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1 December 1955

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
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CONTENTS

- 1. SOVIET OFFICIAL ASSERTS EAST GERMANS CONTROL
EAST BERLIN (page 3).**

- 2. RESIGNATION OF TURKISH CABINET (page 4).**

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(page 5)

* * * *

THE TAIWAN STRAIT
(page 6)

~~TOP SECRET~~

1. SOVIET OFFICIAL ASSERTS EAST GERMANS CONTROL EAST BERLIN

The assertion by the Soviet commandant in Berlin, General Dibrova, that the German Democratic Republic is the sovereign authority in East Berlin

opens the way to East German efforts to interfere with Allied travel in East Berlin and to deal directly and officially with Britain, France, and the United States. Although in theory this would extend to East Berlin the restrictions on Allied access to East Germany, in practice East Berlin will probably continue for the time being to be more accessible, with only spot harassments. To date there is no sign that the Soviet action is intended as a challenge to Allied control of West Berlin or access to the city.

The letters exchanged at the time of the Soviet-East German treaty of 20 September said that East Germany would "exercise guard and control functions" along the zonal and sector borders and in Berlin, while control over Allied military traffic to Berlin was reserved to the Soviet authorities. According to press reports, General Dibrova stated that the transfer of authority over East Berlin to the East German regime had occurred during Foreign Minister Molotov's stop in Berlin on 17 and 18 November on the way home from the Geneva foreign ministers' conference.

East German administrative organs have been exercising gradually increasing control over those of the East Berlin government.

2. RESIGNATION OF TURKISH CABINET

The resignation of the Turkish cabinet on 29 November, immediately following the censure of Acting Foreign Minister Zorlu, the minister of economy, and the finance minister during a Democratic Party "caucus," reflects growing popular discontent with the government's economic program. Prime Minister Menderes, who has been asked to form a new cabinet, may have encouraged the party's criticism of these three ministers in order to shift responsibility from himself for Turkey's economic deterioration and to forestall criticism in the Grand National Assembly.

Turkish legislators have been concerned over the sharp rise in the cost of living and have called for counterinflationary measures. Several deputies have strongly criticized the government for its lack of economic planning and its neglect of current needs in favor of long-term investment.

Deputies who have recently returned from the provinces have heatedly criticized the shortage of essential commodities, indicating for the first time that the peasant population, which is the primary basis of Menderes' political strength, has been affected by Turkey's worsening economic situation.

Menderes' new cabinet will probably contain many of his former ministers. The prime minister will probably now make revisions in his economic program in an attempt to speed negotiations aimed at getting a long-sought American loan.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 30 November)

[redacted]
[redacted] No significant military activity has
been reported in the past 24 hours. [redacted]

The presence of five Egyptian jet fighters (British Meteors) and a C-47 transport at [redacted] Damascus airport has been confirmed [redacted]

[redacted] This is the first indication that the joint Egyptian-Syrian command is starting to operate on a working level. [redacted]

Egyptian minister of war Amir arrived in Jordan from Damascus for a three-day visit on 30 November. The purpose of Amir's visit is not known, but he will probably try to persuade Jordan to join an arrangement similar to the ones Egypt now has with Syria and Saudi Arabia for the co-ordination of Arab military action against Israel. [redacted]

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BIWEEKLY SUMMARY
17-30 November 1955**THE TAIWAN STRAIT****Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
for the Taiwan Strait Problem**

1. After a lull of several weeks in artillery duels in the Quemoy area, Chinese Nationalist 155mm howitzers on 28 November fired 240 rounds at a causeway which the Chinese Communists are constructing between the mainland and Tateng Island, four to five miles north of Quemoy. Communist artillery responded with 680 rounds. No major damage was reported.

2. The Chinese Communists began constructing the 6,300-foot causeway to Tateng apparently early in November. Such a link with the mainland would facilitate supply of Communist military positions on Tateng. Communist artillery now on the island is believed to include only 76mm guns, but 122mm or larger weapons could take any point on Quemoy under fire.

3. On 27 November, two Chinese Nationalist RF-86's on a photo recon mission over the mainland were intercepted by Chinese Communist jet fighters. Although firing passes reportedly were made on one RF-86 in two instances, no hits were scored.

4. Another antiaircraft artillery (AAA) division is tentatively accepted in the Amoy area of Fukien concurrent with confirmed reports of additional antiaircraft artillery weapons in the area. This brings AAA units in the Amoy-Foochow area to a total of three divisions and one independent regiment.

6. Construction of Fukien Province's first rail line, from Yingtan to Amoy, is apparently proceeding rapidly. Aerial photos of 21 November show that track has been laid along the northern portion for a distance of about 25 miles. Since grading work has been in progress for several months on the northern two thirds of the 400-mile line, it is now believed the Communists can complete the entire project by the end of 1956. This would be in advance of the timetable recently announced by Peiping.


7. The only major Chinese Communist pronouncement on the Taiwan issue during the period was a statement by Vice Premier Chen Yi published in the East German press on 24 November. Chen remarked that there were two possible solutions to the question of Taiwan--withdrawal of US forces or "liberation" by military force. Chen stated that Peiping preferred a peaceful solution but realized that it must be prepared for action. He enumerated specific preparations for an invasion, including new airfields, new railroads in Fukien, and construction of ships for amphibious operations.

8. In contrast to the threatening tone taken by Chen Yi, the Chinese Communists have been at pains to stress their peaceful intentions with visiting foreign delegations.

a. Reporting a conversation with Premier Chou En-lai and other Chinese Communist officials in late October and early November when he visited China, French Socialist leader Daniel Mayer said he was told no force would be used in the "liberation" of Taiwan. The Chinese

Communists declared, Mayer said, that while they considered Taiwan to be an internal problem, events had in fact made it an international question, and in practice they would not use force to settle the issue. [redacted]

b. [redacted] purporting to give Chou En-lai's remarks to a visiting Japanese delegation of municipal officials, the Chinese Communist premier warned that the US will never be able to keep "Chiang Kai-shek's government going," but reassured his listeners that the Chinese people will never fight the American people over Taiwan. [redacted]



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
TAIWAN STRAIT SITUATION

1 DECEMBER 1955

CHINESE COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND:

DESIGNATIONS	PRIMARY AIRFIELD CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT IN AREA WITH PREPARED RUNWAY GENERALLY 5000 FEET OR LONGER.	SECONDARY AIRFIELD AUXILIARY OR EMERGENCY BASES OR FIELDS OF LESSER IMPORTANCE. RUNWAYS GENERALLY LESS THAN 5000 FEET.	USABILITY			
			+	I	?	■
ACTIVE BASE FOR MILITARY & CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT. SOME BASES USED BY PISTON TYPES MAY BE USABLE BY JETS	●	OPERATIONAL	▲			
INACTIVE BASES CAPABLE OF USE BY AIRCRAFT	●	SERVICEABLE	▲			
CURRENT STATUS UNDETERMINED		UNKNOWN				

* FIELDS NOT CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING SUSTAINED OPERATIONS AT PRESENT.

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