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SECURITY INFORMATION~~

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3.5(c)

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3.5(c)

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3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION**SUMMARY****GENERAL**

1.

3.3(h)(2)

2. Britain presses sale of TV transmitters to USSR (page 3).

SOVIET UNION

3. Bohlen interprets Soviet reception as effort to reassure West (page 4).

✓ 4. Soviet submarine building program expanded (page 4).

SOUTHEAST ASIA

✓ 5.

3.3(h)(2)

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

6. Jordanian king rejects American irrigation plan (page 6).

WESTERN EUROPE

✓ 7. Pella suggests "preliminary" five-power conference on Trieste (page 6).

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3.5(c)

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

13 Nov 53

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION**GENERAL**

1.

3.3(h)(2)

2. Britain presses sale of TV transmitters to USSR:

The American embassy in London reports that British officials have twice recently stressed the importance their government attaches to the proposed sale of over \$500,000

3.3(h)(2)

worth of television transmitting equipment to the Soviet Union. The embassy states that the government's concern apparently arises from the increasing pressure on it to authorize the sale, and from the extended period of disagreement with the United States over the policy and technical considerations involved.

- 3 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

13 Nov 53

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

3.5(c)

Comment: All television transmitting equipment known to be in operation in the USSR is of Western manufacture and obsolescent. This sale would provide new prototypes and ease the problem of research and development in the Soviet electronics industry, which is hard pressed to keep pace in both military and civilian fields.

Making this List I equipment available to the USSR without unanimous approval in COCOM would constitute a violation of the COCOM agreement. Although several COCOM members have questioned the proposed deal, American opposition appears to be the sole obstacle to the sale at this time.

SOVIET UNION

3. Bohlen interprets Soviet reception as effort to reassure West:

Ambassador Bohlen reports that Molotov's 3.3(h)(2) arrangements at the Foreign Office reception on the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution have caused lively speculation and considerable resentment in the diplomatic corps. The three Western ambassadors, together with Ulbricht and the ambassadors from Communist China, Argentina and Burma, were placed at the only seated table with top Soviet political and military representatives. The other diplomats present were left to fend for themselves.

Bohlen considers that the chief purpose of the arrangement was to caution the West against giving too much importance to the Soviet refusals to negotiate and the sharpness of recent propaganda attacks.

4. Soviet submarine building program expanded:

3.3(h)(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~

13 Nov 53

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: The expansion of production indicates that the USSR has adopted the Gorki model as the principal offensive weapon in building up a modern submarine fleet. This program ends the relative inactivity in construction of new long-range submarines since the war and will add significantly to Soviet offensive capabilities.

Since late 1949, 14 to 20 submarines have been built at Gorki. These four yards together could by 1956 produce an estimated minimum of 16 to 20 per year.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

5

3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)

- 5 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

13 Nov 53

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

6. Jordanian king rejects American irrigation plan:

King Hussain of Jordan told American charge Lynch in Amman on 10 November that there is no possibility now or for years to come of any direct or indirect


3.3(h)(2)

Jordanian collaboration with Israel on the Jordan valley irrigation plan sponsored by the United States. The king declared that even the appearance of cooperation would result in his overthrow.

Lynch comments that this is the considered and final opinion of the king and his government.

Comment: This statement by the highest Jordanian authority confirms previous expectations of Arab rejection of the plan.

WESTERN EUROPE

7. Pella suggests "preliminary" five-power conference on Trieste:

In a note on the Trieste issue given to Ambassador Luce on 10 November, Italian premier Pella proposed that a secret meeting of experts from the five

3.3(h)(2)

interested powers be held to "exchange views and establish the agenda" for a subsequent conference at the highest level. The note specified, however, that gradual implementation of the 8 October declaration would have to begin before and continue during any such preliminary meeting.

- 6 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

13 Nov 53

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

Following presentation of the note, Pella told Ambassador Luce that parliament would under no circumstances permit him to attend a conference without some prior and visible implementation of the 8 October declaration.

Comment: Pella did not define the degree of implementation necessary as a prerequisite for the preliminary meeting. He has previously stated, however, that the minimum conditions for his own attendance at a five-power conference were that the Trieste harbor and police be turned over to Italian control beforehand.

Yugoslavia would probably refuse to attend a meeting conditioned on any degree of implementation of the 8 October decision. According to press reports, Tito's speech this week end will contain strong statements unless some sort of proposal is presented before then.

- 7 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

13 Nov 53

3.5(c)