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FAR EAST

1. Communists press air activity in Korea southwards:

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[Redacted]

Photo reconnaissance on 9 November of Uiju airfield, on the Korean side of the Yalu River, revealed 26 MIG-15 jet fighters in revetments or in preparation for flight. This is the first confirmed sighting of enemy jets on a Korean field.

On the same day, a UN reconnaissance jet bomber was attacked by three enemy jets southwest of Pyongyang. The Communist aircraft, believed to be elements of a flight of 40 to 50 other MIG-15's sighted by the bomber south of Pyongyang, pressed their attack southwards for 12 minutes, breaking off over a Yellow Sea island almost due west of Seoul.

The Far East Command believes that this new phase in enemy operations indicates a "definite" southward expansion of Communist counter-air activities.

Comment: Further evidence of the Communists' intention to expand their air operations in Korea is seen in the continued strenuous enemy efforts to ready the three-airfield complex in northwestern Korea -- Namsi, Taechon and Saamcham -- for operations, and in recent additions to the already heavy antiaircraft defenses of these fields.

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NEAR EAST

[Redacted]

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
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4. Iranian political intrigues increasing:

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The continued absence of Prime Minister Mossadeq has led to growing restiveness and indecision on the part of Iranian National Front leaders. Personal rivalries and ambitions reportedly have

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created dissension in the Cabinet. In this atmosphere of general political uneasiness and confusion, the opposition has been quietly maneuvering to gain more support for the replacement of Mossadeq by Ahmad Qavam.

Comment: Mossadeq's failure to achieve any solid results from his long negotiations abroad will undoubtedly add to the strength of the opposition, but there is no evidence that it will be able to remove him.

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5. Egyptian Prime Minister reportedly considering Western defense proposals:

[Redacted] One of King Farouk's advisers has informed the British Ambassador in Cairo that Prime Minister Nahas Pasha "is extremely unhappy over the present state of Anglo-Egyptian differences" and would be "disposed to negotiate on the defense proposals" if the UK could offer some compromise on the Sudan. The King's adviser hinted that the Egyptian Foreign Minister might even be dropped if that proved necessary. The British Ambassador, on his part, is asking London to give immediate serious study to the Sudan question.

Comment: The Egyptian Prime Minister may now be recognizing that, while the disturbances and incidents of the past few weeks have made the British position in the Canal area more difficult, their continuation, uncontrolled, would threaten the existence of his own Cabinet. While the Prime Minister may be having second thoughts about the value of the Western defense proposals, it is difficult to see how he or any successor at the present time could reverse Egypt's previous rejection of the proposals.

There seems little scope for further British compromise on the Sudan, nor has there been any indication that the new Churchill government is in a yielding mood.

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