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
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## 1. THE SITUATION IN JORDAN

### Comment on:

The inability of King Hussain's premier-designate, Dr. Hussain Khalidi, to form a new government in Jordan may induce the king either to attempt to dissolve the legislature and rule by martial law, or to bow again to the coalition of leftist elements which dominated the previous Nabulsi cabinet.

[redacted] the left-wing Baath and National Socialist Parties had warned Khalidi and two of Hussain's other potential candidates for prime minister that if they agreed to form a government they would be "going against public pressure." The leftists were also reported to have planned to ask army chief of staff Nuwar and new security director Maayta to warn the king of the "dangers which may confront the country as a result of the present situation."

Large demonstrations have, meanwhile, been held in the West Jordan ultranationalist center of Nablus calling for the return of the Nabulsi cabinet. Thus far the demonstrations have been orderly for the most part, and appear intended only as a show of strength. The leftist-dominated National Guidance Committee in Jerusalem, claiming to represent all political groups there, cabled King Hussain to protest the Nabulsi cabinet's dismissal.

Shortly before the Nabulsi cabinet resigned on 9 April, it initiated new moves to limit the power and jurisdiction of the king by ordering the dismissal of not only the former public security director but a number of other senior officials who were also supporters of the palace.

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**2. USSR AND ARAB COMMUNISTS INCREASE AGITATION  
AGAINST RICHARDS MISSION**

Reference: [redacted]

Soviet officials and Arab Communists have increased their secret activity against the Richards mission in Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

[redacted] France and Israel were preparing for aggression against Egypt. [redacted]

[redacted] the United States will support this aggression "under the cover of the Eisenhower plan for the Middle East," and that American forces will "enter Lebanon as a country which has accepted this plan, in order to gain a foothold in the Middle East."

[redacted] Communist leaders of Syria, Jordan and Lebanon met on 27 March to co-ordinate plans for countering the Richards mission, and Jordanian Communists decided on 30 March to try to disrupt its possible reception in Jordan by "holding demonstrations" and "closing schools, stores and government offices."

Moscow propaganda generally has avoided publicizing the Richards mission in its Arabic broadcasts. Soviet broadcasts in Persian attacked American "aggressive" intentions following Richards' visit to Iran and Afghanistan.

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**3. CYPRIOT TURKS MAY PLAN TO ASSASSINATE  
ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS**

*Re:* [redacted] Cypriot Turks will attempt to assassinate Archbishop Makarios if the latter returns to the island,

Cypriot Turks will act despite the virtual certainty that the Greek majority would respond with anti-Turkish violence. [redacted] they would have difficulty containing Turkish violence, since 98 percent of the auxiliary police force of about 3,000 men is Turkish.

**Comment**

[redacted] Turkish feeling against both the British and the Greeks has recently reached a dangerous level. Ankara has thus far controlled Turkish Cypriot opposition to the Greek union campaign and any outbreak of violence would be on Ankara's direction.

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#### 4. JAPANESE ATTITUDES ON RELATIONS WITH US EXPLAINED BY KISHI

##### Reference:

Japanese prime minister Kishi, analyzing the barriers impeding co-operation between Japan and the United States, told Ambassador MacArthur on 10 April that present relations between the two countries do not reflect their basic common interests. In the first of a series of preparatory talks on the agenda for his talks in Washington, Kishi said the Japanese people see US foreign policy as ultimately aimed at a war to overthrow the Communist bloc. They feel that the present US-Japanese relationship commits Japan to this policy and thus may lead Japan to war.

Kishi explained that, because of their own disastrous defeat, the Japanese people hate war more than Communism and see armaments only as instruments of war. Thus, they cannot understand the American argument that armaments deter war and serve the cause of peace. They see the US-Japanese security treaty as the symbol of their country's subordination and point to the United States' right to use bases in Japan for purposes irrelevant to Japan's defense and without Japanese approval. They also fear that the United States intends to hold Okinawa and the Bonin Islands indefinitely despite announcements disclaiming territorial ambitions.

The people see restrictions on Japanese exports to the United States as reflecting latent anti-Japanese feelings. These restrictions, together with US opposition to trade with Communist China, are regarded as contrary to the United States' declared policy of assisting Japan's economy.

Kishi stressed that he does not necessarily share these views or consider them justifiable. He emphasized that Japan desires to remain friendly with the US, but that the key to genuine co-operation lies in how the two governments evaluate, and then remove, the impediments which stem from Japanese national sentiment.

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## 5. JAPAN PLANS FURTHER STEPS TOWARD DE FACTO RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA

### Comment on:

Japan's International Trade and Industry Minister Mizuta announced on 11 April that Japan intends to grant "considerable convenience" to the Chinese Communists in permitting them to establish a trade mission in Tokyo. He said that Japan would also subsidize the establishment of a quasi-official trade mission in Peiping. An exchange of such missions would constitute a significant step toward de facto recognition.

Mizuta also said that the government will give "positive guidance" in forthcoming private trade talks with Peiping. He said that the government is seeking to boost trade with China to \$100,000,000 each way during 1957, a one-third increase over last year.

The cabinet decided on 9 April to send to China a nonofficial repatriation mission consisting of Diet members, and possibly officials of the Foreign and Welfare Ministries, to investigate the status of some 40,000 missing Japanese nationals. These would be the first Japanese government officials to go to Peiping.

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## 6. BONN'S REPLIES TO MOSCOW STRESS REPATRIATION ISSUE AS KEY TO GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

Comment on:

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Bonn is prepared to enter into negotiations with the USSR for the settlement of mutual problems.

any improvement in German-Soviet relations depends on reaching agreement on the repatriation of German nationals.

The replies seem designed to demonstrate to West German public opinion that the government is taking a positive attitude toward Eastern relations. By demanding action on the repatriation problem, Adenauer can protract negotiations past the date of the September Bundestag elections, after which the issue will lose some of its domestic political importance. Moscow has so far shown little intention to repatriate the 100,000 Germans in the Soviet Union, most of whom were removed from Germany at the end of the war.

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## 7. UN REPRESENTATIVE FINDS NO BASIS FOR SETTLING KASHMIR DISPUTE

Comment on:

UN representative Jarring apparently has found no basis for settling the Kashmir dispute during his three visits to Karachi and two to New Delhi. His report is scheduled to be ready for the Security Council by 15 April.

Jarring found India and Pakistan opposed to having the International Court of Justice adjudicate any part of the dispute. After hearing India's fears of possible Pakistani aggression, he obtained a statement from Pakistani prime minister Suhrawardy of willingness to join India in a no-war declaration if India would agree to arbitrate any disagreements regarding establishment of peaceful conditions preparatory to a plebiscite in Kashmir. India's reaction to Suhrawardy's suggestion seems to have been negative, however.

Pakistan has flatly rejected bilateral talks, and any further investigations by a UN representative are unlikely to produce any progress. Suhrawardy seems convinced that he will have to try to obtain General Assembly consideration of the case, but the Western powers will probably try to keep the problem in the Security Council.

If Security Council action is delayed or inconclusive, public opinion in Pakistan will probably demand that the government do something to end Indian occupation of Kashmir. The Pakistani government will probably do its utmost to prevent any tribal incidents pending final Security Council action or referral to the General Assembly.

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## 8. SOVIET-YUGOSLAV TRADE AGREEMENT

Comment on: [Redacted]

The Soviet Union has signed a general agreement with Yugoslavia outlining trade objectives for the period 1958-60, despite the recent postponement of Soviet credits and the general deterioration of relations between the two countries. The agreement is, however, a statement of general intention rather than a firm commitment, since it specifies targets without minimum guaranteed amounts or agreed prices. The goods mentioned for Soviet export include coking coal, petroleum, grain, and machinery, much desired by the Yugoslavs, for which Belgrade will exchange primarily metallurgical, agricultural, and chemical products.

Yugoslav officials have reiterated that the seemingly favorable 1957 Soviet-Yugoslav protocol--calling for a total trade slightly over last year's agreement--was in fact a hollow agreement. The Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow told Ambassador Bohlen on 8 April that Moscow had actually kept at a minimum the list of products to be exchanged in 1957, and he felt that prospects for 1958 and 1959 were no better.

Soviet party boss Khrushchev publicly warned the Yugoslavs in mid-March not to expect the Soviet people to "share their last crumb of bread" unless the Yugoslavs are willing to develop really "fraternal relations," but it is apparent the Kremlin is willing to continue trade on a strictly business basis. [Redacted]

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## 9. MOLLET'S VIEWS ON FRENCH NORTH AFRICAN POLICY

Comment on:

According to a conversation with the American chargé in Paris on 9 April, French premier Mollet believes that France's relations with Tunisia and

Morocco are gradually improving. He proposes to proceed with the planned aid programs for the two areas and to accede to Tunisian demands to withdraw all French military forces except those at Bizerte.

Mollet apparently contemplates a continuation of the pacification drive in Algeria in the hope that a de facto cease-fire will develop over wide areas during the next two or three months. He told the American chargé that he would then proceed with elections wherever the situation is calm, first at the communal, then at the territorial, and finally at the national level.

The premier appears to support Minister Lacoste's optimistic view of the effectiveness of the present military effort. Mollet probably expects that the stalemate in Algeria will continue at least until the National Assembly recesses for the summer, thus increasing his chances for surviving debates on the budget and European integration. At the same time he can assure world opinion that France is holding to the program the UN General Assembly accepted in February.

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## 10. COMMUNIST CHINA SEEN STALLING ON SINO-BURMA BORDER ISSUE

[redacted] Burmese prime minister U Nu's careful and evasive treatment of the Sino-Burma border issue during a press conference on 9 April tends to confirm, in the opinion of the American embassy in Rangoon, a report [redacted] that recent discussions between Chou En-lai and Nu in Kunming had failed to produce agreement because of Chinese Communist stalling. Nu described the border issue to reporters as a "big problem not amenable to easy solution," and admitted "two or three details need to be ironed out."

### Comment

The Burmese prime minister will probably continue, in the immediate future at least, to gloss over difficulties in reaching a border settlement. Prior to his Kunming visit, however, he is reported to have stated privately that he considered Peiping morally obligated to live up to the tentative agreement reached last November. Protracted Chinese Communist stalling would undoubtedly invite Nu's anger and possibly lead to a resumption of the unfavorable publicity which last summer embarrassed Peiping into boundary negotiations.

Peiping will probably continue to stall on the border issue as long as it can offer plausible reasons for delay. Peiping may desire to keep the issue open in the belief that it will facilitate Communist subversion by creating dissension between Rangoon and the Kachins, whose territory is involved.

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Watch Report 349, 11 April  
of the  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

**Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities**

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.
- C. A deliberate initiation of hostilities by either Israel or the Arab states is improbable in the immediate future. Unsettled issues and tensions, particularly the internal situation in Jordan, continue to constitute possibilities for violence. Should there be internal violence or civil war in Jordan, intervention by neighboring Arab states probably would occur, and Israeli intervention would be a possibility.

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