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FAR EAST

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2. Chinese UN delegate unreceptive to US suggestions regarding troops in Burma:

The Chinese delegate to the UN does not believe that the Nationalist troops in Burma will accept internment or that the Burmese Government as an alternative to internment will permit their withdrawal to Formosa. He also thinks it unlikely that his government will agree to recall Li-Mi, the leader of the troops concerned, and to hold him in Taipei.

In addition, the official indicated that he was not concerned about these troops precipitating a Chinese Communist invasion of Burma and even advocated that they be rearmed and sent back into Yunnan. While admitting the embarrassment that would be created by a Burmese appeal to the UN for assistance, the Chinese delegate stated that he would answer such action with "some eloquent speeches."

Comment: It has long been recognized that the Taipei regime exercises little or no control over its troops in Burma. Since the Burmese agreement to defer an appeal to the UN was, in part, contingent upon successful US efforts in obtaining at least a show of cooperation on the part of Taipei, this statement by the Chinese delegate may indicate that the problem is not yet resolved.

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NEAR EAST

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## WESTERN EUROPE

5. French urge caution in approach to Egypt on Middle East Command:

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Comment: Egyptian sentiment is anti-British, rather than neutralist, as a result of the serious Anglo-Egyptian Treaty dispute. Unless, as the French imply, the details of the proposed Middle East Command scheme are made sufficiently attractive to Egypt, Egyptian Government leaders may not approve of the Middle East defense scheme.

6. European fascist meeting reportedly being held in Spain:

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European Social Movement was scheduled to meet in Spain on 28 September to organize a Pan-European Movement or at least an international body of fascist war veterans. Among the groups which reportedly were to be represented at the meeting were the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement, Nazi SS legions, and the Falange.

Among the individuals named as participants were the German neo-Nazi Priester, the Swedish neo-Nazi Engdahl, former SS General Korsemann and

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the notorious Nazi intelligence agent Skorzeny. The Executive Council of the European Social Movement hoped to secure a pledge of Falange cooperation from Franco.

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Comment:

The Falange has maintained friendly relations with other fascist groups in Europe, especially the Italian Social Movement, and the Franco regime has given asylum in Spain to a considerable number of prominent German Nazis, including Skorzeny. The aim of the anti-Communist, anti-US European fascist movements is to achieve a militarily strong and independent union of fascist European governments. Except for the Falange the fascist organizations do not represent, as yet, important political forces in their respective countries.

## LATIN AMERICA

7. Comment on reported revolt and state of siege in Argentina:

Circumstances surrounding the alleged army revolt against the Argentine Government on 28 September and the resultant proclamation of a state of siege indicate that the "plot" may have been largely precipitated by Peron. The only action against the government reported thus far is that army planes, flying over the business section of Buenos Aires, dropped leaflets urging the armed forces to revolt against the government. The quick action of the state-controlled labor confederation in calling a general strike in support of the government appears to indicate prior planning. The police who support Peron were not in evidence.

By afternoon the government announced that it had crushed the revolt and the leaders were in flight.

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Peron's purpose in staging such a demonstration would be to elicit greater popular sympathy by "proving" his continuing charges of conspiracy and to create a pretext for greater restriction of opposition activity. While some top generals object to many of Peron's policies, recent developments indicate that the army is now prepared to support Peron.

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at least through the November elections.

Neither the Navy nor the Air Force is in a position to revolt. Peron has the support of labor. None of the opposition political parties has means to effect a coup at this time.

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