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1. SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE MAY BE IN SESSION

A Soviet central committee plenum may be going on in Moscow. Rumors to this effect have been circulating in the diplomatic colony, and there appears to be a sudden increase in official automobile traffic in the vicinity of the Kremlin. The CBS correspondent in Moscow in his 16 October broadcast indicated that the censors had cut 19 words from his text relating to a forthcoming plenum. Two full members of the party presidium, Zhukov and Aristov, however, are currently on tour outside the Soviet Union.

The Soviet leaders may have called a plenum at this time to assess the effects of their recent technological, scientific, and military achievements on the USSR's over-all position vis-a-vis the West and to outline ways and means for further exploiting the psychological gains already scored by the ICBM and the earth satellite. High on the list of urgent matters for committee consideration would be the Middle East crisis.

In the domestic field there may be disagreement over economic policy, possibly connected with the 1958 plan, which needs to be ironed out at a plenum. There have been several reports that such disagreement exists. Disagreement may also have arisen over the policy statement to be issued in connection with the 40th anniversary celebration on 7 November.

Khrushchev may have convened a plenum in order to have it call a party congress at which a new central committee would be elected. He might wish to call such a congress soon while his prestige and influence are high rather than wait until the next congress which would normally

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have been held in 1960. Through his influence he would probably be able to prevent the election to the central committee of anyone whose support had been anything less than enthusiastic.

Ousters or demotions of important leaders may be approved at the plenum but would probably be kept secret until after the anniversary celebration.

Any early announcement of such changes would probably reflect an overriding need to silence opposition.
[redacted]

2. RENEWED ACTIVITY AT TYURA TAM MISSILE TEST RANGE

[redacted] [redacted]
[redacted] the Tyura Tam missile test range on 17 October indicated that some type of operational activity was intended to culminate at approximately 1300 GMT (0900 EDT) on 18 October. This information suggests a firing of an ICBM or earth satellite vehicle, but does not unequivocally indicate that an actual firing took place [redacted]

[redacted] The Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee believes the scheduled activity could be only a practice exercise within the rangehead and that there is no more than an even chance that a launching was attempted on 18 October.

3. KHRUSHCHEV REPORTEDLY PROMPTS BEVAN TO PROPOSE MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT

[REDACTED]

As a result of "prompting" by Soviet party chief Khrushchev during their mid-September talks, British Labor party treasurer Aneurin Bevan will propose during his Washington visit an immediate embargo on arms shipments to the Middle East and settlement of the situation by a "three-power agreement among the USSR, the United States, and Great Britain," [REDACTED]

Bevan-- Labor's official spokesman on foreign affairs--leaves London on 26 October for a three-week visit to the United States, and has already informed the British embassy that he wishes to talk with Secretary Dulles and if possible with President Eisenhower. Inasmuch as party leader Gaitskell recently told the American embassy in London that he and Bevan agree on the Middle Eastern question, the reported proposal presumably has Gaitskell's support.

In a letter to the Western big three last February, the Soviet government proposed a four-power package declaration, including an arms embargo, which would foreswear interference in the Middle East. At that time the Soviet Union assured the Arab states that its proposal was on an all-or-nothing basis and that the West would not accept.

The interview underscores current Soviet efforts to create close working relationships with the Western European Socialists. Recent Soviet letters to the Socialist parties of eight West European NATO countries have sought to establish grounds for cooperation by arguing that Soviet and Socialist views on many subjects are similar.

4. USSR BROADENS SECRET POLICE ORGANIZATION

Comment on:

The Soviet secret police organization, which the Soviet leaders decentralized after the purge of Lavrentiy Beriya in 1953, now is regaining some of its former strength.

Soviet border troops were transferred earlier this year from the Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD) to the Committee of State Security (KGB), which administers the secret police. Internal security troops may also have been transferred at the same time. This would again unify all security functions, including secret political police activity, foreign intelligence, and domestic and military counterintelligence, as well as command of the border and internal security troops. The combined strength of these troops is currently estimated at 400,000 men, of whom 150,000 are border guards. Nevertheless, the KGB does not yet enjoy the tremendous power of Beriya's MVD empire, which included control of local law enforcement agencies and the huge economic empire based on forced labor.

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5. SOVIET UNION MOVES TO REVIVE TALKS WITH WEST GERMANY

Reference:

[redacted] Moscow

[redacted] has offered to discuss the German repatriation question on a "case-by-case" basis. This offer seems designed to keep West German-Soviet bloc ties from deteriorating and to stimulate the Bonn-Moscow trade talks. [redacted] the West German negotiating mission in Moscow describes the concessions as "very small," but feels that West Germany has little alternative but to reopen the negotiations. [redacted]
[redacted] the Soviet view that there are no longer any Germans in the Soviet Union eligible for repatriation.

Repatriation and trade talks, which were begun in July 1957, have been interrupted on several occasions as a result of Soviet unwillingness to discuss Bonn's claim of 80,000 potential repatriates. Bonn's insistence on a repatriation settlement in return for a trade and payments agreement remains unchanged, but the West German negotiators almost certainly would settle for a smaller number of repatriates than claimed by Bonn. Since the 15 September election, the negotiations hold relatively little interest for the West German government. Adenauer is under pressure from certain elements among West German industrialists to increase trade with the USSR.

However, he is making use of the repatriation issue to avoid having to conclude a long-term trade agreement.

The Soviet Union apparently continues to be concerned that repatriation discussions with Bonn would harm the East German regime's prestige. The East German ambassador to Moscow was reportedly promised in late July that he would be "consulted" on all repatriation matters which might involve the interests of the East German regime. Moscow is currently rumored to be considering a repatriation accord with East Germany. [redacted]

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6. USSR INVITES ARAB OFFICIALS TO 40TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS

Comment on:

The USSR has extended invitations to Saudi, Egyptian, and other Arab government officials to visit Moscow on the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution.

The USSR has not made it a practice to invite non-Communist governments to send representatives to these celebrations but evidently intends to use this year's celebrations to draw Afro-Asian countries as well as Western Socialists closer to the bloc in an enlarged "zone of peace."

Soviet Ambassador to Egypt Kiselev delivered the invitation to the Saudi ambassador in Cairo for "some men from the Saudi Ministry of Education." Kiselev said that similar invitations had been issued to the other Arab nations and that Egypt would send a delegation.

In addressing the invitation to minor Saudi officials, Moscow probably believes the chances of its being accepted are more favorable. Two minor Saudi officials recently attended a Soviet agricultural exhibit at the invitation of Moscow after King Saud had turned down a Soviet suggestion that the minister of agriculture attend.

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7. ISRAELI-SYRIAN BORDER TENSIONS

Comment on:

The Israeli Foreign Ministry appears to be playing down the arrival of Egyptian troops in Syria and reports that the Egyptians may take up positions on the Israeli front. The ministry has put off press queries with a statement that it is awaiting discussion of the question with other governments "equally concerned with events in Syria and Egypt."

The situation along the northeast sector of the Israeli-Syrian border remains tense as a result of Israeli efforts to survey a frontier line where Israeli and Syrian maps disagree. At the request of the UN officer chairing the Mixed Armistice Commission, the surveying has been postponed until 20 October.

Despite earlier warnings, Syria has not contested Israeli work to complete the Lake Hula drainage project. The deepening of the Jordan River south of the lake was completed by 15 October, but a two-week delay in actual drainage of the lake is expected because of remaining dike construction, and the actual drainage operation will probably take place about 30 October. [redacted]

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8. POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN JORDAN

Comment on:

Opposition elements in Jordan appear to have begun a new campaign to demonstrate the unpopularity of the pro-Western cabinet. Six members of the radical National Socialist party have resigned from parliament, leaving only 27 out of 40 members present in the lower house. Six others are in exile and one is under arrest. Further resignations, possibly by members of the ultranationalist Moslem Brotherhood, may be in the offing.

The gesture of resignation probably was adopted to provide a dramatic counter to the cabinet's success this week in using intensive pressure to obtain a vote of confidence.

King Hussayn's government has become increasingly preoccupied with internal security measures, but has failed thus far to prevent smuggling of arms and explosives and the movement of subversive personnel into Jordan from Syria. Severe penalties were imposed last week for the unauthorized possession of arms and explosives, and a vehicle curfew has been ordered in some parts of North Jordan near the Syrian border.

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9. FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS

Comment on:

President Coty had reportedly already decided before Pinay was rejected by the National Assembly to call together the leaders of the Socialists, Popular Republicans, and Independents, to try to get them to agree on a premier candidate they would support. Coty reportedly refuses to designate another candidate until the three major nonextremist groups accept a solution to the three-week-old crisis.

The American embassy in Paris comments that a Popular Republican candidate is most likely to be named in view of intensified Socialist-Independent hostility and the splintering among the small center parties. The embassy notes increasing signs among the Socialists that they realize they cannot insist on their own program and team to the exclusion of any other, and Socialist leader Mallet is rumored to be pushing his party to enter a government headed by a Popular Republican.

Ex-premier Robert Schuman and party leader Pierre Pflimlin are likely Popular Republican choices though the Socialist rank and file is hostile to Pflimlin, and Schuman, who is 71, may be regarded as too old. A government of the center with support from both right and left would probably be more stable than the conservative coalition Pinay had proposed. The Popular Republicans have not participated in either of the two cabinets which have governed since this assembly was elected in January 1956.

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10. BRITISH DECLARE FULL ALERT ON CYPRUS

Comment on:

The declaration of a "full antisabotage alert" on Cyprus on 18 October indicates that the local British authorities fear a full-scale campaign of violence by the Greek Cypriot underground organization EOKA may be imminent. Declaration of the alert followed the bombing of the government-controlled broadcasting station transmitter and two transformers at the RAF base near Nicosia on 17 October.

The bombings are the first acts of violence conducted against government installations since inauguration of the recent seven-month truce. They follow by three days the killing of a Greek Cypriot "traitor" known to have been on an EOKA execution list. British authorities have previously stated that the Cypriot underground, reorganized and re-equipped since last March, could inflict heavy damage during the initial phase of a renewed campaign of terrorism.

Resumption of terrorism would embarrass Archbishop Makarios during his visit to the United States, although he probably would be unwilling to denounce terrorism if the UN debate on Cyprus in November appears negative.

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11. DISTURBANCES LIKELY OVER 20 OCTOBER ELECTION IN GUATEMALA

Comment on:

Serious disturbances may erupt in Guatemala as a result of widespread popular feeling that the 20 October presidential election will be rigged.

The administration political machine probably is prepared to resort to fraud if necessary to assure the victory of its candidate, Miguel Ortiz Passarelli.

Strong protests, possibly leading to serious disturbances, can be expected from rightist supporters of the leading opposition candidate, General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, who is showing wide popular support. Leftists, bitter after the official banning of their Revolutionary party, will probably support and encourage efforts by Ydigoras' followers to resist electoral defeat. Leftist leaders reportedly plan a campaign of sabotage and terrorism at voting places on election day.

The 9,000-man Guatemalan army will be able to control the situation if it remains united under the leadership of Defense Minister Juan F. Oliva. There are, however, some cracks in Oliva's army support. His half-brother, intelligence chief Enrique T. Oliva, is opposed to Ortiz' candidacy. The chief of the air force has displayed an equivocal attitude in conversations with embassy officers. Certain key officers reportedly favor Ydigoras.

In any event, widespread and sustained popular resistance to the election outcome might well influence the army to seize direct control of the government.

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12. RESIGNATION OF FINNISH GOVERNMENT

Comment on:

[Redacted]

Finland's continuing political instability was emphasized by the resignation on 18 October of the Agrarian-Liberal government, following its narrow defeat on a no-confidence motion introduced by the Communist-front Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL) and supported by a large faction of the Social Democratic party. The cabinet resignation, the third within the past six months, derived partly from disagreement over measures to deal with Finland's growing inflation, and partly from purely factional rivalries. Restoration of political stability depends mainly on the Social Democrats' re-establishing party unity and coming to an understanding with the second largest party, the Agrarians.

In the immediate situation, President Kekkonen may ask Premier Sukselainen to remain in office with minor adjustments in his cabinet. New elections, if held now while the Social Democrats are split, would give the SKDL a good chance of increasing its parliamentary representation, which at present consists of 43 deputies out of 200.

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13. CHINESE NATIONALISTS TO SELECT SUCCESSOR TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK AS PARTY CHIEF

Comment on:

The Chinese Nationalist Kuomintang congress now meeting in Taipei has established a new post, that of deputy director general of the party, at the request of Chiang Kai-shek. It is expected that Chiang Kai-shek will name Vice President Chen Cheng to the post. Chiang's motive in naming the one who will succeed him as both president and

leader of the party appears to be to prevent a struggle for power when he dies or decides to step down from his post as director general of the Kuomintang, which he has held since 1938.

Chen's appointment could be interpreted as a blow to his chief rival, Chiang Ching-kuo, the chief of the Nationalist security forces and elder son of Chiang Kai-shek. Many observers believe, however, that young Chiang, who reportedly has been gaining influence recently, would not attempt to contest the succession of Chen Cheng. He would continue his efforts to place his supporters in dominant positions and to control the country from behind the scenes before making a bid for power.

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**CORRECTION TO ITEM 4, PAGE 6, OF CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DATED 17 OCTOBER 1957:**

[Redacted]
[Redacted] The last paragraph should read as follows:

[Redacted] in
anticipation of the inspection to be made a week later by
Soviet Defense Minister Zhukov and his entourage of Yugo-
slav army maneuvers in Slovenia."
[Redacted]

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