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19 April 1956

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
# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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**OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE**  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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
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**1. SOUTH KOREAN NAVAL MOVE MAY PROVOKE INCIDENT WITH NORTH KOREA**

Movement of South Korean naval units to west coast fishing grounds off North Korean territory below the 38th parallel may result in an incident with North Korean forces.

At a press conference on 17 April, South Korea's chief of naval operations, Chong Kuk-mo, said the move was designed to prevent a repetition of the incident of 10 May last year near the Han River estuary, when North Korean shore batteries shelled a South Korean fishing fleet.

Following last year's incident, Pyongyang issued a statement avowing its intention to protect its territorial waters--i. e., up to 12 miles from the coast--and outlining procedures to provide for the "convenience and safety" of South Koreans desiring to fish in the area. The statement specified that "no armed vessels or armed persons" would be permitted to enter the fishing grounds inside the 12-mile limit. Admiral Chong indicated on 17 April, however, that South Korean naval vessels will patrol up to three miles from the North Korean coast this year.

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## 2. YUGOSLAVS ORDER CLOSE CONTROL OF US INFORMATION FILM SHOWINGS

Yugoslav

call for close control over

a US mobile unit touring the Slovene area to show films "containing propaganda in certain parts." The group is to be closely checked for permits to show the films, and if it lacks permits the police are not to allow managers of local movie theaters to show the films.

The police were apparently instructed to use the excuse that the theaters were condemned as fire hazards or else lacked proper authorization for such showings. The police were ordered in any case to list the contacts of the mobile film crew and to report fully on all showings.

## Comment

The Yugoslav police are apparently trying to keep a close surveillance over all ideological influences affecting the populace.

For the last two years, the activities of the United States Information Service have been relatively free of harassment, and it has been able to show such titles as "In Defense of Peace" and "Soldiers for Freedom" to a vast Yugoslav audience. USIS officials in Yugoslavia have reported that the mass of Yugoslav citizens seem to lean further and further toward Western ideas despite the improvement of Yugoslav relations with the Soviet bloc countries.

The Yugoslav press has recently been particularly critical of American-produced films, and local political organizations have reportedly resolved that Yugoslavs "should be spared some of these foreign imports." Tito demanded at the March plenum of his party's central committee that the youth of the land be "rescued from influences which are alien to socialism" and be "defended against various Western influences."

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### 3. POLISH REGIME FACES PROBLEM IN CONTROLLING RELAXATION POLICY

[redacted]

Warsaw is in "a state of real ferment," as a result of the government's recent relaxation policy which encourages greater freedom of expression, according to [redacted] the American embassy in Warsaw. The embassy considers it possible that the regime may have even instigated some of the criticisms from literary circles, but points out that there are now indications of a real effort on the part of writers to see how much public criticism the regime will tolerate.

The government's main concern may be that the policy of relaxation will lead to more overt expressions of disaffection among the workers. There are already unconfirmed rumors of labor unrest at some large factories in recent days.

Rumors are current in Warsaw that the regime has reacted to a few of the most outspoken criticisms by firing--or even arresting--the people responsible. [redacted]

[redacted] First Secretary Ochab warned writers against using an attack on the cult of the individual as an excuse for attacking the party, saying, "You don't want me to bring tanks into the Warsaw streets, do you?"

Although leading officials have called for greater initiative and condemned the stifling of free discussion which resulted from the cult of the individual, the regime will face increasing difficulties unless it is able to set forth clearly the limits of the new freedom.

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## THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION (Information as of 1700, 18 April)

Egyptian prime minister Nasr has issued categorical orders to military commanders not to fire across the demarcation line even if fired upon unless there is clear evidence of a prospective Israeli attack.

Violation of these orders would lead to "serious court-martial charges."

The Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council and chiefs of staff reportedly decided that Egypt would not provoke war with Israel "for at least two or three months."

The reasons given were that Egyptian troops were not yet trained in the use of the Soviet equipment, and that the Soviet bloc air mission estimated that it would take five or six months longer to train a sufficient nucleus of pilots and ground staff.

An Israeli military spokesman told the US army attache in Tel Aviv that Israel believes there are six groups of fedayeen terrorists still in Israel.

Since 1 April, Syrian army units along the Israeli border have been organizing patrols for infiltration of Israel for reconnaissance and harassing operations.

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The officers asking for volunteers cited the need to emulate the Egyptian operations for the purpose of troop morale. [redacted] as of 17 April Syrian troops on the Israeli border still had orders to fire immediately should the Israelis attempt to resume their Jordan River water diversion project in the demilitarized zone.

The American army attaché in Amman reports that it now appears that the shift of Arab Legion units into West Jordan is not as complete as originally reported, in that not all of the armored brigade is in West Jordan.

The Egyptian naval commander in chief stated that the six Soviet-built motor torpedo boats which sortied from Alexandria on 10 April are on training maneuvers.

[redacted] Egyptians were taking paratroop training in Aleppo, Syria. The training was limited to the use of ground equipment, owing to the lack of aircraft, and jump training would be carried out in Egypt.

[redacted] the arrival of a Saudi group in Suez suggests that it is in Egypt for some type of military training.

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**BIWEEKLY SUMMARY  
5-18 April 1956**

**THE TAIWAN STRAIT**


**Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group  
for the Taiwan Strait Problem**

Again there were no significant combat operations in the area. Chinese Communist junks and small naval craft have been sighted in increased numbers along the coast, particularly in the Matsu area. Nothing ominous is seen in these sightings. The increase is believed due to improving weather and the usual intensification of coastal fishing during the spring.

**TAIWAN STRAIT SITUATION**  
18 APRIL 1956

**CHINESE COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND:**

| DESIGNATIONS  | PRIMARY AIRFIELD<br>CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT IN<br>AREA WITH PREPARED RUNWAY<br>GENERALLY 5000 FEET OR LONGER. | SECONDARY AIRFIELD<br>AUXILIARY OR EMERGENCY BASES<br>OR FIELDS OF LESSER IMPORTANCE.<br>RUNWAYS GENERALLY LESS THAN<br>5000 FEET. | USABILITY |   |   |  |
|---|---|--|-----------|---|---|--|
|   |   |  | +         | - | ? | [ ]  |
| ACTIVE BASE FOR MILITARY & CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT. SOME BASES USED BY PISTON TYPES MAY BE USABLE BY JETS | ●   | OPERATIONAL  | ▲         |   |   | MIG-15<br>MIG-17                           |
| INACTIVE BASES CAPABLE OF USE BY AIRCRAFT   | ●   | SERVICEABLE  | ▲         |   |   | TU-2,<br>IL-10<br>LA-9/11<br>TU-4<br>IL-28 |
| CURRENT STATUS UNDETERMINED   | ■   | UNKNOWN  | ■         |   |   | ETC.<br>UNKNOWN<br>UNDER CONSTRUCTION      |
| * FIELDS NOT CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING SUSTAINED OPERATIONS AT PRESENT.                      |   |  |           |   |   |  |

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