


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
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DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

DIA and DOS have no objection to declassification and release

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Congo: [The UN plan to re-enter Matadi has been postponed. According to high officials in the UN Secretariat, the decision to move more slowly was made partly because Hammarskjold's plan was opposed by his military officers in the Congo on grounds they did not have sufficient military strength.]

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Ethiopia: The Emperor's decision of 22 March to yield to the demands of army elements for an increase in enlisted pay scales has lessened--at least temporarily--the threat to his regime. The Emperor, however, has suffered a loss in prestige by surrendering to a threat of force. This incident, moreover, may serve as a precedent for future threats to the regime by other dissatisfied groups.

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South Korea: Scattered violence and the appearance of pro-Communist themes in the later stages of a demonstration in Seoul on 22 March are probably the result of organized subversion. This demonstration, like others in major South Korean cities against a proposed anti-Communist law, failed to attract wide public support. However, it did succeed in arousing considerable emotion stemming from fears of a return to the repressive practices of the Rhee regime and led the press to take a common position opposing the bill. The government has reportedly decided to drop the proposed legislation. The police showed some improvement in their ability to control limited crowds but they still appear incapable of handling large-scale disturbances.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Situation in the Congo

One UN official in New York implied that if tensions lessened as a result of Kasavubu's current visit to the Lower Congo area, a military operation might not be necessary. However, civilians in the UN Command in Leopoldville continue to press local officials to permit a return to Matadi. The UN administrative officer said on 23 March that the command had had no information concerning the arrival of goods in the port since its officers were forced out early in March. As a result, it has issued no instructions for shipping goods inland. Officials of OTRACO, the company which operates the port facilities and the railroad to Leopoldville, apparently believe that the UN has deliberately refused to issue forwarding instructions, since to do so would weaken its claim that a UN presence in Matadi is necessary.

The heads of state of the twelve "Brazzaville powers"--the former French territories in tropical Africa with the exception of Guinea, Mali, and Togo--are to meet at Yaoundé in Cameroun from 26 to 31 March. At this time they hope to develop a common policy on the Congo.

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Cleophas Kamitatu, a former ally of Gizenga who has been cooperating with the Leopoldville government, reportedly is to leave the capital for Stanleyville on Saturday for negotiations with the Gizenga regime. Optimism is high in Leopoldville that a reconciliation can be reached; however, Gizenga's opposition to the central government and its supporters apparently has hardened. He has expelled the five Western consuls from Stanleyville and reportedly told a visiting journalist that there was "not the slightest possibility of reaching a compromise" between his regime and Leopoldville.

In preliminary talks with Hammarskjold's personal representative in Brussels, Belgian Foreign Ministry officials took the position that the only way to settle the question of withdrawing

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Belgian officers from areas controlled by Kasavubu is to have the three parties involved "thrash out the question of individual officers." Even if such a conference could be organized, it is doubtful that it would prove productive.

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Haile Selassie Capitulates to Army Demands

The announced pay increases, which equal the amount promised by the short-lived rebel regime last December, are also to apply to the 28,500-member police force; they apparently do not extend, however, to the air force and the navy. The latter services, which to date have not been involved in significant antiregime activity, apparently are not to receive higher pay because of budgetary considerations. In the future, however, they may join forces with civil servants, whose salaries are to be cut to defray the cost of the army and police pay raises, to create further difficulties for the regime.

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The US Embassy believes that the events of the past few days were well organized.

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Menghistu, whose trial has been in progress since 27 February, is gaining acceptance as the symbol of reform in Ethiopia. Should he be executed, as expected, a new crisis will confront Haile Selassie.

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Demonstrations in South Korea

The demonstrations on 22 March were conducted by about a thousand reformist political agitators and students, but a small, hard-core subversive group is believed to have been responsible for the appearance of pro-Communist slogans favoring Korean unification and for several clashes with the police which occurred during the last stages of the demonstrations.

The demonstrations were staged to protest efforts by the Chang Myon government to tighten the law passed in June 1960 which prohibited membership in or conscious support of Communist groups. One draft law would have punished persons who praised or encouraged antistate organizations--not clearly defined--and their members, or who were in any way involved in defections to North Korea. This law would have increased the maximum penalty for illegal entry from North Korea from five years' imprisonment to death and would have authorized military intelligence agencies to investigate civilians suspected of violating security laws.

A second draft bill would have limited public demonstrations to one-half hour's duration and prohibited demonstrators from blocking public buildings, using loudspeakers, or conducting demonstrations in front of foreign official buildings and private residences.

As a result of its failure to pass the draft legislation, the government presumably will depend on stricter enforcement of existing regulations and more effective police work to control demonstrations, disorders, and subversive activities.

American Ambassador McConaughy comments, however, that such countermeasures provide no fundamental cure. Underlying public apprehension about security legislation is gradually increasing dissatisfaction with the Chang government for its failure to move quickly in the field of economic reform. A demonstration in Seoul on 23 March by 2,000 members of the Korean

Unemployed Association criticized the government for its preoccupation with antisubversive measures and called for speedy implementation of the National Construction Service program, which is designed to utilize large pools of unemployed persons in nationwide public works projects. Further demonstrations are expected in April to celebrate the first anniversary of the ouster of the Rhee government.

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