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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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23 OCTOBER 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet disapproval of communes causing dissension in Chinese party. ①

Chinese leaders tell Indian Communist chief they want "proper atmosphere" before beginning border talks with Nehru. ②

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Soviet diplomat visiting Jordan; USSR offer of aid "with no strings" reported. ③



Nasir makes new effort to speed up political and economic reform in Syria. ④

Terrorist activity in Cameroun may include attacks on US and British consular installations. ⑤

Pakistan President Ayub has invited Afghan prime minister to visit Karachi and discuss settlement of differences. ⑥

LATE ITEM

Ballistic vehicle launched at Tyura Tam. ⑦

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

23 October 1959

DAILY BRIEF

SIRAB

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK

Communist China - USSR: Recently available articles from Communist China's provincial press contain the most explicit admissions to date that Soviet disapproval of the communes contributed to dissension among the rank and file in the Chinese Communist party. The articles attack as "right opportunists" party members who cite Soviet abandonment of communes in the 1920s and who say, "If other socialist countries do not have communes, we should not establish them." Khrushchev's failure to endorse even the limited concept that communes are good "for China" probably has added to difficulties the Chinese leaders are having with unconvinced party members.

(Page 1)

Communist China - India: [Mao Tse-tung on 6 October sought to provide Indian Communist party leader Ajoy Ghosh with a display of Peiping's "reasonableness" which Ghosh could use in offsetting Indian Communist party factional disputes arising out of the Sino-Indian border dispute.]

OK

Mao admitted Peiping had "made some mistakes" by continuing to publicize its extensive border claims, but he assured Ghosh the Chinese would not press the full claims in any negotiations over border outposts. Both Mao and Liu Shao-chi told Ghosh negotiations on the border could begin as soon as the "proper atmosphere" developed--suggesting the Chinese expect the Indian Government to adopt a more friendly tone in public.] Nehru said on 21 October that he had received no reply to his latest letter to Chou En-lai and commented that the Chinese did not show the same "eagerness for peace" as Khrushchev.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

ND

Jordan-Bloc: [The British ambassador in Amman is concerned about the cordial treatment King Husayn and Prime Minister Majalli are accorded the visiting Soviet ambassador to Lebanon, S. P. Kiktev, the first ranking Soviet diplomat ever to visit Jordan. Husayn has stated the Soviet ambassador offered possible military and other aid "with no strings attached." The primary Soviet objective is said to be the establishment of diplomatic relations. A Jordanian Foreign Ministry spokesman said on 18 October that the Czech ambassador in Beirut is expected to visit Jordan "next week."]

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DK

UAR: Nasir's 21 October decree giving Vice President Marshal Amir broad executive powers in Syria apparently is a move to speed up economic and political reforms. Nasir will now almost certainly try to push ahead with activation of the representative "National Union"--the UAR's sole official political party--and toward completion of a shake-up in the Syrian Army. Cairo nevertheless still faces a prolonged period of parrying popular discontent until some real progress is made, particularly in stabilizing Syria's dislocated economy.

(Page 4)

OK

Cameroun: [There are isolated acts of violence against Europeans in French-administered Cameroun, and the atmosphere is becoming more tense there and in the British Cameroons. Attacks by extremist members of the Union of the Cameroons Population (UPC) on British and American consular installations in Douala and Youandé--originally slated for 15 and 19 October--are now scheduled for 1 November.]

[The extremists presumably plan these attacks as a prelude to a new campaign of violence aimed at ousting the moderate Ahidjo government before Cameroun becomes independent on 1 January.]

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Afghanistan-Pakistan: Pakistani President Ayub has invited Afghan Prime Minister Daud to visit Pakistan to "discuss a settlement of their differences," [redacted]

[redacted] Daud has indicated willingness to make the trip if Ayub assures him he will discuss the Pushtoonistan dispute. A meeting of the two leaders might check the deterioration in relations resulting from recent heated propaganda exchanges, but it is doubtful that either side is ready to make the concessions necessary for a settlement of the difficult Pushtoonistan problem.

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III. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Outlook in East, Central, and South Africa. NIE 76-59.
20 Oct 59.

Singapore--Problems and Prospects. NIE 69-59. 20 Oct 59.

LATE ITEM

*USSR: A ballistic vehicle was launched on the Tyura Tam missile test range at about 1333 EDT on 22 October. Location of the impact area is not clear, because of conflicting evidence: 28 minutes after launch, Soviet and American elements reported visually sighting the vehicle near the Kamchatka Peninsula, [redacted]

[redacted] on the other hand, a descending vapor trail was sighted four minutes later by an American observer about 1,100 miles further down range, near three heavily instrumented Soviet ships which were addressees for the Tyura Tam countdown.

[redacted] nor to permit assessment of the mission as an ICBM test or capsule-recovery event.

23 Oct 59

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Chinese Deny Applicability of Soviet Experience With Communes

The most explicit admissions to date that Soviet disapproval of the communes contributed to dissension among the rank and file in the Chinese Communist party are contained in two recently available articles in the Chinese provincial press. A Yunnan Daily editorial on 1 September stated that some Chinese still point out that the USSR abandoned communes after a brief trial in the 1920s. Accusing these Chinese of calling for the study of Soviet experience as a pretext for criticizing the communes, the article warned that Soviet experiments must not be studied in a doctrinaire manner. The editorial argued that while it was "completely correct" for the USSR to disband its communes and "establish collective farms universally," conditions in China were different from the situation in the USSR when communes were tried there.

An article in the Szechwan Daily of 22 September quoted "right opportunist" critics in the Chinese party as stating flatly that "if other socialist countries do not have communes, we should not establish them." Deliberately avoiding any reference to Khrushchev's opposition to the communes, the article revived Stalin's statement that communes were a higher form of agricultural organization.

The resolution adopted by the Chinese central committee plenum last August, strongly reaffirming the "superiority" of the communes over the former cooperatives, is an implicit rebuke to Moscow as well as a slap at Chinese opponents of the commune program. Khrushchev's and Suslov's recent failure to endorse even the limited concept that communes are good "for China" probably has heightened Peiping's irritation and added to the difficulty the Chinese leaders are having in overcoming doubts among certain party members.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mao Seeks to Reassure Indian Communist Leader

[Mao Tse-tung on 6 October sought to provide Indian Communist party leader Ajoy Ghosh with arguments to offset criticism of Communist China, which has split the Indian Communist party on the border dispute. Admitting that Peiping had "made some mistakes" in publicizing its border claims, Mao assured Ghosh the Chinese had no intention of pressing these full claims in negotiating with the Indians to settle disputes over the location of individual border outposts along the McMahon line.]

[Mao did not abandon Communist China's claims, however, and stated it would be necessary to develop the "proper atmosphere" before any negotiations could be held. This suggestion that the Indian Government adopt a more friendly tone in public probably was intended to reach Nehru and, along with the other comments on the border, apparently was conveyed by one of the Indian Communists to the Indian ambassador in Peiping.]

[Mao praised the Indian party for efforts to "overcome nationalist feelings" and conceded that, "under certain circumstances," public endorsement of Peiping was not feasible. Seconding earlier instructions from Moscow, Mao told Ghosh the Indian party should try to "save Nehru from the rightists" and side with him for the time being. Mao's alleged assurances should provide Ghosh with powerful ammunition in subduing "nationalist" and "internationalist" extremists and restoring party discipline.]

[Nehru told the press on 21 October that he had received no reply to the letter he sent Chou En-lai three weeks ago, in which he said no negotiations could be held until China evacuates outposts it holds on the Indian side of the "traditional" frontier. His comment that the Chinese did not show the same "eagerness for peace" as Khrushchev apparently was designed to bolster his theory that Peiping and Moscow are at odds over relations with India.]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Jordanians Give Cordial Reception to Soviet Diplomat

[Soviet Ambassador to Lebanon S. P. Kiktev has proposed to King Husayn that Jordan consider accepting possible military and economic aid from the USSR "with no strings attached,"]

[The King reportedly said Kiktev seemed principally interested in the establishment of Soviet-Jordanian relations, and had suggested that Husayn follow the example of Afghanistan, which continues as a monarchy and receives assistance from both the West and the USSR, including Soviet military aid.]

[British Ambassador Johnston in Amman is concerned over the cordial treatment being accorded Kiktev by the Jordanian Government. Neither Husayn nor Prime Minister Majalli has given any information directly to the British or American ambassador about the discussions with Kiktev.]

[Husayn, who is said to be discouraged and perplexed by Western hesitance regarding future aid commitments to Jordan, probably would like to explore the Soviet offer, although he also presumably is wary of offending Great Britain and the United States by accepting it. He and Majalli may fear that a Western-Soviet rapprochement might result in reductions in Western aid to Jordan which at some future time could, if necessary, be replaced by Soviet assistance.]

[A Jordanian Foreign Ministry spokesman said on 18 October that the Czech ambassador in Beirut is expected to visit Jordan "next week."]

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UAR Vice President Given Full Powers in Syria

UAR Vice President Amir has been made virtual viceroy of the Syrian Region of the UAR in an apparent effort by Nasir to speed up urgently needed economic and political reforms. The Syrian executive council, which includes all cabinet members for the northern region of the UAR, has been made directly responsible to Amir, and the first session under his guidance has been called for 24 October.

Amir will probably lay before the council a blueprint for carrying out Nasir's long-promised program for rescuing the stagnating Syrian economy--dislocated by drought and the consequences of union with Egypt last year. Amir will probably also supervise the completion of purging the First (Syrian) Army of its various dissident elements.

There has so far been no mention of personnel changes in the Syrian ministries, except for giving Interior Minister Abd al-Hamid Sarraj the additional post of minister of propaganda and news, formerly held by the recently discharged Baathist, Riyad al-Malki.

Amir will probably follow through quickly with Nasir's plans for giving the Syrians at least a semblance of local autonomy by formation of local and provincial committees composed of individuals elected last July to the UAR's only legal political party, the National Union. Such a move, particularly if followed soon by selection of Syrians to participate in a UAR national assembly, should do much to forestall clandestine political party activity and mollify Syrian public discontent over Egyptian hegemony.

The regime, however, will continue to face popular resentment of its restrictions on the once free Syrian economy. Cairo's grandiose plans for industrialization probably will not yield significant benefits for several years, and the prospects of a satisfactory agricultural comeback next year are not bright.

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Terrorism in Cameroun

[Sporadic acts of violence by extremist members of the outlawed nationalist movement, the Union of the Cameroons Population (UPC), are reported to be increasing in frequency both in the French-administered territory of Cameroun and in British Cameroons. Four isolated attacks were made against lone Europeans in Cameroun by UPC terrorists between 15 and 20 October. During this period French forces are reported to have captured 10 Czech automatic pistols and 1,200 rounds of 7.62 ammunition. These attacks on Europeans may have precipitated what appears to have been a counter-terrorist raid on 19 October by a group of 20 Africans and 14 Europeans against UPC supporters in British Cameroons.]

[Local British authorities, disturbed over these raids, are reported to be reinforcing their border police with two Nigerian infantry companies. In addition, two Nigerian gunboats are patrolling the coastal waters of the border area to prevent a movement of forces by sea.]

[attacks by UPC extremists on British and American consular installations in Douala and Yaoundé--originally slated for 15 and 19 October--are now scheduled for 1 November. The terrorists presumably plan these attacks, which allegedly include assassinating the American consul general in Yaoundé and the British vice consul in Douala, as a prelude to a new campaign of violence aimed at ousting the moderate government of Premier Ahidjo and forcing new elections in Cameroun before it becomes independent on 1 January 1960.]

[The UPC's capabilities probably are limited to increased guerrilla-type activity, unless it receives significant outside support. Ghana, Guinea, the UAR, and the Communist bloc have provided the UPC with some limited support,]

[but the movement continues to suffer from lack of good leadership, administration, and logistical support.]

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Afghan and Pakistani Leaders May Meet to Discuss
Pushtoonistan Dispute

Pakistani President Ayub has invited Afghan Prime Minister Daud to visit Pakistan to "discuss a settlement of differences." Ayub's invitation, extended on 19 October, is his first conciliatory gesture to the Afghans. After he took power in October 1958, Ayub generally ignored Kabul's Pushtoonistan propaganda, which became increasingly violent. Since early September, however, Pakistan has been retaliating with its own propaganda offensive.

Daud has said he is willing to go to Pakistan if assured that the Pushtoonistan dispute will be the subject of discussion. He has suggested, however, that his brother, Foreign Minister Naim, might first talk with Ayub and learn whether conditions seem favorable to a solution of this problem. Daud probably does not want to return home from a trip to Pakistan with nothing to show for his trouble; if he should feel that Ayub had used a meeting for propaganda purposes, his own Pushtoonistan propaganda would probably become still more violent.

The willingness of both leaders to meet suggests they may desire to halt the deterioration in relations resulting from heated propaganda exchanges. It is doubtful, however, that either side is ready to make sufficient concessions to secure a lasting settlement. [redacted]

[redacted]

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The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

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