

[Redacted] 15 April 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
[Laos:] Steps are being worked out whereby the Boun Oum government would "inform" all concerned--including Souvanna Phouma and Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphanouvong--that they would be welcome at the late King's funeral ceremonies to be held in Luang Prabang the end of this month. The entire cabinet is scheduled to discuss this matter in Luang Prabang today with King Savang, who has indicated he would sanction such an informal get-together of the three Laotian factions.]

[Enemy patrols are reported active against government positions on Route 13 south of Muong Kassy.]

[The government is moving additional infantry and artillery to the Nhommarath area northeast of Thakhek, but many of these reinforcements have little training.] [] (Backup,
Page 1) (Maps)

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Congo: The 2,300-man addition to India's UN contingent has disembarked at Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, and the first planeloads of troops are expected shortly in Katanga. In view of Tshombé's warnings against the reinforcement of UN forces in Katanga, Hammarskjold is considering sending UN military commander McKeown or his deputy to assume personal command of UN forces there.

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Gizenga's representative in Cairo, Pierre Mulele, has advised Stanleyville that while arms and ammunition are available in Cairo, "We do not know how to send them to you." With respect to aircraft, Mulele reported that "the friends" had agreed to provide two to four IL-18s, but only if scheduled flights to Stanleyville could be arranged. He added that "if you can obtain for us an authorization to fly over the Sudan, the planes will reach you in 24 hours."

Meanwhile, Gizenga has continued to leave the door open for a meeting with representatives of the Leopoldville government. Gizenga reportedly has suggested Addis Ababa, Berlin, or Athens as acceptable sites for a meeting.

(Map)

Angola-Portugal: Terrorist activity in the area north of Luanda is continuing in the face of a steady Portuguese military build-up. According to the Portuguese news agency, "thousands" of Africans attacked a village about 100 miles northeast of Luanda but were driven off with heavy casualties by the small garrison there. Disorders have also been reported in Cabinda. (The outgoing overseas minister in Lisbon told Ambassador Elbrick that the situation is very grave and is not improving. He said that the residents of Angola were very nervous and that additional troops were being dispatched.) Provincial authorities are calling for volunteers and are beginning to mobilize reservists.

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Lisbon instructed the Portuguese Embassy in Cape Town to purchase 500 twenty-pound bombs from the South African Government.

In Portugal, Salazar has been reshuffling the military supporters of ex-Defense Minister Moniz, following the cabinet changes of 13 April. (Backup, Page 3)

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~~TOP SECRET~~~~*France-Algeria:~~

~~the decision of the PAG not to go to Evian was
strongly influenced by Moscow and Cairo.~~

(Backup, Page 4)

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~~*USSR: About 1924 GMT (1424 EST) 14 April a test vehicle,
probably an ICBM, was launched from Tyura Tam and failed in
flight shortly thereafter.~~

~~Facilities associated with Soviet space
program launchings from Tyura Tam were not involved in this
launching. However, the Soviet vessels involved in the manned
satellite launching of 12 April have not yet begun returning to
port. This is the eighth probable ICBM launching from Tyura
Tam this year--four of them have been failures.~~

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Mongolia: Moscow's pre-eminent position in Mongolia has been strengthened by the extension of further economic aid for the Mongolian Third Five-Year Plan (1961-65). In an agreement signed in Moscow on 13 April, the USSR granted Ulan Bator new credits worth \$135,000,000 and agreed to defer repayment of trade debts and previous credits. Last September, three months after Peiping boosted the amount of its Mongolian economic aid program, the Soviet Union granted a \$154,000,000 credit to Ulan Bator. Total Soviet economic aid extended to Mongolia since 1945 amounts to about \$665,000,000, compared with the Chinese contribution of \$115,000,000--all of which has been extended since 1956. In addition, however, Peiping maintains a substantial technical assistance program in Mongolia which provides it with a considerable measure of influence in Mongolian industrial and agricultural development.


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Israel: [Ben-Gurion's political position will be jeopardized as a result of the arrest of his unofficial personal military adviser on a charge of espionage for the Soviet Union. The prime minister, who heads a caretaker government pending elections next August, has already been widely criticized for his handling of the domestic crisis centering on the Lavon affair, which precipitated the elections. The revelation of the spy scandal will provide opposition parties with another issue to use against Ben-Gurion in the campaign.]

(Backup, Page 6) *No*

Somali Republic - Ethiopia: The Somali minister of interior,

[expressed his concern over a reported large-scale build-up of Ethiopian military forces in the predominantly Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia. The minister, in the northern region of the republic to investigate recent clashes between Ethiopian troops and Somalis, stated that the Ethiopians were "making no secret of their intention" to use the weapons and aircraft brought into the area "to exterminate once and for all" the Somali people there.]

No

[However, relations in the Ogaden region between Somali tribesmen and Ethiopians are perennially bad and will further deteriorate following Ethiopia's recent reinforcement of its troops in the area. Ethiopia has also intensified patrol activities near the Somali border. Presumably this is an attempt to enforce its regulation against the presence on Ethiopian soil of armed Somali tribesmen.]

(Backup, Page 7) (Map)

France: [The fourth French nuclear test has been postponed until 28 April or as soon thereafter as meteorological conditions permit. This date has been established by the government on the assumption that the UN General Assembly session will have ended by then,]

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[redacted] Prolongation of the session beyond 28 April--which seems likely--may cause a further postponement of the test.

Moscow has softened its earlier charge that further French testing would make a test ban treaty "pointless." The chief Soviet delegate at Geneva told a US newsman on 8 April that a French test would "hamper" the negotiations and said he had chosen this word deliberately rather than a stronger term implying a breakdown in the conference. [redacted]

Honduras: President Villeda Morales on 12 April placed the civil guard and other civilian-directed security forces on a state of alert. He has had increasing difficulty in coping with extreme leftist and rightist groups, and apparently now feels the rightists, with army and air force support, are about to make an attempt to unseat him. Pro-Castro groups, which are stronger in Honduras than in any other Central American country, would quickly exploit any effort to oust the moderate regime of Villeda Morales. [redacted]

(Backup, Page 8)

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
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~~TOP SECRET~~Situation in Laos

{General Phoumi, discussing various aspects of a cease-fire in Laos with the chief of the American military mission, stated that he felt the Laotian Army this time should emulate Communist tactics employed after the 1954 Geneva Agreements by "playing the political game" while infiltrating wherever possible to expand Vientiane's control over as much territory as possible. Phoumi felt that with helicopters he could pre-position army units and establish control in certain areas throughout the country not occupied physically by the Pathet Lao. Although Phoumi did not mention Meo guerrilla assets in this connection, they probably would play a role in any such undertaking since they exercise de facto control over much of the mountainous terrain in Xieng Khouang Province and also have scattered bases in Luang Prabang, Sam Neua, and to a lesser extent Phong Saly Province.]

{Phoumi saw only very slight possibility for an effective coalition government with the Pathet Lao since he felt they were by now strongly oriented toward Communist control. He expressed conviction that Souvanna's policy of peace, unity, and neutrality is not possible under present circumstances, and advocated instead a military solution.]

{An enemy force, estimated to number 500 men, is reported to have attacked two government companies on 13 April at Ban Pha Pho, an outpost in southern Laos about 25 miles from the Cambodian border. Details are lacking, but radio contact with the post has been lost and a ranger company from Pakse has been ordered to reinforce the garrison.]

[] evidence that Russians are directing the air unit as well as flying the major part of it. On 12 February a DRV aircraft apparently was told not to use Vietnamese in contacting a Vietnamese airfield control tower. Two days later Dien Bien Phu airfield complained that "without a translator we can neither talk with []

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{nor understand the friends. The friends are not pleased with this." The "friends" almost certainly are Russians. Airlift activity continues at about the average level.} [redacted]

{There are suggestions that in the projected conference on Laos, the Communists may seek to reopen other matters covered by the 1954 Geneva Agreements. The deputy chief of Poland's delegation on the ICC for Vietnam recently implied in Saigon that the bloc may attempt to resurrect the question of Vietnamese reunification. The Geneva Agreements alluded to reunification elections but did not specify when or how they were to be held. These details were spelled out in a separate declaration which stipulated that general reunification elections should be held throughout Vietnam in July 1956 under ICC supervision. North Vietnam signed both the agreement and the declaration and has endorsed the elections--it has a population majority over the South. South Vietnam agreed to honor the spirit of the agreement and accepted the ICC but signed neither document and has not accepted the election formula.}

{This has not prevented North Vietnam from charging Saigon with "violating the Geneva Agreements" by refusing reunification elections, by accepting US military assistance, and by attempting to halt Communist guerrilla depredations in the South. Communist propaganda has charged that South Vietnam is supporting pro-Western forces in Laos and that it threatens peace in Southeast Asia.} [redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~Situation in Angola

[redacted] officials in Angola believe the situation is worsening and that the terrorist activity can be countered only with increased military actions. On 11 April Luanda asked that additional rifles and machine guns be sent from Portugal for distribution to the civilian militia and to the police. Troop reinforcements from Lisbon reportedly have been landed in coastal cities north and south of Luanda, and an official Angolan communiqué announced that further "important" reinforcements would arrive soon.

In recent months there has been some discussion between South Africa and Portugal on military aid and mutual protection. Previous initiatives aimed at closer military cooperation between the two nations have come largely from South Africa. [redacted]

{ In New York, Angola Peoples' Union (UPA) leader Holden Roberto told American officials that he would continue the current UPA campaign of violence in Angola in an effort to retain the initiative won from pro-Communist groups. He further asserted that UPA would be satisfied with nothing less than a target date within three years for independence. }

[redacted] { In Portugal, Salazar's supporters reportedly felt confident on 14 April that the prime minister's dismissal of key military ministers the previous day had prevented a planned "coup" led by Moniz. [redacted] the new army minister is rapidly completing a change of unit commanders to counteract any immediate move by Moniz, and the pro-Moniz commander of the Lisbon military district has been replaced. Moniz' own whereabouts is unknown. [redacted] if Moniz failed to act on 14 April, he would have missed his chance since many unit commanders loyal to him would have then been replaced. }

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~~SECRET~~Reported Soviet Influence on Provisional Algerian Government

[redacted] reported [redacted]
on "guidance" given him by Soviet Deputy Premier Kosygin.

[redacted] Kosygin advised the Algerians not to meet with the French unless the PAG were recognized as the sole representative of Algeria and were prepared to achieve a complete break with France, i. e., no bases and no French political or economic influence. Kosygin stressed that an independent Algeria should follow the pattern of Nasir and Touré, avoiding the "Bourguibaism" of Tunisia, and he warned the PAG to be wary of French moves and to treat with suspicion any overtures from the US. Algerian representatives who had consulted with Nasir also reported along similar lines.

[redacted] presentation was reportedly very convincing, and, coupled with French Minister for Algerian Affairs Louis Joxe's confirmation that the French would consult with other Algerian groups, could have persuaded the PAG that it should at least delay the opening of negotiations.

[redacted] De Gaulle reportedly was briefed on 6 April about the Soviet recommendations and the PAG reaction to them. His 11 April press conference, which further clarified but did not change his basic policy of self-determination for Algeria, may have reflected this knowledge both in its general castigation of "Soviet imperialism" and in the "almost certain" extension of Communism to Algeria if the rebels chose a complete rupture with France. Joxe told the American Embassy in Paris prior to Tunisian President Bourguiba's February meeting with De Gaulle that the USSR was "complicating matters" by trying to insert itself into the general Algerian picture.

[redacted] De Gaulle's speeches on his current provincial tour have continued his appeals to the rebel leadership to "be reasonable".

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and accept French offers of cooperation. Approximately one sixth of the Algerians detained in camps have been released this week in a further gesture of good intent. De Gaulle's Sunday speech in Bordeaux--being billed as a major address--
~~may contain some new initiative.~~ []

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~~SECRET~~Israeli Spy Scandal Threatens Ben-Gurion

{The accused spy is Dr. Israel Baer, who has been military correspondent for Haaretz, Israel's most respected newspaper, and professor of military science at the Tel Aviv branch of Hebrew University. A native of Vienna, he is a graduate of the Austrian military academy. He took part in the Austrian socialist uprisings of 1934, joined the international brigade in the Spanish Civil War, and reportedly was among those officers of the brigade who were to be sent to Russia for special training at the Frunze Military Academy. However, he allegedly became a convinced Zionist "almost overnight" and went to Palestine instead. He served in a military staff capacity during the Arab-Israeli war and in recent years has been an Israeli Army historian. Before becoming closely associated with Ben-Gurion, Baer was a member of the extreme socialist Mapam party in Israel}

{The Israeli elections scheduled for 15 August were forced by the unwillingness of most other parties to serve again in a government under Ben-Gurion as prime minister. The Mapai party, however, refused to form a new coalition without the participation of its 74-year old leader. The prolonged crisis over the Lavon affair and Ben-Gurion's seemingly vindictive determination to crush Pinhas Lavon as a political challenger have alienated many of the prime minister's former supporters. His main political asset--his stature as pre-eminent defender of Israel's security--now is threatened by the espionage scandal. Even before this development, Mapai was expected to lose several parliamentary seats.}

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Somali Republic Fears Ethiopian Aggression

Sporadic clashes have occurred over the years between Ethiopians and Somali tribesmen who follow their flocks into the Ethiopian Ogaden in search of pasturage during the dry seasons. Recently, however, Somali nomads are reported to have taken part in organized efforts against the Ethiopian authorities, including political and paramilitary activities. On 2 April Somali infiltrators allegedly inspired tribal inhabitants of Dagabur--an Ogaden village located about 60 miles inside Ethiopian territory--to demonstrate for permission to organize a political party and to seek independence for the Somali-inhabited areas of Ethiopia. After Ethiopian security forces arrived on the scene, fighting broke out in which 115 were reported killed.

[redacted] the "whole civilian population of Gabredarre"--largely Somali--approached the provincial office and "demanded independence"; the governor was able to placate them, however, by promising to refer the matter to higher authority.

The Dagabur incident is believed the first major outbreak of violence between Ogaden Somalis and Ethiopians since last December's clash at Danot, when several hundred Ethiopian troops and armed Somalis were involved. The Danot clash began when nomads from the Somali Republic attempted to use water holes already held by Somalis domiciled in Ethiopia. After two days of minor skirmishes involving Ethiopian police, the nomads withdrew across the Somali border for reinforcements. They returned--allegedly reinforced by a well-trained and -equipped paramilitary force--and attacked the local Ethiopian police garrison, but were repulsed by Ethiopian army units supported by aircraft. Addis Ababa reported 260 casualties in the conflict including 60 dead, and the Somali casualties were probably even greater.

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~~SECRET~~Honduras

Villeda is accused by his rightist opposition of weakening Honduran military forces while building up the politically dominated civil guard, of being lax toward the Communist and Castro elements, who are very active, and of tolerating Salvadoran exiles claimed to be plotting in Honduras. Leftists, including the radical wing of his own Liberal party, dislike his friendliness with the United States, his modus vivendi with armed forces chief Colonel Osvaldo Lopez, and his sporadic anti-Communist moves. They consider all these prejudicial to the interests of the Liberal party, which before Villeda's election to a six-year term in 1957 had been out of power for 25 years while the country was under military and authoritarian governments.

Villeda's maneuvers to compromise between left and right have satisfied neither. Conservative groups have recently stepped up their activity against him. Conservative Nationalist party members reportedly fear that if they do not move soon, their chances of regaining power will be lost. They are believed to be plotting with military officials who fear that Villeda's neglect of the armed forces will soon leave them powerless. Colonel Lopez, however, has consistently resisted their approaches for his support of a coup, despite his distrust of Villeda.

Both the Nationalists and the military have been in close contact with Salvadoran officials. These in turn have been encouraging Armando Velasquez, a Honduran revolutionary who has made several unsuccessful attempts to overthrow Villeda. Velasquez, reportedly believing Salvadoran and other Central American governments were not prepared to give him sufficient support, planned to return to Spain on 13 April.

However, Villeda, evidently convinced that a combination of rightist forces backed by the Honduran military was preparing to move against him soon, acted accordingly [In addition]

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[redacted] to his alerting order of 12 April, he made a nationwide radio denunciation of leftist and rightist groups which opposed his "liberal, impartial, and democratic" administration and would undertake the "criminal adventure" of overthrowing the legal government. [redacted] On 13 April, in an apparent move to reassure the Salvadoran governing directorate, Villeda sent an urgent message to the directorate through his ambassador stating that exiled former Salvadoran President Osorio was not in Honduras and would not be allowed to stay if he sought asylum there. [redacted]

[redacted]

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