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## FAR EAST

1. Communists trying to expand air operations in Korea:

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The Far East Command believes that intensive construction efforts at two new Communist airfield locations in northwestern Korea may be in preparation for large-scale air operations from Korean fields.

During the past week, photo interpretation has indicated the construction of revetments and the resurfacing, possibly with concrete, of runways at two new airfields, at Taechon and Namsi, north of Sinanju. Each field, capable of supporting jets when completed, will be about 6,500 feet long with revetments for 45 aircraft. The field under construction at Taechon is protected by an unusual concentration of both heavy and light antiaircraft weapons.

In the light of the recent expansion of Communist jet interception activities to the Sinanju area, Far East Command states that a "continuation of the high level of enemy air activity in this region would undoubtedly render UN air efforts north of Pyongyang extremely hazardous...." Under these circumstances "it would be possible for the Communists to base aircraft on these facilities with relative safety...."

Comment: UN air supremacy over North Korea and the ability to destroy enemy air facilities before they became operational have been predominant factors preventing extensive enemy air operations from Korean bases. This intensive airfield construction, well within the defensive range of Communist jet interceptors from Antung, suggests a Communist strategy of "leapfrogging" units to airfields farther south in order to challenge UN air supremacy closer to the battle line.

On 22 October, nine UN medium bombers attacked the airfield at Taechon and, according to press accounts, "knocked it out."

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2. Burma described as "weakest link" in Southeast Asia:

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The UK Commissioner General for Southeast Asia has emphasized that Burma is the most vulnerable area for Communist expansion in Southeast Asia.

Burmese Communists will have firmly established themselves in Upper Burma by the end of 1952, and that Peiping will probably create a Chinese-controlled "autonomous" state in the Kachin tribal areas.

In view of this situation, the Commissioner is recommending that the British Government suggest to Indian Prime Minister Nehru that he take the occasion of his forthcoming meeting with the Burmese Prime Minister to discuss the possibility of a joint Indo-Burmese effort to solve Burma's difficulties.

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Comment:

The British have previously attempted to interest Nehru in taking positive steps toward helping the Burmese Government achieve internal stability, but with little success. It is unlikely that any new effort along these lines will be any more successful as long as the Kashmir dispute remains unresolved.

## SOUTH ASIA

3. US delegate urges speedy UN Security Council action on Kashmir:

3.3(h)(2)

Ambassador Austin states that the assassination of the Pakistani Prime Minister emphasized the need for immediate consideration of the Kashmir case when the Security Council reconvenes in Paris on 29 October. Austin suggests preparing a resolution outlining areas of agreement and disagreement between India and Pakistan on Kashmir,

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instructing UN Representative Graham to continue his efforts to effect demilitarization, and possibly extending his authority to fields outside the narrow limits of that subject. Austin also suggests a declaration that the Security Council will not recognize actions of the recently "elected" Kashmir Constituent Assembly.

Comment: Disavowal by the Security Council of Indian-sponsored Constituent Assembly actions should produce an adverse reaction from the Indians. The "election" of the Assembly has been widely publicized as an expression of the will of the Kashmiris, and New Delhi undoubtedly foresees imminent ratification by the Assembly of Kashmir's accession to India.

## NEAR EAST

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~~TOP SECRET~~**5. Mossadeq requests continuation of Iranian-Soviet claims talks:**

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**Comment:** The commission was set up to examine claims and demands between Iran and the USSR, including the matter of 12,000,000 dollars in gold which the USSR removed from Iran during World War II. The decision of the Soviet delegation to remain in Tehran, which was announced in the press, is accordingly in response to Mossadeq's direct request.

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## EASTERN EUROPE

7. Yugoslavia ready to sign bilateral arms agreement:

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Assistant Foreign Minister Mates has assured Ambassador Allen that the Yugoslav Government now has a clear conception of the cooperative character of US military assistance and that he is certain that the bilateral arms aid agreement can be carried out in this spirit.

The Yugoslav Government therefore proposes that the agreement be signed as soon as possible and that the chief of the US military group, General Harmony, and an initial staff of six or seven officers, come to Yugoslavia at their earliest convenience to work out details. Mates explained that the Yugoslav Government now appreciates that the US Government needs to furnish satisfactory reports to Congress on use of the military equipment. He added that recent discussions had also brought out the Yugoslav reasons for avoiding any recurrence of the interference and domination which it experienced with the Soviet military mission.

Comment: Signature of the agreement as the Yugoslavs propose will not settle the US-Yugoslav differences over the size and functions of the US arms aid group. This problem will remain to be negotiated after the agreement is signed, and the Yugoslav Government will probably continue to insist that the group's size and functions be limited.

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