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25 May 1961

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
CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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
25 May 1961

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

## CONTENTS

1. Laos. (*Page i*)
2. South Korea. (*Page ii*)
3. Congo: Maneuvering on reconvening of parliament continues. (*Page ii*)
4. Cambodia: Apprehension over Laos results in decrease of feuding with Thailand and South Vietnam. (*Page iii*)
5. African Labor Conference: Ghana and Guinea pressing for militant and anti-Western trade union federation. (*Page iii*)
6. Greece: Agreement on association with Common Market encounters snags. (*Page iv*)
7. Iceland: Work stoppage by Communist-controlled unions threatened on 29 May. (*Page iv*)
8. Ecuador: Vice president and congressional group to visit USSR.   (*Page iv*)
9. Dominican Republic: Trujillo reportedly staging overthrow of puppet president as sop to opposition. (*Page v*)
10. Watch Committee Conclusions. (*Page v*)

~~TOP SECRET~~



25 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

25 May 1961

## DAILY BRIEF

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Laos: [The tripartite talks at Namone on 24 May resulted in an agreement to "examine" a proposal, advanced by the Souvanna group, to discuss formation of a unified delegation to the Geneva Conference which would represent the "Kingdom of Laos," rather than any Laotian "government." The rest of the session was devoted to a reiteration of the opposing views which have thus far deadlocked the talks. The Vientiane government still maintains that no substantive political talks should begin until a mixed military committee is established to regulate the cease-fire in cooperation with the ICC.]


[There are indications that the Pathet Lao is making a concerted effort to eliminate isolated pockets of Laotian Army resistance in Sam Neua Province. In the Pa Dong area, Pathet Lao - Kong Le forces continue their operations against the Laotian army force of Meo guerrillas.]

Bloc airlift operations into Laos were scheduled through 25 May. [ ] (Backup, Page 1) (Map)

[The Watch Committee at its meeting on 24 May reached the following conclusion concerning Laos:]

[Communist forces in Laos appear determined to eliminate the government's Meo guerrilla bases in Xieng Khouang Province and particularly Ban Pa Dong, where intensified Communist attacks are expected. The Communists continue to improve their military position throughout Laos in an effort to reinforce their political hand in the current negotiations and to place themselves]

# Republic of the Congo



25 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page

~~TOP SECRET~~

in a favorable position to resume full-scale hostilities in the event the current negotiations collapse. There is a risk of a clash between Communist forces and South Vietnamese forces. reported to be in Laos east of Tchepone.

South Korea: [The Watch Committee at its meeting on 24 May reached the following conclusion concerning South Korea.]

[Stability of the new government in South Korea is threatened by increasing factionalism in the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. Continued lack of response by ROK Army officers to CINCUNC direction, the relief of experienced commanders, and the failure of the military regime to restore to CINCUNC operational control over some elements of the ROK armed forces have at least temporarily impaired the UNC military posture in South Korea. While there is no evidence of North Korean military preparations to take advantage of the unsettled situation, dissension within the coup group could make the ROK increasingly susceptible to Communist propaganda and subversion.]

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Congo: [Gizenga's call for the reconvening of parliament at Kamina apparently is coming under criticism from the small group in Leopoldville which still supports him. Leopoldville Provincial President Kamitatu, who has been trying to keep a foot in both the Kasavubu and the Gizenga camps, reportedly asserted recently that a meeting in Leopoldville would offer greater opportunity for manipulation of the legislators by Gizenga and Kamitatu than would one in Kamina. Indian Chargeé Rahman, who reportedly has been advising Gizenga supporters in Leopoldville (he claims without the knowledge of the Indian Government) and who has also served as a channel for funds from Gizenga to Kamitatu, is said to have stated that if Gizenga does not cooperate in coming to an agreement with Leopoldville, India will lose interest in helping the Congo solve its problems.]

Gizenga's call

*No*

25 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

ii

~~TOP SECRET~~

[for a meeting at Kamina has, however, received support from Ghanaian President Nkrumah, who offered to assist in furnishing military protection to such a meeting. Soviet UN delegate Zorin,

[According to press reports, new military activity is taking place in southern Kasai Province. A UN report has expressed the belief that aggressive movements against tribal

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(Backup, Page 6)

African Labor Conference: Labor leaders from most African countries are meeting in Casablanca, starting on 25 May, to set up an independent All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF). Several African regimes--notably those of Ghana and Guinea--have promoted the projected organization as a vehicle for advancing their militant and anti-Western brand of pan-Africanism. Representatives from these countries can be expected to press vigorously for an early severance of ties

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25 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

iii

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between the participating labor union and international labor organizations based outside Africa, especially the pro-Western International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The strength of counterbalancing representatives to this conference from ICFTU affiliates and allied Western-oriented unions is not clear. [ ] (Backup, Page 7)

Greece - Common Market: [Greece's association with the European Common Market (EEC), based on an agreement in March between Athens and the EEC Commission, has encountered some snags. Italy, in particular, is objecting to the extent to which Greek products would gain access to markets in the EEC. Modifications of the EEC agreement which the Greeks may have to accept are not likely to be major, and the Greek Government is counting on successful conclusion of these negotiations to enhance its prestige before it schedules general elections. Greece is pressing the US to intervene with the EEC in its behalf. The EEC Council will again meet to consider Greek association on 29 May.] [ ] (Backup, Page 9)

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Iceland: A number of Communist-controlled trade unions are threatening Iceland with a major work stoppage on 29 May over new wage contracts. A Communist success in bringing about an extensive strike could directly threaten the existence of Prime Minister Thors' pro-Western Conservative - Social Democratic government, whose future is closely linked to the economic stabilization program adopted a year ago.

[ ] (Backup, Page 11)

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Ecuador-USSR: [Ecuadorean Vice President Arosemena has accepted a Soviet invitation extended to him and a group of Ecuadorean congressmen to visit the USSR.] [ ]

Arosemena has suggested 1 June as a satisfactory date to begin the visit. [ ] Former Foreign Minister Chiriboga, who resigned on 10 May in opposition to President Velasco's pro-Cuba policy, has told the [ ]

No

25 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

iv

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[American ambassador that he believes Arosemena's trip will encourage anti-Communist activities in Ecuador. Chiriboga feels that rightists may even attempt a coup against the regime.]

\*Dominican Republic: [Trujillo is planning to overthrow his puppet President Balaguer, according to information given separately to the American Consulate on 23 May by the British ambassador and the Brazilian consul. Both link these reports to rumors that the dictator is planning a trip abroad and feel that he may be about to stage a maneuver designed to end in his being recalled to "save the country." The American consul notes that Balaguer is under increasingly heavy fire from Trujillo-controlled propaganda media and that such a maneuver would be consistent with previous Trujillo actions when he was hard pressed.]

(Backup, Page 13) *No*

## WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

- A. [No change from last week.]
- B. [No change from last week.]
- C. [LAOS: Carried on Page i of the Daily Brief]
- D. [SOUTH KOREA: Carried on Page ii of the Daily Brief]

25 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

v

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~~SECRET~~Situation in Laos

[Phoumi has told an American Embassy officer that he and Boun Oum are thinking of proposing an 11-man joint delegation for Geneva comprising five government members and five representatives of Souvanna and the Pathet Lao, with former Premier Phoui Sananikone as delegation head. It seems unlikely, however, that Phoumi could gain the assent of Souvanna and the Pathet Lao to such unequal representation.]

[Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman indicated to Ambassador Harriman on 23 May that his delegation intended to take a strong stand at Geneva in support of efforts to get representatives of five pro - Boun Oun government political parties seated at the Geneva Conference. Thanat has already proposed to the Geneva co-chairmen that two of the three seats allocated to the Laotian government be allocated to representatives of the political parties on a rotational basis, with the remaining seat left vacant until and if the Laotian government chooses to occupy it. Gromyko has rejected the proposal, according to Thanat, claiming that there was an oral understanding that only "three forces" would be seated at Geneva. Despite Gromyko's rebuff, Thanat plans to proceed with his efforts on the basis of conference documents which in his opinion offer him as a delegate the right to nominate those elements he wishes to represent Laos. He intends to give the impression that the Thai delegation may walk out on the conference if this issue is not satisfactorily resolved.]

[the three most influential men in the area are Pathet Lao leaders Phoumi Vongvichit--now in Geneva--Colonel Singkapo, and Quinim Pholsena, leader of the Souvanna Phouma delegation at Geneva.]

[Quinim has more power than Souvanna, who he alleges has been reduced to a figurehead.]

Kong Le's troops have no real power.

the Pathet Lao does not want to negotiate but wants to resume its military drive to conquer Laos.

[the ICC, located in Xieng Khouang town, is denied access to the]

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[major Pathet Lao - Kong Le military base area at the Plaine des Jarres.]

A further indication of Laotian - South Vietnamese cooperation in the Tchepone area

[South Vietnam had granted permission for transports carrying two companies of Laotian troops to land at the Hué airport, whence they would presumably march overland to take up their assigned post a few miles inside Laos.]

[both South Vietnamese special and regular army forces are in this general area of Laos]

The Chinese Communists, who apparently envisage a lengthy stay in Geneva, have continued to depict the US as the stumbling block to "real progress." Reviewing developments in Geneva during the past week, a People's Daily editorial of 24 May derides the US for "disgusting behavior" and for resorting to "every possible means to impede progress." The US is accused of preparing for "new military adventures" in Laos while "clamoring" for a cease-fire at the conference table. The People's Daily warns that each step forward at Geneva will be possible only after a "severe struggle" with the US.

Airlift activity for 23 May involved a total of 14 sorties--thirteen by Soviet transports and one by a North Vietnamese aircraft. Of this number, three Soviet transports were reflected in flights into Laos.

Since 16 May, relatively large numbers of bloc transports have been scheduled to the Vinh and Dong Hoi areas of North Vietnam. Between five and eight transports have been scheduled to these points daily except on 18 May. On 21 May three IL-14s were scheduled to fly from Vinh to Xieng Khouang, and on 22 May three IL-14s were scheduled to fly from Vinh to Muong Ngat, a former Lao army post northeast of Paksane and near the Vietnam border which was seized by enemy forces on 13 May.

The scope of the operation involving Vinh and Dong Hoi indicates that a stockpiling operation is taking place at these two

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locations, possibly in connection with reports of a Communist build-up in the Tchepone area.

Paradrop activities in the vicinity of Kep Airfield--located about 45 miles northeast of Hanoi--indicate that this site may be used for training in airdropping personnel and materiel into Laos. Soviet transports began flying to Kep in mid-March. [redacted]

[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~South Korea

The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) is continuing efforts to promote popular support for the military regime. The thoroughness of the campaign was indicated by the details announced in the South Korean press concerning the demonstration held in Taegu on 22 May. Organizers are reported to have required that each household provide one participant; factories were ordered closed so that all employees could attend; all businessmen were ordered to be present. The groups from each precinct were required to bring two placards displaying approved slogans. About 35,000 people were present at the Taegu demonstration, but the rally was described as lackluster. The American Embassy reports that although there is evidence of "increasing disenchantment" on the part of educated persons and students, general public attitudes range from "acceptance of the coup and military rule to bewildered confusion as to changes."

Of the persons reported arrested since the coup, over 600 are politicians, 540 are teachers, but only 70 are students, bearing out previous indications that the regime intended to handle the student problem cautiously. The arrest of the politicians muzzles such potential opposition leaders as former speaker of the lower house Kwak Sang-hun, and vice speaker So Min-ho. [Foreign Minister Kim Hyong-il told American Chargé Green yesterday he had discussed the matter of the arrest of political leaders with the SCNR and that he was making efforts to get at least the members of the Chang Myon cabinet returned to their homes soon. Lieutenant General Chang To-yong also told Chargé Green yesterday that political arrests would soon be stopped and that certain persons who had been arrested would be released after they had been screened and cleared; he said that members of the Chang cabinet, with one or two exceptions, would be taken from jail and put under house arrest.]

[Air Force chief Lieutenant General Kim Shin told the American air attaché in Seoul on 22 May that regime leaders Chang To-yong and Pak Chong-hui had informed him the military]

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Officers under arrest might be shown some consideration when the situation was stabilized. However, he said that Lieutenant General Yi Han-lim, former commander of the First ROK Army, was an exception and his punishment probably would be severe. Yi's loyalty is especially suspected by the new regime because of his delay in announcing full support for the coup.)

The revolutionary government extended its controls to the provincial and municipal levels on 24 May by appointing nine general officers as governors and nine lower-ranking officers as mayors of cities. Field artillery units involved in the coup are reported to have returned to their previous front-line positions, but the four other major units withdrawn from their tactical positions were still in Seoul late yesterday.

Depressed business conditions are continuing as a result of the limitation on bank withdrawals to approximately \$700 per month. This limitation has almost stopped the movement of goods from manufacturers to retailers, and retail business is largely limited to the purchase of daily essentials. Bank of Korea officials report that administrative confusion is mounting over handling financial transactions. They are pressing for the removal of the cash withdrawal limit, or at least for permission to clear checks without regard to the limit. Strict measures to control prices and the arrest of grain "profiteers" as well as the distribution of government-controlled grains have decreased the retail prices of rice and barley below the pre-coup level. [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~Cambodia

Since the collapse of the Dap Chhuon revolt in March 1959, Prince Sihanouk has faced no significant domestic opposition. As leader of the country's only significant political organization, the Sangkum, and leading member of the Cambodian royal family, he enjoys overwhelming popular support. His policy of neutrality is approved as the most effective means of maintaining Cambodia's security against Thai and Vietnamese incursions, and the aid secured from both bloc and non-bloc sources under this policy has materially benefited the country.

The Soviet Union has provided a major hospital in Phnom Penh, has made developmental loans, and has promised a technical school; Communist China has given plywood, paper, textile, and cement plants, broadcasting stations, and technical training for Cambodians and has offered a large credit for agricultural and industrial development; the United States and France have provided extensive support for projects such as highways, airports and port facilities, technical assistance, and the only foreign support for Cambodia's military forces.

Basic to Prince Sihanouk's concept of Cambodian neutrality has been his country's physical isolation from Communist states. He has argued that the Cambodian monarchy could not coexist with the Communists under other circumstances. Since the Kong Le coup, last August, he has been working to avert a Communist takeover in Laos [redacted]

[redacted] Sihanouk intended to try at Geneva to "limit the loss" in Laos and buy time for Cambodia.] [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~Africans Meet to Establish Independent Labor Organization

The establishment of a neutralist All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) unaffiliated with any "foreign" organization has been an avowed goal of militant African nationalists at least since the first All-African People's Conference (AAPC) in Accra in December 1958. Its formation was endorsed again at the AAPC plenaries held in Tunis in 1960 and in Cairo last March; the latter meeting listed the project first in a resolution on African unity which also called for the creation of Africa-wide federations of youth, farmers, and women's organizations. A preparatory committee dominated by radical nationalists was first organized in the fall of 1959; it set at least two earlier dates for a constituent conference but did not decide definitely to go ahead with the project until last month when its members met in Conakry.

This delay in the actual launching of the AATUF has resulted from rivalries among African leaders--especially between Ghana's Nkrumah and Kenya's Tom Mboya--and from a basic policy dispute over whether or not member unions should be permitted other international affiliations. Since the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) had already agreed to the severance of formal ties with its principal African affiliates in the hope of eventually subverting a unified African labor movement, this controversy has largely revolved around the question of the continued affiliation of certain African unions with the pro-Western International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Nkrumah's labor spokesmen and their Guinean allies--many of the latter were trained by the WFTU--view the ICFTU as a primary instrument of Western "neocolonialism" and have long campaigned against such affiliation. However, other African labor elements, notably those from British East and Central Africa over which Mboya has considerable influence, are anxious to preserve their ICFTU ties--and subsidies--at least for the present. Similarly, the dominant trade union organizations of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria appear unwilling to break with the ICFTU, despite the fact that at least the Moroccan and Algerian organizations

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share in most other aspects of the militant line expounded by representatives of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali at pan-African gatherings.

Recent reports indicate that labor spokesmen from both Ghana and Guinea, recognizing that they will have to compromise, at least temporarily, on the affiliation issue, are pinning their hopes on establishing some type of time limit for disaffiliation. [It also appears likely that these radicals will direct their heaviest attacks against the ICFTU's African regional organization established last November, probably arguing that this still embryonic organization will have lost any reason for existence with the establishment of the AATUF.]

Representatives of ICFTU and its most important African affiliates have been working feverishly over the past month to assure maximum attendance and a coordinated approach on the part of moderate, Western-oriented unions. ICFTU headquarters in Brussels is underwriting travel expenses for its affiliates where necessary. Moreover, these affiliates have apparently been coached to argue for a loose federation within the framework of the AAPC and against the creation of a separate secretariat. While the willingness and ability of the moderates to wage such an aggressive counterattack will presumably depend in part on whether such top-flight ICFTU leaders as Mboya attend the conference, the ICFTU affiliates can be expected to defend their basic position that the question of international affiliations is one to be decided solely by each national labor center.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Greece - Common Market

[Nearly two years of negotiations were climaxed in March 1961 with the initialing of an agreement providing for Greek association with the European Common Market (EEC). While the agreement was still subject to approval by the EEC Council of Ministers and ratification by the member governments of EEC and by Greece, Athens had assumed that no serious difficulties would prevent the coming into force of the agreement by early 1962. Serious obstacles have arisen, however, which have delayed further action on the association agreement and which, conceivably, could endanger the entire project.]

[Difficulties in the Common Market over the association convention are apparently both procedural and substantive. The EEC Commission, which acted as agent for the Common Market in the negotiations with Greece, has been accused by individual members of the EEC Council of exceeding its authority in initialing the agreement--an accusation reflecting at least in part the general reluctance of the Council to see the Commission exercise any "supranational" authority. Although the Council decided on 19 May not to insist on renegotiation of objectionable provisions of the agreement, the Italians apparently decided to press for interpretive protocols which would afford Italian producers additional protection from Greek competition.]

[The new obstacles to Greek association have caused a bitter reaction in Athens. The government had greeted news of the initialing of the agreement in March with profound relief, and the press, including the non-Communist opposition, had applauded this new move to tie Greece more closely to Western Europe. The government had looked to the association agreement as a means of raising its popularity in preparation for national elections which must be held by May 1962 and may be scheduled for this fall. The resultant disappointment of the government at the latest moves by the EEC has been particularly great, and the US Embassy reports that a mere mention of the Common Market puts Premier Karamanlis in a "towering rage."]

[The next move appears to be up to Athens. The EEC Council has asked the Greeks to send a representative to Brussels]

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[for discussions on 25 May. As of 22 May the government had not decided on its answer, but if a delegation is sent it reportedly will be under instructions to state that Greece stands on the initialed agreement and that negotiations are finished. Should the members of EEC insist on their interpretive protocols, however, it is probable that Greece would reply with counterdemands which could lead to a new impasse.]

[Collapse of the Greek association agreement would be embarrassing to the EEC at a time when Britain's application for EEC accession is increasingly expected, and the other members may therefore bring stronger pressure on Rome to withdraw its objections.]

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## Communists Threaten Major Strike Action in Iceland

The Communist-dominated Icelandic Federation of Labor (IFL) has consistently sought to use its control of organized labor as a political weapon. When the Thors government took office in November 1959, its policy of economic austerity led the IFL to expect a period of economic uncertainty. For this reason it induced its member unions to let their contracts lapse to give it a free hand when it believes an opportune moment has arrived for a showdown with the government.

At its congress last November the IFL set the pattern for its member unions by calling for wage increases of 15-20 percent, a shorter workweek, and other benefits. Even though the Thors government may be prepared to consider some wage adjustments as a result of the higher prices, increases of the magnitude proposed by the IFL would negate the progress Iceland has made over the past year toward economic stabilization and would achieve the Communist objective of forcing it to resign. The government is probably counting on the lack of enthusiasm for strike action among the workers and their willingness to give the economic reform program a further chance.

The apparent decision of the Communists and their Progressive allies to attempt major strike action follows their unsuccessful effort to weaken or topple the government on other issues in an effort to regain representation in the government. The settlement last March of the protracted fishing limits dispute with Britain was a major victory for the Thors cabinet and removed an issue which had posed a threat both to the government and to Iceland's NATO ties. Continuing efforts of the opposition parties to arouse public opinion against the US-operated NATO base at Keflavik have also met with little success as a result of endeavors by US officials and the Icelandic Government to minimize the likelihood of incidents involving base personnel.

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Ecuadorean Vice President and Parliamentary Delegation to  
Visit USSR

[President Velasco stated privately in late 1960 that he had no objections to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR but would not take the initiative himself. The proposal is likely to be presented to Arosemena and his mission after their arrival in Moscow.]

[The vice president reportedly plans to select a delegation which will include the principal pro-Castro leader in Ecuador, former Minister of Government Manuel Araujo. Araujo, a close friend of Velasco, favors closer ties between Ecuador and the Soviet bloc.]

[A number of high-level government officials have advocated the expansion of trade with all countries, including the bloc; one official pointed out that bananas, the nation's principal export, "have no ideology." The leftist Ecuadorean minister of education, who visited Prague in late 1960, made arrangements for a \$640,000 barter deal with Czechoslovakia in the initial implementation of this policy.]

[Ecuadorean political forces have become sharply divided in recent months between pro- and anti-Castro elements. Some military officers, in collaboration with conservatives and moderates, have expressed growing concern over the leftist drift of the Velasco regime, particularly its pro-Cuban attitude, and have considered measures to overthrow it. A group of key air force and naval officers has reportedly become involved in this plotting recently and is said to be planning action by mid-June.]

[Aware of rightist opposition to his policies, Velasco shuffled a number of officers in top command positions in the armed forces in late March and early April. This action, which suggests Velasco is uncertain about their loyalty, may have increased dissatisfaction among the military. The recent 30-percent pay increase granted to the armed services was an attempt to ensure their support for the regime. However, Velasco reportedly conferred with military officers in Guayaquil recently, and was presented with demands for a change in his pro-Cuban policy and stronger action against Ecuadorean leftists and Communists.]

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Dominican Dictator May Be Planning a "Controlled Coup"

[Trujillo is believed to have given serious consideration to staging a "controlled" coup last August, just prior to the special OAS foreign ministers' meeting which unanimously voted sanctions against the Dominican regime for its complicity in the attempt to assassinate the Venezuelan President and for its violations of civil rights at home. At that time, Trujillo finally decided to resort to the somewhat less drastic maneuver of having his brother Hector "resign" from the presidency and be replaced by the compliant vice president, Joaquin Balaguer. Balaguer, in his inauguration address, vowed to "continue" the dictator's "process of democratization." Trujillo has remained the dominant political figure, and terrorism and repression against the dissidents and against the Roman Catholic hierarchy have reached new peaks of intensity in recent months.]

[Although Balaguer has shown no sign of independent action, the Trujillo-controlled radio and press have bitterly attacked him, using him as a scapegoat, while praising Trujillo and on occasion calling on the dictator personally to assume the presidency. This lays the groundwork for a possible future claim by Trujillo that he has been called by "popular demand" to assume the presidency.]

[The American Consulate noted on 23 May that dissatisfaction with Trujillo, already at an all-time high, is now reportedly reaching "closer into the core of power" in the regime. It had previously been reported that high Dominican Army officers had begun to oppose the regime. A Trujillo effort to "control" a coup and leave the new regime in the hands of officers in his trust might well get out of his control, particularly if he leaves the country.]

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THE PRESIDENT  
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    Special Counsel to the President  
    The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs  
    The Scientific Adviser to the President  
    The Director of the Budget  
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    Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities  
The Department of State  
    The Secretary of State  
    The Under Secretary of State  
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    The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff  
    The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army  
    The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy  
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