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
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1. FURTHER EVALUATION OF SOVIET CLAIM OF ICBM FIRING


Comment on:

Recently acquired information indicates that a Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile could have been launched a few days prior to the TASS announcement of 26 August. However, the full scope of activities which would be expected to occur during such a launching has not been apparent in available evidence.

Unusual [redacted] activity was noted during August involving the Tyura Tam area of the Turkestan Military District and the Klyuchi area of the Kamchatka Peninsula--believed to be the range-head and terminus, respectively, of a Soviet missile test range about 3,500 nautical miles long.

[redacted]
[redacted]
An actual launching may have occurred on
21 August, [redacted]

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Considered of equal validity in explaining the TASS announcement is the interpretation that the USSR, having accumulated considerable technical confidence from ballistic missile tests over distances up to 950 nautical miles, could have made an anticipatory announcement for its propaganda value.

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2. AMBASSADOR THOMPSON COMMENTS ON ZORIN DISARMAMENT SPEECH



Ambassador Thompson in Moscow believes that Soviet delegate Zorin's speech on 27 August in London was a final statement of the Soviet position for the record prior to winding up work in the UN Disarmament Subcommittee. He notes that Zorin made it clear the USSR considers the subcommittee too restricted and wants the next step to be an airing of the entire problem in the UN General Assembly, where India and other neutral states could participate. He expects the USSR to suspend serious discussion of disarmament and adopt propaganda positions, while seeking to mobilize public support in order to soften up the West.

Thompson believes the speech was also timed to get the maximum effect from the announcement of a successful ICBM test, in order to convey the impression that the USSR is leading from strength on disarmament.

Comment	The British and French delegates to the London talks have also expressed the view that Zorin's speech indicated that the Russians are preparing their stand for the General Assembly session and that no Soviet disarmament concessions can be expected at least until then.
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3. MOLOTOV'S APPOINTMENT TO MONGOLIA

Comment on:

Molotov's appointment as ambassador to the Mongolian People's Republic appears to be a shrewd move on Khrushchev's part, --removing the intransigent "Old Bolshevik" from the Soviet internal scene and at the same time allaying domestic fears and foreign expectations that a Stalin-type purge is forthcoming.

This appointment is another indication of the diverse treatment accorded the various members of the "antiparty group"; Molotov's great seniority in the party--51 years of service--and his prestige and age may have given him some advantage over the others. However, the announcement that the former Soviet ambassador, Vasily Pisarev, will remain in Ulan Bator as minister and counselor suggests that Molotov's appointment is more honorific than substantial.

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
4. IRAQI TROOP MOVEMENTS TOWARD SYRIAN BORDER REPORTED

Several usually reliable sources in Baghdad have informed the American army attaché that within the next few days Iraq plans to move several major units toward the Syrian border. In the

north, an infantry brigade is reportedly being moved from Mosul to the Balad Sinjar area on the Syrian border. The First Division reportedly will be moved from the Baghdad area to the vicinity of Ramadi, an assembly point on the road to H-3 pumping station which is a forward base for a move into either Syria or Jordan.

Comment

The bulk of Syria's army is concentrated south and west of Damascus toward the Israeli border. There are no significant forces facing Iraq in eastern Syria, and little effort has been made to deploy troops or prepare defenses east of Damascus along the desert road from Iraq.

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5. PRESSURE INCREASING FOR UN NUCLEAR TEST RESOLUTION

Comment on:

Failure of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee to agree on suspension of nuclear tests and world-wide public concern over radioactive fallout--particularly strong in Norway and Japan--will increase pressure for a UN General Assembly resolution this fall calling for an immediate suspension of tests. Some Western-oriented countries will probably renew their own efforts, and many members may find it difficult, if not impossible, to oppose a Soviet-sponsored resolution calling for test suspension without adequate safeguards or controls.

The Norwegian NATO representative stated on 28 August that Prime Minister Gerhardsen had already publicly committed himself to follow up the earlier Norwegian UN proposal to register and limit nuclear tests if the subcommittee made no progress. The opposition Liberal party is reported by the American embassy as likely to try during the October election campaign to capitalize on the strong Norwegian public support for such statements as the Schweitzer appeal on the dangers of fallout.

Earlier this month the Japanese government, which has also proposed registration, was reported preparing a new proposal to the UN on suspension of nuclear testing.

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6. LONDON CONCERNED OVER SANDYS' STATEMENT ON
USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE FAR EAST

Comment on:

London fears that the statement by Defense Minister Sandys during his recent Australian visit that British SEATO forces will eventually have a nuclear capability may complicate ratification of the UK-Malayan defense agreement.

While Sandys subsequently said he had not implied that Malaya would be an atomic base, officials in the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Colonial Office, the Foreign Office, and the vice chiefs of staff are reported apprehensive that the statement may stimulate opposition demands in Malaya for British assurances that atomic weapons will never be used in the area, and even lead to demands for Malayan neutrality. It is also feared that when Sandys visits Singapore, there may be public insistence on prior consultation before locating atomic weapons there.

Although the issue probably will not prevent ratification of the defense agreement when it is debated in October in Malaya's Legislative Council, Prime Minister Rahman has already felt obliged to state that nuclear weapons would not be allowed in Malaya. The Sandys statement is also likely to prove useful to Soviet propaganda in Asia during the UN General Assembly disarmament discussions.

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