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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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15 AUGUST 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR fires second unusual missile from
Kapustin Yar rangehead.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Congo--Entry of UN forces leaves polit-
ical status of Katanga unresolved.

②

III. THE WEST

Belgium--Political pressure continues
for drastic cut in defense budget.

③


British find Adenauer favors concentrat-
ed effort to close breach between Com-
mon Market and Outer Seven.

④

LATE ITEM

The situation in Laos.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

15 August 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

***USSR:** At 1230 EDT on 13 August the USSR fired a ballistic missile about 2,000 nautical miles from the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range. It impacted in an area midway between Krasnoyarsk and the northern tip of Lake Baykal. Similar range and launching azimuth were used on 3 August. This second launching confirms Soviet intent to use a launching azimuth considerably north of the normal one and an impact area outside the limits of the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range.

No

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Congo: The entry of UN forces into Elisabethville, and the beginnings of a Belgian troop withdrawal from Katanga, have not brought any resolution of the political status of the disputed province. Katanga Premier Tshombé has stepped up the training of his own security force, and would probably take any action necessary to prevent the entry of representatives of the Lumumba government. Congo Premier Lumumba, in demanding withdrawal of "white" contingents of the UN force, may hope that an all-African force would be responsive to his demands and would take action against Tshombé. In Leopoldville, President Kasavubu's 14 August appeal for national unity stopped short of endorsing Lumumba's policies, and appears unlikely to halt anti-Lumumba plotting among elements of the Abako party.

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III. THE WEST

Belgium: [While no decision has been taken to cut the Belgian defense budget in line with Prime Minister Eyskens' announcement on 9 August that Belgium will revise its NATO commitments in view of Congo developments, political pressure continues for a drastic reduction of \$120,000,000--one third of the budget. Cancellation of the F-104G fighter-plane program and a partial withdrawal of Belgian troops from West Germany are considered likely first steps in the event such a reduction is ordered. According to a high Belgian defense official, the whole future of Belgium's military forces is very fluid and depends on events in the Congo, especially the effect on the public of loss of the Kamina base and the removal of troops from Ruanda-Urundi.] No

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Adenauer-Macmillan Talks:

[the chancellor has accepted the indefinite postponement of further steps toward the supranational integration of Europe in favor of a concentrated effort to close the breach between the European Common Market and the British-led Outer Seven. Such a major shift in Adenauer's foreign policies would be motivated by concern that the Common Market's farm policies would cause Adenauer serious difficulties in the 1961 elections, by a desire to present a united European front against any future Soviet pressures, and possibly by fear that De Gaulle's concept of European cooperation would tend to place West Germany in a secondary role.] No

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*Laos: The rebel-controlled Vientiane radio has announced that King Savang has designated National Assembly President Souvanna Phouma to form a new government. This action follows Savang's acceptance on 14 August of the resignation of the Som-sanith government, which had received a vote of no confidence the previous day from the assembly in Vientiane. The assembly's vote, which was "unanimous," apparently had been forced by the rebel Kong Le group controlling Vientiane, and Premier Som-sanith and other government leaders in Luang Prabang initially dismissed it as illegal. The king presumably acted to avert a military showdown, which was becoming increasingly likely with the failure of repeated efforts to negotiate a settlement with Kong Le.

Lao Defense Minister General Phoumi, chief advocate of forceful action against the rebel units in Vientiane, has refused to accept the king's decision on the Somsanith government. He apparently intends to go forward with his plans for military counteraction, but it is problematical that a unilateral move in defiance of the king's wishes could succeed. *DK*

Souvanna Phouma engineered the short-lived integration settlement with the Communist Pathet Lao dissidents while premier in 1957. He still feels that Laos' best interests can be served by a rapprochement with the Pathet Lao and pursuance of a policy of strict neutrality. [redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

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The Situation in the Congo

The entry of UN forces into Elisabethville and the beginnings of a Belgian troop withdrawal from Katanga have not brought any resolution of the political status of the disputed province. [redacted] Katanga Premier Tshombé has stepped up the training of his own security force, which possibly will be led by former Belgian officers of the Force Publique. [redacted] its European commander left Elisabethville for Brussels on 8 August "to accelerate recruitment." [redacted] the number of volunteers for the Katanga force was taxing available facilities.

Although spokesmen for Tshombé have characterized his talks with Hammarskjold as "cordial," it appears likely that there are considerable areas of disagreement. Hammarskjold almost certainly failed to recognize the "independence" of Katanga, and probably indicated that he could not permit Tshombé to establish the number and nationalities of the UN soldiers to be moved into Katanga.

Congo Premier Lumumba's 13 August demand for the withdrawal of white contingents of the UN force appears likely to meet an equally negative response from the Secretary General. Lumumba possibly hoped that an all-African force would be susceptible to pressure for the forcible unification of the Congo if sufficiently pressed by himself and his Ghanaian and Guinean allies. The anti-white sentiment implicit in Lumumba's demand, however, will increase the apprehension of Europeans in both the Congo and Katanga.

On 14 August, Congo President Kasavubu broke a long silence with a radio speech in which he urged Congolese to support the central government. He stopped short of endorsing Lumumba's policies, however, and his plea appears unlikely to halt anti-Lumumba plotting among elements of the Abako party. Spokesmen for Lumumba have hinted at the imposition of press censorship, and

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Lumumba has alluded to "special tribunals" which would be set up to judge any persons who "provoke trouble" by their attitudes or writings. [redacted]

[large redacted area]

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Drastic Cuts Threatened in Belgian Defense Budget

The American Embassy in Brussels reports continuing political pressure for a one-third reduction of the Belgian defense budget, in line with Prime Minister Eyskens' announcement on 9 August that developments in the Congo will result in a revision in Belgium's NATO commitments. Cancellation of the F-104G fighter-plane program and a partial withdrawal of Belgian troops from West Germany are considered likely first steps in the event such a reduction is ordered.

According to a high Belgian defense official, the whole future of Belgium's military forces is very fluid and turns on the outcome of events in the Congo, especially on public reaction to the loss of the Kamina base and the removal of troops from Ruanda-Urundi. The embassy expects considerable "in-fighting" at the highest levels of the government before the defense issue is resolved.

At his press conference on 9 August Eyskens, embittered by what he considered lack of support from Belgium's NATO partners during the Congo crisis, announced that his government would initiate an "austerity program" involving reductions in orders for military equipment within the framework of NATO and amortization of the Belgian bases in the Congo, which were built in the rearmament period following the Korean war at a cost of \$70,000,000. Some Belgian political leaders have already privately criticized Eyskens' statement as "untimely and childish."

Prior to the Congo crisis, however, parliament had already trimmed the defense estimates calling for an 8-percent increase over the 1959 budget and the Senate had asked to reconsider defense expenditures in the fall. The weak Eyskens coalition government, sensitive to a strong public sentiment in favor of reducing defense spending, has never fully met its NATO requirements since it took office in November 1958. Moreover, the Belgian press, angered by the Security Council's resolutions on the Congo, has stressed the uselessness of continuing costly military efforts within NATO when the Western powers have demonstrated complete indifference to Belgian interests.

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Adenauer May Major Shift in Policy on European Integration

In his recent discussions with Prime Minister Macmillan, Chancellor Adenauer apparently indicated that he has decided to postpone indefinitely further steps toward the supranational integration of Europe in favor of an accommodation between the European Common Market and the British-led European Free Trade Association or Outer Seven.

[] this subject was the major problem discussed by Adenauer during Macmillan's visit to Bonn on 10-11 August, and while no decisions were made, this major shift in Adenauer's postwar policies was "confirmed."

[In deciding to delay indefinitely his ideal of an integrated Europe, Adenauer probably was motivated by both domestic and foreign policy considerations. The decision earlier this year to accelerate the institution of the Common Market's agricultural policy has confronted the West German farmer with a prospective reduction in prices, and Adenauer fears he may in consequence lose votes in the 1961 Bundestag elections. Adenauer evidently also sees an urgent need for European unity on basic policy and posture toward the USSR, and he stressed again in his talks with Macmillan his concern that Washington may not be able to act firmly during the American elections.]

[A bid by Adenauer for Six-Seven unity may cause trouble between Bonn and Paris. It is doubtful that De Gaulle would welcome London in the European confederation he has hoped to develop under French leadership. Even though Adenauer's shift toward a looser form of European integration would be in line with De Gaulle's views, British Foreign Office sources have the impression that Adenauer is "piqued" with the French leader, and he may fear that in a "Gaulist" Europe Bonn would be reduced to a satellite.]

[] the Bonn Foreign Ministry is extremely uneasy that in the course of talks with De Gaulle on 29 and 30 July Adenauer may have undercut the Common Market's institutions. Similar expressions of concern have been heard from other Common Market countries.]

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~~SECRET~~Situation in Laos

King Savang has designated National Assembly President Souvanna Phouma to form a new government according to the rebel-controlled Vientiane radio. This action follows Savang's acceptance on 14 August of the resignation of the Somsanith government, which had received a vote of no confidence the previous day from the National Assembly in Vientiane. The assembly's "unanimous" vote apparently had been forced by the rebel Kong Le group controlling Vientiane, and Premier Somsanith and other government leaders in Luang Prabang initially dismissed it as illegal. Subsequent negotiations in Luang Prabang between the government and a rebel delegation, however, resulted in "complete understanding," [redacted]

[redacted]

These developments occurred when the government seemed to be gaining the upper hand over Kong Le, who had been unsuccessful in extending his control beyond Vientiane and only had about 1200 troops at his disposal. The king presumably acted in the interests of national unity, since a military showdown was becoming increasingly likely with the failure of repeated efforts to negotiate a settlement with Kong Le. Lao Defense Minister Phoumi, chief advocate of direct action to settle the revolt, had already initiated psychological warfare activities against the rebel paratroop units in Vientiane with the introduction of Lao special agents and teams, and was proceeding rapidly with attack plans.

When informed of the king's decision to accept the resignation of the Somsanith government, Phoumi is reliably reported to have expressed surprise. He said that he refused to accept the decision and indicated that he intends to go ahead with his plans to salvage the situation by military means from his command post at Savannakhet in southern Laos. It is doubtful, however, if a unilateral move against the king's wishes could succeed.

The king's course may have been influenced by fear that Kong Le might defect with his troops to the side of the Communist Pathet Lao dissidents if he couldn't derive satisfaction from the government for his demands for policy reforms. Kong Le has sharply accused the United States of interfering in Laotian affairs, and advocates friendly relations with all nations including the Communist bloc.

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Premier-designate Souvanna engineered the short-lived unification agreement with the Pathet Lao dissidents in November 1957 while premier, and still feels strongly that Laos' best interests can be served by finding common ground with the Pathets and by following a policy of strict neutrality.

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