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1. THE SINO-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE

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The Sino-Soviet communique of 18 January, signed by Bulganin and Chou En-lai, is largely devoted to a summary of international questions on which Moscow and Peiping are said to have "perfectly identical" views.

The communique states that the USSR and China "are prepared to continue to give necessary support" to Middle Eastern states against "aggression and interference." This is a noncommittal reply to the American offer of troops if a Middle East state should request them to oppose Communist aggression. An implication in the Sino-Soviet text that support will be given against aggression from any source is probably meant to please the Arabs, who have criticized American proposals as opposing only Communist aggression.

The principal significance of the communique lies in its reflection of the main lines of Sino-Soviet strategy to prevent a further deterioration in intra-Orbit relations. The statement emphasizes the need for bloc unity against the West, while asserting that past "mistakes" in relations among bloc members are being corrected.

The communique provides further evidence that Chou's mission in Moscow and Eastern Europe was that of a moderator, primarily between the Soviet Union and Poland. It reflects previous Chinese admonitions to the USSR to avoid "chauvinism" and to the Eastern European states to suppress "narrow nationalist feelings." It repeats the recent Chinese formula for "unity" to be achieved by genuine consultation among bloc states, and avoids the usual citation of the USSR as head of the bloc.

The Chinese had previously made clear that their support for Gomulka's freedom from Soviet control was

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contingent on his willingness to follow in general the Soviet model in his internal program and the Sino-Soviet line in foreign affairs. These conditions are glossed over in the current communique, as they were in the Sino-Polish communique of 16 January. The latest statement does include, however, an indirect warning that the Soviet Union and China would stand together in military action to prevent any Communist state--in Europe or Asia--from leaving the bloc.

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4. THE POLISH ELECTION OUTLOOK

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On the eve of the 20 January parliamentary elections, strong appeals by the Catholic hierarchy to support the regime-favored candidates may prove decisive for regime candidates in many areas. Gomulka's rapport with the Catholic Church has been one of his greatest political assets.

Last-minute reflection by voters that prudence dictates support for Gomulka may also counteract in part the vigorous campaign of Gomulka's opponents to sabotage the elections. An opinion poll taken by a regime-sponsored youth journal states that "over half" of those questioned said they would vote for the regime-supported candidates, while 30 percent intend to reject some regime candidates on their ballot.

Of the candidates, about 50 percent are members of the Communist Party, 25 percent are United Peasant Party members, 10 percent are Democratic Party members, and 15 percent are nonparty Catholics. Although collaborating with the National Front, the United Peasant Party has reportedly conducted a vigorous campaign in the countryside, and is expected to register gains over Communist candidates in rural areas.

Whatever the result, the composition of the new Sejm will be considerably different from that of the present parliament, since only about 10 percent of the candidates are now Sejm members. The number of top government and party officials who are candidates has been greatly reduced. For example, only half of the present council of ministers are candidates, whereas, in the last Sejm, all ministers ran and were elected.

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7. RIGHTISTS POSE THREAT TO FRENCH REGIME

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American officials in Paris believe that right-wing groups might attempt to overthrow the Fourth Republic if the Algerian situation "goes very sour."

General Charles de Gaulle is extremely active politically and there are indications he has even less concern for constitutional legality than heretofore. In a 10 January talk with Ambassador Dillon, he talked freely of a change toward an authoritarian non-Communist government. He appears to foresee financial difficulties rather than Algeria as provoking the end of the present regime.

If a really difficult crisis should arise, President Coty would call on De Gaulle to form a government, according to Coty's military adviser.

Comment	Speculation regarding De Gaulle's return has increased markedly during the last four months. De Gaulle is unlikely to be seriously considered unless France's internal situation becomes chaotic. The threat of violence by the more than 1,000,000 Europeans in Algeria, however, raises serious concern over the possible ramifications in Paris.
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9. BURMESE-SOVIET ECONOMIC AID AGREEMENT

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An economic agreement signed on 17 January in Rangoon completes the negotiations for Soviet construction and equipment as "gifts to the Burmese people" of a technological institute, a hospital, theater, hotel and a "cultural and sports center" which will include a stadium. The first Soviet offers were made during the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to Rangoon in December 1955.

Moscow, according to a TASS dispatch, will provide engineers and technicians and also will bring Burmese to the Soviet Union for training on the projects, which are to be completed in 1963. In return, the agreement states, Burma "will present as a gift to the Soviet people a corresponding quantity of rice and other Burmese goods."

Burma, which has had difficulty in procuring suitable imports from the Soviet Union, may use some of its current \$10,000,000 credit with the USSR to pay for this equipment and technical assistance. Reduction of credits in this manner may help dispel some of Burma's recent disillusionment with barter trade. The projects themselves are of a type most likely to make a favorable impression on the Burmese public.

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