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19 May 1958

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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19 MAY 1958

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Most recent Yugoslav statement rejects Soviet conditions for continuing normal relations between two countries. ①

Tibetan uprising against Chinese Communists unchecked as of early April.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Lebanon - Government security forces under increasing strain; UAR incitement continues. USSR denounces American role in the situation.

Indonesia - One dissident B-26 shot down in raid on Ambon. Central government troops land in North Celebes.

Some Jordanian military and government elements conspiring against regime, and seeking UAR support.



⑥ Saudi Arabia - King Saud in Dhahran hospital and may be going to West Germany for treatment.

⑦ French military in West Africa back Salan's actions in Algeria.

⑧ Tunisian President requests American aid to combat danger to his regime arising from anticipated French military actions.

⑨ Certain French military leaders in Algiers insist that De Gaulle take over in Paris.

III. THE WEST

⑩ De Gaulle statement expected today. French president, extreme rightists, and Communist labor all planning action contingent on General's intentions.

⑪ Haiti - Army officers now believed plotting to take over from Duvalier.

⑫ Venezuela - Stability of governing junta further weakened by resignation of two civilian members.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

19 May 1958

DAILY BRIEF

SLRAB

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

No

Bloc-Yugoslav dispute: Belgrade is apparently resigned to a general deterioration of official and economic relations with Moscow. Replying Pravda's attack of 9 May, Borba on 17 May reaffirmed Yugoslavia's determination not to be shaken from its independent internal and external policies. The Yugoslav statement declares that acceptance of Moscow's terms for continuance of normal state relations would amount to virtual surrender.

No

Communist China-Tibet: The largest Tibetan uprising since early 1956 occurred in March in the Kansu-Tsinghai border area of northwest Communist China. Peiping claims that it "eradicated" more than 1,000 armed rebels. Four thousand other rebels were attempting to attack Chinese Communist forces, and as of 7 April, the revolt had not been quelled. Peiping, unable to win over these tribes through a policy of conciliation, has recently been adopting harsher measures.

(Page 1) (Map)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

No

*Lebanon: Government security forces appear to be in control of the major urban areas, but the situation in the countryside is less secure. After a week of the emergency, government troops are becoming increasingly fatigued. UAR radios continue inflammatory broadcasts, and on 18 May a Soviet broadcast sharply denounced the "colonial intervention" in Lebanon.

On 18 May Damascus informed Cairo that four planeloads of Jordanians had been sent to Beirut to support

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Chamoun. This invites further UAR counteraction in Lebanon and possibly in Jordan. (SECRET PIVOT) (Page 2)
(Map)

Indonesia: President Sukarno, in his recent speech flatly rejecting any possibility of negotiations with the dissidents, reaffirmed the central government's determination to press for a swift defeat of the dissidents. At the same time he reiterated in strong terms the government's charges of foreign intervention in the conflict. One company of government troops has landed southeast of Gorontalo and is moving toward the town, [redacted] This may be the beginning of a major government offensive in North Celebes. The government air force claims that a dissident B-26 was shot down during a raid on Ambon, in the Moluccas. [redacted] one of two such aircraft failed to return from a mission against Ambon.

[redacted] (Page 4) (Map)

No
Jordan: A conspiracy is apparently being developed against the Amman government by some Jordanian army officers and government officials who are seeking UAR support.

The Amman government's concern that the Lebanese crisis may precipitate new UAR-supported instability in Jordan has resulted in Samir Rifai's remaining in Amman for the time being. Apparently to strengthen King Husayn's position, some 3,000 Iraqi troops have been moved into a camp north of Amman.

[redacted] (Page 5)

yes
Saudi Arabia: The future political leadership of Saudi Arabia continues uncertain. King Saud is now in an American hospital in Dhahran and is reported to be considering a trip to West Germany for medical treatment, despite the political implications of his departure from the country at this time. Crown Prince Faysal, whose authority as chief

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executive officer of the government was affirmed in a decree on 12 May, is chronically ill and is still recuperating from recent operations. [redacted] (Page 7)

The crisis in Algeria:

yes
Algeria: General Salan has established two separate de facto bodies to run civilian and military affairs in Algeria. Jacques Soustelle's presence will strengthen the new regime and is likely to increase the influence of local civilian extremists who are particularly opposed to any compromise with Paris. Certain army leaders in Algeria who have substantial support seem determined to settle for nothing less than the return of De Gaulle to power in Paris. [redacted] (Page 8)

no
Tunisia: President Bourguiba believes that the likelihood of some action against Tunisia by French forces in Algeria or Tunisia has been significantly increased as a result of De Gaulle's recent statement of availability. He asserts that his regime now is in danger and has formally asked the United States for an immediate "token" shipment of small arms. [redacted] (Page 9)

no
French West Africa: The diplomatic counselor to the French High Commissioner for West Africa states that all the local military commanders approve Salan's action in Algiers, but that the local situation is not yet critical. He says that the military forces might well take over control of the colony if civil strife breaks out in France and if Communist-influenced strikes occur at Dakar and other cities. [redacted]

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III. THE WEST

No
*France: General de Gaulle is scheduled to make a public declaration of his intentions shortly. President Coty, extreme rightists, and French labor are all planning various actions depending on what de Gaulle says. Coty is pinning his hopes on a Mollet - Pinay combination as the only one capable of saving the regime. Rightists, who fear the General may issue a weak statement, are reported planning "revolutionary" action before the General speaks. The Communist-dominated labor federation has ordered its members to be on the alert against rightist moves. Non-Communist unions are taking similar but independent action.

(Page 10)

yes

Haiti: A group of army officers, alarmed at President Duvalier's continuing drastic purge of officers he considers untrustworthy, is now believed organizing a move against the government. Political and racial tensions continue to grow, and further deterioration in law and order is possible.

(Page 11)

No


*Venezuela: The two civilian members of the governing junta who resigned on 18 May apparently did so because they disagreed with proposals of the military members for outlawing the Communist party. Since the riots during Vice President Nixon's visit, the junta has come under pressure from top-ranking military officials to outlaw the Communists and to curb the non-Communist Democratic Action party. These officials have also threatened to take over the government.

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC


Large Tibetan Uprising in Northwest China

A major revolt by Tibetan tribes in northwest China began on 31 March and may have lasted for several weeks. Peiping claims to have "eradicated" more than 1,000 armed rebels, and 4,000 more were reported to be attempting an attack on Chinese forces.

The revolt appears to be the largest since early 1956 when Chinese Communist bombers from Sian were used to support ground forces in putting down a flare-up of Tibetan tribes in southwest China. Sporadic outbursts against Chinese rule continued in scattered areas of western China despite Peiping's efforts to win over these tribes through conciliation.

Peiping has apparently decided that these tribes can be subdued only through force and since last fall has made opposition to "local nationalism" the major theme of propaganda directed at minorities. In the latest incident of unrest, the regime has backed up this harsher policy by dispatching troops to the revolt area with orders for the "utter annihilation" of rebel forces. Furthermore, Peiping has declared that it will not be responsible for the destruction of monasteries which shelter "religion-coated counter-revolutionaries" or for the slaughter of monks who aid rebels.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Lebanese Situation

Lebanese security forces appear to be in control of the urban centers, but not the countryside. There is almost a complete lack of control in the area north and east of Tripoli to the Syrian border where infiltrating bands are moving about with little opposition from government forces. However, one such band "in need of water and assistance" was driven off from a Lebanese frontier post and is retreating under air bombardment to the al-Harmal region, according to Syrian police broadcasts.

[redacted] security forces in the Bayt ad-Din area 20 miles southeast of Beirut were retreating and had called for air support, which was promised.

Troops have been deployed in the Biqa Valley to forestall a joining up of dissident Shi'ite Moslem forces from the north and Druze bands from the south. Army commander Shihab, while somewhat encouraged by limited successes, is worried over army morale and fatigue. He has stated that there is increasing tension between Christian and Moslem soldiers in the army.

[redacted]
President Nasir's reference to Lebanon in his 15 May speech greatly heartened the anti-government opposition and that caution must be taken in Egyptian broadcasts not to "broadcast anything which might be used against us."

A clandestine "Voice of Free Lebanon," probably UAR-sponsored, is making inflammatory broadcasts to Lebanon containing statements by opposition leaders "from the field of the struggle." Saib Salam, Moslem opposition leader, has stated that the opposition is prepared to receive arms from "any source." On 18 May a Soviet broadcast sharply denounced the "colonial intervention" in Lebanon which, Moscow charged, was being prepared by the US, and warned that "serious consequences" for the peace of the Middle East might result. The Moscow broadcast bitterly attacked the Eisenhower Doctrine, which it insisted aimed at perpetuating colonialism in the

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Middle East. This Soviet attack will probably encourage Chamoun's opponents, who are likely to see in it direct support of their efforts.

[redacted] Egyptian concern over Armenian rightists who are actively supporting President Chamoun and urges Egyptian authorities in Syria to persuade Armenian leaders there to exert pressure on Lebanese Armenians to "stand aside" from the battle.


The political situation has been complicated further by Prime Minister Sulh's illness, which may encourage opposition forces to harden their bargaining terms with the government. Numerous reports of feverish political negotiations continue to arrive, but no clear picture has emerged.

Increased UAR intervention in Lebanon and possibly in Jordan is likely

[redacted] four plane-loads of reinforcements of irregulars were sent from Jordan to Beirut via Iraq on 17 May and that "two American aircraft arrived at Beirut" with arms. A plea for urgent delivery of arms previously requested was included.

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President Sukarno's firm rejection, in a major speech in East Java on 16 May, of any possible negotiations with the dissidents is additional confirmation that the central government intends to proceed as forcefully and quickly as possible against the North Celebes dissident regime. He reiterated in strong terms the government's charges of foreign intervention and accused the dissidents of asking "foreign imperialists to attack the Republic of Indonesia jointly with them," thus confronting the country with "overt aggression." [redacted]

[redacted] on 17 May one company of central government troops landed southeast of Gorontalo, on the southern coast of North Celebes, and are moving toward that town. [redacted] This landing could be the beginning of a concerted drive against the dissidents, plans for which call for operations against several points in North Celebes, with Menado as the ultimate objective. [redacted]

overnment message stating 24 C-47 aircraft loaded with paratroops would arrive in Balikpapan, Borneo, on 18 May; [redacted] could be an attempt at deception by the central government. [redacted]

Dissident aircraft again were active on 18 May against Ambon Island in the Moluccas. Two B-26 aircraft are reported to have destroyed or severely damaged three government F-51's and one B-25 there and to have hit several ships. One B-26 was damaged in a crash-landing on return to base, and the other failed to return. A central government air force announcement on 18 May claimed that air defense units on Am-bon had shot down one B-26 during the raid. [redacted]

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Jordanian Government Facing New Conspiracy

The Jordanian Government faces a new conspiracy among ultranationalist military and political figures, [redacted] which apparently aims at establishing contact between Jordanian Army officers and UAR military authorities in Syria with the objective of working "in harmony with the UAR." On 15 May the counselor of the Jordanian Embassy in Washington, Mahmoud Rousan, indicated to a UAR official that he was associated with officials in Jordan who were engaged in the above program. Rousan stated that his contacts in the Jordanian Army were critical of what they considered inadequate UAR direction, but were nevertheless of the belief that "matters were progressing nicely." Rousan has been instructed to return to Jordan prior to 17 June to "complete operations."

In 1956 Lt. Col. Rousan was prominent in the ultranationalist "Free Officers' Movement," and was a rival of Col. Nuwar, who became army chief of staff and banished Rousan to Washington as military attaché. Nuwar was one of the leaders of the abortive plot against King Husayn in April 1957. Nuwar and others fled to Syria and Egypt where they are supported by UAR funds. Rousan apparently was not implicated in this affair and was permitted to remain in Washington as embassy counselor.

Despite tight security measures, Jordanian ultranationalists supported by the UAR have continued to plot against King Husayn and the pro-Western Rifai government. A group of Baathist army officers, suspected of plotting to subvert the key Bedouin faction in the army was arrested this spring. That at least some of those arrested are linked with Rousan's conspiracy is indicated in his statement that there was "no evidence" against the officers who had been imprisoned.

The Amman government's concern that new UAR-supported instability in Jordan will result from the crisis in Lebanon has caused cabinet strongman Rifai to be designated head of the Amman government rather than deputy prime minister of the Arab

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Union cabinet. Meanwhile, a reinforced Iraqi brigade of about 3,000 men has moved into camp north of Amman and will probably remain in Jordan to support King Husayn.

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Saudi Arabian Political Uncertainties

The physical infirmity of Saudi Arabia's two most important persons adds to the uncertainty of the country's political future.

King Saud was flown to an American hospital in Dhahran on 17 May for rest and treatment of unspecified ailments which appear to involve the cardio-vascular system. The illness is reported to be not immediately serious, but one which is nevertheless expected to reduce the 56-year-old King's life expectancy.

[redacted] The King, who is also nearly blind, is reported to be deeply worried about his health; his concern has possibly been accentuated by political and family problems in recent months. Saud is said to be considering a trip to West Germany for medical treatment, and does not appear to appreciate the political implication of departure following reduction of his authority by government reform.

Crown Prince Faysal, whose increased authority as chief executive officer of the government was affirmed in a decree on 12 May, has been chronically ill for years and is still recuperating from recent surgery. A royal brother, Education Minister Prince Fahad, has occasionally presided for Faysal at meetings of the Council of Ministers.

In the absence of a predetermined basis for settlement of the succession issue, the death or incapacity of the King and Faysal could result in increased instability susceptible of exploitation by the UAR. In the Bedouin tradition a successor is usually chosen by family council; there are, however, many potential contenders among the numerous brothers and sons of the King and Faysal.

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Situation in Algeria

The regime in Algiers appears to be drifting closer to a formal separation from Paris, and a point-blank threat of separatism might be made as an ultimate pressure tactic related to General de Gaulle's public statement on 19 May.

General Salan, who is apparently under ever-increasing influence from the Algiers Committee of Public Safety directed by General Massu and rightist settlers, has proceeded to establish de facto military and civil cabinets without consulting Paris. Salan, who represents the last shred of legality, probably has the loyalty of the military at least until there is a clear test between Paris and the Algiers regime, but General Massu appears to wield the real authority backed by the parachutists and settlers represented on the Algier committee.

The Algiers regime received a substantial boost when Jacques Soustelle, supporter of De Gaulle and a former Governor General of Algeria, arrived in Algiers and received a tumultuous ovation there and in several other Algerian cities. His presence will further strengthen the determination of the military-civilian junta now in control of all Algeria to insist on De Gaulle's return to power. He will particularly bolster the relative strength of the rightist settler elements who are the ones most opposed to any compromise with Paris.

The Algiers Committee of Public Safety appears little impressed with Pflimlin's parliamentary support in Paris, and the American consul general reports that there is no evidence of any serious thinking in Algiers about what would happen if there is prolonged separation from the Metropole. He believes all efforts of the committee and Massu aim at change of regime in France.

[redacted] Algeria has enough gasoline for three months, enough food for six months, and sufficient ammunition for one year at the normal rate of utilization. [redacted]

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Mounting Tunisian Concern Over Algerian Situation Inspires
New Request for US Arms

The Tunisian Government apparently believes De Gaulle's 15 May statement and the arrival in Algiers of former Governor General Jacques Soustelle have appreciably increased the likelihood of some action against Tunisia by French forces and has formally asked the United States for immediate military aid. President Bourguiba told Ambassador Jones on 16 May that he feared De Gaulle's action would encourage the "madmen" in Algiers who regard Tunisia as "enemy number one" to try to "impose a correction"--perhaps by sending French troops in Algeria to occupy at least a small area inside Tunisia. He also expressed concern that General Gambiez, commander of the 22,000 French forces in Tunisia who so far appears to have remained loyal to the Pflimlin government, might now "recalculate" his position and undertake some hostile action--Bourguiba suggested the apprehension of himself and his colleagues as one possibility--in concert with French military elements from Algeria.

Bourguiba concluded by formally requesting the United States to provide, on an urgent basis, "defensive" arms such as rifles and submachine guns for the still inadequately equipped 7,000-man Tunisian Army and National Guard. He thought delivery "by air or other fast means" of a "symbolic" shipment comparable to those made by the United States and Britain last November would have a deterrent effect upon any elements which might now be tempted to act against Tunisia.

Continued flights over Tunisian territory by French military aircraft in violation of standing Tunisian orders, new border incidents, and reports that French forces on the Algerian side of the Tunisian-Algerian frontier have recently been reinforced are also contributing to the mounting apprehension in Tunis. Acting jointly with Morocco, Tunisia has already notified UN Secretary General Hammarskjold that the need for an urgent meeting of the Security Council "could arise quickly."

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III. THE WEST

The French Crisis (As of 0100 hours)

President Coty intends to ask Premier Pflimlin to resign and make way for a new government headed by Socialist Guy Mollet and including Independent leader Antoine Pinay, but he is awaiting General de Gaulle's scheduled public statement of intentions on 19 May.

[redacted] Pinay, who thinks Pflimlin too weak to handle such a grave crisis, has indicated he would serve under Mollet, since he feels the only alternative is the investiture of De Gaulle.

Coty may hope that the Mollet-Pinay combination could still win back the allegiance of the armed forces and the Algiers regime, but a sharp attack by De Gaulle on the present French system could nullify the chances of even this combination. Chief of Staff Ely's resignation on 17 May underscores military dissatisfaction with Pflimlin and adds to the government's admitted uncertainty as to the intentions of top military leaders in France as well as Algeria.

Interior Minister Jules Moch, the tough Socialist who smashed the 1947 Communist strikes, has given strict orders to quell demonstrations from any quarter. Rightist organizations, particularly of veterans, may nevertheless attempt demonstrations which would provoke counter efforts from the major labor unions whose members have already been alerted for this contingency. Thus far the Socialist and Christian unions are attempting to act independently of the powerful Communist-dominated General Labor Confederation. The heavily reinforced civil security forces seem capable of controlling the situation unless the army is involved against them.

[redacted]

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Serious Violence Expected in Haiti

A group of Haitian army officers, who believe they may be the next victims of President Duvalier's continuing army purge, is preparing to seize power.

A leading member of this group is reported to be Lt. Col. Jacques Etienne, who headed the secret police under ousted dictator Magloire. The extent of the reported plot is not known, but the officer corps is believed to be generally apprehensive over Duvalier's purge and over the activities of his secret police. Army support is essential to Duvalier's continuation in office, and he has already strained his relationship with the military nearly to the breaking point.

Political and racial tensions, prompted in part by the government's virtual reign of terror against the opposition and the small mulatto elite, are already so intense that an attempted coup might be accompanied by mob violence. Many people are likening the present situation to the complete breakdown of public order in July 1915.

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