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
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**1. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AGENTS REPORTEDLY SEE  
"NO WAR FOR YEARS, IF EVER"**



**Comment**

These views appear to be an accurate reflection of the premises underlying Moscow's long-range strategy. The Soviet leaders probably believe their conciliatory policy will generate growing psychological pressures on Western governments which will eventually result in important changes in their policies toward the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Isolated "acts of terrorism" and the currently stepped-up redefinition campaign among former Soviet citizens living abroad have already combined to lower emigré morale, and the lessening of East-West tension will tend to facilitate infiltration and subversion.

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## 2. PRESSURE GROWING FOR REDUCTION OF CHINA TRADE CONTROLS

"Very few" COCOM members are inclined to support retention of the present strict controls over trade with the Communist Far East, according to the American COCOM delegation in Paris. The French proposal to reduce controls on trade with the Communist Far East to the level of restrictions against the Soviet bloc is likely to receive strong support from Japan, Denmark, and Portugal. Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, and Italy would probably continue to favor reduction of controls.

Turkey, probably Greece, and possibly Canada can be expected to follow the American lead to maintain the status quo. Britain and West Germany clearly favor reduction, but it is not clear how far they will go in the face of American opposition.

### Comment

Barring a Far Eastern crisis, it appears likely that a strong initiative to abolish or reduce the China differential will dominate the COCOM Consultative Group meeting later this year. One effect of such a reduction would be to vitiate the UN resolution of May 1951 prohibiting strategic trade with Communist China and North Korea. This resolution is based directly on the UN resolution of February 1951 declaring Communist China an aggressor. The latter resolution is a major obstacle to consideration of Peiping's membership in the UN.

The British and French are already pressing for re-examination of controls on trade with the entire Sino-Soviet bloc as a matter of urgency and regardless of the outcome of any international conference.  
(Concurred in by ORR)

### 3. CANADA FAVORS EARLY RECOGNITION OF CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME

[Redacted]

Canadian external affairs minister Pearson has informed the United States embassy in Ottawa that the Canadian government strongly believes the Peiping regime should be recognized "sooner rather than later," possibly in a year. He said the action should be taken, if only to obtain first-hand information from Peiping.

Canada has no intention of pressing for the admission of Communist China to the UN now, Pearson indicated, and will probably support the United States' position at the forthcoming General Assembly session. He said his own recent public statement favoring admission of Peiping was a trial balloon.

**Comment** Canada has tended to favor establishment of relations with the Chinese Communists since early 1953. Pearson's remarks suggest that Canada finds no substantial reasons for further delay but will be guided as to timing by the views of Britain and other countries whose general attitude it shares.

Canada has indicated that it would support a Belgian proposal to establish a UN study commission on the Chinese representation issue.

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4.

YUGOSLAV

## ATTITUDE TOWARD WEST

## Comment

There have been numerous recent indications that Yugoslav officials are becoming increasingly concerned over the possible effect of the rapid improvement in relations with the USSR on Yugoslavia's relations with the West.

The Yugoslavs will probably make renewed gestures of friendship to the West in connection with Tito's official trip to France from 20 to 25 October and Vice President Kardelj's visit to Great Britain in mid-November.

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5. VIET MINH APPEALS  
ELECTIONS ISSUE

ON

**Comment**

This appeal at the international level follows the failure of Viet Minh efforts to induce Premier Diem to enter into election consultations. If Diem does not begin talks with the Viet Minh, the USSR may raise the question at the Big Four foreign ministers' meeting in October.

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## 6. COMMENT ON ANTI-GREEK RIOTING IN TURKEY

The rioting in Istanbul and Izmir on 6 September indicates that the wide breach which has developed in recent months between Greece and Turkey at the diplomatic level has spread to the general public.

The riots were apparently spontaneous, but the Ankara government is searching for evidence of Communist involvement. According to observations by the American consul general in Istanbul, the police stood idly by or cheered the mob which was looting shops. Only later did troops supported with tanks restore order.

Popular emotions now running high in both Greece and Turkey will probably be sharply controlled by the two governments. In relations between the countries, however, antagonisms which have been created by the Cyprus issue will increase mutual recriminations over other issues and seriously reduce area defense co-operation.

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**BIWEEKLY SUMMARY**  
**(25 August-7 September 1955)**

**THE FORMOSA STRAITS**

**Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group  
for the Formosa Straits Problem**

1. Military activity in the area was extremely quiet apart from increased artillery shelling begun on 2 September by the Chinese Nationalists. The shelling rose to a high on 4 September, when the Communists fired 253 rounds and the Nationalists fired 1,358. The situation returned to normal on 6 September. This activity is not believed to signify any impending attack by the Communists.



3. Another Chinese Communist railway engineer division (the Fifth Railway Engineer Division) has been identified and located in Fukien Province. This makes a total of six such divisions now accepted as engaged in construction of the projected railway that will connect Amoy with the main trunk line south of the Yangtze River.

4. According to a Chinese Nationalist report unconfirmed by other sources, two Chinese Communist "Frogman Raid Groups" totalling about 480 men arrived in the Amoy area on 2 August. Chinese Nationalist authorities express

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concern that the arrival of these units may be a preliminary indication of an amphibious invasion of the offshore islands. There is no evidence in other intelligence reporting to support the claim of Chinese Communist UDT units in the Amoy area, and there have been no other recent indications of an invasion build-up there.

5. Peiping continued to devote only perfunctory attention to the Formosa Strait question during the past two weeks. However, the tone of Peiping propaganda dealing with US policies in Asia became more critical than it had been during the early weeks of the talks at Geneva between US and Chinese Communist representatives.

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## FORMOSA STRAITS SITUATION

Primary roads —————  
Secondary roads —————NAUTICAL MILES  
0 50 100 150  
STATUTE MILES  
0 50 100 150Railroad + + + + Railroad  
Proposed railroad + + + + +

## COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND

PRIMARY  
SECONDARY

● ▲ OPERATIONAL

● ▲ SERVICEABLE

● ▲ UNKNOWN

## USABILITY

+ MIG-15, MIG-17, TU-4, IL-28

| TU-2, IL-10, LA-9/11, LI-2, ETC.

— UNKNOWN

\* FIELDS NOT CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF  
SUPPLYING SUSTAINED OPERATIONS  
AT PRESENT.■ UNDER  
CONSTRUCTION


★ NATIONALIST AIRFIELD

## DESIGNATIONS

PRIMARY: CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT IN AREA, WITH PREPARED  
RUNWAY GENERALLY 5000 FEET OR LONGER.SECONDARY: AUXILIARY OR EMERGENCY BASES, OR FIELDS OF LESSER  
IMPORTANCE. RUNWAYS GENERALLY LESS THAN 5000 FEET.OPERATIONAL: ACTIVE BASE FOR MILITARY & CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT.  
SOME BASES USED BY PISTON TYPES MAY BE USABLE BY JETS.

SERVICEABLE: INACTIVE BASES CAPABLE OF USE BY AIRCRAFT

UNKNOWN: CURRENT STATUS UNDETERMINED.

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