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29 September 1960

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
# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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29 SEPTEMBER 1960

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

North Vietnam wants to stay out of Sino-Soviet dispute.

Sino-Burmese border treaty apparently hits snag. [redacted]

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
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## III. THE WEST

⑦ Ecuadorean foreign minister reportedly to talk trade with Khrushchev at UN.

## LATE ITEM

⑧ Situation in Laos.

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

29 September 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

*SIR AB*

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

North Vietnam - USSR - Communist China: Ho Chi Minh intends to keep North Vietnam out of the Sino-Soviet dispute,

[redacted] Ho de-  
plored the effect the dispute was having on the Communist movement outside the bloc. He said that after the Bucharest conference he had tried to get Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung to "sit together and resolve their differences" but both had refused. Although Ho indicated personal preference for certain Chinese views, his noncommittal policy is borne out by recent North Vietnamese speeches.

(Page 1)

*OK*

Burma - Communist China: The Sino-Burmese border treaty, scheduled to be a major showpiece of Communist China's National Day ceremonies in Peiping on 1 October, appears to have run into a snag. Peiping has rejected a Burmese draft article which defines the entire border in detail, preferring to leave this to future discussions.

[redacted] Nu agreed that his chief negotiator, Brigadier Aung Gyi, must insist on the detailed border description. Prime Minister Nu and his party for the treaty-signing ceremonies arrived in Peiping on 28 September.

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(Page 2)

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

USSR-Guinea: The Soviet freighter Firyuza began unloading a shipment--believed to be arms--at the port of Conakry on

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23 September. Stringent security precautions were being observed, and unloading was continuing as of 27 September.

[redacted] the Firyuza between 22 and 28 August loaded 1,750 tons of cargo at the Black Sea port of Nikolaev, the usual port of origin for Soviet army shipments. This would be the second known major arms shipment to Guinea from a Soviet bloc country, the first being the delivery in early 1959 of a sizable quantity of gift arms from Czechoslovakia.

India-Pakistan: [In "frank and friendly" conversations during Nehru's five-day visit to Pakistan, he and President Ayub reportedly discussed the question of Kashmir at some length. While not modifying their opposing positions, they agreed that a solution must be worked out eventually.]

Nehru was impressed with Ayub and that the two leaders established a personal rapport. Nehru believes that Ayub can reach agreements on mutual problems more readily than other Pakistani leaders. Ayub has accepted Nehru's invitation to visit New Delhi, probably in February. Despite these encouraging developments, their positions on terms for a Kashmir settlement are still far apart, and no early settlement is likely.]

(Page 3)

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Afghanistan-Pakistan: The danger of clashes between Afghan and Pakistani regular forces is mounting as tribal fighting along the frontier continues and Afghan forces become more deeply involved. The Pakistani Air Force is organizing an air drop for use in the event it is decided to send regular army troops into the area. Meanwhile, there are reports of disturbances in some Afghan cities, possibly a result of opposition to the call-up of reserves.

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\*Republic of the Congo: [Army chief Mobutu continues under pressure from UN representative Dayal and from Congolese army elements to impose a reconciliation of divergent political elements and permit the resumption of civil government. The round-table conference of Congo's political leaders, which is expected to convene in Leopoldville around 1 October, may bring a showdown between pro- and anti-Lumumba forces. President Kasavubu]

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[has told the American ambassador that he has no intention of effecting a reconciliation with Lumumba.]

[ ] a disposition on the part of the UAR, Ghanaian, and Guinean contingents to intervene actively on Lumumba's behalf. The commander of the UAR force reported to Cairo on 26 September that "we are strengthening the company at the airport," and that by 3 October it will receive "an antitank troop and some lorries without the UN headquarters' knowledge." [ ]

(Page 5)

### III. THE WEST

**Ecuador - Soviet Bloc:** Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Chiriboga is reported planning to take advantage of the current UN General Assembly session to talk privately with Khrushchev on trade, and with Castro on Cuban support for Ecuador in its boundary dispute with Peru. Chiriboga and President Velasco have stated recently that Ecuador would trade with any countries offering favorable conditions, including those of the bloc. The leftist Ecuadorean minister of education arrived in Czechoslovakia about 19 September for an official visit to negotiate the acquisition of educational equipment. His mission may also involve small-arms purchases to strengthen Ecuador's position in its boundary dispute with Peru. [ ] (Page 6)

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### IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

- A. [No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the US or its possessions in the immediate future.  
te: [ ]]
- B. [No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.]

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Note:

The Soviet note of 26 September, reaffirming East Germany's sovereignty over its territory including "its capital," continues the bloc campaign of gradually undermining the Western position in Berlin, an effort which may be expected to continue for some time to come, without intentionally bringing about a major crisis.

Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action: Laos.

Although opposing elements are attempting to negotiate a compromise, the situation has further deteriorated, as General Phoumi's capability to exert pressures which would lessen Communist inroads has decreased. The Pathet Lao possess military and political advantages which they can exploit effectively.

#### LATE ITEM

\*Laos: The capture on 28 September of Sam Neua town, with its key airfield, will give the Communist Pathet Lao important bargaining leverage in any peace talks with the royal Laotian government. The status of the Sam Neua garrison is not clear, but it had earlier been reported planning to establish new defense positions at Muong Peun, about 20 miles southwest of Sam Neua town. Support of this position would be extremely difficult because of its relative inaccessibility by surface means and because its small airstrip is only marginally serviceable. Vientiane radio claims, meanwhile, that there has been a revolt in the Second Military Region command structure and that the region, which has jurisdiction over Sam Neua and Xieng Khouang Provinces, has now swung its support to the Souvanna Phouma government. If this is true, Lao army forces in Sam Neua may negotiate a truce with the Pathet Lao rather than make a stand at Muong Peun.

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29 Sept 60

DAILY BRIEF

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Military commanders representing the Souvanna regime and General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee agreed in Luang Prabang on 28 September to a cease-fire between their respective forces pending the outcome of negotiations on substantive points at issue between the two groups. These talks are slated to begin within five days.

(Page 8)

29 Sept 60

DAILY BRIEF

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~~SECRET~~North Vietnam Hopes to Stay Out of Sino-Soviet Feud

[Ho Chi Minh intends to keep North Vietnam out of the Sino-Soviet dispute.]

[Ho expressed deep concern about the feud, deplored its effect on Communist movements outside the bloc.]

[The North Vietnamese leader, who made an unannounced trip to Moscow in mid-August and has consistently stressed the need for "socialist unity" in recent speeches, admitted his own efforts at mediation had failed. He said that after the Bucharest conference in June, he had tried to get Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung to "sit together and resolve their differences" but each, convinced that his position alone was the correct one, had refused. Ho complained "neither Khrushchev nor Mao seemed to realize" the damage their dispute was doing.]

[An old-line revolutionary determined to overthrow the present government of South Vietnam, Ho expressed some personal views which would be more acceptable in Peiping than in Moscow. In Ho's opinion, the "bourgeois" elements who brought Afro-Asian nations from colonial status to independence had served their purpose and should now be disposed of by "class struggle." Ho also sided with Peiping's stand on the Indian border.]

[Whatever his private sentiments, Ho's noncommittal policy was borne out by his speeches at the North Vietnamese congress. North Vietnamese writers and spokesmen have continued since then to avoid those aspects of the ideological debate which could be construed as criticism of either Khrushchev or Mao Tse-tung.]

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~~TOP SECRET~~Last-Minute Obstacle in Sino-Burmese Border Negotiations

Negotiations for the Sino-Burmese border treaty, scheduled as a major showpiece of Communist China's 1 October National Day celebrations, have run into an obstacle. Peiping's negotiators have rejected a Burmese draft article which defines the border in detail, preferring to leave such detailed definition to "future discussions." Throughout the negotiations the Burmese negotiators have consistently demanded exactitude in the treaty's language to avoid the dangers of future disagreements.

[redacted] Prime Minister Nu, anxious to have the treaty signed on schedule, at first recommended that his chief negotiator accept the Chinese position. Subsequently faced with a strong protest from Brigadier Aung Gyi in Peiping and hesitancy in the Burmese Foreign Ministry, he authorized Aung Gyi on 26 September to insist on the detailed statement but reserved for himself the right to review the disputed article after his arrival in Peiping on 28 September.

Since U Nu resumed the prime ministership on 5 April, he has carefully avoided taking any action directly opposed by army leaders. As he will have the advice in Peiping of both General Ne Win and Brigadier Aung Gyi, it appears unlikely that he will again accept the Chinese position. Brigadier Aung Gyi, who distrusts Chinese intentions, has explained his insistence on the detailed description by stating, "I personally feel it is of no use to discuss the dowry the morning after the wedding night." [redacted]

[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~Nehru-Ayub Talks

(Conversations between Ayub Khan and Nehru during the Indian prime minister's five-day visit to Pakistan to sign the Indus waters agreement were "frank and friendly" and apparently established a high degree of rapport between the two leaders.

[they discussed at some length and without acrimony the troublesome question of Kashmir. Although neither seemed willing at this time to budge from previous positions, both recognized the importance of a solution in terms of long-range stability in the subcontinent and agreed on the urgency of working out an agreement that both nations can live with.)

(Nehru, reportedly impressed by the Pakistani President, believes that Ayub, more than any previous Pakistani leader, can work out agreements on common problems. He has invited Ayub to visit him in New Delhi, probably in February, to continue their talks. The leaders agreed to correspond during the next few months in order to establish some basis for their future discussions on Kashmir and other problems)

(While no settlement of the Kashmir issue is yet in sight, the tone set by the two leaders and the momentum created by the formal resolution of the Indus waters dispute probably will lead to further negotiations and possible early agreement on other Indo-Pakistani problems, such as relaxation of visa restrictions, settlement of partition debts, and agreement on through rail travel.)

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~~SECRET~~Danger of Afghan-Pakistani Strife Increasing

The danger of clashes between Afghan and Pakistani army units is mounting as tribal fighting along the frontier continues, with heavy casualties, and Afghan forces become more deeply involved.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Qadir announced on 28 September that "the government of Pakistan is holding itself in readiness for all eventualities and is capable of dealing effectively with all attempts at violating Pakistan's frontiers." He emphasized Afghanistan's "hostile concentrations" along the border, and stated that the Afghans reportedly are claiming that they have the support of a "certain big power." [As an indication of the extent of its concern, the foreign secretary on 28 September called in the Soviet and American ambassadors to present his government's views on the situation. In commenting on rumors of Soviet promises of military support to Afghanistan, he told the Soviet ambassador, "We expect and hope the USSR will not get involved."]

The Pakistani Air Force is organizing an air drop in the event it is decided to send regular army troops into the mountains where the fighting is taking place. The Pakistanis apparently hope, however, that tribes friendly to Pakistan will gain control, expel the Afghan irregulars who have crossed the border, and restore order.

The Afghans have shown considerable concern about Pakistan's reaction to the border provocations. [Kabul has apparently placed its Soviet-supplied MIG-17 jet fighters on the alert.] Afghanistan's continued efforts to strengthen its military position along the border are probably directed at preventing Pakistan from stirring up trouble among Afghanistan's tribes as well as at encouraging tribal opposition to Pakistani authority across the border.

Meanwhile, there are reports of disturbances in some Afghan cities, possibly a result of opposition to the call-up of reserves. Many reservists are reportedly already deserting.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Situation in the Congo

The round-table conference of Congolese political leaders, which will probably convene in Leopoldville around 1 October, may bring a showdown between pro- and anti-Lumumba forces. President Kasavubu [redacted] has no intention of effecting a reconciliation with Lumumba. Army chief Mobutu, however, is under pressure from both the UN Command and the army to impose a reconciliation satisfactory to Lumumba.]

Lumumba, [redacted]

[redacted] said army leaders were planning to convene parliament following the round-table conference and to announce at that time a reconciliation among major political elements. Lumumba, however, characterized himself as "in control of the situation," and stated that he had promised the army delegates to placate opposition leaders by offering them cabinet posts.

While prospects for any genuine reconciliation among the Congo's diverse political factions appear poor, there are indications that the round-table conference may be the occasion for active intervention on behalf of Lumumba by Ghana, Guinea, and the UAR.

"the Guineans informed me this morning that they have received instructions from Sekou Touré to work outside the sphere of the UN." On the same day,

[redacted] it had been agreed among Ghana, Guinea, and the UAR that their contingents of the UN force should assemble in Leopoldville.

"we are strengthening the company at the airport," and that by 3 October it will receive "an antitank troop and some lorries... without the UN headquarters' knowledge."

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~~TOP SECRET~~Ecuador Considering Expansion of Trade With the Bloc

Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Chiriboga is reported planning private talks with Khrushchev on trade during the UN General Assembly session. He may also have seen Castro to seek Cuban support in Ecuador's long-standing boundary dispute with Peru.

Ecuadorean President Velasco and Chiriboga have stated recently that Ecuador would trade with any countries--including the bloc--offering favorable conditions. Sergio Quirola, the leftist minister of education, arrived in Czechoslovakia on 19 September for an official visit to negotiate the acquisition of technical educational equipment. His mission may also involve the purchase of small arms to strengthen Ecuador's position vis-a-vis Peru. [ ] the Czechs paid travel expenses to Prague for Quirola and an unidentified Ecuadorean military attaché in Europe. [ ] Dutch and British diplomats in Quito have heard similar reports of Ecuador's interest in acquiring Czech arms.]

Ecuadorean-Czech trade negotiations apparently were initiated during a recent visit to Ecuador by the Czech minister to Brazil--also accredited to Quito. He offered a \$10,000,000 loan and also suggested barter arrangements. There are no resident bloc missions in Ecuador, but trade negotiations now under way may lead to the early re-establishment of the Czech mission, which was ousted in September 1957.

Before and after his inauguration on 1 September, President Velasco--supported by Chiriboga--has made public statements tantamount to a unilateral denunciation of the Rio Protocol of 1942, which provides for settlement of the Peruvian-Ecuadorian boundary problem. This strongly nationalistic issue has been a potential source of armed conflict on several occasions in recent years, and the USSR may now be studying a means to exploit it. [ ]

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[redacted] the Ecuadorean ambassador in Montevideo advised his government that a secretary of the Soviet Legation there had requested "complete texts of the statements of the President of the Republic on the frontier problem with Peru, and he appeared very greatly interested in learning... details."

[redacted]

[redacted]

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### The Situation in Laos

Sam Neua town, with its key airfield, has apparently fallen to the Pathet Lao forces which have been gradually advancing on it since about 1 September. The fate of the Sam Neua garrison is not clear, but it had been earlier reported planning to establish new defense positions at Muong Peun, about 25 miles southwest of Sam Neua town. While Muong Peun is described as a good defensive position, support of troops there would probably present serious problems. It would be difficult to supply and reinforce the garrison by surface means, and Muong Peun's small airstrip is only marginally serviceable. Control of Sam Neua town, the military and administrative center of Sam Neua Province, will give the Pathet Lao important bargaining leverage in any peace talks with the royal government.

Vientiane radio has broadcast a statement by Lt. Col. Kham Hou, military commander in Xieng Khouang Province, claiming that he had assumed command of the Second Military Region and pledging his loyalty to the Souvanna Phouma government. The region, which embraces Sam Neua and Xieng Khouang Provinces, has been loyal to General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee. It is as yet unclear whether Kham Hou can legitimately speak for the whole region, but if the region has in fact swung to Souvanna, it constitutes a serious blow to Phoumi's fortunes. Any such switch might also lead the Lao army forces in Sam Neua to negotiate a truce rather than offer further resistance to the Pathet Lao.

[Military commanders representing the Souvanna regime and the Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee, led by Generals Ouane and Phoumi respectively, held a short meeting in Luang Prabang on 28 September which resulted in a cease-fire agreement between their forces. This meeting is to be followed within five days by a full dress conference of military and political leaders from both sides who will seek to resolve the substantive points at issue. A mutually face-saving compromise will be difficult to achieve.]

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Souvanna Phouma, in confirming to Ambassador Brown that his government had approached the Soviet ambassador in Phnom Penh with the suggestion that diplomatic relations with non-resident envoys be established, pleaded the pressure of "public opinion" as the reason for his move. He added that relations would not actually be established for at least a month. Should a new government emerge from the impending political conference, it is possible that the effort to establish relations with the USSR will be quietly dropped.

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