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30 January 1959


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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


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30 JANUARY 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR offers Greece increased trade and assistance on Cyprus issue, but warns against accepting US missile sites.

**II. ASIA-AFRICA**

Iran agrees to sign nonaggression pact with USSR.

Egyptian editor close to Nasir criticizes Khrushchev speech as interference; Nasir sees Soviet ambassador.

Iraq - Nasir still apparently undecided on timing of move to try to overthrow Qasim.


Yemeni official believes chances for revolt growing; Soviet wheat offer not yet accepted.

Israel attempting to build case against UN handling of border incidents.

⑦ Australian cabinet to consider resumption of relations with USSR.

III. THE WEST

⑧ Haiti - President's domestic position deteriorating.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

30 January 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-Greece: Moscow has offered to assist Greece on the Cyprus question, and to "double or triple" commercial exchanges between the two countries.

No
a Soviet Foreign Ministry official expressed his satisfaction over improved Soviet-Greek relations in the past two years. The Soviet official warned, however, that if Greece allows American missile bases on its territory, Russia will be compelled to build them in adjacent areas, and Greek-Soviet relations would be affected at every level.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

No
Iran-USSR: [The Iranian Government has agreed to sign a nonaggression pact with the USSR, according to Iranian Minister of Court Ala. Three high-ranking Soviet officials arrived in Tehran on 29 January, reportedly including A. P. Pavlov, chief of the Middle East Division of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Soviet Ambassador Pegov's continued presence in Tehran, despite local press reports that he was leaving for Moscow to attend the 21st party congress, is further indicative of important negotiations.]

(Page 1)

No
UAR-USSR: Muhammad Heikal, Cairo newspaper editor who is close to Nasir, in a 29 January article has criticized Khrushchev's speech at the party congress as interference in the UAR's affairs. He added that the Arabs "love and respect" the USSR in spite of, not because of, the activities of local Communists. Nasir met with Soviet Ambassador Kisseelev on the morning of 29 January

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No
UAR-Iraq: [The anti-Qasim group in the Iraqi Army is reported to have again sought Nasir's advice on its course of action. Nasir and his advisers, as well as pro-UAR elements in Iraq, appear uncertain at this time whether to promote an effort to overthrow Qasim.] (Page 2)

No
Yemen: [The Yemeni deputy foreign minister believes that the chances for a revolt in the near future are growing, sparked by antimonarchical sentiment as well as by hostility to pro-Soviet Crown Prince Badr. The Imam seems fearful of an increase in Soviet influence despite his support for Badr and apparently has withheld acceptance of the Soviet wheat offer. Soviet Ambassador Kisseelev, who was visiting Yemen, has returned to Cairo.] (Page 3)

No
Israel: Tel Aviv appears to be renewing its efforts to build a record on the handling of border incidents which will "prove" that the United Nations machinery in the area is ineffective. Although the Israelis themselves are in part responsible for creating the local situations out of which recent incidents have developed, they have submitted a lengthy complaint to the UN Security Council and are taking a "tough" line with local UN officials. (Page 4)

Australia-USSR:

No
 the Australian cabinet will be requested on 5 February to approve the resumption of diplomatic relations with the USSR. Diplomatic relations were severed in 1954 following the Petrov espionage scandal in Australia.]

III. THE WEST

No
Haiti: President Duvalier's domestic position is deteriorating rapidly, give him little

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DAILY BRIEF

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chance of stemming the tide. With disaffection mounting rapidly among government employees, with the general populace restive under a long economic crisis, and with the army already at least passively opposed to him, Duvalier can count only on his personal civilian militia for support.

**IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES**

(Available during the preceding week)

**SNIE 100-10-58. Soviet Objectives in the Berlin Crisis.
23 December 1958.**

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
 (No Back-up Material)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iranian-Soviet Nonaggression Pact Now Appears Certain

[Iranian Minister of Court Ala told Ambassador Wailes in Tehran on 29 January that Iran has agreed to sign a non-aggression pact with the USSR. He also confirmed that three high-ranking Soviet officials, one of whom has been tentatively identified as A. P. Pavlov, chief of the Middle East Division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, arrived in Tehran on the afternoon of 29 January.]

[Further indication that significant developments are taking place in Iranian-Soviet negotiations is Soviet Ambassador Pegov's continued presence in Tehran despite local press reports that he was leaving for Moscow to attend the Communist party congress, a function from which Pegov, a member of the party central committee, would absent himself only for exceptionally pressing business. There are also reports of "intensive" telephone traffic between the Iranian Foreign Ministry and the Soviet Embassy in Tehran during the past few days, as well as of numerous meetings between Pegov and Iranian Ambassador-designate to Moscow Masud Ansuri.]

[Ambassador Wailes regards the situation as serious and believes it has passed the stage of mere "pressure...for budget assistance." He recently reported, however, that the Shah, realizing the serious consequences of signing any agreement with the USSR, may be trying to clarify vague Soviet proposals. In the Shah's present state of depression and apparent disillusionment, confused by conflicting advice from those around him and enticed by attractive Soviet offers, he may blunder into a situation which is beyond his control.]

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~~SECRET~~The Iraqi Situation

[Egyptian President Nasir and his advisers, as well as "nationalist" army and civilian elements in Iraq, still appear to be uncertain whether to make a determined effort to overthrow Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim.]

[Iraqi Minister of Guidance Shanshal and Minister of State Rikabi are advising against a coup--at least for the present. They believe that Qasim has changed his attitude and "is now fighting the Communists." The military group opposing Qasim has again sought Nasir's advice on whether to carry out an immediate coup, or wait until Qasim's policy is more clearly demonstrated. Although Minister of Interior for the Syrian Region Sarraj believes the coup should be carried out soon, Nasir has been reluctant to commit himself since the abortive UAR-supported plot in early December. Nasir may well feel that he does not know enough about the capability of this group, which has never been clearly defined.]

[the central committee of the Iraqi Communist party has been reorganized and has added a number of "honorary" members, including Qasim's aide-de-camp, the chief censor, the director of broadcasting, and several members of the military court which is trying members of the former royal regime. It was further claimed that Qasim is bringing sizable numbers of pro-Communist reserve officers into the army. Senior officers are said to be worried that this might lead to disaffection in the army and refusal to obey commands.]

[The Baghdad regime's recent posthumous "amnesty" for three Communist leaders hanged in 1949 and the acceptance of testimony by Communists in the Baghdad "treason trials" are hardly consistent with Qasim's much touted "crackdown" on the Communists.]

[Qasim is "plotting ill for Faiq Sammarrai," Iraqi ambassador in Cairo and contact man for the conspirators, [Sammarrai is considered [to be the most capable of the anti-Qasim civilian leaders.]

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Developments in Yemen

[Yemen's moderate Deputy Foreign Minister al-Amri has informed an American official that a predominantly "plebian" movement which seeks establishment of a republic has been gaining strength because of the growing unpopularity of the Imamate. Additionally, al-Amri expects violence in mid-February when leaders of the "patrician" tribes, who support Prince Hasan to replace the present Imam, become aware of the Imam's inability to pay annual subsidies to them. Outbreaks in the interior towns might also occur when the Imam and Crown Prince Badr go to the port of Hodeida to meet Yugoslav Marshal Tito about 5 February.]

[The "patrician" forces who support Hasan and the monarchy are members of the Zaidi Shia sect of Islam. Most of them come from the warlike tribes of northern Yemen which traditionally elect each new Imam and provide most of the men for the army. The antimonarchical movement in large part derives support from Yemen's plebian Shafais of the Sunni sect, who inhabit southern Yemen and the coastal plain. The leaders of clandestine Shafai organizations reportedly hope to establish a separate state in Yemen if the Zaidis do not grant them a voice in the next government. The Zaidis traditionally are suspicious of Sunni Egypt, which has long provided asylum for antimonarchical Yemeni exiles and which might support a Shafai coup aimed at reforming Yemen's social order.]

[The Imam's growing fear of the Soviet influence Badr has been promoting in Yemen to improve his chances of succession has apparently caused him to withhold final approval of a Soviet offer of wheat for famine relief as of 24 January. The USSR made the offer after it had learned of an American offer and had with Badr's help unsuccessfully attempted to block acceptance of the American bid. Soviet Ambassador Kisilev delayed a trip to Moscow to fly to Taiz to visit the Imam on 25 January, possibly to make a more attractive offer.]

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Israeli-Arab Incidents

Israel's firm representations to UN truce officials and its complaint to the Security Council seem to be part of an effort to demonstrate the failure of UN machinery to prevent and mediate Arab-Israeli incidents. A record of recent instances of such alleged ineffectiveness could be used to support an Israeli case for any future "retaliation" against the Arabs. [UN Secretary General Hammarskjold believes the pattern is similar to that of 1955-56 prior to Israel's attack on Egypt, but that at present the campaign is "not so far advanced." There are no indications as yet that the Israelis are planning imminent military action.]

[The Israelis, refusing to utilize the facilities of the Mixed Armistice Commission for dealing with border incidents, have "demanded" that UN officers arrange a meeting of local Israeli and Jordanian commanders regarding the fatal shooting of an Israeli soldier in Jerusalem on 26 January. They emphasize that they must have an answer to this request no later than Sunday and "probably even by Friday."] The UN Security Council meets on Friday afternoon, 30 January, to consider Israel's complaint against the UAR. Israel may decide to include the Jerusalem incident in its complaint.

Tel Aviv seems inclined to regard the recent increase of border incidents as resulting from the absence of any decisive action by the Security Council on the previous Israeli complaint in December. An Israeli newspaper which frequently reflects government views has asserted that the present complaint must be understood as a "last warning," and that if the UN is unable to keep peace Israel will be obliged to take action.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**THE PRESIDENT**

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

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