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7 April 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*OK*

Communist China - Lebanon: Peiping has closed its trade mission in Beirut following Lebanon's refusal to sever relations with Nationalist China. The Chinese Communists have grown increasingly sensitive to Taipei's diplomatic competition and probably feel that their withdrawal of the mission in Beirut will put other countries in the area on notice that Communist China "will not tolerate attempts to play at two Chinas."

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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Morocco-France: [The Moroccan minister of public works, who fears the French reaction to demands for the evacuation of French troops, has asked for American assistance in providing technicians should Paris recall its key personnel in electric power and civil aviation functions. The King in his note to De Gaulle last week apparently countered a French offer of a defense pact and only partial evacuation with a request for a commitment that France would withdraw all military forces. Morocco is determined that all foreign forces shall be withdrawn by the end of 1963.]

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### III. THE WEST

British Guiana: Cheddi Jagan's dissatisfaction with London's offer of internal self-government may lead him to agitate for complete independence. Jagan, Communist leader of the dominant Guianese political party, is making efforts to gain wider support in the Caribbean area with a current visit to Cuba. On 4 April he conferred at length with a high-level member of the Cuban Communist party and with Cuban Government officials.

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[redacted]

### IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.
- C. The following developments are susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which could jeopardize the security of the US in the immediate future:

None.

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[redacted]

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Communist China Closes Trade Mission in Lebanon


Peiping has given up its four-year effort to obtain recognition from Lebanon. The Chinese Communists on 1 April closed their trade office in Beirut because the Lebanese Government refused to sever relations with Nationalist China.

Lebanon's relations with the Nationalists, established in 1954, have been a source of contention since the Communist mission arrived in 1956. Peiping intends that such trade missions serve political as well as economic purposes, working to persuade business and government leaders that recognition of the Communist regime is financially and politically desirable. This approach has succeeded elsewhere but has been noticeably unsuccessful in Lebanon, where trade with Communist China is negligible and where the Nationalists have gained in stature. Taipei concluded a \$2,000,000 trade agreement with the Lebanese in 1956 and, in 1957, its diplomatic mission was raised to an embassy. The Nationalist ambassador in Beirut believes accreditation of the first Chinese Nationalist military attaché may have triggered Peiping's decision to withdraw its mission.

Peiping has grown increasingly sensitive to Taipei's diplomatic and trade competition. Guinea, which recognizes the Communist regime, recently received a stiff protest from Peiping threatening to break relations if Conakry repeated the official reception it gave a Nationalist delegation in January. Withdrawal of the unproductive Chinese Communist mission to Lebanon probably is intended to put other African and Middle Eastern nations on notice that Peiping "will not tolerate attempts to play at two Chinas."

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Moroccan-French Relations Expected to Worsen

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(Moroccan-French relations appear to be entering a "new and disquieting phase," in the view of Ambassador Yost in Rabat. Difficulty is likely to center on Moroccan agitation for the evacuation of the 17,000 French troops based in Morocco and to be complicated by other issues such as Moroccan support for Algerian independence, popular opposition to French atomic tests, and nationalist claims to large portions of the Sahara.)

(The Moroccan minister of public works, who fears serious trouble may develop, has asked for American assistance in providing vital technicians in the event Paris recalls key French personnel employed in Moroccan electric power and civil aviation facilities. Prime Minister Ibrahim has also recommended that the minister seek Egyptian or other Arab technicians.)

(President de Gaulle is reported to have expressed displeasure to the Moroccan minister of defense, who presented a message from the King on 31 March, over the promptness of the King's quick counterproposal to a recent offer by De Gaulle of a defense pact and partial evacuation. De Gaulle reportedly believed his offer could not have been seriously considered. The King apparently replied to the French offer with a plea for an immediate gesture along the lines of the American commitment last December to evacuate one air base almost immediately and the three others by the end of 1963.)

(French Ambassador Parodi, who told Ambassador Yost that De Gaulle's proposal went beyond earlier French offers and could have been represented by the Moroccan Government as a gain, nevertheless urged that Paris honor the King's request in order to bolster his position in the face of the mounting

[instability resulting from the political infighting between left and right factions in Morocco.]

[Ambassador Yost comments that the genuine and passionate Moroccan feeling on the evacuation question probably will lead Rabat to push the issue hard. The King, who apparently now intends to prolong the life of the Ibrahim government, may be motivated by a desire to keep the left with him rather than against him during a showdown with the French.]

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## III. THE WEST

New Problems in British Guiana Likely

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The recent moves by Cheddi Jagan, minister of trade and industry in the colonial government and Communist leader of the People's Progressive party, the dominant political group in British Guiana, suggest that there will be a cooling of his working relationship with colonial officials. Jagan is visiting Cuba from 4 to 7 April on the way home from the constitutional conference in London. He conferred at length on 4 April with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a high-level Cuban Communist who is influential in the Castro regime, and with major government leaders. This is the first such contact between British Guiana and Cuba and may lead elements in the Castro government to support Jagan.]

The constitutional talks broke up on 31 March over arrangements for transitional measures toward internal self-government, and Jagan said he would strive for early independence, which the British had refused to discuss until 1963. Although Britain's proposal to introduce internal self-government in August 1961 was received favorably, the Guianese delegation objected to making this advance contingent on satisfactory interim arrangements involving partial retention of British control over the police and internal security and provision for safeguarding the future of British officials in the local civil service.]

The Guianese also opposed allowing the governor to retain the constitutional right to issue decrees in an emergency, but London believes it should retain certain controls because Jagan--who will probably become the first prime minister--is a Communist. Meanwhile, Jagan's control over the People's Progressive party may be challenged at the forthcoming party congress by those critical of his and his wife's autocratic domination of party councils. He probably will be able to fend off any such attack. Despite his desire to press independence demands, he does not wish to prejudice chances for much needed foreign investment by attempting to go too far too fast.]

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

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Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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