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21 June 1961

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
INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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21 June 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

21 June 1961

DAILY BRIEF

first

Laos: Virtually no progress appears to have been made in the Zurich talks between Boun Oum, Souvanna Phouma, and Souphanouvong. The chief stumbling blocks to agreement are the method of forming a coalition government and the role that General Phoumi would play in such a government. Souvanna and Souphanouvong are demanding that Souvanna's "legal government" be expanded to include rightist elements, while the Boun Oum group wants to form a new government headed by the King and approved by the national assembly. Souvanna and Souphanouvong seem willing to permit Phoumi to hold a position in the proposed coalition only if he divests himself of his rank and influence in the military. Souvanna's illness caused postponement of the scheduled 20 June meeting between the three princes; whether genuine or diplomatic, this indisposition gives the conferees some reason to extend the Zurich meeting beyond the originally stipulated three-day period running from 19-21 June.


The mixed Pathet Lao - Kong Le - North Vietnamese force in the Pa Dong area on 20 June attacked one of the new Meo positions about 3 miles southwest of Pa Dong after subjecting the position to mortar and artillery fire the night before. The enemy meanwhile is continuing guerrilla actions against government forces along Route 13 to the north and east of Vientiane.

[Bloc airlift operations continue to be scheduled through 21 June.]

(Backup, Page 1) (Map)

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Republic of the Congo



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USSR: Preliminary evaluation of the characteristics of five of the firings noted since 1 January 1961 on the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range leads to the tentative conclusion that the USSR may be testing a new or second generation ICBM. These firings, which occurred on 3 March, 2 and 15 April, 16 May, and 2 June, were distinguished from other ICBM test vehicle firings to date by a shorter burning time, a higher acceleration, and a lower apogee. These characteristics may be associated with a new propulsion system. On two of these firings, the vehicle is believed to have impacted close to the presumed target of previous ICBM tests, but the other three missed by significant distances. One impacted near Khabarovsk, about 1,100 nautical miles southwest of the usual Kamchatka impact area. Preliminary assessment of the other firings this year suggests other groups with distinctive characteristics.

***Congo:** Katanga's announcement that it will boycott the Congolese parliamentary session beginning on 25 June unless two virtually unacceptable conditions are met threatens to set back efforts to end the political impasse in the Congo and to jeopardize Kasavubu's prospects of controlling parliament. The Katangan statement, signed by all provincial delegates to the parliament, requires that Tshombé be released before parliament meets and that the Congolese legislature accept the confederal accords reached at the March Tananarive meeting. Leopoldville politicians could not accept such terms without risking a military coup, and without Katanga's votes, the Kasavubu regime might be outvoted by the Gizengists. [Gizenga's New York spokesman claimed on 19 June that parliament would either confirm Gizenga as premier or select Minister of Interior Adoula as premier with Gizenga's agreement. The spokesman claimed Gizenga controls]

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75 out of the 137 parliament votes, but American officials in Leopoldville believe Gizenga's strength is closer to 40 delegates.

The ranking UN official in the Congo had reported that the Ghanaian IL-18 flight to Stanleyville, reportedly to deliver medicines and diplomatic personnel, has been canceled at his request.

(Map)

*Bolivia: President Paz Estenssoro yesterday threatened to resign "within five days" if striking miners, who are seeking financial benefits and the release of Communist labor leaders arrested in early June, do not return to work. Paz' threat is designed to rally support for the government within Bolivia and possibly also to remind the United States of the political risks he took in arresting the Communists. Some miners had already returned to work by yesterday, and support for the mine strike appeared to be diminishing. Vice President Juan Lechin would be Paz' legal successor, but is probably too controversial a figure to succeed to the presidency without considerable violence among Bolivia's regular and irregular armed forces. *delete last sent*

Albania: Albania has requested economic and technical assistance from France and Italy. Despite promises of large amounts of Chinese Communist aid, the Albanian regime evidently needs still more help to offset Soviet bloc economic pressures which have been applied since Albania sided with Peiping in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Rome was giving assistance to Tirana in an effort to keep the West's foot in the door. *OK*

Tirana had also recently approached Paris on this matter and that aid would probably be given. France and Italy are the only Western countries having diplomatic relations with Albania. Their trade with Albania has been negligible, although late in 1960 France shipped Albania 30,000 tons of wheat, at least 20,000 tons of which was paid for by the Chinese Communists.

Turkey: A new shake-up in the top echelon of the Turkish armed forces reflects continuing political and personal dissension *ok*

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within the military establishment and the Committee of National Union. Three admirals and two generals have been retired, several senior army officers have been reassigned, and there are strong rumors of an impending purge of an undisclosed number of officers in the grades captain through colonel. These changes, added to the recent forced resignation of General Madanoglu from the command of the Ankara Garrison and the removal of several air force colonels, indicate a further improvement of the power position of General Irfan Tansel, reinstated chief of the Turkish Air Force. He has the support of a majority of the younger, less conservative officers on the Committee of National Union.

(Backup, Page 3)

ok

France: The farmers' agitation which began two weeks ago in Brittany is spreading to central and southern France and may become subject to further exploitation by anti-Gaullist elements, particularly rightists opposed to De Gaulle's Algerian policy. The government, in view of the efficient mobilization tactics being employed by leaders of the movement, has reportedly not ruled out the hypothesis that the demonstrations may be part of a plan to weaken De Gaulle's political position and to tie down security forces in areas remote from Paris.

(Backup, Page 5)

op

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Britain is running into growing difficulty in its efforts to obtain acceptance for the constitutional proposals it is developing for the Central African Federation. Africans in Northern Rhodesia are threatening to call widespread strikes and to demand a definite date for self-government if, under pressure from Europeans, Colonial Secretary Macleod announces measures which would leave the whites in control of the protectorate's legislature. The British governor of Northern Rhodesia reportedly has said he will resign if Macleod insists on revisions to favor the whites.

(Backup, Page 7)

*8 Briefs
4 Backups*

21 June 61

DAILY BRIEF

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Laotian Developments

Unless Phoumi is prepared to make concessions, he will probably maneuver for an early collapse of the Zurich talks. The longer the talks go on the more vulnerable members of the Boun Oum - Phoumi entourage will be to offers by Souvanna of personal deals, which would lead to Phoumi's isolation and to the collapse of the Boun Oum government. Phoumi will also feel himself under a strong compulsion to return to Vientiane to resume personal direction of governmental affairs. [The second-level leaders he left in charge there are sending Phoumi highly colored reports on the trend of developments in Laos since his departure for Europe.]

[General Bounleut, responsible for military affairs in Phoumi's absence,

thought it necessary for Phoumi to return to Vientiane as soon as possible. Bounleut indicated that he had been having some difficulty inducing Lt. Col. Sihou to provide details of his plans for defending Vientiane. Bounleut also referred to "slightly disturbing rumors" of discontent among officers in Luang Prabang.]

[Fuller information on a previously reported enemy attack on a Meo position about 20 miles northeast of the Plaine des Jarres from 16 to 18 June indicates that the attacking force numbered between 800 and 900 and may have been predominantly North Vietnamese. Mortars and recoilless rifles were used in the attack which forced the dispersion of the Meos into hills, where they reportedly plan to operate as guerrillas. In the Ban Hat Bo area northeast of Pak Sane, the enemy for the present appears to be consolidating its forces and not organizing any pursuit of the Laotian army elements which retreated from the area last week.]

[Efforts are apparently being made to improve overland supply of the Communist forces in Laos.

Route 7 between Muong Sen in North

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Vietnam and Ban Ban is being paved and widened to about 26 feet. In addition, all wooden bridges are being replaced with steel structures.

[redacted] a group of Chinese Communist experts planned to "commence work on 21 June," possibly on the road connecting Phong Saly with China, which previous reports indicate the Chinese have undertaken to construct.

Details of bloc airlift operations for the past several days are as follows: On 16 June there was a total of 13 sorties, of which 11 were into Laos; on 17 June, 18 sorties were flown, 12 of which were into Laos. No flights into Laos were noted on 18 June. On 19 June, 17 sorties were flown, of which 12 were into Laos. During the week 12 through 18 June, there was an estimated total of 102 sorties for an estimated delivered cargo of 211 tons. Through 18 June there has been an estimated total of 3,047 sorties by bloc aircraft--2,676 by Soviet transports and 371 by North Vietnamese --for an estimated delivered cargo of 5,706 tons.

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Military Shake-up Continues in Turkey

The abortive attempt by a group of senior military officers to oust 52-year-old Lt. Gen. Irfan Tansel from his command in early June has resulted in significant changes in power relationships in Turkey. General Gursel's position as head of the government has been undermined. General Madanoglu, who had become one of the leading members of the governing Committee of National Union (CNU), has resigned. General Alankus, while continuing to serve--temporarily at least--as minister of defense, has been retired from the army along with Lt. Gen. Alkoc, who was commander of Ground Forces. The deputy chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Onur, is being groomed to replace Sunay as chief of the General Staff. One of the three top-level naval officers retired was Vice Adm. Ozak, who was chief of the Turkish Navy. His retirement, and replacement by Adm. Uran, had been anticipated for some time, however, and does not necessarily indicate naval involvement in the intraservice power struggle. Most of the changes appear designed either to remove officers who represent possible sources of trouble or to re-establish seniorities in the chain of command.

[The so-called "Forces of Solidarity," first mentioned during the present crisis, remains something of a mystery. It reportedly includes most of the younger members of the CNU, some members of the General Staff, officers located in the Ministry of Defense, and officers from army units located in the vicinity of Ankara. General Onur has also aligned himself with this group, which apparently was largely responsible for the reinstatement of General Tansel as chief of the Air Force at the height of the crisis. Because of its representation in units strategically located near Ankara, the "Forces of Solidarity" is far more important than its numbers suggest. The alleged aims of this group include continued military influence on the government following elections, the execution of the top leaders of the former regime, and military intervention against all activities directed against the CNU. The aspirations of the "Forces of Solidarity" could lead to further dissension within the armed forces.]

It has become increasingly apparent that a highly critical situation existed in Ankara during the period 6-9 June. One

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leading Turkish political figure has commented that for a 48-hour period the "possibility of bloodshed hung in the balance." The government has again reaffirmed its intention to hold the referendum on the constitution and national election within the time period previously promised. The referendum is to be in early June and elections prior to the 29 October deadline.

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Subversive Threat in French Farm Unrest

Low farm prices and the government's failure to implement the promises it made last year to improve agricultural conditions have sparked a crisis which in some respects parallels that of the spring of 1960. In March 1960 a demonstration at Amiens was transformed into a major riot on behalf of "French Algeria," and deputies of all major political parties except the Gaullist UNR in effect ganged up to test De Gaulle's political strength by demanding that he convene a special session of parliament. His refusal has been described as a violation of the Fifth Republic constitution in subsequent political assaults on his regime.

The appearance at sabotage sites of the initials "O.A.S." accompanied by a Celtic cross is intended to link the farm demonstrations to the Organization of the Secret Army in Algeria, which is composed of European settler extremists and some military elements. According to the American Embassy in Paris, the same individuals--"commandos"--have participated in demonstrations at successive trouble sites. A vice president of the national federation of agricultural syndicates has reportedly admitted that troublemakers may have infiltrated the demonstrations to profit from disorders. The Communists have made efforts to exploit the movement but thus far have apparently been unable to penetrate it.

Disgruntled political leaders may use the farm issue to voice increasing discontent over the continuation of the emergency powers De Gaulle assumed when he crushed the military revolt last April. They feel these powers handicap normal political activity and are a threat to French democracy. [Socialist party Secretary General Guy Mollet reportedly views the farm demonstrations as a "bad sign" of potentially explosive social unrest which had hitherto been restrained by the fact that French-Algerian negotiations had finally begun.]

Reported government concern over the possibility that the farm demonstrations may be part of a coordinated move to weaken

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De Gaulle politically and pin down metropolitan security forces may be based on information uncovered by investigations of the April military mutiny. The investigations reportedly indicated that a widespread plot against the government was being prepared in metropolitan France as well as Algeria. Security forces in France are considered barely adequate for normal coverage, and government spokesmen have usually voiced alarm when events in Algeria have required the temporary dispatch of many such units from the metropole. Further violent demonstrations are likely on 22 June, when instigators of the seizure of the town of Morlaix earlier this month are scheduled to be tried, and 27 June, which farmers in central France have proclaimed as "Roadblock Day" to indicate their sympathy for the Brittany movement.

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Constitutional Problems Facing Britain in Central Africa

[In its efforts to guide the political evolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Britain is trying to balance the demands of the Federation's two main racial groups as well as its four juridical entities--the largely self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia, the two protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the government of the Federation as a whole. Most of these have different legal bases, and all are at different stages of evolution. The Nyasaland government is to have an African majority following elections this August. A constitutional conference for the Federation as a whole has been adjourned since mid-December 1960, pending the formulation of new constitutions for Northern and Southern Rhodesia.]

[Following talks on Northern Rhodesia's constitution, held in London in February and March, Britain seems to have decided tentatively to establish a 45-member legislature for the protectorate. Of the 45, fifteen would be elected by a group of voters--predominantly European--with high educational and financial qualifications and fifteen by another group--largely African--with lower qualifications. Fifteen "national members" would be elected by all voters, with the votes of each community given equal weight. Under pressure from right-wing Conservatives at home and from white leaders in the Federation, however, the details of the British plan, which may be formally announced later this week or early next week, have been arranged so as to make more likely the numerical predominance of moderate whites and of Africans amenable to their influence. These arrangements have been denounced by both African nationalist organizations in the protectorate. Although Kenneth Kaunda, the outstanding African leader in the territory, has forbidden his followers to resort to violence in opposing the proposals, some of Kaunda's lieutenants have been making references to "racial strikes" and "fanaticism."]

[The alleged concessions to the whites in Northern Rhodesia probably were made partly in order to increase the chances of approval for the Southern Rhodesian referendum next month. The referendum on constitutional proposals published a week ago will be voted on by 76,000 of the 225,000 whites but only 4,000 of the]

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2,870,000 Africans. Under these proposals, Africans for the first time would sit in the colony's legislature. Britain would also agree to end the veto it has held on racial matters, in exchange for the promulgation of a bill of rights and the establishment of a constitutional council to pass on racial legislation. The present moderate leaders of the African nationalist party agreed to these proposals in conference but, apparently as a result of pressure from their extremist followers, rejected it when it was published. With the white electorate almost evenly divided on the issue, African opposition or abstention could result in the defeat of the proposals. The British apparently hope that the Northern Rhodesian constitutional revisions will cause enough Europeans in Southern Rhodesia to vote for the new constitution to offset the loss in African votes.)

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The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

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The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

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U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

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Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

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The Director

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