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Copy No. CI-9

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 17

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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3.3(h)(2)

**SUMMARY****GENERAL****FAR EAST**

3. De Lattre believes Viet Minh has been seriously weakened (page 4).

INDOCHINA FR

3.3(h)(2)

**SOUTH ASIA**

4. New tensions developing between India and Pakistan (page 5).

INDIA, PAKISTAN,  
KASHMIR

3.3(h)(2)

**NEAR EAST/AFRICA**

6. Swiss urge Iranians to come to terms with British (page 6). SWITZ, FRAN, UK  
 7. Egyptian Foreign Minister threatens to denounce Anglo-Egyptian Treaty (page 7).

EGYPT, UK

**EASTERN EUROPE**

8. Rumanian border evacuation reveals internal security apprehension (page 7).

RUMANIA, YUGO

**WESTERN EUROPE**

9. West Germans seek equal status through European Army talks (page 8).

3.3(h)(2)

11. Use of Trieste as center for Yugoslav military aid program would harm US-Italian relations (page 9). TRIESTE, YUGO, ITALY, US, NATO

12. Portuguese Supreme Court approves candidacy of opposition leader (page 10).

PORTUGAL

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
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
**GENERAL**

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**FAR EAST**

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**3. De Lattre believes Viet Minh has been seriously weakened:**

3.3(h)(2)

General de Lattre, stating that Viet Minh losses in the Tonkin fighting of late May have proved to be much higher than originally believed, estimates that the Viet Minh needs

one year to recuperate.

3.3(h)(2)

reports state that three of the Viet Minh's five elite divisions have been ordered to reorganize at one-eighth less than normal strength. He believes that the Viet Minh cannot organize an attack of any consequence within the next six months, and is faced with the alternatives of a "cease-fire," a request for large-scale troop support from the Chinese Communists, or exclusively guerrilla warfare.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: The

[redacted] rainy season (from June to August) would be marked by a decrease in Viet Minh activity, with a resumption of heavy attacks in September. The above estimate is far more optimistic than any which has yet been received. The reference to a cease-fire as an alternative open to the Viet Minh suggests that current rumors of an impending French-Viet Minh truce may have some foundation.

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## SOUTH ASIA

4. New tensions developing between India and Pakistan:

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Since its 2 July complaint to the United Nations regarding Pakistani breaches of the cease-fire agreement in Kashmir, India has been attempting to convince UN Representative Frank Graham of Pakistan's aggressive intentions in that area and has taken several steps to place Pakistan militarily and propagandistically on the defensive. A few bellicose statements made by Pakistanis concerning the establishment of a Constituent Assembly in Indian-held Kashmir have been used by the Indians as an excuse to move practically the whole of their armed forces up to the Pakistani border. Pakistan has countered with a series of defensive troop movements. It

has cancelled all military leaves and has placed all civil defense forces under military control. US and British representatives in South Asia are disturbed over the possibility of war between the two countries.

Comment: India is obviously conducting a war of nerves against Pakistan, possibly hoping that the latter will commit an aggressive act while Graham is in the subcontinent. The Indian Government has no intention of opening itself to charges of aggression, however. Both the Pakistani Government and Army know that aggressive actions on their part would lead to war and probably to the eventual dissolution of Pakistan. Both will seek to prevent such actions though each will attempt to display a bold front toward the enemy. Between them, the government and the army have the capability to keep the Pakistani people and the tribesmen in hand, and it is believed that they will take appropriate measures to do so.

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**NEAR EAST/AFRICA**

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3.3(h)(2)

7. Egyptian Foreign Minister threatens to denounce Anglo-Egyptian Treaty:

[redacted]

The Egyptian Foreign Minister has informed US Ambassador Caffrey that, unless something unexpected happens in Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the defense of the Suez Canal Zone before the mid-August adjournment of the Egyptian Parliament, he will announce the end of the Anglo-Egyptian talks and denounce the 1936 treaty with the UK.

Comment: The British Ambassador, to whom the Foreign Minister made the same threat, considers that there is some possibility that King Farouk, who recognizes the importance of obtaining British cooperation in the defense of the Suez Canal area, will disavow such a move. It is, however, not unlikely that anger over the forthcoming Security Council attempts to have the Egyptian Suez Canal restrictions lifted, plus a resurgence of nationalism generated by events in Iran, will encourage Egypt to denounce the treaty.

## EASTERN EUROPE

3.3(h)(2)

8. Rumanian border evacuation reveals internal security apprehension:

[redacted]

The US Legation in Bucharest reports that the mass evacuation from the Rumanian-Yugoslav border which began about 15 June apparently ceased, at least temporarily, during the second week in July. Western observers in Bucharest now believe that the number evacuated did not exceed 20,000 to 30,000. The Yugoslav Charge estimates that 7,000 of the Yugoslav minority were included in the total.

Comment: Cessation of the border area evacuation strengthens the conclusion that this move does not indicate preparation for immediate hostilities. The apparently selective evacuation of Yugoslavs, other minority groups and hostile peasants strongly suggests internal security considerations.

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## WESTERN EUROPE

9. West Germans seek equal status through European Army talks:

3.3(h)(2)

While "appreciable progress" continues at the Paris European Army talks and while the delegations are confident that an agreed report will be ready next week, the German

delegates are using the occasion to push vigorously the objective of German equality. They insist that changes must be made in Germany's political status before the Federal Republic can sign the projected European defense treaty. Furthermore, they are protesting the French proposal that German recruiting for the European Army should proceed initially under Allied supervision, on the grounds that this arrangement would constitute discrimination.

Comment: Evidence indicates that the Germans will not sign any agreement relating to their armed forces until substantial progress has been made toward political equality for West Germany.

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11. Use of Trieste as center for Yugoslav military aid program would harm US-Italian relations:

3.3(h)(2)

The US Embassy in Rome believes that the use of Zone A as an assembly and processing center for the Yugoslav military aid program would be resented deeply by the Italian public and government, who would interpret it as the establishment of a Yugoslav military base in Trieste.

The Embassy agrees there should be no objections to using Trieste's industrial facilities for producing non-military supplies for Yugoslavia. It points out, however, that inviting substantial numbers of Yugoslav military personnel into Zone A would affect adversely relations between the US and Italian Governments.

Comment: There has been mounting uneasiness in Italy that the West's proposed military aid program for Yugoslavia might enable the latter to replace Italy as the keystone in NATO Mediterranean defense, and that the US and UK are favoring Tito's claims to Trieste in preference to those of Italy.

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12. Portuguese Supreme Court approves candidacy of opposition leader: 3.3(h)(2)

Upon the recommendation of the Council of State, the Portuguese Supreme Court has ruled favorably on the "political eligibility" of opposition leader Vice-Admiral Quintao Meireles, a candidate in the 22 July presidential elections. Professor Rui Luis Gomes, a notorious fellow-traveler, has been rejected.

Comment: The disqualification of Gomes was expected. The 22 July elections will test the popular strength of the Salazar regime, for it will face an election for the first time without the tremendous vote-getting appeal of the late Marshal Carmona. Although Quintao Meireles has hardly a chance of defeating the government candidate, General Craveiro Lopes, he could be the source of considerable embarrassment by causing a noticeable drop in the total vote cast for the Salazar administration. A 71-year old admiral and reportedly a Catholic and a moderate Liberal, Quintao Meireles favors even closer ties between Portugal and the US.

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Report of Articles Submitted 17 - 31 July 1951

## I. Summary

134 articles submitted  
 32 articles rejected  
 102 articles published

Of the 134 recorded:

3 were received before 1200  
 2 were received between 1201 and 1300  
 14 were received between 1301 and 1400  
 38 were received between 1401 and 1500  
 25 were received between 1501 and 1529  
 52 were received after 1530

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 DATE 17-7-71 REVIEWER

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## II. Detailed report

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Article #</u>	<u>Published</u>		<u>Rejected</u>	
		<u>Submitted</u>	<u>By</u>	<u>Submitted</u>	<u>By</u>
17 July	1	1455/16	3	after 1530/16	2
	2	1410/16	2	after 1530/16	3
	3	after 1530/16	2	1435/16	2
	4	1523/16	2	after 1530/16	1
	5	1100/16	2		
	6	1520/16	3		
	7	after 1530/16	2		
	8	after 1530/16	1		
	9	1410/16	3		
	10	1520/16	3		
	11	1430/16	3		
	12	1455/16	3		
18 July	1	after 1530/17	3	1455/17	3
	2	1452/17	2	1440/17	1
	3	1510/17	2	1440/17	1
	4	1458/17	2	1530/17	2
	5	after 1530/17	2		
	6	1458/17	2		
	7	1455/17	3		
	8	1455/17	3		
	9	after 1530/17	3		

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<u>Issue</u>		<u>Published</u>		<u>Rejected</u>	<u>By</u>
	<u>Article #</u>	<u>Submitted</u>	<u>By</u>	<u>Submitted</u>	<u>By</u>
20 July	1	after 1530/19	1	1510/19	2
	2	after 1530/19	2	1520/19	2
	3	after 1530/19	2	1445/19	3
	4	after 1530/19	1		
	5	1424/19	1		
	6	after 1530/19	3		
21 July	1	1522/20	2	1515/20	3
	2	after 1530/20	3	after 1530/20	2
	3	after 1530/20	3		
	4	after 1530/20	2		
	5	after 1530/20	2		
	6	a 1215/20	2		
	7	after 1530/20	3		
	8	after 1530/20	1		
	9	after 1530/20	3		
	10	1515/20	3		
22 July	1	1340/21	1	after 1530/21	1
	2	after 1530/21	2	1340/21	
	3	after 1530/21	2		
	4	after 1530/21	2		
	5	1345/21	2		
	6	after 1530/21	3		
	7	1340/21	1		
	8	after 1530/21	1		
	9	1350/21	1		
	10	after 1530/21	3		
	11	after 1530/21	3		
24 July	1	after 1530/23	2	1420/23	3
	2	1520/23	3	after 1530/23	1
	3	1515/23	2	1520/23	3
	4	after 1530/23	1		
	5	1335/23	3		
	6	1520/23	3		
25 July	1	1500/24	3	1520/24	3
	2	1520/24	2		
	3	1500/24	2		
	4	1520/24	2		
	5	1445/24	2		
	6	1445/24	2		
	7	1500/24	2		
	8	1500/24	3		
	9	1500/24	3		

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<u>Issue</u>		<u>Published</u>		<u>Rejected</u>	
	<u>Article #</u>	<u>Submitted</u>	<u>By</u>	<u>Submitted</u>	<u>By</u>
26 July	1	1514/25	2		
	2	after 1530/25	2		
	3	1516/25	2		
	4	1335/25	2		
	5	1340/25	3		
	6	1512/25	3		
27 July	1	after 1530/26	3		
	2	after 1530/26	1	1525/26	3
	3	1445/26	1	1445/26	3
	4	1350/26	2	after 1530/26	2
	5	1445/26	2		
	6	1510/26	2		
	7	after 1530/26	2		
	8	1500/26	1		
	9	1500/26	1		
	10	1400/26	3		
	11	1400/26	3		
	12	1400/26	3		
28 July	1	1520/27	1		
	2	1300/27	SI	after 1530/27	2
	3	after 1530/27	2	after 1530/27	1
	4	1345/27	2		
	5	after 1530/27	2		
	6	1500/27	1		
	7	1445/27	3		
	8	1445/27	3		
29 July	1	1407/28	3		
	2	1445/28	2	1407/28	3
	3	after 1530/28	2	1115/28	2
	4	after 1530/28	2	after 1530/28	2
	5	after 1530/28	2		
	6	1400/28	2		
	7	1415/28	1		
	8	1407/28	3		
31 July	1	after 1530/30	3		
	2	after 1530/30	3	after 1530/30	2
	3	after 1530/30	2	after 1530/30	3
	4	1115/30	2	1504/30	3
	5	1504/3	3	1500/30	3

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Abbreviations:

- 1 - Section 1, Support Branch
- 2 - Section 2, Support Branch
- 3 - Section 3, Support Branch
- EC - Economic Section, Indications Branch
- P - Political Section, Indications Branch
- M - Military Section, Indications Branch
- RR - O/RR
- SI - O/SI
- \* - Held over from previous day

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