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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~**SUMMARY****GENERAL**

1. Soviet diplomat urges immediate cease-fire in Indochina (page 3).
2. [redacted]
3. Viet Minh receives guidance from Moscow on Geneva role (page 4).

FAR EAST

4. Rhee reported displeased with Chiang Kai-shek (page 4).
5. [redacted]

SOUTHEAST ASIA

6. Navarre sending force to aid Dien Bien Phu (page 6).

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~**GENERAL****1. Soviet diplomat urges immediate cease-fire in Indochina:**

[Redacted]

A member of the Soviet UN delegation told a French delegate on 27 April that the time had come to stop the fighting in Indochina and that this could be arranged within 48 hours. He said the USSR could not appropriately propose a truce but that the French could, if they did it with British support and "free from American influence." He stressed that the important thing was a cease-fire with political arrangements to be made later, adding that "an eventual settlement should be political rather than territorial."


Comment: The Communists' immediate objective appears to be a cease-fire, preferably on French initiative, thus removing the danger of internationalization of the war and affording ample time to maneuver for a favorable political settlement.

The suggestion that a settlement should be political rather than territorial may foreshadow a proposal to create a provisional coalition government, to be followed by elections. It was probably designed to offer the French a solution which would provide them with an excuse for an early troop withdrawal regardless of the eventual consequences.

2.~~TOP SECRET~~

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3. Viet Minh receives guidance from Moscow on Geneva role:




Comment: This is further evidence that the Viet Minh expects to be represented at Geneva, and that the Communists intend to emphasize the "democratic and progressive" nature of the Ho government.

The suggestion that military and economic experts be added implies that Moscow expects negotiations at Geneva which would require detailed technical assistance.

FAR EAST

4. Rhee reported displeased with Chiang Kai-shek:



South Korean president Rhee is displeased with Chiang Kai-shek and is losing faith in him because of the current friendly relations between Taipei and Tokyo and because of Chiang's failure to promote Rhee's Asian anti-Communist conference,

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Rhee believes that because of American pressure Chiang did not do a good job in promoting the conference and did not perform satisfactorily his "task" of persuading the Philippine government to attend the meeting.

Comment: Chiang reportedly feared that the proposed conference would result in isolating Nationalist China and South Korea from the rest of non-Communist Asia and lead to a propaganda defeat which Taipei could ill afford. The conference, originally scheduled for 26 April, has been postponed until midsummer.

Rhee is annoyed because the United States, which did not actively back his proposed Asian anti-Communist alliance, has subsequently pressed for a united front in Asia which would exclude South Korea and Formosa.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SOUTHEAST ASIA

6. Navarre sending force to aid Dien Bien Phu:

General Navarre.

[redacted] outlined the following plan for a revised and expanded "Operation Condor" (see map, p. 7) to aid Dien Bien Phu: Two groups--one consisting of two battalions flown from central Laos to the airfield at Nam Bac, the other of at least three battalions from the diversionary force operating near Sop Nao--will link up near Muong Heup. This force will then proceed to the region of Muong Nha to join an airborne group which will have been parachuted there. The entire force of about eight battalions will then move quickly toward Dien Bien Phu, approximately 14 miles to the north.

Navarre pointed out that five days' notice was required before the parachuting of the airborne group.

Comment: Any success achieved by this operation will depend on the speed with which it is executed and the ability of the French to provide it with adequate supplies by air. The approach of the column may draw off some of the 28-odd battalions the Viet Minh is employing in the siege of Dien Bien Phu, and thereby relieve the pressure on the fortress. It is, however, extremely unlikely that the column will be able to break through the enemy forces and link up with the garrison.

On 26 April Navarre rejected a plan by the French commander in Laos for dropping paratroops on an enemy supply line to Dien Bien Phu. On the same day, he disapproved a recommendation by General Cogny that a ground attack be launched against a Viet Minh supply base north of the delta.

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OPERATION CONDOR

V I E T N A M

28 V.M. Bns.
14 Fr. Bns.

Dien Dien Thu

Total Forces
8 Fr. Bns.

Muong

Nha

3 Fr.
Para Bns.

Sop Nao

3 Fr. Bns.

Muong Heup


2 Fr. Bns.

Muong Ngoi

Nam Bac

L A O S

Nam Ou

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