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
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1. SOVIET DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL INCLUDES EUROPEAN AERIAL INSPECTION ZONE

Comment on:

The new Soviet disarmament proposal made on 18 March contains features designed to show some accommodation to previously announced US positions.

The USSR said it would accept aerial inspection over a zone extending 500 miles to the east and 500 miles to the west of the line dividing the NATO and Warsaw treaty nations. The Soviet proposal of 17 November 1956, which referred to a similar zone, promised only "to examine the question" of employing such a method of inspection. Moscow still has not precisely indicated the geographical limitations of such a zone, although the Soviet ambassador in London reportedly stated that the eastern limit of the area would extend from Riga to Odessa. A member of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations said on 9 January that the zone would be subject to negotiations once the "principle" was accepted. He said the 500-mile limit was an "approximate area," that the lines would "zigzag," and that the area probably would include some portion of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet proposal also responded to the United States' proposal of 14 January for the control of guided missiles. It stated that this question "is closely connected with the banning of atomic and hydrogen weapons as a whole," since the danger of these weapons derives not so much from the missiles themselves as from atomic and hydrogen warheads with which they could be fitted.

Another point intended to show some movement toward the US position was Moscow's offer to ban the

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manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons prior to their withdrawal from national armaments and destruction.

The rest of the proposal reiterates other Soviet proposals made during the past year, especially those of March and November 1956 which contain features unacceptable to the West, such as a pledge not to use atomic and hydrogen weapons, a ban on nuclear tests, and the removal of bases from foreign countries. [redacted]

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2. USSR COMPLAINS TO EGYPT

Comment on:

Moscow has again complained of Egypt's failure to co-ordinate its diplomatic moves with the USSR

Soviet deputy foreign minister Zorin expressed his disappointment to the Egyptian ambassador that there have been "no official comments" by the Arab states favoring the Soviet proposals of 11 February on the Middle East. Seeking even partial endorsement of the proposals, he stated that "Arab official comment can pick up what suits it from the Soviet principles for approval."

he complained that the Soviet statement of principles was treated by the Arab governments "on a par with the Eisenhower doctrine."

Zorin previously requested closer liaison between the USSR and Egypt, stating on 15 February that Moscow was unfamiliar with developments in Egypt and the main line of Egyptian policy, and lacked the information necessary to be of help.

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3. HAMMARSKJOLD'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH NASR

[Redacted]

Secretary General Hammarskjold, who left for Cairo on 19 March, believes that he has three "weapons" to use in dealing with the Egyptians. The first is the possibility of breaking off the talks and referring to the General Assembly the whole question of canal settlement and the disposition of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF). Hammarskjold doubts, however, that this would prove effective because of the difficulty in marshaling a two-thirds majority in the assembly.

His second "weapon" is the threat that the UNEF may be withdrawn. Because the Egyptians know a UNEF withdrawal would be followed by an Israeli move into Gaza and other areas, Hammarskjold feels he has a strong bargaining point. He stated that he had used the withdrawal threat on Egypt three times last November "with good effect."

His third "weapon" is the argument that the UN is Egypt's "bridge to the world" and a stiff Egyptian attitude toward the UNEF could alienate sympathy among UN members. Hammarskjold implied this would be his main approach.

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4. THE SITUATION IN SYRIA

Comment on:

A temporary truce between contending rightist and leftist officer factions in the Syrian army apparently has been reached, probably because neither faction felt certain it could attract and hold sufficient military support to prevail.

[redacted] leaders of the rightist Nufuri and leftist Sarraj factions were summoned before Chief of Staff Nizam al-Din, Defense Minister Azm, and other cabinet members to reach agreement on a major reshuffle of Syrian army officers proposed by Nufuri, until now G-1 of the general staff. The meeting agreed the chief of staff would reappraise the transfers and carry them out "insofar as they were for the general good."

The agreement merely glosses over violent dissension in the Syrian army. Leftist elements probably will soon move to strengthen their grip on the country. The Egyptians appear [redacted] to seek a mediating role, while according to other reports, Saudi Arabia is backing the rightist group and especially President Quwatli. The proposed transfers would have sent Colonel Sarraj, Syrian strong man who has been head of army intelligence, to Cairo as military attaché, but the ambiguous reference to the transfers in the report of the truce suggests he may remain in Damascus.

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5. THE SITUATION IN JORDAN

Comment on:

[Redacted]

Jordan's Prime Minister Nabulsi and left-wing cabinet ministers feel strengthened as a result of recent developments, according to high-ranking officials in

Jordan's Foreign Ministry. The Nabulsi group is now willing to risk open defiance of the king since they consider that it would be virtually impossible for a new cabinet to be formed under present circumstances.

In conversation with Ambassador Mallory on 18 March, King Hussain appeared "not at all certain of his ground," despite his earlier expressions of confidence that he could implement changes in the government after termination of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. [Redacted]

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6. MOSLEM PARTIES STALL EFFORT TO FORM INDONESIAN CABINET

Comment on:

Cabinet formateur Suwirjo's efforts to form a new Indonesian government have been at least temporarily blocked by the refusal of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) to accede to President Sukarno's demand that the anti-Communist Masjumi be excluded from the cabinet. Moslem unity, if maintained, will be a serious setback to Sukarno's plan to eliminate the Masjumi as a political force and to increase Communist influence in the government. The NU is also reported to be negotiating with Sukarno to leave the Communists out of the projected advisory council.

Sukarno continues to refuse to discuss any political questions with former vice president Hatta, who is popular with the Moslem parties and non-Javanese leaders, and he has not invited Hatta for talks as was reported in the Indonesian press.

Meanwhile, the army commanders' conference in Djakarta, which is being attended by commanders from most of the dissident provinces and which was scheduled to end 18 March, has been extended for an indefinite period. The army leaders may be standing by to play a decisive role if necessary.

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