner early in January to seek instructions to negotiate the eventual evacuation of Bizerte. France replied that its "right" to Bizerte was not negotiable, but the French Embassy in Tunis has indicated that France might withdraw more of its Bizerte troops--already reduced since 1958 from 15,000 to about 7,000.]

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Dispute Over Transfer of Powers Threatens  
Congo Conference

Belgian Minister for the Congo de Schrijver's announcement on 28 January that the process of transferring sovereignty to the Congo will extend well beyond the promised 30 June date for "independence" could precipitate a suspension of the current round-table talks in Brussels. His statement largely confirmed views expressed by the governor general in Leopoldville, who recently told American officials that responsibility for defense, foreign affairs, internal security, and finance would remain with Belgium "for the time being." He observed that a new Congolese state would lack qualified personnel in these areas and would be preoccupied with domestic affairs.

De Schrijver's statement was immediately rejected by a spokesman for the African nationalists, who demanded that the Congo receive "all the prerogatives of sovereignty... without any reservation." His pronouncement came at a time when agreement on a date for independence had created an atmosphere of exultation among African conferees "bordering on hysteria."

Possibly in response to the Belgian statement, Abako leader Joseph Kasavubu has appealed for the immediate formation of a provisional Congolese government. Kasavubu, who walked out of the conference on 26 January following a dispute concerning the agenda, may attempt to carry out his repeated threat to set up an "independent" state in the lower Congo area. Belgian officials have long been apprehensive over such a move, and one official recently expressed concern over indications that a Congo nationalist had gone to East Germany to purchase arms for the Congo. [redacted]

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Afghan Government May Provoke Further Tribal Opposition

Afghan Prime Minister Daud apparently has decided to press ahead with his social reform and economic development programs with army backing. This, as in the past, may increase tribal opposition and undercut his government's authority in key areas. Government efforts during January to Westernize the dress of certain Afghan groups indicate that Daud intends to push reforms, despite the unrest resulting from his efforts to abolish the veil. [He has recently strengthened army units, particularly in the disturbed tribal areas.]

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Although there has been no large-scale rioting since the Kandahar disturbances in December, antigovernment sentiment may be growing in urban areas where conservative religious elements are strong and in the tribal areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan. The Mangal tribes have been a major source of unrest in their opposition to abolition of the veil. [The royal family has reportedly failed in an attempt to enlist the support of neighboring tribes against the Mangals. In addition, government control along the main road between Kabul and Kandahar has apparently been challenged.]

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
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## LATE ITEM

## DE GAULLE AND THE ALGERIAN CRISIS

Since 16 September 1959 when De Gaulle announced that Algerians would have a free choice in determining their own ultimate political future, hostility to the president and the government had grown steadily among settler and army elements in Algeria. The announcement of a meeting in Paris on 22 January of key cabinet ministers with political and military leaders from Algeria aroused settler extremists, who were already worked up over revived rebel terrorism in "pacified" areas and by the fear that the lengthy conference of rebel chiefs in Tripoli was aimed at facilitating negotiations with Paris. In this atmosphere, General Massu's interview criticizing De Gaulle's Algerian policy, which was published on 19 January in a German newspaper, forced the government to recognize openly that large elements of the army shared settler concern lest the Moslem majority be permitted to cut Algeria's ties with France. The government confirmed on 20 January its intention to pursue its announced Algerian policy, and on 22 January De Gaulle's decision to relieve Massu was announced. It evoked no overt army reaction in Algiers, but 20,000 settlers demonstrated on 23 January. The next day they set up street barricades, [reportedly in the first stage of a plot by extremist civilian and army groups which may have been designed to take advantage of the expected reaction to Pinay's ouster from the government on 13 January. There is some evidence that the size of the demonstration was a disappointment to the plotters. They had hoped to overwhelm the authorities by a mass turnout which would have convinced military leaders the army would have to assume command as in 1958.] The civilian extremists seem to have been disappointed when no overt military participation developed, but they were nevertheless reassured by the reluctance of the paratroop units surrounding the barricades to limit the movements of the insurgents.

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Insurgent Position and Activities

A clash between settlers and gendarmes on 24 January left 19 dead and 141 wounded. General Challe immediately declared a state of siege, forbade public assembly, and summoned regiments from the interior. By 25 January the insurgents had

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established two main barricaded strongholds within a quarter of a mile of each other--one at the University led by Assembly deputy and former paratrooper Pierre Lagaillarde, and the other at the Compagnie Algérienne bank, under Joseph Ortiz, a café owner and leader of the extremist French National Front. Corridors of paratroopers were thrown around the barricades, but access in and out of the redoubts and supplies to the insurgents were permitted.

Ortiz announced on 25 January that if De Gaulle publicly abandoned self-determination for Algeria and stated an intention to retain Algeria as a French province, the insurgents would lay down their arms. The US consul general reported on 26 January that most authorities in Algiers felt it was no longer possible to apply De Gaulle's policy for Algeria. During 27-28 January insurgent ranks swelled to between 4,000 and 6,000, but settlers were able to rally few Moslem supporters.

The insurgents have expressed the determination not to be robbed of the fruit of their efforts as they maintain they were after the May 1958 coup. [According to Algerian deputy Philippe Marcias, demonstrations were planned for 25 January--not to attempt to reverse De Gaulle's policy, which was thought impossible, but "to raise the temperature" in Algiers with the purpose, of mounting a revolt to overthrow De Gaulle.]

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[Marcias stated on 27 January that Lagaillarde was "absolutely determined" to obtain a reversal of De Gaulle's policy and was prepared to initiate a civil war "with the cooperation of the army, if necessary."]

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This feeling of confidence was fostered by the government's censorship policy, which permitted the insurgents to believe they were winning support in France in the same way the 1958 coup unfolded. Because metropolitan France was in the dark on the seriousness of the situation in Algiers, the Algerian Deputies were emboldened to demand abrogation of the Algerian policy parliament had backed overwhelmingly in October.

The mainstay of insurgent confidence, however, was the belief in army backing. The insurgents rejected Delouvrier's impassioned appeal on the 28th for unity behind De Gaulle as a maneuver to take them in: "The army is with us and we will not budge!" [Lagaillarde and Ortiz were reported to believe on the]

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[Evening of the 28th that the opposing positions were "irreconcilable." They were also reportedly "absolutely convinced" that the 10th and 25th Airborne Divisions--only one tenth of which are actually in Algiers, however--were prepared to fight for the insurgents, and believed other divisions would swing to their side. Insurgent leaders indicated that a move by De Gaulle against them would result in the establishment of a separate Algerian government]

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### The Army

The army had accepted De Gaulle's 16 September self-determination offer in silence, and majority army sentiment was probably correctly represented in a statement by Marshal Juin on 26 October that De Gaulle had acted unilaterally but that Frenchmen would have to accept the challenge since "the dice were thrown!" Juin bowed to the idea of a referendum but maintained it could be held only after a cease-fire in which rebels "reconciled themselves to France and laid down their arms."

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[A colonel in the field in eastern Algeria in late 1959 flatly opposed rebel participation in the proposed referendum, and another colonel told an American that about 20 percent of the army was determined to maintain the French Army in Algeria "at any cost." A European deputy from Algiers claimed that if those officers actively opposed to De Gaulle's policies were to organize against him, the remainder of the military "would be carried along!"]

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[In mid-January a member of Delegate-General Delouvrier's staff said, "We are once more in the tunnel. This time I am truly discouraged." He lamented low army morale and exclaimed, "The entire army feels it can no longer continue the war without knowing why."]

Massu's bitter attack on De Gaulle's policies reflected army fears that Algeria was being lost. He said flatly, "We no longer understand the policy of General de Gaulle." He thought De Gaulle's idea on the way to keep Algeria French "is certainly not ours," and threatened that the army would "forcibly intervene if the situation demands." He insisted the army would never leave Algeria.

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[As recently as 28 January high-ranking officers are quoted as believing that whatever action might be taken by the activist army minority--even a move from Algeria to France to overthrow

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[De Gaulle--would not be opposed by the rest of the army, which is determined to maintain "unity of the army."]

### De Gaulle and the Army

[De Gaulle was aware of this sentiment, but he miscalculated its intensity and the extent of his control over the army. His low opinion of the army's political pretensions is clear in a statement he made to Algerian rightist deputy Lauriol on 19 January: "This false atmosphere of tension has been entirely the creation of the military. I know the military and how they operate. They mounted the Dreyfus affair and they are mounting an Algerian crisis in order to serve their own purposes."]

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De Gaulle apparently wanted firm action to wipe out the barricades, but the issue split the cabinet. [When Debré reported after a quick trip to Algiers on 26 January that the colonels had asserted their willingness to maintain order, but were not willing to move against the insurgents, De Gaulle appears to have changed tactics. He told a 27 January cabinet meeting it was probably a mistake to ask paratroops who have fought for five years to free Algeria to "shoot other Frenchmen who believe the same thing."] Subsequent cabinet approval of orders to Delouvrier and Challe suggests that direct use of force is no longer demanded by Paris.

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The government decision to take Delouvrier and Challe from Algiers during the night of 28 January seems to have been dictated by the need to remove them from an increasingly difficult situation--possibly including seizure by insurgents in the event a new government were proclaimed--and to establish a rallying point where the loyalty of the rest of the army and the other armed services could be demonstrated for the benefit of settlers and paratroops in Algiers.

### Domestic Political Situation

The big political factor favoring De Gaulle is the absence of any individual leader or political grouping able and ready to take over the reins of government. Right-wing extremists and Algerian deputies were loudly critical of De Gaulle at first, but have had less to say publicly since police action was taken throughout France on 28 January against extremists. Initial public apathy has now given way, and support is mushrooming from a wide variety of political, labor, and religious groups and from the press. A

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quickie 28 January public opinion poll in Paris showed 68 percent in favor of backing De Gaulle, and only 9 percent against him.

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The Independent party is badly split. [Ex-Finance Minister Pinay has privately assured De Gaulle of the availability of his "advice and services" in a crisis.] Senator Duchet who is firmly on the side of "French Algeria" on 27 January reportedly declared "this is the end of the line for De Gaulle," but he has since moderated his views. Duchet has apparently broken his ties with Former Premier Bidault's Rally for a French Algeria (RAF), which he considers ineffective. [Bidault apparently believes that the outcome will be the elimination of De Gaulle, and he considers himself the successor.]

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The Radicals have called for respect for republican legality, and the Popular Republicans have reaffirmed full support for De Gaulle, as has the Union for the New Republic, which is firmly under control of loyal Gaullists despite Soustelle's previous efforts to commit the party to integration.

Although the Socialists have placed themselves squarely behind the government, they are worried about finding themselves in a difficult position in the future. Secretary General Mollet on 28 January saw no political leader with enough strength to take over from De Gaulle, but he felt that a military coup led by Marshal Juin or General Salan might succeed. [Mollet warned that if the right takes any action in metropolitan France, the Socialist party and other left-of-center groups will be forced into unity of action with the Communists, possibly leading to a popular front.]

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The Communists appear to be trying to exploit the situation to their own advantage by pressing the government to take extreme action against the insurgents and by stimulating other "democratic forces" to join them in public demonstrations. While the Socialist-oriented Workers' Force has reportedly refused to go along with the Christian Workers Confederation's proposal for a national manifestation including the Communists, a Socialist spokesman said his party would approve common strike action.

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De Gaulle's 29 January Statement

In his speech on 29 January, De Gaulle refused to compromise his self-determination policy for Algeria. He called on the army and the insurgents to obey and respect the authority of the state, sharply distinguishing between the nation and the small group in insurrection.

On the key point of whether the army responds to De Gaulle's appeal for obedience, his 29 January address should put the situation in better perspective for officers who have tended to confuse Algiers with Algeria as a whole. This will facilitate further moves to restore order, e.g., by cutting off supplies to the dissident elements in Algiers. Even before De Gaulle spoke, statements of support for Challe had come in from the eastern and western regional commanders, Generals Ollié and Gambiez; the respected paratroop commander General Gilles; and Mediterranean Fleet Commander Admiral Auboyneau--the last an outspoken supporter of the 1958 coup.

De Gaulle's pronouncement has infuriated the insurgents in Algiers, who continue confident that the army will not use force against them. The extremists probably now believe that only by the overthrow of the Fifth Republic can a "French Algeria" be ensured. De Gaulle's refusal to give explicit assurances of a "French Algeria" increases the likelihood of some dramatic move such as proclamation of an "independent" Algeria.  

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