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SECURITY INFORMATION

14 November 1952



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
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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



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## SOVIET UNION

1. New-type Soviet submarine possibly moving to Baltic:

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[redacted] [redacted] when water depth in the Marinsk canal system would be at least six and one half feet (see map, page 4). Data on the development of ice conditions in the Shcherbakov-Lake Onega sector was also requested.

## Comment: [redacted]

[redacted] movement of the ocean-patrol submarine constructed in Gorki in 1950, which was being outfitted and tested in Baku as late as mid-1952. This submarine, the first of an improved class constructed in the USSR since the war, was originally scheduled to leave Baku in July 1951. Preparations were under way at that time to insure that the floating drydock for its transportation would draw no more than six feet in the Marinsk canal system north of Gorki.

3.3(h)(2)

Inasmuch as the request for information on anticipated ice conditions did not include the White Sea Canal, the submarine may be destined for the Baltic.

## FAR EAST

2. Chou En-lai seeks transfer of POW's from American to "neutral" control:

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Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai


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[redacted] recently that the "important step" in solving the prisoner of war issue is the release of the POW's from American control. Chou is said to be convinced that all prisoners held under "neutral" control would "gradually" be repatriated.

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Comment: Soviet and Satellite spokesmen in the UN General Assembly have recently taken the line that the outstanding issue regarding the POW's is the American screening and forcible detention of the prisoners rather than Communist insistence on total repatriation.

Nevertheless Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky, in his most recent public statement on this issue, on 10 November proposed the creation of a commission which would "promote repatriation of all prisoners."

## NEAR EAST - AFRICA

3. Saudi Arabian Deputy Defense Minister favors European over American arms:

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[redacted] European arms, particularly Belgian and German, are "stronger and better" than those obtainable in the United States. [redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] purchasing arms from European firms would be more advantageous because of less government interference, lower prices, more satisfactory service, and freer choice of military instructors who would be better and more amenable to Saudi Arabian control.

Comment: Saudi Arabia has been the most friendly of the Arab governments toward the United States. This unusually strong statement therefore assumes special significance.

4. British considering alternatives for Suez base:

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] Strategic base sites at Basra, at Haifa, and at Alexandretta in Turkey are being considered by British military planners as the possible alternative to Fayid, the present Suez base. Fayid would probably be used only for workshops and ammunition dumps.

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American Ambassador Caffery agrees with the British contention that Fayid is perhaps not the ideal site from which to oppose Soviet military expansion in the Near East.

Comment: The three choices under consideration reflect a sharp shift in British military thinking. Britain has in the past insisted on maintaining the Suez Canal base because it was considered beyond the area which Soviet forces might overrun in the event of war.

Alexandretta has an excellent natural harbor, while the port of Haifa would need substantial expansion. Britain probably would encounter political difficulties in establishing a strategic base in Israel or Iraq.

5. Greek UN delegation reportedly instructed to avoid discussion of Cyprus:

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Comment: The possibility that Greece might ask for a UN discussion of the Cyprus problem has disturbed the Western powers because they feared it would be exploited by the Communists.

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WESTERN EUROPE

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