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5 June 1959

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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5 JUNE 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Epidemic of bacillary dysentery in East Germany.

USSR seeks through diplomatic channels to quash Burmese libel case against TASS correspondent.

Soviet propaganda maintains pressure on Iran.


II. ASIA-AFRICA

Cairo continues to insist Israeli cargoes in Suez Canal are subject to confiscation; Israel may appeal to UN Security Council.


UAR plans to reclose main road from Syria into Jordan.

Iran preparing protest to Baghdad over presence of Russian technicians on Shatt-al-Arab, Iran's shipping outlet.

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- ⑦ Morocco--King presses for public US declaration of agreement "in principle" to evacuate air bases.
- ⑧ Japanese upper-house election results are psychological victory for Kishi.

**III. THE WEST**

- ⑨ Italy--Communists, Nenni Socialists expected to gain in Sicilian regional elections Sunday.
- ⑩ Ecuador--Student rioting exploited by leftists poses challenge to Ponce government.

LATE ITEM

- ⑪ Adenauer reconsiders decision to run for presidency.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

5 June 1959

DAILY BRIEF

SIR AB

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

MD

East Germany: The inability of the East German regime to bring under control bacillary dysentery of epidemic proportions in the vicinity of Berlin results from inadequate sanitary precautions and deficient diet and is complicated by the extensive flight of professional medical personnel to the West. The epidemic has been causing concern among high-level East German officials. [redacted] (Page 1)

MD

USSR-Burma: The Soviet Union is making an effort to resolve on the "political" level the case of TASS correspondent Kovtunenko--presumably still hiding in the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon to escape libel charges. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin informed the Burmese ambassador in Moscow,

[redacted] that trial in open court of Kovtunenko would "merely stir up anti-Soviet feelings." Pushkin also noted that, while Kovtunenko does not enjoy diplomatic immunity, TASS is a Soviet state organ--thus hinting that Moscow would regard further Burmese attempts at prosecution as an affront to the USSR. [redacted] (Page 2)

OK

USSR-Iran: Moscow has broadcast its note of 31 May to Iran charging that Tehran's claims of overflights by Soviet aircraft are "calculated to lead to a deterioration of Soviet-Iranian relations," and that Iran allowed the aircraft of its Baghdad Pact associates to operate near the Soviet border during recent maneuvers in violation of "Soviet-Iranian agreements." On 2 June, Moscow's broadcasts to Iran also attacked the Shah's private life for the first time, charging that his youth was marked by "shocking immoralities." [redacted] (Page 3)

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

~~MO~~ **UAR-Israel:** Cairo continues to insist cargoes of Israeli-chartered vessels entering the Suez Canal are subject to confiscation, despite efforts by UN officials and Western diplomats to obtain some moderation of this stand. The Israelis plan to take their case to the UN Security Council if the dispute over the Inge Toft is not resolved by 7 June. UN Secretary General Hammarskjold is planning another trip to the Middle East to deal with this and other problems.

(Page 4)

UAR-Jordan: The UAR plans to close the main road from Syria to Jordan in retaliation for Jordanian attacks on Syrian nationals in the border area.

~~MO~~ Such action could restore the virtual blockade on Jordan's vital import trade, particularly in petroleum products, which the UAR imposed during the 1958 crisis in Lebanon, and lifted this spring.

(Page 6) (Map)

Iran-USSR-Iraq: Iranian Foreign Minister Hekmat has proposed a strong protest to the Iraqi Government over the use of Russian technicians in the administration of the Shatt-al-Arab confluence,

~~MO~~ Russian technicians are replacing British advisers and technicians in the port authority of Basra. The Shatt-al-Arab, which forms the boundary between Iran and Iraq, is the primary outlet for Iranian petroleum. Basra is in close proximity to Iran's vital Abadan refinery and to its port city of Khorramshahr; Iranian officials fear the possibility of Communist subversion and sabotage.

(Page 7)

~~MO~~ **Morocco:** King Mohamed V, in an interview with Ambassador Yost on 2 June, emphasized his agreement with Prime Minister Ibrahim's request, made on two occasions last month, for a prompt public declaration by the US recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over the American bases in Morocco and the principle of evacuation. The Ibrahim government is under increasing domestic pressure to demonstrate progress toward removal of all foreign troops from Morocco.

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OK

Japan: Japan's ruling Liberal-Democrats hold 132 seats in the upper house to the Socialists' 85 as a result of the 2 June elections, in which both parties gained at the expense of minority groups. While there was no significant shift in party strengths, the results are an important psychological victory for Prime Minister Kishi's Liberal-Democrats, who succeeded in reversing the steady upward trend of the Socialist popular vote over the past decade. Prime Minister Kishi's ability to manage intraparty dissidence has been strengthened, but it is not yet clear whether the dissident leaders will coonerate in the formation of Kishi's planned new cabinet. [redacted] (Page 9)

III. THE WEST

[redacted]

Italy: National leaders of the major parties--including Premier Segni--have been campaigning in the 7 June Sicilian regional elections. The Communists and Nenni Socialists are expected to gain seats, largely at the expense of the Christian Democrats. This will be a further threat to the national unity of the Christian Democrats, already shaken by leftist gains in regional and local balloting in northern Italy. [redacted]

Page 10)

DK

Ecuador: President Ponce's government is threatened by the rioting of students and other civilian groups which has caused heavy casualties during the past two days in Guayaquil, Ecuador's largest city. Communists, leftist Socialists, and possibly other opposition elements are exploiting the situation in an attempt to unseat Ponce. He has decreed martial law, and seems to have the support of the key leaders of the armed forces. [redacted] (Page 11)

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LATE ITEM

*West Germany: Chancellor Adenauer on 4 June informed leaders of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) he would prefer to remain as chancellor rather than run for the presidency. The CDU leadership and Bundestag faction, already badly split on whether Finance Minister Etzel or Economics Minister Erhard should succeed Adenauer as chancellor, has called an extraordinary meeting for 5 June to discuss the question. Adenauer has strongly supported Etzel as his successor, but thus far has been unsuccessful in overcoming the party rank and file preference for Erhard because of his vote-getting appeal as "father of the German economic miracle." At the meeting the CDU will be under pressure to reach a decision on its presidential candidate in view of the election on 1 July.

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5 June 59

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

East German Dysentery Epidemic Spreads to East Berlin

An epidemic of bacillary dysentery, which has been causing concern among East German officials since April, is [redacted] to have spread to East Berlin.

The epidemic has been raging, apparently almost unchecked, in the Potsdam District adjacent to Berlin and as far southeast as Cottbus. Military units in the area have also been affected. All hospitals in these areas are reported overcrowded.

The party first secretary for Potsdam District reported directly to party boss Ulbricht in late April that some 500 serious cases were known to authorities and that the epidemic was spreading, particularly in industrial districts and to areas along highways and the elevated railroad southwest of Berlin. He said the outbreak had been traced to "imported meat," and that the party planned to issue a general warning against using unprocessed meat.

[redacted] the party central committee was concerned over Western newspaper reports ascribing the epidemic to pork imported from Communist China. A medical official of the Potsdam District stated on that date that the outbreak could only have been caused by "frozen meat and imports from capitalist countries."

The continued failure of the regime to halt the epidemic probably resulted in part from the serious shortages of competent medical personnel caused by flights to the West, as well as from inadequate sanitary precautions and nutritionally inadequate food supplies. [redacted]

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USSR Presses Burma to Drop Prosecution of TASS Newsman

The Soviet Union is making a determined effort to resolve on a "political" level the juridical case of TASS correspondent Kovtunenko--now in hiding in the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon to avoid prosecution on libel charges. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin warned the Burmese ambassador in Moscow,

[redacted] that the Kovtunenko issue is being used by "interested parties" to impair Soviet-Burmese relations, and that a trial in open court would "merely stir up anti-Soviet feelings" which would be exploited by such elements. He stated that the Soviet ambassador in Rangoon had been instructed to seek a settlement with the Burmese Foreign Ministry.

Pushkin claimed that Moscow's policy in such cases involving private individuals inside the USSR is to reach a political settlement outside of court. He pointed out that, while Kovtunenko does not enjoy diplomatic immunity, the TASS news agency is a Soviet state organ--a hint that Moscow would regard further Burmese attempts at prosecution as an affront to the USSR.

Burma rejected previous Soviet requests that the Kovtunenko case be quashed, and it is unlikely that Moscow's latest initiative will prove any more fruitful. Even if the Ne Win government were favorably disposed toward a "diplomatic solution" to the impasse, it would hesitate to expose itself to the strong public criticism which might result from any arrangement which permitted Kovtunenko to leave the country without facing trial. [redacted]

[redacted]

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Soviet Note to Iran Denies Aircraft Violation Charges

A Soviet note on 31 May rejected Iran's protests that Soviet aircraft had violated its territory. The note, publicized in a detailed Moscow radio resumé of exchanges on the subject, charged that Tehran's claims are "calculated to lead to a deterioration of Soviet-Iranian relations," and that flights near the Soviet border by aircraft of Iran's Baghdad Pact associates during recent maneuvers were in violation of "Soviet-Iranian agreements."

Moscow also claimed that Tehran's inability to substantiate its February charge that 81 Soviet aircraft had violated Iranian air space since November 1958 not only supported the Soviet position, but indicated that the violations actually involved aircraft of a "third power." Soviet leaders probably expect that this explanation will gain considerable acceptance, particularly in view of recent incidents involving American and British aircraft in the Caucasus border areas.

In broadcasts to Iran, Moscow on 2 June attacked the Shah's private life for the first time, charging that his youth was marked by "shocking immoralities." The broadcast, which referred to the previous marriages of the Shah, also called his land reform measures a "farce" on the grounds that he is selling to the peasants lands which were confiscated by his father. Although the clandestine "National Voice of Iran" has attacked the Shah personally, overt Soviet broadcasts to Iran had previously avoided such charges.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Israeli-UAR Dispute Over Suez Canal Shipping

The Danish freighter Inge Toft is still detained at Port Said preparatory to possible confiscation of its cargo from Israel--potash, cement, scrap brass, and marble--en route to Hong Kong, Japan, and the Philippines. (The ship's captain, supported by the Danish Embassy, is prepared to protest against any attempt to unload the cargo.) [redacted]

The UAR shows no sign yet of abandoning its claim that Israeli-chartered ships entering the Suez Canal are in effect "enemy" ships, and that confiscation of their cargoes of Israeli origin is justified regardless of who owns them at the time of seizure. (The UAR Foreign Ministry's director of Palestine affairs has said the decision on confiscation is up to an Egyptian prize court.) The Cairo press states that the cargo will be seized "for the benefit of Palestine refugees."

Meanwhile, Israel is seeking Western support. (Prime Minister Ben-Gurion says his government will have "no recourse" except to lodge a complaint with the UN Security Council if the dispute is not resolved by 7 June. The Israelis earlier contemplated seeking an emergency session of the General Assembly in order to avoid an expected Soviet veto in the Security Council. Ben-Gurion said he now has some reason to think the USSR might not exercise its veto.) The USSR, however, would be unlikely to jeopardize relations with the Arabs by voting for or even abstaining on an Israeli complaint. [redacted]

UN and Western officials have already tried to obtain some moderation of the UAR's stand. (UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, who has said the case should be referred to the World Court, is planning a trip to Cairo around 1 July which he hopes will forestall both confiscation of the Inge Toft's cargo and a UN debate of) [redacted]

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the issue. He believes election campaign pressures in Israel
are the chief difficulty confronting private efforts to reach a
solution.)

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UAR May Renew Road Blockade of Jordan

The UAR plans to close the main road from Syria to Jordan in retaliation for Jordanian attacks on Syrian nationals in the border area on 31 May, according to a UAR message from Cairo to Damascus on 2 June. The message added that the action would take place after issuance of statements denouncing the Jordanian harassment. According to the Jordanian version, Jordanian troops attempting to prevent illegal entry of Syrians became involved in an exchange of shots with Syrian troops.

Closure of the Dera-Amman road by UAR authorities could re-establish the virtual blockade which the UAR imposed during the 1958 crisis in Lebanon and lifted this spring. The blockade hit particularly hard at the import of petroleum products, which had to be brought in via the Gulf of Aqaba and the inadequate Aqaba-Maan road. Closure could also interfere with food imports and hamper export of phosphates. Such harassment would accentuate Jordan's chronic financial problems and lead to new pleas for increased aid.

A previous incident on 23 April prompted the Syrians to urge that Cairo approve retaliation with fedayeen terrorists. The UAR official Middle East News Agency announced on 2 June that Jordan continued to attack UAR citizens in the Syrian-Jordanian border area, preventing them from working crops on their land in Jordanian territory. The commentary added that UAR authorities would take necessary measures to safeguard their citizens' rights.

The border incidents may have been initiated by the Jordanian Army, possibly as a result of a policy of stricter border control. Such a border policy would be almost certain to provoke greater tension with the UAR, which could be exploited by Jordan to seek increased Western aid. [redacted]

[redacted]

2007, 1 June 65 (b)(6)

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Iran Preparing Strong Protest to Iraq

Iranian Foreign Minister Hekmat has ordered the drafting for the Shah's approval of a strong note to Iraq protesting the presence of Soviet technicians at Basra, [redacted]

[redacted] Twenty-two Soviet technicians are now at Basra and 15 others are expected to arrive soon to replace the British advisers in the office of the directorate general of harbors, which controls shipping on the Shatt-al-Arab River.

Hekmat, attending a meeting in Beirut, advised his Foreign Ministry that, "Now we cannot just be a spectator and do nothing at all." Iraq would probably consider such a note interference in its internal affairs, and the note would damage any prospects Iran has for improving relations.

Iran claims that it was under British pressure when it agreed to the treaty of 1937 which placed the Iranian-Iraqi boundary on the Iranian bank of the river, which forms the border between the two countries near the Persian Gulf. Iran regards it as intolerable that its principal navigable river, the Karun, and the important ports of Abadan and Khorramshahr are accessible from the Persian Gulf only through the territorial waters of a foreign state. Iran has been particularly annoyed since the Iraqi revolution by the use of Iraqi pilots and armed Iraqi searching parties on ships destined for Iranian ports. Immediately before the Iraqi revolution both countries agreed to permit Swedish mediation of the dispute. No negotiations, however, have taken place under Qasim. [redacted]
[redacted]

Moroccan King Reiterates Request for US Statement on Base Evacuation

(King Mohamed V, in an interview with Ambassador Yost on 2 June, reiterated Moroccan Premier Ibrahim's request, made on two occasions last month, for an early US declaration explicitly recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over the five American air bases in Morocco and the principle of evacuation. On the key question of the duration of US tenure, the King said he was sure that once the US intention to evacuate completely--an assurance already given privately--had been made clear to Moroccan public opinion, an understanding could be reached whereby evacuation might be spread out "over two or three years." Ibrahim, however, continues to take the position that a year is the most for which the US can hope.)

(The Ibrahim government is under increasing domestic pressure to demonstrate progress toward the elimination from Morocco of all foreign forces. France, with 24,000 military personnel in Morocco, and Spain, with 10,000 troops there, apparently feel secure--especially in the absence of any US move toward evacuation--in opposing Moroccan efforts to hasten their departure. Ambassador Yost fears that the acute frustration being caused the Ibrahim government by this situation could lead to a serious government-sponsored anti-Western campaign and perhaps eventually to a Moroccan appeal to the UN. In such a campaign the US would certainly be linked indiscriminately with France and Spain and the bases would be a prime target for a variety of harassments.)

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Japanese General Elections

Japan's upper-house elections, while resulting in no significant shift in party strengths, are an important psychological victory for Prime Minister Kishi's Liberal-Democratic party. Although the Socialists as well as the Liberal-Democrats gained seats at the expense of minority groups, the steady upward trend in popular vote for the Socialists over the past decade was reversed. The Liberal-Democrats won 71 contests and will hold 132 seats in the upper house; the Socialists won 38 and will have 85 seats; 30 seats will be held by minority party members and independents. The Communist party gained one seat, giving it a total of three members in the 250-member body.

Prime Minister Kishi's ability to manage intraparty dissidence has been strengthened by the election results. However, it is not yet clear whether dissident leaders such as Hayato Ikeda, Takeo Miki, Mitsuiro Ishii, and others, will accept posts in the new cabinet, which Kishi plans to form before the new Diet convenes. Inclusion of these leaders is essential for a stable government and would strengthen Kishi's ability to cope with Socialist opposition to ratification of the US-Japan Security Treaty.

The Socialists, with clear-cut control of one third of the upper-house seats, will be able to block amendment of the constitution to legalize rearmament. Both the left and right wings of the party, however, are criticizing party leaders for the scanty gains which many observers are interpreting as a defeat. The right wing is now in a better position to moderate party policies, and this may make it more difficult for the Socialists to offer united opposition to government policies.

The personalities of the candidates and local issues largely determine the decisions of Japanese voters. The results, nevertheless, seem to reflect at least some public dissatisfaction with the Socialists' endorsement of Communist policies for Asia.

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III. THE WEST

Leftist Gains Expected in Sicily

National leaders of Italy's major parties have been campaigning widely in the Sicilian regional elections scheduled for 7 June. The Vatican has reaffirmed its injunction that Catholics not vote for any candidate who cooperates with the Communists. The Communists and Nenni Socialists are almost certain to make gains, largely at the expense of the Christian Democrats. This will be a further threat to the national unity of the Christian Democrats, already shaken by leftist gains in northern Italy.

The present regional government of Sicily is a Communist-supported coalition of Socialists, Monarchists, neo-Fascists, and dissident Christian Democrats. It came into existence last fall as a result of right-wing Christian Democratic opposition to the national policies of Amintore Fanfani, who was then Italian premier. The Communists and Socialists backed the coalition as a means of fostering cleavages within the Christian Democratic party.

Any leftist gains are certain to cause heated debate among the Christian Democrats at their national congress in October, when Fanfani is expected to make an all-out effort to recapture leadership of the party.

In the elections in northern Italy, the Communists and Socialists in the autonomous region of Val d'Aosta on 17 May joined forces with a local Catholic autonomist party to defeat the Christian Democrats and their allies. Although the Christian Democrats improved their position in other parts of Italy in local elections held on 31 May, the Communists and Socialists scored a joint victory over all other parties combined in the province of Ravenna.

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Violence in Ecuador Threatens Stability of the Government

The government of Conservative President Ponce, inaugurated in 1956, is seriously threatened by the violence of the past two days in Guayaquil, Ecuador's largest city and a stronghold of opposition political elements. According to the press, casualties include an estimated 15 to 20 dead. Ponce has decreed martial law, and the police and armed forces apparently are applying strong measures to restore order. Continuing disorders accompanied by harsh government retaliation could lead to a military coup and the fall of the regime. The American Embassy in Quito, however, believes that Ponce will succeed in controlling the situation, but will face a tense period during the next few days.

Communists and leftist Socialists are promoting the violence in Guayaquil largely through student groups. The Communists, who are planning to disrupt or obstruct the 11th inter-American conference scheduled for Quito early next year, may see the present developments as a means of furthering this objective. Other opposition elements--especially the followers of former President Velasco, who retains considerable sympathy in the armed forces--may use the opportunity to plot the overthrow of Ponce. Disorders may also be stimulated by a Liberal party convention meeting in the provincial capital of Portoviejo, an army zone headquarters and scene of the rioting against the army on 29 May which touched off the unrest in Guayaquil.

Key leaders of the armed forces are believed loyal to Ponce, although his support among other officers is questionable.

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LATE ITEM

Adenauer Reconsiders Decision to Run for West German Presidency

Chancellor Adenauer wants to remain as chancellor of West Germany instead of "moving upstairs" to the presidency. He informed leaders of his Christian Democratic Union (CDU) of his change of mind on 4 June. The CDU leadership and Bundestag faction, already badly split on whether Finance Minister Etzel or Economics Minister Erhard should succeed Adenauer as chancellor, has called an extraordinary meeting for 5 June to discuss the question. In view of the presidential election date of 1 July, the party is under pressure to reach a decision on its candidate as soon as possible.

On 7 April Adenauer reluctantly acquiesced in the CDU's desire that he accept the party's nomination for the presidency--in the apparent hope that he could name his successor and guide the transition to a new government. However, sharp differences developed between Adenauer and the party rank and file over his successor. Adenauer has strongly supported Etzel, who is little known to the German public and a relatively colorless personality, while the majority of the CDU Bundestag members have backed Erhard.

When Etzel was brought into the cabinet in 1957, Adenauer was reported to be grooming him as his successor. Adenauer saw Etzel as a strong supporter of his own policy of European integration, based on good relations between Bonn and Paris, and felt that Etzel was more capable than Erhard of handling foreign affairs in view of Etzel's experience as a vice president of the Coal-Steel Community.

The party rank and file, aware of the CDU's need for a popular vote-getter in the 1961 elections, maintained that Erhard, with his reputation as the author of German prosperity, could best fill this role. In the 1957 campaign, Erhard played a significant role, second only to Adenauer's. When Erhard was nominated by party leaders for the presidency in February at Adenauer's insistence, the 270 CDU members of the Bundestag

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revolted and requested that he remain in active politics, as Adenauer's probable successor. Adenauer, however, has refused to consider Erhard's candidacy because he feels Erhard would be less inclined to follow his lead in foreign policy. Erhard has been associated with a CDU faction which favors more tactical flexibility in foreign policy, and has not been a strong supporter of European integration or the priority of good French-German relations.

Although last week Adenauer publicly denied speculation that he would withdraw from the presidential race, he has never been reconciled to the prospect of relinquishing the real power of the chancellorship and the day-to-day control over foreign policy. Since early May he has been considering reversing his acceptance of the nomination, after his close advisers had warned him he could not obtain Etzel's nomination even if, as president, Adenauer formally nominated him. [redacted]

[redacted]

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

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