

~~TOP SECRET~~

9 October 1957

Copy No. 138

3.3(h)(2)

3.5(c)

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 32
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

IT IS CLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TOP SNEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010


AUTH: HR 702

DATE 1-4-80 REVIEWER:

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03153730



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1. KHRUSHCHEV INTERVIEW TO ADD TO ANTI-WESTERN PRESSURE IN UN

Comment on:



The tone and content of Soviet party chief Khrushchev's interview of 7 October in the wake of the launching of the Soviet earth satellite and the announcement that a "mighty hydrogen device" has been detonated by the USSR will increase pressure on the West in the UN General Assembly to accept Soviet disarmament proposals. Khrushchev offered to subject the Soviet earth satellite and missile program to international control, possibly an elaboration of the Soviet proposal of last March to control all missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads as part of the second step in an omnibus disarmament scheme. This latest offer is designed to encourage wavering or neutral nations to support Soviet proposals for a two- to three-year nuclear test ban and a five-year prohibition on the employment of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

Khrushchev said the only obstacle to an accord on the control of all new weapons is the refusal of the United States to accept the principle of peaceful co-existence. He singled out Secretary Dulles for attack in calling on the United States to renounce the cold war and end the arms race.

The Soviet disarmament campaign in the UN will also profit from the positions on nuclear testing taken by Japan and India and by the Polish and Czech proposal to prohibit manufacture and stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories and that of the German states. Ambassador Lodge has warned that public apprehension

over radioactivity has already made it difficult for the representatives of governments normally backing the Western disarmament position to vote against a Soviet proposal for a nuclear test ban if the Russian resolution should be brought to a vote first. The attacks on the West by the Saudi Arabian and Egyptian delegates in their 3 October speeches before the General Assembly have already made it difficult for friendly Arab states to take any pro-Western position.

**2. EGYPT AND SYRIA MAY PLAN INCREASED
TERRORIST ACTIVITY AGAINST JORDAN**

Comment on:

Egypt and Syria may contemplate an expanded program of clandestine violence and intimidation in Jordan.

Jordanian security forces reported on 8 October seizure in West Jordan of a cache of Czech arms and explosives, including 42 such fuses, probably smuggled from Syria. Another cache of smuggled Czech arms was reported seized in North Jordan in late September. On the night of 7-8 October explosives were set off outside the homes of two American diplomatic personnel in Amman. A similar act was attempted against a USIS installation in Amman earlier in the summer. Explosives were also used to sabotage communications facilities, such as bridges and telephone lines, but there had been a lull in such activity in recent weeks.

Commencement by Egypt of "some of the work" in Jordan at this time would probably be intended to harass the pro-Western cabinet's forthcoming attempt to obtain a vote of confidence from the lower house of the legislature. After three months' suspension, the lower house convened on 1 October with only three fourths of the membership present, the remainder being under indictment or having fled abroad. If the lower house is out of control, the

government might try to dissolve the legislature and rule by decree until it is able to assure election of a more co-operative legislature.

Intensification of underground activity in Jordan would undermine King Saud's belief that he had achieved a moderation of Syrian extremism on his recent visit to Damascus.

3. SAUD'S STATE VISIT TO BEIRUT

Comment on:

Although pro-Western Lebanese officials presumably hope that the state visit of King Saud to Beirut, scheduled to begin 10 October, will counteract the effects of Saud's visit to Damascus last month, there are indications that the King may be very cautious in expressing support for pro-Western Arab elements.

Azzam Pasha, Saud's special emissary in the United States, advised the King [redacted] that it might be best to postpone the Beirut visit

until the "political maneuvers become clear from all sides."

Saud himself, seems to feel that his tactic of using purely private persuasion to tone down Syrian extremism is effective. He has informed the American embassy in Jidda that he regards his visit to Damascus as "very successful," and that Syrian civilian and military leaders appeared receptive to his counsel. The King noted with emphasis, however, that he had been unable to answer the Syrian argument that American policy, as exemplified in the question of the Arab-Israeli dispute over the use of the Gulf of Aqaba, is "negative" toward the Arabs. Given this state of mind, and the advice of his counselors, Saud's visit to Beirut may well disappoint pro-Western forces. [redacted]

4. NASIR'S VIEWS ON US-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS

Comment on:

Despite hints from some circles in Cairo that Egyptian-American relations might be improved, President Nasir apparently is giving no encouragement to the idea.

[redacted] he is still acting in accordance with his previous statements that he prefers friendship with the United States but that the initiative for a reconciliation will not come from him.

Nasir may consider that for the time being he can adequately balance his reliance on the Soviet bloc by encouraging a return to more normal economic relations with France and Britain. To this end, Egyptian Information Minister Hatim apparently is making a variety of offers to the British.

Foreign Minister Fawzi and Egyptian Ambassador Hussayn in Washington, however, have both submitted pessimistic reports in the past week on the possibility of any rapprochement with the United States. Hussayn was instructed by Nasir not to try a final sounding out of the State Department prior to his impending return to Cairo on leave, and the Egyptian finance minister was ordered not to undertake any discussions with American officials during his recent attendance at the International Monetary Fund meeting in Washington.

5. PEIPING AND MOSCOW SEEK TO ENHANCE KADAR'S PRESTIGE

The honors given to Hungarian Premier and Party First Secretary Kadar during his recent visits to Peiping and Moscow underline the bloc's effort to enhance his prestige and to strengthen his position in his own party. They are also designed to impress neutralist nations with the normalization of conditions in Hungary.

En route to China, Kadar was banqueted in Moscow by Mikoyan. In Peiping, he was received by Mao Tse-tung, personally praised by Chou En-lai at the National Day celebrations, where he was the featured foreign notable, and was pointedly introduced by Chinese officials to dignitaries from nonbloc nations. On his return to Moscow, he was feted by Khrushchev and Mikoyan.

The recognition that Kadar is the Kremlin's picked man in Hungary will reduce opposition to him in his own party and in Hungary generally. Former Stalinist elements who have supported only his hard-line political measures will be more restrained in challenging his policies, notably the continued relaxation in economic affairs. The Kremlin's reindorsement of Kadar will make it clear to potentially hostile elements in the Hungarian populace that they have no alternative to his regime and will deepen their apathy with the approach of the anniversary of the national uprising.

As Kadar's control over the party and country improves, he may act to be able to afford further concessions, such as a limited political amnesty. The Kremlin might also be willing to make a token withdrawal of Soviet troops.

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6. HAITIAN INAUGURATION MAY BE CRITICAL PERIOD

The approaching inauguration of Haitian President-elect Duvalier, reportedly scheduled for next week, has sharpened speculation concerning the army's future role in politics.

The interim military government has been severely criticized because of the brutal treatment of opposition elements, the death of a US citizen during police interrogation, and an apparent anti-American attitude on the part of some high officials. Some Haitians reportedly feel that the curtailment of US economic aid announced on 4 October may have been a result of the government's failure to offer an acceptable explanation of the American's death.

A reported lessening of tension during the past few days does not preclude a resurgence of civil disorder. The period immediately following Duvalier's inauguration is expected to be the most critical.

7. FRENCH ATTITUDE TOWARD DOMESTIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

The American embassy in Paris reports that statements in the French National Assembly and in the press seem to indicate acceptance of a French nuclear weapons production program "as a foregone conclusion." Although the government has announced no decision to proceed with such a program, the deliberate ambiguity of official statements has created a widespread public impression that at least preliminary weapons work is already under way.

The embassy estimates that French public opinion now would be temporarily satisfied with a token program, but considers it practically certain that the French military will press for the manufacture of the widest range of nuclear weapons the French budget can possibly support.

The most recent confirmation of French intentions to proceed with nuclear weapons production was provided by French insistence that the charter for OEEC's proposed nuclear energy agency not bar technicians engaged in this project from using the resultant information for weapons production.

**8. IRANIAN EXTREMISTS MAY BE AIDED BY
ARREST OF NATIONALIST LEADERS**

Comment on:

The recent arrest in Iran of approximately 70 nationalists on charges of conducting propaganda activities against the Shah may increase the influence of extremists within the National Resistance Movement (NRM), which was backed by former premier Mossadeq. These arrests may have convinced a larger number of its members that forceful removal of the Shah is needed before Iran's problems can be solved. In addition, the action may facilitate Communist penetration of the NRM.

The Iranian Intelligence and Security Agency, Savak, in mid-September started rounding up nationalists in Tehran, Meshed, Tabriz, and Isfahan under direct orders of the Shah. Savak seems to have tried to keep the action from the Iranian public, but it is now well known in Tehran. The government apparently does not have enough evidence to bring most of the prisoners to trial despite the confiscation of a quantity of propaganda material.