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9 October 1959

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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9 OCTOBER 1959

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet diplomat says US rebuff of Khrushchev overtures would strengthen those in USSR who oppose detente.

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Sudan--Junior officers' group reportedly completing plans for coup.

Pakistan--Further changes among top military leaders expected to follow retirement of chief of staff.

South Korean opposition party on verge of split.

## III. THE WEST

[redacted] French foreign minister has offered to resume relations, give Israel no further arms aid.

## LATE ITEM

Baghdad remains quiet under army control; Qasim's assailants still sought.

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
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No

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

9 October 1959

## DAILY BRIEF

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: [The counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Paris told an American official [ ] if the United States rebuffs Khrushchev's efforts toward a relaxation of world tensions, those forces in the USSR opposed to a rapprochement--now "10 to 20 percent of the population"--would "expand rapidly." As part of Moscow's persistent effort to make the West more amenable to Soviet views, Soviet officials have in the past suggested that strong Western opposition to foreign policy initiatives identified with Khrushchev would strengthen elements in the USSR which favor a "tougher" foreign policy. The Soviet diplomat again suggested that agreement could easily be reached on cessation of nuclear tests and expansion of US-Soviet trade, and that Moscow might be willing to pave the way for increased trade by agreeing to a lend-lease settlement of around \$500,000,000 to \$600,000,000.] [ ] (Page 1)

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Sudan: Leaders of a dissident junior officers' group are making final plans for a coup attempt, [redacted]

OK  
[redacted] The plotters admit contact with the UAR Embassy. They claim to be pro-Western Sudanese nationalists and say they have the support of strong army elements, one of the northern tribes, and some religious leaders. In spite of the government's strong security measures, the conspirators believe their plans are not known to the government. If Sudan offers to compromise with the UAR in negotiations beginning in Cairo on 10 October on distribution of the Nile waters, the plotters may accuse the government of a sellout of Sudanese interests as a pretext for launching their coup effort, [redacted]

OK  
Pakistan: [The view is prevalent among army officers and police officials in the Karachi area that other changes may follow the apparently enforced retirement on 30 September of Lt. General Habibullah, Pakistani Army Chief of Staff. They feel that President Ayub probably supported General Musa, the commander in chief, against Habibullah for procedural reasons, but that he is still friendly with Habibullah and may give him a cabinet post. They also suggest that Musa may be removed in the near future and that Interior Minister Lt. General Sheikh may be given the governorship of West Pakistan or a foreign assignment.]

[redacted] (Page 2)

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#3  
South Korea: Factional strife between South Korean opposition Democratic party leaders Cho Pyong-ok and Vice President Chang Myon has brought the party to the verge of a split on the eve of its national presidential convention, scheduled for 15 October. Chang fears that Cho will not only make a strong bid for the presidential nomination but will attempt to exclude Chang's supporters from all key party posts. A split, which appears to have been encouraged by the administration, would destroy South Korea's embryonic two-party system and would enable President Rhee to win re-election next year without resorting to extreme extralegal measures. [redacted] (Page 3)

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DAILY BRIEF

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### III. THE WEST

No France: [ ] The UAR deputy foreign minister informed Cairo [ ] that French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville had told him in New York that France would like to resume diplomatic relations. Couve de Murville also reportedly said France had "absolutely no intention" of entering into new arms contracts with Israel or of strengthening cooperation with Israel in any way. The French approach suggests that Paris hopes renewed French-Egyptian relations will eventually lead Cairo, among other things, to moderate its opposition to De Gaulle's proposals on Algeria. Nasir is likely to move slowly in response to any French approach, despite the lure of a promise of a more circumspect French policy on Israel. [ ]  
[ ] (Page 4)

### IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Outlook for an Independent Cyprus. NIE 32.5-59. 6 Oct 59.  
[ ]

### LATE ITEM

No \*Iraq: The situation in Iraq is quiet. All roads out of Baghdad are under army control, and vehicles are not allowed to leave the city, although persons on foot may leave after being searched. Qasim's assailants have not been apprehended, [ ]  
[ ] "homes of nationalists" have been searched. [ ] Qasim was attacked by a well-organized "gang" which killed one of its wounded members, rather than have him fall into the hands of the police. Military Governor Abdi has spread the alarm for the arrest of two "nationalists," and a number of other arrests have probably been made. The curfew hours have been lengthened to include the hours from 6 pm to 5 am. Qasim's condition according to Radio Baghdad remains "good."  
[ ]

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Soviet Diplomat Comments on US-Soviet Relations

[The counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Paris, presumably at Moscow's direction, told an American official [redacted] if the United States "rebuffs" Khrushchev's efforts toward a relaxation of world tensions, those forces in the USSR opposed to a rapprochement would "expand rapidly." He said these elements now constitute 10 to 20 percent of the population and include older persons and army officers. Soviet officials have in the past sought to encourage Western acceptance of Khrushchev's initiatives in foreign policy on the grounds that opposition would strengthen elements in the USSR which favor a "tougher" foreign policy.]

[The Soviet diplomat suggested that agreement could "easily" be reached on cessation of nuclear testing and expansion of US-Soviet trade. He hinted that Moscow might be willing to pave the way for increased trade by agreeing to a lend-lease settlement of \$500,000,000 to \$600,000,000. Negotiations broke down several years ago when the USSR made a "final" offer of \$300,000,000 in settlement of the debt, which had been scaled down by the US Government to \$800,000,000. Khrushchev indicated during his visit to the US that the Soviet Government is willing to resume these negotiations.]

[The source called President Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union much more important than a summit meeting. He also disparaged Communist China's military and economic position--apparently to convey the impression that even if the Chinese wished to forestall any improvement in US-Soviet relations, their dependence on the USSR would prevent them from doing so.] [redacted]

[redacted]

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II. ASIA-AFRICAFurther Shifts May Follow Retirement of Pakistani Army  
Chief of Staff

[Reports from Pakistan since the retirement on 30 September of Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Habibullah generally agree that he was forced to retire by General Musa, the commander in chief, with whom he had had difficulties during the past year. President Ayub presumably approved Musa's action against Habibullah primarily because he felt he must support the senior officer instead of the junior.]

[Army and police officers in the Karachi area apparently feel, however, that General Musa himself may be removed in the near future because of his difficulties with Habibullah. It is rumored that Lt. Gen. Bakhtiar Rana, now martial-law administrator for West Pakistan, may replace him. Habibullah remains popular with other army officers and seems still to be on good terms with President Ayub. There is speculation that he will be given a cabinet post or some other important assignment in about a month.]

[strong rumors in Karachi that Interior Minister Lt. Gen. Sheikh, one of the topmost military government leaders, may either be made governor of West Pakistan in late October and be replaced by the present commander of the Pakistani Air Force or be given a foreign assignment.]

[Some of these rumors may reflect the disappointment of individuals loyal to Habibullah, the envy of officers bypassed by Musa in his rapid rise, and the disdain felt for Musa by officers who consider him their social inferior. The existence of the rumors nevertheless indicates divisions of feeling within army ranks and uncertainties as to the stability of army and government leadership. These uncertainties may grow following the move of part of the government to Rawalpindi in October and the consequent separation of top officials from their offices in Karachi.]

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### South Korean Opposition Party on Verge of Major Split

Factional strife between South Korean opposition Democratic party coleaders Cho Pyong-ok and Vice President Chang Myon has brought the party to the verge of a major split on the eve of its national convention--scheduled for 15 October--to select a 1960 presidential candidate. Chang fears that Cho not only will obtain the presidential nomination but also will attempt to shut out Chang's supporters from all key party posts.

In view of the party's doubtful election prospects, the basic struggle apparently is for control of the party. Should a split develop, it probably would destroy South Korea's embryonic two-party system, lessen the prospects for the development of a responsible, stable opposition, and assure President Rhee's re-election without the use of extralegal measures. [REDACTED]

The crisis appears to have been actively encouraged by the Rhee administration. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the police were originally instructed to assure the selection of convention delegates favorable to Cho, but that on 2 October they were ordered to support the selection of pro-Chang delegates. [REDACTED]

The crisis was brought to a head by the resignation on 1 October of two Chang supporters from the five-man party Supreme Committee [in protest against alleged administration financial support for Cho and the use of police intimidation to pack the convention with pro-Cho delegates] Cho, in turn, has publicly threatened to retire unless the resignations are "settled satisfactorily. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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France Reportedly Makes New Bid to Resume Diplomatic Relations With Cairo

(French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville

--that France would like to resume formal diplomatic relations whenever Egypt wishes, Couve de Murville reportedly also stated that under the De Gaulle regime, France had "absolutely" no intention of entering into new contracts nor of strengthening French cooperation with Israel "in any way." The foreign minister said the only contracts for supplying Israel with arms and planes were those left over from 1957. He added that France had given neither open nor tacit encouragement to Israel's behavior toward Egypt and that France was "steering clear" of the Arab countries' "meddling with one another."

[The foreign minister's statements are in line with France's recent policy of improving relations with the Arab states and playing down support for Israel. Paris does not see Nasir as any less of a threat to its interests in Africa, but apparently it is trying to moderate the threat, particularly as regards the critical Algerian problem.]

[Couve de Murville's approach will almost certainly be greeted with suspicion in Cairo, although Nasir has at various times indicated genuine interest in returning UAR-French relations to normal and would welcome cessation of French aid to Israel. He has also indicated, however, that a rapprochement cannot be rushed, largely because of possible adverse reaction in the Arab world.]

[Since De Gaulle came to power, Paris has pursued a circum-spect if not "cool" policy toward Israel. There remains considerable sympathy for Israel among some political and military leaders, however. The Israelis have relied heavily on being able to obtain French military aid, particularly jet aircraft of advanced design, and they will probably exert strong pressures in opposition to French overtures to Nasir.]

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The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

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