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
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SUMMARY

SOVIET UNION

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SOUTHEAST ASIA


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SOVIET UNION

1. Comment on Soviet ratification of border and financial agreement with Iran:

[redacted] Soviet ratification of the border and financial agreement with Iran represents one more step in Moscow's campaign to encourage neutrality in uncommitted states along Soviet Orbit borders.

Current Soviet propaganda, by attempting to distort a simple border and financial agreement into a neutrality commitment, reveals apprehension that Iran may now feel freer to join a Western-sponsored defense bloc. It emphasizes that "dangerous tendencies" are pushing Iran along a path contrary to its treaty obligations with the USSR. A Pravda editorial promises that a policy of neutrality in Iran will receive the "full support of the USSR, which more than once came to the assistance of its friendly neighbor."

Until all provisions of the agreement are carried out, including demarcations of the border which will take at least 18 months, Iran is not expected to change its present policy of avoiding offense to the USSR.

The Shah recently proposed, however, [redacted] talks with Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan. His pro-Western inclination and his desire ultimately to link Iran formally with Western defense arrangements are not likely to be weakened by this Soviet gesture. Neutralist sentiment in Iran, which will probably be encouraged by the Soviet action, exerts virtually no influence on government policy. [redacted]

SOUTHEAST ASIA

2. Diem considers procedure for election of national assembly:

[redacted] Premier Diem [redacted]

[redacted] is opposed to the formation of a national assembly whose seats are merely distributed among the

parties and sects. [redacted]

[redacted] process would strengthen persons "who are deeply compromised by their collaboration with colonialism since 1946." [redacted]

[redacted] only elections will eliminate persons "who represent nothing but themselves." He believes the elections can be organized to prevent undue intimidation by the sects.

He envisages excluding Viet Minh agents from the polls by legal arrangements, whose application would be facilitated by the violently anti-Communist feeling in the newly liberated areas. He also envisages the postponement of elections in regions where "conditions of freedom" have not been established.

Comment: Municipal and village elections held two years ago provide evidence that the Viet Minh can be excluded from the polls.

3. Vietnamese government hopes to arrange defection of group of Viet Minh regulars:

[redacted] The Vietnamese government has been negotiating with the leaders of the 308th Viet Minh battalion since 16 April and will probably accept the allegiance of some of its elements in the near future, [redacted]

[redacted] The battalion commander is said to be convinced that the Diem government is nationalist and anti-French. He claims 7,000 followers, but the government believes they number no more than 1,000. [redacted]

Comment: The 308th is a battalion of Viet Minh regulars last known to be in the Camu area, near the southern tip of Vietnam. It may have remained there after the regroupment which was completed on 7 February.

SOUTH ASIA**4. Pakistani prime minister comments on Afro-Asian conference:**

The recently concluded Afro-Asian conference was a "75-percent victory for the free world," according to Pakistani prime minister Mohammad Ali.

Mohammad Ali expressed belief that Chou En-lai was impressed by the strength of anti-Communist forces. He contrasted the skillful parliamentary tactics of the pro-Western countries with Chou's apparent ignorance of parliamentary procedures and Prime Minister Nehru's extraordinary ineptness.

Nehru's loss of prestige was so marked as to frustrate his ambition to be the spokesman for Asia, according to Mohammad Ali, who pointed out that, despite Nehru's strong opposition, the conference had linked international control of nuclear weapons with disarmament. Mohammad Ali also noted that the conference had approved collective security agreements under the UN charter in the face of objections from Chou and Nehru and that Chou's sudden acceptance of the proposal had momentarily isolated the Indian premier.

Comment: Nehru from the start was cool toward an Afro-Asian conference and was anxious to prevent friction at Bandung. He may have been impressed by the strong anti-Communist stand taken by a number of nations, and as a result he may consider it necessary to reassess India's position on current Asian problems.

THE FORMOSA STRAITS

Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group for the Formosa Straits Program

This report is based on information received in Washington up to 1100 hours 27 April 1955.

1. Aerial photography of the East China coast has revealed possible initial construction on another new airfield opposite Formosa. Repair or possible expansion was noted on two other airfields along the coast.

a. Photography on 25 April indicated early stages of possible airfield construction near Lungtien, about 35 miles south of Foochow and 120 NM from Taipei. Only initial clearing was noted on a runway area about 6500 by 240 feet.

b. The first recent photography of Taishan airfield, in the Choushan Islands south of Shanghai, revealed expansion of the field. A 7000' by 440' concrete runway and 10 revetments were observed. One CAB (LI-2) transport and five single-engine fighters were on the field.

c. There was evidence on 24 April that rehabilitation of Machiang airfield, near Amoy, had started. Some vegetation had been removed from the runway. Machiang had been dormant since 1951, when construction work was halted. At present it is suited for only limited operational use by transports, but could be readied for limited fighter operation in about ten days. The field is 15 NM from Quemoy.

2. Photography also noted FALCON (MIG-15) types at airfields near Ningpo and Canton.

a. Thirty-nine FALCON types and seven single-engine piston fighters were counted on Changchiao airfield at Ningpo on 25 April. On the basis of communications intelligence, the 17th Air Division (55 FALCONS) was believed located at Changchiao. This field has also been used as a staging base for naval air force BATS (TU-2) operating out of the Shanghai area. No such aircraft were observed at Changchiao on 25 April.

b. Photography of the Canton area on 26 April revealed 55 FALCONS on Nanhai airfield, southwest of Canton. Photographs of White Cloud airfield, three miles north of Canton, were too poor to permit an aircraft count. There was, however, no evidence of new construction. The presence of one fighter division--the 4th--and one regiment from the 18th Air Division have been accepted in the Canton area. A possible 80 FALCONS are estimated in the area.

3. On 26 April, the Chinese Communists, for the first time, fired upon a Nationalist-held island in the Matsu group. Two rounds of artillery landed on Peikantang and wounded five Nationalist personnel. The firing came from the Peiling Peninsula. The limited number of rounds fired strongly suggests registration. The Communists have had artillery weapons on the Peiling Peninsula for some time and there have been recent reports of additional antiaircraft, artillery and coastal defense positions on the peninsula.

4. A summary of Formosa Straits Reports for the week ending 27 April is attached.

WEEKLY SUMMARY

FORMOSA STRAITS REPORT
27 April 1955

1. [redacted] the transfer of Soviet BUTCHER (IL-28) jet light bombers in the Port Arthur area to the Chinese Communists. The exact number involved cannot be ascertained at this time. If all 84 BUTCHER-type aircraft located at this point plus the 36 BUTCHERS known to have arrived at Tsitsihar in northern Manchuria are assigned to the Chinese Communists, their over-all jet light bomber strength would be raised from 145 to 265.

2. Photography confirms the presence of 23 jet fighters at Tatopu airfield near Changsha, 460 NM inland from Formosa.

[redacted] They would be important in the air defense of central China but would not be effective against Formosa unless staged through one of the coastal bases.

3. No further information has been received to confirm the movement of a possible jet fighter unit of divisional size from the Shantung Peninsula to the Shanghai area as reported 24 April. On 25 April photography of Changchiao airfield, believed to have been the terminal point for these aircraft, revealed only 39 jet fighters present. Although some other aircraft may have been either in the air or at another airfield in the immediate vicinity, this count from one photo mission cannot be taken as confirmation of a second divisional size unit at this airfield.


4. During the period there was almost a complete lack of Communist ground activity. An inspection team from MAAG, Formosa, recently conducted a series of combat readiness tests of Chinese Nationalist troops on the Matsu Island group, resulting in an over-all rating of "satisfactory." Evident weaknesses were the serious understrength of the regimental combat team on the Paichuan (White Dog) Islands, the inexperience of the division staff on Matsu, and the slowness of the Ministry of National Defense to follow MAAG's recommendations for augmentation of crew-served weapons.

5. Chief of MAAG, Formosa, recently recommended that the Wuchiu Islands, midway between Matsu and Quemoy, either be abandoned or garrisoned by regular Nationalist forces. CINCPAC concurred in MAAG's recommendation that the Wuchius be abandoned because he does not consider the position of the islands in the Chinese Nationalist defense system warrants the expenditure of support and equipment for a defending garrison there.

6. Chou En-lai at Bandung and related Chinese Communist propaganda during the past week continued to insist that the "liberation" of Formosa is a purely internal matter in which "outside interference" will not be tolerated, that the only international question susceptible to negotiations is that of US "intervention," and that compromise is out of the question. Chou En-lai, however, has indicated that he does not regard the door to negotiations as entirely closed.

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CHINA-FORMOSA SITUATION 27 April 1955

Legend:

- Selected road
- Railroad
- Proposed railroad

COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND

USEABILITY

- ▲ OPERATIONAL
 - ▲ SERVICEABLE
 - ▲ UNKNOWN
 - ▲ OTHER

+ MIG-15, MIG-17, TU-4, IL-28
 | TU-2, IL-10, LA-9/11, LI-2, etc.
 — unknown

* Fields not considered capable of supporting sustained operations at present.

NATIONALIST AIRFIELD

DESIGNATIONS

PRIMARY: considered most important in area, with prepared runway generally 5000 feet or longer.


SECONDARY: auxiliary or emergency bases, or fields of lesser importance—runways generally less than 5000 feet.

OPERATIONAL: consistently used by military & civilian aircraft.

SERVICEABLE: capable of use by aircraft.

UNKNOWN: current status undetermined.

OTHER: under construction, abandoned, or unserviceable.



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