


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
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
2005

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

**OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE**  
**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**



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1 May 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Sino-Soviet Bloc Area  
FROM : Chief, Ground Forces Branch  
SUBJECT : Zhukov's Speech to GSFG

I have learned a little more with regard to  
Zhukov's statement on aircraft and missile capa-  
bility contained in his speech to top level  
officers in the GSFG in March. [redacted]

[redacted] Zhukov's remarks on the altitude of aircraft  
was within the context of an off-the-cuff boast--  
that he had no set altitude in his prepared speech.

[redacted] Zhukov's  
reference to a missile with only 200 meter devia-  
tion cannot be taken too seriously--that he was  
probably referring to a "book" specification and  
not actual, demonstrated capability. The [redacted]  
view has been passed informally to the services  
and to Stoertz.

[redacted]  
As you may know, the confusion over Zhukov's  
statement that the GSFG must hold out for 46 hours  
while the second echelon moves up has now been  
formally corrected to 4-6 hours. This, of course,  
is even more absurd and defies analysis. Zhukov's  
speech, in part, was directed toward improving  
GSFG morale which might provide some excuse for  
such a statement. But it is difficult to believe  
that he would feel such a remark would be taken  
literally. I can conclude only that there is  
still a mistake somewhere.

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We have received another version of the Zhukov speech, which generally confirms the earlier TD, but which does not include much of the specific information. The new version is an FI report [redacted]  
[redacted] seems to be an obvious attempt to plant information in the West that could serve Soviet interests. It fits into the recent Soviet propaganda framework aimed at intimidation. It stresses Soviet mechanized and atomic capabilities and deprecates American fighting capability. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Zhukov's speech stressed the need for cooperation between the East German and Soviet army, while the earlier TD version has Zhukov warning that strict security measures be maintained with respect to the East German army. Significant points of Zhukov's speech not reported [redacted] include: (1) specific information on aircraft and missile capability, (2) GSFG hooliganism, (3) Western alertness, (4) beating the West to the punch, and (5) the Hungarian rebellion.

[redacted]

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[redacted] Zhukov's remarks on the altitude of aircraft was within the context of an off-the-cuff boast--that he had no set altitude in his prepared speech.

Zhukov's reference to a missile with only 200 meter deviation cannot be taken too seriously--that he was probably referring to a "book" specification and not actual, demonstrated capability. The [redacted] view has been passed informally to the services and to Stoertz.

As you may know, the confusion over Zhukov's statement that the GSFG must hold out for 48 hours while the second echelon moves up has now been formally corrected to 4-6 hours. This, of course, is even more absurd and defies analysis. Zhukov's speech, in part, was directed toward improving GSFG morale which might provide some excuse for such a statement. But it is difficult to believe that he would feel such a remark would be taken literally. I can conclude only that there is still a mistake somewhere.

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## 1. ZHUKOV GIVES VIEWS ON SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY

Comment on:

In a recent [redacted] speech to commanders of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG), Marshal Zhukov reportedly discussed some aspects of current Soviet military strategy. The statements attributed to Zhukov appear generally plausible in the light of estimated Soviet capabilities.

Zhukov's assertion that the Soviet Union would definitely be the one to "unleash the war," as soon as it became apparent that the West was preparing to attack the USSR, is in line with the increased emphasis since 1954 in Soviet military literature on the importance of surprise attack. [redacted] in April 1956 that Soviet troops were being acquainted with the idea of preventive war.

Zhukov reportedly said that the GSFG must hold out for a 46-hour period during which the second echelon moves up with all types of modern weapons. He added, however, that operations must now be planned so that Soviet forces--presumably airborne troops--will reach the English Channel on the second day of war. His remarks suggest that, of the various courses of action open to the USSR, it would choose to place considerable weight on the factor of surprise and therefore would select a course midway between maximum prior reinforcement and initiating an attack with forces already in East Germany.

The marshal's statement that Soviet forces possess everything essential to modern warfare is a standard Soviet position and probably reflects the actual USSR's assessment of its strength vis-a-vis the West. The reference to modern Soviet aircraft with speeds of 1,800 to 2,000 kilometers an

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Our appears accurate, but operational ceilings of 25 to 30 kilometers (82,500-99,000 ft.) are well beyond the estimated capabilities of approximately 60,000 to 61,000 ft. for known existing aircraft. Zhukov stated that the T-10 heavy tank is to be replaced by a new heavy tank. His frank reference to obsolete equipment in the GSFG is surprising in view of the modernization program which has entailed almost complete re-equipping of those forces since 1954.

The warning that the Soviet army must maintain strict security measures in its dealings with the East German army indicates the Soviet estimate of the low reliability of that army and probably all Satellite armies, and suggests that security considerations will severely restrict Satellite capability. It indicates, further, that Soviet statements on strengthening the Warsaw pact probably refer primarily to the political aspects.

Commenting on the Hungarian uprising, Zhukov stated that 12 Soviet divisions were sent from the USSR to reinforce the two divisions already in Hungary.  
[Redacted]

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## 2. THE SITUATION IN JORDAN

Comment on:

Jordan's Prime Minister Nabulsi and his cabinet--in a maneuver probably designed to thwart the king's reported plans to implement sweeping changes in the government--reportedly planned to submit their resignations to King Hussain on 1 April. The resignations could array a majority of ultranationalist political groups against the king, making formation of a new cabinet extremely difficult.

To strengthen his position, Hussain last week sought to recall from abroad certain supporters, including Major General Hiyari--a possible successor to Chief of Staff Nuwar. Meanwhile, Syrian intrigue against Hussain is reported to have induced him to request that Syria's 3,000 troops be withdrawn from Jordan.

Army chief of staff Nuwar, meanwhile, appears to believe that either the king must co-operate with the present anti-Western cabinet, or that he, Nuwar, must be called on to form a military dictatorship with the king's approval. Nuwar continues to work with both sides but is increasingly distrusted by both. Nuwar desires that the king place the police and gendarmerie under army control, which would place the army in virtual control of the country.

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### 3. SYRIAN ARMY WARNS UN OF ISRAELI BORDER ACTIVITIES


#### Reference:

The chairman of the Israeli-Syrian mixed armistice commission reports that he was summoned abruptly to Syrian army headquarters on 30 March and told by Lieutenant Colonels Sarraj and Nufuri to deliver an ultimatum to the Israeli chief of staff to withdraw Israeli forces from a section of the Israeli-Syrian demilitarized zone east of Lake Hula. If the Israelis did not promptly withdraw, the Syrian army would expel them by force.

the Syrians are concerned over the construction by the Israelis of a new bridge and a road which the Syrians assert violates the armistice agreement. The area has also been the scene of sporadic cross-border shooting during night hours.

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~~SECRET~~**5. BRITAIN REPORTED STILL CONSIDERING WITHDRAWAL FROM UN**

The Norwegian United Nations delegation believes the British are continuing to give serious consideration to possible withdrawal from the UN, according to Ambassador Lodge. Study of such a move was

begun in London some weeks before the Bermuda conference, and led to exploratory British approaches to several Western European governments. The British decided, however, not to take a position at Bermuda that Britain and others should withdraw.

**Comment**

The issue of British withdrawal from the UN--on which the Macmillan government has taken no public stand--probably has urgency largely because of pressure on the government from anti-UN elements of the Conservative Party. These elements may have gained an influential spokesman for their views in Lord Salisbury, who resigned from the government on 29 March. The American embassy in London had reported earlier that British dissatisfaction with the UN is accompanied by considerable anti-American sentiment.

Various European countries, including France, Belgium and the Netherlands, have contrasted the UN's actions on Suez unfavorably with those in Hungary. They have long held reservations about the UN's encroachment on sovereign rights, especially in administering colonies.

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## 6. TITO TO PROTEST BULGANIN'S CHARGES

The Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow is to be instructed to protest the charges against the Yugoslav leaders made on 27 March by Soviet premier Bulganin, according to a high Yugoslav Foreign Ministry official. The official stated that, while it was clear Moscow wanted to isolate the Yugoslavs from contact with the Soviet camp, it was somewhat "surprising that such a crude Stalinist way" was being taken.

### Comment

Bulganin, in a speech at the Hungarian-Soviet friendship meeting, containing the sharpest explicit accusation leveled at the Yugoslavs since Stalin's death, charged Yugoslavia with giving Nagy practical as well as verbal support. He also said it is "not permissible for Communists" to characterize the Hungarian "counterrevolution"--as the Yugoslavs had--as originally a true revolution of the people.


In order to strike a definitive blow at "national Communism," Moscow may be hoping to goad the Yugoslavs into taking some action that would make the break complete and open; so far, Belgrade, hoping to preserve whatever influence it can in Eastern Europe, has merely replied in kind to the Soviet charges.

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## 7. SITUATION IN INDONESIA

### Comment on:



The formateur of the Indonesian cabinet, Suwirjo, returned his mandate to President Sukarno on 2 April following his failure to form a cabinet in accordance with the president's instructions. Sukarno announced that he would take further action "in a day or two."

By "further action" Sukarno may have in mind simply the appointment of another formateur, or he may accede to the demands of Moslem and Christian parties that he personally head a "presidential cabinet" which would include former vice president Hatta.

Sukarno threatened to arrest his leading opponents and rule as a military dictator if Suwirjo failed. In this connection, the army, which has been assuming an increasingly important role in administrative measures, is already investigating and interrogating at least 30 prominent politicians, most of whom are opposed to Sukarno's "concept." [redacted]

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## 8. ELECTION DELAY BRINGS POLITICAL CRISIS IN ARGENTINA

Comment on:

President Aramburu's announcement on 30 March that national elections in Argentina, once promised by the end of 1957, will be held on 23 February 1958 was followed by an attempt by Air Minister Krause to withdraw air force support from the regime. Krause has been dismissed, and high air force leaders, who support Krause, are demanding a voice in the choice of his successor.

With the possible exception of the naval air corps, army and navy leaders reportedly are backing Aramburu against Krause. High-level military meetings are continuing, however, and security precautions, including antiaircraft defense, have been strengthened.


Aramburu's "political calendar," which he said was "irrevocable," calls for the election of a constituent assembly on 28 July, general elections on 23 February, and installation of a new government on 1 May 1958. The bulk of the armed forces appear to desire elections without delay, but they would be reluctant to revolt unless they become convinced that this postponement is only the first of several.

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## 9. NEW GENERAL STRIKE THREATENS HAITIAN GOVERNMENT

Comment on:



Port-au-Prince was virtually paralyzed on 1 April by a general strike protesting against the government of Provisional President Franck Sylvain. The strike was called by six presidential candidates to support their demands that Sylvain reorganize his cabinet and end alleged favoritism toward a seventh candidate, Francois Duvalier.

General strikes forced out of office the two preceding presidents, Paul Magloire and Joseph Nemours Pierre-Louis, and the present regime may also be forced to resign. In that event, the most likely successor would be a military junta. 

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