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
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27 January 1955

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


CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 9
NO CHANGE IN CLASS
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 8 Jan 86 REVIEWER A small rectangular redaction box.

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

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SUMMARY



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FAR EAST

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2. Five to seven days needed for Tachens evacuation:



At least five to seven days will be required for the planned evacuation of the two main islands of the Tachens group, according to American navy estimates. Present plans prepared by MAAG call for evacuation of the 12,000 Nationalist regulars and guerrillas

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on the islands, 10,800 tons of supplies and equipment, and those of the 14,600 civilians who want to go.

Evacuation of the outlying Yushan and Pishan islands is to be the responsibility of the Nationalists.

Comment: Concentrations of evacuation vessels and embarking troops would provide tempting targets for Communist air and artillery attacks. The possibility of a serious incident cannot be excluded, although it is believed unlikely that the Communists would deliberately attack American forces engaged in assisting the evacuation.

SOUTH ASIA

3. Indian Congress Party fears Communist election victory in Andhra state:

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According to the American consulate general in Madras, the tactics used in the political campaign prior to the important Andhra state elections beginning on 11

February may be the roughest used in post-independence India. Intimidation and physical violence are already being used by both the Congress Party and its strongest opposition, the Communists.

S. K. Patil, one of the Congress' ablest organizers, who is running the Congress campaign in Andhra, has given Prime Minister Nehru a pessimistic report on the party's prospects, according to Andhra state delegates to the recent annual convention of the Congress. As a result, Nehru has given Patil full powers over the faction-ridden local party organization and authority to raise funds elsewhere, and in the end the elections may be rigged.

Comment: The point at issue is whether New Delhi can prevent the formation of the first Communist-controlled state government in India if, as seems possible, the Communists win a majority. Indications are that the Congress Party will adopt extreme measures rather than permit the state

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to go Communist, or that direct rule from New Delhi will be extended in the state in the event of a Communist victory. The Andhra area has always been one of the centers of Communist strength in India.

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4. Pakistan reported making top-level effort to resolve disputes with India:

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The high-ranking Pakistani officials currently in New Delhi plan to make extraordinary efforts to settle outstanding disputes between the two countries during this visit, according to the American embassy in Karachi. The embassy believes that if the strong team--headed by Governor General Ghulam Mohammad and including the ablest members of the Pakistani cabinet--is rebuffed in New Delhi, there will be little chance for a settlement in the foreseeable future.

Comment: Pakistan's present leaders are probably anxious to settle outstanding disputes with India so that they can deal more effectively with their domestic problems. They may therefore make better offers than those made by previous negotiators. However, India has not yet shown a willingness to make the concessions on major issues necessary to settlement, such as the Kashmir and water disputes.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

5. Comment on replacement of French governor general in Algeria:

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The replacement of Algeria's governor general, Roger Leonard, by Jacques Soustelle on 26 January seems to have been dictated by the immediate need to bolster the parliamentary position of the Mendes-France government. The appointment may improve the premier's chances, which had been considered

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little better than even, of surviving the vote of confidence he is expected to face during the North African debate scheduled to start on 2 February.

Soustelle is a spokesman of the hard-core Gaullist group which has been strongly critical of Mendes-France's North African policies. The replacement is also a concession to the powerful group of reactionary French settlers in Algeria who have long urged that Leonard be ousted.

This change may conciliate Mendes-France's parliamentary opposition sufficiently to permit him to reach an agreement with the Tunisians as well as reassure French Algerians, but it is likely to embitter native Moslems and intensify nationalist opposition in Algeria. An upsurge of isolated terrorist attacks is therefore probable.

An overwhelming majority of the native deputies in the Algerian Assembly are reported to have threatened to resign, and they may be stimulated by this appointment to organize direct and effective leadership for overt opposition to the French government.

EASTERN EUROPE

6. Comment on Yugoslav optimism regarding Satellite "independence":

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[redacted] Yugoslav officials have recently expressed what appears to be Belgrade's view, that the Satellites' position in the Orbit is continuing to evolve toward increasing independence. The Yugoslavs have for months considered that the clue to Moscow's aims in its relations with Belgrade is to be found in the degree of real independence it is willing to grant to the Satellites.

In a talk on 19 January with American officials, Foreign Under Secretary Bebler stated that the USSR had given the Satellites considerable latitude in their internal policies. He said that despite the firm control the USSR is retaining in foreign policy, the Satellites have been permitted to differ considerably in their implementation of the directives for "normalization"

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of relations with Yugoslavia. Vice President Kardelj told a Western magazine editor in December that there are various pressures working for the lessening of Soviet authority over the Satellites just as there are pressures within the Soviet Union against the bureaucratic mode of government there.

The Yugoslav attitude on Satellite "independence" appears to be colored by wishful thinking. Yugoslavia wishes to reduce its isolation as a Communist power outside the Orbit, and considers that it has a "unique historical role" in attempting to make the Satellites as independent as itself.

The Yugoslav statements are designed in part to reassure the West as to Belgrade's motives in improving relations with the Orbit.