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
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**OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE**  
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**1. INDIA REACTS SHARPLY TO UN PLEBISCITE  
RESOLUTION ON KASHMIR**

**Comment on:**

The Indian army is "fully mobilized" against the threat of Pakistani military action in Kashmir,

the Indian army will strike only if Pakistan initiates hostilities.

The state of tension in India, resulting from the UN Security Council's resolution of 24 January which called for a plebiscite in Kashmir, is also reflected in Krishna Menon's statement to Ambassador Lodge on 28 January that there is danger of Pakistani "fedayeen" attacks in Kashmir and that if they occur, he favors taking over all of Pakistan.

The Indian press has lashed out at "the interested and mischievous role" played by Britain and the United States throughout the Kashmir dispute.

India's belligerent attitude will probably become even more extreme in reply to Pakistan's proposal for introduction of a UN force into Kashmir. However New Delhi, which controls most of the disputed state, is unlikely to provoke hostilities unless it decides that this is the only way to prevent a plebiscite--which it would probably lose to Pakistan.

Karachi is equally unlikely to precipitate a conflict as long as it continues to receive UN support.

**2. NEW EGYPTIAN ARMS SHIPMENT BELIEVED EN ROUTE  
TO ALGERIANS**

[redacted] Libya has agreed that "the goods" may pass through his country.

[redacted] the shipment would be ready for delivery in "al-Salum"--presumably the port city on the Egyptian-Libyan border--on 31 January and that "a reliable group" should be sent from Tunisia to receive it there in order to guarantee its arrival in Tunis.

**Comment**

The "goods" [redacted]  
are probably additional arms to support the military offensive being planned by the Algerian rebels.

Arms consignments to the Algerians via Libya reportedly have been stepped up since 1 December with the Libyan government facilitating their transshipment. These reports suggest that Tunisian authorities usually take charge of consignments at the Libyan-Tunisian border and make the actual deliveries.

### **3. HUNGARY REPORTEDLY EXTORTING "CONFessions" IMPLICATING WESTERN NATIONS**

A reliable source of the American legation in Budapest states that many Hungarians deported to the USSR after the revolution have been returned and are now in a Budapest prison. The returnees are being released only if they sign a "confession" admitting "contact" with Western powers.

**Comment** Such confessions may be used in the forthcoming political trials to implicate Western states and their diplomatic missions in the Hungarian uprising.

Hungary has accelerated its anti-Western campaign during the past week, and the legation believes that efforts to hamper the activities of Western missions in Budapest are already under way.

#### 4. FRENCH CHARGE IN LAOS ADVISING PATHET LAO

Comment on:

[redacted] French chargé Soulie has joined with the Indian truce commissioner in recommending the urgent return to Vientiane of Pathet chief Souphanouvong in order to head off growing cabinet criticism of the 28 December agreement with the Pathet Lao.

[redacted] Soulie's lack of sympathy with US-UK efforts to block the formation of a coalition government with the Pathet Lao. It is now apparent that he is actually promoting the coalition.

By such tactics Soulié apparently hopes to increase French influence in Laos. The degree of his success in assuring Souvanna Phouma of French co-operation was made apparent by Souvanna on 27 January when he publicly thanked Soulié for his government's support, and observed that France as a fellow member of the French Union was the only government which had the right to advise and criticize Laos on foreign policy matters.

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
## 5. FRENCH WEST AFRICAN OFFICIALS ALARMED OVER SELF-GOVERNMENT DEMANDS

[Redacted]

these developments, and fear that Paris will not realize the necessity of major policy readjustments to meet the new situation.

According to the deputy high commissioner of French West Africa, the Africans now say they plan to turn the federations of West and Equatorial Africa into two independent states associated with France rather than accepting the French plan for 12 autonomous territories.

Local French officials are deeply disturbed over current political developments in French West Africa, particularly by the growing demands for early self-government. The American consul general at Dakar notes that they are most concerned over the rapid pace of



### Comment

Most of this change in African attitude has taken place since French Togoland was granted autonomy in late 1956, and has been influenced by developments in North Africa and the Gold Coast.

West African territorial leaders recently supported a refusal of the Grand Council at Dakar to discuss the budget because of dissatisfaction with the implementation of the new basic reform law. The African majority of the representatives on a committee of the French National Assembly voted unanimously on 24 January to grant larger powers to African councils.

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