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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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23 DECEMBER 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR and Communist China take divergent lines in commemorating Stalin anniversary.

(1)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Afghan Foreign Minister decides to cancel meeting with Pakistani president.

(2)

Burma--U Nu's prospects for winning February elections improve; army decides on nonpartisan role.

(3)


Lower Congo nationalists intensify demands for early independence from Belgium.

(4)


III. THE WEST

UAR balks at restoration of full diplomatic relations with France.

(5)

**LATE ITEM**

- (6) Laos--Reformist group (CDNI) allegedly plans to demand resignation of Phoui government and, failing that, to stage coup on 26 December with army support.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

23 December 1959

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

D K **USSR-China:** Communist China took the opportunity of Stalin's 80th birthday anniversary on 21 December to underscore once more its disagreement with Khrushchev's current foreign policy tactics by praising Stalin's role as "an uncompromising enemy of imperialism." Peiping, which has been reluctant to criticize Stalin since Khrushchev opened the de-Stalinization campaign in 1956, made no mention of the "cult of personality" but stressed his "important contributions" to socialism. Moscow radio's commentary, based on a Pravda editorial, noted the late dictator's "positive" contributions, but it stressed the harmful effects of the "cult of the individual" and followed with Khrushchev's dictum that Stalin's mistakes must be decisively rejected by world Communism

II. ASIA-AFRICA

N 0 **Afghanistan-Pakistan:** [The prospect of improving relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been set back by Afghan Foreign Minister Naim's cancellation of his scheduled 10 January visit with Pakistani President Ayub. Naim concluded from recent speeches in which Ayub denounced Kabul's Pushtoonistan policy that little would be gained by holding talks with him. Naim intends to inform the Pakistanis of his decision "in a few days." The antigovernment rioting which broke out in Kandahar on 21 December and in which one American was injured may strengthen Naim's decision not to leave the country at this time.]

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Burma: The sweeping victory of former Premier U Nu's political faction in Moulmein municipal elections underscores Nu's improving prospects for a comeback in national elections now set for 6 February. The rival faction of former Premier Ba Swe had considered the Moulmein area its stronghold. Meanwhile, the army apparently intends to play a nonpartisan role in the election. Should U Nu win, the army can be expected to keep a checkrein on the government's activities.

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Belgian Congo: Intransigence on the part of the Abako, the leading nationalist group in Leopoldville Province, threatens to block any compromise between African nationalists and Belgian authorities concerning the timing of Congolese independence. The Abako, whose prestige has been heightened by its successful appeal for a boycott of local elections in the Leopoldville area, has announced it will not recognize Belgian authority in the Congo after 31 December. [Belgian officials in Leopoldville fear that the Abako may be preparing to set up a government-in-exile for the lower Congo if its demands are not met.]

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III. THE WEST

France-UAR: French Foreign Ministry representatives negotiating in Cairo for resumption of relations feel they cannot settle for less than the diplomatic status accorded London on 1 December. While the UAR has been willing to negotiate with France, it has balked at any resumption of relations on a diplomatic level. Paris has resumed Arabic-language propaganda broadcasts against Nasir similar to those of the clandestine radio station France closed down in July in the hope of encouraging closer relations with the UAR.

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LATE ITEM

*Laos: [The army commander has told a high-ranking American official in Laos that the young reformist group (CDNI) is planning to force the resignation of the Phoui government by 26 December. In the event that Phoui refuses to accept a demand to step down, army elements are to seize control in a "bloodless coup" on 26 December. However, it is not certain that pro-Phoui elements in the army can be neutralized as planned by the CDNI. Much will also depend upon the attitude of the new King on whom the CDNI is undoubtedly counting. If he should fail to support the CDNI its plans may well be postponed.]

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23 Dec 59

DAILY BRIEF

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THE COMMUNIST BLOC**II. ASIA-AFRICA****Afghan Foreign Minister Naim Decides to Cancel Visit
To Pakistan**

[The prospect of improving relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been set back by the decision of Afghan Foreign Minister Naim to cancel his visit to Pakistan for talks with President Ayub which had been scheduled to begin on 10 January. Naim has concluded from Ayub's recent speeches that little progress on the Pushtoonistan dispute could be expected from such talks; he intends to inform the Pakistanis of his decision "in a few days."]

[Although Ayub has occasionally indicated that he wants to improve Afghan-Pakistani relations, he apparently remains impatient with Kabul's policies and often betrays his hostility toward the Afghan Government. In recent speeches Ayub has denounced Kabul's demands for self-determination for the Pushtu-speaking tribes living in Pakistan as "fantastic claims on Pakistan's territory." He also has repeatedly condemned the Soviet-assisted road-building program in Afghanistan as facilitating a future Soviet invasion of the Indian subcontinent.]

[Afghan officials may also privately blame the Pakistanis for antigovernment rioting which broke out in Kandahar on 21 December, since Kabul chronically suspects the Pakistanis of fomenting trouble in Afghan territory. The government has officially ascribed the unrest to "certain seditious elements" resisting payment of taxes. However, conservative religious sentiment against the government's policy of encouraging women to appear in public without veils has apparently been mainly responsible for the outbreak.]

[The government, which almost certainly regards the incident as a serious challenge to its authority, has declared martial law and apparently has the situation in hand. It is likely to be particularly embarrassed by this breakdown of law and order, since injuries and property damage were sustained by the American community in Kandahar.]

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Former Burmese Premier U Nu Continues to Show
Political Strength

The overwhelming victory of former Burmese Premier Nu's "Clean" faction of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) in the municipal elections in Moulmein on 18 December constitutes a major setback to former Premier Ba Swe's "Stable" faction and sharply enhances U Nu's prospects for a national victory in the parliamentary general election scheduled for 6 February. In Moulmein, the major city of southeastern Burma--an area considered Ba Swe's personal domain--Ba Swe's supporters lost all 25 contested seats. Their only gains were two seats in districts where they were unopposed.

Army leadership, which has favored Ba Swe and his faction, appears to have accepted the series of recent victories by Nu's supporters in municipal elections as a clear indication that Nu will win in February. After an assessment of early municipal election results showed popular resentment of army intervention on behalf of "Stable" candidates, Premier Ne Win ordered the army to play a nonpartisan role in the election campaigns. Local army units, which had been blatantly anti-Nu, now seem to be obeying the directive.

If Nu regains the premiership, the army, skeptical of both his administrative ability and his integrity, can be expected to keep a close watch on him and to act as a check on government decisions.

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Congo Nationalist Group Delivers Ultimatum on Self-Rule

Intransigence on the part of the Abako, the leading nationalist group in the key province of Leopoldville, again threatens to block any compromise between African nationalists and Belgian authorities concerning the timing of Congolese independence. The Abako, which desires a separate independent lower Congo area, stated on 18 December that it would not recognize Belgian authority in the Congo after 31 December.

The presence of Belgian King Baudouin in the Congo apparently contributed to the orderly manner in which local elections were held in the Leopoldville area on 20 December. Only about 30 percent of the registered voters went to the polls, however, tending to confirm the extensive influence of the Abako, which was aligned with nationalist groups in other areas in boycotting the elections. Although Baudouin appears to retain a measure of popularity in the Congo, African demonstrators have emphasized independence slogans and appeals for the release of imprisoned nationalist leaders. The Abako plans to consult with other nationalist groups on demands to be presented to Baudouin about 28 December.

Brussels has indicated its willingness to accelerate Congolese independence and has advanced to this spring provincial elections originally planned for September 1960. It has refused, however, to consider autonomy for the lower Congo apart from the interior, although the area would presumably have a measure of local autonomy under the planned federal system.

eral nationalist leaders, fear that the Abako may be moving to set up a government in exile if its demands are not met.]

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III. THE WEST

French-UAR Relations Again Deteriorating

[A] French official in Cairo said on 18 December that Paris is irritated by the UAR's negative attitude toward various French interests, particularly the settlement of sequestered property and the status of French schools. Earlier this year, considerable progress apparently was made toward normalizing relations between the two countries, although Cairo balked at resuming diplomatic relations. Since Britain and the UAR have announced resumption of diplomatic relations at the chargé level, Paris reportedly feels that it cannot settle for less. The British expect to resume possession of their former embassy by the end of the month and to exchange ambassadors later.

As long as the Algerian war continues, it is unlikely that France and the UAR can settle their differences. On the other hand, the French alliance with Israel has cooled somewhat under the Fifth Republic, and Cairo has been advised that if France should offer additional military equipment to Israel, Paris would be prepared to make a similar amount of equipment available to the UAR.

French clandestine radio attacks on Nasir beamed to the UAR had been a major source of irritation. The "Voice of Free Egypt," initiated by France following the 1956 Suez Canal episode, was discontinued in July in the hope of encouraging closer relations. However, new anti-Nasir, Arab-language broadcasts--believed to originate in Paris and utilizing one of the announcers employed by the former clandestine station--have recently been heard.]

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Young Reformist Group Allegedly Plans Takeover in Laos

General Ouane, the Lao armed forces commander, has told a high-ranking American official in Vientiane that the reformist Committee for Defense of National Interests (CDNI) plans to force the resignation of the Phoui government by 26 December. In the first stage of the CDNI plan, Ouane will confront Phoui on 23 December with a demand for his resignation by 25 December. If Phoui refuses, influential army officers who are CDNI members will stage a "bloodless coup," by seizing control of government premises in Vientiane on 26 December.

The CDNI, which was excluded from the new Phoui government formed on 15 December, broke with the premier and his conservative followers on the issues of the National Assembly's tenure, the timing of new elections, and the composition of a reorganized cabinet pending the new elections. In a communiqué subsequent to its withdrawal from the government, the CDNI questioned the constitutionality of some of Phoui's recent moves and maintained its position that the assembly's mandate expired on 25 December, and that after this date all powers reverted to the King. The communiqué also implied that the proper course for the King to take after that date would be to form a new, provisional government to prepare for elections in April. Phoui, on the other hand, hopes to continue with his present government until the end of next year.

The reformist group has made plans against the possibility that pro-Phoui elements in the army might seek to impede a coup attempt; however, it is not certain that these elements can be neutralized. Much will also depend on the attitude of King Savang on whose support the CDNI is undoubtedly counting. While Savang strongly supports the CDNI position on the assembly and early elections, he has in the past tended to shy away from extreme action. If he should fail to support the CDNI move against Phoui its plans may well be postponed.

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Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

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Commandant, United States Marine Corps

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Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

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