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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

22 August 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist China: The high-level meeting of Communist China's senior party leaders, which has reportedly been in session outside Peiping for the past several weeks, may have ended. A Peiping news item of 21 August on a reception for Ho Chi Minh revealed that several members of the party politburo, including Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai, Mao's principal lieutenants, were back in the capital. While no public pronouncements on the proceedings have been released by the Communists, the trend of current press comment suggests that economic matters were included in the discussion, and that the meeting decided to reaffirm the regime's hurry-up economic programs.

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Indonesia: The government's decision to permit the Indonesian Communist party to convene its sixth national congress on 7 September is a Communist victory. The rescheduling of the congress from its earlier date of 22 August, after a reported decision to prohibit any meeting, appears to have resulted from a decision by President Sukarno to overrule army wishes for cancellation.

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Pakistan: Recent efforts to discredit the Ayub government indicate that opposition to military rule is becoming more active. In mid-August ousted politicians sought to distribute anti-government posters in West Pakistan. Rumors are now being spread of impending revolt in East Pakistan and of a planned Soviet- or Afghan-supported tribal uprising in West Pakistan in October to overthrow Ayub. Such dissatisfaction, however, is not sufficiently widespread to pose a serious threat to the regime at this time.

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DAILY BRIEF

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III. THE WEST

NO

Cyprus: [The Greek-Turkish deadlock over an interpretation of executive powers in the prospective constitution for Cyprus has become worse. The dispute will probably be referred immediately to the Greek and Turkish premiers. Unless the issue is quickly resolved, the original schedule of events leading to independence by next February will be disrupted and communal tensions may be revived.]

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Britain - West Indies: [London has reverted to its earlier advocacy of associating the West Indies Federation, and especially Trinidad's anti-American Premier Eric Williams, in any review of the 1941 US-UK Caribbean bases agreement. The British seem convinced that Williams will emerge as the future leader of the year-old Federation and must be placated lest he abrogate the agreement later. They fear that a flat US refusal to discuss revision might even result in physical action against the major Chaguaramas base in Trinidad.]

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UN--Khrushchev's visit: UN Secretary General Hammarskjold plans to play down the importance of the Soviet premier's visit to the General Assembly this September. He has scheduled Khrushchev's address to the assembly for 18 September rather than the opening day, 15 September, which the USSR reportedly preferred. Moreover, Hammarskjold plans to include Khrushchev in his regular dinner for heads of all UN delegations rather than give the separate dinner usually accorded "heads of state" visiting UN headquarters.

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Cuba: The Cuban Government on 19 August issued a decree ordering a 30-percent reduction in electric rates of the predominantly American-owned Cuban Electric Company, which supplies about 90 percent of the country's electric power. The company was not given a promised opportunity to refute the findings of a government commission that has been investigating it for several months. Government officials are believed considering a plan for permanent supervision, and the company president fears the government plans to take over the company eventually.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Indonesian Communist Party Congress Rescheduled

The Indonesian Communist party has scored a victory in gaining the army's reluctant approval for the convening of the party's sixth national congress on 7 September. Although behind-the-scenes maneuvers have not been reported, the explanation for the Communists' success appears to be a combination of Communist bluff, an army mistake, and interference by President Sukarno in behalf of the party.

The party had earlier applied for and received army permission to convene the congress on 22 August. This permission apparently had been granted in ignorance of the scope of the meeting and in line with the government's decision to ease the ban on political activity. When Defense Minister General Nasution later informally requested that the congress be "indefinitely postponed," Party Secretary Aidit ignored the request, claiming that permission had already been granted. There are indications that at this point, President Sukarno overruled army efforts to withdraw the previously granted permission and possibly suggested the compromise date of 7 September.

The party is anxious to hold the congress, having repeatedly postponed it--largely as a result of army pressure--from its initially scheduled date in mid-1958. With an increased membership and a domestic situation less favorable to Communist interests, party leaders wish to brief cadres and to lay down revised tactical lines. The party constitution calls for a national congress every three years if possible, and none has been held since March 1954.

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Opposition to Pakistani Military Rule Becoming More Active

[Recent efforts to label the Ayub government as unpopular indicate increasingly active opposition to military rule in Pakistan. Several Pakistani tribal leaders appear to be trying to embarrass the government by disseminating reports of plots for a coordinated tribal uprising to overthrow President Ayub. These leaders probably fear the loss of much of their traditional authority as a result of the government's land reform program, and other measures which will extend the government's authority at their expense. They are unlikely to get sufficient support, however, to risk an open challenge to the government.]

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[In addition, some ousted party politicians are apparently the source of rumors that the government fears a violent uprising in East Pakistan in the near future. These dissidents have become sufficiently frustrated by the regime to try distributing antigovernment posters in West Pakistan. The government discovered this plot in mid-August and made several arrests.]

[The dissidents, especially those from the tribes, may attempt to enlist the support of the Afghan Government. Since the military take-over in Pakistan last October, Kabul has stepped up its Pushtoonistan campaign, demanding self-determination for Pushtu tribes living in Pakistan. Afghan propaganda has played up recent disturbances in the southern Pakistani tribal area of Baluchistan, and Afghan Prime Minister Daud has expressed his concern over recent agitation in Dir, a Pakistani border state north of the Khyber Pass.]

[The Afghans are likely to increase their propaganda support of the tribes in Pakistan, especially during the Afghan independence celebrations which are to begin on 24 August. Such support would worsen further Afghan-Pakistani relations, Kabul would not, however want to provoke a strong Pakistani counteraction which could leave Kabul entirely dependent on Soviet good-will and support.]

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III. THE WEST

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Britain Renews Support of Caribbean Bases Conference

[The British Government is again advocating that the West Indies Federation, and especially Trinidad's anti-American Premier Eric Williams, participate in a review of the 1941 US-UK Caribbean base agreement.]

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[the Colonial Office and Foreign Office have evidently concluded that there is nothing they can do to curb Williams short of revoking the constitution of the year-old Federation--a step London is loath to take without extreme provocation.]

[The British seem convinced that the demagogic Williams will emerge as leader of the Federation, perhaps in 1963 when it is expected to attain complete independence. The present federal prime minister, Sir Grantley Adams of Barbados, and the leader of the majority Federal Labor party, Norman Manley of Jamaica, have reached an age when they may not retain their influence for long. Williams, meanwhile, seems to be gaining greater support.]

[London maintains that if Williams could be associated with a slightly revised agreement now, he would honor it later, despite his clear opposition to US retention of the major Chaguaramas base on Trinidad. Otherwise, the British fear, he would demand sweeping changes. They argue that a "completely negative" US response to the Federation's request for a conference on revision might cause Williams to initiate physical action against the Chaguaramas base. The US Consulate General in Port of Spain has also warned that Williams might try to obstruct American use of the base.]

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Hammarskjold's Attitude Toward Khrushchev's UN Visit

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold plans to play down the importance of Khrushchev's visit to the UN General Assembly this September. He has informed the Soviet delegation that the Soviet premier's speech to the assembly has definitely been set for 18 September, although the USSR had indicated a preference for the 15th, the opening day of this session.

Moreover, Hammarskjold does not want to give a dinner in honor of Khrushchev, but intends merely to invite him to the usual dinner for heads of all UN delegations and cabinet officers present. The customary toast will thus be to the heads of all delegations and not directly to the Soviet premier, who will, however, be the ranking guest. Hammarskjold believes this plan will meet all the protocol requirements of Khrushchev's visit without unduly emphasizing his presence at the UN.

UN protocol requires the secretary general to give a formal dinner or luncheon for all heads of state who visit UN headquarters. He may also accord such honors to other high-ranking persons, if he desires. The fact that Khrushchev is not officially listed as head of state permits Hammarskjold to play down his

visit to the UN.

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Cuba Orders American-owned Electric Company to Slash
Rates 30 Percent

On 19 August, the Cuban Government decreed a 30-percent reduction in the rates charged by the predominantly American-owned Cuban Electric Company, which supplies about 90 percent of the country's electric power. The decree was issued without giving the company a prior opportunity to refute the findings of a government investigating commission as had been promised both to US Ambassador Bonsal and to company officials. The government also instructed all electric companies to continue their development and expansion plans.

The company president, who says the firm cannot operate on the basis of the new rates, fears that the decree may be part of a government expropriation plan. Government leaders are known to be considering a plan for permanent supervision of the utility and last June were reported by a company attorney to be drafting a forced-lease agreement under which the government would take over operations.

The government's action is in line with its policy of forcing down the cost of living by arbitrarily decreeing reductions in rents, mortgage interest rates, and food prices. Other American-owned corporations in Cuba have already been affected or are likely to be in the future by the policies of the highly nationalistic government. Prime Minister Castro has frequently condemned the "monopolistic foreign interests" in Cuba.

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