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6 April 1961

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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4. USSR: Gromyko-McCloy discussion on disarmament. (*Page iii*)



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8. Watch Committee conclusions. (*Page v*)

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[redacted]  
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[serious interest in achieving progress in the forthcoming negotiations. Gromyko indicated interest in "first-step" measures outlined by McCloy, but contended that partial steps taken independently without a program for complete disarmament would create "disequilibrium." Gromyko took a less positive line in discussing the nuclear test talks, indicating that the Soviet proposal for a tripartite administrator for the control system would be a "sticking point" and admitting this was related to the Soviet demand for revising the UN structure. The Polish delegate subsequently told an American official that he had received the impression from Gromyko that the test ban talks would be "locked," with no real progress until general disarmament negotiations had shown signs of advance.] [redacted] (Backup,

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
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#### WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

- A. [No change from last week.]
- B. [No change from last week.]
- C. [LAOS: Carried on Page i of the Daily Brief.]

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[SOUTH VIETNAM: Carried on Page iii of the Daily Brief.]

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Soviet Position on Disarmament and Nuclear Test Ban

[Gromyko's statements together with remarks by the head of the Polish UN delegation, Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz, suggest that, although the USSR will not abandon its insistence on an agreement in principle to general disarmament, Moscow may be considering a procedural move to meet US emphasis on giving priority to "first-step" measures in negotiations. Winiewicz claimed that Gromyko told Zorin that the fact that the American suggestions for immediate measures were not new did not lessen their importance. Prior to these conversations he had told Western officials at the UN that Moscow was thinking in terms of two parallel negotiations, one on complete and general disarmament and the other on first-stage measures.]

[On the nuclear test ban conference, Gromyko maintained the generally pessimistic line taken by the Soviet delegation at Geneva. He said that the USSR hoped for new things to be brought out by the US at Geneva, and would make a serious study of the proposals. He added, however, that Moscow was not impressed thus far. As an example he stated that the USSR did not consider Western reduction in proposed control posts in the USSR from 21 to 19 an important gesture. Gromyko admitted that the proposal for a tripartite administrator reflected the USSR's desire for a veto but contended that Moscow would be "reasonable" in the operation of the veto.]

[The Polish delegate's remark on the link between the test ban talks and the general disarmament negotiations may foreshadow a Soviet move to merge these issues. Since the talks between Khrushchev and Ambassador Thompson on 9 March, Soviet officials have minimized the importance of a test ban. The chief Soviet delegate at Geneva told the British delegation that a test ban was of "extremely limited significance," and Gromyko made a point of asking Ambassador Stevenson whether the US considered a test ban agreement a condition to agreement on general disarmament, which Gromyko viewed as a separate although "related subject." An Izvestia correspondent in Geneva also told an American official that if the US]

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[failed to produce "something new" at the test ban talks the issue would be put into the framework of general disarmament. The UN delegation at Geneva feels that in view of the forthcoming disarmament talks the next French test may be taken as a possible pretext for a Soviet move to terminate the talks--on the grounds that a test ban by the three powers in itself would not contribute to disarmament--and to propose a merger of a test ban with other disarmament plans. Tsarapkin's recent line that only comprehensive disarmament would warrant far-reaching controls probably would be used by Moscow to justify such a move.]

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