

~~TOP SECRET~~

18 October 1957

Copy No. 138

3.3(h)(2)

3.5(c)


# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 40  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.  
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE 1-11-80 REVIEWER

**OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE**  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03190616



Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03190616

~~SORAB~~  
CONTENTS

1. FURTHER EVIDENCE OF SOVIET NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES [redacted] (page 3).
2. USSR ANNOUNCES ATOMIC ICEBREAKER WILL BE LAUNCHED SOON [redacted] (page 4).
3. YUGOSLAVS TO INFORM GREEKS OF BELGRADE-MOSCOW TALKS [redacted] (page 5).
4. SYRIAN COMPLAINT TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY [redacted] (page 6).
5. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN SYRIA [redacted] (page 7).
6. BURMESE DEPUTY PREMIER REPORTEDLY TO DISCUSS ARMS PURCHASES WITH CZECHS DURING BLOC TOUR [redacted] (page 8).
7. SITUATION IN LAOS [redacted] (page 9).
8. NEW GOVERNMENT COALITION IN PAKISTAN [redacted] (page 10).
9. BRITISH MARKING TIME ON CYPRUS PROBLEM [redacted] (page 11).

ANNEX--Conclusions of the Watch Report of the Intelligence Advisory Committee [redacted]  
 [redacted] (page 12).

~~TOP SECRET~~

## 1. FURTHER EVIDENCE OF SOVIET NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES

[redacted] [redacted]  
[redacted] the USSR is building nuclear-powered submarines in that city at "Plant 564" (unidentified), [redacted]

[redacted] Hundreds of new workers were reportedly brought into Molotovsk in 1956, and large installations were unloaded from ships and brought to the plant under heavy MVD guard. [redacted]

### Comment

Molotovsk has been considered the most likely site for the construction of the USSR's first nuclear-powered submarine. It has convenient air and rail communications with Moscow and Leningrad, the locations of the principal design bureaus, research institutes, and administrative offices which would support such a project.

The current estimate on the Soviet nuclear energy program accords the USSR the capability of having a reactor suitable for a submarine in 1957. The growing volume of evidence indicates that the USSR either has an atomic submarine or will complete one very soon. [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

**2. USSR ANNOUNCES ATOMIC ICEBREAKER WILL BE LAUNCHED SOON**

**Comment on:**

Launching of the Soviet atomic icebreaker Lenin, to be proclaimed as the first atomic-powered surface vessel in the world, will evidently be treated as part of the 40th anniversary program culminating on 7 November. The Soviet news agency TASS announced that the Lenin, which was begun in the spring of 1956, would be launched "soon" from the Leningrad yards. Judging from the extent of the construction as shown in a June photograph of the vessel, the hull could probably be launched at any time. It probably would be some time--perhaps as long as 18 months--before the vessel could be fitted out with the reactor installation.

Soviet propaganda, in addition to claiming another "first," will contrast the peaceful purposes of the Lenin with alleged US emphasis on building atomic submarines.

The 16,000-ton, 400-foot vessel, which will probably be added to the icebreaker fleet operating on the Northern Sea Route, will need refueling only about once a year and will be able to travel at speeds of up to 18 knots in open water.

### 3. YUGOSLAVS TO INFORM GREEKS OF BELGRADE-MOSCOW TALKS

Reference:

Yugoslav Vice President Kardelj will attempt to allay Western suspicions over the Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement during his scheduled visit to Greece early next week. Yugoslav Acting Foreign Secretary Bebler told the Greek ambassador in Belgrade on 14 October that Kardelj will inform the

Greeks about Tito's recent conversations with Soviet Defense Minister Zhukov, and also about Tito's meeting with Khrushchev in Rumania.

Kardelj will also raise the subject of the Greek government's refusal--a great disappointment to Belgrade--to participate in the Balkan talks proposed last month by Rumanian Premier Stoica.

In an attempt to create an identity of interests, Bebler asserted that Yugoslav relations with Albania and Bulgaria are fully as bad as Greek relations with those two countries and he said there is no immediate prospect for improvement. In recent propaganda, however, the Yugoslavs have tried to pave the way for better relations.

#### 4. SYRIAN COMPLAINT TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Comment on:

A number of Arab delegations in the UN are disturbed over Syria's complaint to the president of the General Assembly and are pessimistic as to where it might lead, according to an Egyptian news cor-

respondent at the UN. He added that, when Syrian Foreign Minister Bitar had discussed bringing the issue to the General Assembly, some Arab delegations had protested that such action would provide an opportunity for the United States "to agitate for a Palestine settlement." Bitar did not agree and said that Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had assured him that the United States "would lose out completely" in a debate on the Syrian item. Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi reportedly had also attempted to dissuade the Syrians, but they insisted that their domestic situation would be improved by UN action on the external threat to Syria's security. A pro-Western member of the Syrian delegation told Ambassador Lodge that Damascus had submitted the item only in an attempt to avoid "a feared upset of the government."

There have been reports of internal dissension in Syria for some time, but there are no indications that a governmental upset is in the offing.

**5. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN SYRIA**

Comment on: [redacted]

Recent information indicates that the Egyptian military assistance group which arrived in Syria on 13 October is a force of about a thousand men. The group consists of the equivalent of approximately one battalion of infantry with some tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery. These units are reported to be well trained. The Egyptian contingent reportedly will be deployed in the Aleppo region near the Turkish frontier.

[redacted] movement of other groups of Egyptian military personnel, who are to assist in training the Syrian army, has been under way. [redacted] groups of Egyptian infantry, military police, engineers, and artillery personnel were flown to Syria during the first two weeks of October.

According to press reports from Damascus on 17 October, a Syrian government spokesman denied Egyptian press reports that a state of emergency had been declared in the Syrian army. The spokesman acknowledged that officers' leaves had been canceled, but denied that soldiers' leaves had been curtailed or that soldiers had been ordered to return to their units. The spokesman added that no mobilization or even partial mobilization had been ordered. [redacted]

## 6. BURMESE DEPUTY PREMIER REPORTEDLY TO DISCUSS ARMS PURCHASES WITH CZECHS DURING BLOC TOUR

Comment on:

Deputy Prime Minister Kyaw Nyein will negotiate for the purchase of arms during his forthcoming visit to Czechoslovakia,

The Czechs allegedly have offered the Burmese anything they need, from small arms to field artillery, on favorable terms.

During a two-month tour scheduled to begin on 21 October, Kyaw Nyein will also visit the USSR, Poland, and Communist China. This trip will be essentially a good-will tour highlighted by attendance at Moscow's 7 November celebration.

Burma seeks substantial quantities of arms to re-equip its army, now in the initial phases of a reorganization, to enable the Burmese to patrol their borders. New arms are also needed for the police, who are being prepared to assume primary responsibility for suppressing the Communist and Karen insurrections. In answering a reporter's question stimulated by earlier rumors of Czech arms offers, Prime Minister U Nu stated on 30 July that it was the policy of his government to purchase arms from any source without regard to "ideological consideration," provided it is within Burma's means to do so.

The Burmese have been promised \$10,000,000 worth of American military equipment at favorable prices and an American survey team is being sent to Burma in the near future to study the requirements of the police.

~~SECRET~~

## 7. SITUATION IN LAOS

Comment on:

Expansion of Laos' six-man "emergency" cabinet is expected shortly and there are indications that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and other proponents of an early settlement with the Pathet Lao will seize this opportunity to press for a coalition cabinet which would include Pathet Lao

representatives. Souvanna told a leader of the conservative Independent party that enlargement of the cabinet should serve both to bring in former ministers who voluntarily stepped aside during the formation of the present government and to allow the incorporation of Pathet Lao officials into the government.

Souvanna told an American embassy official on 16 October that his brother, Pathet chief Souphanouvong, is prepared to sign a joint communique embodying all guarantees and concessions demanded by the royal government. He said this communique would guide the mixed negotiating commissions in working out the final details of a settlement, which would then be submitted to the national assembly. Acceptance would clear the way for formation of a coalition government.

Conflict of interest involved in the jockeying for cabinet portfolios is seriously straining the alliance between the conservative leaders, Foreign Minister Phoui Sananikone and Interior Minister Katay Sasorith, who have previously served to check Souvanna's drift toward a relatively unguarded settlement with the Pathets. There are indications that Souvanna is exploiting the rift.

## 8. NEW GOVERNMENT COALITION IN PAKISTAN

### Comment on:

The new government coalition in Pakistan, expected to take office on 18 October with Moslem League leader I. I. Chundrigar as prime minister, may bring only a limited period of stability. The exclusion of former prime minister Suhrawardy's Awami League and the domination of the coalition by West Pakistani elements probably will result in a considerable increase of opposition sentiment in East Pakistan.

Chundrigar told the press that the coalition would include his own party and the Republican party, two of Pakistan's major groups, as well as two smaller East Pakistani political factions. He was to have been sworn in on 17 October, but the ceremony has been postponed for one day, possibly indicating a hitch in the naming of his cabinet.

Sixty-year-old Chundrigar has served in several high government positions, but has little political following and lacks the qualities of a dynamic and popular leader. The Moslem League recently called for an "independent" foreign policy, but Chundrigar indicated to the press on 17 October that his government would not make any significant changes in Pakistan's present pro-Western policies.

## 9. BRITISH MARKING TIME ON CYPRUS PROBLEM

### Reference:

The British government has evidently concluded that no new moves to negotiate a settlement of the Cyprus problem would be profitable at the present time. The Foreign Office is discouraged about the prospects of persuading Greece even to discuss the British plan for a British-Turkish-Greek condominium. It believes the Greek and Cypriot assessment of the British Labor party's recent endorsement of self-determination for Cyprus will cause Athens to stall in the expectation that a future Labor government would grant its aspirations. Greek opinion assumes that Labor will win the next general election, which must be held by May 1960 at the latest.

In the meantime, the British intend to weaken the EOKA underground by such tactics as their recent announcement that they possess an EOKA list of 200 Greek Cypriots scheduled for extermination. EOKA is nevertheless likely to resume violence if it believes the UN General Assembly debate, expected in November, does not advance the cause of union with Greece. A resumption of terrorism might impel London to resume efforts to negotiate a settlement.

~~TOP SECRET~~ANNEX

No. 376

Watch Report 376, 17 October 1957  
of the  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

## Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral to the orbit in the immediate future.
- C. Unstable conditions and tensions stemming from developments concerning Syria continue to create possibilities for conflict in the Middle East. The continued deployment of major Turkish forces on the Syrian frontier, the publicized presence of Egyptian forces in Syria, and Soviet pressure moves combine to make this situation particularly tense. On balance, the initiation of hostilities by Turkey against Syria is considered unlikely in the immediate future.

~~TOP SECRET~~