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1 October 1960

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE


BULLETIN



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1 OCTOBER 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Iran somewhat optimistic about current talks with USSR. ①

II. ASIA-AFRICA

South Korean army chief of staff sees urgent need to dismiss top officers associated with Rhee. ②

Laos--Early showdown between Kong Le and Souvanna Phouma possible. ③

Morocco may move against French Army in Algeria if border violations continue. ④

Congo--Mobutu continues to stress Lumumba's dependence on foreign support. ⑤

III. THE WEST

NATO members not united on travel restrictions on East German officials. ⑥

Opposition to De Gaulle's proposals for confederation of Common Market countries declining. ⑦



LATE ITEM

Evidence indicates high-level Soviet delegation has been in Peiping trying to iron out Sino-Soviet differences. ⑧

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

1 October 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC *Sirah*

USSR-Iran: Khrushchev, [redacted] with the Shah, apparently repeated standard Soviet demands for concessions by Iran as the price of "normal" relations. [redacted] he also revived a proposal--previously described by the Shah as meaningless--that the two countries withdraw their troops from along their common frontier. The Shah and other leading Iranian officials are maintaining their opposition to concessions to Moscow, but are continuing to seek a means of improving relations. *120*

[redacted] he and Acting Foreign Minister Afshan took a firm position in exchanges of views with Pegov on 28 and 29 September.

[redacted] that such talks. "if they encounter no obstacle, will be promising."

II. ASIA-AFRICA

South Korea: Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Choi Kyong-nok believes that the dismissal of top general officers associated with the corruption of the Rhee regime is the basic requirement for eliminating dissatisfaction among junior officers and restoring discipline in the armed forces. Choi believes that failure to take early action on this problem will create the real possibility of a revolt supported by the great majority of officers, who as yet have not agitated. While contending that a coup is not the proper solution, Choi noted that military rule has been suggested by civilian as well as military elements. *OK*

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Laos: A showdown may be approaching between Captain Kong Le and the Souvanna Phouma government following Kong Le's apparent refusal to abide by the cease-fire reached between Souvanna's military commanders and General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee. While Souvanna has publicly rebuked Kong Le, his ability to bring Kong Le into line is still open to serious question.

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Morocco-France: Moroccan Acting Deputy Premier Abdelkhalek Torres--the ranking executive in Morocco in the absence of both the King and the crown prince--reportedly will order military action against the French Army in Algeria if alleged recent border violations continue. Torres is said to have the King's permission for such extreme action if necessary. Torres is reported to believe that Moroccan military counteraction would create an international incident on the basis of which Morocco could request the intervention of UN forces. Such intervention is the avowed aim of the Algerian rebels and seems to be the motive underlying Tunisian President Bourguiba's interest in "close union" of the Tunisian and Algerian rebel governments.]

OK

(Page 4)

***Republic of the Congo:** Katanga President Tshombé's refusal on 30 September to attend the forthcoming political round-table conference in Leopoldville appears designed to emphasize Katanga's political independence of the Congo. In Leopoldville, Mobutu is continuing his efforts to discredit Lumumba by emphasizing the ousted premier's dependence on foreign support. However, his charge that Lumumba successfully solicited a loan from Communist China is unsubstantiated.

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Lumumba continues to have the active support of UAR, Ghanaian, and Guinean representatives in the Congo.

[redacted] instructed the UAR ambassador to urge that Lumumba "emphasize that he is prime minister, especially while the General Assembly is in session, by making a large number of declarations, statements, and press conferences and other similar acts within his power." Lumumba reportedly told the press yesterday he would not

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attend the round-table conference on the grounds that only parliament could call such a conference.

III. THE WEST

Berlin: Some NATO governments are refusing to cooperate in imposing travel restrictions on East German officials as a countermeasure to recent East German interference with access to West Berlin. Denmark has stated that trade considerations and the importance of cooperation between the Danish and East German railway systems prevent it from concurring in the restrictions placed by the Allied Travel Office in West Berlin on travel by semiofficial or trade representatives. The Dutch Government has relaxed its travel ban on East German officials in response to urging by the KLM airline that these officials would merely use alternative routes to Western countries.

*On 30 September Bonn denounced the 1961 interzonal trade pact with East Germany, over the apparent opposition of Britain and France. The West German move will not affect interzonal trade before the end of the year. East German officials who have threatened Bonn with retaliations for such a step now may feel compelled to take some action. Possibly aware that Western countermeasures were being contemplated, Foreign Minister Gromyko stressed to British Foreign Secretary Home on 28 September that Moscow was "fully aware" of recent East German actions and warned that if a crisis developed it would be the fault of the West. He indicated, however, that Khrushchev was prepared to resume negotiations on Berlin after a new American administration took office.

(Page 6)

European Confederation: The initial hostility to French proposals for a confederation of the six Common Market countries appears to have declined considerably since De Gaulle first publicly outlined his plan on 5 September. Although still strongly opposed to De Gaulle's related plans for a revamping

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of NATO's structure, Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg apparently feel that De Gaulle's proposals are still subject to modification and have been impressed with French assurances that the Common Market would not be weakened. Premier Debré will probably try to overcome Adenauer's reservations during his 7-8 October visit to Bonn.

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LATE ITEM

*USSR-China: There is accumulating evidence that a high-level Soviet delegation--including Presidium members Mikoyan and Suslov--has been in Peiping since mid-September holding discussions with Chinese leaders. In addition to attempting to work out an agreed position prior to the forthcoming meeting of all Communist parties in Moscow this November, such a delegation may have been sent to China to determine if a meeting of Chinese leaders with Khrushchev during his planned visit to North Korea this month would be possible and fruitful. Recent Chinese propaganda suggests that this attempt at reconciliation has been as unsuccessful as earlier attempts were.

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Purge of Top Generals in South Korean Army

South Korean Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Choi Kyong-nok believes that the "one-shot" dismissal of top general officers associated with the corruption of the Rhee regime is the basic requirement for eliminating the dissatisfaction among junior officers and restoring discipline in the armed forces. Prime Minister Chang Myon, faced with disunity in the Democratic party, also favors removal of these generals, believing they might align with opposition political leaders. The purge probably will include Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. Gen. Choe Yong-hui, First Army Commander Lt. Gen. Kim Chong-o, Second Army Commander Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong, and others senior in rank to Choi.

Choi said that he also recognized the necessity of disciplining junior officers who, hoping for promotion, are agitating for the ouster of senior commanders. He added, however, that failure to remove the generals in the near future could encourage a revolt supported by the great majority of officers who as yet have not agitated. He intimated that the intensity of the feelings of Korean junior officers on this issue is not fully appreciated outside Korean circles.

The junior officers concerned recently visited Chang and the minister of national defense to present their demands. Officials of the ministry,

[redacted] believe that these officers are becoming increasingly confident of their influence, that the prime minister is afraid of them, and that the officers believe they can take over the government if the situation warrants.

Choi noted that a military coup had been suggested by well-informed civilian as well as military elements to restore political stability to the country. Students of two leading Seoul universities are reported to support Choi's program to remove the general officers. One group indicated it would not oppose a military coup by young, honest officers to restore stability in South Korea. [redacted]

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The Situation in Laos

An apparently rancorous exchange between Premier Souvanna Phouma and Captain Kong Le in two separate press conferences indicates that a showdown between the Vientiane government and the paratrooper may be imminent. Kong Le announced that he would continue his offensive against the Phoumi forces east of Paksane despite the cease-fire reached at Luang Prabang and accused Souvanna of being "very soft." He warned that the "people" would have to remove Souvanna if he did not "lead his country in the right direction." He also made slurring remarks about General Ouane, the armed forces commander and his ostensible chief. Souvanna subsequently retorted that Kong Le "was making up stories. Do not talk about him. That will be decided by army headquarters."

[It is problematical whether Souvanna's top commanders--General Ouane and General Amkha, the Vientiane garrison commander--could win in any test of strength with Kong Le. Although the bulk of Kong Le's 2nd Paratroop Battalion is now outside of Vientiane, he probably can count on the support of the numerous irregulars he armed in the period immediately after his 9 August coup d'etat. He is also believed to have generated considerable popular support in the capital. In earlier phases of the crisis, moreover, neither Ouane nor Amkha showed much appetite for action against Kong Le. The scales might be tipped decisively against Kong Le, however, were Phoumi's forces east of Paksane to unite with Amkha's units in Vientiane.]

Phoumi's Radio Savannakhet, meanwhile, has issued an appeal "to our foreign friends" for help in the face of the alleged presence in Laos of three North Vietnamese units. Such statements, whether true or not, would be calculated to excite Thai Premier Sarit and would possibly be used by him to justify increased support. The Thai general staff is reported to have a plan for direct Thai intervention if it becomes clear that the Communists have taken over Vientiane.

[British Ambassador Addis in Vientiane reports being informed by Souvanna that the USSR has accepted Laos' proposal

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that nonresident diplomatic relations be established. Souvanna claimed all he needed now was the approval of the King. Under Souvanna's proposal, the Soviet ambassador to Cambodia would also be accredited to Laos, while the Laotian ambassador to France would be accredited to the USSR. The King's decision could well be delayed pending the outcome of political discussions that may result in a new government.

The Soviet counselor in Peiping recently told [redacted]

[redacted] that Peiping did not intend to intervene in Laos, but if the Chinese should decide to send troops to counter a United Nations move into Laos, the USSR would support Peiping "even to the extent" of sending Soviet troops. The US consul general in Hong Kong points out that the authority of the Soviet counselor is probably limited but that his statement is indicative of the impression Moscow wants conveyed to the West.

Moscow propaganda has emphasized the gravity of the Laotian situation and, together with Peiping and Hanoi, is making an effort to forestall intervention by Laos' pro-Western neighbors or the United Nations while avoiding any specific threat of bloc counteraction. [redacted]

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**Moroccan Government Seeks New Means of Embroiling UN
In Algerian Question**

The Moroccan Government is reported to have protested sharply several recent incidents of alleged shelling by French military units in Algeria of Moroccan territory along the eastern border of Morocco where several thousand armed Algerian rebels are based. Such incidents occur fairly regularly, but are seldom publicized. Abdelkhalek Torres--Morocco's acting deputy premier and, in the absence of both King Mohamed V and Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, the ranking Moroccan official--is reported to have decided that should similar incidents recur he will order the Moroccan armed forces to take military action against the French.

Such a Moroccan counterattack would be designed to create an international incident enabling Morocco to request the intervention of the United Nations. General Ben Hamou Kettani, commander of Morocco's forces in the Congo, returned to Rabat on 29 September and may have been summoned to advise Torres on this question. Torres is said to have the King's permission to take even such extreme measures as military retaliation.

Torres has recently held talks with Algerian rebel leaders, who may have sought to enlist Morocco's support in enlarging the Algerian conflict just before the question is debated by the UN General Assembly.

Meanwhile, the Tunisian Government is exploring ways to implement the Algerian-Tunisian "union" which President Bourguiba suggested on 3 September might be formed if such an action "would hasten the end of the war." Bourguiba designed his announcement as a gambit to break the Algerian-French deadlock resulting from the failure of the Melun talks last June and is aware that any such "union" would entail the risk of war with France.

North African leaders apparently consider the use of the United Nations forces to restore and maintain order in the

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Congo as a precedent which may be followed to obtain Algerian independence if De Gaulle cannot be induced to open negotiations with the rebel leaders. There have been North Africa overtures to some of France's NATO allies to exert pressure on De Gaulle to reopen talks with the Algerians. [redacted]

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Allied Restrictions on Travel by East German Officials

Some NATO governments now are refusing to cooperate in imposing travel restrictions on East German trade and travel representatives as a countermeasure to recent East German interference with access to West Berlin. Previously, the Benelux governments had given support to the restrictions by a tentative decision to withhold visas from East Germans who had not been cleared through the Allied Travel Bureau in West Berlin. The Netherlands even suspended short-stay permits for those in transit to other countries.

The Danish Government has informed the American Embassy in Copenhagen that because of trade considerations and the importance of cooperation between the Danish and East German railway systems, it is unable to concur in the proposed restrictions. There is evidence that since early this year, the government has been under considerable pressure from Danish trade and travel interests to expand contacts with East Germany. Despite reported opposition from the justice and defense ministries, the Foreign Ministry has acceded to certain East German requests for privileges and permitted the East German railways to open an office in Copenhagen.

The Dutch Government has modified its travel ban as a result of pressure from the KLM airline on behalf of an East German official en route to Cuba, and it now appears likely that entry will be granted to East Germans making a stopover in transit to other countries. The airline argued that if the Netherlands refused such entry, the East Germans would merely use alternate routes.

On 30 September Bonn denounced the 1961 interzonal trade pact with East Germany, over the apparent opposition of British and French officials. The West German move will not affect interzonal trade before the end of the year. Bonn's move may compel the East Germans to give meaning to the

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[threat made by Foreign Trade Minister Heinrich Rau on 6 September, when he said that if West Germany took steps to interfere with trade between East and West Germany, "it will only hasten the measures needed to make West Berlin a free city." Possibly aware that Western countermeasures were being contemplated, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko stressed to British Foreign Secretary Home on 28 September that Moscow was "fully aware" of recent East German actions and warned that if a crisis developed it would be the fault of the West. He indicated, however, that Khrushchev was prepared to resume negotiations on Berlin after a new American administration took office.]

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Opposition to De Gaulle's European Confederation Plan Lessening

Hostility to De Gaulle's proposals for a confederation of the six Common Market countries, which he first publicly outlined in his 5 September press conference, appears to have moderated considerably in the past few weeks. Opposition is still strong to De Gaulle's related ideas for a revamping of NATO's structure to permit France to "speak for" a Continental bloc, but several of the Common Market countries seem prepared to accept the confederation plan itself as a basis for negotiation.

Typical of this more receptive attitude is the Italian position as outlined by an Italian Embassy spokesman in Washington on 26 September. According to him, Rome "strenuously opposes" creation of a "restricted steering group" in or outside NATO but feels De Gaulle's "proposed version of Europe could be accepted in principle." The spokesman explained that Italy believes it is impossible to make progress toward political integration without France and without extending integration beyond the economic field.

Luxembourg's prime minister, who visited Paris in mid-September, is said to have been "relieved and encouraged" by De Gaulle's exposition of the French position.

the Belgian foreign minister has also said he agrees with the objectives of the De Gaulle plan, which is being considered with a "favorable preconception."

Paris has been attempting since De Gaulle's press conference to give the impression that his plan is open to negotiation and would not weaken the Common Market. Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, for example, has publicly referred to the Common Market as the "cornerstone of the European edifice." Considerable interest has also been aroused in the Common Market by a series of press articles]

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by a prominent Gaullist deputy in which he implied that the confederation's decisions might ultimately be reached by majority vote--that is, not subject to French veto.

To find out whether France is prepared in fact to make any such far-reaching concessions will probably be Bonn's major objective during French Premier Debré's visit on 7-8 October. Adenauer, whose position will be crucial, has remained publicly noncommittal on the confederation plan, but has implied certain reservations about it and has frequently reiterated his strong support of NATO.

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High-level Soviet Delegation Visits Peiping

A high-level Soviet delegation has been in Peiping since mid-September holding discussions with the Chinese on the "ideological issue," [redacted]

[redacted] Soviet Ambassador to India Benediktov informed Indian Party General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh that the five-man delegation included Presidium members Anastas Mikoyan and M. A. Suslov, as well as candidate Presidium member P. N. Pospelov.

Ambassador Thompson reported on 27 September that a rumor was circulating in Moscow that Mikoyan and Suslov were visiting Communist China. [redacted] There have been several unscheduled VIP-associated flights from Moscow to Peiping, one on the 15th of September and another on the 27th. [redacted]

A delegation of this stature, including Suslov, the Soviet Union's top ideologist, would be empowered to conduct serious negotiations with the Chinese in an effort to bring their positions closer together so that the forthcoming meeting of Communist parties in Moscow in November would not result in the same impasse as the Bucharest meeting of last June. The Soviet party may have felt that its efforts of the last two months to marshal support for its own views and thus isolate the Chinese within the world Communist movement would induce the Chinese to adopt positions closer to those of the Soviet Union. In addition, the delegation may have been sent to China to determine if a meeting of Chinese leaders with Khrushchev during his planned visit to North Korea in October would be possible and fruitful.

Recent Chinese propaganda suggests that this latest attempt at reconciliation has been as unsuccessful as were earlier attempts to resolve the dispute. On 29 September, two weeks after the talks were reported to have begun, the CCP Central Committee, in a commentary on a new volume of Mao Tse-tung's works, issued its [redacted]

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most substantial reaffirmation since the Bucharest meeting of several of the most important Chinese positions in the dispute. Chinese comments on the occasion of the October 1 celebration of the 11th anniversary of the regime, while asserting the need for "unity" within the Communist world, have adhered to the hard-line positions set forth in the Central Committee's pronouncement.

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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

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