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## FAR EAST

## 1. Breakdown of Soviet and Caucasian troops in North Korea estimated: 3.3(h)(2)



The US Far East Command estimates, on the basis of 96 pertinent reports received in the period from 1 January to 1 September 1951 that a total of 25,900 Soviet or Caucasian personnel are in Korea.

Soviet personnel in Korea, numbering 15,400, are listed as follows:

- Three antiaircraft divisions, unidentified -- 6,000
- One security or infantry regiment, in northeastern Korea -- 1,500
- Military advisers -- 2,000
- Engineers - 1,500
- Supply, counterespionage, local security -- 1,500
- Coastal defense, artillery and antiaircraft artillery (separate from antiaircraft personnel listed above) -- 1,500
- Signal and radar -- 1,000
- Civilian advisers -- 400

Caucasian elements, numbering 10,500, are believed to be assigned as follows:

- One artillery division, unidentified - 5,000
- Other capacities (ground and air) -- 5,000
- Hospital and medical -- 500

The Caucasians are believed to be advance elements of a "Soviet Puppet Force," according to the Far East Command, additional reports indicate the presence in or imminent movement to Korea of troops that would fall into the classification of Caucasian members of a "Soviet puppet army." Information concerning the existence of an organic, tactical "Soviet Puppet Force" continues to be inconclusive.

Comment: While this estimate of the number of Soviet troops in Korea cannot be verified, their number undoubtedly has risen sharply during 1951. No Soviet or Caucasian combat unit has been positively identified in Korea.

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2. References to early termination of navigation in Sakhalin area:

A recent message from the Soviet Far East refers to the termination of navigation between Sakhalin and the mainland by the end of September. Another refers to September as the deadline for shipments to Kamchatka and the lower Amur area.

Comment: Navigation in parts of these areas continues year round, and in general is not complicated by ice formation until considerably later than September. It may be that after September shipping space is reserved for military goods, or possibly the references to terminating shipping represent an attempt by Sakhalin trading organizations to expedite delivery of products ordered from the mainland.

3.3(h)(2)

### EASTERN EUROPE

3. Czechoslovak President perturbed by Western moves:

During an interview with President Gottwald and Foreign Minister Siroky on 13 September, the Belgian Minister in Prague gained the impression that the Czech Government was "considerably disturbed by recent developments" in Czechoslovak-Western relations as a result of the Oatis case. The purpose of the interview, the first Gottwald has given to a non-Communist representative in many months, was to notify the Prague government of the accession of the new Belgian king. Upon completion of the formalities, however, Gottwald turned the subject to Western relations and stated that Western Europe, under US leadership, was trying to blockade Czechoslovakia. The Belgian Minister replied that, in his opinion, the US would never abandon its attempts to free Oatis.

Comment: The interview with the Belgian Minister may impress the Czech regime with the widespread support in the West of the US position on the Oatis case. Czech propaganda has recently shown sensitivity to the adverse reaction to the Oatis case in the West.

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**WESTERN EUROPE**

3.3(h)(2)

**4. US Minister to Austria opposes concession on air corridor agreement:**

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US Minister Donnelly has advised the British Deputy High Commissioner of US concern over current Anglo-Soviet conversations regarding a proposed modification of the air corridor route between Vienna and the British Zone of Occupation. Donnelly asserted that he could see no justification for amending the corridor agreement, and that he would not in any case concur with the suggestion that the Soviet authorities be given prior notice of the flights of military aircraft. The British deputy agreed with these views and promised to keep the US Legation informed on the bilateral negotiations.

Comment: The Soviet authorities have been pressing vigorously their proposal to shift the British air corridor north and west of its present route, ostensibly for reasons of safety. The British have submitted counterproposals involving controlled and variable-altitude flights. Allied authorities are convinced that Soviet Headquarters is concerned because present flights permit photographic reconnaissance of the Soviet military airfield at Wiener Neustadt.

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