

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.3(h)(2)

3.5(c)

20 May 1961

Copy No. C 80

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


20 May 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Laos. (*Page t*)
2. South Korea. (*Page ii*)
3. USSR: Illness of Frol Kozlov, leading contender as Khrushchev's successor, may intensify maneuvering for the succession. (*Page iii*)
4. USSR: Press comment on extension of death penalty apparently intended to forestall public fear of revival of police terror. (*Page iii*)
5. USSR: M. V. Keldysh replaces A. N. Nesmeyanov as president of Academy of Sciences. (*Page iii*)
6. Ghana-Angola: Nkrumah apparently hopes to become exclusive sponsor of Angolan rebel organization. (*Page iii*)
7. France-Algeria: Reported plot to assassinate De Gaulle. (*Page iv*)

~~SECRET~~



20 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

20 May 1961

DAILY BRIEF

Sirab
*Laos: The deadlock in the 19 May session of the tri-partite talks at Namone reflects General Phoumi's instructions to the government delegation to stall talks on formation of a coalition government. The Pathet Lao and the Souvanna Phouma group repeatedly have attempted to get political discussions started, but the government delegation is insisting that the meeting address itself first to cease-fire matters because of recently received reports of continued fighting in Pa Dong and in other scattered areas. The next session is scheduled for 22 May.

delete
Brief -
delete
P's 1, 2, 3, 6,
7, 8, 9, 10.
of Backup

No action was reported on the major military fronts. Bloc airlift operations into Laos were scheduled through 20 May. [] (Backup, Page 1) (Map)

i

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

*South Korea: President Yun announced at a press conference this morning that he has reconsidered his resignation and plans to remain as chief of state. Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) Chairman Chang was reported very upset by Yun's surprise resignation and has evidently succeeded in persuading him to remain to provide the new regime with some semblance of constitutional authority.

Gen. Chang meanwhile has named a 15-man cabinet-- all military officers--with himself as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. There are growing indications, however, that dissensions are developing within the MRC particularly over the question of transferring power to a new civilian government. There are also unconfirmed reports of a dispute developing between the marines, who seek an early restoration of civilian administration, and the army, which claims there is need for indefinite military rule. Army officers constitute the bulk of the MRC, but the marines have a large troop concentration in Seoul and are opposing attempts to replace them with army units. *No*

General Chang's first bid for public support was an announcement on 19 May that rice rations for military units would be reduced and increased quantities made available for civilian consumption, both to counter runaway grain prices and to offset food shortages in some areas.

The National Police have been instructed to give "positive impetus" to grain shipments for the cities.

Some segments of the South Korean populace are becoming apprehensive about the dictatorial powers assumed by the military group, but on the whole the public remains apathetic.

20 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

ii

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

USSR: Frol Kozlov, probably the leading contender as Khrushchev's eventual successor, has been "convalescing from heart trouble" since 22 April, according to a Soviet Foreign Ministry official. Kozlov's chances of succeeding Khrushchev may now be reduced and below-the-surface maneuvering for the succession may be intensified. Any serious impairment of Kozlov's activities would also necessitate the redistribution of his key administrative responsibilities in party, organizational and personnel work.

OK

USSR: Initial Soviet press comment on the decree which sets the death penalty for large-scale embezzlement, counterfeiting, and forgery is apparently intended to forestall public fears that Stalinist police terror may be revived. While calling for strict enforcement of the new decree, Moscow at the same time insists that "liberalization trends" have not been reversed. The Kremlin is apparently also concerned that this move will furnish propaganda fuel for the West.

OK

(Backup, Page 5)

USSR: For comment on election of M. V. Keldysh, who is believed to have played an important role in research on the Soviet guided missile program, as president of the Academy of Sciences, USSR, see Page 6.

OK

Ghana-Angola: (President Nkrumah on 16 May reportedly claimed he could supply "any quantity" of arms to the Angola People's Union (UPA)--the organization believed chiefly responsible for the rebellion in Angola. In a talk with UPA leader Holden Roberto in Accra, the Ghanaian President said that such materiel would come from the bloc, which had responded "immediately" to a request from him for arms "for Gizenga, Angola, and South Africa"--presumably a reference to the arms delivered to Ghana by the USSR last month. Nkrumah admitted, however, that a secure means of delivery still had to be worked out. Nkrumah also offered to provide "plenty of money" if the UPA would establish its headquarters)

No

20 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

iii

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(in Accra or at least assign a permanent representative there to receive funds and advice. At the same time, Nkrumah discouraged Roberto from seeking aid elsewhere, apparently in the hope of becoming the exclusive sponsor of the UPA.) [redacted]

(Backup, Page 7)

***France-Algeria:** [redacted]

cer-

certain army units in France plan to storm the Elysee Palace, De Gaulle's official residence, and "remove him" shortly after the 20 May opening of negotiations with the Algerian rebels. Premier Debré is said to have been alerted to this report, which is one of a number in circulation concerning an early rightist civilian or military attempt to assassinate De Gaulle.

Collapse of the late April military revolt in Algeria has left military and civilian extremists still bitterly opposed to De Gaulle's Algerian policy. In view of the failure of past plots to seize control of the government or otherwise persuade De Gaulle to modify his policy, fanatic rightists probably feel assassination is the only remaining way to block Algerian independence.) [redacted] *7/10*

20 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

iv

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Situation in Laos

(General Phoumi,

[redacted] stated that he neither expected nor intended to come to an early agreement with Souvanna and Prince Souphanouvong on a coalition government. Phoumi cited various legal and technical impediments to early formation of such a regime but added that in any event, it was impossible to settle the question until the neutrality of Laos had been assured by some form of agreement at Geneva. With regard to a much-mooted "summit meeting" with Souvanna and Souphanouvong, Phoumi stated that he would be willing to meet with them, provided a mutually satisfactory site could be agreed upon.)

(According to a report that is probably true, Phoumi was to stop off in Nong Khai, Thailand, on 19 May, during a flight to Savannakhet, to see Premier Sarit. Phoumi was characterized [redacted] as feeling isolated and puzzled by the American position on Laos; it is probable that he hoped to obtain new insights into American intentions from Sarit on the basis of the latter's recent talks with Vice President Johnson. The report quotes Phoumi to the effect that if the United States is not prepared to act militarily in his behalf in the event the Pathet Lao should suddenly attack Vientiane or Luang Prabang, he should know about it, in which case he would prepare to move his government to Pakse in southern Laos.)

(Should Phoumi become persuaded that the United States would not come to his assistance in the event of the resumption of the Pathet Lao offensive, there is a possibility that he might suddenly come to terms with Souvanna and the Pathet Lao, his contrary protestations to Ambassador Brown notwithstanding.)

[redacted] Xieng Khouang town [redacted] the airstrip there is lightly defended by two companies. The radio station appeared powerful and had a trans-horizontal aerial. Three pairs of permanent telephone lines were observed along the Plaine des Jarres - Xieng Khouang road with one pair terminating about four miles from the Plaine des Jarres. The ICC villas in Xieng Khouang are)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(guarded by Pathet Lao troops under the supervision of Kong Le paratroops, who seem to be in control of the area. The paratroops were equipped with US arms, whereas the Pathet Lao were armed with Soviet carbines.)

(The South Vietnamese special forces engaged in patrol duty just inside the Laotian border in the Tchepone area were reportedly withdrawn on 19 May. Their return to South Vietnam was allegedly occasioned by a letter written by the local Laotian commander in which he asked them to withdraw, as "the war was over," and refused to accept any further responsibility for their acts or security. No mention was made in the report of elements of the Third Battalion of the South Vietnamese Army, which is also reported to be in Laos in the same general area.)

(Several prominent South Vietnamese opposition leaders now residing in Paris are reported assembling in Geneva, where they hope to make informal contact with various delegations to the conference on Laos and to advance their political aims in South Vietnam. Among them are leaders, alleged by South Vietnamese officials to have some covert French and North Vietnamese backing, who are working for the ouster of President Diem and are advocating a policy of neutrality for South Vietnam. Although they have no official access to the conference, they may also hope to present their views if the question of Vietnam is raised at the meetings.

[redacted] Indications that the Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam were planning a "program for responding" to the conference [redacted]

(A key Chinese Communist objective at the Geneva Conference is to damage SEATO as much as possible, according to recent statements of Communist newspapermen to Western journalists. Since arriving in Geneva, the Chinese have maintained a steady barrage of attacks on the US alliance structure in Southeast Asia. These attacks are designed to create international apprehension--particularly among Asian neutrals--over US defense commitments in the area, and the Chinese lose)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(no opportunity to charge that, so long as these commitments exist, the peace of Southeast Asia is threatened. Moscow also has shown, both in Gromyko's speech and in propaganda, that one of Moscow's central objectives is to reduce SEATO's effectiveness)

(Peiping also is promoting closer ties with the pro - Souvanna Phouma commander in Phong Saly Province, which borders on Communist China's Yunnan Province. On 17 May Peiping announced that Lieutenant Colonel Khamouan Boupha had arrived for a "friendly visit" in Kunming. Khamouan was greeted by the ranking Chinese Communist military officer for the Kunming garrison and by Yunnan provincial government officials)

(Airlift operations on 18 May involved an estimated total of 19 sorties--16 by Soviet transports and three by North Vietnamese aircraft. Of this number at least four Soviet IL-14s, but possibly nine, were involved in flights into Laos. In addition, two Soviet LI-2s probably flew to Nam Bac)

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Soviet Comment on New Embezzlement Law

On 14 May, the official government organ Izvestia pointedly denied that promulgation of the new death decree had come as a shock and asserted that the measure enjoys the approval of the entire Soviet people. Ostensibly written in answer to Western press criticism, the commentary has strong overtones of Kremlin concern that the law will revive old memories of indiscriminate police terror. Izvestia reassured the "capitalist world" that there has been no abandonment of the post-Stalin trend of liberalization of the Soviet penal code and denied that crime is on the increase or that the punitive arm of the state has been strengthened.

Apparently anticipating Western propaganda exploitation of the law, Moscow twice broadcast the Izvestia article to Europe on the day it was published.

The Kremlin nevertheless seems bent on enforcing the law, and the secret police (KGB) have evidently assumed responsibility for investigating the crimes which it covers. On 18 May, the KGB announced the arrest of a gang of "large-scale speculators" in currency; declaring that "the hour of revenge" had come, Izvestia hinted that the ringleader might be sent to the firing squad in accordance with the law.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~M. V. Keldysh, New President of Academy of Sciences, USSR

Moscow radio announced on 19 May the election of M. V. Keldysh as president of the Academy of Sciences, USSR. He was elected by the academy's General Assembly of Academicians and Corresponding Members. The outgoing president, A. N. Nesmeyanov, who had served since 1951 and is 62 years old, was relieved at his own request and received a unanimous expression of gratitude by the General Assembly for his service.

Keldysh, who is 50 years old, is a leading Soviet scientist in the field of mechanics and mathematics and has specialized in aerodynamics, hydrodynamics, and the theory of functions of complex variables. He is believed to have played an important role in the basic research essential to the development of Soviet guided missiles. He graduated from Moscow State University in 1931 and thereafter served in several leading scientific institutions. He became a corresponding member of the academy in 1943 and a full member in 1946, at which time he was the youngest of the new academicians. He became the head of the academy's department of physical-mathematical sciences in 1953 and last year a vice president of the academy. Although he has been a member of the Communist party since 1949, he is said to have limited political interests and to devote all his efforts to science and technology. [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]
Nkrumah Bids for Influence Over Angolan Nationalist Organization

(Nkrumah's apparently increasing interest in the Angola situation and the Angola People's Union (UPA) stems from his desire to align any future African regime there with his own program for African unity. This desire has probably been intensified by the frustration of the similar hopes he held a year ago with respect to the Lumumba government in the Congo. That development embittered Nkrumah toward the West and made him more receptive to close collaboration with Sino-Soviet bloc countries.) [Redacted]

(Roberto's meeting with the Ghanaian President this week followed an urgent invitation from Nkrumah. [Redacted])

Roberto received the invitation last month while in New York for the UN General Assembly session. [Redacted] Roberto normally operates out of UPA headquarters in Leopoldville, but has been a frequent visitor to Accra at least since late 1958, when he represented the Angolan nationalist movement at the first All-African People's Conference. At that gathering--promoted and dominated by Nkrumah--Roberto, like Lumumba, emerged as a member of the organization's policy-making steering committee. Nkrumah's regime apparently began to provide some direct support to the UPA about the same time. More recently, the UPA appears to have established close ties with Tunisia.)

(Roberto indicated that Nkrumah had warned him against yielding to overtures for a united front being made by the rival Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), whose leaders have long been subsidized by the bloc. Nkrumah denounced the MPLA as Communist controlled; Roberto believes he had tried but failed to lure the organization to Accra from Conakry. At the same time, however, Nkrumah defended, as he has in the past, the acceptance of Communist aid by African nationalists. He insisted that strong leaders such as)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

(himself would have no difficulty severing ties with the Communists once their assistance was no longer needed.)

(Urging Roberto to have faith in him ("I am leading Africa down the path to freedom and socialism."), Nkrumah also warned the Angolan against any contact with "the Americans," whom he accused of assassinating Lumumba and of refusing to "help me in my cause." When Roberto expressed hope of receiving help from the 20 moderate Monrovia conference states, Nkrumah condemned the Monrovia conferees as "tools of imperialism." Roberto had earlier asked the participants at Monrovia for material and financial support to supplement and offset the UPA's present dependence on Ghana.)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~