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
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1. SHIGEMITSU ADVOCATES WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS FROM JAPAN

[Redacted]

Japanese foreign minister Shigemitsu strongly believes the improvement of Japan's relations with the United States is directly related to the early withdrawal of American ground forces from Japan, according to Ambassador Allison. The six-year plan to build up Japan's defense forces, which he will present in Washington, suggests the possibility of American withdrawal in 1958, when Japan's forces will number 180,000 men.

Shigemitsu told Allison on 18 August that American naval and air forces would be needed in Japan for a longer period. He emphasized, however, that the "Socialist menace" made it necessary for the government to "get on an equal footing with America as soon as possible."

Comment

A majority of the Japanese public view the American ground forces in Japan as a symbol of continued occupation, and important leadership groups, including those most friendly to the United States, publicly and privately advocate their withdrawal.

Japanese businessmen and government officials believe the economy can bear the consequent reduction in dollar income and that this loss might stimulate a more permanent solution to Japan's long-term economic problems. [Redacted]

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
2. VIET MINH ATTACK ON CAMBODIAN OUTPOST ANTICIPATED

The Cambodian army anticipates a Viet Minh attack on Voeune Sai, in northeastern Cambodia, about 20 August, according to the American embassy in Phnom Penh. The attacking force is expected to comprise five battalions.

Government reinforcements approximating two battalions are reported en route to Voeune Sai. The government is believed planning to make a formal request to the International Control Commission for an investigation.

Comment

The 200-man Voeune Sai garrison earlier reported attacks on 14 and 17 August, the latter by a battalion-size unit identified as Viet Minh by the post commander.



American observers in Phnom Penh are not yet fully convinced that the attackers were actually Viet Minh. It is conceivable, however, that the Viet Minh ordered stay-behind units in southern Laos and the plateau region of Annam to enter this remote and sparsely populated area in order to force the commitment of Cambodian forces needed to maintain security elsewhere.

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3. PAKISTAN PREPARING TO ADHERE TO TURKISH-IRAQI PACT

Pakistan has sent Turkey copies of a proposed instrument of accession to the Baghdad pact and the reservations it intends to attach. The reservations make it clear that (1) the military liabilities accepted by Pakistan will apply only in the event of unprovoked attack on the signatory countries of the Middle East, and (2) Pakistan's contribution will depend on the military resources available in reference to Pakistan's internal situation and the general international situation at such a time.

Comment

Pakistan's long-delayed formal adherence to the pact will probably take place shortly.

Pakistan's entry as fourth member will make possible the setting up of the permanent council of ministers for the pact. Once this is done, increased pressure for American support and participation may be expected from the three Middle Eastern states.

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4. ITALIAN PREMIER COMMENTS ON POST-SUMMIT ATMOSPHERE IN ITALY

Premier Segni considers that the summit talks have had a very bad effect on the Italian internal situation, and that they are likely to cause a growth in neutralism, according to a Foreign Ministry official who was transmitting the premier's views to Ambassador Luce. Segni believed, he added, that the talks had greatly accelerated a demand even from some Christian Democratic elements for an overture to the Nenni Socialists seeking the latter's support for the government.

Segni was reported to have stated that his government's immediate concern was over what to do about the invitation to visit Italy apparently being sought by Premier Bulganin.

Ambassador Luce on 18 August reported that the political climate in Italy has been marked in the past three months by a "disturbing growth of fraternization between non-Communist Party elements and the pro-Cominform Socialists."

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