


7 April 1954

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DOS review(s) completed.

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GENERAL

1. Soviet note seeks to accord special status to Communist China at Geneva:

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The Soviet reply of 5 April to the Western aide memoire on administrative arrangements for Geneva argued that the Berlin agreement makes it clear that all five powers should participate "on an equal basis" in the examination of "all questions relating to the conference."

The note also proposed, on the basis of the Berlin agreement, that Chinese be an official language, along with English, French and Russian, "during the course of the whole conference." It stressed that Korean should be an official language only during the consideration of the Korean question.

Comment: This is the latest move in a continuing Soviet effort since Berlin to confer on China a status equal to the four sponsoring powers, or at least superior to that of the other "invited powers."

The insistence on China's participation throughout the conference may foreshadow a Soviet demand at Geneva that China be included in the negotiations on the composition and scope of the discussion on Indochina.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

2. Comment on Viet Minh reinforcements for Dien Bien Phu:

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Further indication of a Viet Minh intent to take Dien Bien Phu regardless of cost is the reported large-scale movement of enemy reinforcements toward the battle area. The number and arrival dates cannot be accurately determined, but information from French intelligence suggests that close to 20,000 troops may now be en route.

Of these, one group of 10,000 and another of 3,000 are recruits who were recently undergoing training to the south and north of the Tonkin delta. The movement of the larger group is reported to have been delayed by heavy rains.

Up to 1,600 first-line troops from a regiment of the 304th Division near the apex of the delta have also been ordered to move toward Dien Bien Phu, according to French information. Other regular units numbering about 4,000, which have been engaged against pro-French guerrillas north and west of Dien Bien Phu, and an undetermined number of regional forces from both Tonkin and Laos, have also allegedly been ordered to reinforce the besieging troops; these units could arrive within several days.

In addition to the reinforcements now en route, the Viet Minh received 3,000 replacements last week which it has already committed. Reports from De Castries' headquarters indicate that the extreme youth and lack of training of these replacements were partially responsible for the weaker enemy efforts of the past few days.


3. Viet Minh believed capable of further major assaults on Dien Bien Phu:

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French intelligence officers at Hanoi estimated as of 6 April that the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu had, or soon would have, the capability for "two more nights of major assault." While they feel the Viet Minh may attempt attritional warfare to capture the fortress, they consider an all-out attack more likely. De Castries reported at 0900 on 6 April that sporadic enemy fire was continuing, but that there was no change in his positions. (See map, p. 5.)

The French command in Hanoi had to call off a scheduled drop of reinforcements on the night of 5-6 April because of stormy weather.

Information from captured prisoners suggests that the heavy Viet Minh attack on 5 April was hurriedly staged as a reply to Navarre's announced intention of landing hospital planes on that day. Prisoner interrogation also indicates that Viet Minh units used on 5 April were reduced in strength.



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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

5. Iraqi leader suggests modification of Turkish-Pakistani pact:

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Iraq's elder statesman Nuri Said believes that the Turkish-Pakistani pact should be amended to provide that an unprovoked attack on Iraq or its neighbors "would

bring the military aspect of the pact into play." Nuri told Ambassador Berry in Baghdad that the Arab states would read into such an amendment a promise of Pakistani aid in the event of an unprovoked Israeli attack on Syria. In this way, Nuri explained, Arab opposition to Iraqi participation in the pact would be eliminated.

Nuri told Ambassador Berry that this amendment was favored by Pakistani officials, to whom he had broached it during recent talks with them, but they thought it should be advanced by the United States.

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Comment: Ankara and Karachi would probably oppose any amendment which is susceptible of an anti-Israeli interpretation, despite Nuri's statement that Pakistan approved his plan.

In asking for this amendment, Nuri is doing what Iraqi prime minister Jamali is doing in current negotiations for an Iraqi-American arms aid agreement--using the prospect of popular opposition as a lever for extracting maximum concessions from the West. Meanwhile, Iraq is getting additional time for pondering the situation.

6. Syrian cabinet seen seriously split:

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The Syrian cabinet is divided on the question of what action should be taken to maintain internal stability and may fall at any time.

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the prime minister and the minister of interior have privately admitted that Communists and leaders of the extremist Arab

Socialist-Resurrectionist Party are seizing every opportunity to cause trouble.

On 2 April, Acting Foreign Minister Azm told Ambassador Moose in Damascus that the government could move against these left-wing radicals only if it received help from the West on the Palestine issue. According to Moose, Azm's statement was probably prompted by reports of unrest among left-wing army officers, as well as by Socialist-Resurrectionist opposition to the cabinet.

Comment: Leftist agitation and army unrest will continue to grow if Syria's major parties--the Nationalists and Populists--are unable to achieve a working unity. They have apparently failed to agree on whether ex-president Quwatli should be allowed to return to run for the presidency in the elections promised for June.

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7. American and British ambassadors appraise Egyptian situation:

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The immediate prospects of the Revolutionary Command Council retaining control of the situation in Egypt are "fairly good," provided there is no outbreak of terrorist activities, according to the American and British ambassadors in Cairo.

The council's continuation in power depends on the prospects of a Suez base settlement, however. A prolonged delay in resuming negotiations will increase the risk of further dissension within the council and the Egyptian army.

If an Anglo-Egyptian agreement is reached, the regime could be expected to "survive in some form" until January 1956--end of the proclaimed three-year period of transition to civil government.

The council, "or any successor government created by it," can be expected to carry out commitments it has freely undertaken. The ambassadors believe there is no alternative Egyptian government in sight which would be as satisfactory to the West as the present regime.

8. French-Moroccan situation worsens:

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The split between urban Moroccans and the French is now practically complete, according to the American consul general in Casablanca. French contact with friendly elements has been broken by fear of terrorist retaliation; terrorist attacks are shifting from Moroccan to French officials.

The consul general reports a growing belief among local French officials that the present reform program will do little to improve the situation, and thus is scarcely worth the effort.

Comment: Other reports indicate a growing anti-French, anti-sultan sentiment in normally pro-French rural areas. There is also recent evidence of an increasing belief among pro-French Moroccans that measures must be taken to appease popular feeling.

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9. Kenya government planning new anti-Mau Mau measures:

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The Kenya government is planning to evacuate 10,000 Kikuyu residents from Nairobi in mid-April in order to relieve the present insecurity there,

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Mau Mau adherents and sympathizers will be picked up in a mass screening operation and deported to two communal work camps.

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the surrender appeals by captured "General China" to other Mau Mau leaders will fail because of his limited influence over them.

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Comment: These plans may have resulted from the recent visit of the colonial secretary and the chief of the Imperial General Staff. The deportation might cripple terrorist activity for a while, but would be unlikely to eliminate the Mau Mau in Nairobi, where there are 50,000 Kikuyu residents.

WESTERN EUROPE

10. French timetable calls for late May EDC debate:

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French foreign minister Bidault outlined to Ambassador Dillon on 1 April a timetable calling for National Assembly debate on EDC to begin on 25 May.

Bidault said that he plans a conference with Chancellor Adenauer on the Saar in mid-May, and has ordered the preparatory negotiations in Bonn reopened. He does not expect the

Socialist Party to hold its planned congress on EDC prerequisites before 18 May.

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Comment: The government is under pressure from the Popular Republicans who have threatened to withdraw from the coalition if debate on the treaty is not begun prior to their party congress on 27 May. The government is apparently discounting the danger that further obstacles will develop during the course of the Geneva talks.

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