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29 March 1961


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
29 March 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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France: [The next French nuclear test is planned for 15 April at the Reggane test center, or as soon thereafter as meteorological and operational conditions permit.]

[] this test, the fourth conducted by France since 13 February 1960, will be France's last atmospheric test, and further tests beginning in the fall of 1961 will be underground. Since the resumption of the Geneva talks, the Soviet delegation has emphasized that continued French testing would make a test ban treaty "pointless," and Moscow is likely to issue an official warning to the US and Britain following the next test. [] the Soviet delegation has hinted, however, that cessation of French testing is not a precondition for continuing negotiations. The French test is certain to bring renewed protests from African states and may possibly complicate negotiations between France and representatives of the Algerian rebel government which are scheduled to open on 7 April.

*Laos:

[] the British note on Laos has generated enough pressure for Soviet acceptance to put Khrushchev in a difficult position. Nehru, meanwhile, says he has sent a message to Souvanna Phouma in Paris urging him to return to Phnom Penh for further talks with Phoumi. The Laotian Army apparently is continuing its efforts to recruit some Chinese Nationalist irregulars, despite its position that all are in process of repatriation to Taiwan. The military situation remains essentially unchanged.


Page 1) (Map)

Congo: Tshombé's forces apparently are gathering for an attack on Manono, the capital of the Baluba tribal state in

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northern Katanga. The attack may take place sometime this week. The offensive force reportedly is to comprise 1,000 European and African troops and will be led by a unit of 60 South African legionnaires.

[] there are only 164 troops in Manono to resist the attack. Gizenga's forces are likely to be supported by Baluba irregulars, however. Nigerian UN units in the area probably will try to interpose themselves between Tshombé's forces and Manono, and the Swedish UN commander in Elisabethville has said he would try to arrest the South Africans as violators of the Security Council resolution against foreign military intervention.

Commenting on his most recent trip to Stanleyville, an official of the American Embassy in Leopoldville reports that public order in Orientale Province continues to improve. The official believes that although the main leaders in Stanleyville are still preoccupied with their own claims to legitimacy, Stanleyville representatives might now be willing to attend a conference of Congolese leaders on some neutral ground if their security were assured by the UN. [] (Backup, Page 5) (Map)

South Vietnam: [Growing discontent is reported among middle- and junior-grade officers of the South Vietnamese armed forces over the government's failure to check Communist guerrilla successes and to rally popular support; in addition, the officers are fearful that the Communists themselves might initiate an ostensibly non-Communist coup.]

[] discontent in the officer corps is greater than at any time since last November's attempted coup d'etat against President Diem. A restraining factor, however, is the realization that, without effective alternative leadership, any effort to replace Diem could lead to a Communist takeover.]


(Backup, Page 6)

Iraq: [The anti-regime demonstrations in Baghdad continued on 28 March despite troops firing on demonstrators late Monday. Baghdad University is closed and its students]

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[have joined the strike. A large part of the population is actively in sympathy with the strikers. Military Governor Abdi has cordoned off the nationalist quarter of Baghdad with troops and ordered a curfew. Troops have been ordered to shoot on sight anyone entering the quarter.] (Backup, Page 7)
 (Map)

Jordan: [King Husayn has acted to thwart what he believed was a plot to seize control of the Jordanian Army and perhaps ultimately the government. On 27 March he forced the resignation of the minister of defense and discharged the commander of the armored forces and three other senior officers. At least one of the officers had been in touch with Jordanian exiles in Syria who have been plotting a coup against Husayn's regime. The minister and the armored commander are leaders of the Bani Sakhir Bedouin tribe, which heretofore has been the dominant influence in the Jordanian Army and a main support of the King. Their dismissal has aggravated an already unsettled situation and invites further army dissidence.]

(Backup, Page 8)

Yemen: The Imam was wounded by gunshots on the night of 26 March. He is reported to be in a state of shock, although the wounds are said to be superficial. No information is yet available on the identity of those involved in the assassination attempt, although some arrests have been made, reportedly including young army officers. If the Imam should be incapacitated for a lengthy period, his opponents might seek to supplant him and prevent the succession of his unpopular son, Crown Prince Badr, now in Rome for medical treatment. Such an effort could lead to a prolonged struggle in Yemen.

[Badr was informed by members of the court that the situation in Yemen was under control. [expressed the hope that Badr would soon return home.] (Backup, Page 9)]

Tanganyika-UK: [Julius Nyerere, chief minister of Tanganyika, is expected to urge British Colonial Secretary Macleod, who is chairing the constitutional conference now under way in Tanganyika's capital, Dar es Salaam, to announce an early date--possibly 1 October--for the independence of this East African trust]

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[territory. While Macleod is expected to agree to eliminate the few remaining British controls over Tanganyika's internal affairs, he will probably attempt to maintain Britain's present schedule, which calls for independence in 1962, unless he is convinced that Nyerere's prestige would otherwise seriously decline.] (Backup, Page 10) (Map)

Communist China: Economic difficulties continue to limit China's ability to maintain a satisfactory export-import program. The Japanese Embassy in Warsaw has informed Tokyo negotiators at trade talks with Poland said China would not be able to supply rice, wheat, pork, or other foodstuffs in 1961. The Japanese Embassy received this information from the Polish minister of foreign trade. In addition to agricultural problems, the Chinese also admitted difficulties in exporting iron ore, claiming that high-quality ores from Hainan Island "had all been dug out." Moreover, Chinese negotiations for additional purchases of grain from Australia have bogged down because the Australians have not agreed to a Chinese request for credit.

(Backup, Page 11)

Albania-USSR: Albania and the USSR appear to be continuing cooperative naval activities despite political differences.

[two W-class submarines of the 12-unit Soviet submarine detachment stationed in Albania, as well as a subtender, are now under some degree of Albanian control. The Soviet Union may be providing Albania with these naval units in exchange for base rights in the Mediterranean area.]

In addition, all Soviet naval units based in Albania have been integrated into the Albanian communications system, and two countries have been cooperating in the development of naval shore facilities in Valona Bay. An extensive joint naval exercise began on 20 March and is still in progress.

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~~TOP SECRET~~The Situation in Laos

[redacted] the British note of 23 March on Laos, which incorporated Soviet proposals for reconvening the International Control Commission (ICC) and an international conference, has generated strong pressure for Soviet acceptance and placed Khrushchev in a difficult position.

[redacted] other pressures on Khrushchev which are likely to prevent full acceptance of the British plan. These include the timing of the note just prior to the SEATO conference and movements of the US Seventh Fleet which, [redacted] gave the British note the flavor of an ultimatum and would cause resentment and resistance in Moscow. [redacted] Khrushchev cannot afford to give the appearance of retreating under American pressure, since both the "extremists" in his own party and the Chinese Communists are ready to make capital out of any "appeasement" of the US.]

[redacted] Khrushchev most likely will accept the substance of the British proposals but will recommend that the first step of arranging a cease-fire be incorporated into the second phase, whereby the Geneva conference co-chairmen would call for the immediate reactivation of the ICC and would authorize the ICC to request and arrange for supervision of a cease-fire.]

Although the authoritative "Observer" article in Pravda on 27 March avoided direct comment on the timing and terms of a cease-fire, it implied that the USSR would not agree to any approach which would indicate Soviet responsibility for and direction of the Pathet Lao - Kong Le forces. Pravda characterized President Kennedy's statement of 23 March calling for a cessation of armed attacks by externally supported Communists as being "tantamount to an ultimatum to the people of Laos." While Pravda's position would not necessarily preclude

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Soviet agreement to a joint appeal by the Geneva co-chairmen for a de facto cease-fire, recent bloc propaganda on this issue suggests an intention to evade any firm commitments on the timing of a formal cessation of hostilities prior to an international conference, on the grounds that this is a matter for the conference itself to decide.

The Pathet Lao radio on 28 March broadcast an interview with Prince Souphanouvong in which the Pathet Lao leader accused the US of intensifying "its interference and aggression" in Laos. Souphanouvong charged that the US was forced by world criticism to accept the British proposal for a cease-fire, but called it a US scheme to halt the war "in order to have enough time to save the Phoumi - Boun Oum clique from total collapse, build up the rebels' strength, and hinder forever the conference of 14 nations." Souphanouvong warned that if the US continues to "create complications to a peaceful solution to the Laotian problem, the forces and people of Laos... will appeal to peace-loving countries for military help." This threat had first been broadcast on 23 March by the Pathet Lao radio, and subsequently repeated by the bloc.

Charging that "the Kennedy administration... is more frenzied and more aggressive" than its predecessor, Peiping, in a broadcast on 27 March, accused the US of planning to crush the "national liberation movements" with armed force. The following day Peiping broadcast a highly edited version of the 27 March Pravda "Observer" article, choosing to emphasize that portion of the article which implied the use of force to counter any SEATO intervention.

[Nehru apparently feels continued efforts toward reconciling Laotian political elements are needed as urgently as a cease-fire and an end to foreign intervention in Laos. New Delhi has generally taken the position that any national government formed without Pathet Lao participation would be neither effective nor acceptable as a basis for international agreement. Nehru continues to urge in his public statements, as he has privately to Khrushchev, that the British- and US-backed proposals be accepted as a "good way" to solve the crisis.]

Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces are continuing to maintain their positions north of the junction of Routes 7 and 13; south

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of the junction they are blocking any further Laotian Army advance with felled trees, mines, and mortar fire. In the Tha Thom area, they retain control of the southern approach to the Plaine des Jarres.

[redacted] General Phoumi is still urging the irregulars to remain in Laos; in Taipei, [redacted] the withdrawal of the approximately 2,000 Chinese Nationalist troops from Laos is going well but that the operation is being complicated by Laotian efforts to recruit among the irregulars. Recruiting agents reportedly are offering 26 US dollars a month to those who join the Laotian Army.]

[This recruiting effort apparently is being extended to those Chinese Nationalist forces grouping in northern Thailand for repatriation.]

[redacted] some irregulars have come over from nearby Laotian territory to proselytize on behalf of Phoumi's forces. Out of one group of some 700 irregulars scheduled to start repatriation from northern Thailand, all but 35 refused to leave when trucks arrived for them on 23 March.]

[redacted] Phoumi is anxious to incorporate some of the Nationalist elements clandestinely into his army to bolster the fighting spirit of the Laotian troops.]

[redacted] those irregulars scheduled for integration all speak Laotian or a minority tongue.]

Pathet Lao propaganda continues to denounce the presence of Chinese Nationalist troops in Laos, and, as recently as mid-March, threatened that the "legal" Laotian government would take appropriate measures "to annihilate them as the Burmese Government has done" unless they were withdrawn.

One Soviet AN-12 heavy transport may be en route to North Vietnam from Moscow. A Soviet AN-12 en route from

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Moscow to Omsk on 28 March, although not previously noted
in flights to South China or North Vietnam.

Soviet
transports have been scheduled to fly at least 14 sorties
from Hanoi to the Nam Bac area on 29 March. ET

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Situation in the Congo

Tshombé's forces reportedly are gathering both north and south of Manono, with the primary concentrations at Mitwaba, Kongolo, and Piana Mwanga. They have had some success in establishing control over areas on the periphery of Baluba territory, and their willingness to fight has probably been strengthened to some extent by the "white legionnaires," most of whom are scattered through the African units. However, the Katanga troops have not mounted an operation of this size before, nor have they ever attempted a deep penetration into the Baluba area.

Reports of the plans for an offensive against Manono have caused increased tension in Elisabethville, which, like most of the other mining cities in southern Katanga, has a substantial Baluba population. Non-Baluba tribesmen reportedly fear that violence will occur if the Katanga forces move on Baluba territory in the north. The disturbances might be led by tribal leaders whom Tshombé recently released.

According to the American Embassy official, the Stanleyville authorities appear to be developing some sense of responsibility and are beginning to bring their forces under control. Moreover, they seem increasingly disenchanted with the failure of the bloc and Afro-Asian nations to send aid or diplomatic representatives. Gizenga and his aides apparently have been in telephone contact several times with the Leopoldville government.

However, Gizenga may be inhibited by Mulele, his Cairo representative, who advised against a "rapprochement with the puppets". Mulele also stated that an ambassador from Mali would arrive in Orientale on 26 or 27 March--the first diplomatic representative to reach Stanleyville.

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
Growing Discontent Among South Vietnamese Military Officers

Professional officers in South Vietnam have long felt that operations against the Communist guerrillas were hampered by political interference in assignments and field orders as well as by inadequate intelligence and faulty command structure. They have also been concerned that President Diem's reluctance to reform his authoritarian rule and his suppression of non-Communist political opponents are facilitating the Communist drive to take over South Vietnam.

While the bulk of army units remained loyal to Diem in last fall's paratroop revolt, the coup attempt increased the officers' awareness of the army's political potential. The government's subsequent mistrust of officers who did not give all-out support to Diem has also had an unsettling effect. Diem's foot-dragging in carrying out a promised government reorganization prompted the air force commander to express doubt that Diem intended to do more than replace one group of "yes men" with another; a similar complaint was made recently by the marine corps commandant. Deputy Chief of Staff General Khanh, whose position was strengthened after the coup, is himself reported unhappy over the situation. Early this month, a ranking officer of the 1st Infantry Division defected to the Communists.

Uneasiness in the armed forces is intensified by the prospect of a major Communist political and military effort to disrupt the presidential election on 9 April. Recent open Communist efforts to win the cooperation of non-Communists in front activity aimed at Diem's overthrow reportedly have led to some military talk of a "preventive coup."

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Bağdad Demonstrations Growing More Serious

[Prime Minister Qasim returned to Baghdad from Basra on the night of 27 March in the face of increasing open hostility throughout the country. The strike began as a protest by taxi and bus drivers against an increase in the price of gasoline but expanded into an anti-regime movement by various elements, including the Communists. Led by Baghdad University students, demonstrators stoned buses again on 28 March in downtown Baghdad. Numerous shops have closed after pressure from the students for a general strike. Although troops fired on demonstrators on 27 March, they may be reluctant to carry out extreme repressive measures against a cause supported by the general populace. Sympathy strikes have broken out in Kirkuk and Mosul in the north and Najaf and Karbala in the south.]

[Recurring strife between groups of Kurdish tribesmen in the Mosul-Kirkuk area appears to be increasing, although Iraqi security authorities so far have relied on police detachments to maintain order. While army troops have not yet been involved in the tribal difficulties, the regime is not likely to call them to Baghdad to assist in putting down the rioting there.]

[The disorders in Baghdad may weaken the effect of recent moves against the Communists by the Qasim regime, unless Communist participation can be demonstrated. Qasim, in a speech on 28 March, blamed "imperialists and foreign companies," an apparent slap at the Iraq Petroleum Company, with which he has been engaged in fruitless negotiations for some months.]

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[Redacted]

King Husayn Acts to Thwart Plot in Jordanian Army

[Husayn made his move because he believed the suspected officers were preparing to take military action to seize control of the Jordanian Army in the early morning of 27 March,

[Redacted] The officers, led by Major General Akash Zabin, commander of the armored forces, had alerted their units without appropriate authority from army headquarters, and Defense Minister Akif Fayiz subsequently endorsed their "right" to do so. Counteralerts by other units had apparently discouraged the plotters even before the King learned of the situation.]

[Zabin and Fayiz may have aimed, at least initially, only to unseat Army Commander in Chief Habes Majalli, who is the leader of a rival faction within the army. These Bani Sakhir leaders reportedly were plotting to make such an attempt during Majalli's current absence from the country. In any case, their removal now leaves the Majalli faction in the strongest position within the military establishment. However, members of the Bani Sakhir tribe still constitute a large proportion of the army, especially the armored force, and their future loyalty to the King seems doubtful at best.]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Imam of Yemen Survives Assassination Attempt

The 67-year-old Imam has ruled Yemen's 5,000,000 citizens since 1948 by a combination of subsidies to powerful tribal elements and suppression of all dissidence. If he is able to act quickly now, he can probably cow any opposition by imposing wholesale punishment on those involved. In 1955 he handled a similar situation with dispatch, publicly beheading his own brother, who had sought to lead a revolt against his regime.

Yemen's northern tribesmen resent the Imam's disregard for their traditional authority and would probably welcome his removal. They also oppose Badr, whom the Imam named as his heir in violation of the historic custom that Yemeni rulers be chosen by tribal agreement. Badr's current absence from Yemen would have facilitated the seating of a ruler acceptable to the tribes.

The UAR may have an interest in seeing Badr's succession hastened, inasmuch as Badr has been under its influence and the Imam has recently shown a determination to lessen this influence.

Chaotic conditions in Yemen might induce the UAR to intervene in force, under the terms of the United Arab States agreement of March 1958. This agreement links Yemen to the UAR in a loose and so far ineffective confederation formed in the aftermath of Egyptian-Syrian union. Saudi Arabia's interest in the maintenance of a friendly government in Yemen might also lead it to intervene in support of tribesmen and other conservative elements, but King Saud would be unlikely to make such a move if it risked conflict with Nasir.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Tanganyika to Seek Independence at Constitutional Conference

[The conference began on 27 March in an atmosphere of general good feeling and is expected to adjourn on 30 March without serious difficulties. The only problems expected to arise are those related to the actual date for independence and the terms of separation pay for the departing British civil servants.]

[London has already promised early independence for Tanganyika but is reluctant to set a date earlier than 1962 because of the political situation in Britain and in its other African territories. Nyerere, an able and moderate nationalist, reportedly told Minister of Home Affairs Kahama that he is determined to hold out for independence in 1961. Nyerere probably hopes that by taking a strong position at the conference he can appease the more radical members of his own party and undermine the popularity of the rival--and increasingly extremist--African National Congress (ANC).]

[The Colonial Office has already assured Nyerere that Tanganyika can achieve "full internal self-government" at his discretion--probably in June 1961. This would include removing Governor Sir Richard Turnbull as chairman of the Council of Ministers (cabinet) and replacing him in that capacity by Nyerere, possibly eliminating the post of deputy governor, and replacing the two remaining government ministers with elected African ministers acceptable to Nyerere. Macleod is also expected to agree to an early transfer to the Tanganyika Government of control over the remaining expatriate civil servants and to make a generous offer regarding salaries and separation pay.]

[Redacted]

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Communist China's Continuing Trade Difficulties

Two years of poor harvests have made Peiping unable to maintain important export commitments. Poland's foreign trade minister told the Japanese ambassador that his country received "absolutely none" of the rice promised it under the 1960 trade agreement and only a small amount of the scheduled 120,000 tons of wheat. Peiping will not be able to recover its export position in food unless there is a good harvest in 1961. The persistent drought in North China, now in its third year, is making Peiping cautious about this year's food prospects.

It seems unlikely that the iron ore deposits on Hainan Island have been exhausted. It is more likely that the Chinese want to reserve this high-grade ore for their own use. [redacted]

[redacted]
China's foreign exchange position is under heavy strain as Peiping pays out hard currency for grain imports from the West. Despite rumors that Soviet financial aid will be forthcoming, there is still no evidence of transfers of foreign currency to the Chinese. Although the London branch of the Bank of China had been advised by its Peiping office to expect a transfer of sterling from the USSR, no funds had been transferred as of early March.]

[redacted]
The future of economic relations between the USSR and China is still under negotiation both in Moscow and in Peiping. Some agreement may be reached to extend repayment of existing Chinese debts to the USSR, which would ease Peiping's severe payments problem.]

[redacted]

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The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

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