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9 April 1960

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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9 APRIL 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

SEATO council in Bangkok alarmed by worsening South Vietnamese internal security situation; UK urges India toward ICC action.


Plotting by South Vietnam and Thailand against Cambodia elicits public warning by Sihanouk.

Indonesia brands scheduled Dutch naval flag-showing cruise to West New Guinea as intimidation and seeks means of hindering it.

Japanese may break off Soviet-Japanese fishing talks and conduct Western Pacific fishing without agreement if Moscow refuses reasonable quotas.

Arab League to meet today to discuss economic retaliation against France for Sahara nuclear testing.

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- ②
- ③
- ④
- ⑤



III. THE WEST

- ⑥ Cuba expecting early Czech request for diplomatic relations; first Czech ambassador would be the former minister to Mexico who arranged 1954 arms shipments to Guatemala. (TOP SECRET DAUNT)
- ⑦ Adenauer still fears Western compromise on Berlin at the summit.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

9 April 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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South Vietnam: [The consensus at the last SEATO council of representatives meeting in Bangkok was that the security situation in South Vietnam was growing steadily worse and could "eventually sap the morale of the population and government." The British representative called the situation alarming, and expressed the opinion that the cleanup job against the Vietnamese Communist guerrillas would be even more difficult than was the Malayan emergency. The British Foreign Office is urging India, in its capacity as chairman of the International Control Commission (ICC) in Vietnam, to call the ICC's attention to this situation.]

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Cambodia: Plotting against the Sihanouk regime by South Vietnam and Thailand may result in further dissension among the three countries. Premier Sihanouk seems informed of these intrigues, [which apparently include the sponsorship of a renegade band for forays into Cambodia,] and has warned publicly that Communist bloc counteraction would result if his neighbors tried to take over Cambodia.]

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Indonesia-Netherlands: Indonesia, complaining of Dutch "imperialist aggression," may try to make an international issue out of a scheduled Far Eastern flag-showing cruise by three Dutch warships which will visit West New Guinea. The Indonesian Foreign Ministry has already branded the undertaking a "form of intimidation" bound to increase tension in Southeast Asia. Djakarta asked its diplomatic missions in North Africa and the Near East for suggestions for hindering the Dutch operation or "at least making it more difficult."

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Japan-USSR: [Tokyo apparently is prepared to break off the current annual fishery negotiations with the Soviet Union and to conduct fishing operations in the western Pacific without an agreement if Moscow refuses to agree to reasonable quotas for the Japanese salmon catch. In addition, partly as a result of the growing influence and increasing activity of former Prime Minister Yoshida, Kishi and other government leaders have forbidden any Japanese initiative--and have ordered their negotiators to resist any Soviet move--which would link favorable fishing terms to a peace treaty requiring surrender of Japanese territorial claims.]

(Page 4) (Map)

Arab League - France: The UAR-dominated Arab League Council will hold an emergency session in Cairo today to discuss, among other questions, an Arab states boycott of French goods and the freezing of French assets, as a protest against French nuclear tests. In mid-March Cairo quietly banned further permits for importing French goods, and Saudi Arabia reportedly has followed suit. Since economic relations with France are important to many Arab states, the league members present probably will remain split over the issue, and unanimous action by all Arab states appears unlikely. Some members of the league, however, may follow Cairo's lead and boycott French goods. Afro-Asian UN members are continuing their campaign for a special General Assembly session.

III. THE WEST

Cuba - Sino-Soviet Bloc: The Castro regime is evidently preparing to accept its first ambassador from a Sino-Soviet bloc country. [Czechoslovakia] will ask for agreement for Vladimir Pavlicek, a career diplomat in Latin American affairs who, as minister to Mexico, arranged for the shipment of Czech arms to the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954. This move probably signals plans for relations with other satellite countries. There is no evidence that the USSR has followed up the reference in the Mikoyan Castro communique to a resumption of Cuban-Soviet diplomatic relations at an "appropriate" time.

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West Germany: Since his return from his world tour, Chancellor Adenauer has [redacted] doubt that he can fully rely on the Western powers to avoid a dangerous compromise on the Berlin issue at the summit conference. Adenauer apparently is still strongly in favor of a pre-conference West Berlin plebiscite, which he feels would prevent the Western allies from relinquishing their original occupation rights. The fate of the plebiscite proposal, which is still meeting strong opposition from West Berlin leaders, now appears to be up to the Bonn government and the three Western powers. [redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

SEATO Concern Over Security Situation in South Vietnam

[Concern over the security situation in South Vietnam was expressed by all delegates at the last meeting of SEATO council representatives in Bangkok on 30 March. The consensus was that while the Vietnamese Communist guerrillas probably are not capable of overthrowing the Diem government at present, the situation is growing steadily worse and could eventually sap the morale of the population and government. There was general agreement that while military action by the government alone was no solution, the inherent need for concentrating on security measures drastically hindered the execution of planned economic and social measures.]

[The French representative expressed the view that the upsurge in Communist terrorism in South Vietnam's southern provinces over the past six months was leading to the spread of panic throughout the country. The British delegate described the situation as "alarming," and said he thought the cleanup job against the estimated 3,000 Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam would be even more difficult than was the case in Malaya.

In this connection, experts in counter guerrilla operations recently have arrived in Saigon from Malaya in response to urgent pleas from President Diem.]

[The British Foreign Office, meanwhile, is pressing India in its capacity as chairman of the International Control Commission (ICC) in Vietnam to direct ICC attention to South Vietnam's security problem in view of the relatively open corridor for entry of Communist guerrillas through Laos. India, while previously holding legalistic and technical objections to such an undertaking by the ICC, is showing an increasingly sympathetic attitude to Western efforts to counter the Communist threat in South Vietnam.]

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~~TOP SECRET~~Cambodia Denounces South Vietnamese and Thai Intrigues

A build-up in plotting against the Sihanouk regime in Cambodia by South Vietnam and Thailand threatens to erupt into another round of serious dissension among these countries. Premier Sihanouk seems well informed and has warned publicly that if an alleged plan for military action against Cambodia is "pushed to its conclusion, it risks causing a general conflict in Asia" in which Sihanouk would expect Communist assistance.

Influential elements in South Vietnam and Thailand, in spite of the collapse of the Dap Chhuon coup movement against Sihanouk in early 1959 which they had supported, evidently have continued their plotting against the Cambodian leader. Their efforts to generate internal opposition to Sihanouk--whom they consider a tool of the Communists--have included sporadic clandestine broadcasting, the distribution of pamphlets, bribery, and rumor campaigns.

[redacted] both Thailand and South Vietnam have covertly organized bands of dissident Cambodian elements on their territories for forays into outlying Cambodian provinces. A secret meeting at the residence of Thai Interior Minister Prapat in Bangkok on 8 April reportedly was to discuss the dispatching of 100 armed guerrillas from Thailand into Cambodia. [redacted]

[redacted] at least one foray by such elements has already taken place. [redacted]

Sihanouk, in recent speeches and press articles, has inveighed against South Vietnam and Thailand for their "daily more hostile attitude." In his personal press organ, the Nationalist, on 2 April, Sihanouk concluded that their aim in bringing psychological and military pressure to bear was to badger Cambodia into turning to the Communists for support, thereby justifying their efforts to "eliminate this danger" to the free world. Sihanouk warned that Cambodia would resort to guerrilla warfare to confound any contemplated invasion and said that the Communist bloc would not remain "passive" under such circumstances. [redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~Indonesia Denounces Scheduled Dutch Naval Cruise

The Indonesian Foreign Ministry has denounced the scheduled Dutch naval flag-showing cruise to Netherlands New Guinea and Far Eastern ports as a form of intimidation bound to increase tension in Southeast Asia. A Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that the Dutch are trying to preserve colonialism in a part of Indonesian territory by armed force but that the Indonesian Government and people will maintain their vigilance and that the Dutch will have to bear all consequences of such intimidation.


The Indonesian Government's persistent claim to Netherlands New Guinea has influenced and sometimes dictated foreign and domestic policy [redacted] The Foreign Ministry [redacted]

[redacted] Indonesia's North African and Near Eastern embassies requesting suggestions and opinions on hindering the projected Dutch naval operation or "at least making it more difficult." [redacted] The Indonesian Government is most unlikely to attempt any counter show of force, but will undertake a shrill campaign of protests and denunciation.

The Dutch vessels--an aircraft carrier and two destroyers --will tour the Far Eastern area, probably stopping at Singapore and Australia as well as New Guinea, from approximately 1 June to mid-December 1960.

When informing the North Atlantic Council on 6 April of this plan, the Dutch stressed that they must bolster the defense of West New Guinea in view of the continuing Indonesian threat to the territory's security. Long worried over Indonesia's increasing military strength, its infiltration capabilities, and the inadequacy of Dutch defenses in the area, the Dutch have been further disturbed recently by report of Djakarta's plans to construct a marine institute--with Soviet aid--at Amboina. The three ships in the Dutch naval mission are NATO-committed, and some of the aircraft aboard the carrier Karel Doorman were obtained by the Dutch under the US Military Assistance Program. [redacted]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Soviet-Japanese Fishing Talks

[Tokyo is apparently prepared to break off the annual negotiations with the USSR for a fishery agreement in the north-western Pacific and to proceed with its fishing operations if Moscow refuses to agree to reasonable quotas for the Japanese salmon catch in 1960.]

[Agricultural Minister Fukuda, who is leaving for Moscow to become chief Japanese delegate in the two-month-old talks, told Ambassador MacArthur on 6 April that the Soviet proposals for this year would reduce the Japanese salmon catch by 70 percent. Fukuda believes Japan's best chance is to insist on a reasonable agreement and to be prepared to fish without an agreement, if necessary. He emphasized, however, that in such case the Japanese would limit their salmon catch to a reasonable figure.]

[The chief Soviet aim in the current negotiations appears to be an extension of the salmon fishing ban south of the existing line into an area where the Japanese take more than half of their entire salmon catch. The Soviet Union has as yet made no attempt, as it has in past years, to use the fishing terms as a lever to obtain political concessions from Japan.]

[The Japanese stand this year is more firm than in past negotiations. Partly as a result of pressure by former Prime Minister Yoshida, the government has ruled against elements who would barter political concessions such as surrender of Japanese claims to the Kuril Islands for favorable fishing terms. Negotiators have been instructed that they are to initiate no moves to link the fishing talks to a peace treaty and are to resist any Soviet moves in this direction. The Japanese position also reflects a gradual regrowth of national confidence, which in the past year has been evident in the conclusion of a repatriation agreement with North Korea and the emergence of a firmer policy toward South Korea.]

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III. THE WEST

Cuban-Czech Exchange of Ambassadors Evidently Imminent

The Castro regime evidently is preparing its first exchange of ambassadors with a Sino-Soviet bloc country. On 6 April Foreign Minister Raul Roa advised the Cuban Embassy in Mexico that it would receive a demarche asking agreement for Dr. Vladimir Pavlicek as Czech ambassador in Havana. On 7 April the secretary general of the Cuban Communist party, in Prague en route to Moscow, told Czech newsmen that he hoped "the Cuban ambassador would soon arrive in Prague on the basis of an agreement to establish diplomatic relations."

The Czechoslovak Government has been a leader in bloc penetration of underdeveloped areas and was the first Communist country to establish a permanent commercial representation in Cuba. Although the two countries have not yet signed a formal trade agreement, there has been increasing economic, cultural, and military contact between them since Castro's assumption of power. There are numerous unconfirmed reports that Cuba has tried to buy jet fighters from Czechoslovakia, either directly or by means of a third-country arrangement.

Pavlicek, a career diplomat in his forties, is a Latin American specialist who has served as Czech minister to Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, and Guatemala. While in Mexico he arranged the clandestine Czech arms shipment to the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954. In the past two years Pavlicek has served as chief of the American Affairs Division of the Czech Foreign Ministry.

In recent months Cuba has signed trade agreements with the USSR, Poland, and East Germany and accepted a \$100 million Soviet credit. Castro undoubtedly plans to establish diplomatic relations soon with other satellite countries and probably Communist China. There is no evidence that the USSR has taken any action to follow up the reference--in the communiqué at the close of Mikoyan's visit to Cuba--to a resumption

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of Soviet-Cuban diplomatic relations "at a convenient time." Mikoyan stated in Cuba on 13 February that this is merely "a technical question" and implied Cuba would take the initiative. Moscow may wish to assess reaction to the Czech move and may prefer to wait until after the summit conference in May. Mikoyan stated that he had invited Castro to the Soviet Union. Such a visit could provide the occasion for an announcement of the resumption of relations.

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Adenauer Still Concerned Over Outcome of
Summit Conference

{Since returning from his world tour, Chancellor Adenauer has [redacted] doubt that he can fully rely on the Western powers to avoid a dangerous compromise on Berlin at the summit conference. He feels that all of the summit participants will not have the same firmness as Khrushchev, and wants to eliminate the Berlin issue from the summit agenda.]

{Adenauer still strongly advocates a pre-conference plebiscite in West Berlin as a means of binding the Allies to their original occupation rights. He has encountered strong reservations, however, from West Berlin leaders who believe a referendum at this time could be interpreted as mistrust of the Allies and who have warned that it might lead to a retaliatory plebiscite in the eastern sector of Berlin and West Germany. Until recently, Bonn's All-German Affairs Minister Lemmer agreed with the West Berlin leaders, but on 7 April the cabinet was reported as supporting Adenauer unanimously.]

{In a report to the chancellor on 6 April, the West Berlin city council attempted to straddle the issue. Although declaring that the views of Berliners were clearly indicated in the last city elections in December 1958, when candidates opposed to the Soviet free-city proposal won more than 90 percent of the vote, the council reserved the right to call for a plebiscite "at the appropriate time." The report added that the Berlin leaders are ready for a plebiscite "even prior to the summit should the Federal government, in accord with the three Western powers, desire it," and noted that technical arrangements to make a referendum possible are already under way.]

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Scientific Adviser to the President

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Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

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The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

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Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

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