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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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
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DAILY BRIEF

Sirah

*Congo: Ambassador Timberlake is extremely concerned *OK*
 over the explosive atmosphere developing between the UN com-*in Brief*
 mand and Congolese forces. He says the UN command seems
 increasingly likely to use a display of force which he fears would *delete*
 complicate rather than solve the problem and could spell dis-*Ind. sent of P 2*
 aster for the UN effort in the Congo. Press reports that Ham-*of P 2*
 marrskjold has asked UN special representative Dayal to remain *in Backup*
 for "some months," if confirmed, will exacerbate the situation
 in view of the already acute antipathy between Dayal and the *delete*
 Congolese government. *Ind. sent of P 3*

[Belgium's announcement that it will withdraw its troops *at 1st instance*
 from the Kamina and Kitona bases by 15 March and "invite" *of P 3*
 Belgian mercenaries to return home will probably be regarded by pro-Gizenga states in the UN as only token acceptance by
 Belgium of demands that all Belgian military personnel and advisers be removed from the Congo. Hammarskjold has indicated he hoped the Belgian announcement would meet Indian conditions for furnishing more troops to the UN Command. The Belgian action will not necessarily influence the numerous Belgian advisers to Tshombé in Katanga, or the nearly 1,000 non-Belgian Europeans reportedly serving in Tshombé's army.]

[Tshombé and his vice president and rival, Jean Kibwe, are reportedly quarreling over the agreement Tshombé signed with Ileo and Kalonji on 28 February, and over the role to be played by French Colonel Trinquier, who was offered the post of commander of Katanga's military forces on 2 February. This was apparently done over Tshombe's objections, and Trinquier reportedly has now arrived in Elisabethville despite Tshombé's efforts to have him detained by the British in Rhodesia. Kibwe]

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[opposes any accord with Leopoldville, and Tshombé is said to fear that Trinquier may assist Kibwe and others to take over the Katanga government.] [] (Backup, Page 1)
 (Map)

France-Algeria: [Tunisian President Bourguiba now seems convinced that De Gaulle has decided all aspects of colonialism must disappear from Algeria, even to the point of full independence. Bourguiba reportedly went from Paris to Rabat determined to induce rebel premier Ferhat Abbas to respond to De Gaulle's overtures. Bourguiba is presumably aware that some rebel leaders are distrustful of negotiations with France. Previous reports have raised the question whether all rebel military commanders would comply with orders to end the fighting, should such orders be given by the provisional Algerian government in the course of negotiations with De Gaulle. The 1 March joint communiqué issued by Abbas, Bourguiba, and King Hassan of Morocco declaring that the way is now open to direct negotiations for Algerian independence in a North African framework suggests that Tunisia and Morocco desire to have some role in French-rebel negotiations.] [] No

(Backup, Page 3)

USSR-UAR: [The USSR is continuing military aid deliveries to the UAR. In addition to a shipment of at least 12 MIG-19 jet fighters to Alexandria in late January, another Soviet merchant ship arrived with an 1,800-ton cargo of arms in late February. Two more Soviet vessels, whose destinations are not yet known, have loaded an additional 6,200 tons of military equipment at the Black Sea port of Nikolaev,] [] No

(Backup, Page 5)

*Laos: [Souvanna Phouma, who returned to Phnom Penh on 1 March after a week in northern Laos, is reported to have reached a decision with his supporters in Pathet Lao - held territory that a 14-power conference is the only means to a peaceful solution of] [] OK
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the Laotian crisis.

the object of this conference would be to discuss the formation of a neutralist all-party government for Laos, excluding Phoumi and all military figures; the Pathet Lao are said to be insistent on Souvanna Phouma as prime minister of such a government. General elections would then be held as soon as possible under the supervision of the 14 nations. General Phoumi, meanwhile, says he still hopes to confer with Souvanna, but is proceeding with separate plans to revamp the Boun Oum government regardless of Souvanna's attitude toward accepting a post.

Souvanna is reported to have found the Kong Le - Pathet Lao troops "extremely well organized," with high morale, and actively recruiting new personnel. The Plaine des Jarres area held by these troops is said to have been completely brought under the Communist way of life; Communist slogans and leftist youth groups are prominent throughout the area.

SELECTED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action With Respect to Laos. U. S. I. B. SNIE 58-61.21 February 1961. 0036778. ~~(TOP SECRET)~~

Prospects for Iran: Stability of the Shah's Regime, the Role of the Military, the Economy, and Foreign Policy Toward US and USSR. U. S. I. B. NIE 34-61. 28 February 1961. ~~(SECRET)~~

Comparison of Capital Investment in the US and the USSR, 1950-59. Bibliography, graphs, tables. O. R. R. CIA/RR ER 61-7. 57pp. February 1961. ~~(UNCLASSIFIED)~~

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Situation in the Congo

Ambassador Timberlake believes that Hammarskjold and his staff have been so conditioned by Dayal's reporting that they might consider any incident to be the "final straw" and feel that the time had come for a display of force.

Dayal has recently been described by the Indonesian representative in Leopoldville as in a "revengeful mood" for the attacks and humiliation he has suffered.

Although Congolese soldiers lack the will to fight each other--as illustrated by the recent Luluabourg incident--they would probably fight UN troops, especially in the present atmosphere of Congolese suspicion and distrust of the UN. Kasavubu's speech of 27 February "mobilizing" the country against UN "tutelage" and calling for volunteers has, according to a Brussels broadcast of 2 March, already produced over 12,000 reservists and volunteers--probably more than the Leopoldville government can arm. Ambassador Timberlake feels that UN troops would win any actual battle with Congolese forces--but that Congolese troops elsewhere would retaliate against Europeans and isolated UN personnel.

The British consul in Elisabethville reports that Kibwe was conspicuously absent from a luncheon given by Tshombé for Iléo and Kalonji on 28 February. The consul also corroborated that Colonel Trinquier was in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, on 28 February, along with other officers, and that Tshombé had asked him to arrange for Trinquier to be detained there.

Other reports state that Trinquier left Paris for Elisabethville, via Brussels, on 26 February, after having given his word to French Minister of Armies Messmer that he would not leave France for two weeks. Trinquier reportedly took with him 12 former Free French army officers holding ranks from captain to lieutenant colonel. Reports in January indicated that if Trinquier accepted the position as commander of Katanga's forces, he would import 15 or 20 French officers to fill key

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[] positions in the army, plus one to be attached to each ministry of the Katangan government.]

[] three Fouga Magister jet trainers of French manufacture being assembled without difficulty. The commander of the Katangan air force said that he had opposed the purchase of these planes, as their range is insufficient for support of ground troops operating in northern Katanga and there is only one airfield in Katanga currently capable of handling them. The Katangan commander said that although the aircraft had wing racks for training bombs and rockets, the government of Katanga has no armament nor any prospects of receiving any. He admitted that the "bombs" dropped near Manono on 30 January had been made from pipes filled with TNT, and had been employed at the insistence of the minister of defense "to scare the natives." The commander concluded that these aircraft were of little use other than to increase the prestige of the Katangan government. The rest of Katanga's air force consists of six Piper cubs, nine other assorted propeller-driven planes, and five helicopters. []

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[Redacted]
De Gaulle - Bourguiba Talks

[One of De Gaulle's major objectives in inviting Bourguiba to visit Paris was to convince the Tunisian President of his willingness to negotiate a settlement of the Algerian war and to have this impression conveyed to the leaders of the provisional Algerian government. De Gaulle probably hoped thereby to strengthen the moderate wing of the rebel movement and encourage steps toward negotiations on terms acceptable to France. De Gaulle has in the past indicated that he will insist on guarantees for the Europeans in Algeria and for certain French economic interests and military base rights.]

[Following his Paris conversation with De Gaulle, Bourguiba told Ambassador Averill Harriman in Rabat he believed there was no longer any real difficulty on the French side. He said De Gaulle understood the necessity of preventing a recurrence of the stalemate last June when preliminary talks failed to settle even matters of protocol. Bourguiba is optimistic that De Gaulle will free rebel leader Ben Bella and give sympathetic consideration to the release of political prisoners detained by the French in Algeria.]

[In an effort to move the rebels to negotiations, Bourguiba has broadcast to the Algerians in Tunisia stressing his conviction of the genuineness of De Gaulle's intentions. Bourguiba apparently has in mind, however, that negotiations could fail because of the inability of the moderate leaders to control all factions of the rebel movement. Some 15,000 to 20,000 rebel fighters operate in Algeria with only a minimum of coordination and control by the rebel government in Tunis. If these forces object to a moderate settlement and continue military and terrorist activities, De Gaulle might halt political negotiations.]

[In another report on the Bourguiba - De Gaulle conversation, Habib Bourguiba, Jr., recently nominated as Tunisian ambassador to the US, said that De Gaulle "silenced" French Premier Debré, whose statements had nearly prevented the Bourguiba - De Gaulle meeting. Debré, while on a visit to the Sahara, said in a public statement that France intended to remain there.]

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According to Bourguiba, Jr., Debr  also made difficulties during Tunisian Secretary of State for Information Masmoudi's earlier trips to Paris to arrange the Bourguiba - De Gaulle meeting.

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Soviet Arms Deliveries to the UAR

The last large-scale Soviet deliveries to the UAR were made to the Syrian region in the fall of 1958 under an agreement concluded prior to the formation of the UAR. Moscow may now be prepared to provide Cairo with some of the materiel it has asked for since then, including T-54 medium tanks, additional naval equipment, and more jet aircraft. [The UAR reportedly expects early delivery of three Soviet submarines.] Moscow has also promised more jet fighters, presumably MIG-19s.

Since late November there has been a large increase in the processing of military cargo for export at the Black Sea port of Nikolaev. Most of this has been shipped to Iraq, but recently, although large quantities of materiel continue to arrive at Nikolaev, shipments consigned for delivery to Iraq have fallen off. Arms shipments to Cuba have been at a low level since the extensive deliveries last fall, and shipments to Indonesia under the January arms agreement have not yet begun in quantity. Furthermore, two of the ships which recently loaded arms cargoes at Nikolaev normally are used in Middle East traffic by the USSR. This suggests that the current preparations are for shipments to the UAR.

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