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
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1. NASR TELLS ARABS REASONS FOR REJECTING US PROPOSALS ON SUEZ

[redacted] Nasr

informed King Saud, King Hussain and President Quwatli that the modifications of Egypt's Suez memorandum proposed by the United States are unacceptable because they "do not conform with Egyptian sovereignty and honor." He said the six principles are subject to varying interpretations, particularly the third principle regarding the separation of the canal from politics. Each country, he noted, would make its own interpretation according to its point of view, as proved by "the announcement by Britain, France, and America that Israel has the right of passage through the canal." Nasr added that should Egypt accept this principle and then prevent Israeli ships from passing, "Israel will have recourse to the International Court of Justice."

The Americans' suggestions for representation of users, Nasr commented, "would give them rights which are really the prerogative of Egypt.... This would be tantamount to another internationalization of the canal." He said the suggestion for multilateral adherence to the memorandum would allow Israel as a member of the UN to sign the Egyptian memorandum, "thus putting her in the position of a joint contractor with Egypt."

Comment

These are the same objections Egypt has made to American officials. Nasr's characterization of the American proposals suggests this [redacted] may be in part designed to indicate to these Arab rulers that the United States, as well as Britain and France, is seeking to rob Egypt of its sovereignty and promote the cause of Israel. The Egyptians may thus hope to justify Egypt's opposition to the broader American Middle East proposals as well as to the specific suggestions for the Suez Canal declaration. [redacted]

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2. DEVELOPMENTS IN JORDAN

Comment on:

Deployment on 8 April of armored cars and infantry elements of the Jordanian army's 10th Armored Brigade to cover the approaches to Amman appears to have been undertaken by ultranationalist army officers to discourage King Hussain from attempting to dismiss army chief of staff Nuwar and the leftist-dominated cabinet of Prime Minister Nabulsi. Supporters of Nuwar and the cabinet had apparently learned of Hussain's plans to take action against them on 9 April. According to press reports from Amman on 9 April, the cabinet had been in a night-long meeting attended by General Nuwar.

Hussain

[redacted] did not order the deployment of troops around Amman, which had been reported as a "routine training exercise." Although Hussain professed confidence that they would not move against him, [redacted] Nuwar and the ultranationalist "free officers" had advised Hussain that the army would not support him against popular demonstrations which would break out if the cabinet were changed. These troop movements will therefore probably forestall hasty action by Hussain. He would have no chance of successful action without army support.

Should Hussain now attempt to appeal directly to loyal army units against the "free officers," a breakdown in internal order could occur which would invite moves by Israel, and possibly Iraq, on Jordan.

Saudi Arabia and Syria presently each have over 3,000 troops in Jordan. At the time of the termination of Britain's responsibilities to defend Jordan on 13 March, about 1,300 British troops--including a tank battalion--were deployed in South Jordan near Aqaba. Evacuation of these forces has begun and is scheduled to be completed in the next few months.

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3. TENSION IN GREECE AND TURKEY OVER MAKARIOS

Comment on:

Official and popular feeling in Greece and Turkey is becoming increasingly explosive in anticipation of the arrival of Archbishop Makarios in Athens. Ambassador Allen says the Greek government is in a state of extreme irritation and indecision over future Cyprus policy. Allen expects Makarios to be greeted

with "tremendous demonstrations" and surrounded immediately by the most extreme proponents of the union of Greece and Cyprus.

Allen and Ambassador Warren in Ankara agree that Makarios' visit to Athens will further damage Greek-Turkish relations for a long time to come. Secretary General Birgi of the Turkish Foreign Ministry told Warren on 6 April that the situation is growing more and more tense and that public opinion toward Britain is "rapidly becoming unpleasant" as a result of the release of Makarios. The Turkish position regarding Cyprus has hardened noticeably since his release, and deputies are now questioning whether the Turkish Cypriots had been wise in refraining from terrorist tactics on Cyprus. American officials in Ankara believe the Turks may use more forceful means than heretofore. Birgi told Ambassador Warren that Turkey would fight if necessary.

Developments following Makarios' arrival at Athens will depend particularly on whether he chooses to arouse Greek emotions against Britain, Turkey or the Karmanlis government. Since his release from detention Makarios has made repeated public statements indicating that he plans to renew his campaign for union of Greece and Cyprus.

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4. SITUATION IN INDONESIA

Comment on:

[Redacted]

President Sukarno's "extraparliamentary" cabinet will probably undertake as its first project the establishment of a national advisory council, with Communist participation, in accordance with his concept of "guided democracy." Another major point on the cabinet program, as prescribed by Sukarno, is the restoration of the central government's authority throughout the islands.

Moslem dissatisfaction with the cabinet is already evident. Masjumi chairman Natsir has denounced Sukarno's action as unconstitutional and the party has expelled the only member who accepted a cabinet post. The Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which has four representatives in the cabinet, is reported to be divided on the issue of cabinet support. This opposition, however, is unlikely to deter Sukarno and his cabinet will probably operate with reasonable effectiveness--in Java, at least--as long as it retains the support of the army. In addition, Sukarno can be expected to maintain heavy pressure on his opponents, as is indicated by the smear campaign now being conducted by certain Djakarta newspapers against former vice president Hatta.

In Central Sumatra, officials reportedly have stated that if Sukarno persists in pushing his "personal" government, they will continue to ignore Djakarta. Regional army officers are expected to continue their support of local political and economic autonomy.

[Redacted]

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