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
7 June 1961

Copy No. C 79

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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7 June 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DAILY BRIEF

*Laos: Enemy forces penetrated Pa Dong's defenses late in the afternoon of 6 June, and following fighting which continued into the night, government forces began withdrawing to alternate positions several miles to the south and west. The attack was preceded by a heavy artillery barrage. The extent of government losses is not yet known.

*Serial**delete**smt 4-5**of P 1 of**Brief**P 3 of**Brief**use only*

General Phoumi left Vientiane as scheduled on 6 June for Nice, where he is expected to join Premier Boun Oum for talks sponsored by Prince Sihanouk with Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong. The latter two arrived in Moscow on 6 June en route to the Geneva Conference.

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Bloc airlift operations into Laos were scheduled through 7 June.

(Backup, Page 1) (Map)

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Dominican Republic: Present government leaders are making a strong effort to convince international opinion that the regime no longer merits the police state label. The presence of American newsmen has served as a brake on police excesses that terrorized the dissidents immediately after the assassination. Some of those arrested then have apparently been released. The 6 June presidential decree canceling the army commission of John Abbes is clearly designed to disassociate present leaders from his hated symbol of police brutality. Last year Abbes was "replaced" as head of the Military Intelligence Service for similar reasons; he continued as de facto head of the organization.

Indications of loyalty to the Trujillo family have been observed among low-income groups in the capital as well as in the countryside, where units of the peasant militia were observed on 4 June to be performing patrol duties with considerable enthusiasm. It is among the usually politically inarticulate lower classes that the "father image" of the late dictator has its greatest strength. Middle-class elements with at least some formal education, from which future Dominican governments will have to draw their personnel, are believed very largely to be anti-Trujillo in sympathy.

Dissidents in the capital and in provincial cities appear thoroughly intimidated and unwilling to make their views publicly known, thus giving the impression to the casual observer that the regime is unopposed.

American embassies in London, Paris, and Madrid reported on 5 June that officials there had received no information from their embassies in the Dominican Republic on the police terrorism that took place immediately after the assassination. The Dominican dissidents are not known to have established contact with any but the US mission.

[redacted] have no doubt that General "Ramfis" Trujillo exercises dominant control. "Ramfis," who explicitly denied in his 3 June press conference that he holds anti-US views, is known to harbor deep resentments against the United States. If he and other government leaders fail in the current effort to obtain at least passive US support, "Ramfis" is likely to resume his past efforts to reach an accommodation with the Soviet bloc and in any other way available

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to him to undercut US influence. [redacted] A possible early move in this direction was suggested [redacted]

[redacted] the Dominican Consulate and the Czech Military Mission in Berlin are in contact on an undisclosed matter.

[redacted] Venezuelan President Betancourt, in a four-and-a-half-hour conversation with Ambassador Adlai Stevenson on 4 June, urged a series of OAS actions "up to and including possible collective military action" to bring down the "Ramfis"- Balaguer regime. The precedent thus established could later be employed in Cuba, he said. He proposed an OAS foreign ministers' meeting, after the July inter-American economic meeting in Uruguay, which would give the Castro regime 90 days to dissociate itself from the Sino-Soviet bloc, observe civil liberties, and hold free elections. If Castro does not comply, the foreign ministers would again meet to apply the same sanctions against Castro that had been imposed against the Dominican regime.]


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Cuba: The Castro regime is evidently preparing to merge all "political parties and revolutionary mass organizations" into a single political machine with Fidel Castro as its secretary general. Such a union has long been an aim of the Communist Popular Socialist party (PSP). The PSP, which is now the only organized political party, can be expected to exploit its close alliance with Castro and gain control of the new party. Minister of Industries Che Guevara maintained in a recent address to a student meeting in Havana that "real unity" already exists, although "the party of the masses" is not yet "organized." According to an early May East German press interview with long-time PSP leader Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the merger is expected to be completed by 26 July, the eighth anniversary of the Castro movement's fight to gain power in Cuba.

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(Backup, Page 4)

***USSR:** An operation conducted at Tyura Tam on 6 June may have resulted in failure of an ICBM test vehicle shortly after launch. The countdown was carried through to completion,

No
This is the
15th ICBM launch this year, six of which probably failed in flight.)

Afghanistan-Pakistan: President Ayub has proposed that talks be held between Pakistani and Afghan officials to ease tensions in the Pushtoonistan dispute. Kabul has responded by proposing that Ayub visit Afghanistan, but it seems likely that he would do so only after lower level discussions offered some hope that progress could be made. In an apparent effort to improve Kabul's bargaining position, Afghan agents have stepped up agitation activities in the past few weeks and have succeeded in inciting a number of small-scale incidents in the

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frontier area. Pakistani authorities are strengthening their police forces and arresting more dissident tribesmen.

(Backup, Page 6) (Map)

UAR-USSR: The UAR is now conducting an intensive propaganda campaign in retaliation for recent Soviet criticism of the UAR's suppression and alleged mistreatment of local Communists. At a press conference in Damascus on 5 June, Riyad al-Turk--one of the Communists Moscow claimed had died by torture--attested to his "good treatment" in prison, treatment which the Cairo press commented was better than that received by "inmates of Siberia." The UAR official newspaper Al Jumhuriyah on 6 June stated that Moscow's propaganda is putting the USSR in the "imperialist camp" and added that if Soviet leaders believe they can impose their views on the UAR through the USSR-UAR trade agreements, "they feed on delusions."

(Backup, Page 7)

OK

Sudan: Pressure against the Abboud government is likely to be severe during the next few weeks. Siddiq al-Mahdi, head of the powerful Ansar religious sect and leader of the civilian group which has been agitating against the military regime, has sent a new note to General Abboud protesting a recent police action against two members of the Mahdi family. In the note, which was apparently intended for wide circulation, the Ansar leader accused the military government of religious persecution, and reiterated his demand for a return to civilian government.

[Siddiq al-Mahdi has also reportedly brought into Khartoum approximately 1,000 of his Ansar followers, in order to resist any government harrassment] The opposition group may be planning a civil disobedience campaign in conjunction with a strike planned by the Sudan Railway Workers Union for 16 June.

(Backup, Page 8)

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Communist China - Nepal: Peiping is seeking to capitalize on King Mahendra's suspicion of India and his growing political and economic difficulties. Communist China's chief of state, Liu Shao-chi, has reportedly sent a confidential letter to the King endorsing his regime and calling for speedy utilization of the \$30,000,000 in Chinese aid already committed to Nepal under

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[previous agreements. Peiping is also pressing for permission to start construction of a road in Nepal which would link up with a Chinese road in Tibet. A Chinese economic delegation now in Katmandu has reportedly met with the King to discuss the Chinese aid program. Although the King is likely to be receptive to offers of additional assistance from non-Indian sources, he will probably try to maintain a balance in his relations with India and Communist China.]

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The Situation in Laos

The Pathet Lao radio on 5 June broadcast a statement attributed to the National Military Committee, on which both the Pathet Lao and the Kong Le forces are represented, attacking the proposed establishment of an ICC observer team at Pa Dong. The statement affirmed strong support for the "destruction of the bandits" dropped into the Pa Dong area after the 3 May cease-fire. Declaring that the ICC's presence in southwestern Xieng Khouang Province was "illegal," the statement warned that the National Military Committee could not guarantee its safety there.

Phoumi told an American Embassy officer just prior to his departure for France on 6 June that he had received word that the meeting between Souvanna, Souphanouvong, and Boun Oum was scheduled, in principle, to begin on 8 June.

This sharp reaction to the possibility of an ICC presence in Pa Dong reflects the importance the Pathet Lao attaches to the liquidation of Meo units in Xieng Khouang. Pa Dong was the most important of several Meo base areas in the province; small Meo units are scattered at various points behind enemy lines, where they are in a position to harass the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces and prevent consolidation of their control. These units, a part of the regular Laotian armed forces, have demonstrated a notable will to fight. So long as they remain active in Xieng Khouang, they will be a thorn to the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces and enable the royal government to claim enclaves in Xieng Khouang when and if the opposing forces settle down to negotiations aimed at a political settlement.

Chinese

Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi,

said that all sides want a neutral and independent Laos but differ significantly on the means for attaining these objectives. Chen expressed

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reservations about a strengthened ICC, arguing that helicopters proposed for the commission could be used to transport arms to royal government forces.


[redacted], the Chinese foreign minister said Peiping intends to denounce, "with all possible vigor," the first public sign of a US effort to obtain any kind of role in Laos for the UN.

Chen Yi also stated recently that he envisages a coalition Laotian cabinet headed by Souvanna Phouma and consisting of five or six Souvanna followers, three Pathet Lao representatives, and three ministers drawn from the Boun Oum government. Chen's remarks were probably intended to persuade the Cambodians and other neutralist delegations that Peiping's position is a moderate one and that it supports Souvanna as the leader of neutralist Laos. Neither Chen Yi nor any other bloc spokesman would consider these remarks binding.

Airlift operations on 5 June involved only three flights, of which one and possibly two were into Laos. The Soviet AN-10 transport that flew to Canton on 3 June was scheduled to arrive there again on 6 June. It had returned to Irkutsk on 4 June. Four of the six LI-2s that flew to Canton from Hanoi on 1 June were again scheduled to arrive at Canton on 6 June, probably to meet the AN-10. Although the exact nature of this operation remains undetermined, it is almost certain that the LI-2s are ferrying into North Vietnam the cargo the AN-10 is off-loading in Canton. The most recent shuttle operation of this type was conducted in mid-December, when three AN-12s landed at Canton. At that time their cargo was apparently off-loaded at Canton and ferried into North Vietnam by Soviet transports which were involved in airlift operations out of Hanoi. Since that time Soviet heavy transports engaged in Laotian support operations have flown directly to North Vietnam, most of them landing at Haiphong. There was one exception, in late December, when an AN-12 did not complete its scheduled flight into Haiphong from Canton because of mechanical difficulty. The

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Soviet IL-18 that arrived at Haiphong from Moscow on 4 June departed for Peiping on 5 June, apparently returning to the USSR. [redacted]



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Single Political Party Imminent in Cuba

Cuban groups which probably would be included in the new single political organization are the PSP, Castro's 26th of July Movement--which has virtually ceased to exist as an active organization--and the 13th of March Revolutionary Directorate, an almost defunct student group which fought against the Batista dictatorship independently of Castro's forces. Quasi-political groups which might also take part in the merger are the Castro/Communist-controlled labor, student, youth, and women's organizations, the revolutionary militia, and the "committees of defense of the revolution," according to Che Guevara.

The Communists heretofore have preferred to cultivate the impression that the PSP supports the general revolutionary program of the Castro movement but remains politically separate from it.

They invariably have referred to Fidel Castro as the leader of the country and appear careful never to challenge his authority, while at the same time they have made it clear that they do not regard him as one of themselves. Party leaders have previously acknowledged, however, that the amalgamation of all existing political groups into a single party is a fundamental Communist goal and a prerequisite for the organization of the Cuban state along "socialist" lines.

Recent statements by Castro and other leaders of his regime may be interpreted as having paved the way for the political fusion. The Cuban premier has repeatedly declared that the "party of the revolution" and the "party of the counterrevolution" are the only two parties in Cuba. Referring to his May Day identification of the Cuban revolution as a "socialist" one, Castro recently told a Colombian reporter that "the revolutionary reality is socialistic, and the constitution and the institutions of the future must be based on those historic facts."

Several foreign diplomats in Havana have noted an apparent acceleration in Cuba's drive toward formal state socialism since Castro's May Day speech.

the Castro regime was "falling more and more into line with the popular republics as far as concerns

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the application of Marxism and Leninism, on the way to becoming a Communist regime, and this in spite of the personality of Castro, of whose Marxist convictions it is permissible to doubt, but who is seduced by the possibility of a complete victory."

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Recent Developments in Afghan-Pakistani Border Dispute

President Ayub's proposal for talks was delivered to Afghan King Zahir four days after several Pakistani garrisons near the border had repulsed an attack by "tribesmen"--believed to be Afghan special forces. The Pakistani regime may estimate that Kabul is becoming discouraged by its failure to spark a general tribal uprising or to win non-Communist support for its Pushtoonistan campaign and that it may welcome an opportunity to negotiate a settlement.

In recent months the Afghan Government has reportedly become increasingly concerned that the lack of success of its Pushtoonistan campaign, to which it is heavily committed, may weaken the royal regime's stability. Kabul has long wanted negotiations with the Pakistanis and has been greatly annoyed by the latters' denial that the "self-determination" of Pakistan's Pushtoons is subject to negotiation with Afghanistan. The Afghans probably regard Ayub's offer as a limited success for their agitation efforts, even though the Pakistanis probably intend to devote any discussion mainly to the reduction of border clashes.

Meanwhile, both sides are making a show of force in the tribal area. Bombing incidents occur almost daily in Peshawar, the main city in the Pushtoon tribal region, and similar violence is being incited all along the frontier. Afghan agents apparently are trying to provoke harsh repression by the Pakistani Government and to publicize Pushtoon resistance.

If nothing comes of Ayub's proposal for bilateral talks, the Afghans may try to indict Pakistan for its "colonialist repression" in the United Nations.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~UAR-Soviet Propaganda Exchanges

Some UAR commentators have speculated that the USSR chose this time to attack the UAR because of Nasir's leading role in the current "nonalignment" conference in Cairo. Al Jumhuriyah, asserting that Nasir long ago made it clear that the UAR was nonaligned despite the acceptance of Soviet aid, states that the Soviet propaganda campaign "provides us with an opportunity to demonstrate our adherence to positive neutrality and nonalignment." Despite the exchange of polemics, there is no evidence that economic and military collaboration has declined.

The UAR's Middle East News agency suggests that the USSR has never accepted the Egyptian-Syrian union of 1958, "at which time the USSR's major tool in the area--the Syrian Communist party--lost its power to work in the Arab field." Khalid Bakdash, Syrian Communist leader, fled to the bloc at the time of the union and has subsequently published anti-UAR articles in international Communist journals.

Nasir--who exchanged recriminations with Khrushchev over the activities of Arab Communists in early 1959--undoubtedly ordered the anti-Soviet attacks. Thus far, the current dispute has been restricted to propaganda by both sides and two UAR official requests that the USSR "correct" its broadcasts. The first request was made to the Soviet ambassador in Cairo on 22 May; the second was presented to the director of Moscow radio's Arabic service by the UAR press attaché on 5 June.

The USSR's latest statements on the dispute were made on 2 June. Moscow radio broadcast a protest made to the UAR by the USSR's Central Council of Trade Unions, again alleging UAR mistreatment of Communist prisoners. On the same date Moscow announced the sending of a similar cable to Nasir by "more than 1,200 students" from 65 countries who are studying in the USSR, including students from several Arab states.

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~~SECRET~~Sudan

The opposition group is essentially a coalition of a variety of political and religious elements with disparate interests. It apparently lacks organized support within the army. Its chief goal is to bring about the downfall of the military regime and return the civilian politicians to power. It does not appear to have any definite plans for overthrowing the military regime, but apparently hopes to force concessions by staging a series of civil disturbances. In the past the group has lacked a concrete issue with which to arouse public support for such a move, but Siddiq al-Mahdi may attempt to exploit the religious issue in an effort to rally the Ansar tribesmen.

According to reports reaching the American Embassy in Khartoum, the leaders of the opposition, who have become convinced that British and American policy is now aimed at supporting the Abboud government, are exploring the possibilities of obtaining UAR support. The opposition leaders are said to have offered to conduct a foreign policy satisfactory to the UAR in return for UAR support.

This new maneuvering comes at a time when the Abboud government is facing a possible crisis in the labor field. The Sudan Railway Workers Union (SRWU), the largest trade union in the Sudan, is reliably reported to be planning a strike for 15 June. There is no evidence that the opposition was active in planning the strike, but it is encouraging the union and is obviously hoping to turn the strike to political advantage.

The opposition's plans for civil disturbances will undoubtedly be hampered by the government's ban on all public gatherings because of an outbreak of meningitis which has reached epidemic proportions.

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