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8 April 1959
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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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Greece: Preliminary returns from the 5 April country-wide Greek municipal elections indicate that the Communist-sponsored EDA party has failed in its effort to discredit the government. However, claims of a "smashing defeat" for EDA appear to be exaggerated. The results do not necessarily indicate a popular anti-leftist trend, but suggest that the Greek Government's anti-EDA propaganda and pre-election police measures have been effective.

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*Argentina: The riots of 3 April, led by the Communists and joined by Peronista extremists, demonstrated the Communists' capability for subversion. The Frondizi government has declared at least five Soviet diplomats persona non grata, charging interference in internal affairs. Although the riots apparently were brought under control rapidly, there are reports of increased apprehension, especially among the military

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DAILY BRIEF

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Greek Municipal Elections

Despite Greek Government claims that the pro-Communists suffered a "smashing defeat" in last Sunday's municipal elections, the alleged "solid victory" for progovernment candidates should not be regarded as indicating a definite popular trend away from the Communist-sponsored United Democratic Left (EDA). Preliminary reports show increased popular support for the incumbent National Radical Union (ERE), some weakening in the political stature of the EDA, and a further trend toward elimination of the center parties. The local administrative picture will not be altered significantly, but the government's drive against pro-Communist elements begun before the election may have considerable impact.

The governing ERE entered no official slates and neither did EDA, except in certain isolated centers of known strength such as Piraeus, Mytilini, and Naoussa. Nonetheless, the main contest was between these two parties. EDA was determined to roll up a massive antigovernment vote and to secure popular support for attaining "bourgeois legality." It failed in both attempts, largely because of the effective anti-EDA campaign by the government and because the issues on which it focused, especially Cyprus and missile bases, failed to stir the electorate.

EDA-supported candidates, who as a result of an agreement with the Liberal faction led by Sophocles Venizelos ran mostly as Liberals, virtually everywhere received fewer votes than EDA-supported candidates in the national election last May. EDA polled nearly 25 percent of the total vote in 1958. However, according to government statistics, EDA strength in last Sunday's election ran as high as 49 and 56 percent in some localities. Despite the loss in total comparative strength, when viewed in terms of the 1958 parliamentary elections, pro-Communist strength was impressive in several localities.

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Argentine Communists Demonstrate Strong
Subversive Capability

The ability of Argentine Communists to mobilize some 3,000 demonstrators for riots in central Buenos Aires on 3 April, despite a well-publicized police ban and state-of-siege regulations, has increased apprehension--especially among the military--over the government's capacity to meet this threat. Worker participation was limited to extremist Peronistas. The interior minister termed the riots "a typical Communist action, considering the persons who took part, the manner in which it was carried out, and the objectives pursued."

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The Soviet Embassy counselor was declared persona non grata on 7 April, and as many as four other Bloc diplomats may be expelled as a result of official investigations indicating foreign Communist participation in the riots. Mexico just took similar action against two Soviet diplomats accused of involvement in the recent railway strikes there.

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