

~~TOP SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION~~

17 January 1952

[redacted]  
Copy No. 49

3.5(c)

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 30  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. D  
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2001  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE 12-14-71 REVIEWER [redacted]

3.5(c)

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~**SUMMARY****FAR EAST**

1. Communist aircraft strength in China-Manchuria-Korea increased to 1700 (page 3).
2. Chinese Nationalist forces from Burma reported in clash with Chinese Communists (page 3).

**NEAR EAST - AFRICA**

3. Iranian insurgents in the USSR return to Tehran (page 4).
4. Mossadeq continues adamant on the oil dispute (page 4).
5. Egyptian Government confident of victory over British (page 5).

**EASTERN EUROPE**

6. Hungary negotiating for Iranian oil (page 5).

**WESTERN EUROPE**

7. Comment on German inter-zonal trade (page 6).
8. Churchill still opposes NATO plans for Atlantic Command (page 6).
9. Comment on Spanish reaction to anticipated US aid (page 7).

**NORTH AMERICA**

10. Canadian Cabinet rejects NATO request for economic aid to Europe (page 8).

\* \* \* \*

3.5(c)

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

## FAR EAST

1. Communist aircraft strength in China-Manchuria-Korea increased to 1700:

US Air Force *Indications Review*  
 16 Jan 52  
 SUEDE

A US Air Force estimate states that there is sufficient evidence to justify the upward revision of Communist military aircraft strength in the China-Manchuria-Korea area to 1700.

It had been carried at 1450 since November. The new figure includes 900 jet fighters and 240 TU-2 light bombers and represents an increase of 100 jet fighters, 80 light bombers, and 50 transport aircraft. Communist air strength in Manchuria is estimated at 1000, including 600 jets and 160 light bombers.

Comment: This increase occurred entirely in China proper. Combat aircraft strength in Manchuria has actually declined slightly since November, because of the movement of several units from South Manchuria to the Nanking-Shanghai area.

The increase of light bombers and transports in China is due to the transfer, since the last estimate, of TU-2's and transports from the USSR to China proper. The upward revision of jet fighter strength is accounted for by the identification in December of two additional jet fighter divisions at Hankow and Peiping.

2. Chinese Nationalist forces from Burma reported in clash with Chinese Communists:

Chinese Nationalist forces suffered 300 casualties on 11 January in heavy fighting with the Chinese Communists in Yunnan near the Burma border,

Meanwhile, in Rangoon informed Saigon of a Burmese request to the French and Thai Legations that visas be refused to the

3.3(h)(2)

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Nationalist General Li Mi in order to prevent his return to Burma. The [redacted] reported serious Burmese concern over the situation.

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] that the Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma were being supplied by air directly from Formosa and had recently been reinforced by 900 non-commissioned officers, which seemed to indicate an intent to resume operations.

## NEAR EAST - AFRICA

3. Iranian insurgents in the USSR return to Tehran:

[redacted]

Iranian military intelligence has received detailed information that "a large number" of insurgents who were in Soviet territory have entered northeastern Iran and are now assembling in Tehran. Iranian dissidents inside Iran are also gathering in Tehran and are possibly "being trained for a dangerous operation."

3.3(h)(2)

**Comment:** This information is unconfirmed. When the Soviet-supported Kurdish and Azerbaijan republics which had been created in northwest Iran collapsed in December 1946 after a few months of tenuous existence, hundreds of Iranians directly involved fled across the frontier. Since then there have been various rumors that these insurgents, some of them avowed and trained Communists, would come back. The return of sizable numbers of such individuals could result in the formation of the nucleus of a hard-core terrorist or revolutionary organization.

4. Mossadeq continues adamant on the oil dispute:

[redacted]

Prime Minister Mossadeq has indicated that he considers politically inadvisable the acceptance of any solution to the Anglo-Iranian dispute proposed by the International Bank which does not represent a clear-cut victory for Iran over the British.

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] he believes that his victory in the current elections will force the British to accept Iranian terms.

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Comment: Mossadeq is aware that his political stature depends on an unqualified victory for Iran in its oil dispute. His recent demand that the British close their consulates in Iran indicates that he intends to use his anti-British stand to secure a vote of confidence at the Parliamentary interpellation on 22 January. Although he is genuinely concerned over the serious financial condition of his government, there is no indication that he will agree to any compromise on the oil dispute.

5. Egyptian Government confident of victory over British:

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted]

According to the American Ambassador in Cairo, the Wafd government is becoming more confident each day that the present Egyptian commando tactics in the Suez Canal zone will eventually force the British to withdraw from the country. Even the King is being influenced by this attitude.

The Ambassador reiterates that a compromise must now be made on the Sudan issue. He states that ex-Prime Minister Sirry Pasha has warned that if matters continue to drift as they are, even recognition of the title of King of the Sudan will not "buy" Egyptian acceptance of the Western defense proposals.

Comment: The type of reasoning indulged in by the Wafd government has induced even the more moderate leaders to refuse to take action to stop deterioration in the internal situation.

## EASTERN EUROPE

6. Hungary negotiating for Iranian oil:

3.3(h)(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.3(h)(2)

Hungarian petroleum production has declined steadily in the postwar period, and wasteful practices preclude any sizable increase in the output of the known fields. In 1950, 500,000 metric tons of crude oil were produced, whereas the Hungarian refineries have an annual capacity of one million tons.

### WESTERN EUROPE

#### 7. Comment on German inter-zonal trade:

Allied officials in Germany are now considering whether or not to extend the present virtual embargo of inter-zonal German trade adopted in retaliation against Soviet harassing of Berlin trade. The Soviet interference has been gradually reduced, particularly since early November, to a point where it now consists only of slow handling of Berlin export permits. West Berlin firms do not appear to be suffering from the present restrictions, and American officials feel that current airlift operations can be reduced and possibly soon ended.

British and French officials have indicated their desire to permit the West Germans to renew trade with East Germany, and recently, United States officials in Germany have suggested that the Allied embargo might now be dropped. They stress that it has become less and less effective because of the Soviet expectation that it will be of short duration, and because of the apparent East German ability to procure needed materials from other Western countries.

#### 8. Churchill still opposes NATO plans for Atlantic Command:



3.3(h)(2)

Expressing his continued opposition to the existing agreement for an American Supreme Allied Commander in the Atlantic, Churchill told Canadian officials in Ottawa that he would take up the matter again on his return to Washington, and requested support

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

for his stand. He stressed Britain's greater experience in dealing with convoy problems and maintained that the command question was a matter of "British life blood" as against American and Canadian inconvenience.

The Canadian Chiefs of Staff still favor the United States' view for technical military reasons. External Affairs Minister Pearson and other political leaders, however, believe Churchill may propose a compromise and hope the United States can accept it, feeling that the political gain might offset the technical loss.

9. Comment on Spanish reaction to anticipated US aid:

3.3(h)(2)

The US State Department has expressed interest in reports that the Spanish Government is misrepresenting the motives and conditions of proposed American aid to Spain and that the Spanish people are not being informed as to American objectives in seeking a military arrangement with Spain.

Spanish propaganda has treated impending American aid and military negotiations as a personal victory for Franco and as vindication for his intransigent refusal to alter the internal policies of his regime, as well as overdue recognition by the United States of the military value of Spain. The controlled press has strongly implied that economic aid will not necessarily depend upon military considerations and that every sector of the country's economy will receive immediate aid in major proportions.

The emphasis on economic aid and official expressions to American representatives of impatience over its delay reflect the political importance to the regime of concrete evidence of US assistance and may result in serious disappointment with the results of future negotiations.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## NORTH AMERICA

10. Canadian Cabinet rejects NATO request for economic aid to Europe:

[Redacted] The Canadian Cabinet on 12 January rejected 3.3(h)(2) the recommendation of the Temporary Council Committee that Canada extend 200 million dollars in economic aid to Europe in 1952. Minister of

External Affairs Pearson was unable to override the opposition of the Minister of Finance, whose views were accepted with little debate.

The Cabinet has indicated that Canada might provide some additional military aid to Europe out of its 2.5 billion dollar defense budget for the fiscal year 1952-1953. The American Embassy in Ottawa points out that this suggested transfer would mean only the diversion of some defense production to NATO without any increase in the Canadian or the total NATO effort.

Comment: This unexpected action may be a government attempt to frustrate opposition efforts to make mounting domestic inflation a major political issue in a year which may see a general election.

~~TOP SECRET~~