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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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1. JORDANIAN ULTIMATUM TO SYRIA

[redacted] if Syrian press attacks against King Hussain and the Jordanian government did not cease, Jordan would break diplomatic relations and use armed force against Syria [redacted]

[redacted] The Damascus radio made the ultimatum public on 3 August and declared that it had been rejected.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Comment

[redacted] Jordan has become increasingly sensitive to the threat of isolation posed by signs of rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Syria, and by rising Egyptian and Syrian propaganda attacks coincidental with the current trials of antimonarchical Jordanian officers.

Hussain may be fearful because Nasr has ignored his recent attempt to seek reconciliation and has increased his attacks on Jordan. [redacted]

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[redacted] Egypt and Syria continue to engage actively in covert political action against Jordan in cooperation with refugee Jordanian leftists and Palestinian groups. One recent report suggests that the wave of propaganda attacks on King Hussain may culminate in his assassination. Hussain is also disturbed by reports that Egypt is preparing to support revolutionaries in West Jordan who would declare their independence and support for the ex-Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. The Jordanian government has increased security precautions as a result of an outbreak of sabotage and distribution of leaflets in West Jordan.

Cairo radio on 4 August denounced Rifai's warning as having been inspired by an American, British and French plot against the Arabs. Accusing Rifai of "high treason" against the Arab cause, the broadcast issued an exhortation to rebel, stating that by his action Rifai "has opened the way for the Jordanian free Arab people to destroy the walls of the prison."

Syria on 1 August announced the recall of its chargé from Jordan. The United States army attaché in Damascus on 1 August reported evidence of above-normal military movements in the Damascus area and greatly increased security measures at Arab Joint Command Headquarters. While this may be a reaction to the temporary damming last week of the Jordan River by Israel, it may also bear relation to new internal political maneuvering.

The Israelis may be expected to take precautions against contingencies which might develop from the situation in Jordan and Syria. [redacted]

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2. THE OMANI REBELLION

Comment on:

The decision of the Macmillan government to commit British ground forces in action against the Omani rebels underlines its anxiety to restore the Sultan of Muscat's control quickly before his difficulties have repercussions in other Persian Gulf states and before Saudi Arabia becomes publicly involved. RAF operations to date have failed to end the rebellion, and London apparently believes that if the Sultan's forces were to suffer a second reverse, liquidation of the rebellion would be long drawn out. Meanwhile aerial reconnaissance indicates that the area in revolt is enlarging and now includes three villages in Sharqiya Province which have displayed Omani colors.


Detachments of the British Cameronian battalion are being moved to Ibra and several other points on the northern and western periphery of the dissident area. The British troops will give direct support to native forces of the Sultan and the Trucial Oman Scouts in converging on the rebel-held highlands. The Cameronians will be reinforced by a small armored car force which is being brought from Aden, and by additional military specialists and weapons from Cyprus. At least one company of another British unit is being flown from East Africa to Bahrain.

London's decision to employ British troops came only a day after the commander of British land forces in the Middle East arrived in the Persian Gulf to assess the situation. Prime Minister Macmillan had earlier stated [redacted] he was determined that British ground forces not become involved.

The RAF has concentrated on efforts to paralyze all activity on the ground within the rebel area. The inhabitants are in the midst of gathering the date harvest, which is

almost their sole source of income, and it is hoped that loss of the harvest will turn the population against the rebel leaders.

Meanwhile, what appears to be the first significant oil discovery in the Sultan's territory has been publicly announced by the American Cities Service Oil Company. The strike was made in Dhofar Province, over 400 miles southwest of the Omani rebellion. Preliminary tests reportedly indicate a producing capacity of 2,000 barrels a day from a depth of 3,200 feet. The well site is said to be about 35 miles inland from Salala. If true, this would appear to be south of the border area which has been in dispute between Saudi Arabia and the Sultan of Muscat.



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3. TURKEY REPORTEDLY MODIFYING ATTITUDE TOWARD CYPRUS SETTLEMENT

The Turkish position on Cyprus is not irrevocably tied to partition of the island as previously indicated,

In order to establish a strong position in any future negotiations, the Turks would demand partition at the 35th parallel but would be prepared to accept "any lesser" geographical

The possibility of a condominium over Cyprus is currently under study in Ankara and the Turks will be prepared to negotiate aspects of this solution. Turkey reportedly would even be willing to accept self-government for Cyprus under NATO guarantees for an extended period of time, preferably 20 years.

Comment

For months the official Turkish position toward a Cyprus settlement has been an adamant demand for partition as the only acceptable compromise between union of the island with Greece and its return to Turkey. Recently, there have been indications that the Turks might relax their inflexible attitude, but this is the first report to indicate that alternatives are under serious study in Ankara.

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4. OPPORTUNITY SEEN FOR SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF SUDANESE COTTON SLUMP

Comment on:

[redacted] [redacted] the possibility of Soviet economic intervention in the Sudan as a means of winning public favor and influencing the forthcoming Sudanese elections. After a recent discussion with Sudanese Prime Minister Khalil, the Iraqi diplomat advised his government of his fear that the USSR and its satellites might take advantage of the current slump in Sudanese cotton sales to make a large purchase and thus reap considerable propaganda benefits for the pro-Egyptian and Communist anti-government elements in the Sudan. There have been numerous reports of increasing Egyptian and Soviet activity in preparation for the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for next February.

The Sudan has a one-crop economy based on cotton. The USSR has received favorable comment in the Sudan after first entering the Sudan's cotton market by a purchase of 9,000 bales on 13 June. At that time there were reports that more purchases might be made in the near future. Although the sale to the USSR was only 1.5 percent of this year's record yield of over 600,000 bales, the sales to all purchasers as of 30 June was estimated to be only 17 percent of the total supply.

Segments of the Sudanese press and public have been sharply critical of the Western powers' cotton policy, which they claim has reduced the world price of cotton and created hardships for the Sudan.

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5. BULGANIN DROPPED FROM SOVIET DELEGATION TO EAST GERMANY

Comment on:

The name of Soviet Premier Bulganin was not included in Moscow radio's announcement of the "party and government" delegation which will leave for East Germany on 7 August, suggesting

he will soon be ousted as chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Pravda had announced on 23 July that Bulganin would accompany Khrushchev to Berlin, but Mikoyan will now go along instead.

Bulganin, who may be sick, has been active in Moscow affairs since accompanying Khrushchev to Czechoslovakia last month, and attended the reception given on 1 August by the Swiss ambassador in honor of the Swiss national holiday.

Bulganin was given a "last chance" censure by the party central committee plenum in June, presumably because he "vacillated" in his support of Khrushchev.

If Bulganin is demoted, his formal dismissal or "resignation," like Malenkov's in 1955, will probably take place at a Supreme Soviet session. Such a session may be convened later this month or early in September to hear a review of the international situation and a report by Khrushchev on the results of his recent talks with Tito and the trip to East Germany.

A meeting of the party central committee would be necessary to remove Bulganin from the party presidium. He may remain on that body for some time, as did Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich after their demotions in the government.

Mikoyan appears the most likely candidate to succeed Bulganin. He has had many years' experience as

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a top-level government administrator and apparently has Khrushchev's full confidence. He replaced Bulganin on the "B and K team" in the recent talks with Tito and he is now to represent the Soviet government during the scheduled visit to East Germany.

Other possible candidates include Nikolai Shvernik, former titular head of state, and Defense Minister Georgy Zhukov, recently rumored to become Bulganin's successor as a reward for supporting Khrushchev in June.

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6. SOVIET PARTY SHAKE-UP UNDER WAY IN
LOWER ECHELONS

A secret instruction of the Soviet Communist Party's central committee, apparently dealing with mass dismissals of secretaries of local party organizations has been sent to all

Comment

Khrushchev is apparently carrying out a general shake-up in the lower levels of the party designed to remove from positions of influence all followers of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich. A press dispatch from Moscow on 1 August suggests that the shake-up may involve their outright exclusion from the party. It stated that Soviet President Kliment Voroshilov, in an unspecified magazine article, demanded cleansing the party of all members guilty of "dogmatic conservatism." "Dogmatic conservatism" was one of the charges levied against the "antiparty" group ousted in June.

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7. KHRUSHCHEV-TITO MEETING IN RUMANIA

Comment on:

The meeting between Khrushchev and Tito in Rumania on 1 and 2 August appears to restore to Yugoslav-Soviet relations a status comparable to the "honeymoon" period which ostensibly existed at the time of Tito's visit

to the USSR one year ago last June. This attempt to establish a new era of good relations is handicapped from the start by acknowledged differences between the two states.

Moscow radio announced on 3 August that the Soviet party delegation, headed by Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Kuusinen, held talks with the top Yugoslavs, Tito, Kardelj and Rankovic, concerning Yugoslav-Soviet relations. The delegations reaffirmed the Belgrade and Moscow declarations of 1955 and 1956 calling for the development of closer party and state relations on the basis of the "principles of respect for equality and independence." There was no announcement, however, of a specific affirmation of these principles in respect to other socialist states, a point for which the Yugoslavs have long contended.

Moscow radio announced that the meeting emphasized the need for "constant ties" through the exchange of party delegations, mutual information, and publications.

These conversations were foreshadowed just following the Soviet presidium shake-up when Khrushchev in Prague clearly indicated that he would welcome talks with Tito in order to improve Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Subsequently, a Yugoslav precondition for such talks was met with the restoration of Soviet "postponed" credits to Yugoslavia on 29 July.

8. OUSTER OF CUBAN PRESIDENT PLANNEDComment on:

Opposition groups in Cuba will shortly present President Fulgencio Batista with the choice of resigning in favor of a military junta or of facing "intensive revolutionary action," [redacted]

If Batista chooses to resist, the opposition with dissident members of the armed forces will attempt to occupy military installations, to isolate Havana from army headquarters at Camp Columbia, to

[redacted] install a provisional president.

If Batista accepts the alternative of resigning, an interim junta will assume power, possibly on 6 August, and will be replaced by a provisional president when control of the country has been assured. If the plan is successful, Col. Ramon Barquin, who has been imprisoned on the Isle of Pines since he attempted unsuccessfully to instigate a barracks uprising in March 1956, will become provisional president. Barquin is considered to be pro-US and anti-Communist.

The plan has widespread support among leading opposition and military leaders, [redacted] Rebel chieftain Fidel Castro and other leaders of the revolutionary 26th of July Movement are reported in agreement with the plan. Some police, army, navy, and air force officers and enlisted men are involved. The Federation of University Students may also attempt revolutionary action.

Batista's best chance of resisting concerted revolutionary action is with continued support from the majority

of the armed forces, which have been the bulwark of his regime. Some key officers are showing signs of defection.

Meanwhile, a general strike which began on 1 August in Santiago de Cuba, the island's second largest city and center of opposition activity in rebel-infested Oriente Province, is spreading to other cities in eastern Cuba. Government efforts to force commercial establishments to remain open have failed. Constitutional guarantees were suspended on 1 August for a period of 45 days.