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12 April 1961


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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LATE ITEM

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USSR: From preliminary analysis, it appears that the Soviets have successfully orbited and recovered a man from space in Sputnik XI, launched from Tyura Tam at about 0607 GMT (0107 EST), 12 April 1961.

The countdown proceeded smoothly with all Soviet facilities which had supported previous space events being identified in the operation.

clearly showed a man who was seen to move his head.

Moscow made its first official announcement of the launching about 50 minutes after lift-off and some 50-60 minutes before recovery. The statement that Sputnik XI weighed about 10,400 pounds taken together with the data on its orbit indicates that the vehicle was similar to five previous Sputniks identified with the Soviet man-in-space program.

Available data indicate that the capsule landed intact some 100-110 minutes after launch about midway between Saratov and Stalingrad and that the astronaut, still in the capsule about an hour later, was alive and reporting that he had "a very big headache."

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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12 April 1961

DAILY BRIEF


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Laos: [The government's Muong Kassy operation apparently is folding according to an appraisal of available information from that sector by chiefs of American missions in Laos. Elements of the infantry battalion airlifted north of that town on 5 April are reported withdrawing northward; the government parachute battalion in the same general area reportedly has broken out of enemy encirclement but its present location is unknown. The government force south of Muong Kassy has received reinforcements but thus far has made little forward progress. Ambassador Brown, noting the considerable government forces committed to the Muong Kassy operation with scant results, does not rule out the possibility that General Phoumi might be maneuvering to create a situation that he would hope would bring American intervention. The ambassador also notes that Phoumi and other Laotian Army officers are pointing increasingly to their lack of reserves and the need for outside forces. The Australian ambassador has expressed similar concern, suggesting that Phoumi might order a Laotian Army withdrawal from Pak Sane or elsewhere to bring Pathet Lao forces to the Mekong and thus seek to force American or SEATO intervention.] use 1st 3
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(Backup, Page 1) (Map)

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12 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page

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Congo: [Congoese officials in Leopoldville were told on 11 April that Hammarskjold plans to send Dayal back to the Congo as UN representative. The secretary general had earlier informed Ambassador Stevenson that as a result of pressure from Nehru, Dayal would return in a week or so. Commenting on this development, Congolese Foreign Minister Bomboko, who has been advocating moderation in Leopoldville's dealings with the UN, told an American official on 11 April that Dayal's return would be marked by a series of incidents between the UN and Congolese forces. He further asserted that no UN forces would be allowed in Matadi and that the Indian contingent presently being sea-lifted would be fired on if it attempted to land there.]

(Backup, Page 3) (Map)

Angola-Cabinda: Western officials in Cabinda expect this Portuguese enclave to be the next target for uprisings by African nationalists--probably to coincide with General Assembly discussions of Lisbon's policies toward its overseas territories. The General Assembly is expected to debate this issue within two or three weeks. Cabinda, settled by a relatively small number of whites, has an insufficient number of troops--two all-white companies and one African company--to close its frontiers to incursions from its Congo neighbors. In north-western Angola armed white civilians are reported still conducting reprisals against natives for alleged participation in last month's outbreaks there.

(Backup, Page 5) (Map)

*France-Algeria: De Gaulle's remarks on Algeria at his long-scheduled 11 April press conference will give the rebel leaders little encouragement that he intends to go any further toward meeting their conditions for holding negotiations. While he did not close the door on peace talks, he belittled the influence of the rebellion and questioned the provisional Algerian government's ability to take responsible action. In spelling

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out additional details of his views on alternatives for Algeria's future, De Gaulle made his strongest threats to date designed to discourage the choice of "chaotic independence" without ties to France. He may, on the other hand, have sweetened for the rebels the alternative of association by indicating that it might involve French aid of various types in exchange for minority guarantees and base rights.

Soviet Bloc - Cuba: The Soviet merchant ship Nikolai Burdenko on 10 April unloaded in the Cuban port of Mariel a cargo of military goods shipped from the Black Sea port of Nikolaev. Since mid-December 1960, when the bloc resumed sizable arms shipments to Cuba after a two-month pause, ten Soviet ships have delivered arms cargoes to Havana. Total bloc arms deliveries to Cuba since major shipments began last September total well over 35,000 tons, plus large numbers of military vehicles. Thus far the deliveries have been limited primarily to land armaments, including medium and heavy tanks, self-propelled assault guns, field and antiaircraft artillery, and large quantities of small arms and ammunition. No additional shipments are known to be en route at present, but as Cuban military personnel complete training in the bloc--including advanced flight courses--additional materiel will probably be delivered.

17-a

USSR: The USSR is selling gold on the international market for the first time since October 1960. Sales on the London market since 15 March have totaled at least \$35,600,000 and may be as high as \$47,600,000. So far, however, they do not appear to fall outside the general pattern of Soviet gold sales, which meets the USSR's foreign exchange requirements.

17-b

(Backup, Page 6)

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CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

The USIB has noted the following conclusions reached by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situation for the period 7 March 1961 through 10 April 1961:

1. We have no indications that the USSR plans to increase tensions over Berlin at this time. *Backup only*
2. There have been no significant developments with regard to access to Berlin and East Berlin during the period covered by this report.
3. Over the past month the bloc has devoted increased attention to the German and Berlin issues. Soviet propaganda commentary, statements by high-level East German and Soviet officials, and the 30 March Warsaw Pact communiqué have all stressed the necessity of concluding a peace treaty and solving the Berlin problem, but without any suggestion of deadlines.

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Situation in Laos

[Laotian politicians, in the uncertain atmosphere in Vientiane pending decisions on a cease-fire and international conference, continue to propose various formulae for a new government. This situation has given rise to numerous rumors; there appears to be some substance to one that a rift is developing between Premier Boun Oum and General Phoumi. According to Phoumi, Boun Oum--now in Pakse on personal matters--feels that his own side has let him down by discussing replacing him as premier.]

[Rumors are also circulating concerning the possibility that Phoumi may make a deal with the Pathet Lao which would ensure him a position in the government. Phoumi's recent approach to the British ambassador, asking his opinion of a government divided equally among Souvanna Phouma elements, the Pathet Lao, and Phoumi men, has added fuel to these rumors. Whatever their validity, these rumors are probably further demoralizing the government in its political and military efforts against the Pathet Lao.]

Prince Sihanouk, commenting on the Laotian situation in a speech before the National Assembly on 10 April, warmly praised President Kennedy's objective of seeking a genuinely neutral Laos, but expressed serious doubt as to whether "past errors" in that country would permit achievement of this goal at this late date. According to press accounts, Sihanouk's response to a recent note from Macmillan deplored the fact that an international conference on Laos--first suggested by Sihanouk on 1 January--"was on the point of being accepted only under pressure of military events unfavorable to the West." Sihanouk reiterated his belief that a conference still offers the best solution, but under conditions "infinitely more disadvantageous than the West could reasonably have expected a few months ago."

North Vietnam, the Pathet Lao, and Kong Le all appear determined to avoid taking any step in negotiations on Laos.


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which would lend substance to claims by Phoumi and Boun Oum that they represent the legitimate government. All take strong exception to Phoumi and Boun Oum's announced readiness to "sponsor" a conference of the various Laotian factions in order to form a united government. The Communists have indicated that they are agreeable to negotiations with Vientiane representatives, but assert that only the "lawful government of Souvanna Phouma" can call such a conference.

Airlift operations continue to be scheduled. Three Soviet IL-14s now en route to North Vietnam from the USSR could either augment present operations or replace some of the IL-14s which have been flying almost continuously since early January.

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Situation in the Congo

Gizenga and his representative in Cairo, Pierre Mulele, are continuing their efforts to find a channel for furnishing funds to Stanleyville. On 9 April, Gizenga, answering a 6 April request from Cairo, told Mulele to credit funds to the account of an individual in Kenya whom he termed "most reliable." [] asked for the name of such an individual in order to transfer a "large sum" to the Gizenga regime. An earlier attempt to send \$380,000 to Stanleyville by courier failed when the courier "lost" the money in Khartoum.

Mulele apparently is worried, however, that his influence in Stanleyville is waning. [] he expressed concern that various recent attempts made by Stanleyville to establish lines of communication abroad appeared to bypass his office. [] Gizenga was growing impatient with Mulele, who has had little success thus far in securing aid for Stanleyville. []

Indecisive maneuvering between Stanleyville and Leopoldville apparently is continuing. Telephone contact between leaders in the two capitals is being maintained, but Leopoldville Provincial President Kamitatu doubts that negotiations will have proceeded far enough to permit face-to-face talks this week. The tentative efforts of civil officials to come together apparently were disrupted by Mobutu's journey to northern Congo, allegedly to negotiate with Gizenga's military aides. The latter, however, reportedly refuse to act independently of Gizenga. Gizenga in turn is said to be unwilling to attend in the absence of Kamitatu, who refuses to attend any conference in which Mobutu participates.

In Katanga, Tshombé is continuing his harassment of UN officials, in an effort to halt the apparent UN attempt to blunt the Katanga military operations around Kabalo. Elisabethville banks reportedly are no longer honoring UN checks, and Katanga troops at the Kamina base, where some 1,400 Indian troops are

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stationed, are maintaining roadblocks and mining roads in the area. The UN has reinforced its contingent of Ethiopians at Kabalo, and a spokesman for the organization said on 10 April that the UN was in "complete control" of the town.

The UN apparently now is investigating means of airlifting part of the Indian contingent in Dar es Salaam directly into Katanga in aircraft under its control. Hammarskjold has about 15 C-54s at his disposal, which could carry 40 troops each trip. [redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~Disorders Expected in Cabinda

The Leopoldville-based Angola People's Union (UPA), believed responsible for organizing the recent clashes in Angola, probably also is planning uprisings in Cabinda. Conditions in the exclave are particularly suitable for nationalist activities. In addition to being inadequately defended, Cabinda's difficult terrain is even more suitable for guerrilla warfare than that of northwestern Angola. Close tribal ties exist between the natives of the exclave and those of the former French Congo, and some government officials in Brazzaville are known to be sympathetic to nationalistic aspirations in Cabinda.

Moreover, the exclave offers a convenient location for the establishment on Portuguese soil of a native "government in exile" from which to carry out a campaign to "liberate" all Portuguese overseas territories.

three nationalist organizations were planning a Conference of the Peoples of the Portuguese Colonies from 14 to 16 April in Casablanca to outline such a campaign.

The governor general of Angola indicated

that the situation in the disturbed northern region remains tense, with certain areas "practically in a state of alarm." He added that the situation would continue to get worse as long as insufficient forces were available to "calm the population and guarantee immediate repression of any rebellion which might arise."

Armed white civilians in these areas are reported taking the law into their own hands by punishing natives after forcing them to admit participation in plots against whites. On 10 April the governor general warned the inhabitants of Luanda--for the second time in 48 hours--that he would impose a curfew unless calm returned to the capital. The second warning followed a clash which involved natives, police, and probably white civilians and which resulted in the death of several natives and the arrest of 30 others.

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~~SECRET~~USSR Resumes Gold Sales

[redacted] total Soviet sales in London of \$35,600,000 worth of gold between 15 and 23 March. Two shipments through Paris totaling about \$12,000,000, which were reported by the press in early April, may be part of or in addition to these sales.

During 1960 the USSR sold about \$107,000,000 worth of gold in London between May and October and then abruptly withdrew from the market during the international "gold rush" last fall. Moscow was apparently reluctant to sell gold since such sales might have eased the strain on the dollar. It apparently also believed that the new US administration would be forced to raise the price of gold. The resumption of sales was apparently motivated by the increased stabilization of the gold market, repeated denials by the US Government of any intention to change the price of gold, and the balance-of-payments pressure on Moscow caused by its sustained import drive.

Persistent reports that the USSR is supplying Communist China with foreign exchange to ease its difficult economic situation remain unconfirmed, and so far the amounts involved in these sales suggest that they are to be used only for Soviet foreign exchange requirements. [redacted]

[redacted]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Possible Soviet Proposals on Berlin and Germany

[redacted]
[redacted] Moscow, in support of a call for new negotiations on Berlin and Germany, may advance further proposals broadening the standard Soviet call for a German peace treaty and free city status for West Berlin by incorporating earlier East German schemes. [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] that Moscow may endorse previous East German plans for a nonaggression pact between the two Germanys, a phased approach to disarmament in Germany similar to the Rapacki plan, and the formation of an all-German confederative council and a peace treaty commission--all of which were included in the plan proposed by party leader Ulbricht in February 1960. The Bonn Foreign Ministry is convinced that this report published in the Frankfurt paper on 30 March was in fact inspired by the Soviet Embassy. The Frankfurt paper was used [redacted] in November 1958 to leak the Soviet proposal for a free city before the USSR officially presented the plan to the Western powers.

[redacted]
[redacted] the USSR was considering the timing of a new diplomatic initiative on Berlin. Further confirmation of a possible Soviet offer along these lines was contained in Ulbricht's public statement on 1 April that his proposals were discussed "in detail" at Moscow.

The bloc's increased attention to the German and Berlin issues since the publication on 4 March of the Soviet memorandum to Bonn also suggests that the USSR is preparing further diplomatic moves on Berlin. Moscow's reference in that memorandum to an interim agreement on Berlin was the first such public reference since before the Paris summit, and Ulbricht in his speech to the East German central committee plenum in

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mid-March called for a solution in the "spirit of the Soviet memorandum." He also listed a number of initial measures for a Berlin solution, which appear intended as part of any interim agreement. The revival, well in advance of any negotiations, of the concept of an interim solution suggests that it will remain a principal element in any new package proposal.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**THE PRESIDENT**

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Executive Offices of the White House

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

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The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

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The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

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Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

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The Director

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