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17 October 1960

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

17 October 1960

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

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[redacted]
Okinawa: [Japanese leftists are arranging to give some financial support to the anti-American Okinawan Socialist and Communist parties for use in their campaigning for the Ryukyuan general elections next month.] The Okinawan leftists, who could hold the balance of power in the new legislature, are basing their campaign on opposition to American control of the Ryukyu Islands and to the presence of American military bases. [Japanese conservatives and moderate Socialists have not responded to requests from their Ryukyuan counterparts for financial help.] [redacted] OK

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[redacted]

Tunisia-Algeria: [Tunisian President Bourguiba, apparently convinced that the Algerian rebels have moved toward the Sino-Soviet bloc as one means of "internationalizing" the Algerian war, is pressing for a closer association between Tunisia, Morocco, and the Algerian rebel regime as an "alternative kind of internationalization." Bourguiba has shown increasing concern over the possibility that the Algerian rebels, seeing little likelihood of new direct negotiations with France, have obtained assurances of substantial support from the USSR and Communist China. Rebel premier Ferhat Abbas recently visited both Moscow and Peiping. Fearing that the bloc may be enabled to gain a predominant influence over the rebel movement, Bourguiba is also pushing harder for "forceful" US action to persuade France to offer a settlement acceptable to the rebels.] [redacted] no

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[redacted]

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Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Native unrest in Southern Rhodesia is reaching the explosive stage and the coming week may be "extremely critical," [redacted]

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[redacted] Leaders of the native movement in Southern Rhodesia last week reportedly threatened a general strike to be concerted with demonstrations by the leading African political organizations in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Whitehead promptly mobilized 1,600 white national guardsmen and stationed them in African townships adjoining several of the colony's larger cities which in recent weeks have been scenes of violent disorders. Whitehead now has banned all political meetings in African urban centers for a month and will soon propose new legislation calling for wider police powers.] [redacted] (Page 4) *OK*

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Laos: Armed Forces Commander General Ouane is now in Lueng Prabang laying plans for a dual effort against the Pathet Lao and Captain Kong Le and his Second Paratroop Battalion. Ouane appears to have taken the decision to work against Kong Le independently of General Phoumi. He plans, however, to concert his moves with Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee. Ouane's departure from Vientiane on Saturday has already aroused Kong Le's suspicions, and it is possible that Kong Le will move quickly to neutralize troops loyal to Ouane in Vientiane in an effort to establish full control of the capital.

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*Premier Souvanna Phouma, in a quick trip to Luang Prabang on 16 October, professed full approval of Ouane's plans. He was careful to qualify a promise eventually to identify himself openly with Ouane's scheme, however, which may indicate that he has not yet abandoned hope of finding a formula more to his liking for a solution to the crisis in Laos.

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III. THE WEST

Austria-Italy: Austria's determination to introduce into the UN General Assembly's Special Political Committee on 18 October a resolution demanding full regional autonomy for the South Tirol has already exacerbated the bad feeling between Italy and Austria on this question and may lead to outbreaks of violence in the South Tirol. Several Western European UN members have deplored the Austrian resolution as "bad" and likely to do the West no good. The Italians, as expected, have indicated they will strongly oppose any such resolution.

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Cuba: The summary execution last week of more than 20 men--including three Americans--for counterrevolutionary activities is a serious blow to the chances of a genuine revolt against the Castro regime,

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
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[REDACTED] The "neighborhood" spy system recently threatened Castro appears to have been started in eastern Spain, where the people reacted to last week's executions with silence and fear. In a speech on 15 October, Castro again denied charges of US official complicity in all counter-revolutionary activity, said his revolution is moving into its second and less drastic phase, and insisted that "loyal" private interests need not fear nationalization. [REDACTED]

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Okinawan General Election
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[Japanese leftists are arranging to give some financial support to the anti-American Okinawan Socialist (OSP) and Communist parties in their campaigns for the general election scheduled for 13 November to fill the 29 seats in the Ryukyuan unicameral legislature. The Japanese Socialist party has reportedly agreed to contribute \$300 to each OSP candidate, and the Japanese Communist party reportedly provides the Communist Okinawan People's party (OPP) with \$550 to \$600 monthly, plus additional sums for special activities such as elections.]

The OSP, which cooperated with the OPP in the 1958 election by backing members of a Communist-front organization and which holds no seats in the present legislature, is campaigning on a platform opposing the US-Japanese security treaty and US military installations on Okinawa and proposing immediate reversion of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan. The OPP, represented in the current legislature by five members of a front organization, is running on a platform which calls for reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan, opposition to "anti-Communism," opposition to American nuclear weapons on Okinawa, and application of the Japanese social security system to Okinawa. The OPP lacks significant anti-American issues--in 1958 it derived a large protest vote from the land question and the ouster of the mayor of Naha--but it could profit from its own well-disciplined organization, division of the conservative vote, and secret collaboration with the OSP.

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[The two moderate parties, [which apparently have been unsuccessful in attempts to get financial help from their Japanese counterparts,] may lose some districts to the leftists by dividing the moderate vote. The conservative Okinawa Liberal-Democratic party, which holds 14 seats but has been plagued by factionalism, is emphasizing preparation for eventual reversion to Japan through "practical unification"--a series of steps for merging the social security, land conservation, and scholarship programs of Japan and the Ryukyus. The Okinawa Socialist Masses party, a moderate socialist party with 10 seats, is proposing gradual reversion and, like the Liberal-Democrats, greater Okinawan autonomy by public election of the chief executive, who is now appointed by the US High Commissioner.]

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[Redacted]

Bourguiba Displaying Mounting Concern Over Algerian Situation

{ Statements by Tunisian President Bourguiba in an interview given an American journalist on 5 October, along with

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[Redacted] reflect increasing concern by Bourguiba over the possibility of direct Communist intervention in Algeria. The Tunisian leader, who spoke of the Algerian rebels as having "moved rapidly toward the Communist world," apparently believes they have already obtained assurances of substantial support from the USSR and Communist China.

{ President Bourguiba is reported to have stated in a press interview on 16 October that he was worried, but could not oppose bloc aid which would help the liberation of Algeria either directly by supporting the fighters or indirectly by causing the United States to intervene. Moscow, on the same day, announced that supplies including machinery, vehicles, food and medicines are now being loaded in Odessa for delivery on behalf of the Soviet Trade Union Council to Algerian "refugees" in Tunisia.

{ Bourguiba, in common with other moderate North African leaders, sees these increased contacts with the Sino-Soviet bloc--such as the recent visit to Moscow and Peiping by rebel premier Ferhat Abbas--as an important aspect of the rebel campaign to "internationalize" the Algerian conflict. Rebel efforts along this line, re-emphasized following the collapse last June of direct talks with the French, have been intensified as the prospects for an early resumption of bilateral negotiations have dimmed.

{ Zouhir, presumably voicing Bourguiba's views, expressed doubt to Ambassador Yost in Rabat that Communist intervention would involve any substantial number of combat "volunteers," but he said there would be technicians, a substantial quantity of arms, and a great increase in the numbers of Algerians trained in Communist countries. Arrangements of this sort, Zouhir said, would raise the prospect of Communist domination of the rebel movement and of any future independent Algeria as well.

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In an attempt to forestall such developments, Bourguiba is actively soliciting support for, and trying to enlist Moroccan participation in, his publicly projected scheme for a "union" with the rebel regime. Zouhir acknowledged that his government is still "groping for an alternative kind of internationalization" and that its conception of the proposed association is not yet clear. He said it would not go so far as "fusion," but that it might be in the form of a confederation or involve the employment of Tunisian and Moroccan "volunteers" in the rebel forces.

Simultaneously, Bourguiba has renewed his appeal to the United States to persuade France to offer a settlement acceptable to the rebels. Expressing the belief that "the US is capable of forcing a change in French policy," he told the journalist there is an "urgent need" for "forceful action" by the US if an extension of the cold war into North Africa, possibly along Indochina lines, is to be avoided.

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Situation Deteriorating in Southern Rhodesia

(Unrest among the African population in the native townships adjoining several of Southern Rhodesia's urban centers threatens to become explosive, perhaps during this week,

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Since July there have been several instances of racial violence triggered by some minor incident. These disorders are indicative of the underlying discontent arising from unemployment and poor housing, as well as from growing nationalist fervor to end white minority rule.)

The situation is complicated by the conviction of local Africans that the shooting by police, particularly the inexperienced white police reservists, during last week's disorders was "unprovoked" and was intended to cow the Africans by firepower. The government's intention to deal sternly with disorders was indicated by the statement of the Federation's press and public relations director to an American official on 9 October. "If there is more trouble," he said, "police and federal troops will teach the Africans a lesson they won't forget for years and years. There will be so many corpses out there you won't be able to count."

Leaders of the colony's largest African movement, the National Democratic party (NDP), reportedly told Prime Minister Whitehead on 12 October there would be a general strike unless he agreed to political discussions with the NDP and called off enactment of tougher security measures. The NDP warned that any action by it would be concerted with demonstrations by nationalist groups of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.)

Apparently because of these threats and his anxiety that whites might attempt vigilante reprisals after the next African demonstrations, Whitehead immediately began a program of tightening up security in Southern Rhodesia. On 13 October he mobilized 1,600 white national guardsmen and stationed them in platoon strength at strong points in the African townships adjoining Salisbury, Bulawayo, and Gwelo. On 14 October, Whitehead imposed a one-month ban on all public meetings--except those of a cultural, sports, or religious nature--in all African townships in the urban areas of Southern Rhodesia. This week he plans to propose new legislation to strengthen the colony's police power.)

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Armed Forces Commander General Ouane flew to Luang Prabang on 15 October to begin preparations for what he claims will be a dual effort against the Pathet Lao and the forces of Captain Kong Le. Although Ouane appears to have made his decision to leave Vientiane independently, professedly out of concern that the Pathets were gaining too much ground, he intends to coordinate his plans--to date largely unformed--with General Phoumi in Savannakhet. Ouane's immediate intention is to form eight new battalions in the north to block any move on Luang Prabang by the Pathet Lao in Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces, areas in which he reports there are indications of a Pathet Lao build-up.]

[Regarding Kong Le, Ouane appears to have a somewhat vague concept of creating, through military and psychological pressure in concert with Phoumi, conditions whereby it will ultimately be possible to wrest control of Vientiane from Kong Le. One of the first steps in this campaign reportedly will be a declaration by the First Military Region, with headquarters at Luang Prabang, that it no longer supports the Souvanna Phouma government.]

[Ouane probably will need time to refine these plans and be ready for action. In the meantime, Kong Le may move to consolidate his hold on Vientiane and prevent members of Souvanna's cabinet from escaping to Luang Prabang or elsewhere. Kong Le's suspicions apparently have already been aroused by Ouane's departure.]

[Premier Souvanna Phouma, in a quick trip to Luang Prabang on 16 October, professed full approval of Ouane's plans, encouraging in particular a buildup in the First Military Region's capabilities against the Pathet Lao. He claimed that he must return to Vientiane to "reassure the diplomatic community," but that in the event the Pathet Lao did not back down from their excessive demands in the current negotiations, he would announce his resignation. Such a step would pave the way for the establishment in Luang Prabang either of a transitional military government or a new government of national union.]

Souvanna may merely have been on a fishing expedition in Luang Prabang; in any event his careful qualification of his promise eventually to identify himself openly with Ouane's plans suggests that he has not abandoned hope of finding a solution to the crisis in Laos possibly more to his liking. He may, for example, be biding for time in which to explore more fully possible Soviet offers of aid in conversations with the newly arrived Ambassador Abramov, which might give him more leverage in the struggle for survival of his government. He may also hope that Abramov can be persuaded to induce the Pathet Lao to trim their demands.

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[REDACTED]

UN Debate on South Tirol Issue Likely to Exacerbate
Austro-Italian Relations

(The longstanding Italian-Austrian dispute over the South Tirol, which involves the question of the rights of the German-speaking minority in this area of Italy and which has recently caused new outbursts of public feeling in both countries, is scheduled for debate in the UN General Assembly's Special Political Committee on 18 October. An Austrian draft resolution aimed at ensuring full regional autonomy for the South Tirol has been described by Italian UN delegate Ortona as "outrageous and provocative," completely unacceptable, and embodying the essence of pan-Germanism. Various Western European UN delegates fear the resolution may precipitate a bitter debate.)

(The Italians have consistently maintained that they cannot accept any UN resolution that goes beyond implementation of the De Gasperi - Gruber agreement of 1946. This agreement contained safeguards for the ethnic character and economic development of the German-speaking inhabitants and granted the German and Italian zones autonomous legislative and executive regional power. The Italians maintain that the full regional autonomy which Austria wants for the German linguistic area is not provided for in the agreement.)

(The UN Special Political Committee may recommend that the two countries continue negotiations to arrive at a settlement of their dispute and, if these fail, that the issue be submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The Austrians, who view the inclusion of the South Tirol item on the UN agenda as a victory in their efforts to arouse international opinion on the issue, have already indicated unwillingness to submit the case of the ICJ.)

(Meanwhile, further outbursts by nationalistic elements in both Italy and Austria may be expected similar to the

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[redacted]
anti-Italian demonstrations of an irredentist and pan-German nature in Innsbruck early in October and the more recent student demonstrations in Rome and other Italian cities clearly indicating neo-Fascist support. Some outbreaks of violence may occur in the South Tirol. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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