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29 November 1960

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE


BULLETIN



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29 NOVEMBER 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA


Iranian prime minister discouraged at Shah's continued interference in government operations.

Indonesian President reportedly planning to bring Communists into government despite army opposition.

UAR President Nasir offers jet aircraft and military vehicles to Sudan; Sudanese Army also has acquired military personnel carriers from USSR.

Congo--Lumumba's flight to Stanleyville may initiate new phase in Congo power struggle.

The situation in Laos.



III. THE WEST

Honduran Government exhibits new tendency to speak out against Cuban agitation in Honduras.

(6)

(7) El Salvador--Communist-dominated labor federation announces it is proceeding with plans to organize peasant committees throughout country; peasant organization would give Communists potent political weapon.

(8) Venezuelan President decrees partial suspension of constitutional guarantees in effort to control rioting in Caracas.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

29 November 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Surat

Iran: Iranian Prime Minister Sharif-Emami is discouraged at the Shah's continued interference in government operations and fears that the Shah is planning to rig the new parliamentary elections as blatantly as those of last August, which the Shah canceled following widespread protests.

Former Prime Minister Eqbal is working hard, according to Sharif-Emami, to persuade the Shah that the last elections were actually satisfactory and that the same procedures should be followed again. The prime minister also expects the Shah to schedule elections before the new American administration takes office in the belief that this would avoid American pressure for freer elections.]

[The Shah appears unwilling to give up his day-to-day concern with governmental affairs--although he has insisted several times that he would do so--and Sharif-Emami is facing the same situation which reduced the former Prime Minister virtually to the status of a "yes man" for the Shah.]

) (Page 1)

Indonesia: President Sukarno is pursuing plans to bring Communists into the cabinet despite opposition from army officials. Communist appointments to the national government have so far been limited to rubber-stamp legislative bodies and advisory groups which have not effectively challenged the army's political power. [Army Chief of Staff General Nasution and his deputies profess to be confident that they can resist Sukarno on the issue, although lower ranking staff officers feel the army is losing ground vis-a-vis the President.]

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UAR-Sudan: Before returning to Cairo on 25 November from a cordial ten-day state visit to the Sudan, President Nasir proffered a gift of six jet aircraft and twenty UAR-manufactured military vehicles.

[redacted] the planes Nasir planned to present were six obsolete British jets which could be spared by the UAR.

no

The Sudanese Army now has its first Soviet-made equipment--a gift from the USSR of five BTR-152 armored personnel carriers, and Prime Minister Abboud has announced that his government is purchasing 25 more.

Congo: Lumumba's 27 November escape from house arrest in Leopoldville resulted primarily from a desire to return to political activity. Since early November,

[redacted] Lumumba's preoccupation with a shift of base to Stanleyville in his home Orientale Province, and Lumumba's public statement that he will return to Leopoldville following the funeral of his daughter in Stanleyville appears designed to avoid an impression of retreat. The arrival in Stanleyville of Lumumba and his chief lieutenants may initiate a new phase of the Congolese power struggle. Lumumba may eventually proclaim a rival Congolese government.

(Page 3)

updated

Laos: A government good-will mission, possibly led by Premier Souvanna Phouma himself, is scheduled to visit Hanoi and Peiping in early December. The dispatch of such a mission was one of the major points of agreement between Souvanna and the Pathet Lao in their mid-November accords.

OK

[redacted] A National Assembly delegation, headed by assembly president Tiao Somsanith, apparently will fly to Savannakhet on 30 November in an effort to find some basis of negotiation with General Phoumi. The Somsanith delegation will probably be unable to bridge the chasm between Phoumi and Souvanna;

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[there is even some possibility that it may be convinced by the Savannakhet group of the necessity for assembly action aimed at Souvanna's ouster.]

III. THE WEST

Honduras-Cuba: President Villeda Morales' open rebuke of the actively pro-Castro Mexican ambassador illustrates the new tendency of his moderately leftist government to speak out against the well-organized Cuban agitation in Honduras. At the President's birthday reception on 26 November, the Honduran foreign minister criticized the celebration of pro-Cuba week, and, when the Mexican ambassador made an intemperate pro-Castro speech, Villeda denounced the ambassador and Mexico for being "two-faced" in its attitude toward Cuba. Villeda has an influential pro-Castro wing in his party and has hitherto been chary of taking any position critical of the Cuban regime.

(Page 4) OK

El Salvador: The Communist-dominated labor federation of El Salvador has announced it is proceeding with plans to organize peasant committees throughout the country. Should the junta, contrary to the practice of previous governments, permit the organization of the peasants, this would provide the Communists with a potent political weapon. Salvadoran peasants, a generally depressed group with real socio-economic grievances, can easily be manipulated politically. More than any other development, this Communist tactic would probably strengthen the resolve of anti-Communists, particularly among the military, who are giving serious consideration to staging a coup. OK

(Page 5)

Venezuela: President Betancourt decreed a partial suspension of constitutional guarantees on 28 November and called in the army to reinforce other government security OK

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forces in an effort to control four consecutive days of rioting in Caracas. The disturbances, which may be a decisive phase in the contest for power, are almost certainly being promoted by pro-Castro leftists as part of a campaign of violence initiated in October to undermine Betancourt. The long-widening rift in Cuban-Venezuelan relations seems to be nearing an open break. Betancourt is believed still to have the backing of most of the armed forces; moderate political elements and much of organized labor are likely to rally to his support.

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DAILY BRIEF

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[REDACTED]

Iranian Premier Dissatisfied With Shah's
Continuing Interference

[Iranian Prime Minister Sharif-Emami is discouraged over the Shah's failure to consult with him on policies and key appointments and by the monarch's continued involvement in day-to-day government operations. Sharif-Emami has claimed several times recently that the military in particular are bypassing him and going to the Shah for support. The prime minister also fears that the Shah has not learned from the elections last August-- which the Shah canceled after widespread protest over blatant rigging--and will again use government pressure to ensure the election of his chosen deputies. Sharif-Emami expected the Shah to schedule elections before the new American administration takes office in the belief that this would avoid American pressure for freer elections.]

[According to Sharif-Emami, former Premier Eqbal is attempting to persuade the Shah that the August elections were actually satisfactory and that similar procedures should be followed in new elections.]

[the elections were probably better than past ones and that any "complications" were the fault of interference by the intelligence and police chiefs in favor of their friends. A repetition of rigging would be likely to precipitate the most serious crisis in Iran since the Mossadeq period.]

[The Shah, despite his assurances on several occasions that he would withdraw from day-to-day personal control of governmental affairs, is unwilling to do so. Sharif-Emami now finds himself in the same situation which has reduced previous prime ministers to impotence. He must accept the role of a virtual "yes man" to the Shah, as Eqbal chose to do, or resign.]

[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~Indonesian President Plans to Include Communists in Cabinet

President Sukarno is pursuing plans to bring Communists into the cabinet despite opposition from the army. Communist appointments to the government so far have been limited to rubber-stamp legislative bodies and advisory groups which have not effectively challenged the army's political power. Sukarno's concept of "guided democracy" calls ultimately for an amalgam of nationalist, religious, and Communist elements from which government leaders will be selected and from which all party lines eventually will disappear.

[Army Chief of Staff General Nasution, who is concurrently minister for national security, succeeded in postponing a conference scheduled for 20 November which would have discussed a cabinet reshuffle to include Communists. The chief of staff and his deputies are relatively confident that they can resist Sukarno on the issue; Nasution is reported unconcerned over reports that Sukarno is planning to move against him personally.]

Lower ranking staff officers, however, fear that the army is losing ground vis-a-vis Sukarno. The Indonesian army intelligence chief fears that a cabinet reshuffle, which Nasution will be unable to obstruct, will take place in the fairly near future. The two large non-Communist parties--the National party and the Nahdatul Ulama--support Sukarno on the inclusion of Communists in the government.

Sukarno apparently will press his efforts to overcome army objections on the inclusion of Communists in the cabinet. Should the army remain adamant, however, he is likely to shelve his plan until a more favorable opportunity arises. []

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The Situation in the Congo

Lumumba's 27 November escape from house arrest in Leopoldville resulted primarily from a desire to return to political activity.

"Lumumba sent a letter today requesting his early transfer to Stanleyville" in view of the delayed arrival of the UN Conciliation Commission "and the attitude of the UN to Kasavubu." The exact mode of Lumumba's escape is unclear; without air transport he would probably not reach Stanleyville, in Orientale Province, for several days.

Although Lumumba has stated that he would be willing to return to Leopoldville to meet with the UN commission, he probably plans to make Stanleyville the base for his political operations for the foreseeable future. There are indications that he plans first to consolidate his position in Orientale and then to "reconquer" other provinces of the Congo interior.

Lumumba lieutenant Antoine Gizenga as "still in control of the situation in Stanleyville," "Lumumba's arrival there would strengthen the position."

"The movement there should be encouraged and similar movements started in Kasai, North Katanga, and Kivu."

In Leopoldville, where President Kasavubu received a popular welcome just prior to Lumumba's departure, the Belgian news agency reported on 28 November that the expulsion of the UAR ambassador was imminent. Such reports, following the UN's seating of Kasavubu's delegation and Mobutu's expulsion of the Ghanaian representative in the Congo, may have influenced the timing of Lumumba's flight.

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Honduran Government Concerned Over Pro-Castro Activity

Officials of Honduras' moderately leftist government evidently are becoming alarmed by the extent of pro-Castro agitation in their country and are no longer reluctant to speak out against it. President Villeda Morales, who often feels he must cater to the influential pro-Castro left wing of his Liberal party, has been chary of criticizing the Cuban regime or of interfering with the increasingly well-organized Cuban activities throughout Honduras. Reassured by the International Court of Justice award of 18 November favoring Honduran territorial claims on the Nicaraguan border and by orderly local elections earlier this month, Villeda now may feel strong enough to take a firmer stand against a reported campaign to manipulate his government from within for Cuban purposes.

At Villeda's birthday reception on 26 November, Foreign Minister Alvarado Puerto--who is often sympathetic to the left-wing Liberals--questioned the loyalty of Hondurans who were dedicating that week to "defense of Cuba" rather than to celebration of the territorial award. He was challenged by the Mexican ambassador in Tegucigalpa, Cesar Garizurieta, whose cooperation with Cuban Embassy activities in Honduras has enhanced the respectability and representation of local pro-Castro and pro-Communist groups. Rebuffed by other guests, Garizurieta reportedly boasted he could arouse greater response among the Honduran people than anyone present.

This open challenge aroused Villeda to strongly abusive language against Garizurieta. The President is also reported to have accused Mexico of having two faces in foreign policy, one for the US and one for Cuba--evidently referring to pro-Castro statements by high legislative officials of Mexico's ruling party. Villeda's outburst was wildly applauded by the other guests. Garizurieta reportedly will leave for Mexico on 2 December with no plans for return.

If Villeda can better control the leftists within his party and administration without threatening his own position, he will be able to move ahead with planned economic and social reforms which would lessen the popular appeal of the Castro revolution in Honduras. However, he is also faced with high unemployment and labor unrest on the banana plantations.

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~~SECRET~~Salvadoran Communists to Organize Peasant Committees

The Communist-dominated labor federation of El Salvador (CGTS) has announced it is proceeding with plans to organize peasant committees throughout the country. Should the junta, contrary to the practice of previous governments, permit the organization of the peasants, this would provide the Communists with a potent political weapon. Salvadoran peasants, a generally depressed group with real socio-economic grievances, can easily be manipulated politically. The organization of peasant committees could also be the first step by the Communists toward organizing a peasant militia with which to defy any attempt by the armed forces to dislodge the Communists from the provisional government, where they and their supporters have become entrenched at all levels.

The CGTS, which has operated virtually without government restrictions since the ouster of the Lemus regime last month, reportedly invited peasants to a meeting on 6 November, where they heard a Salvadoran Communist recently returned from Peiping and Cuba speak on methods used in disarming an army and in organizing a civilian militia. On 20 November peasants were brought from outlying towns to San Salvador where they participated in a mass meeting sponsored by the CGTS and pro-Communist and pro-Castro students. Dr. Roberto Carias Delgado, secretary general of the Communist-front April and May Revolutionary party, told the crowd, estimated at 7,000 to 10,000, that "a foreign country"--meaning the United States--"was using ships and planes" as a means of interfering with their fight to rid themselves of "dictators and oppressors."

The Communist tactic of organizing the peasants, more than any other development, would probably strengthen the resolve of anti-Communists, particularly among the military, who have been giving serious consideration to staging a coup. The army and the wealthy landowners have long feared that the large peasant population might revolt, as in 1932, when a Communist-led insurrection was suppressed by the army only after thousands had been killed.)

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The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

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