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10 November 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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10 NOVEMBER 1960

**I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**

USSR attempts to mollify De Gaulle on policy toward Algeria but retains free hand to aid rebels.

**II. ASIA-AFRICA**

Europeans in Algeria increasingly bitter over De Gaulle's policy; extremists may be encouraged by sudden protest resignation of the number-two French civil official there.

Belgian Communists, with Soviet support, reportedly plan base in Ghana for subversive operations aimed at the Congo.

Japanese expected to begin production from Persian Gulf offshore oil concession early next year.

**III. THE WEST**

Italy--Failure of national government coalition to control important city councils in local elections may eventually pose new cabinet crisis.

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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### DAILY BRIEF

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#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

\*USSR-France-Algeria] Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, in a talk with French Ambassador Dejean on 5 November, maintained that it is not the USSR but France that has shifted its policy on Algeria. Gromyko repeated Khrushchev's observation in New York that the USSR, in extending de facto recognition to the Algerian rebel regime, had only gone as far as De Gaulle on the question of recognizing the provisional Algerian government. Soviet leaders probably still hope to avoid provoking an open break with Paris for the immediate future, and assurances of this type appear primarily designed to mollify the French while retaining for the USSR a free hand to aid the rebels. In addition to recent well-publicized shipments of relief supplies and small quantities of nonmilitary equipment, Moscow is likely to supply the rebels with at least small quantities of light arms and ammunition and possibly some "technical personnel," and to give strong diplomatic and propaganda support for the Algerian proposal for a UN-supervised referendum in Algeria.]

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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Algeria: De Gaulle's 4 November speech has created a feeling of bitterness and depression among members of the European community in Algeria, according to the American consul general in Algiers. Although popular demonstrations have been few and the powerful Front for French Algeria has reportedly urged the Europeans and loyal Moslems "to clench fists and wait," the sudden resignation of Andre Jacomet, the second-ranking civil official in Algeria, shows serious concern over De Gaulle's policy and may encourage extremists

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and some elements of the army to overt action against De Gaulle. The rebel provisional government, now meeting in Tunis, will probably continue to assess Algerian reaction before making any official comment on the speech.

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\*Republic of the Congo: [The Belgian Communist party, which in the past has had a primary responsibility for the development of Communist assets in the Congo, plans to establish in Ghana a base for propaganda operations and for

25X1 the indoctrination of selected Congolese leaders, ]

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[ ] Two Belgian Communists who visited Moscow in late October reportedly received a promise of "all necessary aid" for the establishment of such a center, whose activities would include publication of a newspaper. The projected center appears to be one effort to counter Mobutu's expulsion of bloc diplomats and technicians in mid-September, a move which jeopardized Communist propaganda and penetration operations in the Congo.]

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\*Japan - Persian Gulf Oil: Japanese oil interests in the Middle East are expected to begin production from their off-shore oil concession in the Persian Gulf near Kuwait in early 1961. It is estimated that by 1963 this production will amount to 30 percent of present Japanese requirements. The crude probably will be refined and marketed almost totally in Japan in a determined effort to cut Tokyo's foreign exchange costs for petroleum, which in 1959 amounted to \$385,000,000.

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### III. THE WEST

Italy: The Italian Communist party will be encouraged by its gains in the 6-7 November local elections to press the Nenni Socialists to abandon their "autonomist" policies and return to close cooperation with the Communists because their combined electoral strength has almost reached that of the

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Christian Democrats. The government coalition parties won a slim nationwide majority but failed to gain control of such important city councils as those in Rome, Genoa, Venice, Florence, and Naples. If the Christian Democrats form municipal alliances outside the pattern of the national government coalition, Fanfani's minor coalition partners may threaten a cabinet crisis.

#### IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

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The conclusions with respect to initiation of hostilities remain unchanged. The following was approved as Conclusion D:<sup>3</sup>

There are indications that, unless some progress is made in the near future toward a negotiated solution of the Algerian problem, the Algerian rebels will request military aid from the Sino-Soviet bloc and that transit rights for such aid will be granted by one or more of Algeria's North African neighbors. If requested to send such aid, the bloc would be likely to comply to the extent of arms and some technicians. In this event the French would probably try to seize bloc arms shipments and might attack depots of bloc arms on Tunisian and Moroccan territory.

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Algeria

President de Gaulle's 4 November speech has created a feeling of bitterness and depression among members of the European community in Algeria, who, according to the American consul general in Algiers, feel tricked and betrayed. The Europeans are particularly incensed because of their belief that the option for a French Algeria has disappeared from De Gaulle's thinking in regard to a referendum on self-determination in Algeria.

Popular manifestations of opposition to the speech have been limited to easily controlled street demonstrations, mostly in heavily European Oran; the powerful Front for French Algeria has reportedly urged the Europeans and loyal Moslems to "clench fists and wait." Urgent sessions of reserve officer and veterans associations have been reported since the speech, and French security officers have expressed concern over these meetings. The general Moslem reaction has been cautious.

The resignation of André Jacomet, the second-ranking civil official in Algeria, took place without warning at a meeting of leading French officials presided over by Delegate General Delouvrier. Jacomet's somewhat dramatic gesture--he has since been summoned to Paris and "dismissed" by the government--is evidence of the state of mind among those who must implement De Gaulle's Algerian policies, and may encourage the extremists and some elements of the army to overt opposition to De Gaulle.

The Algerian provisional government, now meeting in Tunis, maintains its official silence on the speech, but the rebel minister of information indicated on 8 November that he might soon be able to inform the American Embassy in Tunis of the government's reaction. There are signs that Tunisian President Bourguiba wants the rebels to keep open all possibilities for negotiation with France. [redacted]

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[redacted]  
Belgian Communist Party Mapping Operations  
Against Congo

[redacted] Moscow has promised two Belgian Communist party officials, Albert Deconinck and Jean Terfve, "all necessary aid" for the establishment in Ghana of a propaganda and indoctrination center aimed at the Congo, [redacted]

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[redacted] Activities at the projected base--which would operate as a "studies center" for Congolese--would include propaganda, indoctrination of "progressive" Congolese, and publication of a newspaper.

[redacted] Prior to the Congo's independence on 30 June, the Belgian party and the Czech Consulate in Leopoldville appear to have shared responsibility for Communist propaganda and penetration efforts, with the Belgian Communists operating primarily among Congolese visitors to Brussels. It appears likely that Communist efforts in the Congo have been seriously hampered by Colonel Mobutu's expulsion of bloc diplomats and technicians in mid-September. [redacted] if Lumumba regains power, Soviet and Czech specialists are prepared to return to Leopoldville "at once." [redacted]

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Italian Local Elections

The Italian Communists made gains in the nationwide local elections held from 1 to 7 November. Interest in the voting for provincial councils--always an indicator of party strength for the country as a whole--was heightened this year because television for the first time played an important part in a political campaign and the appeal of the party chiefs to a national audience emphasized broad issues. The ruling Christian Democrats and their center party allies in the national coalition--the Democratic Socialists, the Republicans, and the Liberals--retained a margin of popular support, but the total Communist and Nenni Socialist vote nearly equalled that of the Christian Democrats, whose percentage was down 2 percent from the national elections of 1958.

Nenni may argue that his policy of political independence from the Communists did not prevent the Socialist party from holding its own in the voting--as the party left wing had suggested it would. Nevertheless, the party's failure to make substantial gains will put him under strong pressure from the left wing to renew close ties with the Communists. This issue may cause trouble at the next Socialist party congress, planned for January or February.

The Christian Democrats and their coalition allies failed to gain a majority on the provincial councils of such important cities as Venice, Naples, and Genoa. Deadlocks in the councils have in the past been resolved by having a government commissioner appointed who is responsible to Rome. The Christian Democrats may try to avoid this unpopular step by making alliances with parties to the right or left of the national coalition. Alliance with the neo-Fascists, however, would be strongly opposed by the Democratic Socialists, while alliance with the Nenni Socialists would be anathema to the Liberals. If the Christian Democrats persist, a cabinet crisis might ensue. [redacted]

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Director of the Budget

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Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

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The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

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The Director, The Joint Staff

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Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

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Commandant, United States Marine Corps

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Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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Commander in Chief, Pacific

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