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
11 May 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
11 May 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DAILY BRIEF

Laos: At Souvanna Phouma's invitation the three delegation chiefs of the ICC were to go to Xieng Khouang town from Vientiane on 10 May. Results of the visit are not yet known.

[redacted] *In Brief*
 Vieng indicates possible preparations for holding cease-fire talks with the ICC present, either at Namone [redacted] *use next*, or at a village about 10 miles nearer government lines. The military situation continues unchanged. Southwest of the Plaine des Jarres, a Pathet Lao unit was ordered on 10 May [redacted] *delete rest of Brief.* to launch a full-scale attack immediately, if possible, on the Meo base camp at Pa Dong, "because when the ICC comes in [redacted] *In Backup* it will be giving us a hard time." *delete P.3*


*Soviet airlift operations into Laos were scheduled through 11 May. [redacted] (Backup, Page 1) (Map)

[redacted] The Watch Committee at its meeting on 10 May reached the following conclusion concerning Laos:

[redacted] Communist forces in Laos have generally observed a cease-fire on the major fronts, but are continuing small-scale guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations, and are progressively encroaching into areas lightly held by government forces. The dispatch of large delegations to a Geneva conference from Peiping, Hanoi, and Xieng Khouang suggests that the Communists will hold current military operations to a level which they believe would not jeopardize the likelihood of Western, particularly US, participation in the conference. From the Communist point of view, entering the conference without a prior formal agreement on a cease-fire verified by the International Control Commission would enable the Communists, in support of their political objectives, to maintain the threat of further military action and to continue improvement in their military capabilities.

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Republic of the Congo



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Congo: Hammarskjold said on 9 May that contrary to fears in Katanga, the UN did not intend to use force to secure the withdrawal of Belgian military or political advisers from the Congo. He added, however, that any Belgians who fell into UN hands would be repatriated. Hammarskjold now plans to keep Dayal in New York for about five weeks; thereafter, if relations between Leopoldville and the UN remain cordial, he will return Dayal to Leopoldville for a brief stay. Hammarskjold said that Nkrumah is not pressing his threat to withdraw Ghana's troops from the Congo and expressed doubts that the Ghanaian President would do so.] *No*

According to the American Embassy in Brussels, Belgian Foreign Ministry officials regard the arrest of Tshombé, who is now being removed to Leopoldville under guard, as a stupid maneuver which might increase unrest in Katanga without facilitating a rapprochement between Leopoldville and Stanleyville. Brussels reportedly is attempting to keep itself disengaged from the public dispute over Tshombé, although it has told Congolese representatives in New York that it disapproves of Leopoldville action.

Iran: The Iranian Government has forbidden any further demonstrations, except at one specified public stadium where assemblies may be held "to express the people's demands" and stated it will take strong measures to maintain order.

Crowds, including many students, have been in the streets, however, celebrating the collapse of Sharif-Emami's cabinet and hailing the government's announcement that the police officer responsible for killing a demonstrator last week would be prosecuted. The teachers' organization, which sparked the earlier demonstrations, appears willing to continue its strike for higher wages, although its leader, Mohammad Derakhshesh, appears undecided. He has been mentioned as a possible candidate for minister of education, a cabinet post not yet filled by Amini.] *OK delete last P*

*Amini has told the American ambassador that he intends to draw up a new election law, to work for and with the Shah, and to ask for prompt US aid in carrying out major reforms.]

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The Shah is still planning to leave for Europe next week.]

Turkey: Antiregime plotting in Turkey has led to the arrest of at least 80 former members of the banned Turkish Democratic party, headed until last year's military coup by ex-President Bayar and ex-Premier Menderes. Guns, ammunition, and explosives were reportedly found in the homes of some of those arrested on the night of 8-9 May. The Turkish National Security Service, which has had the group under surveillance for some time, claims the conspirators attempted to secure arms and ammunition from military units, including the military academy in Ankara. The full extent of the plot is still undetermined, but General Madanoglu, the Ankara garrison commander and a member of the Committee of National Union, ordered all suspects arrested when it became apparent that the Istanbul group was ready to act.

(Backup, Page 3)

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Ghana: The replacement on 9 May of Ghana's pro-Western Minister of Finance Gbedemah by former Minister of Trade Goka--who is subservient to Nkrumah and has evidenced strong left-wing tendencies--will further strengthen the faction in Accra which favors closer ties with the Soviet bloc. In early May, President Nkrumah tightened his personal control over the governmental and party apparatus by ousting several experienced cabinet officials and bringing in younger and more radical figures. Nkrumah has taken personal responsibility for all financial matters, and the ouster of Gbedemah, who was the main contact point for Western economic groups, particularly in relation to the Volta River hydroelectric project, may lead to a further loss of confidence in the Ghana Government by private Western interests]

OK

Mexico: Mexico's neutral position in consultations on Cuba arises partly from the reluctance of President Lopez Mateos to challenge the pro-Castro activities of Lazaro Cardenas, who was president between 1934 and

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1940, is widely respected both in Mexico and throughout Latin America for his land distribution program and his nationalization of foreign oil companies. In recent years he has increasingly allowed his prestige to be used by the Communists, and he is Castro's most renowned supporter in Latin America. Lopez Mateos is also strongly influenced by his country's deeply ingrained attachment to the diplomatic principle of nonintervention, a principle most fervently invoked by Mexico when the United States is involved.

(Backup, Page 5)

No

*South Vietnam: The cabinet reorganization announced by President Diem on 10 May implements a long-postponed step first outlined last February and is intended to demonstrate Diem's determination to carry out reforms urged upon him to meet the growing Communist guerrilla and political threat. The action follows closely after two decrees which established a central intelligence organization and unified the military command; these were designed to increase the impact of American military aid and to meet the desires of some army officers for less political interference in operations.

The cabinet shuffle, aimed at providing greater coordination among related ministerial functions, elevates several capable government figures and suggests some effort to balance the preponderant influence of Diem's controversial brother Nhu. The appointments reach little beyond presently trusted circles, but appear to offer some appeasement to dissatisfied younger elements, particularly in the replacement of Foreign Minister Mau. The effectiveness of the reorganization, however, as well as of the military reforms, will depend primarily upon Diem's willingness to delegate authority and to curb political rivalries.

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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

- A. No change from last week.
- B. No change from last week.
- C. LAOS: Carried on Page i of Daily Brief.



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~~SECRET~~Laos

Contrary to previous reports, ICC members did not travel to Xieng Khouang on 8 May. The group that was scheduled to leave Saigon on that date was denied permission by North Vietnam to transit Hanoi's Gia Lam airfield, apparently to prevent observation of Soviet airlift activities.

Peiping has rebroadcast a Pathet Lao statement to the effect that the ICC cannot perform formal supervision and control functions until there is a three-way agreement between the Pathet Lao, Xieng Khouang, and Vientiane on rules governing the cease-fire. Only then, according to the Peiping broadcast, could the ICC "assist" a tripartite Laotian commission in supervising and controlling a cease-fire.

[redacted] enemy

[redacted] forces in that area were taking advantage of the cease-fire to demarcate sectors under their control with flags, and to infiltrate areas "contiguous to ours in an attempt to bottle us up."

[redacted] General Phoumi, skeptical that the other side really wants a cease-fire, plans to take advantage of any respite provided by local negotiations and by the Geneva Conference to reorganize and refit his forces.]

A 10 May Pathet Lao broadcast, repeated by Hanoi, accused "the Phoumi - Boun Oum group" of plotting to reoccupy areas liberated by the "patriotic forces" prior to the cease-fire. The broadcast claimed that draft legislation--prepared on orders from the "US imperialists"--to divide Luang Prabang Province into four parts and make Tchepone District a separate province proves that Phoumi's forces are planning to attack these areas. It warned that if Vientiane deliberately violated the cease-fire, sabotaged the negotiations, and sent Laotian, US, Thai, or South Vietnamese troops into these areas, these troops would be dealt with "appropriately." [The]

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[broadcast did not imply any knowledge of the presence of South Vietnamese special forces in the Tchepone area.]

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Antiregime Activity in Turkey

UAR reports of serious localized incidents in southern Turkey remain unconfirmed and Turkey has denied that clashes took place, [redacted]

[redacted] the Turkish-Syrian border was closed.

[redacted] antiregime demonstrations in three separate districts of southern Turkey had resulted in "many killed and wounded." One report placed the figure at 120 killed; another referred to 100 killed or wounded when the Turkish Army intervened. The alleged demonstrations were said to be in protest against increased taxes and increased military salaries.

The military regime in Turkey, which ousted the Bayar-Menderes regime almost a year ago, is subject to popular criticism from various groups--including retired military officers, political dissidents, and economic critics--but it apparently faces no serious threat. There has been no indication of any significant military disaffection, and no nonmilitary group could stage a successful coup without substantial military support or assured neutrality.

[redacted] Turkish security forces, however, have reported an increase in cooperation among the former members and friends of the banned Democratic party, whom they regard as having a potential for swift action of an undisclosed nature. In recent weeks a slogan predicting a "new revolution" has appeared in several provinces, accompanied by security reports that people have been removing weapons from caches to their homes. The gendarmerie has been confiscating unauthorized weapons, and the government may decide to undertake a general search.]

[redacted] The Turkish National Security Service has foreseen the possibility of popular demonstrations but has not suggested anything as serious as the alleged incidents in southern Turkey. Members of the military Committee of National Union (CNU), however, have indicated the government's readiness to suppress any threat to domestic security.]

In recent weeks Turkish officials have indicated a growing concern over Communist propaganda broadcasts that

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are reaching Turkey. The charge that the alleged conspirators recently arrested had benefited from the "subversive influences of foreign ideologies" probably refers to this propaganda rather than to any covert operation by foreign agents.

With the increase of pre-election political activity aimed at the approach of the 29 October deadline for national elections, and with the approaching conclusion of the political trials of the leaders of the ousted government, the military regime will probably become more sensitive to popular criticism and will deal ruthlessly with demonstrations opposing the programs of the regime or favoring the leaders of the former regime who face possible death sentences. In the event of any major demonstration of pro-Democratic strength, the CNU might decide to postpone elections, although such action would probably arouse opposition from all political elements. All elements have so far restrained their criticism in an effort to assure the early resumption of civilian government.

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~~SECRET~~Leftist Former President's Activities Affect Mexican Foreign Policy

Sixty-six-year-old General Cardenas, who rose to influence during Mexico's long period of revolutionary upheaval beginning in 1910, is regarded by many Mexicans as the most important living symbol of the earlier and basic accomplishments of the Mexican revolution.

The exploitation of Cardenas' prestige by the Communists, both domestic and foreign, has tarnished his reputation only among more conservative-minded Mexicans. Cardenas, recipient of the Stalin Peace Prize in 1956, was the chief sponsor of the Latin American "Peace Conference," held in Mexico City in March, which was dominated by the Communists and substantially subsidized by the Castro regime.

Although President Lopez Mateos is evidently deeply annoyed at Cardenas' recent activities, he hesitates to challenge them openly for fear of arousing the active opposition of Mexico's influential leftists, most of whom usually cooperate with the ruling party in return for a certain degree of freedom of action. Many of them hold key government positions. On the other hand, certain high Mexican officials have privately expressed sympathy for the US position vis-a-vis the Castro regime.

Last year, General Cardenas applied for retirement as a general in the Mexican Army, but his application was turned down, presumably so the President could maintain some degree of control over him. It was reportedly the President's personal intervention that prevented Cardenas from following through on his announced intention of going to Cuba as a personal gesture of solidarity with the Castro regime immediately following the anti-Castro landings there last month.

For generations, Mexican governments have been more consistent and more emphatic than those of any other Latin American country in adhering to the principle of nonintervention in the affairs of another state. Strict interpretation of the

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nonintervention policy led Mexico to oppose the 1954 Caracas resolution of the Organization of American States (OAS) opposing Communist domination of an American country; Mexico is the only OAS member that has not ratified this resolution. At the seventh OAS foreign ministers' meeting at San Jose in 1960, Mexico was against naming Cuba as linked to a threat of Soviet bloc intervention in the hemisphere. The Mexicans were even reluctant to take action against the Trujillo dictatorship in the Dominican Republic, but finally backed the unanimous OAS action when Trujillo's guilt in an attempt to assassinate the Venezuelan President had been established. Along with UN delegate Padilla Nervo's ambition to become UN secretary general, the nonintervention policy was probably responsible for Padilla's recent UN draft resolution which urged all states "to ensure that their territories and resources are not used to promote the civil war in Cuba." The draft resolution, which was submitted without prior notice to the other Latin American states, failed to obtain a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly.

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Executive Offices of the White House

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

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The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

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