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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN



State Department review completed

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

12 December 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK

USSR-Cuba: The Soviet press is devoting increased attention to Cuba, and Izvestia recently characterized the Castro regime not as the usual Latin American revolution but a "national liberation movement"--Soviet terminology usually reserved for Afro-Asian anticolonialist movements. This portrayal implies that Moscow has put the stamp of approval on the Cuban revolution within the context of Marxist-Leninist dogma. The Soviet press also featured an article by a Cuban Communist party leader which advocated diplomatic relations with the "socialist camp" and, above all, the USSR and Communist China.

East Germany: The East German regime is already making preparations to be present at a future summit conference. The Foreign Ministry protocol chief [redacted]

NJ

[redacted] planned a trip to Geneva this week to arrange accommodations for an East German delegation. East German Foreign Ministry officials will make every effort to participate in the conference. They believe that they will have Soviet support, and that the Western powers will eventually concede on the issue. Chancellor Adenauer, however, has stated that West

[Germany should forego attendance at the summit in an effort to forestall East German participation.]

OK
Communist China - Indonesia: Peiping's note of 9 December to Djakarta, while conciliatory in language, reflects China's determination to continue its pressures on the Indonesian Government to end its "persecution" and "cruel treatment" of Chinese nationals. Warning against forces "bent on sabotaging the friendship" between the two countries, the Chinese Communists propose the immediate implementation of the long pending Sino-Indonesian nationality treaty, along with Indonesian guarantees of protection for and nondiscrimination against Chinese who do not choose to take Indonesian citizenship.

Although Djakarta is apparently willing to proceed with implementation of the treaty, it is believed determined to carry out its program of resettling Chinese retailers and is unlikely to offer guarantees satisfactory to Peiping.

OK
Taiwan Strait: [The Chinese Communists have fired only 14 high-explosive shells against Chinmen so far this month, as compared with 81 last month and 1,215 in June. The Mat-sus have not been shelled at all in the last 12 weeks. This marked decline in shelling coincides with other indications of increased stress on a political solution of the Taiwan issue.]

II. ASIA-AFRICA

NO
Turkey: A Turkish public health and medical survey delegation, headed by Minister of Health Lutfi Kirdar, left Istanbul on 9 December for a 10- to 15-day study tour of the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Government. Kirdar will be the first Turkish minister to visit the Soviet Union since 1939. Ankara has had a long-standing invitation to send such a delegation and has assured the American Embassy that the trip has no political significance. It is not regarded as representing any basic change in Turkey's attitude toward the Soviet Government, but the timing suggests that Ankara may

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be trying to increase its maneuverability in anticipation of any broader East-West rapprochement. [redacted]

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N.D.

Sudan: The Abboud military government has shown its determination to stamp out further dissident activity in the army by discharging 16 junior officers suspected of involvement in the antiregime plotting which led to the abortive coup of 10 November. The coup leaders were executed or sentenced to long prison terms early this month. The power of Deputy Army Commander in Chief Hasan Bashir Nasir, who was primarily responsible for thwarting the coup attempt and who for several months has been advocating a purge of the officer corps, probably is increasing. [redacted]

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N.O.

Japan-Korea: The only condition blocking an accord between Seoul and Tokyo on repatriation of Korean residents in Japan to South Korea is said to be Japan's insistence that South Korea agree that in the future all Japanese fishermen who violate the Rhee line will be released automatically on completion of their prison sentences. Seoul has expressed its willingness to return on 24 December those fishermen who have already served their sentences. The Japanese Government fears, however, that South Korea may back out on its promise to release the fishermen when the repatriation to North Korea scheduled for 14 December begins. Such action would cause the Japanese to nullify any agreement for repatriation to South Korea. [redacted]

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III. THE WEST

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Cyprus: The political campaign on Cyprus will culminate on 13 December in the election by the Greek population of a president for the new republic. Observers on the island predict that Archbishop Makarios will defeat his 72-year-old rival, John Clerides, who is supported by an alliance of dissident rightists and Communists. Makarios' margin of victory must be over 60 percent of the total vote or he will suffer

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DAILY BRIEF

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a damaging blow to his prestige both on the island and abroad. Makarios has the backing of the Greek Government, and Turkish Cypriot leaders as well as the British authorities favor his election.

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OK
Guatemala: The extensive fraud used to assure the victory of a majority of pro-administration candidates in the 6 December congressional election has led the moderate leftist Revolutionary party (PR) to announce its refusal to accept the election outcome. PR leaders plan protest demonstrations; some violence may occur but the government does not appear in immediate danger. On 10 December all public demonstrations were prohibited, and the police and army are likely to be used quickly to prevent serious disorder.

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Increased Soviet Press Attention to Cuba

An Izvestia article recently characterized the Castro movement not as a usual Latin American revolution but a "national liberation movement" in which the working class and laboring peasantry "took the most active role." The application of this terminology specifically to Cuba implies that Moscow has put its ideological stamp of approval on the Castro regime. The October issue of the Soviet journal International Affairs had called Perez Jimenez' overthrow in Venezuela as well as that of Batista in Cuba a "turning point" marking the emergence of a "new stage in the national liberation struggle in Latin America."

On 4 December, Pravda published a lengthy article by Cuban Communist party leader Escalante in which he described the Castro regime as a 'people's government' not controlled by the working class but subject to great influence by the 'proletariat and the peasantry.' He charged the US with threatening to reduce sugar imports, obstruct trade in general, and restrict tourism as a means of bringing pressure on the Cuban Government to submit to the interests of the "US monopolists." Escalante concluded by advocating that diplomatic relations be resumed between Cuba and the "socialist camp," particularly with the USSR and Communist China. Moscow's publication of these remarks is probably intended to indicate its receptivity to any Cuban overtures to resume diplomatic relations.

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Peiping Proposes Talks With Indonesia Regarding Overseas Chinese

Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi sent a letter on 9 December to Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio which, while using conciliatory terms, said Peiping could not but be seriously concerned over the "intolerable" treatment of Chinese nationals in Indonesia. Chen said that Indonesian disregard of the rights of Overseas Chinese was "extremely detrimental" to friendly relations between the two countries.

Chen proposed immediate negotiations to solve the dispute. He suggested that, while Chinese in Indonesia should feel an obligation to take up Indonesian nationality, those who did not want to do so should be protected by the Indonesian Government from discrimination and persecution. Peiping expressed willingness to repatriate Chinese dispossessed under Djakarta's decree against alien businessmen.

In order that Chinese in Indonesia might state their citizenship preferences, Chen expressed Peiping's readiness to exchange immediately ratification instruments of the dual nationality treaty. The treaty, signed in 1955, would require Chinese in Indonesia to choose between Indonesian and Chinese citizenship within two years.

Peiping's proposals are obviously intended to stall further implementation of Indonesia's decree banning alien retailers in rural areas and resettling them in nearby cities. Foreign Minister Subandrio's reply to the Chinese proposals has not been made public. In view of Djakarta's consistently strong position on the decree as an issue of "national interest," it is not likely to back down on the ban and it apparently wants the dual nationality treaty to go into effect promptly.

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**DATA ON CHINESE COMMUNIST SHELLS FIRED ON
OFFSHORE ISLANDS**

<u>Month</u>	<u>Chinmen</u>		<u>Matsu</u>	
	<u>HE Shells</u>	<u>Propaganda Shells</u>	<u>HE Shells</u>	<u>Propaganda Shells</u>
June	1215	808	429	108
July	537	373	404	41
August	125	225	78	64
Sept	156	808	5	69
Oct	114	872	0	0
Nov	81	491	0	0
Dec (thru 9th)	14	0	0	0

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Communists Gradually Reducing Shelling Against Offshore Islands

There has been a marked decrease in Chinese Communist shelling of the offshore islands since June, especially during the last three months. Only 14 high-explosive shells had been fired against Chinmen through 9 December, as compared with 81 during November and 1,215 in June. The Matsus have not been shelled at all in the last 12 weeks.

The Communists may be preparing the way for a period during which persistent political approaches will be made to Nationalist officials in an effort to get them to defect to the Communist cause or to create suspicion between them and US officials. Coincident with the decline in shelling, Chinese Communist leaders have de-emphasized the use of force against Taiwan both in current propaganda and in recent conversations with foreign visitors and have suggested the prospect of "leniency" to the Nationalists by their recent amnesty of 30 Kuomintang "war criminals."

During his visit to China last October, Khrushchev may have given added impetus to Peiping's apparent shift to political warfare against Taiwan. []

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[] Khrushchev had "strongly requested" the Chinese not to embark on any new military action against Taiwan in the near future, and the Chinese are said to have given Khrushchev "assurances" that they would undertake no new military initiatives against the island. []

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III. THE WEST

Electoral Fraud Prompts Bitter Reaction From Guatemalan Leftists

The extensive fraud used to assure the victory of a majority of pro-administration candidates in the 6 December congressional election in Guatemala has led the moderate leftist Revolutionary party (PR) to announce its refusal to accept the election outcome. PR leaders have publicized a number of specific charges of fraud and plan to challenge in the courts the electoral results in a number of constituencies. They also plan protest demonstrations and antigovernment disorders.

On 9 December, PR leader Mario Mendez Montenegro asked a leader of the antigovernment faction of the rightist Nationalist Democratic Movement (MDN) to support PR tactics, [redacted] The MDN leader did not give a firm reply, but is reported to have requested another meeting. The MDN, suffering an internal rift covertly fostered by President Ydigoras just before the election, has also bitterly attacked the government's election tactics. The murder of an MDN official on 8 December, allegedly by government agents, has added to its anger, and an MDN-associated veterans' organization has declared that it will tolerate no more abuse from the government.

Some violence may occur if demonstrations are attempted, and MDN groups may resume the terroristic tactics they used occasionally last summer and fall. The government, however, does not appear immediately threatened. On 10 December all public demonstrations were prohibited, and the police and the army are likely to be used to prevent serious disorders.

In the long run, Ydigoras may weaken his own position by antagonizing the strong leftist forces in Guatemala. His tactics may also weaken the anti-Communist leaders now heading the dominant PR and enhance Communist efforts to win control of leftist political forces. [redacted]

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[Redacted]
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The Director

[Redacted]
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