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
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1.

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
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2. SOVIET RESOLUTION ON ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN



The lengthy central committee resolution of 30 June explaining and justifying the anti-Stalin campaign is an attempt by the Soviet regime to provide an answer to questions recently raised by foreign Communist parties.

In tones frequently defensive, the resolution attempts to demonstrate that Stalin's errors in no way discredit the Soviet system as such nor its present leaders and policies.

The resolution reviews Stalin's errors but states that they were expressed in methods rather than goals and contends that the Soviet system developed consistently and progressively despite these errors. Stalinism, it asserts, "could not change and has not changed the nature of our social order," and it rebukes Italian Communist leader Togliatti for raising the question.

As to guarantees for the future, the resolution argues that the historical conditions which gave birth to Stalinism have passed forever and cites post-Stalin changes as proof.

The resolution asserts that the Soviet party launched the anti-Stalin campaign deliberately with an eye to "a positive result from the point of view of the . . . ultimate aims" of the Communist movement, and calls for a closing of ranks against Western attempts to exploit "temporary difficulties."

The resolution abruptly dismisses the question of the current leaders' responsibility for Stalinism with the

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statement that it is "in no way a question of lack of personal courage." An attempt to check Stalin in his later years, the resolution argues, would have been misunderstood by the Soviet public.

The resolution offers little that is new in its analysis of Stalin's role and the socialist system in the USSR. Most of the points it makes have already been presented in both Soviet and Western Communist statements.

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3. POZNAN SITUATION

The situation in Poznan is quiet, but there are signs that the riots have aroused concern in other Soviet bloc countries. According to embassy officials who visited Poznan on 1 July, all tanks had been withdrawn from the city the night before, telegraph and telephone communications had been restored, and transportation facilities were normal.

Militia checkpoints, however, remained on the outskirts of the city and at various points between Poznan and Warsaw. Border units on the East German-Polish border have also reportedly been strengthened.

The other bloc countries have echoed the Polish line that the riots were due to the activities of a reactionary underground and have called for increased vigilance to prevent similar outbreaks. In East Germany, provincial party units were ordered

to report on the prevailing attitudes and reactions regarding the riots in Poznan. The instructions emphasized the importance of estimating the attitude of the populace and detecting any "deviations among comrades and workers."

while it is not yet possible to evaluate the entire situation, most workers "correctly recognize fascist provocation for what it is." A few workers, however, had expressed the opinion the Polish uprising was justified and that it would sweep through Czechoslovakia and into East Germany.

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4. HUNGARIAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESOLUTION CONDEMNS "ANTIPARTY" GROUP

The Hungarian party leadership has made its first major effort since the Soviet 20th Party Congress to check the "moderate" faction and whip the party rank and file back in line.

A Hungarian central committee resolution, published on 30 June, sharply condemned a "malignant anti-party movement formed around Imre Nagy" which has launched an attack "gradually increasing in strength against the policy and leadership of our party." The resolution specifically cited the "Poznan provocations" as a warning to every Hungarian "to oppose firmly attempts at troublemaking!"

This sharp attack is in reaction to outspoken criticism of leading Hungarian Communists, made in a series of meetings of journalists, economists, philosophers, youths, World War II resistance fighters and intellectuals in the past few weeks.

The resolution indicates that Rakosi's leadership was re-endorsed in early June by Soviet presidium member Suslov, who was then in Budapest analyzing the problem of Hungarian factionalism, and at the end of June by Soviet leaders during Rakosi's reported visit to Moscow.

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5. DUTCH AND BELGIAN COMMUNIST PARTIES ON KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH

[redacted] confusion in the ranks and leadership of the Netherlands Communist Party indicates no guidance was given them by the USSR on how to handle the revelations of Khrushchev's secret speech at the Soviet 20th Party Congress. Moreover, there is no indication that the Netherlands party believes Italian Communist Party leader Togliatti was given Soviet endorsement to speak for Western European Communist parties or to lead their reactions. Secretary General Paul de Groot is apparently striving to steer a middle course between the Italian party criticism of Khrushchev and the milder treatment by Eugene Dennis of the United States party. The whole matter of the 20th Party Congress will be aired at the next Netherlands party congress in September.

Comment

The Netherlands party is the only Western European party to have issued a statement criticizing the recent remarks of Togliatti.

On 10 April the executive committee of the Netherlands party reluctantly published a resolution capitulating to the Soviet party line on Stalin.

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6. DALAI LAMA REPORTEDLY SEEKING ASYLUM

The Dalai Lama is anxious to flee Tibet, according to a statement made by the Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim to American consular officials in Calcutta on 28 June. Although India reportedly has been requested to grant asylum, the Dalai Lama's advisers do not consider New Delhi's favorable response as firm enough and seek American assurances of sanctuary elsewhere in the event that asylum in India is refused.

The Maharaj Kumar said fighting is severe in eastern Tibet, but additional arms are needed to extend the uprising to other parts of the country.

Comment

The Chinese Communists indicated doubts of the Dalai Lama's loyalty when they refused to permit him to attend Buddhist festivals in India this year. The Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim, who went to Lhasa to extend an invitation on behalf of a Buddhist society, said the Dalai Lama expressed a keen desire to attend the ceremonies. Peiping's refusal may have been the final factor in bringing the Dalai Lama to a decision to seek asylum outside Tibet.

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7. FOREIGN MINISTER MAY HEAD JAPANESE MISSION AT SOVIET PEACE TALKS

Comment on: [redacted]

Foreign Minister Shigemitsu reportedly has consented to head the Japanese delegation for the peace treaty negotiations with the USSR which are scheduled to be resumed late this month, [redacted]

Prime Minister Hatoyama may have offered the post to Shigemitsu in the hope the foreign minister's opposition to a quick settlement with Moscow would cause him to refuse the appointment and thus provide an excuse for forcing his resignation from the cabinet.

Shigemitsu is reported to have accepted in the belief that success at the peace talks would strengthen his position in the party or that, if he could not agree to Soviet terms, the breakoff of the negotiations could be blamed on Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Kono because of the commitments he made in the Moscow fishery pacts.

If Shigemitsu has accepted, he may now be willing to concede a quick settlement with Moscow to save his cabinet position in a reshuffle tentatively scheduled for some time after the 8 July upper house elections.
[redacted]

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8. SOVIET LEADERS EXPECT RECORD HARVEST

[Redacted] At a reception in Moscow on 28 June, several Soviet officials expressed great satisfaction with the harvest prospects for this year. Khrushchev said that taking the country as a whole, present indications were that the Soviet harvest this year would be "record" and he was very pleased.

Comment On the basis of these statements, and observations by officers of the American embassy who recently traveled through parts of the "new lands," present prospects are that the 1956 harvest may be substantially above that of 1955. In 1955 the harvest was fairly good, with grain production showing an announced 29-percent increase over the 1950 level and amounting to over 100,000,000 metric tons. A major drought seriously reduced the size of crops in the "new lands" last year, but the harvest in the Ukraine was excellent.

Previous statements by Soviet officials had indicated that crop prospects this year were only fair in the Ukraine, but were good to excellent in the North Caucasus and Volga regions, as well as in the "new lands." In addition, the area under cultivation in the "new lands" is 50 percent or 25,000,000 acres greater this year than last.

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9. POSSIBLE INDIAN PURCHASE OF SOVIET IL-14 AIRCRAFT

India seems about to purchase Soviet IL-14 aircraft for its domestic airline.

Soviet eagerness to supply both civil and military aircraft to India has been amply demonstrated in recent months, and there seems no doubt that negotiations on the subject have been conducted. The USSR has offered military jet aircraft and both jet- and piston-engine commercial planes. The only transaction which seems likely to be successfully concluded in the immediate future, however, is that involving IL-14's.

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10. PAKISTANI-SOVIET TRADE AGREEMENT

The Pakistani-Soviet trade agreement concluded on 27 June appears to portend no significant change in relations between the two countries.

The agreement provides for the exchange of Pakistani agricultural products for Soviet machinery, industrial equipment, petroleum, and timber. A special arrangement is included under which payments will be in rupees, and a Soviet trade office is to be established in Karachi. There has been no official announcement of the duration of the agreement, although the Pakistani press reports it is for one year, renewable on mutual agreement. No mention of technical or economic aid is included.

The Pakistani government has apparently been careful to minimize the opportunities for Soviet economic penetration. Soviet requests to establish trade offices at Lahore and Dacca were rejected, but permission was given to open an office in Karachi. Conclusion of the trade agreement avoids an open rebuff to Moscow's recent overtures and will probably satisfy some Pakistani businessmen who have been eager to find new trading partners.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 2 July)

Egyptian machine-gun fire was directed at an Israeli patrol near the Gaza strip, according to an Israeli spokesman. (Press)

The Israeli ambassador in Moscow is trying to secure an invitation from the Soviet Union for Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to visit the USSR, according to a news correspondent in Tel Aviv. An unsuccessful effort to arrange such a visit was made in late 1955, the report stated, but the recent change of foreign minister in Israel might result in a positive reply.

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