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
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1. COMMENT ON ARGENTINE SITUATION

The new governing junta established as a result of truce negotiations between the victorious forces of the Argentine revolution and the military junta of the "loyalist forces" consists of professional military leaders, none of whom is known to be unfriendly to the United States.

Retired army general Eduardo Lonardi has been announced as the head of the new junta, which will also include Admiral Rojas and Generals Bengoa and Bergallo. Lonardi, who has a reputation for integrity, was implicated in the unsuccessful September 1951 revolt. Admiral Rojas commanded the rebel fleet during the current revolt. General Bengoa, who is widely respected throughout the army, was reported in the early stages of the June 1955 revolt to be the rebel commander but later claimed to be on Peron's side. He resigned from the service in August. General Bergallo is believed not to have been engaged in any political activities.

The new junta will be plagued both by interservice rivalries and by the ever-present danger of serious strikes and possible sabotage by the General Confederation of Labor and those members of the Peronista party who remain fanatically loyal to Peron.

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2. BURMESE COMMUNIST CHIEF ORDERS CONTINUATION OF INSURRECTION

Thakin Than Tun, the leader of the insurgent Burma Communist Party, issued a proclamation on 26 August stating that the party would "continue to oppose and fight our enemy, the government, with determination and keenness." Members were specifically instructed to carry on full-scale guerrilla warfare, to undertake careful intelligence work, and to make every effort to bring about internal dissension in government ranks.

Comment

The Burmese Communists revolted against the government in 1948, and have been a major security problem since that time. Than Tun's proclamation may have been motivated by a fear that his party is about to be sacrificed in the interest of friendly Sino-Burmese relations. There have been reports suggesting that Peiping is not averse to writing off the badly discredited Burma Communist Party. Such an act would not significantly reduce the Chinese Communists' capabilities for promoting subversion in Burma because they can utilize the overt and pro-Communist Burma Workers and Peasants Party.

3. COMMENT ON VIET MINH CABINET CHANGES

[Redacted]

President Ho Chi Minh's relinquishment of the premiership to Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong, together with appointment of Vo Nguyen Giap and Phan Ke Toai as vice premiers, formalizes an already existing arrangement. Pham Van Dong has been closely associated with daily direction of government affairs. There is no indication that these changes result from factional struggles or policy differences.

Ho's position now more closely resembles that of Mao Tse-tung in Peiping. Ho remains president of the state and chairman of the Lao Dong (Communist) Party.

The announcement was made before a session of the National Assembly hastily called to approve the government's policies and its campaign for unification of all Vietnam. Ho's new position allows him to stand above and apart from the government and thus may enhance his value as a popular symbol in South Vietnam as well as in the north.

[Redacted]

BIWEEKLY SUMMARY
(8-21 September 1955)

**Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
 for the Formosa Straits Problem**

1. Military activity in the area remained at a low level during the period. Small-scale artillery exchanges occurred intermittently.

2. Chief, MAAG (Formosa), reported on 18 September that President Chiang Kai-shek has ordered an additional artillery battalion and another infantry battalion to reinforce the Matsu garrison. The apparent basis for this is Chiang's expectation of a Communist attack against Matsu sometime between 27 September and 15 October. Chief, MAAG, has protested and has reiterated his position that no more troops should be sent to the offshore islands. Of the 21 infantry divisions in the Nationalist army, 7 1/3 currently are on the offshore islands and chief, MAAG, considers that this is already a larger force than can be adequately supported.

The Nationalists will probably proceed with this reinforcement, however, just as they did with the recent movement of a division to Quemoy over strenuous MAAG objections. The claim of an impending attack against Matsu is not confirmed by any other sources and is probably a fabrication to justify this reinforcement. It may be that Chiang believes that by committing an excessively large portion of his regular forces to the offshore islands, the US will be compelled to support him in the event of a Communist attack.

3. Aerial photography of 7 September showed 78 MIG fighters at Luchiao, 150 miles northeast of Matsu, as compared with 36 in early August.

at least 34 jet fighters flew from Shanghai to Luchiao. There are

indications that Chinese Communist air force and naval air force units are periodically staged into Luchiao for area-familiarization flights. [redacted]

4. Peiping's tactics evidence a continuing determination to get the US to negotiate with Communist China on the questions now dividing the two countries. Peiping's propaganda and Wang Ping-nan's statements to Ambassador Johnson have hinted that the repatriation agreement would be jeopardized if the Americans refused to get on with the second phase of the Geneva talks. [redacted]

22 SEPTEMBER 1955
FORMOSA STRAITS SITUATION

Primary roads _____
Secondary roads _____

NAUTICAL MILES
0 50 100 150
STATUTE MILES
0 50 100 150

Railroad
+++++ Proposed railroad

COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND

PRIMARY
SECONDARY
● ▲ OPERATIONAL
● ▲ SERVICEABLE
● ▲ UNKNOWN
■ UNDER CONSTRUCTION


USABILITY

- + MIG-15, MIG-17, TU-4, IL-28
- | TU-2, IL-10, LA-9/11, LI-2, ETC.
- UNKNOWN
- * FIELDS NOT CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING SUSTAINED OPERATIONS AT PRESENT.

DESIGNATIONS

- PRIMARY: CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT IN AREA, WITH PREPARED RUNWAY GENERALLY 5000 FEET OR LONGER.
- SECONDARY: AUXILIARY OR EMERGENCY BASES, OR FIELDS OF LESSER IMPORTANCE - RUNWAYS GENERALLY LESS THAN 5000 FEET.
- OPERATIONAL: ACTIVE BASE FOR MILITARY & CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT, SOME BASES USED BY PISTON TYPES MAY BE USABLE BY JETS.
- SERVICEABLE: INACTIVE BASES CAPABLE OF USE BY AIRCRAFT
- UNKNOWN: CURRENT STATUS UNDETERMINED.

★ NATIONALIST AIRFIELD

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