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5 April 1958

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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5 APRIL 1958

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC



USSR launches second ICBM test vehicle at Tyura Tam/Klyuchi ballistic missile range within week. Missile covered at least 3,500 nautical miles.

Some reports of opposition to Khrushchev received. However, there is no indication at this time of an organized effort against him.

While Khrushchev says USSR will accept controls over nuclear test suspension, more likely Moscow will continue to insist on test suspension before control details are negotiated.

Hungarians give Khrushchev cool reception.

Technical and substantive problems may delay publication of new international Communist journal until July or September.



⑥ Peiping receives somewhat negative reaction to suggestion that Asian diplomats volunteer for token physical labor on Chinese projects.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

⑦ Indonesia - Hints by government officials that Djakarta will shortly take some anti-Communist action probably are designed to curry favor with West.

⑧ Israelis likely to resume canal digging in Lake Hula area; further border clashes probable.

⑨ Gaza legislative council asks for membership in United Arab Republic at "right opportunity."

III. THE WEST

⑩ Cuba - Castro will probably attempt general strike about 7 April.

⑪ Bolivia - Conflict between Bolivian President and leftist labor leader continues.

⑫ Canada - Election results foreshadow some modification of Canadian policies.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

5 April 1958

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

no

Soviet ICBM test: The USSR on 4 April launched the second ICBM test vehicle at Tyura Tam/Klyuchi ballistic missile range within a week.

the missile covered at least 3,500 nautical miles. (Page 1)

* Soviet leadership: Although Khrushchev appears to have reached a position of uncontested authority, there are some reports of continuing opposition to him.

no

goes so far as to state that Suslov will replace Khrushchev as party first secretary within the next two weeks. There have been indications that Suslov is out of step with current policies and Khrushchev's take-over as premier could give any leaders who may fear Khrushchev's power a compelling motive for uniting against him. Any combination strong enough to oust him would have to include a number of his hand-picked lieutenants in the presidium, and the opportunities for the coalescence of effective opposition are limited. There is no clear evidence that an organized group of opponents has begun to form. (Page 2)

no

USSR - Summit tactics: In his 4 April Budapest speech, Khrushchev said that the USSR was prepared to accept international control over nuclear test suspension. His emphasis on the ease of solving the control problem, however, suggests that at the summit negotiations the USSR would seek to minimize the degree of inspection and continue to insist that the nuclear powers

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agree on test suspension before the details of control are negotiated. In answer to the 31 March Western proposal for diplomatic exchanges in Moscow, the USSR is likely either to propose a foreign ministers' conference in April without preliminary talks or to insist that ambassadorial exchanges should be confined to settling procedural details for an early ministers' meeting. In mid-March, Khrushchev expressed his preference for a heavily publicized foreign ministers' meeting without preliminary diplomatic exchanges.

(Page 3)

FLD
Hungary-USSR: In Budapest Khrushchev is being greeted with "cold indifference," and so far Hungarians have turned out in "pitifully" small numbers for the liberation ceremonies. Khrushchev is going out of his way to build up Janos Kadar as Moscow's chosen leader, and is making it unmistakably clear he has no intention of returning the associates of former leader Rakosi to power. The visit to date has disclosed nothing on the future fate of Imre Nagy.

msg
New Communist journal: The new Communist international journal, replacing the defunct Cominform journal, established in Prague on 11 March probably will not appear before July and maybe not until September. A number of technical and substantive problems remain to be ironed out, possibly including the nature of Polish and Yugoslav participation.

FLD
Communist China: A public relations effort by Peiping to get several Asian foreign diplomats to join bloc diplomats in volunteering for token physical labor on Chinese Communist construction projects could have adverse repercussions among some Asian nations. UAR diplomats in Peiping have already volunteered, but the Burmese and Indian ambassadors are unwilling to join. The Burmese ambassador has told Rangoon that he

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considers the request "beyond toleration." Rangoon has instructed its ambassador not to participate.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

no

Indonesia: Hints by Indonesian officials that some anti-Communist action will be taken by the government shortly may have been made to curry favor with the West, particularly the United States, and to assuage fears of growing Communist influence in Indonesia.

(Page 6) (Map)

no

Israeli-Syrian border: More fighting in the Lake Hula area is likely if the Israelis resume canal digging operations there as is probable.

no

Gaza Strip: The recently created Gaza Legislative Council has asked for membership in Nasir's United Arab Republic at "the right opportunity." Nasir may wait to accede to this "request" until the move could be made part of a wider campaign resuming pressure on King Husayn's government in Jordan, where most of the Palestine Arab refugees are located.

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III. THE WEST

no

Cuba: The situation in Oriente Province remains essentially unchanged. Castro is said to have set 7 April for attempting a general strike, but the government has increased its chances of thwarting this by authorizing violence against strike agitators. Batista's reiteration of an amnesty offer appears to be propaganda designed to impress public opinion with the government's sincerity in wanting a peaceful solution with free elections in November.

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DAILY BRIEF

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yes
Bolivia: The basic conflict between President Siles and leftist labor leader Juan Lechin--which threatens the US-backed economic stabilization program--has not been resolved. Although the crisis between the two precipitated in early March has subsided slowly, a new dispute may arise in connection with the government party convention in preparation for congressional elections which legally must be held before 6 June. [Page 8]

yes
Canada: The American Embassy in Ottawa anticipates that the Diefenbaker government's overwhelming electoral victory will result in more acts of self-assertion in relations with the United States. This may involve increased efforts to reduce economic dependence on the United States, and the government's raising of a political umbrella over US-Canadian defense cooperation will continue to slow defense planning. The growing popular desire for a modus vivendi with the Communist world, while not changing Ottawa's active support of NATO, presents some risk of a future Canadian divergence from the United States on some important issues.

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet Test ICBM Firing on 4 April 1958

[redacted] Tyura Tam/Klyuchi ballistic missile range indicate that a test ICBM was launched at about 1530 GMT on 4 April 1958.

[redacted] the test ICBM covered at least the full 3,500-nautical-mile range.

This is the second test ICBM launching from Tyura Tam in less than one week, indicating a high test launching rate capability. [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~SECRET~~Continuing Opposition to Khrushchev

Party Secretary Suslov is Khrushchev's main critic and that he will try to unseat him if current policies are unsuccessful.

[redacted] a Soviet official answered allegations that Khrushchev's assumption of the premiership was a return to Stalinism by stating that within two weeks a central committee plenum would be called at which Khrushchev would resign as first secretary in favor of Suslov.

These reports conflict with the fact that Khrushchev emerged from the recent Supreme Soviet session with greater powers than ever before in his career. At the same time, he is vulnerable to charges of trying to become another Stalin, and fear of this possibility might be a compelling motive for uniting against him.

There have been indications that Suslov is out of step with current policies--particularly the machine-tractor program--but he would have to gain the support of several members of the party presidium who have been part of the Khrushchev camp before attempting a showdown with the premier. Opportunities for the coalescence of effective opposition are limited, and there is no clear evidence that an organized group of opponents has begun to form. [redacted]

[redacted]

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Soviet Summit Tactics

In his 4 April speech in Budapest, Khrushchev reiterated that the USSR is prepared to accept international control over nuclear test suspension and urged Britain and the United States to follow the Soviet example by suspending tests without delay. His emphasis on the ease of solving the control problem, however, suggests that at summit talks the USSR would seek to minimize the degree of inspection and probably continue to insist that the nuclear powers agree on test suspension before the details of control are negotiated.

A member of the Soviet UN delegation has told an American delegate that diplomatic exchanges in Moscow regarding a summit meeting, as proposed by the three Western powers on 31 March, would be useless because the USSR could not be expected to show the "extreme flexibility" in preparatory talks which it is prepared to show at the summit. He called the proposal a Western device to produce a deadlock which the West could use as an excuse for avoiding a summit conference.

This statement reflects Khrushchev's suspicion of diplomatic talks, which he said in mid-March might "bog down in an endless labyrinth" and "quietly bury the idea of a summit meeting." While not flatly rejecting diplomatic talks, Khrushchev expressed his preference for a foreign ministers' meeting, which would be held in the full glare of publicity.

In reply to the 31 March Western notes, Moscow is likely either to propose a foreign ministers' meeting in April without preliminary diplomatic talks or to insist that ambassadorial exchanges be confined to settling procedural details for an early foreign ministers' meeting. The USSR is probably interested in getting a summit meeting quickly because Bulganin's letter-writing campaign has failed to force any major Western concessions on terms for a conference, and its propaganda value is decreasing. On his recent visit to Moscow, UN Secretary General Hammarskjold found the Soviet leaders self-confident and determined to have a summit meeting if only to show the world that the USSR is a major force to be reckoned with.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Publication of New Communist International Journal Delayed

The new Communist international journal established in Prague on 11 March, originally reported as scheduled to begin publication in May, probably will not appear before July and maybe not until September, according to the counselor of the Yugoslav Embassy in Prague. This source attributes the delay to a number of unspecified technical and substantive problems. There have been numerous conflicting reports concerning the question of Yugoslav and Polish participation in the new journal.

B. N. Ponomarev, who may become editor in chief of the new journal, has assumed considerable prominence in the USSR in the past two years. He is a member of the editorial board of the Soviet theoretical journal Kommunist and is thought to head the department of the Soviet party central committee for liaison with foreign Communist parties.

According to a Soviet official, the new journal will be "less theoretical" than the Cominform journal--For A Lasting Peace, For A People's Democracy. It will be similar in form to the Soviet publication International Affairs, a reportorial and journalistic monthly. If the new journal is confined mainly to foreign policy questions, it probably will be acceptable to the Poles and Yugoslavs. [redacted]

[redacted]


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Burmese and Indian Diplomats in Peiping Balk at
Joining "Socialist Construction"

Communist efforts to win the voluntary participation of some Asian diplomats in Peiping in China's "socialist construction" may backfire. Burmese and Indian diplomats have taken personal affront at the proposal, which calls for token physical labor on agricultural and industrial projects.

Peiping Radio announced on 24 March that Ambassador Rajab of the United Arab Republic and 40 members of his staff put in six hours of "voluntary labor" at a reservoir project near Peiping, thus following the example set earlier in Canton by visiting bloc delegations.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Situation in Indonesia

[redacted] dissidents in the Prapat area of North Sumatra were well armed and were maintaining strong defensive positions, presumably in the hills outside the towns. Farther north, dissident troops were reported by the progovernment Medan radio to be attacking in the Siantar area. The local commander in Tapanuli, who has protested the presence of progovernment forces in his territory, has been informed by the deputy chief of staff in Medan that these troops will withdraw immediately once he has taken action against the dissidents whom he has freely permitted to enter his command.

In Djakarta, hints by Indonesian officials that some anti-Communist action will be taken by the government shortly apparently are intended to curry favor with the West, particularly the United States, and to allay fears of growing Communist influence in Indonesia.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Gaza Strip - Jordan

The bid by the Gaza Legislative Council for inclusion in the United Arab Republic may presage increased UAR pressure on the pro-Western regime in Jordan, home of nearly half a million refugees from Arab Palestine.

[redacted]
It is therefore possible that the Jordanian exiles have reached agreement on a cooperative effort to undermine King Husayn. On 27 March, exiled Jordanian Baath party leader Rimawi left Damascus for Cairo for a meeting with Nasir on a "very serious matter."

[redacted] the Egyptians are expected to step up their efforts to cultivate support among the Palestinian refugees in Jordan, and will distribute gifts in the camps during the holiday following conclusion of Ramadan the end of April.

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III. THE WEST

New Tensions Likely in Bolivia

Bolivian political tensions, which led to a threat of civil war in mid-March, may reach another crisis this month as two factions in the governing Nationalist Revolutionary Movement seek to dominate nominations for the congressional elections, which by law must be held before 6 June. Neither moderate President Siles nor leftist labor leader Juan Lechin won a clear-cut victory in the mid-March test of strength, and each is likely to make a new effort to secure support for his faction in the approaching convention. Since the party polled 82 percent of the vote in the 1956 election, its nominations are regarded as decisive in this year's election of 6 senators and 34 deputies.

Political tensions, increased labor unrest, and the 1 April drop in the price of lead seriously threaten the US-backed economic stabilization program despite the relative success and popularity of the program during 1957, its first year of operation. If the International Tin Council is unable to support tin prices at present levels as has been rumored, the Bolivian economy will face a further strain since tin and lead provide three fourths of its foreign exchange earnings. [redacted]

Sources: [redacted]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Canadian Government May Take More Nationalistic Line

As a result of the recent Canadian elections, the US Embassy anticipates a more difficult period ahead for US-Canadian relations. The new Diefenbaker government, eager to accommodate public opinion, will strive to reduce Canada's economic dependence on the United States by increasing economic ties with the Commonwealth and to take a more independent approach on some defense and foreign policy issues. It will be quick to seize on specific issues which seem to it to involve US economic domination.

While there will be no change in Canada's attitude toward NATO, the growing popular desire for a modus vivendi with the Communist world may lead to a gradual softening of the government's attitude toward the Sino-Soviet bloc. A review of Canada's policy of refusing to recognize Communist China is a possibility. The government will probably be more inclined than previously to inject political considerations into negotiations on joint US-Canadian defense projects. [redacted]

Source: [redacted]

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