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24 February 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DAILY BRIEF

USSR:

Preliminary cal-

culations indicate that the probe will arrive in the vicinity of Venus about 20 May, passing within 97,000 nautical miles of the center of Venus if the probe continues on its present path. The probe is of sufficient size--weighing about 1,400 pounds--to include a control system with a propulsion unit which could provide correction in mid-course in order to achieve a much closer pass or even an impact on Venus.

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Congo:

[REDACTED] UN Representative Dayal's mission in the Congo has deliberately suppressed information that the Gizenga regime recently executed 15 political prisoners. Ambassador Timberlake comments that the conclusion is inescapable this information was deliberately withheld since its release would have counteracted the effect of the recent political killings in South Kasai by anti-Lumumba Congolese and would have affected the Security Council debate.]

No

[REDACTED] the Czech ambassador to the UAR requested clearance for an IL-14 flight to Stanleyville between 22 February and 3 March.

[REDACTED] already granted clearance in behalf of the Stanleyville regime, and added, "We hope after a time to get clearance from the Sudan." The aircraft allegedly would carry the "representative of the Republic of Czechoslovakia to Stanleyville." The ambassador reportedly stated

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that previous efforts in early February to obtain flight clearance from Sudan had failed. Sudan apparently remains unwilling to permit such transit, despite continuing requests from the bloc and neutralist nations as well as developing internal pressures.

(Backup, Page 1)

Laos: A Pravda article of 23 February, the first authoritative commentary in over a month on Moscow's conditions for reaching a settlement in Laos, stressed the need to convene an international conference before the International Control Commission resumes its activity in Laos. Carefully avoiding direct criticism of present US policy in Laos, the article reiterated the USSR's contention that any such commission could deal only with Souvanna Phouma since the King of Laos did not have executive authority. Communist China's foreign minister on 22 February became the first bloc spokesman to attack the neutral nations proposal publicly. Chen Yi termed the plan the "start of a new US scheme...so that it can conveniently perpetuate its aggression and interference" in Laos.

supplies continue to be moved into the pro-Communist stronghold of the Plaine des Jarres by truck over Route 7. Two convoys--one of 12 trucks and another of 15 to 20--were sighted between the North Vietnamese border and this area.]

(Backup, Page 3)

Nationalist China: [Chiang Kai-shek is strongly opposed to the evacuation of the Chinese irregulars who have been driven from Burma into Laos,] Taipei is considering undertaking negotiations with Vientiane to permit them to remain and retain their arms.]

(Backup, Page 5)

Sudan: [Opposition to the Abboud regime's pro-UN stand in the Congo appears to be forcing the government into negotiations with the group of politicians which has been pressing for]

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[a return to civilian government in the Sudan. Public reaction to Lumumba's death, which at first took the form of small pro-Lumumba street demonstrations, has assumed an antigovernment character. Although the government believes the demonstrations were planned by the Sudanese Communist party and pro-UAR elements, it apparently fears that basically conservative civilian politicians will use the disorders to try to bring down the military regime.]

(Backup, Page 6)

UAR-Jordan: The UAR announced at an official press conference in Damascus on 23 February the uncovering of a new Jordanian plot, allegedly supported by the British, to foment a revolution in Syria. Cairo has probably had evidence of Jordanian plotting for some time but chose to make the exposure now while Nasir is in Damascus trying to generate local enthusiasm for Egyptian-Syrian unity. This action ends a brief and uneasy propaganda truce between the two governments and could be a prelude to stepped-up UAR subversive activity against Jordan.

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[alleged UAR plans for terrorist action in Jordan, including a plot to assassinate King Husayn.]

USSR-Morocco: [An agreement providing for Soviet economic aid to Morocco--possibly including a \$120,000,000 credit--reportedly was initiated by Moroccan Crown Prince Moulay Hassan and Soviet President Brezhnev during the latter's recent visit to Rabat. This would be the first time Morocco has accepted Soviet economic aid, although Moscow has in the past two years made offers ranging from a \$100,000,000 line of credit to smaller amounts for specific projects. Morocco's decision last November to accept a gift of Soviet jet aircraft--which arrived in Morocco during Brezhnev's visit--probably paved the way for the conclusion of this pact.]

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Situation in the Congo

Gustave Duran, the chief UN representative there, knew on 19 February that the 15 opponents of Lumumba--including ten legislators and five soldiers--had been killed but that this information had not been transmitted to New York. UN spokesmen in the Congo have so far failed to provide public confirmation for the reports. On 23 February Dayal sent a plea to Stanleyville, urging that the "truth be made known."

Dayal, a high-ranking and capable Indian official who has the confidence of Hammarskjold and has been given an almost completely free rein in running the UN Congo operation, has displayed considerable anti-American bias and often appears to have worked to further the cause of Lumumba's supporters. He has occasionally intervened personally with the UN military command, often to try to forestall military moves by Mobutu. At the same time he apparently has suppressed information concerning movements by pro-Lumumba forces. He also seems to be attempting to undermine Joseph Ileo's efforts to form a broadly based government. Recently he severely criticized the United States at a gathering of newsmen and foreign officers, charging that American policy was responsible for the chaotic situation in the Congo.

Hammarskjold has repeatedly refused to remove Dayal, although Dayal is on extremely poor terms with the Congolese authorities in Leopoldville. However, his contract expires in three weeks, and Hammarskjold has indicated that it will not be renewed. Dayal himself reportedly has twice asked Nehru to recall him, but Nehru refused on the ground that the Indian "commitment" to the UN must be honored.

In Katanga, a standoff apparently exists between UN officials and members of Tshombé's government. Although Tshombé announced on 22 February that he had agreed with the UN not to undertake any troop movements, his associates seem to be reiterating their demands that UN recognition of Katanga's sovereignty is a prerequisite for the complete cooperation of the

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Elisabethville regime. The UN representative in Elisabethville is not hopeful that even the present degree of stability can be maintained in the province; he has recommended that additional UN troops be dispatched in case a show of force should be necessary.

[redacted] an entire division would be needed to pacify the dissident Baluba area.

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Communist Bloc Reaction to Laotian King's Declaration
Of 19 February

The initial reaction of Communist bloc governments to King Savang's declaration of 19 February suggests concern lest the King's move deprive them of the diplomatic initiative in the Laotian crisis and make it more difficult for them to insist that any settlement be based on the 1954 Geneva agreements. Following broadcasts by Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow of Souphanouvong's bitter denunciation of the neutral nations commission proposal, Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi, in a speech on 22 February, said the US had declared its support for Savang's proposal and he attacked this as the beginning of an American "scheme" to "bury" the Geneva accords and perpetuate US "aggression and interference" in Laos.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Sobolev argued that any neutrality arrangements for Laos should be based on the solid legal foundation of the Geneva agreements. Sobolev said he feared that the sort of neutrality envisaged in Savang's declaration might lead "only one way."

The bloc's insistence that any Laotian negotiation or settlement be based on the 1954 agreements stems from its conviction that this approach would guarantee a major bloc voice in any solution and provide the best device for obtaining strong Pathet Lao participation in any expanded government of "national unity" that might be recommended by an international conference. In his remarks on Wednesday, Chen Yi took the position that the "sole, correct way to peacefully solve the Laotian question and to ensure the peace and neutrality of Laos lies in convening an enlarged Geneva conference, as proposed by Prince Sihanouk, with the Geneva agreements as its basis...." He also renewed the call for reactivation of the ICC in Laos and recognition of "the lawful government of Laos headed by Prince Phouma."

Pravda, in an article yesterday, commented obliquely on King Savang's declaration by charging that the Boun Oum government is "flouting the Geneva agreements, which provide the only

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foundation for peace and security in the Indochina area." The article claimed that the USSR's proposals for dealing with the crisis have "met with widespread international response," and contended that Britain, which together with the USSR co-chaired the 1954 Geneva Conference, has agreed in principle that any settlement should be based on the Geneva agreements. Pravda also welcomed Britain's proposal of 21 January for re-activating the ICC in Laos as a "move toward a realistic approach." The article went even further than Moscow's official reply of 18 February to the British proposal by saying that the ICC "must meet at once." It repeated, however, the standard position that the ICC must have new instructions and authority to deal with the present situation, that only an international conference could provide these, and that the ICC must deal only with Souvanna Phouma as head of the lawful government since the King of Laos "does not, under the Laotian constitution, have the powers of executive authority!"

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~~SECRET~~Chinese Nationalist Irregulars in Southeast Asia

[redacted] was willing to withdraw any or the Chinese military forces remaining in Burma who are willing to leave, and to cease re-supply of those who choose to remain. He predicted, however, that most of the irregulars would move to Laos rather than choose evacuation to Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek has often maintained that the irregulars are not a part of the armed forces and will not take instructions from Taiwan. He probably hopes events will develop in Laos which would justify the use of these irregulars or enable them to establish a new base.]

[The Chinese Nationalist Government during 1960 attempted to reorganize and train the Nationalist irregulars in the Burma border area into an effective military force capable of tactical missions. By December Taipei had transferred from Taiwan to the irregulars' base approximately 1,000 junior officers and enlisted personnel who had received special-forces and paratroop training. The flow of weapons, ammunition, and other supplies was increased. Some of the special forces are believed to be among the 2,000 to 3,000 irregulars recently driven into Laos. Besides these, about 7,000--including both irregulars and their dependents--were forced by a Chinese Communist - Burmese offensive to cross the Mekong River into Laos in late January. Chiang has asked for United States help to resettle these refugees in Taiwan or in civilian communities in Thailand.]

[Burma, meanwhile, has sent a letter to the UN secretary general protesting Taiwan's overflight of its airspace and its violation of the United Nations resolution of 1953 in supplying the irregulars. Rangoon asked that all countries stop supplying the irregulars in Burma but is not now planning to call for formal UN action on the issue. The only significant force of irregulars still in Burma--possibly 3,000 to 4,000 troops--is near the Thai border.]

[elements of these irregulars have been under repeated attacks from the Burmese Army]

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Sudanese Government Considering Concessions
To Opposition Group

[The Sudanese military regime ignored a petition presented last November by a coalition of politicians calling for a return to civilian government. Since then the leaders of this group have been touring the provinces attempting to win support, but they have lacked a clear-cut issue with which to arouse public enthusiasm. Government leaders, concerned over the appearance of antiregime slogans in the pro-Lumumba demonstrations, apparently now are willing to consider concessions to the opposition group in hopes of bolstering their popularity.]

[On 16 February representatives of the Supreme Council, the Sudan's top ruling body, met with Siddiq al Mahdi, the pro-Western leader of the opposition group, in an attempt to reach a compromise. It appears that the only agreement reached was "to continue talking." The group leaders are reportedly optimistic as a result of the meeting, and some have expressed the opinion that a compromise will eventually be reached which will increase civilian participation in the government and provide for return to complete civilian control sometime in the future.]

[Although the coalition group includes Communist and pro-UAR elements, it is predominantly conservative. If included in the Sudanese Government, therefore, it would not be likely to press for a change in the Sudan's policy toward the UN in the Congo.]

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