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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
14 MARCH 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR - Mikoyan may become foreign minister.


Chinese Communists deploy additional jet fighters to East China coastal area.

Tibetan unrest continues; Dalai Lama representative agrees to "struggle for independence."

**II. ASIA-AFRICA**

Tunisia - Bourguiba under increasing pressure from Algerian rebels in Tunisia; bloc contributions to rebels bypassing Tunisian channels.

(4)



- (5) Chinese Nationalists approve plans to resupply Indonesian rebels in the Celebes.
(6) Japan would shelve plans for repatriation to North Korea if South Korea negotiated fishery issues.

III. THE WEST

- (7) Portuguese security forces thwart move against regime; further attempts possible.
(8) Bolivia - Spreading strikes and growing tension cause evacuation plans for US nationals to be considered.
(9) Cuba - Disillusionment with Castro spreading.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

14 March 1959

DAILY BRIEF


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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR: [There is continuing speculation among foreign diplomats in Moscow that First Deputy Premier Mikoyan may replace Gromyko as foreign minister. Khrushchev may desire to have a more authoritative spokesman at a conference of foreign ministers. Mikoyan's international stature was considerably enhanced by his visit to the United States and he has recently been making more frequent pronouncements on foreign policy: thus, such a shift would be logical.]

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*Communist China: [A flight of at least 45 Chinese Communist jet fighters arrived at Lungchi, near Amoy on the East China coast, on 11 March. The bulk of these aircraft came from the Nanchang area. The reasons for this increase at Lungchi, where there have been an estimated 35 jet fighters, are not clear, but the move may reflect Communist sensitivity to the recent step-up in Nationalist overflight activity, a build-up at Lungchi, or a continuing rotation of units based on the coastal fields.]

Tibet: []
[]
[] a
representative of the Dalai Lama is reported to have attended an anti-Communist meeting on 1 March and to have agreed to "struggle for independence." []
The exact role of the Dalai Lama in the present unrest is unclear, as are his whereabouts and condition.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Tunisia: President Bourguiba appears to feel more and more isolated and increasingly subject to pressure from Algerian rebels within Tunisia. Rebel soldiers are becoming more cocky, while Soviet-bloc contributions to the more than 90,000 Algerian refugees inside Tunisia, heretofore channeled through the Tunisian Red Crescent, now are delivered directly to the Algerian Red Crescent in Tunisia.

(Page 2)

OK

Nationalist China - Indonesia: [Chinese Nationalist security chief Chiang Ching-kuo has approved in principle a plan for further supplying the Indonesian rebels in the Celebes "at an appropriate time." Rebel representatives in Taipei have requested in addition that Chinese crews for four rebel owned aircraft reportedly now on Taiwan be placed on alert] Nationalist authorities have never admitted supplying a large shipload of ammunition last December which apparently has contributed greatly to increased dissident activity in the Celebes during the past few weeks.]

(Page 3)

NO

Japan-Korea: Prime Minister Kishi indicated to Ambassador MacArthur on 11 March that it might be possible to shelve indefinitely the plan to repatriate Koreans to North Korea if South Korea could be persuaded to accept a "reasonable solution" of the "Rhee Line" issue and the return of detained Japanese fishermen. Kishi would rather settle these issues in direct negotiations with South Korea than submit them to the UN or to engage in direct negotiations with North Korea. Seoul, however, has shown no willingness to compromise on the fisheries issue.

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III. THE WEST

NO

Portugal: [A plan by a civilian group with military support to move against the Salazar regime on 12 March has been thwarted by the security forces. In view of the discontent,

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[including that among junior army and navy officers, and doubt over Salazar's health, further attempts against the regime are possible.]

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NO

*Bolivia: The US Embassy is going ahead with unobtrusive evacuation of nonessential US citizens because of spreading strikes and growing public tension over financial policy.

On 13 March the Government said it was incorporating into a decree a proposal of the International Monetary Fund, strongly opposed by the politically powerful armed miners.

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OK

Cuba: Disillusionment with the Castro regime seems to be spreading. Castro's position as arbiter of all official actions and policies hinders efficient functioning of the government, and his preoccupation with certain projects, such as social and agrarian reform, is delaying economic recovery. He has alienated certain commercial, professional, and political groups, including some of his former supporters, but his popularity with the lower classes is apparently undiminished.

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Further Details on Tibetan Unrest

additional information about unrest in Lhasa, center of Chinese administration in Tibet. The rebels are reported to have "besieged the radio station"--presumably in Lhasa--and to "control" the Dalai Lama's "home."

[an organized anti-Communist movement participated in by Tibetan religious leaders developed in the Lhasa area and perhaps elsewhere in Tibet early in March.]

[The exact role of the Dalai Lama in the movement is unclear, as are his whereabouts and condition, but his representative is reported to have attended an anti-Communist meeting on 11 March and to have agreed to "struggle for independence." Some of the Tibetan lay aristocracy apparently have sided with the Chinese. Further dissension within the Tibetan ranks is indicated in the disagreement which is said to exist between anti-Communist forces in Lhasa and those in West China.]

[Since the Communist occupation of Tibet in 1951, Peiping's policy has been to use the Dalai Lama as much as possible in carrying out the Communist program, but he is believed to have responded with only minimum cooperation. At the same time, the Communists have been grooming the rival Panchen Lama--a Chinese puppet--as a counterbalance to the Dalai Lama. If the Dalai Lama fails to cooperate fully in ending the dissidence, Peiping may attempt to replace him with the Panchen Lama.]

[In suppressing the unrest, the Chinese Communists risk incurring adverse international criticism. Indian officials are already disturbed over the diplomatic problem they would face should Tibetan rebels try to take refuge in India or Bhutan.]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Tunisian President Pessimistic Over North African Situation

President Bourguiba is becoming increasingly pessimistic concerning the North African situation, particularly prospects for a settlement in Algeria. This attitude may stem from lessened Tunisian control over the activities of Algerian rebels in Tunisia, as well as Bourguiba's growing diplomatic isolation. The rebels now are operating more openly than in the past, and this may cause a new crisis in Tunisia's relations with France.

Rebel troops seem to be growing more cocky and now are seen on the streets of western Tunisian cities in uniform. An earlier decision that the Tunisian rather than the Algerian Red Crescent was to receive all relief supplies destined for the 90,-000 Algerian refugees in Tunisia is being circumvented. A 37-ton shipment from the Rumanian Red Cross was delivered in January to the Algerian Red Crescent, and Algerian Red Crescent and trade-union officials apparently will take delivery of shipments from Czechoslovakia and from Soviet trade unions soon to arrive.

Having made repeated but fruitless bids last month for a meeting with De Gaulle to discuss an Algerian solution, Bourguiba now is telling news correspondents that his government cannot withstand the general drift toward Communism which he fears will occur in North Africa unless the Algerian question is resolved. While this line may in part be "psychological warfare," Bourguiba's relations with France are growing more difficult, and he is already isolated from the United Arab Republic--with which he has competed for maximum influence among the Algerian rebels. Even cooperation with Morocco seems to be slipping; Bourguiba is, in fact, peculiarly sensitive to the possibility that Moroccan relations with France may improve while Tunisia's relations deteriorate.

In the view of the American ambassador in Tunis, Bourguiba is "stuck with the Algerians," and the Algerians, particularly those in rebel military circles, view him with no great esteem in spite of the Tunisian facilities they enjoy.

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Chinese Nationalists may resume supplying Indonesian Rebels

[Chinese Nationalist security chief Chiang Ching-kuo has approved in principle a plan for further supplying of the Indonesian rebels in the Celebes "at an appropriate time."]

[if support is renewed, the decision should be made soon enough to exact commercial and mining concessions from the rebels before Nationalist aid becomes of less importance to them.]

[Rebel representatives in Taipei have requested that Chinese crews for four rebel aircraft--two PBYs, a B-26, and a C-54--reportedly now on Taiwan should be placed on an alert status.]

[The last Nationalist shipment of supplies to the rebels was made last December, although Chiang Ching-kuo has insisted to an American observer that no arms have been sent since last July. The December shipment, transported on a 1,000-ton rebel ship, consisted mostly of small-arms ammunition, medical supplies, boots, and uniforms in sufficient quantities,

[] , to maintain the dissidents for six months. The shipment arrived safely and the rebels soon thereafter began to score successes against the government. It is probably this record of success which has tempted the Nationalists to consider sending more aid.]

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Japan May Shelve Plans to Repatriate Koreans to North Korea

[Japanese Prime Minister Kishi told Ambassador MacArthur on 11 March that he thinks it is possible to find some formula for indefinite shelving of the plan to repatriate Korean residents in Japan who desire to go to North Korea. This would be contingent on South Korean willingness to accept a reasonable solution on the questions of the "Rhee Line" and the return of detained Japanese fishermen. Kishi said he would rather settle all issues with Seoul by direct negotiations than submit them to the United Nations, as demanded by some conservative party leaders and other elements in Japan.]

[South Korea continues to demand that Japan unconditionally drop the repatriation plan. President Rhee probably views the worsening of relations with Japan as a welcome opportunity to divert both domestic and foreign attention from an internal political crisis and has shown no willingness to compromise on the fishing line. However, he might agree to renew negotiations with Japan in view of the threat of UN action.]

[The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) plans to take no action on the Japanese request to screen Korean residents for possible repatriation unless the Red Cross societies of both Japan and North Korea ask that it be carried out under ICRC auspices. Pyongyang opposes any screening, probably fearing that its claim that 100,000 Koreans desire repatriation to North Korea is greatly exaggerated; however, it may be willing to send a Red Cross delegation to Geneva to discuss the question.]

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III. THE WEST

Move Against Portuguese Premier Reported Inwarded

[Portuguese security police claim to have frustrated opposition plans to move against the government on 12 March. The plans called for an attack on the residences of President Thomaz and Premier Salazar and the seizure of arms stored at the headquarters of the Portuguese Legion Naval Brigade in Lisbon. The arrest of two civilians revealed that a civilian group with military support was behind the plot.]

[The police are not convinced that the army is loyal as the army minister maintains. A 70-year-old army reserve captain is also under arrest, and another captain and a naval brigade officer are implicated. There have been reports of considerable discontent among junior army and naval officers over promotion policy and also over the failure of the regime to remedy its political and economic shortcomings. Opposition groups in Oporto have tried to obtain the support of army elements in a move to oust Salazar. The reserve officer involved in this plan is reportedly a key member of the National Independent Movement, headed by former presidential candidate General Humberto Delgado, who has been in asylum in the Brazilian Embassy in Lisbon since 12 January.]

[The possibility that the 70-year-old Salazar may be unable to resume his energetic direction of the government because of his recent illness could spur opposition groups with military support to make further attempts against the regime. Ambassador Elbrick reports that when he saw Salazar on 11 March, he looked tired and somewhat drawn, but he was mentally alert.]

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~~SECRET~~Bolivian Financial Crisis May Cause Anti-American Violence

The US Embassy is going ahead with unobtrusive evacuation of nonessential US citizens in Bolivia because of spreading strikes and growing public tension over financial policy. On 13 March the Government said it was incorporating into a decree a proposal of the International Monetary Fund for settling a hotly contested wage question in the tin mines. Bolivian President Siles had said his government was unable to impose this recommendation on the armed Bolivian miners. The IMF had insisted that its recommendation on mine wages be accepted as a condition for continuing financial aid. Bolivia's foreign-exchange position of minus \$2,300,000 on 12 March threatened a shutdown of the Central Bank.

The tin miners' strike protesting the proposed wage decision entered its second week on 12 March, and sympathy strikes have spread through the country. The International Federation of Miners' Unions, an affiliate of the Communist-dominated WFTU, has sent a sympathy cable to the Bolivian miners.

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New Signs of Disillusionment With Castro Government

Signs of disillusionment with the Castro government are increasing, and [redacted]

[redacted], the seeds of counterrevolution are being sown. The government has been slow to attack the many economic, political, and social problems the revolution promised to correct, and Prime Minister Fidel Castro's position as sole arbiter of official policies and actions is a continuing deterrent to efficient government.

Castro's preoccupation with agrarian and social reform has kept the government from taking more direct steps toward economic recovery. Certain moves by the new government, such as lowering rents and cutting utility rates, have been designed to appeal to the lower classes without regard for the effect on the economic structure.

The "war crimes trials," which have lowered Castro's prestige abroad, now are being criticized in Cuba, particularly following the retrial and sentencing to long prison terms of several air force personnel originally acquitted of genocide. Castro's decision, announced on 12 March, to extend the death penalty to persons guilty of misusing public funds will cause further speculation that he is more interested in revenge than in justice.

Opposition to Castro is undoubtedly developing among commercial and political groups, although he probably retains his great popularity among the lower classes. [redacted] Adam Clayton Powell, long a stanch supporter of Castro, told [redacted]

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Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

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