


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15 December 1953



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
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DATE: 26/12/79 REVIEWER:



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SUMMARY**GENERAL**

1. Comment on Communist response to break in Korean talks (page 3).

SOVIET UNION

2. [Redacted] 3.3(h)(2)

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

3. Prominent Iranian nationalist assumes leadership of antigovernment coalition (page 4).

WESTERN EUROPE

4. French deputies fortified in anti-EDC attitude by visit to Poland (page 5).
5. Italians reportedly not opposed to Yugoslav attendance at informal talks on Trieste (page 5).

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GENERAL

1. Comment on Communist response to break in Korean talks:

Peiping radio's prompt comment on the break in the Korean talks is a further indication that the Communists do not want a Korean political conference at this time except on their own terms. They apparently believe they can escape the onus for a complete breakdown of the talks.

The first communique from the Communist side after Ambassador Dean's walkout on 12 December stated that it was still prepared to negotiate and accused South Korea rather than the United States of "perfidy" in releasing the 27,000 prisoners last June. A later broadcast, while reiterating that the Communist side insists on the resumption of the talks, interpreted Dean's action as a sign that "the American government might commit further perfidies" and blamed the break on the "contemptible cold war policies of the United States."

Moscow and Peiping appear to have agreed to reserve decision on a Korean political conference pending the results of Soviet proposals for four-power and five-power conferences on other major questions. [redacted]

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SOVIET UNION

2.

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
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
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

3. Prominent Iranian nationalist assumes leadership of antigovernment coalition:

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3.3(h)(2)

Comment: The National Resistance Movement, a coalition of groups desiring Mossadeq's return to power, has been unable to promote effective antigovernment measures. Makki, a prominent ultranationalist and rabble rouser, may be able to provide the leadership that the Movement has heretofore lacked.

Makki probably would be more interested in advancing his own political fortunes through control of the party than in supporting Mossadeq, with whom he broke shortly before the latter's removal from office. [redacted]

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15 Dec 53

WESTERN EUROPE

4. French deputies fortified in anti-EDC attitude by visit to Poland:

[redacted] Eight of the nine French National Assembly deputies who recently visited Poland as guests of the Polish government are satisfied that the reconstruction and industrial program

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there is without military significance and that consequently there is no need for EDC and German rearmament. They made clear to French embassy officials in Warsaw that their purpose was to seek information with which to combat the EDC in the assembly, according to the American embassy in Warsaw.

Comment: Since their return two of the deputies have insisted publicly that the Oder-Neisse line between Poland and East Germany should remain. This may foreshadow a drive to encumber French EDC ratification with a demand that West Germany formally renounce any claim to Polish-held territory. Such a demand would seriously embarrass the French government, which shares the Allied position that disposition of this area should be reserved for a final peace treaty.

5. Italians reportedly not opposed to Yugoslav attendance at informal talks on Trieste:

[redacted] Premier Pella hopes to discuss the Trieste issue with Secretary Dulles and Foreign Secretary Eden during the current NATO meetings in Paris,

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] The cable quotes a "senior Italian Foreign Office official" to the effect that Pella would not object to the presence of the Yugoslav ambassador at the discussions.

Comment: Italy's position heretofore has been that implementation of the Anglo-American declaration of 8 October must be begun before it could participate with Yugoslavia in any discussions on Trieste.

The Yugoslav government would probably be willing to have its ambassador attend such informal talks, since it has repeatedly said it would attend any type of conference without preconditions.