

17 October 1957

3.5(c)

Copy No. 138


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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 39  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 7  
11 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S.C.  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 1-4-80 REVIEWER:

**OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE**  
**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03190615



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~~TOP SECRET~~

1. GROMYKO STRONGLY SUPPORTS SYRIAN  
COMPLAINT IN UN

Comment on:

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in a personal letter to the president of the UN General Assembly on 16 October stated that the USSR is "prepared to take part with its forces" in suppressing any Turkish intervention against Syria, and called for immediate investigation of the "intolerably dangerous" situation along the Turkish-Syrian border. The letter coincided with and was intended to give strong support to Syria's submission of Turkish "military threats" for formal UN action. The Syrian request was reportedly the result of considerable prodding from Gromyko and other Soviet officials in New York and Damascus.

The Soviet demarche on this occasion is similar to its warnings to Eden, Mollet, and Ben-Gurion last November in support of Egypt, which were also within a UN context. The USSR is using the UN as a forum to blame the United States for any hostilities or claim credit if there are none.

## 2. ZHUKOV REPORTEDLY HEADS SOVIET SECRET POLICE

Comment on:

[Redacted] Marshal Georgiy Zhukov "took over control" of the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) sometime during August.


[Redacted] There is no supporting evidence.

The KGB, a government committee which was established in 1954 to take over the secret police functions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), has been administered by I. A. Serov. The report could reflect the assignment of responsibility for general security affairs within the party presidium to Zhukov. There is a possibility that Zhukov gained supervision over the KGB as his price for supporting Khrushchev during the purge of the antiparty group last June.

With direct control of both the armed forces and the secret police, Zhukov would be in a powerful position to frustrate any ambitions Khrushchev might have for personal dictatorship. Khrushchev's actions during the last two months, however, have suggested an enhancement rather than a reduction in his authority.

### 3. INDICATION OF CONTINUED SOVIET PRESSURE ON THE SUDAN

Comment on:



The USSR is dissatisfied with the Sudan's failure to accept its economic offers of last August and has suggested Soviet-Sudanese ministerial discussions, according to an article in the Sudanese press by a pro-Communist Sudanese editor who is on an official visit to Moscow. The USSR is said to be ready to confer on projects costs and technicians for power, textile, communications, and irrigation projects. Soviet Ambassador Teplov has postponed his return to Khartoum in order to participate in informal talks with pro-Egyptian Sudanese Minister of Interior Rahman, who is now en route to Moscow.

There has been continuing pressure by the opposition on the Khalil government to bring the Sudanese economy into closer contact with the USSR or risk charges that it is courting economic disaster. Moscow and Cairo consider next February's Sudanese national elections an important opportunity for strengthening pro-Egyptian elements in the government.

Moscow concluded its first purchase of Sudanese cotton in June and leaked to the Sudanese press the text of its August offer, probably to the discomfiture of the Khalil government. The Sudan has a large surplus of cotton this year which it has been unable to market in the West.



#### 4. YUGOSLAVS SUSPICIOUS OF SOVIET BLOC REPRESENTATIVES

Comment on:

The Slovene security police headquarters [redacted] ordered all commanders to place under strict and "completely discreet" surveillance "persons of foreign Eastern representations" accredited to Yugoslavia who enter their areas. [redacted] in particular [redacted] "Klimiceva"--possibly the Soviet military attaché.

These orders indicate that the Yugoslavs continue to regard with suspicion the activities of Soviet bloc representatives despite the new accord between Moscow and Belgrade. A major Soviet charge leveled against the Yugoslavs in 1948 was Yugoslav surveillance of Soviet officials, an activity which Moscow denounced as incompatible with relations between socialist states.

Soviet Defense Minister Zhukov and his entourage were inspecting Yugoslav army maneuvers in Slovenia at the time these orders were dispatched.

## 5. NEW TENSION IN TURKISH-SYRIAN SITUATION

[redacted] Turkish forces on the Syrian frontier now number 50,000 rather than the 37,000 reported earlier.

On the Syrian side, no military build-up at the frontier has been noted. However, Damascus' formal requests for UN discussion of the Turkish threat, and the proclamation of the state of emergency in the Syrian army on 16 October, suggest that Syria is becoming increasingly concerned over possible Turkish action. According to press reports from Damascus and Cairo, Damascus in declaring a state of emergency has also begun extensive distribution of arms to popular resistance groups, which are largely leftist dominated. [redacted]

**6. KING SAUD IRKED BY EGYPTIAN TROOP MOVE  
TO SYRIA**

**Comment on:**

Press reports from Beirut that King Saud is "angered" over the movement of Egyptian troops to Syria apparently originated with Lebanese President

Chamoun who, [redacted] conveyed the news of the move to Saud [redacted]

[redacted] Saud appeared disturbed [redacted] calling the move "unnecessarily provocative." Saud's major concern appeared to be the failure of the Syrians and Egyptians to consult him, especially in view of the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi pact and Arab joint command arrangements.

A press report originating in Damascus, that Saudi troops will be sent to Syria as a gesture to balance the Egyptian movement has been denied. The dispatch of a token force would not be out of line, however, with Saud's efforts to win the Syrians to moderation by offering to support them against outside aggression. [redacted]

[redacted] the King is more convinced than ever that he is the only person in the Arab world who can materially lessen the bad feeling between the West and the Egyptian-Syrian bloc. [redacted]

## 7. SITUATION IN LIBYA

### Comment on:

Libya's formal acceptance on 14 October of an Egyptian gift of arms and armored cars is a further indication of a weakening of Western influence in Libya. This action underlines Egypt's return to official favor in Libya, which less than a year ago dismissed the Egyptian military attaché for engaging in subversive activities.

King Idriss probably continues suspicious of the motives of Egypt and the USSR. The public and private statements of Prime Minister Kubaar and members of his government, however, give the impression of a turn toward neutralism. Repeated press attacks against the West have received only occasional censure. The promised replacement of Egyptian schoolteachers in Libya by less anti-Western teachers has not taken place.

The Libyans have not followed up their previously reported intention to request renegotiation of American base rights. They may be saving such a move for forthcoming talks on the relative roles of Britain and the United States in providing military assistance. When the subject is brought up, the Libyans almost certainly will refer again to pressure on them to accept Soviet aid offers. Libya now appears to be cooperating with the French in easing local tension on the Algerian border, and a French official stated on 14 October that the situation there was not serious. There is no indication, however, that Libya will stop cooperating with Egypt in furnishing arms and refuge to the Algerian rebels.

## 8. THAI POLITICAL SITUATION

### Comment on:

Although Thai elections are less than two months away, prospective candidates for the 160 seats at stake in the National Assembly are cautious in presenting their position. Much of Thailand is still under martial law and many candidates are reluctant to begin their campaigns until they are more certain of the latitude that will be permitted them by the Sarit military group.

While political alignments following the 16 September coup are still somewhat blurred, it seems likely that the conservative Democratic party, the pro-Sarit Unionist party, and the left-wing Socialist United Front will be the principal protagonists in the coming elections. There is some indication, however, that Marshal Sarit, the armed forces commander and actual ruler of Thailand, does not entirely trust the Unionist party, which he organized last June, and may secretly subsidize other candidates as an alternative grouping should the Unionists prove inadequate for his purposes.

There are growing indications that the provisional government may soon move against the leftist press. The decision to do so was reportedly taken on the insistence of Premier Pote and with Sarit's approval. Interior Minister Prapart informed the press on 8 October he believed that a "certain number of newspapers in Thailand receive Communist subsidies." This strongly suggests that the planned government crackdown is imminent.

Sarit is currently on a 15-day vacation at a seaside resort. Although his close associates insist that he is being consulted on all major decisions, there is a growing body of evidence indicating that he may be gravely ill.

## 9. THE SITUATION IN ARGENTINA

### Comment on:

The Aramburu regime has alerted provincial governors to possible disorders instigated by Peronista elements on 17 October--the twelfth anniversary of Peron's rise to power--and is holding emergency meetings with labor leaders in an attempt to avert a general strike called for 22 October.

A number of progovernment union leaders who helped break the Peronista-backed general strike of 27 September reportedly have joined forces with the Peronistas in demanding an end to the government's wage freeze. They apparently fear that continued economic hardship will lead to their losing control of the union membership. This situation presents as great a threat to the stability of the Aramburu regime as the reported discontent of conservative military elements who are demanding a crackdown on labor agitation.

a group of retired army generals is laying plans for a counter-coup should the conservatives seize on the current unrest to oust Aramburu and postpone the general elections scheduled for next February.