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
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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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ARMY and DOS review(s) completed.

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FAR EAST

1. Military capabilities of North Korea seen superior to South Korea's:

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A study by the Far East Command concludes that in the event of a renewed conflict between North and South Korea, and in the absence of foreign forces and overt logistical support, the south would ultimately be defeated. Although South Korea could withstand an offensive for a short period, the FEC believes that North Korean air superiority and long-range covert logistical support would be decisive.


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The study notes that while the South Korean army has more manpower, it has a higher proportion of support personnel and lacks armor and antiaircraft artillery. The south's superiority in artillery would be counterbalanced by the north's superiority in mortars, tanks and self-propelled guns. Removal of the UN air threat would also permit the north to use its antiaircraft artillery units in a ground role.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

4. Navarre foresees defensive war in Indochina until next summer:

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[Redacted box] General Navarre told Senator H. Alexander Smith on 19 November that he must fight an essentially defensive war until next summer, at which time he expects to be strong enough to engage the Viet Minh in decisive battle. In the meantime he will be able to carry out tactical offensives and clean-up operations inside the Tonkin delta.

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Navarre hopes to defeat the enemy's regular forces decisively by the spring of 1955, leaving only a guerrilla problem that can be handled by the Vietnamese army. He emphasized the problem of instilling in these troops a really warlike spirit.

Comment: This more moderate estimate of French capabilities is somewhat at variance with Navarre's presentation to an American group last summer.

Navarre's plans are based to a considerable degree on the build-up of an effective Vietnamese national army. While newly formed light battalions are being activated approximately on schedule, several of those that have seen action have made a very poor showing.

SOUTH ASIA

5. Comment on first Afghan reaction to reports of US-Pakistani military aid pact:

The first Afghan reaction to reports of a possible military aid pact between Pakistan and the United States is critical. The Kabul newspaper Anis, which is published by the government press department and presumably reflects official Afghan opinion, foresees that any such alliance will lead to World War III.

Like India, Afghanistan opposes any increase in Pakistan's military strength which would make Karachi less susceptible to pressures such as the Pushtoonistan campaign for the independence of Pakistani tribal areas. The threat of World War III probably looms less large in the Afghan mind than in the Indian, though it makes a convenient talking point.

Despite its opposition, Afghanistan is unlikely to make any move that would materially alter its relations either with Pakistan or the United States.

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
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
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EASTERN EUROPE

7. Finnish foreign minister disturbed by public disclosure of Soviet offers of assistance:

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
Finnish foreign minister Torngren considers ex-premier Kekkonen's public disclosure of Soviet offers during his term of office an "incredible development." Torngren

fears that it may bring about considerable unrest among the almost half-million displaced Karelians in Finland.

Torngren told the American minister that his personal knowledge of the matter was limited to one discussion in which Soviet minister Lebedev vaguely referred to a possible loan to Finland and the possible use by Finland of the Saimaa Canal, which is in that part of Karelia lost to the USSR during World War II.

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The American minister in Helsinki believes that the disclosure, which Kekkonen probably made in order to establish himself as the only leader who can ensure continuation of good relations with the USSR, may boomerang.

Comment: If the Soviet Union, which has been highly critical of the new Finnish government, fails to carry out these offers, the disclosure will seriously embarrass the new government. The displaced Karelians may be encouraged to agitate for the return to Finland of parts of their former homeland lost to the USSR in World War II.

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9. French Communists press advantages against government:

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[Redacted]

The French Communist Party is attempting to force the government to drop legal proceedings against Benoit Frachon and other Communist leaders for whom warrants have been issued but not yet served.

The American embassy in Paris, noting the considerable publicity given Frachon's recent attendance at a labor meeting, believes that the Communists hope to make the government's anti-Communist campaign look still more ineffectual.

Comment: The recent vote in the National Assembly not to lift the immunity of Communist members showed the extent to which the Communist Party has improved its position in the assembly in recent months, partly because other deputies were aligned with it in opposition to the EDC and on the Indochina question.

Communist leaders are probably eager to exploit this advantage both to create dissension in parliament prior to next month's presidential election and to show labor that the present government can be flouted with impunity.

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