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16 May 1958

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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16 MAY 1958

**I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**

Further report by Guided Missile Intelligence Committee on third Soviet satellite. (See page 1.)

Activity in Polyarnyy Ural area indicates missile-launching or instrumentation site construction.



Communist allegations of US intervention in Indonesia suggest new initiatives by Moscow and Peiping to support Djakarta.

**II. ASIA-AFRICA**

UAR orders arms distributed to Chamoun's opponents inside Lebanon for march on Beirut.

Indonesia - Djakarta aircraft bomb installations in Menado; four dissident planes destroyed, two damaged.

De Gaulle's declaration will strengthen Algerian rightists who may now have General Salan's support.

**III. THE WEST**

- ⑩ France - Pflimlin seeking broader support for government; De Gaulle announces readiness to return to office.
- ⑪ West Germans make major tactical concession by agreeing to official talks with East Germans on Berlin barge-toll issue.
- ⑫ Venezuela - Military reported preparing take-over of government as aftermath of recent rioting.
- ⑬ Guatemala - US ambassador concerned over possibility of demonstrations during Dr. Milton Eisenhower's visit scheduled for next month.
- ⑭ Bolivia - Siles government suppresses 14 May revolt in Santa Cruz Province

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

16 May 1958

## DAILY BRIEF

SIRAB

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*No* Soviet earth satellite: The Guided Missile Intelligence Committee issued a statement on 15 May with further information on the launching of the USSR's third earth satellite vehicle. [redacted] (Page 1)

*No* Soviet missile activity: New activity in the Polyarnyy Ural area in the Soviet Arctic strengthens previous indications that an ICBM launching site or an instrumentation site for missile test activities is being constructed there. Helicopter flights to two new points in the area follow a pattern similar to ones noted in the early stages of construction of the Tyura Tam - Klyuchi missile test range. (Approved by Guided Missile Intelligence Committee.)

[redacted] (Page 2) (Map)

Communist bloc - Indonesia: Statements by Moscow and Peiping alleging "American intervention" in Indonesia may presage new Communist initiatives to strengthen the central government's stand against compromising with the dissidents. [redacted] (Page 3)

### II. ASIA-AFRICA

*No* Lebanon:

[redacted] distribute arms inside Lebanon--in the Biqa Valley and in northern Lebanon--in preparation for a march on

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Beirut to support antigovernment elements in the city. On 14 May, UAR officials in Damascus were notified that opposition elements in Beirut and dissident tribesmen were in "dire need" of more ammunition.

The focus of military activity in Lebanon has shifted from the towns to the countryside, but bombings and sniping continue in Beirut. The government intends on 16 May to ask Parliament for "special powers" to deal with the security situation.

(Page 4)

*No*

Watch Committee conclusions--Middle East: A deliberate initiation of hostilities in the Middle East is considered unlikely in the near future. However, serious incidents are likely to recur. In Lebanon, where the current crisis represents a severe threat to the continued existence of the state as presently constituted, the opposition to Chamoun is being exploited by a number of neutralist and anti-Western elements, including the UAR and the Lebanese Communists. There is no evidence available to indicate military participation by the Soviet bloc or by Israel. There is evidence of considerable intervention by the UAR, including armed irregulars, but military dispositions do not indicate an intention openly to intervene in force.

Indonesia: Three central government B-25's and two F-51's on 15 May bombed and strafed the dissident airfield, town and harbor at Menado, destroying two C-45's, one PBY, and one F-51. Two other F-51's and the airfield runway were slightly damaged.

(Page 6) (Map)

*JK*  
Algeria: General de Gaulle's declaration on 15 May will probably have the immediate effect of strengthening the determination of rightist elements in Algeria to maintain pressure for a change of regime in Paris. A majority of the 1,200,000 resident Europeans appears to support the

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actions taken so far. The Pflimlin government has ordered regional military commanders in Algeria to report directly to the Ministry of Defense rather than to Algiers headquarters, where commanding General Salan appears to be identifying himself more closely with the position of General Massu and the Algiers "committee of public safety." The local military have assumed control throughout Algeria. Their reaction to Pflimlin's order is not known. [Page 7]

*No*

Morocco: In reaction to developments in Algeria, the Moroccan premier has summoned French Ambassador Parodi and told him that the evacuation of French troops cannot be longer delayed; French air activity in Morocco must cease forthwith; and military airfields near the Algerian border must be closed down. All French units stationed in Morocco--numbering about 46,000--are reported to have been confined to their bases. The premier indicated to Parodi that Morocco would prevent French forces in Morocco from aiding those in Algeria, and would assume responsibility for public order and the protection of the 300,000 French nationals resident in Morocco. He added that all meetings and demonstrations would be banned.

*DR*

Tunisia: The situation remains quiet throughout the country. Special security measures imposed by the Tunisian Government after the civilian-military coup in Algiers are now in force throughout the country. General Gambiez, commanding some 22,000 French troops in Tunisia who have been confined to their bases since 8 February, is reported to be loyal to the Pflimlin government and has ordered his forces to make no moves. [Page 9]

*No*

\*Nasir's Moscow visit: The joint communique marking the end of Nasir's visit to the USSR, while giving the impression that his Kremlin talks have solidified Soviet-Egyptian relations, reveals no new developments. The communique carefully avoids any reference to decisions reached in the top-level discussions, and addresses itself to such obvious

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topics as colonialism, Algeria, Yemen, and nuclear tests. Nasir and Khrushchev call for an end to foreign "interference" in Indonesia, and give their full support to the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian Arabs. The cryptic approval of "nonaggression treaties between states" as a means of reducing international tensions may foreshadow future action between Moscow and Cairo. The Soviet leaders' acceptance of Nasir's formal invitation to visit the United Arab Republic suggests that the momentum of Egyptian-Soviet relations will be maintained.

### III. THE WEST

*OK*

\*France: (Information as of 0200): Prospects that the Pflimlin government can soon reassert control over French authorities in Algeria were dimmed on 15 May when Pflimlin was unable to broaden his government by obtaining full Independent party support, and rightists, particularly those in Algeria, were encouraged by De Gaulle's statement that he was "ready to assume the powers of the republic." The government admits that it has little solid information on the attitude of the military, even in France itself. Thus far, however, there has been little public reaction to De Gaulle's bid.

(Page 10)

*OK*

Berlin: Bonn's decision to hold official talks on 16 May with East German ministerial representatives on the new tolls imposed on barge traffic to Berlin is a major tactical concession.

(Page 11)

*OK*

Venezuela: Minister of Defense Castro Leon and the chief of the general staff, the two leading senior officer holdovers from the Perez Jimenez regime, seem to be considering a take-over of the government as a result of serious

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military dissatisfaction over the recent rioting. [redacted]  
[redacted] the governing junta  
is already finished. [redacted] (Page 12)

*DR*

Guatemala: Ambassador Mallory is concerned over the possibility of anti-American disturbances during the scheduled visit of Dr. Milton Eisenhower next month. President Ydigoras has been weak and vacillating; Communists and pro-Communists are becoming bolder; and the political atmosphere is conducive to demonstrations of extreme nationalism. [redacted] (Page 13)

*No*

Bolivia: A revolutionary outbreak in the province of Santa Cruz appears to have been suppressed without bloodshed by the government's action on 14 May in declaring a state of siege and sending troops to the area. [redacted]

[redacted]

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Statement of Guided Missile Intelligence Committee of 15 May 1958


1. The USSR announced the launching of its third satellite on 15 May 1958. [redacted] a probable satellite/space vehicle was launched at 0301 EDT (0701Z).

2. At about 0900 EDT, 14 May 1958 (1300Z), operational traffic was first observed on the Tyura Tam end of the Tvura Tam missile test range. [redacted]

[redacted] The countdown proceeded with little delay, culminating in a launching at about 0300 EDT (0700Z).

5. It is expected that more details will be announced by the USSR and that additional information will be derived [redacted]

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Activity at Possible Missile Site of Polarnyy Ural

Since late April [redacted]

[redacted] six or possibly seven HOUND (MI-4) military helicopters to two isolated Arctic locations, Porsyakha and Poluj, from Obskaya, the closest airfield to Polarnyy Ural. Both destinations appear to be illogical for development as radar sites or airfields; hence the flights probably indicate an expansion of the possibly missile-associated construction activity in the Polarnyy Ural area. [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] the Obskaya helicopters may also be associated with the missile program.

[redacted]  
[redacted] Mis-sile-associated construction activity in the Polarnyy Ural area was indicated by the transfer to that area in the latter half of 1957 of construction personnel formerly associated with supervision of construction at Klyuchi, terminus of the Soviet ICBM test range. [redacted]

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### Sino-Soviet Political Support for Indonesia

Simultaneous statements by Moscow and Peiping denouncing "American intervention" in Indonesia may presage new Communist initiatives intended to stiffen the Indonesian Government, by a display of bloc support, against any possible willingness to compromise with the rebels. The bloc, in its effort to discredit the US for its "interference" in Indonesia and for its alleged violation of the UN Charter, could be laying the groundwork for a move to raise the issue in the United Nations.


The concerted attack, which follows the pattern of charges during the Turkish-Syrian "crisis" last October, is designed to draw world attention to the central government's charges against foreign aid to the rebels. The statements contain carefully phrased "warnings" that the Communist bloc will stand beside legitimate and independent Afro-Asian governments. Unlike previous Chinese statements, Peiping's formal declaration warns that the American - Chinese Nationalist "intervention" will give rise to "very dangerous consequences." The declaration reassures the central government of Communist China's "full support" and hints at readiness to send other than economic aid "as may be requested."

The Chinese Communists have sent no military aid to Indonesia, although bloc aircraft for the central government have been crossing Communist China.

Peiping's assistance thus far has been limited to a \$20,-000,000 loan including timely shipments of food, textiles, and other consumer goods to meet Indonesia's emergency needs.

The USSR, in addition to granting economic development and arms loans, has sold ten cargo ships to Indonesia and is now sending small tankers to replace Western vessels on inter-island runs. At least one small tanker now en route will arrive in early June, and others probably will be provided.

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Lebanese Situation

According to unconfirmed reports of other UAR interference in the Lebanese crisis, 20 busloads of Arabs in "tribal dress" have been sent from Homs into northern Lebanon, and Syrian army commandos are now operating in Lebanon from different points along the border. Syrian Communists are said to be cooperating with Syrian Baathists in a temporary united front to assist the Communists and opposition in Lebanon, [redacted] Several small ships from Gaza carrying arms and fedayeen have been intercepted off the southern Lebanese coast.

Although bombing and sniping is still going on in the cities, the arena of military activity is shifting to the countryside, where government forces and progovernment irregulars are beating back opposition elements. The forces of anti-Chamoun leader Kamal Jumblatt were driven off from Bayt ad-Din and are thought to be retreating into the Biqa to join up with opposition bands heading south from the al-Harmal region for a move on Beirut. Lebanese army commander General Shihab is said to have a battalion and a tank squadron in the Biqa to meet such a threat. Mountains between the Biqa and Beirut also impede any such


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movements. Lebanese air force planes are patrolling the Syrian border on the lookout for armed bands coming over the frontier.

Early on 15 May Shihab was reported to be optimistic about the situation. The government on 16 May intends to ask Parliament for "special powers" to deal with the security situation. [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~Indonesian Situation

The dissident capital at Menado, its airfield and harbor were bombed and strafed on 15 May by three government B-25's and two F-51's, [redacted]. The government destroyed two C-45's, one PBY, and one F-51 and damaged two F-51's and the airfield runway. The dissidents' B-26 aircraft apparently were not damaged.

The government air strike presumably was made in an effort to neutralize the dissident air force before proceeding with amphibious attacks on dissident targets in Celebes, Morotai, and Halmahera. Dissident air activity continued through 15 May, however, with bombings of Ambon on 13 and 15 May and of the Palu area in North Celebes on 13 May.

Although the Indonesian Army is reported to have prohibited the holding of a mass "anti-intervention" rally in Djakarta on 16 May, the three major non-Communist parties as well as the Communist party have committed themselves to participate. The American Embassy comments that it will be significant if the army follows through on its reported ban in view of the endorsement of the meeting by all major parties.

The renewal of charges and countercharges between the Philippines and the Djakarta government appears to have further strained the relations between the two countries. The Philippine defense secretary has charged recently that the USSR is assisting in Djakarta's operations against the rebels and has warned of a Communist take-over in Indonesia. On 14 May, Philippine President Garcia publicly supported the statements of his cabinet minister. The Indonesian Government has repeatedly accused the Philippines of assisting the rebels, and the Indonesian leftist press has recently claimed that 2,500 Philippine volunteers are fighting with the dissidents.

Japanese Vice Premier Yamada has indicated to American officials Japan's willingness to help stabilize the Indonesian situation by trying to persuade President Sukarno to compromise with the dissidents. Yamada said Japan also hopes to strengthen economic ties with Indonesia through the reparations program and thereby undercut Sino-Soviet offers.

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Situation in Algeria

General de Gaulle's statement has apparently encouraged dominant military and rightist civilian elements in Algeria--among whom indications of disunity had begun to appear--to maintain pressure for a change of regime in Paris. The army's tightening of security controls on 15 May helped forestall new disorders but tension remains high, especially in Algiers, where a crowd of several thousand Europeans greeted De Gaulle's statement with a lengthy ovation.

A military spokesman for General Massu's "committee of public safety" in Algiers said De Gaulle's declaration was "decisive for our action" and would allow the "rapid development of the situation." He also announced that representatives from 129 "public safety" committees throughout Algeria would meet in Algiers on 16 May to set up an Algeria-wide committee, which could formulate political policy until De Gaulle can take over in Paris. However, the spokesman's evasiveness as to the committee's course if De Gaulle does not gain power suggests that at least some of the present leaders in Algiers want to keep a path open for reconciliation with the present Paris regime. A tenuous link still exists between Paris and the Algerian committees in their mutual recognition of General Salan as the titular authority in Algeria.

New strains were imposed on this link when Salan, at the conclusion of a brief public speech prior to De Gaulle's pronouncement, specifically acclaimed De Gaulle. Salan's action appears to have momentarily reassured civilian extremists whose suspicions of Salan's real intentions had been aroused. At the same time, the Pflimlin government, despite its earlier statements implying Salan's complete loyalty to Paris, ordered regional field commanders in Algeria to report directly to the Ministry of Defense in Paris rather than to Algiers headquarters.

Clashes between French army elements and National Liberation Front (FLN) guerrillas appear to have tapered

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off considerably since the 13 May coup. [redacted]

[redacted] French troops have been pulled back into the cities, giving the guerrillas more freedom of movement. [redacted] the FLN would take full advantage of this situation to move troops and supplies into place in preparation for a future offensive. [redacted]  
[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~Tunisian Reaction to Developments in Algeria

Tunisia remains quiet, the Tunisian Army is on an alert basis, and other special security measures are in force throughout the country following the 13 May coup in Algiers.

Nevertheless, the Tunisians are closely observing all French military activities, and continue to fear the intentions of these French forces which have been confined to their bases on Bourguiba's order since 8 February. Mokkadem informed the American Embassy in Tunis that reports of activity early on 14 May at the French air base near Tunis and at a nearby radar installation turned out to be false alarms.

Members of the Neo-Destour party and other public organizations are on emergency call in the event of trouble. A Neo-Destour leader claims that he fears an attempt by agents of the United Arab Republic to stir up trouble in Tunisia and authorities are being "particularly alert" to the possibility.

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### III. THE WEST

#### French Political Crisis (Information as of 0200)

French Independent party refusal to let party leader Pinay participate in the government, as requested by Premier Pflimlin, jeopardizes the premier's ability to rally a more broadly based government in time to re-impose Paris' authority over the defiant military and French settler elements in Algeria. A top Pflimlin aide admitted to an American embassy official on 15 May that the government has "very little solid information as to what the military is up to," even in France.

General de Gaulle's 15 May pronouncement of readiness "to assume the powers of the republic" thus far has apparently aroused little positive public reaction in France itself, where most political elements have rallied to "defend the republic." The embassy notes that there is also a widespread determination that means must be found to avoid the secession of Algeria at all costs. The growth of pressure in Algeria for De Gaulle's return to power seems unlikely to be affected by the measures Pflimlin has asked parliament to approve on 16 May--declaration of a state of emergency and dissolution of several extreme rightist groups.

The Communists are trying to use the threat of De Gaulle's return as pressure for the formation of a popular front to "save the republic." The Communist-dominated General Labor Confederation is reported calling for symbolic work stoppages, possibly with a view to broadening them into a general strike. [redacted]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~West Berlin Waterways Question

Bonn's cabinet decision of 14 May to send ministerial representatives to negotiate with the East Germans on the Berlin waterways question is a major tactical concession reflecting Bonn's reluctance to apply effective counter-measures against the new East German tax on barge shipping.

Bonn has previously refused to negotiate above the technical level. In a similar situation in 1955, negotiations with the East Germans were conducted by a Hamburg waterways office. Preliminary talks on 9 and 10 May this year were conducted by the interzonal trade representatives, who are also technical experts. Now Bonn's representatives will include a department chief from the Ministry of Transportation.

The East German regime has thus made some gains toward its primary goal of establishing government-level relations with Bonn. The East Germans can be expected to exploit the meeting to the fullest as evidence that the two Germanies are equal, in the hope that other Western countries will then find it feasible to establish closer relations with East Germany. Having achieved a meeting at the ministry level, the East Germans will probably be amenable to reducing the barge toll in return for a satisfactory compensation by West Germany for flood damages East Germany expects to result from the projected Geesthacht Dam on the Elbe River.

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Coup May Be Imminent in Venezuela

The recent rioting in Caracas has strengthened the faction of the Venezuelan military which apparently opposes civilian control of the government. Minister of Defense Castro Leon and Chief of the General Staff Perez Morales, the two leading senior officers held over from the Perez Jimenez dictatorship, have already assumed dominant roles in the Venezuelan Government as a result of a power shift late on 13 May, [redacted]

[redacted] A second source reports that Castro and his adherents were about to take over the government on 13 May but at the last minute decided against doing so because of Vice President Nixon's presence in the country.

Castro and Perez apparently still hope to supplant the present junta which is partly civilian. Junta President Wolfgang Larrazabal's public statement that he would not order the shedding of Venezuelan blood contributed to the extent and violent nature of the recent rioting. Admiral Larrazabal has consequently suffered a serious loss of prestige among the military.

Establishment of a military dictatorship in Venezuela at this time would occasion bitter criticism of the United States in most Latin American countries. The Communist-inspired rioting has recently given wide circulation to the popular Latin American charge that the United States supports dictatorial government. [redacted]

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Leftist Trend in Guatemala Considered Threat to  
Visit of Dr. Milton Eisenhower

The political atmosphere in Guatemala is conducive to continuing Communist gains and to the development of extreme nationalism and anti-Americanism. American Ambassador Mallory fears that Communists and other anti-American elements, such as leftist student groups, may feel encouraged to instigate disorders during the scheduled visit of Dr. Milton Eisenhower, tentatively set for 15 to 19 June.

President Ydígoras [redacted]

[redacted] has made no effort to control or counteract the activities of returning exiles and other Communists and pro-Communists, who are daily becoming bolder and more active. The President lacks well-organized political support and has failed to develop a program with popular appeal. Although a conservative by background and temperament, his actions and statements during his first two months in office suggest that he probably hopes to gain the support of at least some leftist, non-Communist groups. Apparently impressed by the ability and growing strength of the leftists, he will probably go out of his way to avoid offending them.

Pro- and anti-Communist factions of the fast-growing leftist Revolutionary party are already maneuvering for control at the party convention scheduled to begin on 25 June. [redacted]

[redacted]

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