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10 October 1959

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700350001-1

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist China - USSR - India:

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Khrushchev is said to have urged that Peiping refrain from public statements on the border issue. The Chinese, who apparently accepted these recommendations, in fact have not publicly criticized New Delhi since mid-September. Chou En-lai's message on 6 October to Nehru playing down the border issue as a mere episode in an "age-old friendship" is the latest indication that Peiping hopes to create an atmosphere of reconciliation. The Chinese, however, have given no indication of willingness to accept Nehru's condition for talks by evacuating their forces from areas claimed by Nehru to be Indian territory.)

N<sup>o</sup>

[redacted]

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Communist China: A recent article by a leading Chinese Communist party official contains the regime's most explicit admission of widespread discontent with the party leadership. The article seems to be mainly addressed to the lower ranks, but its warning against "individualism" on the part of high-ranking party members may be directed at some of central committee and politburo rank. Former Defense Minister Peng Te-huai and his ex-chief of staff seem to be particularly vulnerable. Both men were absent from Peiping's 10th anniversary celebration on 1 October and have not appeared since.


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Communist China - UAR: Peiping apparently does not want a diplomatic break with Cairo, but has warned the UAR to stop "fabricating rumors and slanders" about Communist China. In its first public comment since the recent UAR attack--precipitated by Syrian Communist leader Bakdash's speech in Peiping--the official New China News Agency categorically denied Cairo's press charges on 8 October that the Chinese ambassador had been recalled and that the UAR Embassy in Peiping is being harassed. Citing the "friendship of the Chinese people to people in the UAR," the Chinese broadcast advised UAR newspapers to stop their anti-Chinese campaign. While the Chinese apparently wish to avoid public recriminations, they are likely to respond vigorously to any further UAR press attacks.

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Ghana - Soviet Bloc: Ghana, probably influenced in part by Guinea's example, appears to be giving its neutralist policy a new emphasis by developing more active relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Although the USSR now is the only bloc country with a diplomatic mission in Accra, serious consideration apparently is being given to an early exchange of ambassadors with Peiping. Total bloc personnel in Ghana--including the existing Polish, Czech, and East German permanent trade missions--now is estimated at 80, a figure expected to increase next year. [redacted]  
(Page 5)

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### III. THE WEST

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*No*  
United Nations: [Ambassador Lodge estimates "pessimistically" that Poland thus far has a two-vote lead over Turkey for the UN] [redacted]

10 Oct 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

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[Security Council seat now occupied by Japan. Even if Turkey should pick up a possible 11 votes on the second or third ballot, Ankara will not have the required two-thirds majority. The resulting deadlock might cause the emergence of a neutral dark-horse candidate, probably a member of the Asian-African bloc. Balloting begins on 12 October.] [REDACTED]

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\*Bolivia: Bolivian President Siles plans to ask Congress to accept his own resignation or rescind its 7 October election of Ruben Julio as the new Senate chief, a post which includes the right of succession to the national presidency. Siles' actual resignation would probably set off rioting and an intense struggle for power. Julio has recently allied himself with the left-wing opposition to Siles in a bitter conflict with the President over a cabinet appointment. [REDACTED]

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### Peiping Continues Campaign Against Domestic Critics

An article by an alternate member of the Chinese Communist party's secretariat in the official People's Daily on 28 September contains the regime's most explicit admission of widespread discontent with the party leadership. The article seems to be addressed mainly to the lower ranks, but contains a warning to "high-ranking functionaries" against "individualism."

The writer specifically attacks "unit" leaders who object to party interference and attempt to turn their spheres of responsibility into "independent kingdoms." These comrades, he continues, say that the party should assume only "political and ideological" and not "organizational" leadership. Calling this attitude a serious political mistake, the writer states that the party must completely expose this point of view and deal those who espouse it a "determined blow." Some of these charges are similar to those made in 1954 preceding the purge of two high-ranking party leaders.

The article concludes with the most effusive praise of Mao Tse-tung of the past year. This strong defense of Mao and his policies--following similar efforts in the past few months--points up the widespread criticism of the leadership, both within and outside the party, which resulted from the "leap forward" and commune programs.

This article illustrates again the intention of Mao and the "party-machine" leaders to maintain their domination of the party by threatening and punishing their critics. At the highest levels of the party, former Defense Minister Peng Te-huai and his ex-chief of staff seem to be particularly vulnerable to the kind of criticism contained in this article. Both men were absent from Peiping's 10th anniversary celebration on 1 October and have not appeared since.

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### Ghana Expanding Relations With Bloc

Ghana now appears to be implementing its long-professed policy of "positive neutralism and nonalignment" in a more active manner as far as its relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc are concerned. Motivated apparently by an increasing interest in exploring the possibilities of bloc economic and technical aid as well as by a desire not to appear appreciably less "neutralist" than Guinea, the Nkrumah regime is exhibiting increased receptivity toward bloc efforts to promote contacts. These efforts have been progressively intensified since late 1958.

Although the Soviet Embassy established in August is the only bloc diplomatic mission in Accra at present, Prime Minister Nkrumah has apparently been giving serious consideration to an early exchange of ambassadors with Communist China. An announcement to this effect may possibly be made in connection with the current visit to Peiping of a Ghanaian trade and good-will mission. Since its independence in 1957, Ghana has held that it "inherited" recognition of Peiping from Britain and has consistently voted in the UN against postponement of the Chinese representation issue. Guinea's decision to establish diplomatic relations with Communist China was announced on 4 October.

Meanwhile, the European satellites--especially East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, which have permanent trade missions in Accra spearhead the bloc's drive in Ghana. Their representatives, including trade delegates and technicians, now account for over 60 of the estimated 80 bloc personnel resident in Ghana. Most of the Communist-bloc countries send periodic special delegations which have offered technical assistance and conducted industrial feasibility surveys. The East Germans, striving for international recognition, have been particularly active. Last month they induced Ghana to sign agreements providing for the training of 50 Ghanaian students in East German universities, technical schools, and factories.

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### III. THE WEST

#### Security Council Contest May Result in Deadlock

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[The close contest between Turkey and Poland for the UN Security Council seat now occupied by Japan may result in a deadlock and the emergence of a neutral dark-horse candidate-- probably from the Asian-African bloc. Ambassador Lodge estimates that Poland thus far has a two-vote lead over Turkey, with neither having the necessary two-thirds majority. Even with 11 votes which may switch to Turkey on the second or third ballot, Turkey will not have the 54-plus votes needed. Voting is by secret ballot.]

[Many UN members, now committed to Poland, might have supported Turkey if its candidacy had been announced sooner. In addition to Communist support, Poland has the backing of many UN members who consider this council seat allocated to Eastern Europe. Six Latin American members are supporting Poland for this reason. Other members claim they do not understand the United States' strong opposition to Poland in view of the "present detente" between Moscow and Washington.]

[Balloting begins on 12 October, and it is possible that as many as 30 ballots will be required before the issue is resolved. In 1955, when a contest occurred between the Philippines and Yugoslavia, 34 ballots were insufficient to resolve the problem, and the two countries divided the two-year term between them.]

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### Bolivian President Plans Ultimatum to Congress

Moderate Bolivian President Siles plans to go before a joint session of Congress to force that group to choose between his own resignation and a reversal of the Senate's 7 October election of Ruben Julio as Senate chief, a post which stands first in line of succession to the presidency. Julio has recently allied himself with the left-wing opposition in a bitter conflict with the President over a cabinet appointment.

Siles seeks a vote by both houses of congress, apparently hoping that the majority in the Chamber of Deputies may be sufficient to overcome the opposition's majority in the Senate. One of his supporters won the top office in the lower house last August by 32 to 29.

Siles' actual resignation would set off an intense struggle for power. Control of the government machinery is an important factor in the decisive government party nominating convention, scheduled for December for the 1960 presidential election. Tensions would probably lead to rioting and possibly to clashes among the armed groups of civilian militia, which could involve the army. [redacted]

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