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**Office of Current Intelligence****CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

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State Department review  
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3. Official statements give distorted picture of Burmese situation:

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Prime Minister Thakin Nu of Burma told a press conference in New Delhi, after his two day meeting with Nehru, that conditions in his country were improving daily. He stated that there were only 3,000 to 4,000 insurgents scattered about the country and that their rebellion was no longer "very serious." The Burmese also said that the insurgents had not received aid from China, which, he claimed, had maintained a "very correct attitude" towards Burma.

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Comment: These statements represent a deliberate distortion of the facts. It is now estimated that there are about 18,500 insurgents in Burma and Commander in Chief Ne Win recently admitted that the initiative had passed to them. The remarks of the Prime Minister may be

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only an effort to maintain the fiction of Burma's "neutral" foreign policy or to hide the Burmese Government's weakness. The extreme air of casualness, however, which has been assumed by both the Burmese and Indians gives rise to the suspicion that the conference between the two Premiers was of greater significance than described and that important substantive decisions may have been taken regarding Burma's foreign relations, particularly insofar as they relate to Communist China.

4. Dalai Lama endorses Communist program for the "liberation" of Tibet:

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Peiping radio has broadcast an exchange of telegrams between Mao Tse-tung in Peiping and the Dalai Lama in Lhasa. Mao thanked the Dalai Lama for his "efforts in implementing the agreement for the peaceful liberation of Tibet." The

Dalai Lama had advised Mao on 24 October that the local government, monks and populace of Tibet are giving the May 1951 agreement "unanimous support."

Comment: A delegation from Lhasa concluded an agreement with the Peiping regime in May 1951 providing for Tibetan cooperation in the extension of Chinese Communist authority over Tibet. It was widely believed that the Dalai Lama, in refuge on the Indian border, would repudiate this agreement, which deprived him of all significant power in Tibet. However, by September the Dalai Lama had returned to Lhasa, under occupation by Chinese Communist advance forces, and has since been expected to endorse the agreement. The Dalai Lama's adherence will facilitate the consolidation of Communist control of Tibet.

### SOUTH ASIA

5. Indo-Pakistani relations reportedly have improved:

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According to the US Embassy in New Delhi, the depth and sincerity of India's reaction to the Pakistani Prime Minister's assassination, and

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the conciliatory statement on Indo-Pakistani relations made by Liaquat Ali's successor have lessened tension between the two countries. A member of the British High Commissioner's office has also expressed the view that Indo-Pakistani relations are now better than at any time in the last four years.

Comment: Previous experience with Indo-Pakistani crises suggests that Indian reaction to Liaquat Ali's assassination, however sincere, is likely to be brief. Pakistan's almost immediate return to a state of apparent normalcy has demonstrated the ability of the government to control the country; and identification of the assassin as an Afghan national has minimized the possibility of armed anti-Indian outbreaks in Kashmir. Accordingly, the Indians may feel little need to modify their previous policies with regard to Pakistan, and they may be as uncompromising as ever when the UN Security Council meets to discuss the Kashmir case.

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WESTERN EUROPE

9. Opportunity seen for non-Communist labor alliance as Communists plan strikes:

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[Redacted] The US Embassy in Paris believes that present critical wage-price problems may soon result in a national conference of French economic groups from which the government will exclude the Communist-controlled General Labor Confederation. The success of such a conference, which would include the Socialists, would make a strong non-Communist trade union alliance possible. Some of the leaders, with "astonishing" though perhaps "undue" optimism, are even talking of unification of the major non-Communist groups "for the first time."

Meanwhile, there are indications that Moscow has given the French Communists a free hand for organizing an "economic" mass movement devoid of "political antics." Strikes will probably be called during the UN Assembly session in Paris.

Comment: The General Labor Confederation dominates French labor largely because the non-Communist unions have always failed to cooperate effectively. Virtually every political crisis in recent years has been precipitated by the Socialists, who feared General Labor Confederation gains at the expense of the non-Communist unions.

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The Socialists, in order to prevent a Gaullist accession to power, may now try to strengthen the wobbly Pleven government by supporting such a national economic conference.

French Communists have consistently failed in their strike movements largely because they were ordered to tie in political objectives.

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