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Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003300030001-1

State Dept. review completed

25X1



5 September 1957

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Copy No. 136

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 3  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
I I DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 1-4-80 REVIEWER: 

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**OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE**  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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1. AMBASSADOR THOMPSON COMMENTS ON SOVIET  
DISARMAMENT OBJECTIVES

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[REDACTED]

The USSR probably considers that the Western disarmament proposals fail to meet even minimum Soviet objectives, according to Ambassador Thompson in

Moscow. He believes the Soviet Union will not feel compelled now or in the foreseeable future to accept terms which it considers unfavorable.

Thompson thinks the USSR is less concerned than the United States about the spread of atomic capability to other states, except for West Germany. Non-orbit states are more likely than the satellites to produce or insist on receiving atomic weapons, and their possible use of such weapons against each other could be exploited by the USSR. Thompson believes, furthermore, that Moscow sees no value in the Western proposal for a cutoff of world-wide production of fissionable material as long as the United States reserves the right to station units with atomic weapons abroad and supply atomic weapons to other countries. He believes the USSR's emphasis on ending tests springs less from a desire to prevent other nations from acquiring atomic weapons than from the propaganda advantages to be gained from Western rejection of such a ban or the lessening of international tension if the West accepts.

The ambassador feels that the Western aerial inspection proposals, even if confined to the Arctic, would not only be considered costly by the USSR but would force the USSR to give up a large measure of its advantage of greater secrecy than the West can maintain. He quotes a Soviet Foreign Ministry official as saying recently that the USSR could never agree to aerial inspection as long as Western bases exist on the periphery of the Soviet bloc.

Thompson points out that the proposed armed forces levels would mean a greater reduction for the USSR than the West. The Western proposals do not satisfy important Soviet objectives of maintaining the status quo in Eastern Europe, reducing the danger of an explosion there, and diminishing the risks of local conflicts developing into major wars with atomic weapons. The USSR does not attach much importance to the prime Western objective of reducing the danger of surprise attack.

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2. NEW SOVIET NOTE REAFFIRMS USSR'S POSITION  
ON MIDDLE EAST

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The USSR's notes to the United States, Britain, and France on 3 September were probably intended to pave the way, in anticipation of the forthcoming UN General Assembly debate on the Hungarian report, for a Soviet resolution accusing the United States and its allies of aggressive acts against Middle East countries and the Soviet bloc.

The note to the United States, implicitly continuing Soviet support of the Arab states, charged that the "Eisenhower doctrine" proves American readiness to use force in the Middle East. It also attacked the Baghdad pact, British military action in Oman and Yemen, and Western interference in the internal affairs of the Arab states, as evidenced by what it termed the antigovernment plot in Syria. The USSR warned the West of "dangerous consequences" resulting from attempts to draw countries into military groupings, but suggested no specific Soviet counteraction to Western "interference" in Oman, Yemen, and Syria.

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, who asked Ambassador Thompson's reaction to the American version of the notes, insisted that a "constructive approach" was contained in the last sentence, which like the Soviet notes of 19 April called for a four-power declaration condemning the use of force and "renouncing interference in internal affairs of the Near and Middle East." Gromyko agreed with Thompson that the Middle East situation was "very delicate and difficult," but gave no suggestion of greater Soviet tractability.

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4. IRAQI CROWN PRINCE RECALLS NURI SAID

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[Redacted]

Iraqi Crown Prince Abd al-Ilah told American officials in Istanbul he feels that there must be some changes in the Iraqi cabinet if a resolute attitude is to be adopted toward Syria. The crown prince said he was requesting former prime minister Nuri Said to return to Iraq, probably to become deputy prime minister, and that he has other cabinet changes in mind.

[Redacted]

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Comment

The Iraqi cabinet headed by Ali Jawdat has followed a "soft line" toward Egypt and Syria with the ostensible objective of bringing about a rapprochement among the Arab states. King Hussayn of Jordan has complained about the weakness of Iraqi support, and Abd al-Ilah also apparently now feels that this "soft line" has not been productive.

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