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Approved For Release 2008/04/29 : CIA-RDP70T00975A004800160001-1

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Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800160001-1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800160001-1

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
19 November 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Ok
USSR: In his speech to Soviet journalists at a Kremlin reception on 14 November, Khrushchev returned to the theme that has dominated his foreign policy pronouncements since his visit to the United States--growing Western recognition of the necessity of peaceful coexistence. He reaffirmed his satisfaction with the improvement in East-West relations and expressed confidence that the "present incipient lessening" of international tension will continue. Perhaps in response to critics within the bloc, he denied that the USSR has changed its policies and again invoked Lenin as the author of the peaceful coexistence concept. Despite Khrushchev's apparent attempt to create the impression that 250 ICBMs were produced by a single Soviet missile plant in one year, available evidence suggests that only the 700-nautical-mile missile has been in production long enough to permit achievement of such a production rate.

OIC
East-West Germany: Since 1957 the migration from West to East Germany, involving mostly returnees, has been growing, possibly reaching 50,000 in 1959. During 1958 the East German refugee flow to the West, about 204,000, was 22 percent lower than in 1957. The drop in 1959 is expected to be about 30 percent. Semiskilled labor makes up the bulk of the increasing eastward movement, and the trend will probably continue as economic conditions in East Germany further improve. The westward flow is being affected at present not only by gradually improving security measures but by developments in the international situation which occasion a "wait-and-see" attitude.



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Iraq: The Baghdad radio statement indicating that Prime Minister Qasim had left the hospital on 17 November appears to have been premature. However, Qasim's departure may be imminent, since he has previously said he expected to leave this week.

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800160001-1

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Watch Committee Conclusions: Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeopardize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq.

Laos: Dissident military activity remains at a low level. However, the insurgents retain a considerable potential for guerrilla action, and no decrease in their subversive activities is foreseen at the present time.

Middle East: The situation in Iraq remains unstable, and the possibility of further assassination attempts or coups remains.

NO

Indonesia - Communist China: A public exchange of recriminations between the Chinese Communist Embassy in Djakarta and the Indonesian Foreign Ministry is further evidence of the growing strain in Sino-Indonesian relations. The Chinese Embassy has denounced as untrue Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio's claim that the Chinese ambassador had agreed to cooperate with the Indonesian Government's program to remove Overseas Chinese from rural areas. Djakarta has now retorted that if the ambassador persists in his denial, and in his justification of the obstructive activities of his embassy officials, this will have "grave and serious consequences."

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Philippines: The administration's victory in securing five of the eight Senate seats and a majority of the local offices contested in last week's election reflects the strength of the Nacionalista party machine. At the same time, the defeat of candidates closely associated with President Garcia points up his personal unpopularity. Garcia may become increasingly preoccupied with a struggle for control of his own party as well as with a growing challenge from the opposition Liberal party to the further neglect of administrative reforms. The Liberals were strengthened by the election of three senators and various local officials. Garcia may step up emphasis on his policy of economic nationalism despite the limited campaign appeal of the Nacionalista "Filipino First" slogan.

III. THE WEST

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Greece-USSR: (The worsening economic position of Greece is increasing its vulnerability to Soviet efforts to reduce Greek ties with the West, according to Greek Foreign Minister Averoff. The Soviet campaign, described by Averoff as alternating between the "smile" and "snarl" techniques, has proceeded since last summer in the political, economic, and cultural fields and has recently resulted in attacks on the Greek Government for rejecting bloc proposals for a Balkan "summit" conference. In view of the developing economic situation, the American ambassador in Athens regards the Soviet campaign as a serious threat to Greece's position in NATO.) (Page 8)

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Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800160001-1

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev Again Defends Peaceful Coexistence Policy

Khrushchev's somewhat rambling speech to Soviet journalists at a Kremlin reception on 14 November, the text of which was published on 17 November, underscored the theme that has dominated the Soviet premier's foreign policy pronouncements since his visit to the United States--growing Western recognition of the necessity of peaceful coexistence. As in his major policy address to the Supreme Soviet on 31 October, Khrushchev attributed this shift in Western policies and attitudes toward the USSR to the deep impact of Soviet military and technological achievements.

These statements appear to reflect Khrushchev's confidence that there is an irresistible drift in the West toward an accommodation which the USSR can exploit to win at least tacit Western recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe and East Germany.

Khrushchev expressed satisfaction that East-West relations "have taken a better turn" and indicated confidence that the "present incipient lessening of international tension" will continue. He asserted that a comparison of his talks with President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan this year with his discussions with British and American leaders at the Geneva summit meeting in 1955 shows important progress toward Western "understanding of the necessity of peaceful coexistence."

As an example of the "mighty weapons" at the USSR's disposal, Khrushchev stated that "in one year 250 missiles with hydrogen warheads came off the assembly line in the factory we visited." The context implied he was referring to Soviet ICBM production. However, available evidence suggests that only the 700-nautical-mile missile has been in production long enough to permit achievement of such a production rate.

In this speech, Khrushchev again appeared to be seeking to justify the correctness of his peaceful coexistence posture. Perhaps in response to expressions of misgivings within the

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bloc regarding the long-range implications of his present course, Khrushchev denied that the USSR has changed its policy. In line with the assurances in his Supreme Soviet speech that "there cannot be any question of concessions" in matters of ideology, Khrushchev declared, "We were born Communists, we live as Communists, and will not die, but continue to march onward as Communists." He again invoked Lenin as the author of the peaceful coexistence slogan and said, "We are proud that we have always acted and are acting as we were taught by Lenin, who was the first to proclaim this slogan."

After attacking Chancellor Adenauer in connection with West German plans to establish a radio station in West Berlin, Khrushchev remarked that "it would be a good thing if no one tried to exacerbate...the situation in this or other areas of the globe."

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Migration From West to East Germany Increases

Migration from West to East Germany appears to be increasing substantially, while the refugee flow in the opposite direction is decreasing. The East German Foreign Ministry asserted on 16 November, according to a Western news report, that the eastward movement in 1958 was 82.6 percent higher than in 1957. While this figure is highly suspect and cannot be checked, it is believed that as many as 50,000 persons may go to East Germany during 1959.

During 1958, the East German refugee flow to the West, totaled about 204,000--22 percent less than in 1957; the total in 1959 will be about 30 percent less than in 1958.

These trends will probably continue. Economic pressures in East Germany have abated, and if this improvement continues, dissatisfied West Germans and refugees who have not been satisfactorily assimilated will be increasingly willing to seek work in East Germany. The bulk of the eastward movement consists of semiskilled labor.

At the same time certain factors currently inhibiting the westward flow will probably cause further declines. East German security measures are becoming increasingly effective. In addition, many would-be East German refugees have adopted a wait-and-see attitude during the current international detente. [redacted]

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Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800160001-1

19 Nov 59

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 3

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800160001-1

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800160001-1

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Philippine Elections

Results of the Philippine senatorial and provincial elections held on 10 November reflect the basic strength of the incumbent Nacionalista party machine, but reveal President Garcia's personal unpopularity. Candidates closely associated with the President were defeated. None of the five senators elected from the eight-man Nacionalista ticket is a close Garcia follower, and the Nacionalista mayors elected in the major cities of Manila and Cebu had openly campaigned against corruption in the Garcia administration.

Although Garcia may recognize in this setback the need for administrative reforms, he may become increasingly preoccupied with a struggle for dominance of his party in advance of the 1961 presidential election. His announcement that he will continue a policy of economic nationalism, despite the limited campaign appeal of the Nacionalista "Filipino First" slogan, may lead to further harassment of foreign business interests for domestic political reasons.

Garcia also faces a growing challenge from the opposition Liberal party, which has been strengthened by the election of three senators--giving the opposition bloc a total of six in the 24-man Senate, 19 governors in the 54 provinces, and about two fifths of the municipal mayors. On the other hand, prospects are poor for the newly formed opposition Grand Alliance to maintain itself as a third party since it failed to win any major office. Its eventual absorption into the Liberal party would significantly enhance the prospects of the anti-administration forces. Renewed efforts to forge such unity, however, may again face obstacles if the desires of Alliance leaders for some significant role in the opposition are rejected. [Redacted]

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Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800160001-1

19 Nov 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 7

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800160001-1

25X1

Greece Regarded as Vulnerable to Soviet Campaign

The American ambassador in Athens regards the current Soviet effort to reduce Greek ties with the West as a serious long-range threat to that nation's position within the NATO defense chain. Greek Foreign Minister Averoff also has expressed his government's "uneasiness" regarding possible effects of the recently intensified campaign. Averoff put particular stress on Greece's increasing vulnerability to bloc initiatives in the light of worsening economic conditions caused, in part, by inability to dispose of large agricultural surpluses. The USSR and several East European countries have made attractive offers to purchase such surpluses. A protocol on commodity deliveries, calling for increased trade between Greece and the USSR, was signed on 31 October.

Moscow's campaign has proceeded on three fronts--political, economic, and cultural--and has alternated, according to Averoff, between "smile" and "snarl" techniques with the former particularly effective in view of a general desire in Greece for international peace. A major Soviet-bloc effort to improve relations, including invitations to the Greek leaders to visit Moscow and proposals that the Balkan states settle their differences at a "summit" conference, has been followed in recent days by bloc propaganda criticism of the Greek Government. Premier Karamanlis has been castigated for failure to adapt to the "Camp David spirit," refusing to attend a Balkan conference, declining the invitation to Moscow, and permitting establishment of "Honest John" missiles in Greece.

Symbolic of the return to the "snarl" technique is the issuance by the USSR of a postage stamp honoring Manolis Glezos, sentenced by a Greek court last July to five years in prison for assisting Communist spies. Karamanlis has decided to reply in kind, and the Greek Government has announced its intention to issue a stamp honoring Imre Nagy, executed by the Hungarian Government in 1958. 25X1

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