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~~TOP SECRET~~**GENERAL**

1. Embassy Moscow's views on Soviet reaction to proposed formal guarantees to Greece and Turkey:

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[Redacted]

The US Embassy in Moscow believes that, despite Soviet sensitivity to military developments in the Black Sea area, formal guarantees to Greece and Turkey by the West are

sufficiently important to outweigh any foreseeable risk. The Embassy considers that, particularly in the light of recent developments in Iran, it is necessary to check a possible trend toward neutrality on the part of Turkey. Furthermore, the USSR is unlikely to be unduly disturbed by such action, since it is already evident from present British and French undertakings to Greece and Turkey as well as American military assistance to them that defense of these two countries would be fully supported by these major powers. On the other hand, inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO would reinforce the Soviet claim that this pact is aggressive, thereby strengthening the USSR's bid for mass popular support throughout the world. Furthermore, the Soviet Union might derive an advantage from the feeling of isolation that would develop in other Near Eastern countries. Nevertheless, the Embassy concludes that failure to admit Greece and Turkey into formal collective security arrangements with the three major Western powers would encourage Soviet hopes to disrupt free world unity and determination to resist aggression.

FAR EAST

2. Chinese Nationalists eager to sign Japanese peace treaty:

3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted]

The Chinese Nationalist Foreign Minister has requested that the State Department be advised of the extreme importance attached by his government to its inclusion among the signatories of the Japanese peace treaty. The Foreign Minister stressed the prestige involved in being one of the signatories and the practical


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advantage to his government of resuming diplomatic relations with Japan at the same time as other allies. Exclusion from the treaty would place the Nationalists' diplomatic representation in Japan at a disadvantage in comparison with other allies.

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SOUTH ASIA**WESTERN EUROPE****4. New pressure on Adenauer from coalition partner announced:**

Leaders of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) 3.3(h)(2)
chief partners of Adenauer's Christian Demo-
crats (CDU) in the West German Government
coalition, have announced a new series of

demands aimed at increasing the influence of their party in the government.
While the FDP has included in its demands certain conditions in connec-
tion with its approval of the Schuman Plan, its most drastic demands call

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for considerable enlargement of federal powers, particularly in the finance and police fields. Any such move toward centralization will run into opposition from other sections of the coalition, notably the Bavarian wing of the CDU. US officials in Bonn, while commenting that this action results from the favorable FDP showing in recent local elections, still feel that the FDP will not carry its demands to the point of causing a break-up of the present coalition.

Comment: The FDP, particularly since a recent shakeup in its party leadership, has been trying to gain a more influential position in the coalition. The party, which represents conservative industrial interests, undoubtedly seeks to influence the economic policy of the government, especially since its failure to kill the recent legislation on labor participation in management. Because of the seriousness of the Socialist opposition to its policies, the FDP is not likely to break with Adenauer.

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