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## 1. INDIA WEIGHING OFFERS OF SOVIET AID

[Redacted]

India will probably accept some Soviet aid because of its urgent need for foreign economic and technical assistance to ensure fulfillment of its second Five-

Year Plan, according to the secretary general of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs in a conversation with Ambassador Cooper. The Indian government, however, does not wish to accept from the Soviet Union a technical co-operation program similar to that of the United States, though the USSR has suggested that this be done.

The secretary general, who is chairman of the group discussing economic matters with Soviet first deputy foreign minister Gromyko in New Delhi, feels that his government will be able to "ride out" the effects of the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit and to evaluate not only Soviet proposals but also any possible alternatives of aid from the West before committing itself.

Comment	The statements of the secretary general indicate the caution with which the Indian government is approaching the subject of increased economic relations with the USSR. So long as India has hopes of obtaining substantial aid from the United States, it will probably continue to maintain a reserved attitude toward Soviet offers of extensive aid.
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## 2. POLITICAL SHOWDOWN IN BANGKOK MAY BE NEAR

[redacted] [redacted]  
 Events seem to be moving toward a showdown between Thai premier Phibun and Police Director General Phao, in the opinion of the American embassy in Bangkok. Phao is under heavy attack from Phibun's newspapers, and is reported showing considerable strain. His headquarters is being heavily guarded by his supporters.

[redacted] the army ordered an alert on 23 November which apparently is still in effect. [redacted] this action was taken following rumors of a possible coup attempt by Phao's police. [redacted]

**Comment** Since last summer Phibun, supported by the army chief, General Sarit, has progressively circumscribed Phao's powers. It is possible that the ambitious and often impetuous police chief is contemplating a coup.

It is equally possible, however, that Phibun ordered the army alert not in anticipation of a specific coup attempt but to forestall police resistance to possible cabinet changes designed further to reduce Phao's power, or even to eliminate him from the government.

**3. BURMA'S ACCEPTANCE OF SOVIET AID MAY PRECLUDE  
IBRD PROGRAM**

[redacted] Burmese prime minister Nu [redacted]

[redacted] is committed to accept a Soviet team to prepare a program for diversification of agriculture. He asked if the presence of Soviet technical advisers would adversely affect the prospects for an IBRD program.

In the opinion of the official who is leading the IBRD mission in Burma, Burma's acceptance of Soviet technicians and aid in return for its rice exports may leave little or no scope for assistance from the bank. The mission is investigating the possibilities of developing Burmese ports, railways and agriculture.

**Comment** Although U Nu is known to have made several requests for assistance during his recent visit to the USSR, this is the first indication of Moscow's favorable response. Soviet offers of assistance have great appeal to Asian nationalists because they are made without requests for political commitments.

An IBRD mission which visited Burma earlier this year wrote a report criticizing Burma's development plans as poorly conceived and overly ambitious. The Burmese government was offended by the report and for a time it seemed questionable whether further negotiations would be conducted.

**THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION**  
**(Information as of 1700, 28 November)**

A minor clash between Egyptian and Israeli patrols near the southern end of the Gaza strip is the only border incident reported for 28 November. Each side claimed a border violation by the other's patrol. (Press) [redacted]

On 26 November Egyptian prime minister Nasr told Ambassador Byroade emphatically that Egypt is not directing guerrilla operations into Israel. Nasr said he felt a great deal of the trouble is spontaneous. He admitted that there is an organization for such operations, and suggested that the ex-Grand Mufti of Jerusalem might be doing something on a small scale without Nasr's knowledge or approval. In his denial Nasr referred specifically to the impression of "Glubb and some Jordanians" that Egypt is responsible for the raids. [redacted]

Unconfirmed press reports assert that a new shipload of Soviet bloc arms for Egypt was unloaded at Alexandria on 25 November. (Press)

Other press reports, also unconfirmed, state that Egypt has sent a unit of jet planes to Syria to participate in the newly established Syrian-Egyptian joint command. (Press)