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22 May 1956

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
# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 50  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X  
1 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS G 0  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2001  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 12-26-71 REVIEWER:

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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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State Dept. review completed

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Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002500500001-8

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## 1. FRENCH-SOVIET TALKS CONCLUDE

[Redacted]

Sharp differences between the French and Soviet negotiators at the talks in Moscow forced omission of several controversial points from the joint communique. It was agreed in principle to expand both cultural and commercial relations.

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The USSR rejected as premature or inappropriate a French proposal approving UN secretary general Hammarskjold's efforts for Near Eastern peace. It refused to insert a statement approving any future UN measures to put an end to the arms race, such as an embargo on shipment of arms to the Near East, unless specific mention was made of Iran and Pakistan. This suggests that the USSR will insist on including Middle East members of SEATO and the Baghdad pact in a Middle East arms embargo.

The French say they expect the communique's reference to France's Algerian policy to have a sobering effect on both the French Communist Party and such Arab countries as Egypt. They believe the statement makes it clear that Algerian policy is a Paris responsibility. This effect may be nullified, however, by the Soviet version of the communique, and by Khrushchev's toast at a reception to "the Arabs and all others who are struggling for national independence."

The American embassy in Moscow considers that Mollet was firm with the Russians throughout the conversations, particularly on the point of France's allegiance to NATO. The Russians bluntly rejected French efforts to include some reference to German unification and to Paris' loyalty to its international alliances.

**2. ELECTION RESULTS OPEN PERIOD OF INSTABILITY  
IN SOUTH KOREA**

President Rhee's 19 May acknowledgment of Chang Myon's election as vice president, together with opposition action in postponing the funeral of Democratic leader Sin Ik-hui, appears to have averted large-scale violence in South Korea. Rhee's cabinet has submitted its resignation, however, and this may open a period of political instability as the Rhee administration attempts to cope with a degree of opposition unprecedented in South Korea.

Defense Minister Son has stated to American chargé Strom that the present situation is dangerous for both Rhee and Chang, with the possibility of assassination.

President Rhee will probably accept the resignations of certain of his ministers, and may offer certain government posts to members of Chang Myon's Democratic Party. Chang, however, while indicating a willingness to co-operate with Rhee, has stated that he does not desire a coalition government at this time.

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#### 4. RESIGNATION OF JORDANIAN CABINET

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The resignation of the Jordanian cabinet of Prime Minister Rifai on 20 May clears the way for a government more responsive to Arab nationalism and will probably result in closer co-ordination of the external policies of Jordan and Egypt. For some months Rifai has not enjoyed the confidence of King Hussain, who has shown a tendency to exercise increasing authority. Rifai, who has attempted to resist the spread of Egyptian influence in Jordan, has been attacked by Egypt for failing to end his country's friendly relations with Britain.

Said al-Mufti, who has been invited to form a new government, has been prime minister three times previously. He last resigned the premiership in December 1955 during Britain's attempts to draw Jordan into the Baghdad pact. One of his first acts in his new capacity was to announce his intention to amend the Anglo-Jordanian treaty to make it "more compatible with Jordanian interests."

He has also emphasized his plans for a "purely Arab" cabinet. Some of the new cabinet members will be chosen from outside parliament, according to Arab press releases.

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## 5. BURMESE IMPRESSED BY SOVIET TECHNICAL PERSONNEL

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[REDACTED] Initial skepticism in Burma regarding the desirability of the technological institute which the USSR has offered to build has been overcome by eight Soviet experts

who have been in Burma for three weeks, according to the American embassy in Rangoon. The embassy quotes one Burmese government official as saying he has been impressed by the Russians' excellent technical qualifications and their understanding of the Burmese viewpoint.

The USSR reportedly plans to staff the proposed institute with English-speaking instructors and is ready to begin construction as soon as the Burmese government gives its formal approval.

**Comment** The scope of the proposed institute had aroused reservations among some Burmese officials regarding its practicality, and they were also concerned over its subversive possibilities.

The technological institute is the first large project to be undertaken by the USSR in Burma. Soviet success in gaining Burmese confidence in this project would facilitate Moscow's entire assistance program in Burma.

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