

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

23 January 1952



3.5(c)

Copy No.

49

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 35

NO CHANGE IN CLASS

( DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS

NEXT REVIEW DATE:


AUTH: HR 70-8

DATE: 12-49-21 REVIEWER: A rectangular redaction box.

3.5(c)

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

**SUMMARY****GENERAL**

1. Italy maneuvers for admission to United Nations (page 3).

**FAR EAST**

2. Reports of political unrest in Thailand continue (page 3).
3. Malayan Police rivalries hamper security operation (page 4).

**SOUTH ASIA**

4. Chinese Communists advocating "liberation" of Kashmir provinces (page 4).

**NEAR EAST - AFRICA**

5. Czechs ready to buy oil from Iran (page 5).
6. Iranians push for conclusion of Polish trade agreement (page 5).

**WESTERN EUROPE**

7. Comment on Belgium's intransigence on the European Defense Community (page 6).

**LATIN AMERICA**

8. Attempt against Guatemalan Government possible (page 7).

\* \* \* \*

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~**GENERAL****1. Italy maneuvers for admission to United Nations:**

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] Italy says it has lined up seven Security Council votes, including France's, for the Soviet omnibus resolution on UN membership. In addition, it will try to persuade Britain to support the resolution, or at least to abstain from voting. It hopes that the United States will abstain.

The American Embassy in Rome expresses the hope that the United States will be able to abstain, and thus avoid being placed in the position of having blocked Italy's membership in the United Nations Organization.

Comment: Either a US abstention or a vote against the resolution would provoke an unfavorable public reaction in Italy.

**FAR EAST****2. Reports of political unrest in Thailand continue:**

[redacted] A number of independent sources have recently [redacted] predicted a new outbreak of violence in Thailand in the near future. [redacted]

[redacted] such violence might erupt on 25 January, which is Thai Army Day. The primary cause of the tense situation is the continued friction between the supporters of General Sarit, the Bangkok garrison commander who has been seeking the support of the King, and those of Army Commander Phin and Police General Phao.

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Comment: Maneuvering for power within the present ruling military clique has been continuing without cessation since the 29 November coup d'etat, and an open clash could occur at any time. There is, however, no firm evidence that Sarit considers himself strong enough to challenge the Phin-Phao faction, or that the latter group considers itself in such jeopardy as to warrant an attempt to eliminate Sarit.

### 3. Malayan Police rivalries hamper security operation:

3.3(h)(2)

The abrupt resignation and departure from Malaya of the Commissioner of Police and his Director of Intelligence have left the Malayan Police without effective leadership

at a critical time. The lack of a positive police program, a condition which will continue until the staff of the newly-appointed High Commissioner is selected and organized, increases the opportunity for internal Communist aggression in Malaya during the next few months.

Comment: Inability of the British authorities in Malaya to eliminate top-echelon rivalries within the police organization and between the police and the army has hampered operations against the Communist guerrillas.

## SOUTH ASIA

### 4. Chinese Communists advocating "liberation" of Kashmir provinces:

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] a propaganda campaign is under way in Kashgar and other cities of Sinkiang advocating the "liberation" of the two Kashmir border provinces of Ladakh and Gilgit on the ground that these areas are an "integral part of China."

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Comment: [redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] the Pakistani Consulate-General in Kashgar, near the Soviet and Kashmir borders of Sinkiang, is still open; this report may therefore be based upon personal observation by Pakistani officials. Although no Chinese government is known ever to have claimed authority over, or to have had direct relations with, any of the provinces of Kashmir, Chinese Communist patrols have operated well within that state in the past year.

## NEAR EAST - AFRICA

5. Czechs ready to buy oil from Iran:

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] the Czechs are ready to buy up to 500,000 tons of oil. They are now attempting to find shipping space for it and have asked for Iranian help in this matter. The Czechs wish to pay for the oil by barter, in view of foreign exchange difficulties.

Comment: These proposals result from talks conducted by the Iranian Legation at the behest of its Foreign Office. Lack of transportation continues to be an obvious major obstacle to the implementation of any Iranian oil transaction with Orbit countries. Moreover, oil is not an item of high priority on the Czech import list, and there is no indication that these negotiations will be quickly concluded. Iran's pressing need at this point is hard currency or sterling.

6. Iranians push for conclusion of Polish trade agreement: 3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] that the Iranians are pressing for speedy conclusion of the Iranian-Polish trade negotiations currently being carried on there. Iran is also anxious to sell oil to Poland despite the Polish Minister's lack of authorization to discuss anything except the trade agreement.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

Prime Minister Mossadeq is planning to use the opening of trade negotiations with Poland and prospective oil negotiations with Czechoslovakia "to strengthen the position of the government and to refute the accusation that the government is following an anti-national and pro-American policy." "According to our friends," the Polish Minister reported, "the situation should be exploited and the agreement signed."

Comment: Rumors of Polish negotiations for Iranian oil have been circulating for several months.

3.3(h)(2)

considerable interest and coordination exists within the Soviet Orbit on the Iranian situation. There is no indication, however, that the Soviet bloc actually will purchase Iranian oil or that it intends to help the Mossadeq government to survive. Mossadeq is interested in securing an economic agreement to bolster his own position and to indicate that his government is following a neutral policy.

## WESTERN EUROPE

### 7. Comment on Belgium's intransigence on the European Defense Community:

Belgium's participation in the European Defense Community is still uncertain, and current discussions in Paris and Brussels will probably be decisive. Foreign Minister van Zeeland has adopted an extremely cautious attitude and has stated that the Belgian Parliament is merely lukewarm to the plan. He says that if Belgium had to "take it or leave it" now, a decision against participation would receive popular and parliamentary approval.

Aside from constitutional objections, Van Zeeland is opposed to the top-heavy political structure borrowed from the Schuman Plan. The US Ambassador in Brussels believes that he is also concerned about the attitude of the Belgian King, who would probably object strongly to a transfer of authority over the country's armed forces.

Except for the Foreign Minister's half-hearted approaches to Parliament, there is no indication that the Belgian Government has made a definite attempt to induce favorable parliamentary consideration of the Defense Forces plan.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## LATIN AMERICA

8. Attempt against Guatemalan Government possible:

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] the possibility of a revolt there during the last week of January.

3.3(h)(2)

It is the general belief in Guatemala that Lieutenant Colonel Castillo Armas is now in Mexico or El Salvador after a trip to the United States, where he is said to have been successful in obtaining help for the overthrow of the Arbenz administration.

Castillo Armas is reported to have the support of one-third of the Guatemalan Army and to be receiving help from within the country.

**Comment:** Castillo Armas led the abortive attempt on the Guatemalan Government in November 1950. He has been traveling in Central America since his escape from jail in Guatemala last June.

Last month Castillo Armas was reported to have spoken optimistically of his plans for overthrowing the Guatemalan Government and occupying the presidency. He stated that his movement had more than enough money, that people were organized within Guatemala, and that the movement lacked only a few more arms and last-minute organization. Presumably, one of the movement's objectives would be to remove Communists and Communist-sympathizers from positions of influence in Guatemala.

~~TOP SECRET~~