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
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## 1. ZORIN'S SPEECH AT THE LONDON TALKS

The United States delegate to the London disarmament talks regards Soviet delegate Zorin's 90-minute speech on 27 August as an indication that the USSR is preparing to make further concessions to meet the West in a first-step agreement. The delegate believes that the harsh tone of Zorin's speech was intended to avoid any impression that these concessions might be a sign of weakness. However, he also considers it possible that Moscow may be developing a propaganda position to be used in the event of a failure to reach an agreement at London.

### Comment

Zorin's harsh denunciation of Western proposals suggests that Moscow anticipates a recess at London and is seeking to sharpen the points at issue in preparation for a full-dress disarmament debate in the UN General Assembly. There, the USSR hopes to score propaganda gains and bring pressure on the West for further concessions.

Zorin's strong criticism of the subcommittee's composition and procedure also suggests a desire for an early move from the London talks to the General Assembly. The USSR probably plans to repeat its proposal of last year for an expansion of both the UN Disarmament Commission and its subcommittee to include countries such as India which could be expected to adopt a sympathetic attitude toward Soviet proposals.

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## 2. PARIS URGES WESTERN COOPERATION ON SYRIA

French Foreign Ministry officials have made two recent demarches to American embassy officials urging Western cooperation on Middle Eastern problems. On 24 August the director of Near Eastern and African affairs told an American embassy representative that the French believe it essential for the Western powers to work closely together under American leadership in Syria. He said

that it seemed most likely the West would do nothing, since he "ruled out" overt action by the United States alone or in concert with Britain and France. On 26 August the director of political and economic affairs emphasized the importance of the fullest possible Western cooperation, even though admitting that parallel rather than joint action might often be preferable.

however, the French government concluded in mid-August that the 1950 tripartite declaration on maintenance of the status quo in the Near East was obsolete. The cabinet, in response to a Lebanese request for an opinion, reportedly declared that Lebanon is now guaranteed by the American Middle East doctrine, and that if the Lebanese want further guarantees a new tripartite declaration may be necessary.

(NOFORN)

## Comment

The Foreign Ministry approaches may be a feeler on the advisability of a new tripartite declaration. The Baghdad pact, on which France was not originally consulted, has never set well with Paris, and the French government may hope to refurbish its prestige in the Arab world by a move which would take the spotlight away from both the Baghdad pact and the American Middle East doctrine.

Britain, like France, evidently considers the 1950 declaration dead, but presumably would welcome any new joint statement as a token of Washington's willingness to resume public association with Britain and France regarding the Middle East. However, such a move, particularly at this time, would only irritate the Arab states.

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### 3. BONN OFFICIALS REPORTEDLY CONSIDER NATO DEVICE FOR GERMAN POLITICAL COMEBACK

#### Reference:

[redacted]  
recently prepared a memorandum on how Bonn can use its NATO membership "as a smoke screen behind which we can complete our comeback into world politics."

[redacted] Bonn's "halo of the most preferred ally of the US" and its position as the potentially strongest NATO member on the European Continent can be used to apply pressure on the other Western nations, particularly on the issue of reunification.

The memorandum expresses the hope that there will be no early disarmament agreement "until we have attained a military position of strength and influence." [redacted] the West German rearmament program should be dragged out over four more years [redacted] Bonn will then possess nuclear arms and thus share in the decision in the event of a major war. At that time, [redacted] "we can lay down our cards" for a reunification settlement. [redacted] need to "build our bridges to the East" and reduce dependence on the West, but at the same time "maintain a position in which the West will be forced to stand behind us in case of a military threat."

[redacted]

#### 4. CAMBODIA REPORTEDLY OFFERS LIMITED REPRESENTATION TO PEIPING

[redacted] The Cambodian government is willing to accept Chinese Communist diplomatic representation in Phnom Penh, but on a basis short of the full recognition sought

by Peiping,

Following several months of negotiations with the Chinese Communist economic mission in Phnom Penh, Cambodia reportedly has proposed that Peiping be represented by a quasi-official envoy as is South Vietnam.

Among other prerogatives, Peiping's envoy would have authority to issue passports and visas to Chinese in Cambodia, a function now permitted the Chinese Nationalist consul in Phnom Penh. Taipei's consulate in Phnom Penh--a holdover from the French administration and not officially accredited--would be reduced to trade mission status, presumably to justify the withholding of full consular status from Peiping's representatives. (NOFORN)

##### Comment

The Cambodian government appears to be under increasing pressure from Peiping to grant political representation, particularly since the Chinese Communist economic aid program got under way this spring. Phnom Penh, however, has been reluctant to grant diplomatic recognition to Peiping because of the increased danger of subversion. Any new Chinese Communist representation would be interpreted by the Overseas Chinese in Cambodia as firm evidence that Peiping's influence in local affairs had surpassed that of Taipei, and many could be expected to react accordingly.