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13 March 1955

Copy No.

88

## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 47NO CHANGE IN CLASS  DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C


NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010

AUTH: HR 70-2

DATE: 8 Jan. 80 REVIEWER: 

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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
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**GENERAL****1. Comment on Soviet statement on negotiations with Austria:**

[Redacted] The Soviet statement of 11 March on recent conversations between Foreign Minister Molotov and Austrian ambassador Bischoff is an attempt to create the impression that the USSR is willing to sign an Austrian treaty on conditions acceptable to the West. It is intended to exert pressure on Austria to persuade the Western powers to agree to a conference which could cause a delay in ratification of the Paris accords, or, if the West refuses, create friction between it and Austria.

The statement fails to clarify what Molotov meant in his speech to the Supreme Soviet by four-power "agreed measures on the German question" necessary to "preclude the possibility" of a new Anschluss. Austrian Communist propaganda has emphasized that "real and effective measures" and not mere "paper guarantees" are needed, indicating that the Anschluss prohibition in Article 4 of the draft treaty is not enough. It appears that Moscow's demand at any conference on Austria would be the banning of West German rearment.

Austrian foreign minister Figl publicly stated on 9 March that his government would maintain its previous position that guarantees against a future Anschluss and military alliances were provided in the draft state treaty and past official government statements. [Redacted]

**2. Comment on Pravda article on Tito speech:**

[Redacted] Pravda's 12 March comment on Tito's criticism of Molotov's references to Yugoslavia in his speech before the Supreme Soviet is an attempt to assure the Yugoslavs that the new Soviet regime will continue to seek improved relations. Pravda emphasizes the future prospects for better relations, and tries to avoid a continued debate over the causes of and the blame for the 1948 split. At the same time, the Pravda article

is probably also intended as a warning to Belgrade that the Soviet Union will not publicly admit that it was to blame for the split in 1948.

Ambassador Bohlen had earlier implied that the publication of Tito's attack in the Soviet press may have reflected on Molotov personally, although there have been no other signs that Molotov's position had been impaired. There may have been some dissatisfaction among the other Soviet leaders with the fact that the strongly Stalinist tone of Molotov's speech has caused some alarm abroad. In this respect, the Pravda article is probably an effort to correct the record and to convey the idea that Molotov has been misinterpreted. [redacted]

## SOVIET UNION

### 3. Comment on Soviet military promotions:

[redacted] The elevation on 11 March of six officers to the rank of marshal of the Soviet Union is the largest simultaneous promotion ever made by the USSR to this highest normal military rank. It increases to seventeen the number of marshals of the Soviet Union. The decree also provided for the promotion of five additional officers to the next lower rank of marshal of a special arm or service.

These promotions, published shortly after the major governmental changes in February, reflect a further increase in the prestige of the military leadership in the USSR, which has risen steadily since the death of Stalin and the purge of Beria. The promotions are a further manifestation of recent Soviet emphasis on military preparedness.

With the exception of Biryuzov, the new marshals of the Soviet Union were outstanding combat commanders of World War II. For three of them--Grechko, Moskalenko, and Biryuzov--this promotion represents an unusually rapid advancement, since they were promoted less than two years ago. Grechko and Moskalenko were associated with Khrushchev in the Ukraine during the postwar period, and, in comparison with other military figures, have been active in party affairs.

The three air officers included in the promotion list are experienced primarily in tactical aviation. No officers associated with the Long Range Air Force have been reported to a high rank in recent years. Inclusion of the three air officers does not alter the fact that the Soviet air forces are notably under-represented in the higher military ranks in comparison with ground force officers.

## FAR EAST

### 4. Japan may avoid taking generally anti-Communist stand at Afro-Asian conference:

Tokyo's general approach at the Afro-Asian conference will be to "avoid taking a stand as an anti-Communist nation," although certain of its recommendations

may tend to line up Japan against the Chinese Communists, according to a Foreign Ministry policy paper transmitted to the American embassy. Tentative Japanese proposals include discussion of disarmament and the peaceful uses of atomic energy, emphasis on economic problems, and adoption of objectives identical with those of the United Nations.

The embassy comments that while no final policy decision is possible until appointment of the next cabinet, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu is in accord with Japan's over-all policy of a soft, noncontroversial tone in the plenary sessions.

Comment: Japan's latest policy paper more than likely represents a compromise between the two factions within the Foreign Ministry--one of which wants Japan to remain strictly neutral at the conference and the other of which advocates a strong anti-Communist stand. Current reports indicate that Shigemitsu, who has been somewhat of a restraining influence on those Japanese eager to do business with the Orbit, is almost certain to be retained as foreign minister.

It is doubtful if Prime Minister Hatoyama and his closest advisers, however, would approve of any actions which would antagonize Peiping.

## WESTERN EUROPE

5. Bonn Socialist confident on bringing Saar treaty before court:

Karl Mommer, West German Social Democratic Bundestag deputy, is now confident that his party will get sufficient support from dissident coalition deputies to enable it to bring the Saar treaty before the Constitutional Court. Mommer informed American officials that in his opinion the court will not only accept the party's petition, but will issue an injunction to prevent the treaty's promulgation until the case has been heard.

Bundestag supporters of Chancellor Adenauer now admit that the Socialists may secure the required number of signatures on their petition to bring the matter to the court. They do not believe, however, that the court will hear the case or issue a restraining injunction.

Comment: The Socialist case is legally weak and does not appear likely to delay final ratification and deposit of the Saar treaty, which is a part of the Paris accords.

## LATIN AMERICA

6. Chilean president may choose to resign:

The "pressure of political and economic problems" has convinced President Ibanez that he should resign,

the army is opposed to his resignation at this time, since it wants to use Ibanez as a front for its own control of the government.

Ibanez had received a memo signed by 40 high army officers asking that "professional politicians" be removed and that the government "return" to the economic policies of Jorge Prat,

former minister of finance. [redacted] a general belief that Agrarian Labor Party members of the government would be removed and some type of military administration set up.

**Comment:** Should Ibanez resign, it is unlikely that the army would permit Interior Minister Montero, an Agrarian Laborite, to fulfill the duties of president pending an election, as constitutionally provided.

Because Prat's economic policies demanded official economies, increased taxes, limits on wage increases, and decreased government employment, they aroused popular opposition which resulted in Ibanez' sixth cabinet reorganization in January. Execution of his policies, which were never adopted, would be very difficult even for a military regime.