



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17 June 1960



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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17 June 1960

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### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR: Soviet delegates at both the disarmament and nuclear test talks in Geneva have issued thinly veiled warnings that the USSR may withdraw from the negotiations and resume nuclear weapons tests if Western concessions are not forthcoming. At the disarmament conference, the Soviet delegate is making a strong effort to exploit differences in Western reactions to Moscow's latest proposals. Soviet spokesmen have hinted that, in view of the "lack of Western cooperation," the USSR may take the issue to the UN General Assembly. Moscow's representative in the nuclear test talks has warned that if the US and Britain go ahead with the experimental underground explosions without accepting Moscow's conditions for Soviet participation, the USSR will consider itself free to resume nuclear weapons tests.

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

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[redacted] Japan: Kishi's humiliation in being forced to cancel the President's trip will almost certainly result in his early resignation as prime minister and party chief. An acceptable compromise successor will be difficult to find and extensive political wrangling is likely. The 15 June Soviet note and widespread identification of the Japanese Communist party as the source of the recent violence will tend to focus Japanese attention on the extent of Communist influence over leftist elements. The extremists under Communist leadership, however, now are greatly encouraged and likely to increase their violence in an effort to defeat the ratification of the security treaty. Under these conditions anti-American incidents may occur. [redacted]

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25X1 Indonesia: President Sukarno, despite unprecedently heavy criticism, apparently intends to proceed with his plan to install a new parliament with strong Communist representation. Sukarno has previously announced that "some improvements," involving the appointment of additional members, will be made, but he has not disclosed how many he will name nor their political orientation. He is expected to confer shortly with political leaders, but it is not expected that he will materially modify his program. [redacted]

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### III. THE WEST

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France-Morocco: France has made a preliminary offer to evacuate all its bases in Morocco by 1963, and will try for "reasonable" settlements on other disputed questions such as French property holdings and certain border problems. The French are probably willing to concede the evacuation of troops in order to protect their large economic stake in the country--a move that would be consistent with De Gaulle's policy in other new African states. Morocco will probably prolong discussions both to gain maximum concessions from France and to forestall leftist criticism that the King is selling out to the French.

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### IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

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Situation in Cuba. NIE 85-2-60. 14 June 60.

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DAILY BRIEF

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USSR Intensifies Pressure on West in Geneva Talks

Soviet delegates at both the disarmament and nuclear test talks in Geneva have stepped up pressure on the West by issuing thinly veiled warnings that the USSR may withdraw from the negotiations and resume nuclear weapons tests if Western concessions are not forthcoming.

Soviet delegate Zorin is making a strong effort in the ten-nation disarmament conference to exploit differences in Western reactions to Moscow's latest proposals. [The British, French, Italian, and Canadian delegates have all expressed the view that some modifications must be made in the Western disarmament plan.] Zorin has singled out French delegate Moch for special attention, complimenting him on his efforts to bridge East-West differences. He has pressed for a full French reply to the new Soviet proposal to prohibit and destroy all means for the delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage of a disarmament program--a proposal particularly designed to exploit French insistence on top priority to measures for controlling nuclear weapons delivery systems.

Soviet spokesmen in London have hinted that, in view of the "lack of Western cooperation," the USSR may soon pull out of the disarmament conference and take the issue to the United Nations General Assembly. Zorin has warned that if the West continues to refuse to discuss Soviet proposals for complete and general disarmament, there will be no basis for further negotiations.

These tactics suggest that Moscow's principal current aim at Geneva is to build the strongest possible record for again presenting the Soviet disarmament position to the United Nations General Assembly next fall or, possibly, to a session of the 82-nation UN Disarmament Commission prior to the assembly's regular meeting.

In the nuclear test talks, Soviet delegate Tsarapkin has demanded full Soviet participation in the formulation and

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execution of Western research explosions and has announced that the USSR has no plans to conduct underground explosions of either chemical or nuclear devices. Tsarapkin has warned that if the United States and Britain proceed with underground nuclear explosions for research purposes without accepting Moscow's conditions for Soviet participation to verify that the explosions are not being utilized for military purposes, the USSR will consider itself free to resume nuclear weapons tests "for the purpose of ensuring its security."

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Sukarno Proceeds With Plans to Install Indonesian Parliament

President Sukarno, despite unprecedently heavy criticism, is proceeding with plans to install his appointed parliament later this month. He has made the minor concession, however, of promising to name additional members and is expected to confer with selected political leaders before the installation.

Sukarno has not announced how many more members he plans to appoint. Indonesian sources claim the number will total 23 to 25, all of them representatives of Moslem groups. The forthcoming political discussions probably will involve bargaining on the distribution of the appointees, and Sukarno may also find it expedient to make a further slight increase in membership. Of the original 261 appointees, 24 percent are Communist.

The Democratic League, which led criticism of Sukarno during his absence on a world tour during April and May, has renewed its charges that non-Communist elements are under-represented and that parliament is unconstitutional. Significant factions in the National party and the orthodox Moslem Nahdlatul Ulama oppose the parliament, although the national leadership of both parties supports Sukarno. Apparently in reply to these criticisms, a cabinet spokesman announced on 13 June that Sukarno and the cabinet would not be intimidated on the parliamentary issue, although they were ready to entertain constructive suggestions.

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France Makes New Settlement Offer to Morocco

The French ambassador in Morocco has resumed "serious discussions" with King Mohamed V on outstanding French-Moroccan problems, according to a senior French Embassy official. On 13 June he made a preliminary offer providing for France to give up its military bases in Morocco, not excepting its major naval and naval air installations at Kenitra (Port Lyautey) and Agadir, when evacuation of American Air Force bases is completed in 1963. Paris probably will concentrate on obtaining a "reasonable settlement" of the extensive property claims of French nationals in Morocco. It would prefer to let the frontier questions wait, pending Mauritania's anticipated accession to independence and clarification of Algeria's future status.

This new French move appears consistent with De Gaulle's general policy of physical French withdrawal from Africa in exchange for good relations with the new states there. In Tunisia, France has already withdrawn from all military installations except the base at Bizerte, which it maintains is essential for the defense of French interests in the Mediterranean. There have been intermittent negotiations on French property in Tunisia, but no settlement has yet been reached, although the French holdings there are smaller and less complex than those in Morocco.

Although French officials expect the King's government to be more tractable than that of former left-wing Premier Abdullah Ibrahim, the King will seek maximum French concessions in line with his proclaimed policies of obtaining commitments during 1960 for the evacuation of all foreign troops, Moroccanizing the administration and economy, and "regaining lost territories." The King will be especially wary of giving the nationalists a chance to charge him with having sold out to France. A French official in Rabat claims that the King asked that talks not proceed too rapidly "lest the opposition be encouraged to attack the results solely on the grounds of undue haste," and anticipates that several months will pass before results become apparent.

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Executive Secretary, National Security Council

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The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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