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24 June 1960



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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Communist China - USSR: The major Chinese address at the Rumanian party congress on 22 June was judiciously worded to avoid antagonizing the congress and was devoid of either support for or sharp criticism of Soviet positions on points at issue between Peiping and Moscow. Eastern European delegation heads also addressed the congress on 22 June and, with the exception of Albania, appeared to support strongly Khrushchev's speech of the previous day. Propaganda emanating directly from Peiping continued to be sharply critical of Khrushchev's foreign policies. As far as is known, Sino-Soviet political differences have not so far affected economic and military cooperation between the two powers, but continuation of current polemics could make collaboration in these spheres more difficult to maintain. For this reason, further attempts to resolve these differences may be expected.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

[Japan: Prime Minister Kishi's impending resignation has shifted political activity to more conventional tactics and has reinforced expectations of early general elections. Although demonstrations have subsided, the leftists retain their capability for violence and large-scale action in the election campaign. Major factors in the leftist success thus far have been failure of the government to declare an emergency and issue appropriate orders and unwillingness of police authorities, in the absence of such orders, to jeopardize their public standing by using the strong measures needed to control the riots and demonstrations.]

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India: Several top defense officials are inspecting remote outposts along the Tibetan frontier, probably in a concerted effort to answer domestic criticism of the government's "in-action" and to bolster the morale of border units. Defense Minister Krishna Menon, accompanied by Air Force Chief of Staff Mukherji, has been inspecting posts in Ladakh, while Army Chief of Staff Thimayya is touring the Sikkim-Darjeeling area. Nehru plans to visit the Ladakh frontier in late June or early July.

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IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Probable Trends in the Horn of Africa. NIE 76-60. 21

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Peiping Stands Firm in Political Disputes With Moscow

The major Chinese address at the Rumanian party congress--delivered by politburo member Peng Chen on 22 June--made no concessions to Khrushchev's authoritative restatement of Soviet policies toward the West delivered at the congress the previous day. Peng did, however, attempt to avoid exacerbating the situation in Bucharest by presenting a judiciously worded statement. He blurred the question of the inevitability of war by quoting contradictory statements from the 1957 Moscow Declaration, but he made no mention of peaceful coexistence and limited his endorsement to Khrushchev's attack on the United States at the summit. Peng gave credit for China's economic success to the regime's "leap forward" and commune programs--Chinese domestic developments in disfavor with Moscow.

Propaganda emanating directly from Peiping continued to voice sharp criticism of Khrushchev's foreign policies. An article in the official party paper, People's Daily, on 21 June--broadcast on 22 June--made many of Peng's points but in much stronger language. Reflecting the Chinese view that the bloc is in a position to deal from strength, the article rejected Khrushchev's policies of "active coexistence" and "friendly cooperation" with the West, calling instead for a "resolute struggle" against imperialism as the only assurance for peace. By implication, the article names Khrushchev a "renegade" for branding the Chinese interpretation of Leninism as "stiff dogmatism" and takes the Soviet leader to task for lauding what the Chinese call "shameful actions of betrayal" as creative Marxism-Leninism.

As far as is known, Sino-Soviet political differences have not so far affected economic and military cooperation between the two powers, but a continued deterioration in political relations would make close cooperation difficult to maintain. For this reason, further attempts to resolve these differences may be expected.

On the same day Peng spoke, all the Eastern European satellites except Albania wholeheartedly supported Khrushchev's

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speech, calling it of "fundamental significance for the entire workers' and Communist movement." The head of the Albanian delegation--the only East European group not led by its party leader--not only failed to mention Khrushchev's speech but generally reaffirmed a view similar to that of the Chinese on some aspects of foreign policy.

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Japanese Demonstrations Subside, Elections Awaited

Prime Minister Kishi's impending resignation--the date of which is contingent on the outcome of the struggle within the ruling Liberal-Democratic party (LDP) to select his successor--has temporarily calmed political tensions in Japan and reinforced expectations of early elections to the lower house of the Diet.

With the new US-Japanese security treaty in force, Kishi's announcement that he intends to resign has deprived the leftists of issues for continuing widespread disturbances. The Socialists persist in claiming that the treaty ratification was illegal. As yet they have given no indication that they will end their boycott of the Diet, and they apparently intend to maintain a united front with other leftist groups in opposing the treaty. The leftists retain their capability for violence and large-scale action.

Major factors in the leftist success thus far have been the failure of the government to proclaim an emergency which would authorize maximum police measures and the unwillingness of police authorities without specific instructions from the government to exercise powers necessary for controlling the riots and demonstrations.

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Despite restraints on their action and the fact that they sustained numerous injuries, policemen have maintained excellent discipline and morale while avoiding leftist attempts to have them create martyrs during the outbreaks. The American Embassy in Tokyo concludes that the Japanese police remain an effective and courageous force, needing only adequate support at the political level to function satisfactorily.

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