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**OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE**  
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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**1. KING SAUD MAY CALL MOSLEM CONFERENCE**

[redacted] at the recent Baghdad talks King Saud indicated that he was giving consideration to calling an all-Moslem conference, [redacted]

The conference would have the purpose of developing a general position on relations with the West, and would be attended by Moslem leaders not only of Baghdad pact nations but of North African countries and Indonesia as well as all Arab countries. [redacted]

[redacted] Saudi's idea is that if Nasr fails to attend, he will be isolated, whereas if he does, he would find himself greatly in the minority.

[redacted] Saudi not only stated that he could live with the Baghdad pact, but declared it a good thing.

[redacted]

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## 2. DJAKARTA DISMISSES EAST INDONESIAN MILITARY COMMANDER

Comment on:

[Redacted]

On 18 May the Indonesian army announced the relief of dissident Lt. Col. Samual as commander of East Indonesia. This action is the latest in a series of steps indicating the hardening attitude of President Sukarno toward the rebellious provinces.

It is quite likely that Sukarno, who has frequently called for vigorous action to solve Indonesia's pressing problems, overruled the recommendation of Prime Minister Djuanda. The latter, who has just returned from a visit to the East Indonesian command, reportedly warned only three days ago that Samual's dismissal would not solve the crisis there.

Samual can be expected to ignore the order. Should Sukarno attempt to enforce it, he would call on the special task force of Col. Sudirman in southern Celebes. Reports suggest, however, that Sudirman, although loyal to Djakarta, might not be entirely reliable in this situation.

[Redacted] Sudirman would not follow Djakarta's directives if they would have "dangerous results."

3. NASR [REDACTED] REASSERTS INTENT TO SEIZE  
ISRAELI "TEST" SHIP

[Egyptian president Nasr has told [REDACTED] that if an Israeli ship enters Egyptian territorial waters to transit the Suez Canal, the ship, crew and cargo will be seized.]

Comment

Because of Nasr's past vehemence on this subject, there is little reason to doubt that a ship bearing the Israeli flag would be seized. Any concession by Nasr on this point would result in a serious loss of face in the Arab world. The attempt made in 1954 to send an Israeli ship through the canal ended in the confiscation of the vessel and its cargo.

Nasr's position with regard to a non-Israeli vessel transiting the canal to an Israeli port is uncertain. Before the hostilities last fall, most such vessels passed unimpeded, but some seizures of cargo were effected on the ground that they were contraband war materials.

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#### 4. MOLLET USING SUEZ ISSUE TO RETAIN PREMIERSHIP

Comment on:

[Redacted] [Redacted]  
France and the United States "are drifting apart" over the Suez issue. In an apparent effort to elicit US support in the UN Security Council, he said a serious outburst of anti-American feeling would arise in France if Mollet's appeal to the council were fruitless.

[Redacted]  
He denied that Mollet's recent moves were dictated by domestic political considerations, but admitted that the premier's appeal to the council on Suez and his dramatic attempt to resign would have "domestic repercussions." The immediate favorable popular response to Mollet's latest move on Suez indicates the continued value of this issue as a rallying point for French nationalist sentiment.

[Redacted]  
[Redacted] the government expects to survive the vote of confidence on the tax issue, now scheduled for 21 May. Despite increasing speculation on a new premier, Mollet is apparently confident that the assembly will prefer to leave the Socialists saddled with the problems of Algeria and France's shaky financial situation. His advisers expect that in the event Mollet falls, the rise of his prestige during the crisis that follows will permit his return to power.

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## 5. POLISH PARTY PLENUM

### Comment on:

Polish sources have told representatives of the Western press that First Secretary Gomulka's speech to the ninth plenum of the Polish Communist Party on 15 May was followed on 16 May by attacks on his policies by his Stalinist opponents. These attacks, reportedly directed against his entire policy rather than parts of it, suggest a concerted move against Gomulka and a high degree of cohesion within the Stalinist Natolin wing.

Press observers believe that the Natolin attacks have served to reduce criticism of Gomulka by the party's liberal wing, which was singled out for criticism in his keynote speech. Gomulka may now give up his attempts to appease the Natolins and strongly insist on acceptance of his moderate program in the hope that a show of firmness will bring him enough support from uncommitted sectors to offset Natolin hostility.

The terse communiqué issued by the central committee on 18 May stated that Minister of Agriculture Ochab had been released from his post as a central committee secretary, though he remains on the politburo. Zenon Kliszko, an old associate of Gomulka, and politburo member Jerzy Morawski, a liberal, were added to the secretariat. Ochab, a former first secretary, was probably released from his duties as secretary to enable him to devote full time to implementing Gomulka's important agricultural reforms. Apparently no one from the Stalinist group was added to either the politburo or secretariat.

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## 6. SOUTH VIETNAM ALTERS TACTICS ON OVERSEAS CHINESE

South Vietnam is planning a long-range policy of harassment, rather than large-scale immediate direct action, to force locally born Chinese to accept naturalization,

The policy will be based primarily on scattered arrests, small-scale expulsion and economic pressures.

### Comment

Vietnamese foreign secretary Mau agreed recently to permit voluntary expatriation to Taiwan of those Chinese who refuse naturalization, but this may have been only a temporary expedient to prevent further rioting in Saigon while President Diem is abroad. In the face of a hardening resistance among the Chinese community of nearly 1,000,000, Vietnamese leaders remain confident the Chinese will comply eventually in order to protect their wide commercial interests, and the government appears willing to suffer any economic losses in the process. Compliance thus far has been negligible despite intimidation by the government.

While Chinese reaction to a coercive policy would depend on its pace and severity, further rioting, rupture of Saigon-Taipei relations, and growing pro-Peiping sentiment among the Chinese in Vietnam are possible consequences.

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