TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

5 November 1952 3.5(c)
3.5(c)

Copy No. 57

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 22
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2009
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 18 Dec 79 REVIEWER 3.5(c)

3.5(c)

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

3.5(c)

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

SUMMARY

FAR EAST

1. Armed strife in Thailand believed imminent (page 3).
2. Burma will abstain from UN vote on Korean POW issue (page 3).
3. Burmese Defense Minister suggests repatriation of Chinese Nationalists (page 4).

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

4. Mossadeq reportedly plans ultimatum on oil sales. (page 4).
5.
6.

3.3(h)(2)

7. Britain to await Egyptian initiative in Suez negotiations (page 6).

EASTERN EUROPE

8. Unusual military activity reported in Bulgaria (page 6).

WESTERN EUROPE

9.

3.3(h)(2)

* * * *

3.5(c)

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

3.5(c)

FAR EAST

1. **Armed strife in Thailand believed imminent:**

An armed clash between supporters of   3.3(h)(2)
Police Director General Phao and the
Deputy Commander in Chief of the Army,
General Sarit, will occur before the end
of November,   3.3(h)(2)
the clash will result in a stalemate that will be resolved
only when independent military commanders who are presently opposed
to both Phao and Sarit commit themselves.

Comment: 3.3(h)(2)
relations between Phao and Sarit had in recent months reached their
most critical point.   3.3(h)(2)
tension had increased, but there was no indication of
an imminent coup d'etat.

3.3(h)(2)

2. **Burma will abstain from UN vote on Korean POW issue:**

3.3(h)(2)

the American resolution endorsing the UN
Command's stand on repatriation of POW's.
Burma could   3.3(h)(2)
support neither the position of the UN Command nor that of the
Communists.

Comment: 3.3(h)(2)
Burma's "neutral" foreign policy. In previous UN
sessions Burma has voted with the Communist bloc against labeling
Communist China an aggressor and with the Western powers in
denouncing North Korean aggression.

3. **Burmese Defense Minister suggests repatriation of Chinese Nationalists:**

3.3(h)(2)

Burmese Defense Minister Ba Swe suggested to Under Secretary of Defense Foster, during his visit to Rangoon, that the problem of Chinese Nationalist troops in northeastern Burma might be solved by the "surrender" of 2,000 hard core Nationalists to American or other neutral officers. They could then be repatriated through Thailand or, if necessary, through Burma.

The American Embassy believes that Ba Swe's suggestion might offer a solution if it could be assumed that Taipei would issue the orders and that they would be obeyed.

Comment: Taipei professes to have little control over the Nationalist force in Burma and on several occasions has indicated a preference that it remain in a position to harass Communist China.

Ba Swe has previously suggested repatriation of the Chinese Nationalists and last summer stated that he would begin military action against them if they had not been evacuated by fall.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

4. **Mossadeq reportedly plans ultimatum on oil sales:**

3.3(h)(2)

Prime Minister Mossadeq plans to demand an early declaration from the Department of State to the effect that it has no objection to the purchase of Iranian oil by Americans, If the United States does not comply, Mossadeq will infer that the United States is "unfriendly."

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: The proposed demand is in line with new efforts by various Iranian leaders to blackmail the United States into assisting Iran in its oil problem. The withdrawal of the British from Iran has also stimulated extremist pressure on Mossadeq to cancel American aid programs in Iran.

5.

6.

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

7. **Britain to await Egyptian initiative in Suez negotiations:**

Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the Suez base 3.3(h)(2)
will not be reopened before next January,
unless the Egyptians press for talks, according
to an official of the British Embassy in Cairo.
Britain is not anxious to begin talks until its Chiefs of Staff have
completed their appraisal of the entire military situation in the Middle
East.

The official stated that the staff study, one
result of the recent Anglo-Turkish talks in London, is expected to
take two months, and may result in a lower estimate of the strategic
importance of the Suez base.

Comment: Previous British strategic
studies have concluded that there is no satisfactory alternative location
for the Middle East defense base. British military planners are now
convinced, however, that the lack of Egyptian cooperation limits the
value of the Suez base, and they are prepared to recommend some
concessions in order to hasten a settlement of the Suez issue.

EASTERN EUROPE

3.3(h)(2)

8. **Unusual military activity reported in Bulgaria:**

an 3.3(h)(2)
extensive mobilization of reserves was
in progress between 17 and 20 October
in the Second Army area in central and
south-central Bulgaria.   no unusual security   3.3(h)(2)
measures or indications of war hysteria, and observed no military
personnel in the border area.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Comment: Other reports indicate that during mid-October an extensive call-up of reserves, requisition of vehicles, and the use of schools as barracks resulted in considerable excitement and tension in the First Army District, which includes Sofia. The concurrent mobilization in the First and Second Army areas is in contrast to the phased mobilization test which was conducted in 1951.

There has been no recent evidence of unusual military activities in the other Satellites. Neither Orbit propaganda nor other evidence suggests a Soviet intention to launch hostilities in the Balkans in the near future.

WESTERN EUROPE

9.

3.3(h)(2)

- 7 -

TOP SECRET

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

TOP SECRET

3.5(c)