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
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1. AMBASSADOR THOMPSON COMMENTS ON SOVIET DISARMAMENT OBJECTIVES

The USSR probably considers that the Western disarmament proposals fail to meet even minimum Soviet objectives, according to Ambassador Thompson in

Moscow. He believes the Soviet Union will not feel compelled now or in the foreseeable future to accept terms which it considers unfavorable.

Thompson thinks the USSR is less concerned than the United States about the spread of atomic capability to other states, except for West Germany. Non-orbit states are more likely than the satellites to produce or insist on receiving atomic weapons, and their possible use of such weapons against each other could be exploited by the USSR. Thompson believes, furthermore, that Moscow sees no value in the Western proposal for a cutoff of world-wide production of fissionable material as long as the United States reserves the right to station units with atomic weapons abroad and supply atomic weapons to other countries. He believes the USSR's emphasis on ending tests springs less from a desire to prevent other nations from acquiring atomic weapons than from the propaganda advantages to be gained from Western rejection of such a ban or the lessening of international tension if the West accepts.

The ambassador feels that the Western aerial inspection proposals, even if confined to the Arctic, would not only be considered costly by the USSR but would force the USSR to give up a large measure of its advantage of greater secrecy than the West can maintain. He quotes a Soviet Foreign Ministry official as saying recently that the USSR could never agree to aerial inspection as long as Western bases exist on the periphery of the Soviet bloc.

Thompson points out that the proposed armed forces levels would mean a greater reduction for the USSR than the West. The Western proposals do not satisfy important Soviet objectives of maintaining the status quo in Eastern Europe, reducing the danger of an explosion there, and diminishing the risks of local conflicts developing into major wars with atomic weapons. The USSR does not attach much importance to the prime Western objective of reducing the danger of surprise attack.

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2. NEW SOVIET NOTE REAFFIRMS USSR'S POSITION ON MIDDLE EAST

[Redacted]


The USSR's notes to the United States, Britain, and France on 3 September were probably intended to pave the way, in anticipation of the forthcoming UN General Assembly debate on the Hungarian report, for a Soviet resolution accusing the United States and its allies of aggressive acts against Middle East countries and the Soviet bloc.

The note to the United States, implicitly continuing Soviet support of the Arab states, charged that the "Eisenhower doctrine" proves American readiness to use force in the Middle East. It also attacked the Baghdad pact, British military action in Oman and Yemen, and Western interference in the internal affairs of the Arab states, as evidenced by what it termed the antigovernment plot in Syria. The USSR warned the West of "dangerous consequences" resulting from attempts to draw countries into military groupings, but suggested no specific Soviet counteraction to Western "interference" in Oman, Yemen, and Syria.

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, who asked Ambassador Thompson's reaction to the American version of the notes, insisted that a "constructive approach" was contained in the last sentence, which like the Soviet notes of 19 April called for a four-power declaration condemning the use of force and "renouncing interference in internal affairs of the Near and Middle East." Gromyko agreed with Thompson that the Middle East situation was "very delicate and difficult," but gave no suggestion of greater Soviet tractability. [Redacted]

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3. DISSIDENT CUBAN MILITARY ELEMENTS REPORTED PLANNING REVOLT AGAINST BATISTA



Comment Growing resentment within the armed forces against the present repressive regime has been reported recently, though support from the military has traditionally been Batista's main strength. Known leaders of an abortive army revolt in April 1956 were imprisoned, but others have evidently continued to recruit dissidents among young officers. Effective use of several planes might immobilize Camp Colombia, giving impetus and protection to other attacks on the government by some of the many groups which are bitterly opposed to Batista.

4. IRAQI CROWN PRINCE RECALLS NURI SAID

[Redacted]

Iraqi Crown Prince Abd al-Ilah told American officials in Istanbul he feels that there must be some changes in the Iraqi cabinet if a resolute attitude is to be adopted toward Syria. The crown prince said he was requesting former prime minister Nuri Said to return to Iraq, probably to become deputy prime minister, and that he has other cabinet changes in mind.

Abd al-Ilah is worried over King Saud's attitude. He said that while Saud had expressed concern to him over the Syrian developments, implying that Egyptian President Nasr was to blame, he nevertheless said the situation must not be remedied by force of arms.

Comment The Iraqi cabinet headed by Ali Jawdat has followed a "soft line" toward Egypt and Syria with the ostensible objective of bringing about a rapprochement among the Arab states. King Hussayn of Jordan has complained about the weakness of Iraqi support, and Abd al-Ilah also apparently now feels that this "soft line" has not been productive.

Saud's cautioning against the overthrow of the present Syrian regime by force of arms may reflect fear of an Egyptian or Syrian countermove against him. Iraqi and Jordanian officials consider Saud's support essential for any attempt by the other Arab states to change the government in Syria. Saud may still cling to the idea that the trend there may be reversed by internal efforts.

5. USSR OFFERS TO INCREASE ITS MILITARY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL IN EGYPT

Comment on:

The Soviet Union proposes to send 20 technicians to repair damages resulting from misuse of thermostat equipment on Egypt's three submarines and give training in maintenance. Egypt presumably will welcome these technicians. Cairo had previously requested Moscow to provide personnel to construct dry-dock facilities and to supervise the dry-docking of the submarines.

Moscow also has recommended that Egypt accept 80 specialists to staff military "field and unit workshops." Egypt replied that this number of workshop specialists is "larger than can be accepted immediately" and that the "expenses are huge!" [redacted] the cost in 1957 of the program recommended by the USSR would be \$600,000. Cairo suggested that only 30 of these specialists should be sent this year and that the number "be increased gradually in the future."