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SECURITY INFORMATION

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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FAR EAST**1. Floods temporarily hamper Communists in western Korea:**

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Comment:

the loss

of vehicles and food rations as a result of floods. These difficulties, combined with the recent shifting of Communist troops from the front to the west coast in expectation of a UN amphibious attack, have temporarily weakened the enemy's capabilities along the battle line.

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NEAR EAST - AFRICA**2. Iranian Chief of Staff restricts travel of foreign military attaches:**

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Iranian Chief of Staff Baharmast has denied every request of the American and British Military Attachés during the past two weeks for permission to travel outside Tehran. Although the restrictions ostensibly apply to all military attachés, the American Army Attaché notes that other foreign attachés seldom leave the capital.

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Ambassador Henderson believes that the restrictions are directed primarily against the British to prevent them from contacting tribes along the Iranian frontiers.

Comment: Baharmast recently ordered the General Staff not to discuss army reorganization plans with the US Army Mission, and the new restrictions apparently represent another step in Baharmast's anti-foreign policy.

3. Iranian official believes Mossadeq will deliver ultimatum to British:

[Redacted] Prime Minister Mossadeq's official reply to the joint Anglo-American approach for a solution of the oil dispute will neither threaten severance of diplomatic relations

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with Great Britain nor set a time limit for the British reply, according to the vice president of the Iranian Senate.

Ambassador Henderson also reports that Iranians close to Mossadeq are hoping that his reply will persuade Great Britain and the United States to change their policies toward Iran.

Comment: Awareness of nationalist sentiment in Iran may induce Mossadeq to deliver an ultimatum. Judging from his past actions, however, he may not carry out his threats. There is no evidence that he is ready to give up attempts at an agreement.

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4. [Redacted]


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5. Egypt may consider British-drafted constitution on Sudan:



Egypt may accept the British-drafted constitution on the Sudan as a basis for discussion, but may first suggest amendments, such as postponement of the elections scheduled for November, according to Lieutenant Colonel Sabri, Egyptian senior staff officer in the Sudan. Sabri stated that Egypt's chief objection to the Sudan constitution is that it gives the Governor General too much power.

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Sabri's position suggests that Egypt's military regime has adopted a more reasonable view on the Sudan issue than previous Cairo governments. Sabri's advice may carry some weight in Egyptian official circles, since he is a brother of one of General Nagib's close advisers.

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Comment: If Sabri's advice is followed, it would represent a major change in Egyptian policy on the Sudan question. There is no clear indication, however, that General Nagib is prepared to face the repercussions within Egypt that such a settlement might cause.

6. Turkish reaction to British proposal on MEDO:

[Redacted] The Turkish Foreign Ministry states that 3.3(h)(2) it agrees in principle with the British proposal on the Middle East Defense Organization, but believes that the Arab

States should be invited to sit in on any discussions preceding its organization. Arab participation need not imply a commitment on membership, and such an invitation should refute possible claims of the Arabs that the sponsoring powers were proceeding without consulting them.

The Turkish Foreign Ministry observes that the present Egyptian Government appears more favorably inclined toward MEDO than its predecessors. Ankara proposes more military aid to Turkey and eventual establishment of MEDO headquarters in southern Turkey.

Comment: The Turks do not favor proceeding with defense planning before the obligations of each member of MEDO are clarified. Egypt's position is still unclear, but General Nagib's desire for Western arms may make him consider a more moderate course than his predecessors. Ankara's desire to have MEDO headquarters in Turkey is presumably motivated by considerations of prestige.

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WESTERN EUROPE

7. Paris Embassy comments on French Communist Party crisis:


The American Embassy in Paris states that the current crisis in the French Communist Party, the most serious since 1939, is the compelling reason for Thorez's imminent return from the Soviet Union.

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The Communists are facing a "delicate situation" which could develop into a national deviationist movement along Titoist lines. If Andre Marty and Charles Tillon, the purged leaders who represent the militant elements and paramilitary cadres, further delay a 'full public confession,' grave repercussions may be expected.

The whereabouts of Marty and Tillon are unknown.

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8. Italy believed unwilling to approve rapid build-up of NATO military bases:

The American Embassy in Rome states that the Italian Government will certainly be unwilling to approve a rapid acceleration of the military bases program in Italy. The

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government fears that its survival in next spring's national elections would be jeopardized by such approval. The Embassy believes that such an acceleration would further the Soviet cold-war objective of alienating the peoples of Western Europe from the United States.

Comment: The Italians have previously indicated that a program of such scope would require parliamentary ratification.

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