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4 June 1960



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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

4 June 1960

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### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR: The new Soviet disarmament proposals, published five days before the ten-nation disarmament conference resumes in Geneva, are aimed in part at exploiting Western differences resulting from France's insistence on giving top priority to measures for controlling nuclear weapons delivery systems. Khrushchev's press conference statement on 3 June made it clear that the new proposals, which include more detailed provisions on the nature and functions of a control system, are intended to appear responsive to other Western views. Khrushchev probably hopes that this move, in addition to strengthening the position of the bloc disarmament delegates at Geneva, will help offset the damage to the USSR's image as the champion of peace and disarmament inflicted by his performance in Paris.

\*Khrushchev's press conference remarks on 3 June did not modify his earlier position that the status quo in West Berlin would be maintained until another summit meeting takes place in "six to eight months."

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*[Redacted]*

\*USSR: A protracted meeting of the Soviet party presidium on 2 June made Khrushchev and a contingent of presidium members an hour and a half late for a scheduled appearance at a British exhibit in Moscow. Heated discussion broke out among them as they departed, according to a British diplomat who was near the group. Khrushchev was overheard to remark, "All right, we will continue the discussion tomorrow morning." The presence in Moscow of three presidium members who live in provincial centers may be an additional sign of important deliberations. There are as yet, however, no indications to support reports that the party central committee may be convened earlier than its meeting scheduled for 13 July.

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Japan: Major newspapers, increasingly apprehensive about leftist excesses in recent demonstrations, have warned that violence during the strikes set for 4 June would lessen public sympathy for protests against Kishi's "dictatorial" tactics and against the US-Japanese security treaty. Factions of the ruling Liberal-Democratic party may temporarily be closing ranks in the face of leftist attacks in an effort to complete the ratification of the treaty by 19 June. However, Kishi's prospects for remaining in power for more than the next few weeks do not appear improved.

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DAILY BRIEF

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D/K  
Belgian Congo: Patrice Lumumba's demand that he be appointed premier of the Congo on the basis of his plurality in the recent legislative elections appears designed to confront Belgium with the choice of bowing to his demand or facing the threat of an attempt by him to seize power. In a press conference on 2 June, Lumumba also called for the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo and for the election of the chief of state by popular vote rather than by the legislature. Lumumba's warnings may have been prompted by concern over the possible formation of an anti-Lumumba coalition led by Joseph Kasavubu, who departed for Brussels suddenly on 1 June.

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### III. THE WEST

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Cuba: Nicaragua's suspension of diplomatic relations with the Castro regime on 1 June has again called public attention to Cuban subversive activities in other Latin American countries, as did the Guatemalan break with Cuba on 29 April. The Castro regime is repeating its charges that such actions by "dictatorial, pro-imperialist" regimes are the initial moves in a US plot to cause its downfall. Some circles in Latin America were receptive to this propaganda tactic after the Guatemalan break.

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### New Soviet Disarmament Proposals

Khrushchev has again put forward new disarmament proposals as a means of refurbishing the image of the USSR as the champion of peaceful coexistence. In his letter to President Eisenhower on 2 June, the Soviet premier stated that "recent events have not only not lessened but, on the contrary, have strengthened the Soviet Government's determination to achieve a radical solution of the disarmament problem." He reaffirmed his intention to work, as before, to "normalize the international situation and improve relations between states."

Khrushchev's new proposals which, he said, had been prepared for presentation to the summit meeting, are designed to appear responsive to Western views on a number of important issues. However, in an effort to exploit Western differences resulting from France's insistence on giving top priority to measures for controlling nuclear weapons delivery systems, the new Soviet plan provides for the prohibition and destruction of all means for the delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage of Moscow's revised program for complete disarmament. The USSR insists, however, that these measures must be accompanied by the liquidation of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of other states.

The new proposals include detailed provisions on the nature and functions of a control system which are designed to give the impression that Moscow is seeking to meet Western criticisms of the vague and ambiguous control provisions Khrushchev placed before the United Nations last September. The new proposals spell out control measures for each of the three stages in the Soviet program and outline the composition and voting procedures of the proposed International Control Organization. Moscow now provides for on-site inspection of successive disarmament steps, missile-launching sites, and plants and installations engaged in military production.

In a move aimed at meeting the United States' emphasis on banning the use of outer space for military purposes, Moscow's

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new first stage would prohibit the launching of "special devices" and confine all missile launchings to peaceful purposes.

Moscow has also adopted another feature of the Western plan by agreeing to "joint studies" in the first and second stages of measures to be undertaken in subsequent stages.

Khrushchev's press conference remarks did not modify his earlier position that the status quo in West Berlin would be maintained until another summit meeting takes place in "six to eight months." However, he warned the West against believing that the conclusion of a separate treaty with East Germany could be delayed by postponing a summit conference beyond the time period he has suggested. He indicated that Moscow would go through the normal steps of calling a peace conference of wartime allies before taking any unilateral action. As to the timing, Khrushchev stated only that the USSR would initiate this process "when we see that enough time has passed."

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### Congo Leader Hints at Move to Seize Power

The demand by extremist Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba that he be appointed premier of the Congo on the basis of his plurality in the recent legislative elections appears to be a threat to seize power if his various demands are not met by the Belgians. Lumumba's National Congo Movement won about one third of the 137 seats in the lower house of the new Congo parliament. In a press conference on 2 June, Lumumba also called for the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo and for the election of a chief of state by popular vote rather than by the legislature. He hinted that there would be "trouble" if his various demands were not met.

Lumumba's warnings may have been prompted by concern over the possible formation of an anti-Lumumba coalition by Joseph Kasavubu, who departed for Brussels suddenly on 1 June. Lumumba might proclaim himself head of government, but his ability to seize power is doubtful in view of the hostility toward him among many African groups and Belgium's control of the Congo's security forces.

Meanwhile, Europeans continue to leave the Congo at an accelerating rate in the face of antiwhite threats. Newspapers in Stanleyville and Katanga Province have reportedly published lists of Europeans who should leave the Congo "at once."

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### Nicaragua Suspends Relations With Cuba

The Nicaraguan Government cabled the Cuban Foreign Ministry on 1 June demanding the recall of the Cuban ambassador and his entire staff for having repeatedly engaged in subversive activities. The Nicaraguans regard this move as equivalent to "suspension" of diplomatic relations, an action taken by the Guatemalan Government for similar reasons on 29 April. Nicaragua's action again calls public attention to Cuban subversive activities in other Latin American countries.

Nicaragua and Guatemala are exerting pressure to have the governments of Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador take similar action, since they regard Cuban subversion as directed against all five Central American governments. Honduras may do so, because the Cuban ambassador there has been particularly provocative in his support of radical, Communist-inspired opposition groups. However, Costa Rica and El Salvador appear unlikely to break with Cuba in the near future.

The Castro regime is repeating its charges that the actions of "dictatorial, pro-imperialist" regimes are the initial moves in a US plot to cause its overthrow. Some circles in Latin America were receptive to this propaganda line after the Guatemalan break.

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Latin American annoyance at the Castro regime is being reinforced by Cuban President Dorticos' "good-will" trip in South America, which is demonstrating that the best organized support

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in Latin America for the Castro regime is Communist. In Argentina, he flouted protocol, viciously attacked the United States before a pro-Communist university group, and went out of his way to meet with leaders of an actively antigovernment, Peronista labor group. In Uruguay, the Cuban Embassy was admonished prior to Dorticos' arrival that the Uruguayan Government wanted no public statement adversely reflecting on any foreign government. The Cubans reportedly agreed, but Dorticos nevertheless made his usual anti-US attacks.

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