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GENERAL

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2. French COCOM delegate states France will refuse Soviet request for embargoed ships:

 France will refuse to deliver any tankers or cargo ships of 8,000 to 10,000 tons to the Soviet Union, according to the French delegate to COCOM. He also told Ambassador Dillon that ultimate action on the Soviet request for 5,000-ton cargo ships would be in accordance with COCOM advice.

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[Redacted Box] 3.3(h)(2)

3. Rumors of Soviet-Austrian bilateral talks discounted:

[Redacted Box] Ambassador Bohlen comments that Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko in a conversation with the Austrian charge in Moscow, as reported by the latter, made no mention of bilateral Soviet-Austrian talks, as had been rumored.

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The charge interpreted Gromyko's reference to the desirability of Austria's being a link between East and West as an oblique reference to the concept of a neutralized Austria.

Comment: Recent Soviet propaganda has suggested the need for the Austrian government to follow a policy of neutrality.

SOVIET UNION

4. Comment on Ehrenberg's speech to World Peace Council:

Speaking to the World Peace Council meeting in Budapest, Soviet delegate and well-known Communist propagandist Ilya Ehrenberg appeared to be outlining a Soviet plan for a period of negotiations and relaxed tensions between East and West. Treating the Korean truce as almost a fait accompli, Ehrenberg called for negotiations in Korea to be followed by "other negotiations."

Ehrenberg's thesis that the security of individual nations could best be maintained by bilateral nonaggression pacts which were "not contrary to the spirit of the UN" seemed designed to strengthen Moscow's present diplomatic gestures to individual countries outside the Orbit.

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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

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permit the government to announce a reduction in work norms without losing face flared up into a near revolt in which the demonstrators clamored for abolition of the regime itself and called for free all-German elections.

The rioting will probably cause West Germans to demand greater efforts at unification by the Bonn government. The West German insistence on free elections as a prerequisite will be buttressed by the similar demands of the demonstrators.

The East Berlin rioting will probably cause the Kremlin to review the future course of the "softer" foreign policy which began after the death of Stalin.

7. US officials in Bonn comment on recent Soviet tactics in Germany:

American officials in Bonn do not believe that 3.3(h)(2) the Western defense build-up is menacing enough yet to have forced the Kremlin to sacrifice its position in East Germany in exchange for unification of the country. They point to the serious implications such a sacrifice would have on the Satellites. Nevertheless, these officials are concerned over the effects of the unity campaign on Western opinion.

The two immediate Soviet objectives are apparently to diminish public confidence in Adenauer's policy and to prepare the ground for unification talks, possibly on the high commissioner level. Additional minor concessions in Germany are also expected.

8. Bidault reaffirms support for current French policies on Indochina and EDC:

French foreign minister Bidault told Ambassador 3.3(h)(2) Dillon on 15 June that he would not support any government failing to pledge continuance of current French policy in Indochina and support of NATO objectives, including the European Defense Community. He had vigorously opposed Mendes-France's plan to tell the United States at Bermuda, "we can no longer carry the burden in Indochina; what do you want to do about it?"

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Comment: The importance the French attach to the prospective Bermuda conference will probably result in Bidault's return as foreign minister in the next French government. His record suggests, however, that he might later bend his foreign policy views with prevailing political winds, particularly under a left-center regime based on Mendes-France's policies.

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