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21 October 1951

Copy No.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DOCUMENT NO. _____
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS C C 2001
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH: MR 70-2
DATE 12-12-71 REVIEWER

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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GENERAL

1. French oppose invitation to Arab states to join in Middle East Command:


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The French Foreign Office opposes the US suggestion for an early quadripartite approach to the Arab states inviting their participation in the Middle East Command. The French consider that in the "present state of public emotion" the Arab governments would not "dare" show a lack of solidarity with Egypt and that even a demarche stressing NATO determination to proceed with Middle East Command plans and activities would be unwise.

France is "in full agreement," however, that the closest possible cooperation among the four powers organizing Middle East defense is necessary and believes that the US suggestion can be reconsidered if the Egyptian situation "quiets down."

Comment: For the immediate future, the Arab governments will be inclined to give the Egyptians strong support. The Arab states would tend to be impressed, however, with a show of determination by the NATO powers. Such a policy could be expected later to tempt individual Arab governments to participate in the Middle East Command should the present conflict of interests in the Middle East result in a stalemate.

FAR EAST



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SOUTH ASIA


3. India faces dilemma on the Suez Canal issue:

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India understands and is sympathetic to the Egyptian desire for complete independence and freedom, according to the Secretary-General of India's Ministry of External Affairs. However,

this same official gave the US Charge in New Delhi the impression that India's practical interests might cause it to sympathize with the British. He said that his country's position on the Suez question was, as in the Iranian case, extremely difficult because of its desire not to strain its relations with either the Moslem world or the Commonwealth.

Comment: On Far Eastern problems India, with few economic interests, is pronouncedly anti-Western and pro-Asian. In Near and Middle Eastern Affairs where Indian economic and security considerations are at stake, it apparently is willing to let idealism give way to expediency.

4. Pakistani Government identifies Prime Minister's assassin as an Afghan national:

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An Afghan national assassinated the Pakistani Prime Minister, according to an official release by the Government of Pakistan.

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The US Embassy in Karachi reports that if this information is accepted as true, the public will demand war.

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Comment: There is sufficient doubt about the matter to indicate that the identification of the killer may be merely an attempt to divert the attention of the Pakistani public. The Afghan Government has officially denied any connection with the killing. The situation in Pakistan seems to be well in hand, and there is nothing to indicate that extreme nationalists could promote a war against Afghanistan

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5. Comment on constituent Assembly elections in Kashmir:

The Kashmir National Conference, the government in Indian-held Kashmir, has concluded its "elections" for a constituent Assembly. Only two of the 75 seats were contested by anti-Indian elements, and even these were won by the National Conference. These Indian-sponsored elections, whose results were a foregone conclusion, have already created antagonism and bitterness in Pakistan.

Although, in any UN discussions on Kashmir, India will place great emphasis on the outcome of these elections as expressions of the popular will of the people, any argument based on these elections is worthless.

NEAR EAST

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EASTERN EUROPE

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WESTERN EUROPE

8. US officials indicate US claims to Soviet-seized zone in Berlin are tenuous:

Soviet Zone police on 18 October occupied 3.3(h)(2) small Berlin district of Steinstuecken and announced that henceforth the area will be administratively incorporated into the city of Potsdam.

West Berlin spokesmen assert that the area belongs to the Berlin District of Zehlendorf and is therefore a part of the US sector.

Commenting on the seizure, US officials observe that, although the area was part of the Berlin district assigned to the US in 1944, the US has never exercised effective control over it. The West

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Berlin government has continued to administer the district in matters of elections and social security payments, but West Berlin police have not patrolled the area since 1948.

US authorities are considering what reprisals can be undertaken.

Comment: A somewhat similar "nibbling" operation was undertaken by Soviet and East Berlin authorities against the British sector earlier this year. Inasmuch as the division of Berlin between the East and West left the demarcation line vague in many places, there is ample opportunity for such incidents. The West Berlin population is aroused over the unilateral Soviet action, and Western authorities have demanded that the Russians withdraw from the area.

9. Austrian contribution to Western defense discussed:

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US officials in Vienna have suggested that "at some suitable time" US political and military officials should once more discuss with the government what military contribution Austria is willing to make in the event of a Soviet attack. The US Legation points out that any estimate of Austria's military manpower potential would necessitate a definite statement from the government of its willingness to commit the gendarmerie and to call for volunteers to fight with Western forces.

Conversations regarding such a commitment would require the West to state an intention to hold as much of Austria as possible. Previous reactions of Austrian government officials when approached on this subject are described as "mixed."

Comment: While there is no question that the sympathies of the government and people are wholly with the West, both Austrian and US officials in Vienna have been reluctant to formalize any connection between Austria and Western defense plans prior to an Austrian treaty. Soviet authorities have recently charged that Austria is being incorporated into the NATO organization and have warned of the dire consequences of such action.

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10. Madrid government charges UK with sabotaging US aid program in Spain.
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[Redacted]

For the second time in three months the Spanish Ambassador in London has lodged with the Foreign Office an official protest against the British Government's "very unfriendly attitude" toward Spain. The Foreign Office confidentially informed the US Ambassador that the new Spanish note, dated 12 October, is couched in stronger language, and complains, among other things, that Britain is sabotaging Spain's chances for US dollar aid.

It is feared in British diplomatic circles that the Madrid government may be preparing to press Spanish claims on Gibraltar, possibly accompanied by a threat to expropriate the British-financed Rio Tinto copper mines. The Foreign Office, however, is inclined to believe that the Spanish action was calculated to hasten the adoption of a favorable British policy toward Spain in the event that the 25 October elections bring the Conservatives to power.

Comment: The earlier Spanish note on 21 July followed the British-French demarche against the US-Spanish mutual defense talks. It protested bitterly against British "interference with Spain's sovereign rights." The 12 October note appears to reflect a Spanish fear that the UK may have attempted at Ottawa and Washington to minimize Spain's strategic capabilities, thereby placing in jeopardy the only claim Spain might have for US financial assistance.

It is not unlikely that the Franco regime is trying to capitalize on current British diplomatic reverses in the Middle East in order to remind the Foreign Office of Spain's latent capabilities for harassing the British in the Mediterranean.

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