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CONTENTS

1. NASR PLEADS FOR US HELP (page 3).

25X6

**3. PATHET LAO LEADER FAVORABLY IMPRESSES
INDIAN TRUCE OFFICIAL (page 5).**

**4. COMMENT ON MIDDLE EAST MILITARY TALKS
IN IRAQ (page 6).**

17 Aug 55

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 2

25X1

Approved For Release 2008/03/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002100480001-4

1. NASR PLEADS FOR US HELP

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[redacted] Egyptian prime minister Nasr is stepping up his campaign for American military assistance and diplomatic support, in the hope that such support will bolster his domestic position and increase his personal influence with the army.

In a talk with Ambassador Byroade on 14 August, the former Egyptian ambassador to Washington, Ahmad Husain, reported that Nasr is getting himself into a "real box" on the question of accepting Soviet economic and military aid. According to Husain, Nasr believes the Soviet offers are so attractive [redacted]

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[redacted] the army may not let Nasr refuse them, although he realizes the acquisition of such arms is "the road to Soviet domination."

Nasr appears to feel that his relations with other members of the Revolutionary Command Council and with younger army officers are so precarious that he must score a significant success in order to retain their support. Husain urged the United States to think of some dramatic move to help Nasr in this situation.

Nasr himself talked with Byroade later the same day, emphasizing Egypt's diminishing dollar exchange and asking that the United States take Egyptian pounds for the military equipment it is offering. Nasr did not mention the Soviet offers or problems with his army supporters.

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3. PATHET LAO LEADER FAVORABLY IMPRESSES INDIAN TRUCE OFFICIAL


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[Redacted]

Returning from a visit with Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphanouvong, the Indian member of the International Control Commission--who is acting chairman--stated that he was impressed with the "sincerity" of the prince and his desire for a peaceful settlement with the royal government.

The Indian official also professed to believe that the extent of Viet Minh influence on the Pathets has been exaggerated. He said he saw no Vietnamese and that Souphanouvong assured him the Pathets need and receive little aid from the Viet Minh.

Despite his failure to obtain any tangible concession from Souphanouvong in connection with the deadlocked Pathet-royal government negotiations, the Indian official's attitude indicates the bias with which he will continue to attempt to break the stalemate.



Recent reports from Vientiane indicate that the military situation in the disputed provinces has become increasingly serious as a result of recent armed attacks by Pathet Lao forces. Conditions in the Muong Peun area of Sam Neua Province are described by the American army attaché as "critical" and Communist activities in Phong Saly Province are following the pattern which preceded the July attack on Muong Peun.

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4. COMMENT ON MIDDLE EAST MILITARY TALKS IN IRAQ

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[redacted] The Turkish-Iraqi-Iranian-Pakistani military staff talks at Habbaniya, Iraq, ended 14 August in a cordial atmosphere and the participants agreed to co-operate, subject to approval of their respective governments, and provided that any arrangement has the support of the Western powers, according to the American military observer at the meetings.

The American observer ascribed the success achieved at the meetings to the tactful leadership of the Pakistani delegate.

These talks are the first step toward bringing Iran into Middle East defense arrangements. The uncertainty among the participants is reflected in the decision to leave the initiative for further talks up to Iran.

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The Shah, [redacted] has "cooled considerably" to the idea of a defense pact unless the United States helps Iran's army to obtain aid on a par with that of Turkey. With his visit to Moscow in the offing, the Shah may believe that it is an opportune time to press the United States for more military aid.

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