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30 July 1953

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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## GENERAL

1. Indication of Soviet position on postarmistice political conference membership:

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Soviet UN delegate Tsarapkin told General Assembly president Pearson that he contemplated a postarmistice political conference limited to the "two sides" in the Korean dispute. He also indicated that, should the USSR participate, there would have to be a larger membership and "some kind of voting procedure would have to be worked out."

Comment: The noncommittal remarks of the Soviet representative suggest that Moscow is waiting for a clearer indication of Western thinking before taking a firm position on the membership question.

The reference to "two sides" suggests that the Soviet Union has not excluded negotiations in which each side has one vote. Any Communist proposal for a multilateral conference would probably follow the Soviet UN resolution of 10 November 1952 which called for the creation of an 11-nation commission in which the Communist members would exercise a virtual veto. This resolution received the support of Chou En-lai, who said that the commission "is of the same nature as the political conference provided for in the armistice agreement."

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

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## SOUTHEAST ASIA

5. Burmese set time limit on Bangkok negotiations:

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Burmese commander in chief Ne Win states that Burma's delegate to the four-power committee in Bangkok will be withdrawn



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when the next regular UN General Assembly convenes on 17 September unless some progress toward the evacuation of Chinese Nationalist troops is achieved in the meantime. Ne Win expressed confidence that his forces could wipe out the Nationalists, but he said a campaign against them would delay operations against the Communists and other insurgents for probably a year.

Comment: Past performances indicate that the Burmese armed forces are incapable of eliminating the Nationalists in the foreseeable future by their own efforts. Recognition of this situation was probably the primary basis for the recent statement by the acting foreign minister that Burma may be forced to seek Chinese Communist assistance in dealing with the Nationalists.

## SOUTH ASIA

6. Nehru refuses to accept Battle Act conditions as binding on India:

25X1A [redacted] Prime Minister Nehru on 28 July categorically informed the American ambassador in New Delhi that he would not attempt to stop the previously reported shipment of thorium nitrate from Bombay to Communist China. He further stated emphatically that India never would jeopardize its national sovereignty by permitting an American law to determine with whom and in what commodities India should trade.

He could not accept the conditions of the Battle Act as binding on his country, and would never be willing to give guarantees as to the nature of India's commerce.

Comment: Nehru's remarks presumably end all hope of halting the shipment, thus making it mandatory for the United States immediately to terminate all military, economic, and financial aid to India.



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