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30 January 1961

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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### CONTENTS

25X1

3. Poland interprets November Communist manifesto as endorsement of its right to determine internal policies. (*Page ii*)
4. Italy: Threat to Fanfani government increased by alliance of Christian Democrats and Socialists in Milan. (*Page iii*)

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

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Poland: Party First Secretary Gomulka, in his speech to the central committee plenum on 20-21 January, interpreted the manifesto of the November 1960 conference of Communist parties in Moscow as an endorsement of the Polish party's right to determine its own internal policies. At the same time, Gomulka was careful to stress his support for Soviet foreign policy, indicating that he did not feel this would preclude good relations with the West. ( [redacted] )

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30 Jan 61

DAILY BRIEF

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Italy: The threat to Premier Fanfani's Christian Democratic government has been sharply increased by the alliance formed by the Christian Democrats and the Socialists to administer the city of Milan. The right-wing Liberal party has reacted strongly and may withdraw support from Fanfani if this alliance extends to the provincial government. The Liberals fear that the Milan alliance opens the way to a national government relying on Socialist support, which they may feel they can block if they force early national elections by overthrowing Fanfani.

72

25X1  
25X1

30 Jan 61

DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1

25X1

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Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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Poland

Gomulka used the 20-21 January central committee plenum of the Polish Communist party to reassure the people that he interpreted the manifesto of the November 1960 conference of Communist parties in Moscow as an endorsement of the Polish party's right to determine its own internal policies, including the relative freedom for individuals which has characterized the Gomulka period in Poland. Gomulka, who has relied on Khrushchev for support since 1958, was careful to stress his support of the Soviet foreign policy line, indicating his belief that this would not stand in the way of good relations with the West.

The Polish leader is hampered by the fact that his party has little popular support and that many of its members are opportunists rather than dedicated Communists. He has felt it necessary to rely on party militants who, while effective as administrators, are opposed to his liberal internal policies. The regime's avoidance of terror as an instrument of policy has permitted leading intellectuals and technologists to be safely aloof from politics, and the masses to remain openly apathetic or opposed to Communism, although all concerned apparently believe that there is no feasible alternative to Gomulka.

The regime's gradual encroachments on Roman Catholic influence are most recently illustrated by educational measures substituting the study of Communist ideology for the study of religion and the humanities. This violation of a 1957 modus vivendi between church and state is bound to increase tensions and will add to the uneasiness already caused by the conflict over questions of birth control and confiscatory taxes on church property.

In the economic field, individual farmers, who constitute over 52 percent of the population, fear that force will eventually be used to collectivize agriculture, but they continue to resist "voluntary" membership in the regime's farm cooperatives. The urban standard of living--particularly regarding

housing and food--has not met the expectations raised by the Polish Communists, and the prospect is for continued austerity, at least until 1964, to help pay for rapid expansion of heavy industry.

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### Italian Government's Tenure Increasingly Threatened

The local elections in Italy last November failed to give the four-party coalition supporting Premier Fanfani's all-Christian Democratic government a majority in such key cities as Milan, Genoa, Florence, Venice, and Rome. The Christian Democrats are hampered in seeking allies outside the national coalition to form city administrations because their Social Democratic and Republican partners object to alliances with the Monarchs on the right, while their Liberal allies oppose ties to the Nenni Socialists on the left.

A minority city government's greatest weakness is the necessity to muster an absolute majority on the municipal budget. The only alternative, a Rome-appointed commissioner to take the place of mayor and governing board, is a highly unpopular solution which was tried in Venice, Genoa, and Florence before the last elections, and apparently lost the Christian Democrats some votes.

Socialist leader Nenni had originally indicated that he would participate in the Milan city administration only if the Socialists were also accepted in the government of Milan Province. The national coalition parties have sufficient seats to form the provincial administration, and Christian Democratic party Secretary Aldo Moro reportedly would rather have a commissioner appointed for Milan Province than risk a coalition including the Socialists because he is convinced that Liberal party leader Giovanni Malagodi would then bring Fanfani down. While the Christian Democratic leaders in the province are sympathetic to the Socialists, they may not press the issue because Socialist leader Nenni does not want a crisis now.

The Liberals threaten to repeat the policy they followed in January 1960, when they caused a lengthy cabinet crisis by withdrawing support from the government because they feared Socialist backing was in prospect. The current coalition resulted after Communist-led riots brought about the downfall of an interim cabinet dependent on neo-Fascist

support. When Fanfani was invested, the Socialists abstained instead of following their usual practice of joining the Communists in opposition during a vote of confidence.

The Liberals expect that, when the Socialist party congress is held from 16 to 19 March, Nenni will have to have some quid pro quo to justify to his party's left wing his move away from the Communists. The Liberals may decide to dump Fanfani before March in order to discredit Nenni by blocking local alliances between Socialists and Christian Democrats. A repetition of the protracted cabinet crisis of 1960 would jeopardize the Italian parliamentary system, and if early elections resulted the Christian Democrats would probably suffer and the Communists gain.

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