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12 April 1961

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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4. France-Algeria: De Gaulle takes firm line in  
press conference. (*Page ii*)

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Berlin situation. (*Page iv*)

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\*France-Algeria: De Gaulle's remarks on Algeria at his long-scheduled 11 April press conference will give the rebel leaders little encouragement that he intends to go any further toward meeting their conditions for holding negotiations. While he did not close the door on peace talks, he belittled the influence of the rebellion and questioned the provisional Algerian government's ability to take responsible action. In spelling

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out additional details of his views on alternatives for Algeria's future, De Gaulle made his strongest threats to date designed to discourage the choice of "chaotic independence" without ties to France. He may, on the other hand, have sweetened for the rebels the alternative of association by indicating that it might involve French aid of various types in exchange for minority guarantees and base rights.

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## CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

The USIB has noted the following conclusions reached by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situation for the period 7 March 1961 through 10 April 1961:

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1. We have no indications that the USSR plans to increase tensions over Berlin at this time.

2. There have been no significant developments with regard to access to Berlin and East Berlin during the period covered by this report.

3. Over the past month the bloc has devoted increased attention to the German and Berlin issues. Soviet propaganda commentary, statements by high-level East German and Soviet officials, and the 30 March Warsaw Pact communiqué have all stressed the necessity of concluding a peace treaty and solving the Berlin problem, but without any suggestion of deadlines.

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Possible Soviet Proposals on Berlin and Germany

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[redacted] Moscow, in support of a call for new negotiations on Berlin and Germany, may advance further proposals broadening the standard Soviet call for a German peace treaty and free city status for West Berlin by incorporating earlier East German schemes. [redacted]

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[redacted] Moscow may endorse previous East German plans for a nonaggression pact between the two Germanys, a phased approach to disarmament in Germany similar to the Rapacki plan, and the formation of an all-German confederative council and a peace treaty commission--all of which were included in the plan proposed by party leader Ulbricht in February 1960. The Bonn Foreign Ministry is convinced that this report published in the Frankfurt paper on 30 March was in fact inspired by the Soviet Embassy. The Frankfurt paper was used [redacted] in November 1958 to leak the Soviet proposal for a free city before the USSR officially presented the plan to the Western powers.

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
[redacted] the USSR was considering the timing of a new diplomatic initiative on Berlin. Further confirmation of a possible Soviet offer along these lines was contained in Ulbricht's public statement on 1 April that his proposals were discussed "in detail" at Moscow.

The bloc's increased attention to the German and Berlin issues since the publication on 4 March of the Soviet memorandum to Bonn also suggests that the USSR is preparing further diplomatic moves on Berlin. Moscow's reference in that memorandum to an interim agreement on Berlin was the first such public reference since before the Paris summit, and Ulbricht in his speech to the East German central committee plenum in

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mid-March called for a solution in the "spirit of the Soviet memorandum." He also listed a number of initial measures for a Berlin solution, which appear intended as part of any interim agreement. The revival, well in advance of any negotiations, of the concept of an interim solution suggests that it will remain a principal element in any new package proposal.

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