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3 February 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



State Dept. review completed

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Chinese UN Representation: [Nationalist China's position in the United Nations is becoming increasingly precarious. Taipei suffered some of its worst setbacks during the first half of the 15th UN General Assembly. Although the assembly in October decided to shelve the question of Chinese UN representation for the duration of the session, it did so by the slimmest margin Taipei has received since 1951. In addition, for the first time Nationalist China will almost certainly lose its seat on the UN Economic and Social Council, although the five permanent members of the Security Council have traditionally been re-elected when their three-year terms expire. Nationalist China may also lose its right to vote unless it makes a payment of more than \$1,000,000 toward its overdue assessments before the assembly resumes. Although it is difficult to overrule a previous decision of the assembly, all these factors may encourage some of Peiping's supporters to reopen the issue of Chinese UN representation at the General Assembly session scheduled to resume on 7 March.]

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Arab League: The Arab League foreign ministers began meeting in Baghdad on 30 January with the representatives of all ten league members present for the first time

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in nearly three years. Tunisian participation in the meetings, ending the boycott imposed by Bourguiba in 1958, appears to be part of an effort by Tunisia, Iraq, and Jordan to make the league more effective and less of an exclusive instrument of UAR President Nasir's policies. Nasir, however, holds important advantages in any contest for influence in the league. His more strident anti-Western propaganda has greater popular appeal in the other Arab states, while the league's secretariat is located in Cairo, subject to all the direct and indirect influences the UAR leader can bring to bear. Most other Arab leaders will almost certainly feel compelled to echo Nasir's strong propaganda attacks on Western policies, especially concerning Algeria, Congo, and Israel, regardless of their differences with Nasir and their real attitudes on these questions.

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Ethiopia: The political situation in Ethiopia appears to be deteriorating further as Emperor Haile Selassie continues to delay naming a new government. The Emperor, preoccupied with security matters in the seven weeks following the abortive coup, has concerned himself more with pressing charges against those who participated in or sympathized with the revolt than in reconstructing the government or in attempting to alleviate the conditions which caused the uprising. The American ambassador believes new disorders could break out in Addis Ababa if the military tribunal, which is reported ready to begin proceedings against the popular rebel leader Mengistu Neway, imposes the death sentence.

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Bolivia: [President Paz Estenssoro believes that acceptance of Soviet bloc economic aid will not endanger the US grant-aid program which makes up a substantial part of Bolivia's domestic budget, according to American Ambassador Strom. Strom states that although Paz is aware the bloc]

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[may score politically in Latin America through contributing "show" projects for Bolivia, Paz feels no obligation to impede such a development. A Bolivian economic mission will probably leave for the Soviet bloc on 1 March to explore a Soviet offer of a \$150,000,000 credit.]

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**SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
AND ESTIMATES**

(Available During the Preceding Week)

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Ethiopian Prospects After the Abortive Coup of December 1960. SNIE 76.1-61. 24 January 1961.

Supplements NIE 76-60.

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**Chinese UN Representation: Taipei's UN
Position Precarious**

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[While a majority of UN members have supported the moratorium on Chinese UN representation since 1951, it has been evident since 1955 that Taipei would not be able to muster the necessary two-thirds majority vote to sustain its position if its right to the China seat were formally questioned on a substantive vote. The 15th UN General Assembly on 8 October "decided not to consider" the question, but only 42 members supported the resolution, while 34 opposed it and 22 members--mostly African--abstained. Following the balloting, various African delegates made statements indicating that the abstentions were grudgingly given and would not be repeated in the future. Many supporters of the moratorium agreed that it could not be upheld at any future session. One of these, the government of Pakistan, has recently asked the US Embassy in Karachi whether the United States would be prepared in the future to have its allies "follow their own conscience" on the question or whether it considers support of the moratorium a test of friendship with the United States.]

[Nationalist China, considerably in arrears in paying its assessed dues, would find it difficult to get the assembly to grant an exception which would enable it to retain its vote at the resumed 15th session. The UN Charter does provide that the General Assembly may permit a defaulting member to vote if failure to pay is due to "conditions beyond the control of the member."] [REDACTED]

[Nationalist China faces another critical vote when the World Health Organization convenes in New Delhi on 7 February. If Peiping's supporters--encouraged by Taipei's precarious UN position--succeed in unseating Taipei, this will be the first time Communist China has been formally admitted to an international organization affiliated with the United Nations.] [REDACTED]

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The Arab League

The Arab League was founded in 1945 to promote unity among its member states, but it has made little progress toward achieving this goal. Its founders--foremost of whom was the late Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Said--professed a desire to work toward the sacrifice of sovereignty and special interest in order to attain such unity. The original members were Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Yemen, along with Egypt and Syria, which in 1958 formed the United Arab Republic. Entry into the league by Libya (1953), the Sudan (1956), and Tunisia and Morocco (1958) brought the total membership to its present ten. Algeria, whose rebel government has a representative attending the current meeting, is not a member. In the 16 years of the league's existence, relatively minor advances in cultural and economic cooperation have been made, but political differences remain as pronounced as ever.

The league attempts to set forth a coordinated Arab viewpoint on various issues and maintains information offices outside the Arab world for this purpose. This kind of display of unity is negated, however, by the almost constant propaganda contest among Arab leaders for position as the leading champion of Arab causes. At various times, for example, Cairo, Amman, and Baghdad have accused each other of promoting a policy of softness toward Israel or of lukewarmness toward the Algerian rebels.

In recent years, Nasir's strong advocacy of his type of Arab nationalism and neutralism, which offends pro-Western Arab governments and many ambitious Arab leaders, has been the most constant irritant in inter-Arab relations. Jordan's King Husayn and Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim--well aware of Nasir's past sponsorship of attempts to overthrow their respective regimes--oppose Nasir's continued dominance of the League, but neither commands great trust or respect from other members. In such an atmosphere, the league is unlikely to increase its meager contributions to Arab unity, and efforts to form a bloc to undermine Nasir's influence in the organization will probably grow only gradually.

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Situation in Ethiopia Deteriorating

Haile Selassie's legal adviser had urged that trials of those suspected of disloyalty be conducted "in an open and dignified manner." This the Emperor has refused.

[redacted] secret trials of civilians accused of criticizing the regime or of expressing sympathy for the aims of the rebels have been under way for over a week, with sentences of up to eight years pronounced.

The Emperor has failed to reassert his strong personal leadership and the American ambassador has characterized the political situation in Ethiopia as a "state of aimless drift." Dissident elements are circulating antiregime rumors and distributing leaflets in the capital asking for support of the rebel cause. This activity, together with the widespread concern over the fate of General Menghistu, the former Imperial Body Guard commandant, has increased public support for the objectives espoused by leaders of the abortive coup.

Western officials in Addis Ababa, aware that a continuation of the present trend could lead to further disorders, have apparently been unable to persuade the Emperor that prompt political and economic reforms are necessary to quell the discontent.

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Bolivian President Plans to Accept Both US and Soviet
Bloc Aid

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[President Paz has indicated to American Ambassador Strom that he is making plans to utilize both US and Soviet bloc aid. The United States has contributed grant aid in recent years to enable the Bolivian Government to balance its domestic budget. In a conversation with Ambassador Strom on 30 January, Paz conveyed the impression that he considers American grant aid, contributed in recent years to balance Bolivia's domestic budget, a part of ordinary revenues on which his administration can count.]

[The USSR, which has offered a credit of \$150,000,000, wants its aid to go to projects entirely separate from those where US aid is involved, according to an earlier statement by Paz. Paz has also said that he was considering "reserving" for the USSR the opportunity to provide equipment for hydroelectric generating plants for the nationalized Bolivian Mining Corporation because he assumed that such plants would not be included in aid to the mines from the United States, Germany, and the Inter-American Development Bank. If this assumption was incorrect, Paz said, Soviet aid could be reserved exclusively for the national petroleum company.]

[The Bolivian Government signed a cultural agreement with Czechoslovakia on 23 January providing for relations between scientific institutions, universities, and cultural and sports organizations. The signing took place during the six-day visit of Deputy Foreign Minister Hajek, who had been invited by President Paz. Ambassador Strom notes that the pact is Bolivia's first cultural agreement with the bloc and that it provides opportunity for political penetration.]

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