

~~TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION~~

18 January 1953

3.5(c)

Copy No.

58

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 15
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C 2009
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HP 70-2
DATE: 19 Dec 79 REVIEWER:

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~TOP SECRET~~**S U M M A R Y****SOVIET UNION**

1. Additional fighter division indicated in Soviet Far East (page 3).

SOUTHEAST ASIA

2. [redacted] 3.3(h)(2)
3. Burma reportedly plans concerted military effort against Chinese Nationalists (page 4). 3.3(h)(2)
4. [redacted] 3.3(h)(2)

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

3.3(h)(2)

5. [redacted]
6. Comment on current Egyptian crisis (page 6).
7. [redacted] 3.3(h)(2)

WESTERN EUROPE

3.3(h)(2)

8. Bidault anxious for Saar settlement without foreign intervention (page 7).
9. Italian spokesman opposed to EDC modification prior to ratification (page 7).

* * * *

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~**SOVIET UNION****1. Additional fighter division indicated in Soviet Far East:**

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: Authorized strength of a Soviet fighter division is approximately 110 jet or 150 conventional aircraft.

This would be the second fighter division added to the Fifth Fleet Air Force since November 1952, and would raise the total of Soviet Naval Air divisions in the southern Maritime and Kwantung Peninsula areas to eight.

SOUTHEAST ASIA**2.**

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.3(h)(2)

3. Burma reportedly plans concerted military effort against Chinese Nationalists:

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] Burmese officials are planning an all-out military effort against the Chinese Nationalist forces in northeastern Burma, [redacted]

[redacted] the government plans to retaliate against Chinese civilian residents of Rangoon suspected of assisting the Nationalist troops.

Comment: Burmese Commander in Chief Ne Win told the US Army Attaché in Rangoon on 7 January that the problem resulting from the presence of Nationalist troops in Burma has "reached serious proportions," and that he was undecided whether to concentrate his forces against the Communist insurgents or the Nationalists. More recently, the Army Attaché estimated that a major operation against the Nationalists would follow the current country-wide redeployment of Burmese troops.

Diversion of Burmese forces against the Nationalists would preclude aggressive operations against the Communists during the current dry season, and would provide them an opportunity to regroup and consolidate their positions in north-central Burma.

3.3(h)(2)

4.

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

5.

3.3(h)(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~**6. Comment on current Egyptian crisis:**

General Nagib's abolition on 16 January of all political parties in Egypt, following the arrest of alleged plotters, demonstrates that Nagib can meet any internal threat to his government and that no political figure can initiate a successful coup without strong army support. By describing the plot as "Communist-Wafdist" inspired, the government attempts to discredit further the former dominant party.

There is no evidence that this episode augurs a change in Nagib's attitude toward Britain and the West.

7.

3.3(h)(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

WESTERN EUROPE

8. Bidault anxious for Saar settlement without foreign intervention:

3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted]

French Foreign Minister Bidault, while admitting to the British Ambassador in Paris that he did not know Premier Mayer's specific ideas on the Saar question, stated that he attaches importance to making maximum progress as soon as possible and believes West German Chancellor Adenauer is just as sincere in his desire for progress.

Bidault made it plain that neither British nor American "intervention" would be desirable at this time.

Comment: This first statement on the Saar by Bidault suggests that the Mayer government has no specific new plan for fulfilling its stipulation that "a definition" of a Saar settlement must precede parliamentary debate of EDC.

Bonn is not likely to agree to the French proposals as they now stand.

9. Italian spokesman opposed to EDC modification prior to ratification:

[Redacted]

French attempts to modify the EDC treaty before ratification would impair its chances of ultimate adoption, according to Italy's permanent representative to the EDC Interim Commission. He told American Ambassador Draper that the French objective of maintaining "unity and integrity of French forces" by negotiating a protocol permitting countries to withdraw forces from EDC would not be acceptable to other member countries.

The representative recalled Premier de Gasperi's statement at the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council that the treaty should be ratified "quickly" in its present form and modified later. He asked whether the United States has any alternative in mind if EDC must be abandoned.

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Comment: Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany has taken the same position as De Gasperi toward EDC treaty ratification.

The Italian Parliament, where the EDC treaty is buried in committee, is not expected to consider ratification before the May national elections.

~~TOP SECRET~~