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19 April 1958

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

No
USSR--Summit tactics: In bringing a protest to the UN Security Council against alleged flights of United States bombers carrying nuclear weapons across the Arctic toward Soviet frontiers, the USSR has reverted to a standard Soviet device designed to place the United States on the defensive during important negotiations. This move has the same purpose as Gromyko's attack last June on NATO commander Norstad on the day when the US delegate to the London disarmament talks was scheduled to outline the American response to the USSR's proposal for a test suspension. Moscow is seeking to discredit US intentions and generate distrust of US leadership at the opening of the diplomatic talks on summit preparations.

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
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No
*Foreign Minister Gromyko has told the three Western ambassadors that he wants separate meetings with them and that, if the West insisted on joint meetings, he would propose the inclusion of other ambassadors such as those from Poland and Czechoslovakia. Presumably Gromyko hopes to use this device to probe any divergence of views among the three Western powers and to emphasize the Soviet position on parity of representation at a summit meeting. Despite the USSR's previous position that ambassadors should only discuss procedural arrangements for a foreign ministers' meeting, Gromyko queried Ambassador Thompson about appropriate topics for negotiation.

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yes
USSR - Pakistan: The most recent move in the Soviet propaganda campaign against Western military bases is a formal note of protest to Pakistan, attacking the establishment of American bases on Pakistani territory. Soviet pressure probably is intended to embarrass current American-Pakistani negotiations on the establishment of a United States Air Force communications facility and may cause the Pakistanis to stall or seek greater concessions in the Washington military and economic aid talks in late April. [redacted]

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[Redacted]

* USSR - Yugoslavia: The latest issue of the Soviet party journal, Kommunist, has broken the uneasy Yugoslav-Soviet ideological truce by condemning virtually every significant section of the program for the Yugoslav party congress next week. The Yugoslavs, who had made concessions on the foreign policy sections of the program following a discussion in Moscow between Khrushchev and the Yugoslav ambassador, will reply in kind. The Soviet attack is the most complete repudiation of Yugoslav dogma since the reconciliation in 1955.

[Redacted]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

[Redacted]

No
Lebanon: The authorities continue to be plagued with internal security problems, created in large part by infiltration of weapons and armed parties from Syria. Although the pro-Western government has suppressed several outbreaks of violence by elements who oppose President Chamoun, further attempts at civil disturbances by these elements seem likely. Opposition elements are presumably aware that General Shihab will support the present government.

[Redacted]

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III. THE WEST

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France: Speculation continues that President Coty may call on the Social Republican, Jacques Soustelle, to make the initial attempt to form a new government during the period between the two local election dates of 20 and 27 April. Such a move would permit Soustelle to exploit anti-American sentiment to try to rally support for the return of General de Gaulle. This prospect might in turn prod the major nonextremist parties into earlier efforts to reach a compromise solution and avert a long crisis. [redacted]

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Haiti: President Duvalier seems to be in a weaker position than at any time since his inauguration last October. He is uncertain of continued support from the army, because of growing tension among the officers and friction between the President and his recently appointed chief of staff. [redacted]

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Britain-Maldives Islands: London fears further delays in construction of an air staging base on Gan Island in the Maldives Islands, a vital alternative to transit facilities on Ceylon which Britain is relinquishing. Britain is prepared

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to conciliate the Maldivians by granting considerable autonomy in foreign relations. The Maldivians have already sought support from India and Ceylon and may stir up a propaganda campaign which would damage Britain's relations with countries in the Indian Ocean area.

[redacted] (Page 11) (Map)

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet Protest Against Alleged US Bomber Flights

The USSR's request for an immediate United Nations Security Council meeting to consider a Soviet protest against alleged flights of American bombers carrying nuclear weapons across the Arctic toward Soviet frontiers appears aimed at disrupting Western unity in the current Moscow talks on preparations for a summit conference. By portraying American policy as provocative and irresponsible, Moscow hopes to generate distrust of United States leadership and force Britain and France, under pressure of public opinion, to break with American views on prerequisites for summit talks.

The appeal to the UN was foreshadowed by Khrushchev's statement during an interview on 14 April with the Belgian ambassador and Queen Mother Elizabeth that American planes were carrying atomic bombs toward the USSR. He said he would produce documentary evidence to support this charge later. He conceded that the US planes in question had not overflowed Soviet territory, but claimed that other American aircraft had done so recently.

The Soviet press and radio are renewing earlier warnings of "catastrophic consequences" in the event of war for those Western European nations that permit the establishment of nuclear stockpiles and missile sites on their territory. Moscow has also denounced the Paris meeting of NATO defense ministers as heightening international tension and hindering summit talks.

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Soviet Protest to Pakistan

On 17 April, Moscow made its first formal protest to Karachi on the establishment of American military facilities on Pakistani territory. This is in line with Soviet attempts to hamper Western efforts to strengthen military cooperation of Baghdad Pact and SEATO countries and is probably intended to embarrass current American-Pakistani negotiations on military assistance. Soviet Ambassador Shpedko declined Prime Minister Noon's offer to escort him to any suspected location in order to disprove the charges.

Moscow propaganda has made frequent reference to the establishment of American air and "atomic" bases in Pakistan, including the repetition of erroneous Indian allegations regarding jet airfields in Gilgit and Kashmir. Moscow is exploiting Pakistan's economic troubles by charging they are the product of military obligations forced on the country by its ties to the West.

Continued strong Soviet pressure on this subject might cause the Pakistani Government to delay signature of the communications agreement now under discussion, pending a review of the situation. The Pakistanis also might use Soviet protests to seek additional military and economic aid from the United States during the forthcoming visits to Washington in late April and early May of the finance minister and the commanders of the army and air force.

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USSR Attacks Yugoslav Party Program

The latest issue of the Soviet party journal Kommunist condemns virtually every significant section of the Yugoslav party program and undoubtedly heralds Moscow's intention to read Belgrade out of the Communist world unless the Yugoslavs make extensive alteration in the program next week at their party congress. It now appears probable that the bloc parties will not be represented by official delegations at the Yugoslav congress. The attack on Yugoslav dogma will probably strengthen the hand of the hard-line Communists in Eastern Europe and place Gomulka in a difficult position with his party and with the bloc generally in view of his announced intention to receive Tito in Warsaw next month.

The Soviet announcement in early April that Voroshilov, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, would visit Yugoslavia in May could be evidence that Moscow hopes to maintain good state relations with Belgrade, whose stand on foreign policy is still valuable to the USSR.

The Yugoslavs undoubtedly will vigorously defend their program particularly since they have recently made concessions on certain of its foreign policy aspects following a meeting between Khrushchev and the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow on the draft program. Although Tito will regret the sharpness of the Soviet attack, he has the opportunity by standing up to the USSR to strengthen his currently declining domestic support as well as his international position.

In view of its stand in the past that Khrushchev was the most sympathetic Soviet leader toward the Yugoslav brand of Communism, Belgrade may interpret this article as a sign that Khrushchev has yielded to the "Stalinist wing" of the Soviet party.

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Lebanese Security Situation

Despite the success of the Lebanese Government in suppressing or warding off attempts by the anti-Chamoun opposition to create serious incidents, the internal security situation remains critical. Pro-Syrian tribes near the Syrian border have been engaged in sporadic fighting with anti-Syrian elements since 10 April; Lebanese security forces have refrained from interfering. The situation in the south has improved somewhat as a result of the government's success in countering moves by the opposition Druze faction to create disorder. Army commander Shihab's prompt support of the gendarmerie in this case, as well as his reported stern warning to opposition leaders to desist from inciting further incidents, has apparently temporarily spoiled their plans to embarrass President Chamoun by generating more serious outbreaks.

The arming of the populace, both pro-Chamoun and opposition elements, continues at a rapid pace. Chamoun has said he provided arms to "friendly" elements, and the Shah of Iran has disclosed he furnished 2,000 rifles to the President. The Egyptians and Syrians are smuggling arms into Lebanon, as well as giving guerrilla training to opposition partisans. Lebanese authorities claim to have arrested the leader of a Syrian-inspired team sent to assassinate Chamoun and have learned that up to 400 Syrian fedayeen and 300 Druze tribesmen have been planning to infiltrate Lebanon over the Ramadan holidays--18 to 21 April.

Chamoun has indicated that while at present he hopes to amend the constitution and secure re-election during the first two weeks of May, he may postpone taking action until July if he feels he lacks sufficient strength. A potentially dangerous situation may arise through Chamoun's stated intention to "provoke" the opposition into taking actions which would embarrass it.

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III. THE WEST

Coty May Ask Soustelle to Try to Form New French Government

Speculation continues that French President Rene Coty might call on Social Republican Jacques Soustelle next week to make the initial attempt to form a new government. The American Embassy understands that Coty has informally sounded out Independent leader Pinay, but that Pinay declined, probably assuming his chances will increase as the crisis worsens.

Present anti-American sentiment affords Soustelle a good opportunity to try to rally support for the return to power of General de Gaulle. Coty might call Soustelle in an effort to force the major nonextremist parties--particularly the Independents and Socialists--to speed up their efforts to arrive at a compromise choice and thereby avert a prolonged crisis.

Coty, moreover, is under pressure to make some move to clear the way for serious party negotiations. It is believed in Paris that the choice of Soustelle, whose party's organization at the grass-roots level is too weak to permit it to play a significant role in the 20 and 27 April local elections, would have less influence on the second-round vote than most other selections. Nevertheless, there is a possibility that an investiture try by Soustelle would significantly aid the right-center, thereby supporting the latter's view that there is countrywide support for its tough position on Tunisia and Algeria.

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Growing Friction With Army Threatens Haitian President


Haiti's President Duvalier appears to be in a weaker position than at any time since his inauguration last October. Duvalier's power struggle with the army probably offers the most immediate and serious threat to his position. On 16 April the army was placed on a 100-percent alert, which was somewhat relaxed the following day. Tension is increasing because of arrests and transfers of officers, many of them ordered by Duvalier in order to replace men whose personal loyalty he doubts with others firmly committed to him. These moves have thrown Duvalier into conflict with Chief of Staff Flambert, who on at least one occasion is said to have refused to carry out an order from Duvalier. A break with Flambert might lead to a coup attempt by the army and in any case would give the Duvalier regime little chance of surviving an antigovernment move by any of the President's several political opponents.

Rumors persist that ousted Chief of Staff Kebreau is plotting against Duvalier with the support of Dominican dictator Trujillo, who has repeatedly denied involvement in Haitian politics. An anti-Duvalier radio propaganda campaign has recently begun from the Dominican Republic.

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Britain-Maldives

Difficulties with the government of the British-protected Maldives Islands have caused Britain to halt reconstruction of the wartime airstrip on Gan Island, and London fears that completion of this vital air-staging base will be seriously delayed. The Gan base will be an essential refueling stop on the transit route to the Far East once facilities at Katunayake, Ceylon, are abandoned. Britain is committed to relinquish use of these by 1962 but intends to quit them earlier.

The new Maldivian Government, which came into power last December, has been attempting to renegotiate the 1956 base agreement with Britain, with arrangements for resettlement of the nearly 600 displaced islanders being the principal controversial issue. The Maldivians have not been placated by a recent British economic aid offer and have tried to arouse public support in India and Ceylon.

The British evidently fear the Maldivians, who are influenced by Cairo radio, will stir up a propaganda campaign damaging Britain's relations with countries in the Indian Ocean area. In order to speed negotiations, London is prepared to grant the Maldivian request for revision of the protectorate agreement to permit independent conduct of foreign cultural and economic relations.

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NATO commander Norstad on the day when the US delegate to the London disarmament talks was scheduled to outline the American response to the USSR's proposal for a test suspension. Moscow is seeking to discredit US intentions and generate distrust of US leadership at the opening of the diplomatic talks on summit preparations.

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