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SECURITY INFORMATION

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
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USSR

1. Redisposition of Soviet Air Force fighter units in Occupied Europe ~~3.3(h)(2)~~
be under way:

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[] one Soviet Air Force jet
 fighter division (three regiments totaling

about 100 MIG-15's) had departed eastward out of Germany by rail. The departure of another fighter division from Germany by rail has been reported, but not definitely confirmed, and the aircraft of a third division cannot be located.

[] one regiment of a 3.3(h)(2)

fourth fighter division has changed its base within Germany during the past week. No new air units have arrived in Germany.

[] 3.3(h)(2)

the aircraft of three Soviet Air Force divisions (about 300 MIG-15's, constituting half the jet fighters in East Germany) have been missing from their bases since early October. Communications intelligence confirms an absence of flying activity by these units and supports the probable departure from Germany of at least one division.

These recent moves may be part of a Soviet redisposition program within Eastern Europe to improve tactical air capabilities in that area, or may represent the departure of some units to reinforce another area. Less likely explanations are: occupation of new airfields; a re-equipment or modification program; or maneuvers.

The evidence to date does not support the conclusion that a major reduction in Soviet military strength in Occupied Europe is under way. The full extent of the air redisposition is not yet known, there is no evidence of a reduction of ground forces, and the preparation of permanent military installations in Germany continues.

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FAR EAST

2. Japanese-Korean negotiations promise to be difficult:

The Japanese-South Korean negotiations 3.3(h)(2) over the problem of Korean residents in Japan promise to be difficult and have little chance of success unless American pressure is exerted on both parties, according to

Comment: The Korean minority, estimated to number between 600,000 and 1,000,000, of whom two-thirds are considered pro-North Korean, have been the instigators of many postwar civil disturbances in Japan. The Japanese Government would like either to deport unruly elements or to insure good behavior by the threat of deportation. The South Korean Government, however, while in no position to accept such a mass transfer, wishes to have its jurisdiction over this minority recognized and has virtually demanded extraterritorial privileges for Koreans in Japan.

The Koreans desire US pressure to bring about Japanese acquiescence, while the Japanese wish to stall until after the peace treaty goes into effect and they become relatively immune to Korean pressure.

NEAR EAST

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3.3(h)(2)

4. Turkish-Iranian relations deteriorate:

Turkish-Iranian relations have deteriorated as a result of Turkish support of Britain in the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute. Turkey is being denounced as "a stooge of the British and Americans and a traitor to the Moslem world." Communists and fellow-travelers are exploiting the situation in order to hinder the plans for an expanded Middle East Command.

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Comment: Although Iran tends to follow the lead of Turkey in international affairs, traditional suspicion and jealousy of a strong neighbor have made Turkish-Iranian relations difficult.



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3.3(h)(2)

6. NATO membership for Egypt to be proposed by Italy:

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Italy,

is ready to propose a solution of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute by suggesting that Egypt be admitted to NATO. This action is to be taken with the understanding that Egypt will

then make available military bases, including the Suez defenses, under the same conditions as facilities furnished by other NATO members.

The proposal would permit British forces in the strength provided for in the 1936 treaty to remain in the Canal Zone until NATO arrangements have been finalized.

Comment: There is no confirmation that Italy is about to make such proposals. On 2 November the US Ambassador in Cairo reported that the Egyptian Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior were coming to realize that possibly the only way out of Egypt's difficulties would be the Middle East Command proposals.

A proposal of membership for Egypt would be unacceptable to most NATO members. If it were seriously considered, the now pending ratifications of the protocol for admitting Greece and Turkey would be imperiled, especially in those NATO countries which already fear over-extending NATO.

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WESTERN EUROPE

3.3(h)(2)

7. A "rightist solution" is not imminent in France:

[Redacted]

The US Embassy in Paris concludes on the eve of the new Assembly session that the disunity among the components of the middle-of-the-road coalition "has at least not worsened and may in fact be less now than when the Assembly recessed in September." While Premier Pleven has neither made nor received commitments envisaging more solid Socialist support of the government, the likelihood of an early deal between the other supporting parties and the Gaullists appears to have lessened.

The new Secretary-General of the Gaullist party has indicated that, although the General "realizes he must share the government with others on a coalition basis," he insists on having firm leadership of such a coalition himself.

Comment: This is a further indication that the middle-of-the-road coalition should not be expected to crumble in the near future despite the growing weight of the problems facing the Pleven government.

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