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26 May 1961

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
26 May 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## DAILY BRIEF

*Sarab*  
Laos: [redacted]

[redacted] the Thai premier [redacted] had no confidence in the successful outcome of the Geneva talks and predicted a major Communist offensive to seize the Mekong river valley when the talks broke down. [redacted]


[redacted] he expected the Chinese Communists to intervene in Laos, which would lead to an even more widespread conflict than the Korean War. Sarit promised Phoumi and his forces asylum in the event they were forced to withdraw from Laos.

[redacted] At Pa Dong, the Communist forces stepped up their attacks on government Meo positions on 24 and 25 May. On midday of 25 May the enemy made its heaviest artillery attack to date on Pa Dong.

[redacted] Bloc airlift operations into Laos were scheduled through 26 May. Airlift operations on 24 May consisted of a total of 24 airlift and airlift-associated sorties--23 by Soviet transports and one by a North Vietnamese aircraft. Of this number, at least three flew into Laos.] [redacted]

[redacted]

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Vietnam: Communist guerrillas have shifted to more secure communications in South Vietnam's Kien Giang Province, and a loss of intelligence on Viet Cong plans and activities is anticipated. Although the new cipher, first noted in mid-May, is at present confined to the one province, its introduction may foreshadow a general shift to this complex system throughout the Hanoi-directed communications network in South Vietnam.

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Iran: [The American Embassy at Tehran believes that Prime Minister Amini does not yet have a broad base of public support, although his moves so far to create an image of a hard-working frugal government have produced an initially favorable public impression. The embassy feels it is too early to judge how successful Amini will be in facing his problems but says, "There are signs Amini himself is becoming overwhelmed by them." While the embassy does not believe that a coup attempt is imminent, reports from other sources have indicated that conservative or military interests, if they become fearful of their position, could unite against Amini. The reformist National Front, which had opposed the former regime, has already come out in opposition to some of Amini's policies by calling for elections within a month and a neutral foreign policy.]

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Amini has ordered that public meetings and the formation of new branches of the National Front in the provinces be prohibited until further notice.

(Backup, Page 1)

Tunisia-France-Algeria: [President Bourguiba, gambling on De Gaulle's willingness and ability to settle the Algerian problem, continues to support French efforts, to the annoyance of the provisional Algerian government. The rebels, already displeased by Bourguiba's unsolicited advice in speeches during his recent trip to the US, Canada, and Great Britain, were particularly irked by his approval of the unilateral French]

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[cease-fire announced on 20 May. Although failure of the talks would be a blow to Bourguiba's prestige and would increase his political isolation in Africa, there are no signs of significant domestic opposition to his stand.] (Backup, Page 2)

\*Dominican Republic: [A group of Dominican Army officers plans a coup in about two weeks to replace the Trujillo regime with a democratically oriented and pro - United States government,]

The military leaders of the plotting group probably include the two army generals who were reported late last month to be confident of considerable military backing for their plans. These coup plans should be distinguished from the maneuvers Trujillo himself is reportedly considering for a "controlled" coup that would be no more than a change in Trujillo puppets.

#### SELECTED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

France and the Algerian Problem: De Gaulle's Position in France After the April '61 Coup Attempt in Algeria and Prospects for a Negotiated Settlement Within the Next Six Months.  
U. S. I. B. SNIE 22-2-61. 23 May 1961.]

Outlook for Yugoslavia: Domestic Policies and Position of the Regime; Economic Situation and Foreign Trade; and Foreign

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Relations With the Bloc, the West, and the Neutralists. U.S.I.B.  
NIE 15-61. 23 May 1961. [redacted]

Short-term Outlook for Iran: Likely Relations of the New  
Amini Government with the Shah and Possibility of a Military  
Coup. U.S.I.B. SNIE 34-2-61. 23 May 1961. [redacted]

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### Concessions by Prime Minister Amini Aggravate Iran's Economic Problems

The antiregime National Front has already clashed with Amini over the issue of elections, demanding that they should be held within a month rather than be delayed as Amini insists. The National Front has been reported considering a general strike if its elections demands are not heeded.

[redacted] the group would like to avoid a strike because it might be difficult to control the crowd, and the resulting disorder could be used as an excuse for a military coup.) The embassy believes that the National Front, although disorganized and without a clear program, "has spurted to a prominence and degree of influence which has many conservative elements concerned if not frightened." (The prime minister has given the Front every indication of his willingness to try to work with its members on a "sensible basis" but has said that if it is obvious in future meetings that the Front plans to be unreasonable, he "will warn it of the possibility of a military government.")

Although Amini has publicly announced Iran's continued support for CENTO, the embassy comments that his position has not received popular support and that his government, if it stays in office, may have to espouse a more neutral position.

In his efforts to buy time, Prime Minister Amini has taken some measures which complicate Iran's economic and financial problems. The granting of wage increases to the teachers, a continuation of credits to the merchants, the granting of increased load limits to truck owners, and a projected land reform program create a pattern of concession to special interest groups which could lead to more costly demands. The American Embassy doubts that Amini has enough capable staff members for the committees he has appointed to devise solutions to major problems. He is not using a number of competent Iranians because of their association with the Eqbal government.

The Shah has completed his official visit to Norway and is returning to Tehran. Prior to his departure from Tehran on 17 May, it had been announced that his visit would be limited to about a week and that his unofficial travels in Europe would be canceled.

[redacted]

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[Redacted]

### Algerian Rebels' Relations With Tunisia and Morocco

(The provisional Algerian government (PAG) was reportedly so irritated by Bourguiba's statements in Canada and the US that it sent a special cable to Washington requesting him to refrain from further public advice to them concerning negotiations with the French. Bourguiba's endorsement of the French cease-fire--a sharp contrast to the PAG's initial reaction--is an unusual public disclosure of difference between Tunisian and PAG policies. The rebels are reportedly angrier at Bourguiba for endorsing the move than with the French for making it, and feel that they cannot count on his unquestioning support during the negotiations.)

(Nevertheless, [redacted] 16 Tunisians are in Geneva to advise and support the rebel negotiating team. Bourguiba fears that if a settlement is not reached soon, leaders of other countries will supplant his influence with the rebels. He has repeatedly urged the PAG to limit its demands and come to a broad general agreement with the French. Tunisian Secretary of State for Information Masmoudi--who was in charge of arranging the February meeting between Bourguiba and De Gaulle--told the US ambassador on 23 May that he felt all would be lost if the Evian conference became involved in details. The rebels, however, will be wary of any Tunisian advice to compromise on the key issue of the Sahara, as they are reportedly suspicious of a Tunisian-Moroccan "deal" to pressure them into a Saharan settlement short of complete sovereignty.)

(At least some members of the PAG may also be distrustful of Moroccan support. [redacted])

[redacted] rebel Minister of Armaments Boussoff was extremely displeased with the reception given him during an early May visit to Morocco. Boussoff was not received directly by King Hassan II--as he always had been by Mohammed V--but was obliged first to get concurrence from [redacted])

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(Director of the Royal Cabinet Reda Guedira, who also attended the audiences and directed the discussion to the point of answering for the King.

[redacted] "the Evian talks began in Rabat"--presumably meaning that Guedira, and possibly the King, took the French side.)  
[redacted]

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