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2 March 1960


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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2 MARCH 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Poland--Poznan workers discuss possible strike action.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

South Vietnam plans commando force to counter rise in Communist terrorism.


②

Indonesia--General Nasution's statements on West Irian not believed to foreshadow imminent military operations.

③

Kenya--African leaders make aggressive statements on their return from London conference.

④



III. THE WEST

⑤ Italy--Christian Democratic strategy to try first a center coalition for new government and failing that a left-center coalition.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

2 March 1960

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

***Poland:** [Workers from four key industrial establishments in Poznan--despite threats of punitive actions by the regime--have met informally to decide on a possible coordinated protest if the wage cuts resulting from the higher work norms continue through the 10 March pay day. The workers now appear to be better organized than for the apparently spontaneous strike on 19 and 20 February at the Poznan railway repair shops and railway yards, which was readily brought under control by regime threats to blacklist striking workers. The Warsaw regime has already laid off a number of industrial workers to cut production costs, and is using the threat of unemployment to forestall strikes.]

NO

II. ASIA-AFRICA

South Vietnam - Malaya: [The Diem government, concerned over the sharp rise in terrorism, plans to create a "commando" force of at least 10,000 to counter this threat.]

In connection with this program Saigon [] instructed its legation in Kuala Lumpur to obtain detailed information on all aspects of Malaya's anti-terrorist campaign as a follow-up to briefings given President Diem during his visit to Malaya last month. A request is also to be made through the Malayan Government for British experts in jungle warfare to be sent to South Vietnam as instructors.

(Page 1)

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Indonesia: The statements to parliament by the army chief of staff and security minister, General Nasution, regarding Indonesia's claim to West Irian (Netherlands New Guinea) reflect the government's renewed emphasis on the issue but do

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not foreshadow imminent military operations. Nasution said that the struggle to reclaim West Irian would be intensified and that it would be waged on all fronts--political, economic, and military. Nasution undoubtedly hopes to keep the army in the forefront of the politically significant West Irian campaign, which has been consistently exploited by President Sukarno and the Communist party and which received the support of Soviet Premier Khrushchev during his recent visit. [] (Page 2)

OK Kenya: [African leaders have indicated that they do not expect the London agreements to last as long as the four or five years hoped for in London, and have made aggressive statements on their return to Kenya. A speech by Tom Mboya, in which he advised moderate as well as rightist Europeans to accept an African-dominated "democracy" in Kenya or get out, was followed by disorders between African nationalists and police. The prospect of increased African participation in government, and of unabated African demands for full independence will prompt some Europeans to leave Kenya and may lead others to consider extralegal means of combatting the African "threat."] (CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN) (Page 3)

III. THE WEST

OK Italy: While the process of forming a new government is still in the initial stages, [] party strategy is to try first a center coalition with the Liberals, Democratic Socialists, and Republicans--which the Democratic Socialists are unlikely to join. The Christian Democrats will then attempt a more likely solution, a left-center coalition omitting the Liberals. Such a government could muster a theoretical parliamentary majority with the adherence of minor center groups, but would depend on Nenni Socialist abstention for an effective working majority. The Christian Democrats claim that Segni as premier of such a government would reassure the right. [] (Page 4)

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

South Vietnam Moves to Combat Communist Terrorism

[The Diem government is planning more intensive training in guerrilla and counterguerrilla tactics for its armed forces to meet recently stepped-up Communist terrorism in South Vietnam. President Diem and other officials are seriously concerned with the deterioration in the security situation, and feel that prompt and vigorous countermeasures are required.]

[Plans for the formation of a well trained and equipped 10- to 20,000-man "commando" force apparently are being hastily implemented, even though organizational details are still hazy. These commandos--volunteers from the army, reserves, and the civil guard--would be assigned to anti-guerrilla operations under the command of military region commanders after an intensive three-month training period conducted by the army. South Vietnam has urgently requested that American special force personnel be sent to assist in this program.]

[The Diem government, meanwhile, has informed the International Control Commission (ICC) in Vietnam that it has requested the United States to increase its present MAAG personnel ceiling of 342 to 685 to accelerate defensive training of the Vietnamese military in the face of recrudescence Communist terrorism.)]

[South Vietnam is also interested in benefiting from Malaya's experiences in combating Communist terrorism. Saigon has instructed its legation in Kuala Lumpur to obtain detailed information on all aspects of the anti-terrorist campaign as a follow-up to briefings given Diem during his 15-19 February visit to Malaya. This is to include information on Malaya's regroupment of rural population to isolate the terrorists, a program which South Vietnam now is undertaking in the troubled southwestern provinces.]

[the legation is also to request that British experts in jungle warfare be sent from Malaya to South Vietnam as instructors.]

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Renewed emphasis on Indonesia's claim to West Irian (Netherlands New Guinea) probably is indicated by statements to parliament on 27 February by Army Chief of Staff and Security Minister General Nasution. Nasution reportedly stated that the struggle to "reclaim" West Irian would be intensified, that it must be waged on all fronts--economic, political, and military--and that it must be carried on both within West Irian and outside its borders. He said that the West Irian issue affected all of Indonesia's domestic and foreign policies and would continue to do so as long as the territory was not returned to Indonesia. The army's press spokesman, however, has denied press reports that Nasution said the nation should be prepared to undertake a war in behalf of its claim.

During the same parliamentary debate, Foreign Minister Subandrio refused to say whether or not Indonesia would raise the Irian question at the next session of the UN General Assembly, claiming it would be a "tactical error" to reveal future actions at this time. [Subandrio told the Thai foreign minister a few weeks ago that Indonesia was very anxious to settle the West Irian question with the Netherlands, and that if this could be done adjustments would be made regarding Dutch economic claims in Indonesia.]

Both Subandrio and President Sukarno have stated publicly during the past year that Indonesia will not resort to force to achieve its claim. Indonesian officials, particularly President Sukarno and air force leaders, undoubtedly feel that the nation's military build-up is strengthening its international stature and will assist in bringing pressure to bear on the Netherlands. Indonesian paramilitary groups reportedly continue to infiltrate West Irian in an effort to stimulate the local population against the Dutch administration.

The West Irian claim was de-emphasized in 1958 and 1959, and anti-Dutch measures in Indonesia itself were substituted. National pride and political necessity now may dictate renewed emphasis. Nasution undoubtedly hopes to keep the army in the forefront of leadership for the politically significant West Irian campaign, which has been consistently exploited by President Sukarno and the Communist party and which was supported by Soviet Premier Khrushchev during his recent visit.

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Kenya Africans Maintain Pressure for New Concessions

[Statements by African delegates on their return to Kenya from constitutional talks in London have been provocative in tone and reflect intent to continue pressure for full independence. African leader Tom Mboya has characterized the compromise agreed to in London as only an interim measure, to be followed swiftly by full independence. The London agreements provided for legislative elections later this year under a greatly enlarged African franchise which is expected to result in a legislature with an African majority.]

[A speech on 27 February by Mboya--in which he advised moderate as well as rightist Europeans to accept an African-dominated "democracy" in Kenya or get out--was followed by disorders between African nationalists and police. A second African spokesman emphasized in a press conference that African delegates had not committed themselves to the preservation of the White Highlands, a rich farming area which remains a European preserve despite action late in 1959 to legalize African holdings.]

[The prospect of increased African participation in government, unabated African demands for full independence, and continuing pressure on the White Highlands will prompt some Europeans to leave Kenya and may lead others to consider extralegal means of combatting the African "threat."]

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III. THE WEST

Italian Cabinet Negotiations

[redacted] the Christian Democratic party directorate and former Premiers Fanfani and Segni have agreed on party strategy in the search for a new Italian cabinet. They would first try to form a centrist quadripartite cabinet of Christian Democrats, Democratic Socialists, Liberals, and Republicans. Fanfani would be proposed to head it in an effort to encourage the participation of the Democratic Socialists and Republicans.

In view of Democratic Socialist leader Saragat's repeated insistence that he would participate only in a center-left government, the Christian Democrats would next try a tripartite coalition without the Liberals. The 273 Christian Democratic, 17 Democratic Socialist, and six Republican deputies would need three additional votes for a parliamentary majority. These would probably be found among the six representatives of minor groups, but primarily such a government would depend for survival on abstention by the Nenni Socialists.

The Christian Democrats claim that Segni would be the most appropriate choice to head such a coalition, in order to give the Church and the Christian Democratic Right some assurance that Christian Democratic unity or basic policies would not be endangered. They say Fanfani or Segni would take the Foreign Ministry if the other became premier. Participation in the government by all Christian Democratic factions would be assured by distributing the other major posts to party notables such as Scelba and Pella. In addition to these men, Segni's Justice Minister Gonella and more particularly Piccioni, head of the Christian Democratic senators, have been mentioned previously as possible heads of a center-left government depending on Nenni Socialist abstention. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

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Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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