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11 October 1960

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 35
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S D
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR YU-2
DATE: 10 JUN 1980 REVIEWER:

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11 OCTOBER 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA


South Korea--Government faces new demonstrations; security forces alerted, but their effectiveness reduced by purges.

Laos--Province in northeast Laos switches to Phoumi; probably will strengthen his resolve.

Pakistan strengthening control over tribes near Afghan frontier; regular Pakistani forces not involved in continuing tribal border clashes.

Turkey--Anti-regime sentiment voiced as trial of Menderes regime nears.

Lumumba still attempting to strengthen his position; anti-Tshombé guerrilla activity stepped up in Katanga.



LATE ITEM

Launching from Tyura Tam on 10 October apparently ended in failure shortly after launch; nature of Soviet test not yet clear.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

11 October 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

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South Korea: According to the press, demonstrations have taken place in Seoul, Taegu, and Masan--centers of the revolt that toppled former President Rhee from power last April. Demonstrators charge the government with failure to uphold the spirit of the revolution and protest the "light" punishment given former high officials of the old regime. South Korean military and police forces are reported to have been alerted to maintain order in the event of a popular uprising demanding the ouster of the Chang Myon government. Press reports thus far, however, have given no indication of the size or scope of these new demonstrations. Should disturbances erupt on a large scale, the effectiveness with which the military and police would act to maintain order may be reduced by the recent purges of personnel in these services. [redacted] (Page 1) *OK*

OK

Laos: The provincial government and the military command of Xieng Khouang Province, in northeastern Laos, have switched their allegiance back to General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee, apparently as the result of pressure from Meo tribesmen, who constitute a major ethnic group in the province. General Amkha, Vientiane garrison commander, who was sent out by Vientiane to act in a liaison capacity for the short time the province was loyal to the Souvanna Phouma government, has been arrested and flown to Savannakhet. This apparent bolstering of Phoumi's position may increase his resistance to any further effort by Souvanna Phouma to persuade him to end his opposition to the government. [redacted] (Page 2)

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Pakistan-Afghanistan: The Pakistani Government apparently intends to exploit the current border friction to increase its presence in tribal areas on the Pakistani side of the frontier which have been traditionally autonomous. The recent arrest of the rulers of two tribal regions for "double-dealing" probably is motivated by Rawalpindi's desire to install more amenable leaders and to deploy border security forces in this sector closer to the Durand line. This action may encounter serious resistance among the local tribes, and probably will be seized on by Kabul as evidence of Pakistan's "repression" of the Pushtoon people. Border clashes apparently are continuing on a smaller scale than in September. While elements of the quasi-military border security forces have been involved, none of the regular military forces being moved to the vicinity of the tribal areas have been committed.] (Page 3) OK

Turkey: Expression of anti-regime sentiment is reported to be increasing in Turkey, especially in Ankara and Istanbul, as the 14 October date approaches for the beginning of the trial of the leaders of the ousted Bayar-Menderes regime. The military junta ruling Turkey has reportedly increased its own security staff for self-protection in the event of trouble as an outgrowth of the trials.

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Republic of the Congo: Recent activity by deposed Premier Lumumba--including his "cabinet" reshuffle and a day of campaigning in the native district of Leopoldville--represents an effort to strengthen his position and counter recent defections among his followers.

imminent "reversals" for Lumumba unless he received strong international support.

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*The Mobutu government has once again demanded that the UN permit the arrest of Lumumba, and UN representative Dayal in Leopoldville has asked for new instructions.

In Katanga, guerrilla activity by anti-Tshombé Baluba tribesmen has been stepped up. President Tshombé's strong

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criticism of Brussels' failure to grant Katanga diplomatic recognition is designed in part to counter domestic criticism of his 'pro-Belgian' policies, as well as to bring pressure to bear for recognition. [redacted]

(Page 6)

LATE ITEM

*USSR: A test vehicle of as yet undetermined nature apparently was launched from Tyura Tam yesterday at 1428 GMT (1028 EDST), and failed shortly after being launched. The launching followed a full-scale countdown in which the Tyura Tam and Klyuchi facilities as well as the four Sibir vessels in the Pacific participated.

Shortly after the apparent launch time. [redacted] *no*

[redacted] there was evidence that the Soviets were attempting to track some object. In-flight failure is indicated [redacted]

[redacted] by the termination, about 26 minutes after the apparent launch time, of operations on the Tyura Tam range complex.

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There are no firm indications as to the type or characteristics of vehicle involved in yesterday's operations. Possibilities would include a man- or animal-carrying satellite or test vehicle intended for recovery in the vicinity of one of the Sibirs in the Pacific. [redacted]

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Demonstrators Demand Ouster of South Korean Government

Demonstrations demanding Prime Minister Chang Myon's resignation and dissolution of South Korea's parliament have taken place in Seoul, Taegu, and Masan--centers of the revolt that toppled former President Rhee from power last April. Press reports have given no indication of the size or scope of the demonstrations, but state that the demonstrators have charged the government with failure to uphold the spirit of the April revolution and have protested the "light" punishment given former high officials of the old regime. Military and police forces are reported to have been alerted to maintain order.

Hampered by political factionalism, the Chang administration has failed to display the dynamic leadership expected by the people after the April revolution. Growing unrest and dissatisfaction has been suggested by continued student demonstrations, agitation among lower ranking military officers, and strong press criticism of the administration. According to police figures, there have been over 1,500 demonstrations since April.

In the event of new large-scale disturbances the effectiveness with which the military and police would act to maintain order and support the Chang government may be reduced by the recent purges of personnel. Military discipline probably has been weakened by recent command changes and agitation among lower ranking officers for the removal of senior commanders identified with the former government. The police, discredited for their actions under the Rhee regime and subsequently subjected to repeated purges, have as yet displayed little capability for maintaining order.

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~~SECRET~~The Situation in Laos

The northeastern province of Xieng Khouang, after an interlude of about twelve days during which it supported the Souvanna Phouma government, has again swung its allegiance to General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee. The circumstances leading to the switch are somewhat obscure, but tribal unrest among the Meos--a major ethnic group in the province--may have played an important role. General Amkha, the Vientiane garrison commander who was sent to represent the Souvanna government following the province's switch of support to Souvanna, has reportedly been arrested and flown to Savannakhet. Phoumi should have little difficulty effecting Amkha's defection if he should so choose; Amkha has shown a tendency to vacillate ever since the Kong Le coup.

In Vientiane, armed forces commander General Ouane claims to have warned Captain Kong Le on 7 October of the dangers posed by the growing strength of the Pathet Lao in the capital. He noted, however, that Kong Le was "so volatile" that he could not be relied on to pursue any agreed-upon course of action to its conclusion. The armed forces commander added that the real problem in Kong Le's Second Parachute Battalion was a deputy, Lt. Deuane, who he says was responsible for organizing a leftist youth rally in Vientiane on 4 October against the wishes of the government.

Premier Souvanna meanwhile has told Ambassador Brown in Vientiane that he will insist in the forthcoming peace talks that the Pathet Lao cease attacks throughout the country and return Sam Neua Province to government administration. If the Pathet Lao refuse these demands, Souvanna claims he will break off negotiations.

The minister of public works in the Souvanna regime has informed an American Embassy officer that Burma has agreed to sell foodstuffs and other merchandise to Laos. The goods would be delivered at the Laos-Burma border and brought by river craft to Luang Prabang and Vientiane via the Mekong River. The official stated the plan would be implemented as an alternative source of supply should the Thai blockade of Vientiane continue. Motor fuel has already been flown from Burma to Vientiane, however.

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~~SECRET~~Afghan-Pakistani Border Situation

The Pakistani Government apparently intends to use the current border trouble with Afghanistan as a pretext to increase its presence in frontier tribal areas which, although located within Pakistan, have enjoyed considerable autonomy.

Foreign Minister Qadir announced on 8 October that the Nawab of Dir, ruler of a tribal state bordering Afghanistan north of the Khyber Pass, had been arrested along with his son, who rules a small tribal region just to the south. Qadir said the Pushtoon leaders were arrested following "many accusations of double-dealing." The Nawab reportedly had appealed to Kabul in September for help against rival tribal elements who were seeking to overthrow his regime, possibly with the support of Pakistani authorities.

Relations between the central government and Dir long have been strained, and Rawalpindi probably views the present Afghan-Pakistani border friction as a good excuse to intervene and install a more amenable ruler. Reports in Rawalpindi indicate that another son of the Nawab will be named as his successor. Pakistani authorities probably also feel their intervention now will make it possible for border security forces to be positioned directly on the Durand line, thereby affording a means of controlling contact between tribal elements on either side of the frontier.

The arrest of the Nawab of Dir may, however, arouse considerable resentment among the local tribes and cause them to resist forcibly attempts by Rawalpindi to extend its control over the region. Kabul is likely to seize on the arrests to step up its propaganda campaign denouncing Pakistani "repression" of the Pushtoon people.

Skirmishing is continuing along the Afghan-Pakistani frontier, although on a smaller scale than in September. Despite reports from Kabul that Pakistani "troops" have been involved,

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there is still no evidence that Rawalpindi has committed regular army forces. Units of the quasi-military border security forces, however, have been sent to the troubled Bajour area--placing them on this sector of the frontier apparently for the first time--and reportedly have been involved in some of the fighting. [redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~Upsurge of Anti-Regime Propaganda in Turkey

The announcement that the long-awaited trials of the leaders of the ousted Bayar-Menderes government will begin on 14 October has apparently sparked increased expressions of opposition to the military junta that overthrew the regime. Slogans opposing the Committee of National Union (CNU) have appeared on outdoor display cases and posters, and it is alleged that code passwords, reminiscent of the pre-coup demonstrations, are being circulated orally.

those who criticize the military regime are being arrested. There has been no significant expression of opposition.

Nonetheless, the military junta, by its recent propaganda tour of the provinces and its extension of the term of martial law, has indicated a continuing uneasiness. A senior member of the CNU is reported to have stated recently that the committee would be willing to eliminate half of the four million supporters of the former Democrat party if necessary to protect the revolution.

Army units throughout Turkey reportedly have been alerted to be prepared for possible rioting as an outgrowth of the trials. The CNU is also reported to be taking security precautions for itself, the cabinet, and members of the court that will try the members of the deposed regime.

According to the Turkish press, 38 of the nearly 500 persons imprisoned on the island of Yassiada are under indictments carrying the death penalty. These include ex-President Bayar, ex-Premier Menderes, and most members of the deposed cabinet. There are reports, however, of considerable pressure both within and outside the government to minimize the use of the death penalty. Whatever the outcome of the trials, it appears that the present regime will face its greatest test of stability during the next few weeks until all major figures are tried and sentenced. There apparently is no appeal of decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of Justice, which has been named specifically for these trials.

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~~TOP SECRET~~The Situation in the Congo

Recent activity by deposed Premier Lumumba--including a reshuffle of his "cabinet" and a day of speechmaking in the native quarter of Leopoldville--represents an effort to strengthen his position and counter recent defections among his followers. Although Lumumba's harangues hinted at a countercoup, his return to "house arrest" in the premier's residence, after several popular demonstrations on his behalf, suggests that he is at a loss as to his next move.

Lumumba's conduct also suggests that he is following Cairo's advice that he "emphasize that he is prime minister... by making a large number of declarations, statements, and press conferences and other similar acts within his power."

imminent "reversals" for Lumumba unless he received strong international support. In the wake of Mobutu's exposure of the UAR's pro-Lumumba activities, Cairo instructed its ambassador on 8 October "to carry out the UN's instructions" even if it involved the transfer of UAR forces away from Leopoldville.

In Katanga, anti-Tshombé Baluba tribesmen have stepped up guerrilla activity. The most recent disorders began on 4 October, when Baluba bands attacked trains and other railroad installations near Albertville. A UN official in Elisabethville has observed that anti-Tshombé tribesmen continue to dominate central Katanga, and that he sees no sign of improvement in the present situation. Tshombé, however, has criticized the UN for failing to give his troops a free hand to put down the disorders.

Elsewhere, Tshombé has strongly attacked Belgium for failing to grant diplomatic recognition to Katanga. His 9 October statement appears designed to bring pressure to bear for diplomatic support, while at the same time avoiding any suggestion of subservience to Brussels. He may be under pressure from within the Conakat party to modify his hitherto pro-Belgian posture.

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