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19 May 1961

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CENTRAL

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BULLETIN



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reopening parliament in Kamina; Hammarskjold
says Dayal will return to Congo for about a month.
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
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Republic of the Congo



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Congo: Anti-Gizenga commentary on Radio Leopoldville indicates that Kasavubu so far is holding to his own proposals on reconvening the Congolese parliament. The Leopoldville radio on 17 May characterized the Congo crisis as "in its final stages," and after alluding to Gizenga's counterproposals observed that "no delaying tactics will prevent... the convocation of parliament" by Kasavubu.

Belgian officials in Elisabethville have again voiced concern that the security situation in Katanga will deteriorate as Belgian military personnel are replaced in coming weeks. The Belgian consul general has said that he had no confidence in the ability of the UN to protect the 12,000 Belgians in Katanga, and that Belgian nationals in Elisabethville have drawn up emergency evacuation plans. The American Consulate believes that at present these Belgian fears are exaggerated.

*Hammarskjold has told Ambassador Stevenson that he plans to send Dayal back to Leopoldville on about 25 May for roughly one month. Hammarskjold stated that he was convinced that the reaction to Dayal's return would not be so sharp as to paralyze UN operations. He insisted that were Dayal not to return to Leopoldville there was a real danger that India would shift its position not only on the Congo but on broader UN issues.

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(Backup, Page 3) (Map)

France-Algeria: Despite the hope of the Provisional Algerian Government (PAG) that the broad outline of an agreement with the French would be reached through preliminary contacts before talks begin at Evian on 20 May, recent reports indicate that little common ground has been established. The PAG negotiating team reportedly still feels that Algerian sovereignty--including the Sahara--must first be recognized before it can offer concessions for French participation in the economic sphere and guarantees for the European minority. The PAG is said to hope that the negotiations can be completed in three months--but is ready to break them off if no concrete progress is made within two weeks. The French team is expected to be firm but courteous, since it is well aware from

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[previous efforts to arrange negotiations that the rebels will attach great importance to first impressions]

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The Situation in the Congo

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[Hammarskjold's decision to return Dayal to Leopoldville --despite the danger of undermining the UN's newly improved relations with the Leopoldville government-- reflects his sensitivity to Nehru's views. Despite Dayal's unpopularity with virtually all Congo factions, Hammarskjold has long favored returning him to the Congo at least for a token period.]

Gizenga's determination to resist Kasavubu's call for a meeting of parliament in Leopoldville appears to have sharpened differences among his followers which forced the adoption of strict security measures. The American Embassy in Leopoldville reports, however, that Gizenga has released from prison Colonel Yangoie, the army officer who in April negotiated with General Mobutu's representatives concerning the desirability of reconvening parliament. The embassy speculates that Yangoie's release was prompted by a desire to avoid unrest in the army.

The embassy notes that recent arrests in Stanleyville stem from opposition to Gizenga among moderates, notably those in the Orientale provincial government. The easing by the Leopoldville government of the economic blockade of Stanleyville reportedly permitted an influx of goods to the provincial government which strengthened its hand in relation to Gizenga's "national" government. While the Gizenga regime appears doubtful of its ability to control a new meeting of the Congo parliament and continues to be troubled by factionalism, the American Embassy believes it is not likely to collapse soon.

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
[In Katanga, Belgian interests appear under pressure from both the UN and the Katanga government. Hammarskjold's personal representative in Brussels has told Ambassador Stevenson that the new Belgian Government seems to be yielding to financial interests and the press and is doing little to bring about a progressive withdrawal of Belgian advisers from the Congo, particularly Katanga. In Elisabethville, the Munongo government has severely criticized officials of Union Miniere]

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[for alleged acts inimical to Katanga, and has said it intends to replace Belgian technicians with French advisers. Munongo's pique has probably contributed to Belgian apprehension concerning the safety of Belgians in Katanga.]

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Prospects for French-Algerian Negotiations

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[The rebel delegation is competent and politically well balanced, although its members will be handicapped by their lack of experience in diplomacy. Deputy Premier Belkacem Krim, who will head the delegation, commands the respect of the "military" faction of the rebel movement. His participation should improve prospects that the rebel fighters will abide by any agreement which might be reached at Evian. The other "ministerial" member--Finance Minister Ahmed Francis --is a skillful technician who is said to have compiled an extensive dossier on the Saharan problem and is personally more acceptable to the French than Krim.]

[De Gaulle has indicated that as soon as negotiations begin, imprisoned rebel leader Ben Bella--also a PAG deputy premier--will be moved from the military fortress where he is imprisoned, probably to enforced residence near Paris, from where he could influence negotiations. Ben Bella is highly respected as an original leader of the rebellion, and his level-headed advice to the PAG might facilitate a solution.]

[The rebel negotiators will be under considerable pressure to accept nothing less than French recognition of their fundamental right to exercise sovereignty over all Algeria, including the Sahara and the areas of dense European colonization. However, Tunisian, Swiss, and other moderate advisers are urging the PAG to limit its demands, so that it can come to power in Algeria and consolidate its political authority.]

[The rebels would prefer to use the negotiations to arrive at an over-all statute for Algeria rather than merely to arrange a cease-fire and set conditions for a referendum. Paris reportedly has not spelled out its intentions on this score, but De Gaulle's 8 May speech moved beyond his previous references to negotiating a cease-fire and conditions for a referendum to]

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[suggest the possibility of a joint French-PAG endorsement, prior to a referendum campaign, of an independent Algeria with close ties to France]

[New demonstrations and possibly violence by die-hard proponents of a "French Algeria" may coincide with the opening of the Evian talks, despite the earlier warnings by top French civilian and military officials in Algiers that demonstrations on 20 May will not be tolerated. Leaflets signed by the settler extremist Organization of the Secret Army are said to call for demonstrations in Algeria this coming Saturday.]

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