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1. NEW ANTI-BRITISH VIOLENCE ON CYPRUS

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[Redacted]

There was a new outburst of anti-British violence on Cyprus on 14 November, springing from a Cyprus court's refusal to reprieve a Cypriot Greek who was sentenced to death for killing a policeman. It is likely that some terrorism will

continue as long as the issue of self-determination is unresolved.

Negotiations between the British and nationalist leader Archbishop Makarios on the future status of Cyprus appear to be making some progress. There is a strong possibility, however, that the terrorist organization EOKA and other extreme nationalists will repudiate the archbishop if he agrees to any plan which does not grant the island immediate self-determination. The British appear willing to discuss only gradual moves toward self-determination.

The Greek government has announced its intention to continue its support for self-determination of Cyprus. Athens also stated that it would appeal again to the United Nations if no solution were reached by January.

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2. INDONESIAN CABINET WINS CONFIDENCE VOTE

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[Redacted]

Parliamentary approval of the Indonesian cabinet on 15 November by a vote of 135 to 2 makes it likely that Prime Minister Harahap will stay in office until the new parliament elected in September is seated next spring.

Rather than face a legislative defeat, the opposition, numbering 99 deputies, chiefly of the National and Communist Parties, boycotted the 15 November session of parliament.

The National Party, if it shows markedly increased strength in the 15 December elections for a constituent assembly, may make a determined effort to unseat the cabinet before the new parliament convenes. Should election returns be about as evenly distributed as they were in the 29 September parliamentary elections, the Nationalists will probably demand only that the new parliament meet as soon as possible.

The Masjumi-led Harahap cabinet may be expected to continue a friendly policy toward the West and to implement its anticorruption and trade-improvement programs.

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**3. DIEM GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL RECOMMENDS PLACING
OF FRENCH FORCES UNDER SEATO**

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The South Vietnamese under secretary of state, in a memorandum on the withdrawal of French forces from Vietnam and the continuation of the 1954 Geneva cease-fire agreements, has recommended retention of a French Expeditionary Corps in Vietnam under the SEATO framework and continuation of French responsibilities under the armistice. If the French withdraw all their forces, however, the Vietnamese would assume responsibility for logistical and security support of the International Control Commission.

Comment

The cease-fire agreement for Vietnam places various responsibilities on the high commands in both zones. The Diem government has already indicated a readiness to assume the military responsibilities under the cease-fire agreement, but this implies no willingness to enter into political negotiations with the Viet Minh.

The French are seeking a clear-cut transferal to the Vietnamese of all responsibilities for maintaining the cease-fire.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

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[redacted] No significant military activity has occurred during the past 24 hours. Israel, however, is giving increasing evidence of irritation over incidents along the Jordan border, and is engaged in antiterrorist activity on a country-wide basis. The chairman of the Israeli-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission believes the Israelis may be planning to carry out their threat of "serious repercussions" against Jordan for the recent dynamiting of Israeli houses near the Jordan border. The Israeli chief of staff told the British ambassador that Israel expects an increase in the number of incidents on the Jordan border, and laughed in disbelief when the ambassador replied that the Arab Legion was doing its best to prevent trouble. An Israeli-inspired incident on the Jordan border appears likely.

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[redacted] major items of Soviet bloc military equipment [redacted] will have arrived in Egypt by the end of this month. [redacted]

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Press reports of 15 November from
Damascus that Syria is in the final stages of concluding an
arms purchase deal with Czechoslovakia, similar to the
Egyptian-Czech deal, may be true.

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12 Mysteres to Israel at an early date

France may deliver

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The American embassy in Rome reports
that press statements that the Egyptians had signed a con-
tract to buy 30 new Vampires are inaccurate, but that the
Saudi Arabians were trying to purchase 25 surplus Vampires
and have them reconditioned.

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In reference to British prime minister
Eden's offer to mediate the Arab-Israeli dispute, Prime Min-
ister Ben-Gurion has denounced it as promoting the "dismem-
berment" of Israel.

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A high Israeli Foreign Ministry official
in Geneva said on 14 November that Israel was determined to
bring about the downfall of Egyptian prime minister Nasr.
This statement repeats one made by Foreign Minister Sharett
on 13 October. In another statement which is probably part
of Israel's continuing psychological pressure campaign, the
official said that if Israel's demands for arms and a security
guarantee from the West are not granted, Israel intends to
trap Nasr into a fight by sending a warship up the Gulf of
Aqaba. If the Egyptians fired on it, Israel would then reply
in kind, claim Egypt was the aggressor, and demand the as-
sistance of the West.

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