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11 April 1960

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist China - USSR:

Khrushchev's visits to capitalist countries may be good for Soviet policy but cannot be useful for the "socialist camp."

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it has become China's task to support the "anti-imperialist" forces in Africa who are struggling against the "imperialists" for independence. These remarks and recent official Chinese statements indicate that Soviet tactics in Western Europe will not inhibit Peiping's policy of open support to nationalist movements.

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Communist China: In his 10 April foreign policy speech to the concluding session of the National People's Congress, Premier Chou En-lai indicated Peiping's opposition to any stabilization of the status quo in the Far East. He stated that "up to the present there has been no change in the tense situation between China and the United States" and that, regarding Taiwan, Peiping will "struggle to the end" to defend "its territorial integrity." Referring to Japan, Chou repeated that there could be no possibility of improving relations with the Kishi government. With reference to China's disputes with India and Indonesia, Chou merely called for "reasonable solutions."

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Union of South Africa: The unsuccessful attempt of an English-speaking white farmer to assassinate Prime Minister Verwoerd will aggravate the domestic situation because of the

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interpretation likely to be given the act by various groups. Although the would-be assassin had no known political backing, die-hard elements within the Nationalist party will see the attack as proof of a widespread plot to kill government leaders and will demand further repression of non-Europeans and liberal whites. The Africans are likely to see the attack as an indication of support among the English-speaking community for their antigovernment effort. They will probably increase their agitation and may stage disorders on 15 April, Africa Freedom Day.

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Somalia - British Somaliland: [Somali nationalists of the Italian-administered trust territory of Somalia and of the British protectorate are planning to bypass official channels and hold discussions regarding a possible union of the two areas. Italian and French officials in the area apparently suspect that these moves are the result of British machinations. Officials in the British protectorate fear that disorders would erupt if authorities attempted to contain nationalist enthusiasm.]

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(Page 3) (Map)

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Afro-Asian Conference: The second "nongovernmental" Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference which begins in Conakry, Guinea on 11 April seems likely to be marked by a struggle for control of the solidarity movement between Communist participants and UAR-led neutralists. This conflict and the indifferent and sometimes hostile attitude of African nationalists toward the movement will probably continue to limit its prestige and effectiveness.

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Peiping's View of Khrushchev's Policies

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[Khrushchev's visits to capitalist countries may be good for Soviet policy, but cannot be useful for the "socialist camp,"]

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[by visiting Paris Khrushchev could not help both France and the "anti-imperialist" movement in Africa, and that it is China's task to support the movement. These remarks and recent official Chinese statements indicate that Peiping, in pursuit of its policy of giving open support to nationalist movements in underdeveloped countries, is determined not to be inhibited by Soviet tactics in Western Europe. The Chinese apparently feel the bloc should play a more vigorous role in weakening the position of European powers in Africa.]

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[Khrushchev is not a "revolutionary" leader like Stalin and that he is trying to do things which are contrary to the "revolutionary ideas" of Communism. This remark may in part refer to Peiping's preference for a truculent posture toward the United States. Articles in Peiping's theoretical journal Red Flag are attempting to demonstrate that Khrushchev's policy calling for "friendly" East-West contacts and "mutual concessions" has no historical precedent in Communist doctrine. The articles insist that the real attitude toward USSR-US coexistence lies in Lenin's remark, "Let no American capitalists touch us. We will not touch them."]

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[The Chinese view Khrushchev's policy as leading to an undesirable stabilization of the status quo and as detracting from their effort to justify open hostility to the United States. In line with this effort, Red Flag recently insisted that the "predatory nature of imperialism must be exposed."]

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[the United States is turning its attention to small-scale wars--a "fact proving that American peaceful posturing is feigned."]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Assassination Attempt May Aggravate South African Situation

The unsuccessful attempt of an English-speaking white farmer to assassinate Prime Minister Verwoerd on 9 April will probably have important domestic consequences, although the would-be assassin probably was not acting for any political group and may have been demented. The country's tense political and racial situation will be aggravated because of the interpretation likely to be given to the attack by various elements of the population.


Powerful die-hard groups within the dominant white Nationalist party, who have shown no willingness to ameliorate local racial laws under international pressure, may see the attack as proof of a widespread conspiracy to kill government leaders. They will probably demand a further repression of protest activities by the non-Europeans and liberal whites, and will call for a strengthening of official restrictions on individual rights during the racial crisis. Traditional animosity between the English and Afrikaner communities may be heightened. Right-wing Nationalist politicians may redouble their efforts to weaken South Africa's traditional ties with Britain by advocating an early proclamation of a republic and reappraisal of the Commonwealth connection.

The Africans, interpreting the attack as evidence of English-speaking opposition to Verwoerd's policies, will probably be spurred on in their agitation against the government. African nationalists may cause disorders on 15 April--celebrated widely as Africa Freedom Day--by a stay-at-home campaign and street demonstrations.
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Somali Nationalists to Meet to Discuss Union

[Somali nationalists in the Italian-administered trust territory of Somalia and in the adjoining British protectorate of Somaliland plan to bypass official channels and to hold discussions about a possible union of the two areas. A mission of eight government and legislative leaders from the protectorate sought and received an invitation to visit Mogadiscio, capital of Somalia, on 12 April. Somalia is slated for independence on 1 July, and pressure is mounting for early independence in the British protectorate.]

[The Italian administrator looks on the visit as a "plot to extend British influence" to Somalia and may attempt to forestall the meeting. Such action would place Italy in the position of being an obstacle to Somali aspirations, but would strengthen Somalia Prime Minister Issa and rid him of some of the stigma of being an Italian stooge by allowing him to appear as champion of a Greater Somalia--toward which he has been somewhat apathetic. The fact that Issa's government is dominated by the Hawiya tribe while the rival Darot tribe is predominant in the Somaliland protectorate may have influenced his outlook toward a close union of the two areas.]

[Anticipating the arrival of the protectorate mission, the Somalia Government is whipping up enthusiasm for association. A government newspaper has given extensive coverage to Issa's statements characterizing the unity of all Somali territories as his most pressing political problem. Publication of these statements suggests that the prime minister either intends to adopt a pro-union line or is enabling himself to shift the blame elsewhere in case talks fail.]

[An official in the French Foreign Ministry has expressed some skepticism regarding British motivations in Somaliland. He believes the British could put a brake on pan-Somali developments, at least until Somalia becomes independent in July. The official believes]

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[British policy endangers Paris' hope that a satisfactory modus vivendi can be worked out between the Somalis and Ethiopia-- which is highly suspicious of all pan-Somali activities.]

[In London, a Foreign Office spokesman was skeptical of the judgment of the Somaliland Government that disturbances would erupt in the protectorate if the United Kingdom failed to go along with the legislative council's motion for independence and union with Somalia. Nevertheless, he did not exclude the possibility of independence for Somaliland and association with Somalia by 1 July.]

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Afro-Asian Conference Opens in Guinea

The second Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference--a "nongovernmental" organization--is scheduled to meet in Conakry from 11 to 16 April, with approximately 300 delegates. The first conference, held in Cairo at the end of 1957, provided Nasir and the Communists a joint vehicle for exploiting Asian and African nationalism and furthered Soviet efforts by adopting a strong anti-Western line. In the past two years, however, a split between UAR-led neutralists and Communist elements has developed within the organization, and the Conakry meeting seems likely to reflect a struggle for control between these two groups.

The agenda of the present session will probably include discussions on the liquidation of imperialism and colonialism, on independence and unity in Africa and Asia, on coexistence, disarmament, and economic development, and on strengthening the solidarity movement. Despite the anticipated neutralist attempts to prevent Communist domination, which have a reasonably good chance of success, the conference will almost certainly have a pronounced anti-Western cast.

Enthusiasm for the Conakry conference is markedly less than that prevailing at the time of the Cairo session. Most delegations, with the exception of the Soviet, Chinese Communist, and UAR groups, have little support from their home governments. The neutralist-Communist conflict and the indifferent and sometimes hostile attitude of African nationalists are likely to continue to limit the prestige and effectiveness of the solidarity movement.

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