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
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**1. SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY APPEAL TO WEST
EUROPEAN SOCIALIST PARTIES**

Comment on:

The appeal which the central committee of the Soviet Communist party addressed to Socialist parties in seven West European NATO countries on 15 October was apparently designed to advance four major objectives:

(1) to focus world attention on Soviet charges of Western plotting against Syria and underline Soviet support of the Syrian-Egyptian axis;

(2) to encourage Socialist parties in the NATO countries to bring pressure on their governments to block alleged American and Turkish plans to intervene in Syria;

(3) to generate suspicion of American aims in the Middle East and divide the United States and its European NATO allies;

(4) to lay the groundwork for a revival of the pre-Hungary efforts to establish closer relations with non-bloc Socialist parties and to encourage their cooperation with local Communists.

The Soviet central committee's message to the British Labor Party reiterated charges made by Soviet spokesmen and in diplomatic notes over the past month of American and Turkish military preparations for an attack on Syria. It pointedly reminded the Laborites that Britain, by the operation of its NATO obligations, might be drawn into a "military adventure by the United States and Turkey."

The message asserted there was "a certain rapprochement" between the views of the two parties on international issues. It proposed "joint action" to maintain peace in the Middle East and called upon the Labor party to support the

USSR's proposal for a four-power declaration condemning the use of force and interference in the internal affairs of Middle East countries, as well as a "mutual stoppage" of arms deliveries to the area.

The Soviet leaders probably will use the forthcoming 40th anniversary celebration of the Bolshevik revolution to make renewed appeals to the Socialists for co-operation in the name of "international working class unity."

2. SUPREME SOVIET TO MEET ON 6 NOVEMBER

Comment on:

The convening of a special session of the Supreme Soviet on 6 November, "devoted to the 40th anniversary of the October revolution," presumably is intended to give the

appearance of popular backing to the official statements that are scheduled to be made on that date in connection with the celebration. The Soviet leaders may use the meeting to obtain formal approval for the major address which is traditionally delivered by a leading member of the hierarchy on the evening of the sixth. This address may include a report on the international situation and on foreign policy, particularly with reference to the Middle East, the earth satellite and ICBM developments.

The Supreme Soviet has already met twice this year, as required by the constitution, but another meeting had been expected at the end of the year to give formal approval to the 1958 state budget and probably to adopt the economic plan for 1958. These plans may therefore also be discussed at this meeting.

**3. POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE
TO MEET**

Comment on:

[redacted] [redacted] the anticipated tenth plenum of the central committee of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) party will be held in Warsaw within the next few days.

Gomulka will probably use the plenum for new attacks on both conservative and revisionist factions in the party, and to consolidate majority support for the policies he plans to present at the party congress scheduled for December. The central committee will probably approve the program to be discussed and set a specific date for the congress, the first such meeting since Gomulka's accession to power in October 1956.

Press censorship, a principal cause underlying the Warsaw student demonstrations of early October, will probably also be discussed at the plenum. A Trybuna Ludu editorial on 11 October condemned criticism of the type featured in Po Prostu, the suppressed journal of the extreme revisionists, as antigovernment in intent. Warsaw has been quiet since the student riots, but dissatisfaction among Polish intellectuals has increased in recent weeks as a result of tightened press censorship and restrictions on travel to the West.

Although the Stalinist wing of the Polish party suffered a severe setback at the ninth plenum in May, it remains a possible threat to the stability of Gomulka's regime, despite some success on Gomulka's part in eliminating Stalinists from lower party echelons. [redacted]

**4. FRENCH COMMUNISTS MAY FORCE RIOTS ON
17 OCTOBER**

Comment on:

The French Interior Ministry's ban on the demonstrations scheduled by the Communist party for 17 October regarding Algeria is indicative of the government's touchiness as the political crisis enters its third week. If the Communists go ahead with their announced intention to demonstrate regardless of the ban, some disturbances can be expected.

Although Communist demonstrations have been banned in the past when there was a likelihood of disorders, the government is probably particularly alert now to avoid any situation which might induce violent rightist counteraction. Paris police concern over the demonstrations was evident in an official recommendation on 14 October that US personnel steer clear of the city on 17 October.

Further social-economic unrest is possible as pressure builds up for new wage hikes in the face of climbing prices. Members of the gas and electricity unions have scheduled a 24-hour work stoppage for wage increases on 16 October, and unrest is growing in the metallurgical industry. The Socialist-oriented Workers Force is increasingly fearful that it may not be able much longer to restrain demands from the rank and file for an all-out campaign for wage increases.

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5. BONN CONSIDERING BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA

Comment on:

Chancellor Adenauer's immediate reaction to Yugoslav recognition of East Germany was to favor breaking diplomatic relations with Belgrade, and State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Hallstein has told American officials that he sees no possibility of avoiding such a break.

Bonn has been anticipating the Yugoslav action, but with some differences of opinion within the Foreign Ministry as to what retaliatory measures should be taken. Some officials reportedly feel that recognition of East Germany by some non-NATO countries is inevitable and that for Bonn to break completely with Belgrade would prejudice its prospects of improving relations with Poland and other bloc countries.

Hallstein had previously expressed the opinion that one possible solution would be to leave an economic mission in Belgrade, and then establish similar missions in Soviet bloc countries. Hallstein feels, however, that Adenauer will proceed cautiously with any modification of present policies toward bloc countries, and that it is unlikely Bonn will establish diplomatic relations with any of them in the near future.

The Bundestag faction of the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union at its meeting in Berlin on 15 October decided unanimously that no rush measures should be taken in answer to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and East Germany, and that the Federal Government's countermeasures should be studied with great care. Foreign Minister von Brentano, who reported in great detail on the Yugoslav move, pointed out that the German answer will be styled in such a way that it will not handicap West Germany's policy toward the east.

6. BELLIGERENT SYRIAN ATTITUDE ON ISRAELI BORDER

Comment on:

Syrian Assistant Chief of Staff Nafuri informed the UN armistice commission on 13 October that he had issued orders to Syrian forces at the front to fire on an Israeli surveying party if it continued

working, according to the American army attaché in Damascus. Nafuri contended that the Israeli party was working in Syrian territory. When a UN inspection indicated this was not the case, and the senior Syrian delegate to the mixed armistice commission advised Nafuri to act cautiously, Nafuri reportedly ignored him.

Lt. Col. Akram Dayri, the commander on the Israeli front, is reported to be an impetuous officer who has caused armistice commission officers concern for some time. They fear that he might provoke Israeli-Syrian hostilities.

Nafuri may have adopted an aggressive stand to bolster his position and influence in the army. The recent dispatch of Egyptian troops to Syria, as well as the Soviet Union's support for Syria, will continue to encourage among Syrians the attitude displayed by Nafuri.

7. SYRIAN CHIEF OF STAFF MAY VISIT KING SAUD
ON 20 OCTOBER

Comment on:

Syrian Chief of Staff Bizri has not yet made his previously reported visit to King Saud.

Bizri would be able to make the trip, which he had earlier cleared with Cairo, between 15 and 20 November.

Saud instructed his embassy in Damascus to ask Bizri to alter the date of his visit to 20 October, by which time Saud presumably will have returned from Lebanon.

8. PRESIDENT MIRZA STILL NEGOTIATING TO END PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT CRISIS

Comment on:

After three days of fruitless negotiations for a new coalition government in Pakistan, President Mirza reportedly approached Awami League leader Suhrawardy on 14 October to effect a reconciliation which would return the prime minister to power. Suhrawardy resigned on 11 October after Mirza's Republican party had withdrawn its support from the Republican-Awami League coalition government, although he agreed to stay on temporarily in a caretaker capacity.

Mirza proposed that Suhrawardy either "explore" the possibility of forming an all-party government led by himself or alternatively consider new conditions for a realignment of the Republican-Awami League coalition. Suhrawardy appeared reluctant to negotiate a national coalition unless Mirza formally commissioned him. Confident that he has popular support, Suhrawardy is convinced that Mirza now realizes he cannot obtain a stable government without him.

Mirza on 15 October accepted a different coalition between the Republicans and the opposition Moslem League, excluding Suhrawardy's Awami League. The government would be headed by I. I. Chundrigar, Moslem League parliamentary leader. This coalition is contingent, however, on the approval of the Moslem League president, who plans to consult with Republican leaders on 16 October.

Mirza probably is dealing with both parties in the hope of forcing a solution most advantageous to his own position. His final decision may be withheld until the competition for a workable coalition is concluded.

**9. SECOND INDONESIAN NATIONAL CONFERENCE
PLANNED FOR NOVEMBER**

Comment on:

Prime Minister Djuanda has told the American ambassador in Djakarta that he plans to call a second national conference which would convene on 15 November and that he is trying to persuade former vice president Hatta to be its chairman. The conference, unlike the one held in September which covered a wide range [redacted] of problems, will deal only with economic and reconstruction matters. Djuanda probably hopes that in thus limiting the conference agenda there will be a better chance to reach an understanding on some of the provinces' outstanding grievances and thereby halt the trend toward national fragmentation. Djuanda undoubtedly also feels that if Hatta chairs the conference, the provinces--which have been demanding that Hatta be given a responsible government position--will feel impelled to attend the meeting and support its recommendations.

Djuanda's chances of reaching any significant agreement with the provinces at a second conference appear slim as there has been no slackening of the antigovernment sentiment since the September meeting. The disaffected provincial commanders seem not only to be increasingly firm in their united opposition to Djakarta, but they reportedly are disillusioned with Hatta's failure to speak strongly for regional interests. Recent reports suggest that relatively greater stress is now being placed on the achievement of political rather than economic objectives. Among these are the adoption of a national policy of anticomunism and the removal of Chief of Staff Nasution.

President Sukarno, who remains the key factor in the situation, continues to refuse concessions to the provinces and still advocates giving the Communists an important role in the government. On 11 October, he reportedly warned National party leaders that unless they cooperated with the "progressive forces" in Indonesia their party would "decline."

[redacted]

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10. NEHRU'S VISIT TO JAPAN

Comment on:

During Prime Minister Nehru's nine-day visit to Japan which ended on 13 October, Nehru and Prime Minister Kishi agreed that a ban on the manufacture and use of mass-destruction weapons is urgently needed. However, they could not reconcile Nehru's insistence on an immediate, unqualified suspension of nuclear tests for two years with Kishi's call for a temporary suspension during which time an effective supervisory and control mechanism would be worked out.

According to a Japanese Foreign Ministry official, Nehru favored recognition of Communist China by all nations, but Kishi remained adamant against such recognition at this time. Japanese officials professed the belief that Nehru does not regard the dangers from Communist China and the USSR seriously enough, and Nehru's neutralist attitudes appear to have had little effect in Tokyo.

The Indian prime minister showed great interest in long-term arrangements for the stabilized supply of iron ore from India to Japan and in Kishi's offer of credits to India to finance the import of capital goods from Japan. They agreed that experts should hold substantive discussions on these issues, but the Japanese Ministry of Finance opposed credit extension on the ground that it is a "political loan" which Japan cannot afford.

The subject of an Asian development fund was omitted from the final communiqué, but the course of discussions revealed that Nehru continues to regard it unfavorably. In general, Nehru indicated that he wanted to concentrate on India's problems rather than concern himself with world affairs.

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**11. THREAT OF COUP IN GUATEMALA GROWING AS
ELECTION NEARS**

Comment on:

General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, the leading opposition candidate in the 20 October Guatemalan presidential election, is gaining wide popular support and there are indications that attempts may be made to stage a coup.

Defense Minister Juan F. Oliva, Guatemala's strong man, would probably not permit a Ydigoras victory and has almost certainly been urged by associates to stage a pre-election coup. He is reportedly seeking a pretext, such as expected antigovernment demonstrations by the weak but vehement leftist groups, to show that the army must rule to keep order. At least some segments of the administration's political machine, the National Democratic Movement (MDN), would probably support an Oliva coup, since they are concerned over the failure of MDN presidential candidate Miguel Ortiz Passarelli to build up the popular support expected.

Surveys throughout the country show substantial Ydigoras support among the country's politically conscious minority, and MDN leaders privately concede that Ydigoras will carry Guatemala City. The MDN is relying for victory on its tight control in rural areas, where illiterate Indians can be voted repeatedly. Ydigoras supporters know this and have warned that a fraudulent election would justify rebellion. Ydigoras himself has told the American embassy that losing the election would be proof enough of fraud for him. [redacted]

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**12. JUNTA CHIEF KEBREAU REASSERTING CONTROL
OVER HAITI**

Comment on:

Brig. Gen. Kebreau, chief of Haiti's military junta, [redacted]

[redacted] appears to be regaining a dominant position in the army following a brief period during which officers supporting former dictator Magloire were believed in control.

President-elect Duvalier seems likely to be only a puppet president, subject to ousting by the army at his first show of independence. His inauguration has been postponed from 15 October to 22 October, and there is increasing speculation that it may be postponed indefinitely.

Reports that a high-level delegation from the Dominican Republic is scheduled to confer on Kebreau one of the highest Dominican decorations suggest that he may have made a deal with Dominican dictator Trujillo. The American embassy in Ciudad Trujillo suggests that the Dominican Republic may be attempting to establish political influence in Haiti by offering economic aid. Some support is offered this theory by Kebreau's apparent unconcern over withdrawal of US economic aid and by the government's indifference toward the deterioration of its relations with the United States. [redacted]

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