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FAR EAST

1. US Political Adviser in Tokyo comments on local election results:

The US Political Adviser in Tokyo reports 3.3(h)(2) that nearly complete returns in the nation-wide local elections held on 23 April indicate an impressive Conservative victory, with

Conservative-supported candidates winning 94 percent of the contested seats. In his opinion, the Socialist defeat was not so much a blanket endorsement of the Conservative parties as a rejection of the Socialist "peace principles," (neutrality in the East-West struggle, opposition to US bases in Japan and opposition to a "separate peace" with the non-Communist nations). He adds that Ambassador Dulles' recent return to Japan and his press conference of 19 April (which dealt primarily with Pacific security) probably had a damaging effect upon the Socialist campaign.

Comment: Socialist Party leaders, as well as a large section of the Japanese press, agree\$ that Dulles' return and subsequent remarks were an important factor in the Socialist defeat. With the long-desired peace treaty imminent, the Japanese people were unsympathetic to the Socialist position, which they generally recognize as inconsistent with an early termination of the Occupation.

2. General de Lattre says US has designs on Indochina:

The US Consul in Hanoi reports that at a gathering of top French military and civil officials 3.3(h)(2) General de Lattre made several derogatory statements about the US. The General accused US officials in Indochina of slanting their reporting in favor of the Vietnamese, and asserted that a Vietnamese political party in Tonkin was supported by the Americans. He accused US officials, especially those in ECA, of undermining the French position and turning the Vietnamese against France. In addition, he stated that US missionaries were turning the natives against the French. When the

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Consul pointed out that to accuse the US of having designs on Indochina is to accept the Communist propaganda line, the General replied, "Well then, the Communists are right for once." On the following evening, the Consul discussed De Lattre's remarks with the general's aide, General Cogny, who said that De Lattre's behavior was merely the frankness of a man who felt himself among friends, and that it would be unfortunate if superficial French-US differences were permitted to play into the hands of the enemy.

Comment: General de Lattre has made similar accusations in the past, particularly with respect to ECA. US officials have found it extremely difficult to assess the spontaneity and sincerity of De Lattre's outbursts against US policy in Indochina. There seems to be little doubt that De Lattre, like many other Frenchmen, is grievously conscious of France's decline during the past generation as a world power and reacts in an exaggerated fashion to any real or fancied slight to French honor.

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4. Embassy Moscow comments on Sadchikov remarks concerning intervention in Iran:

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Informed by the French about a conversation between the Soviet Ambassador to Iran and some Satellite officials regarding Soviet intentions should the UK land forces in Iran, the

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US Embassy in Moscow believes that in view of the USSR's customary complete reticence as to its real intentions, this reassuring statement by Sadchikov is a deliberate plant to encourage a chain of events favorable to Soviet expansionist moves in Iran. Terming the statement a virtual invitation to the British, the Embassy adds that any landing of UK forces would increase internal disorder and nationalist agitation, possibly culminating in the establishment of a new government willing to invite the Soviets to come "to its rescue" under the 1921 treaty. (Sadchikov's conversation with the Satellite officials is summarized in the Current Intelligence Bulletin of 26 April 1951.)

5. Nehru approves Congress Party opposition to Communist "peace appeal":

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On 30 March, the Secretary-General of the Indian Congress Party addressed a confidential letter to all Provincial Congress Committees advising party members to have nothing to do with Stockholm Peace Appeal committees or signature campaigns, since "they are designed for certain political purposes." The US Embassy in New Delhi is reliably informed that

Prime Minister Nehru attended the All-India Congress Committee meeting at which the advisability of distributing this letter was discussed and that he approved of its dissemination.

Comment: The Congress Party's circular letter is obviously designed to dissuade party members from participating in the current Communist effort to obtain signatures in support of an appeal for a Five Power Peace Pact and universal reduction of

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armaments. This is believed to be the first time that the Indian Congress Party has taken official cognizance of international Communist intentions and propaganda techniques and shown its opposition to them. Prime Minister Nehru's reported approval of the letter, while thought-provoking, does not necessarily indicate that his previously expressed views on international Communism and the USSR have changed.

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6. Egypt makes counter-offers to UK defense proposals:

The British Ambassador in Cairo has revealed that the Egyptian Government, in its reply to the UK defense proposals, stated that practically all the British proposals were unacceptable.

The Egyptian reply also reportedly contained counter-proposals, including the demand for British evacuation from the Suez area within one year, which were "the same old story." The US Charge in Cairo comments that the fact that Egypt has made counter-proposals leaves the door open for future talks, and that the UK has now succeeded in getting Egypt on record as opposing self-determination for the Sudan.

Comment: The fact that the Egyptian Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister have so far refrained from making detailed public comments either on the UK defense proposals or on Egypt's reply, as well as the fact that Egyptian parliamentary debate on this issue has been postponed, indicates that the Egyptian Government would still prefer a continuance of the discussions to their complete breakdown.

7. Turkey continues to press for inclusion in Western security arrangements:

Turkish Foreign Minister Koprulu informed the US Ambassador in Ankara that current discussions with the Turkish Ambassadors from London, Paris and Rome were being held with a view to crystallizing Turkish foreign policy. The Turkish Ambassador to the US has been instructed to join them in Ankara. Koprulu stated that French Foreign Minister Schuman had assured the Turkish

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Ambassador in Paris that, while in Washington, he had almost reached agreement with the US Government on support of a Mediterranean pact which would include the US, UK, France, Turkey and Greece. In this connection, Koprulu indicated to the US Ambassador that Turkey was not adverse to such an arrangement if it were a subsidiary to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Comment:

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Turkish desire to assure its own security has been heightened by recent international developments, such as the disorders in Iran and the recall of General MacArthur. Currently, Turkey seems to be hopeful that, in view of its firm stand in Korea and its growing reputation as a non-Communist bastion in the Middle East, it may be closer to achieving some type of satisfactory security arrangement with the West.

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9. Yugoslavs may raise question of Satellite pressures in UN:

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Upon his return from Belgrade, Yugoslav UN delegate Bebler informed US Ambassador Austin that increasing tension in the Balkans may force Yugoslavia in the next month or two to raise

the question of Satellite pressures on Yugoslavia in the UN. As a possible preliminary step to a full -fledged UN discussion, Belgrade is considering presenting a memo to the UN citing the causes and nature of the tension provoked by the Satellites. Bebler, however, refused to commit himself to a statement that Yugoslavia considers the situation urgent. Bebler further stated that the Yugoslav Government was unable to guess the time and place where Satellite forces might strike, if ever. He suggested that the build-up may be aimed at increasing the Soviet political bargaining position, but admitted that the enormity of the economic effort indicates that the build-up is for a major purpose.

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