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15 June 1961

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
INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## DAILY BRIEF

Laos: Both in the speeches of its foreign minister at Geneva and in editorial comment on the conference, Communist China is denouncing formulations that would provide for any international supervision over the manner in which Laos would practice neutrality. Peiping clearly wants no form of international scrutiny that might inhibit Pathet Lao activities in the event of a Laotian settlement.

The Pathet Lao, in line with the general Communist effort to limit the present and future role of the ICC in Laos, has launched a strong drive to exclude the ICC observers from sessions of the Namone peace talks. No new reports of fighting in Laos have been received. [redacted]

Bloc airlift operations continue to be scheduled through 15 June. [redacted] (Backup, Page 1) (Map)


[The Watch Committee at its meeting on 14 June reached the following conclusion on Laos:


[The Communist forces in Laos will continue their efforts to eliminate pro-government forces operating in Communist-dominated areas, and to improve their already strong military position. At Geneva, the Communists continue to delay implementation of an effective cease-fire. They apparently believe that these tactics will eventually result in the establishment of a "neutral" Laotian government satisfactory to them.] [redacted]

Belgium-Congo: Ambassador MacArthur at Brussels reports he is somewhat encouraged by recent discussions with the directors of various Belgian firms having interests in the Congo, particularly Katanga. From his discussions, the ambassador got the impression that these firms, which

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# Republic of the Congo





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formerly preferred to see an independent Katanga and presumably used their influence in that direction, now agree that the Gizenga regime presents the greatest threat to their position and that their best protection is to effect a rapprochement between Katanga and Leopoldville under Kasavubu. The ambassador cautions that representatives of some of the Belgian companies in the Congo will continue to cause trouble.

USSR: A new class combatant ship, designated Kynda by the US intelligence community, is in series production at the Zhdanov shipyard in Leningrad, where at least two units are being built. Western naval attachés who have visited the area report that a missile launcher, probably for surface-to-surface missiles, has been installed on the forward portion on one of the units. Their reports also suggest that the new units will be highly streamlined and that they are about the same size as the 4,000-ton "Krupnyy" guided missile destroyers, which first appeared in 1959 and which the new class may now supplant. Although these ships have been seen only in Leningrad, it is possible that they are also under construction at other yards which have previously built guided missile destroyers, such as Komsomolsk in the Far East and Nikolayev in the Black Sea area.

*ok*

Jordan - Arab League: King Husayn fears that the creation of a "general Headquarters of the Arab Armies," which is being considered by Arab League foreign and defense ministers now meeting in Cairo, would pose a serious threat to his regime. He believes the UAR would inevitably control the headquarters and that UAR troops probably would be stationed in Jordan, providing Nasir with opportunities for penetration and subversion among the Jordanian Army and civil population.

*No*

, however, Husayn has not yet decided to reject the proposal, recognizing that if he did so, he would be further discredited both within Jordan and elsewhere in the Arab world. He would be placed in the position of jeopardizing the development of coordinated Arab plans to oppose

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implementation of Israel's Jordan River diversion project.]  
 (Backup, Page 3)

United Nations: Mauritania, whose application for UN membership was vetoed last December by the USSR in a move which tied its admission to that of Mongolia, is now supported by 11 former French African states. They have generally maintained that if Mauritania fails to gain admission because of an anticipated veto by Nationalist China of Mongolia's application, they will break relations with Taipei and vote for Peiping's admission to the UN. [While aware of these threats, Nationalist China's foreign minister has said Taipei is determined to prevent Mongolia's admission "no matter what the cost."] (Backup, Page 5) *No*

Zanzibar: [The security situation in Zanzibar is now under control, but the British Resident believes that suspicion and resentment between the African and Arab groups will remain and for a long time pose a substantial security problem. He considers that it will be necessary to retain a battalion of troops or police in the protectorate until all trials and other legal actions arising from the recent disorders have been completed. Thereafter, one company will be required as a permanent garrison until the local police have built up an adequate striking force. The opposition Afro-Shirazi party, which draws its membership from Zanzibar's African element (some 80 percent of the population), has decided to boycott the legislature and has warned that the party "can no longer be held responsible for whatever repercussions take place."] *ok*

USSR: An ICBM test vehicle was launched from Tyura Tam to the Kamchatka impact area at about 0545 GMT (0145 EDT) this morning.

the vehicle successfully reached the Kamchatka Peninsula. *No*

This is the 16th Soviet ICBM launch this year, six of which probably failed in flight.

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~~TOP SECRET~~**WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS**

[On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:]

- [A. No change from last week.]
- [B. No change from last week.]
- [C. LAOS: Carried on Page i of Daily Brief.]

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## The Laotian Situation

The French draft protocol proposing a strong ICC function in Laos was condemned by Peiping's People's Daily on 14 June as an attempt to infringe on the sovereignty of Laos. Echoing the theme of Foreign Minister Chen Yi's 12 June speech at the conference, People's Daily stated that the Laotians should supervise their own neutrality--"there are many countries in the world pursuing a peaceful and neutral policy which have different political forces internally. This, however, does not put them in need of international control." While People's Daily declared flatly that the "socialist countries" are not going to accept any supervised neutrality in Laos, the Chinese are portraying themselves as businesslike and reasonable--both Chen Yi and People's Daily avoided vindictive language and expressed cautious optimism that "there are all the conditions for our conference to reach an agreement."

[At the 14 June session of the Namone talks, discussions in the political committee degenerated into a dispute over whether the ICC should be represented at future meetings. The government denied that it had assented last week to a Pathet Lao motion excluding ICC observers from the Namone talks and insisted that representatives of the ICC be seated as in the past. No ICC representative was present. In the military subcommittee, where the ICC was represented by Indian General Singh, the Pathet Lao took the position that the ICC should be allowed to inspect only the forward positions of the opposing forces on Route 13 south of Vang Vieng and not such "liberated areas" as Pa Dong. When Singh asked each side to name a point the ICC could visit on 16 June, the Pathet Lao challenged his right to speak at sessions of the subcommittee.]

Souvanna Phouma, in a speech to the Geneva conference on 14 June, also sought to downgrade the role of the ICC. He stated that the cease-fire should be regulated by a committee of the three major forces in Laos--his group, the Pathet Lao, and the Boun Oum government--with recourse to the ICC being limited only to "difficult questions." Souvanna said that the commission's

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main functions should be to supervise withdrawal of foreign troops and check on the shipment of arms into Laos; he specifically excluded French troops, who would be allowed to stay under the terms of the 1954 Geneva agreement. He added that the ICC might be called upon to supervise the next election in Laos, but in any event, the ICC should "act in agreement with local authorities in the respect of our sovereignty."

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[REDACTED]

### King Husayn and the Arab League's Palestine Proposals

[The approaching implementation of Israel's Jordan River diversion project--the Israelis say the first stage will be completed in 1963--has prompted a series of attempts to develop a coordinated Arab policy toward Israel. The Arab League Council considered the problem at its February meeting in Baghdad and decided to refer various military questions to the Arab states' army chiefs of staff. The latter conferred in Cairo in April. In late May and early June an Arab League "Palestine Experts Committee" also met in Cairo and by majority vote recommended the reinstitution of the old "Palestine Government" which was formed in Cairo in 1949, following the Arab-Israeli war, but which was never effective.]

[Like the proposal for a "General Headquarters of the Arab Armies," the revival of a Palestine political entity poses an implied threat to King Husayn's regime. It appeals to the Palestinian majority of Jordan's population, over 600,000 of whom are refugees from what is now Israel, and by inference the proposed "Palestine Government" would at least aspire to having jurisdiction over the West Bank area of Jordan. The West Bank, the largest remaining Arab-controlled portion of the old Palestine mandate, was annexed by Jordan in 1950.]

[Husayn believes the "Palestine Government" proposal, as well as the projected unified Arab army command, is part of a new program Nasir has instituted to weaken and gain control of Jordan. The King now feels that the recent exchange of letters he initiated with Nasir has placed him at a disadvantage in attempting to cope with the courses of action Nasir may follow. Husayn expects the UAR President to present a facade of moderation toward Jordan in conjunction with subversive activity designed to exploit any relaxation of internal security measures in Jordan or any uncertainty among the Jordanian people. The]

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[King has decided to postpone a decision on the nature and timing of Jordanian elections until the issue of reviving the "Palestine Government" is "clarified." ]

[ Husayn's suspicions reflect a fundamental problem of his regime: it remains dependent on the economic and political support of Britain and the United States, whom all Arabs regard as supporters of Israel. As Ambassador Macomber points out, this makes the King, in Arab eyes, "the friend of the Arabs' most bitter enemy." Husayn's predicament, on the other hand, is alleviated by Israel's tacit approval of his regime so long as it is free of control by Nasir.]

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## Developments on Admission of Mauritania and Mongolia to UN

The USSR's veto of Mauritania was an attempt to curry favor with Morocco at a time when Moscow was negotiating an arms deal with Rabat. Morocco claims the former French territory and attempted to delay its independence. The USSR has repeatedly proposed Mongolia for UN membership and has linked its admission to the admission of other countries. After the veto, the 15th General Assembly passed a resolution sponsored by the 11 African states endorsing both Mauritania and Mongolia for UN membership. The Security Council will probably meet on this question shortly before the opening of the 16th General Assembly next September.

Nationalist China considers Mongolia a part of China. In 1955, despite numerous representations from its Western allies, Taipei vetoed Mongolia's admission, thereby precipitating the Soviet veto of Japan and causing considerable resentment among UN members.

Taipei's sensitivity about this issue and its awareness of the gloomy prospects for maintaining the General Assembly moratorium on Chinese representation seem to have hardened attitudes in the Foreign Ministry. [The foreign minister indicated to the US ambassador on 5 June that the Mongolia problem--particularly the US decision to investigate the feasibility of establishing diplomatic relations with Ulan Bator--and other developments are propelling the Nationalist leadership psychologically toward a decision to leave the United Nations despite the advantages of UN membership.]

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