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16 July 1959

CONTINUED CONTROL

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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16 JULY 1959

**I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**

suggests possible device  
Gromyko may propose for getting West-  
ern agreement to an all-German com-  
mittee.



**II. ASIA-AFRICA**

Iraqi political groups may see Qasim's  
remarks on 14 July as signal to start  
new maneuvering.

Ethiopia planning strong protest to UK  
over press attacks from British Soma-  
iland.

**III. THE WEST**

West Germany soliciting support for  
French position in UN debate on Al-  
geria, possibly in return for French  
support on reunification issue.



## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## DAILY BRIEF

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Watch Committee conclusion--Berlin: No significant indications bearing on the possibility of hostilities. [redacted]

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USSR-Geneva: [redacted] Gromyko may seek to obtain Western agreement to an all-German committee by offering to make this organ subordinate to a four-power commission on the whole German problem. [redacted]

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[redacted] such an "autonomous" all-German committee should report to a "four-power senior body" by a certain date but that this time limit would not apply to Western rights in Berlin. He suggested that the foreign ministers could agree in principle on a time period of two or three years and that the precise date could be established at a summit meeting. [redacted] acknowledged

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that the all-German committee proposal was intended to make Western recognition of the East German regime "more palatable!" [redacted]

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeopardize US interests exist, particularly in Iraq and Iran.

The initiation of significant hostilities is unlikely in the immediate future. [redacted]

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*OK*

Iraq: Qasim's announcement that the period during which political parties should refrain from activity will end before 6 January 1960, and that following this an elected "national council" will be created, appears intended to remove the force of Communist criticism and pressure for open political action now. The announcement is likely to be regarded by the various political elements as an invitation to strengthen their organizations and mass following, as well as to try to obtain control of key government departments. This may lead to intensified factionalism rather than to the political truce which Qasim seems to hope for.

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*MO*

Ethiopia-UK: [The Ethiopian Government plans a strong protest to the United Kingdom over press attacks on Haile Selassie, apparently originating from British Somaliland. This may lead to a new deterioration in Ethiopian-British relations, coming just after the Emperor's acceptance of a 400,000,000 ruble credit (\$100,000,000 at the official rate) from Moscow.] The reaction in Addis Ababa to the Soviet credit is generally one of elation because of the anticipated Soviet help for easing Ethiopia's economic difficulties. However, some top officials reportedly fear the Emperor has gone too far.

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### III. THE WEST

*MO*

West Germany - France: [Bonn is seeking to gain support for France in the UN debate on Algeria this fall. Following up a personal letter from Chancellor Adenauer to Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis, the West German ambassador in Athens urged the Greek Government to demonstrate NATO unity by supporting the French position. The Greeks are unlikely to agree, in view of their policy on Cyprus and their Middle East interests, but the German action is evidence of willingness to make an effort on behalf of France. This may indicate that Bonn has shelved its long-standing policy of staying out of colonial controversies and has begun a more active role in support of France, in return for French diplomatic support for the West German position on reunification.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Soviet Spokesmen Hint at Compromise on All-German Committee

[Foreign Minister Gromyko may seek to obtain Western agreement to an all-German committee by offering to make this organ subordinate to a four-power commission.]

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such an "autonomous" all-German committee should report to a "four-power senior body" by a certain date. He insisted, however, that the USSR would not press for a terminal date on Western rights in West Berlin.]

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that a four-power commission to work out the terms of a German peace treaty could be part of a compromise settlement on Berlin.]

[Soviet spokesmen are seeking to create the impression that the time limit on any interim agreement is harmless by suggesting that it would apply only to the all-German committee and not to the duration of Allied rights in Berlin.]

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[Gromyko, however, made it clear in his public statement of 28 June that a "definite time limit will be established for the temporary status of West Berlin and for the work of the all-German committee." He said the temporary status agreement would be "designed for a year and a half," and specified that the "all-German committee would have to complete its work by the end of that period.]

[The USSR probably would insist that the four-power commission should be confined to negotiating a German peace treaty, with reunification left to the Germans. Moscow rejected a West German]

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[proposal last September for a four-power commission with advisers from both German states to discuss the "German question," proposing instead that the four powers work toward the conclusion of a treaty and leave the reunification problem to an all-German committee.]

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[ ] suggested that the foreign ministers could agree in principle on a time period of two or three years and that the precise date could be established at a summit meeting. He agreed that an all-German committee would imply substantial Western recognition of East Germany, and added that "it would seem to be one way of making recognition more palatable!" [ ]

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

The Iraqi Situation

Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim's declaration on 14 July that the "transitional period" of the revolution will draw to an end before 6 January 1960 probably is a move to mitigate the force of Communist criticism and pressure for immediate political activity. Qasim has opposed activity by political parties during this period, despite Communist and extreme leftist demands that political life be restored. Qasim also announced that a "national council" will be elected before the next anniversary of the revolution.

Iraqi political factions are likely to view Qasim's declaration as an invitation to begin strengthening their organizations and mass following, as well as to seek control of government departments that could be used to further their objectives. Although the National Democratic party recently has been stepping up its efforts to gain support outside the cities, the Communists appear to have better organization at the grass-roots level. This may lead to an increase of factionalism and friction rather than the stability and political truce which Qasim probably hoped for.

Qasim's reorganized and expanded cabinet, which appears to reflect a shift toward the left, may be intended to satisfy the Communists in order to balance recent moves favoring the army and nationalists. At least three of the four new members are extreme leftists--Faysal Samir, Guidance; Awni Yusuf, Works and Housing; and Nadia Dulaymi, Municipalities. Dr. Dulaymi, Iraq's first woman cabinet minister, has a long record of association with Communist-front groups; she is reputedly a member of the Iraqi party's central committee.

In early July all three signed the Communist-sponsored charter issued by the Communist-dominated "United Front" demanding participation of political parties in the government, arming of the Communist-dominated Popular Resistance Force, and a purge of "corrupt" elements from the army and government. [redacted]

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Ethiopian Relations With London May Deteriorate

Addis Ababa will shortly protest to the United Kingdom over press attacks in the British Somaliland Protectorate on Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie and demand that they be stopped, according to the American adviser of the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry. This action may lead to a new deterioration in Ethiopian-British relations, which only recently were reported to be "back to normal." Addis Ababa had reacted sharply to London's policy statement of 9 February on British Somaliland, which Ethiopia claimed was support for a greater Somalia state affiliated with the British Commonwealth at the expense of Somali-inhabited Ethiopian territory.

Addis Abba's proposed protest comes at a time when Ethiopian ties with the West may be subject to new strains over the Emperor's acceptance on 11 July of a \$100,000,000 credit from Moscow. The Emperor reportedly expects "large numbers of Soviet technicians" to enter Ethiopia in connection with the aid program. This probably accounts for the feeling among some top officials that he has gone too far, although the government officials generally are elated over the prospect that Soviet aid may ease Ethiopia's economic difficulties.

Addis Ababa, perhaps encouraged by what it considers strong support from Moscow, now may be preparing to assume a more aggressive attitude toward the West. A remark by the American adviser that the Ethiopian Government "contemplates strong action" unless "full satisfaction" is forthcoming from London may be an expression of this new policy.

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## III. THE WEST

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West Germany Seeks Support for France in UN Debate on Algeria

[Bonn is attempting to gain support for France during the UN debate on Algeria this fall, possibly in return for continued French support for the West German position on reunification. Following up a personal letter from Chancellor Adenauer to Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis, the West German ambassador in Athens has urged the Greek Government to demonstrate the unity of NATO by taking a firm stand behind France. Bonn's action reflects the high level of personal agreement and mutual support that has gradually developed between Adenauer and French President de Gaulle since the latter's return to power.]

[Foreign Minister Averoff told US officials that Greece has sought to be as helpful as possible to France in regard to Algeria by not recognizing the Algerian rebel government, but that Greece has traditionally opposed colonialism and has good relations with Arab countries which it is anxious to maintain. He expressed annoyance with the timing of the request, pointing out that it followed too soon after a sizable German loan to Greece.]

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Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

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Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

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The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

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The Director of Intelligence and Research

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The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

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Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

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