


~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1



*ED*

11 August 1960

25X1

Copy No. C 71


# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 36  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S O  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 18-2  
DATE: 9 JUN 1980 REVIEWER:

25X1

Army and Navy  
review(s) completed.



25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200360001-4

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200360001-4

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

11 August 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

25X1 [REDACTED]

International Communism: Plans reportedly are being made to hold another meeting of representatives of all Communist parties in a continuing attempt to resolve Moscow's and Peiping's conflicting views. The failure of the recent Bucharest meeting to provide a real resolution of the conflict apparently resulted in the formation of an international Communist commission to plan for such a meeting. It will probably be held in Moscow in conjunction with the USSR's October Revolution celebration. In addition to its serious concern with the unfavorable effects of the dispute on the image of bloc strength and unity, Moscow is probably increasingly worried by the strain it imposes on national Communist parties whose traditional left-right disagreements are being exacerbated by the Moscow-Peiping rift.

25X1 [REDACTED]

70

25X1 [REDACTED]

USSR-UN: Khrushchev's hint that he may participate in the UN General Assembly's disarmament debate suggests that he sees a repeat performance at the UN as a means of refurbishing the peaceful image he attempted to create last September, when he unveiled his complete and general disarmament scheme before the General Assembly. An appearance at the UN, in conjunction with possible visits to Cuba or Mexico, would also provide an opportunity for some "dramatic" new gesture such as calling for a world disarmament conference. Khrushchev's hint probably was timed to strengthen the efforts of the Soviet UN delegation to prevent a meeting of the UN Disarmament Commission as requested by the US.

25X1 [REDACTED]

OK

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

**Pakistan-USSR:** Pakistan's announcement that it welcomes a Soviet proposal to discuss details of oil exploration assistance is symptomatic of Pakistan's desire to enhance its aid from abroad by introducing competition between the US and the bloc. [REDACTED] The Soviet proposal, originally made in 1958, was renewed in response to a Pakistani initiative last May. President Ayub probably does not intend to jeopardize Pakistan's alliance with the US, but he presumably hopes to arouse apprehension that Pakistan is moving toward a more "independent" policy.

## LATE ITEMS

\***Republic of the Congo:** Secretary General Hammarskjold is expected to arrive in the Congo on 11 August and to proceed on Friday to Elisabethville where Katanga Premier Tshombé has stated he is prepared to begin negotiations for entry of UN troops

25X1

25X1  
into Katanga.

25X1

[redacted] Despite his efforts to reconstitute the Force Publique, Lumumba probably has no more than a few hundred troops loyal to himself, however, and no Congolese aircraft with which to airlift them to Katanga.

In Leopoldville, there have been anti-Lumumba disturbances for the second consecutive day. Possibly in reaction to rumors of a coup attempt, Congolese police on 10 August raided the office of the Abako party, which on 8 August passed a motion of no confidence against Lumumba. Several Abako adherents were reportedly wounded when firing broke out, but reports that Lumumba himself was injured in street demonstrations have been denied by an aide. The premier has warned that large numbers of Europeans would shortly be arrested for "plotting against the Congo," a threat which may lead to a new exodus by Belgians, including those in Katanga.

Brussels continues critical of the US for supporting the UN resolution calling for the "immediate" withdrawal of Belgian troops from Katanga and for activity allegedly prejudicial to Belgian interests. Although Foreign Minister Wigny has indicated that all Belgian troops could be evacuated from the Congo by 21 August, Brussels still may hope to avoid a commitment concerning a date for the evacuation of its Congo bases. Public criticism of Prime Minister Eyskens' government has sparked new rumors he may soon resign.

25X1

25X1  
25X1  
\*Laos: The area controlled by the rebellious second parachute battalion and other small units allied with it still is apparently restricted to the Vientiane area.

25X1  
[redacted] The provisional executive committee announced in Vientiane by the revolutionary high command contains diverse elements unified mainly by their dislike of the

25X1

25X1

Somsanith regime.

25X1

[redacted] Any compromise  
between the two contending regimes would in all likelihood  
lead to some loosening of Laos' ties with the United States  
and to an effort to reach a settlement with the Communist  
Pathet Lao.

25X1

### III. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

- A. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.
- C. The following developments are susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which could jeopardize the US in the immediate future:

While the origin and objectives of the 9 August coup in Laos are still unclear, there are indications that anti-US neutralist factions may be directing it. The internal developments create a situation favoring Communist exploitation, particularly Pathet Lao. There are no indications of any Chinese Communist or North Vietnamese intention to intervene overtly. The danger of such overt intervention would be greater if Thailand or South Vietnam were to intervene militarily. \*

\*The Director of Naval Intelligence and the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, feel that the situation

is best described simply as one which presents opportunities for Communist exploitation without regard to the many possibilities for which there are as yet no indications.

25X1

25X1

11 Aug 60

DAILY BRIEF

v

Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200360001-4

25X1

Probable Future High-Level Communist Meeting

25X1

Plans are being made to hold another meeting of representatives of all Communist parties in an attempt to resolve the conflict of views which continues to divide the Soviet Union and Communist China.

25X1

[ ] [ ] Most parties, either through conviction or as a result of Soviet pressure, supported the Soviet Union at Bucharest. However, even after a 24 June meeting of representatives of the bloc countries had agreed on an innocuous resolution stressing unity, the Chinese delegate carried his country's opposing views to larger meetings of representatives of all Communist parties on 25 and 26 June.

Apparently on the suggestion of the Rumanian delegate, who was chairing the meetings, an international commission--comprising both bloc and nonbloc delegates--was established to prepare for another conference. This will probably be held in Moscow in conjunction with the USSR's October Revolution celebration. In November 1957 a similar meeting attended by Mao Tse-tung worked out a declaration which was instrumental in maintaining a facade of unity for some time thereafter.

In addition to its serious concern with the unfavorable effects of the dispute on the image of bloc strength and unity, Moscow is probably increasingly worried over the strain it imposes within national Communist parties whose traditional left-right disagreements are being exacerbated by the existence of two opposing views at the apex of the Communist movement. Although the more disciplined and closely controlled bloc parties have swung behind the Soviet Union in the dispute, especially since the Bucharest meeting, there were indications earlier that support existed within certain of these parties for some of the Chinese views.

Prior to the Bucharest meeting the Chinese also lobbied for their point of view in such international front organizations

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200360001-4

Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200360001-4

as the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade Unions. This led to furious discussion in these bodies, thereby confusing the Communists who make up their membership and reducing the effectiveness of their appeal.

Within Communist parties of the free world the debate between the Soviet Union and China has been mirrored in debates between leftist, internationalist factions, who borrow from Chinese declarations for support, and rightist, nationalist groups, who rely on Soviet arguments. In India, for example, the Communist monthly journal has been reprinting Chinese speeches and the inflammatory Red Flag articles, while the weekly publication reprints Soviet speeches and statements. A similar situation apparently exists within the Iraqi Communist party, and, among others, within some Latin American parties.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200360001-4

Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200360001-4

Khrushchev Hints He May Again Address UN General Assembly  
On Disarmament

Khrushchev's hint in a 9 August Pravda interview that he would participate in the UN General Assembly disarmament debate this fall suggests that he sees a repeat performance at the UN as a means of refurbishing the image of himself as peacemaker which he attempted to create last September, when he unveiled his scheme for general and complete disarmament before the General Assembly. Khrushchev repeated his defense of the Soviet walkout from the ten-nation disarmament talks in Geneva last June and renewed his attacks on the Western disarmament policy, which he again called "control without disarmament." The interview was probably timed to bolster the Soviet delegation's efforts to prevent the meeting of the UN Disarmament Commission, scheduled on 16 August, which the USSR probably feels would lessen the impact of an appearance by Khrushchev before the General Assembly in September.

Khrushchev may seek to use the UN once again as a forum for announcing a dramatic new disarmament proposal, such as urging a world disarmament conference. On 11 July the Communist-front World Peace Council called for a disarmament conference to be attended by all states, whether or not they are members of the UN, and announced it would undertake a major agitation campaign on the model of the 1950 Stockholm Appeal. Both the council's president and the Soviet delegate to it claimed that the omission of Communist China had given disarmament conferences of the past ten years an "air of unreality." In anticipation of Western proposals to bring about an early resumption of disarmament talks, Khrushchev may call for a world disarmament conference or the inclusion of Communist China and neutral countries as a means of avoiding serious negotiations on this subject until a new US administration takes office. In his letters to the Western powers in late July, Khrushchev asserted that the question of inviting other states to join the talks would arise during the UN session.

Khrushchev may be contemplating an appearance before the General Assembly in conjunction with possible visits to Cuba and Mexico. Raul Castro recently stated that Khrushchev had set a definite date for a trip to Havana, but Mexican officials continue to deny that he has been invited to attend Mexico's independence celebrations.

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200360001-4

### Proposed Soviet Oil Exploration Assistance to Pakistan

Pakistan's announcement that it welcomes a Soviet proposal to send a delegation to discuss details of assisting in the exploration of mineral--especially oil--resources shows Rawalpindi's desire to increase its aid from abroad by introducing competition between the US and the bloc. President Ayub presumably hopes to arouse apprehension that Pakistan is moving toward a more independent policy, but he probably does not intend to jeopardize Pakistan's alliance with the United States.

Many Pakistanis have argued for some time that India has secured larger amounts of foreign aid because it accepts help from both free-world and Communist countries. Recent Soviet successes in discovering oil deposits in India and Afghanistan probably have also been factors in Rawalpindi's decision to seek Soviet help in this field.

The Soviet proposal was originally made in 1958 and was renewed in response to a Pakistani inquiry last May. In their public announcements each country, however, now is trying to make it appear that it is responding to the initiative of the other.

The Pakistani military regime may hope that its show of "independence" will strengthen its support among the people, many of whom entertain strong, though usually latent, neutralist sentiments.

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200360001-4

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200360001-4

25X1

Laotian Coup Developments:

The area controlled by the rebellious second parachute battalion and other small units allied with it apparently still does not extend beyond Vientiane and its immediate environs.

25X1

25X1

The provisional executive committee announced by the revolutionary high command in Vientiane on 10 August is a diverse group united mainly by hostility toward the Somsanith government. Its most prominent member is Souvanna Phouma, a former premier who has long advocated stricter neutrality for Laos and believes the Communist Pathet Lao can be more easily handled if brought back into the national community than if forced to continue in armed insurrection. Also on the committee are two generals whose quarrel with the government was based on personal considerations of advancement

25X6

[redacted] rather than on ideological considerations. A number of disgruntled politicians of varying degrees of leftist persuasion are also included, among them Bong Souvannavong, a neutralist politician who long served as an apologist for the Pathet Lao. Two of Bong's extreme leftist sons appear to have played an important role in the coup.

25X1

Any compromise between the two contending regimes would in all likelihood lead to some loosening of Laos' ties with the United States,

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200360001-4

25X1

25X1

a friendlier policy toward the Sino-Soviet bloc, and an effort to reach a negotiated settlement with the Pathet Lao.

25X1

Communist China so far has not reported the coup; North Vietnam broadcasts indicate sympathy for the rebels. Although Hanoi has not specifically endorsed the Kong Le clique, it has rebroadcast rebel communiq  s and criticized the Somsanith government.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200360001-4

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA REPO ID: 075A005200360001-4

**TOP SECRET**