


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Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800010001-9

CONTENTS

- ✓ 1. TOP-LEVEL SOVIET DELEGATION IN WARSAW
25X1A [REDACTED]

- ✓ 2. CHINESE COMMUNIST REMARKS ON SOVIET-POLISH
RELATIONS [REDACTED]

25X1A

- ✓ 3. POLE PREDICTS TWO-PARTY SYSTEM IN POLAND

25X1 [REDACTED]

- ✓ 5. JAPAN AND THE USSR RESTORE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
25X1A [REDACTED]

- ✓ 6. BONN ANNOUNCES NATO FORCE GOALS FOR 1956 WILL
NOT BE MET [REDACTED]

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25X1 [REDACTED]

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

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1. TOP-LEVEL SOVIET DELEGATION IN WARSAW

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A TASS communique issued in Moscow early on 20 October confirms that Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Molotov and Kaganovich arrived in Warsaw on 19 October to carry on discussions with leading members of

the Polish Workers' (Communist) Party. The communique stated that Wladyslaw Gomulka, purged in 1948 for "Titoism" and just reinstated in the central committee, attended the discussions. The statement gave no indication that the four Soviet presidium members are participating in the work of the plenum of the Polish party central committee now in session.

According to the communique, a delegation of the Polish politburo will "shortly" go to Moscow to discuss political and economic questions with the Soviet leaders. The fact that Poland will send such a delegation to Moscow for additional talks suggests that Soviet policy toward Poland and the other Satellites is still being formulated. Pending a decision on this policy, the Soviet leaders can be expected to make a strong effort to prevent the Polish plenum from taking further public steps confirming the present trend toward internal democratization and independence from Moscow.

The noncommittal tone of the communique and an unusual reference to the atmosphere of "outspokenness" in the talks suggest that there remain divergent views between the Polish and Soviet leaders. The high level of the Soviet delegation is probably intended to impress the Poles with the unity of the Soviet leadership at a time of basic readjustment in Soviet-Satellite relations.

25X1A

20 Oct 56

Current Intelligence Bulletin
25X1A

Page 3

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800010001-9

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800010001-9

2. CHINESE COMMUNIST REMARKS ON SOVIET-POLISH RELATIONS

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The New York Times correspondent in Warsaw is convinced of the authenticity of the report given him by two members of the Polish party's central committee that the Chinese Communists have assured Polish party leader Ochab of their support for Polish "independence." The American embassy in Warsaw is also inclined to believe the account.

The correspondent states that it was Chou En-lai, not Mao Tse-tung, as originally reported in the Times, who gave the assurances to Ochab on his trip to Peiping last month. Chou is said to have declared that he understood the Polish desire for independence and that "Poland should not be dictated to by the Kremlin."

Comment

In making these remarks, Chou did not necessarily intend to question Soviet policy toward the Satellites. His remarks are consistent with the Chinese understanding of Soviet policy pronouncements on "independent roads to socialism!"

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800010001-9

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800010001-9

25X1A

3. POLE PREDICTS TWO-PARTY SYSTEM IN POLAND

Julian Hochfeld, a former Socialist who is now a member of the Polish United Workers (Communist) Party and the Sejm (parliament), recently told a small group at London University that he envisaged the establishment soon of a two-party system in Poland. He said the "opposition" party would be made up of social democrats or groups inspired by social democratic traditions. When asked whether the Russians would give permission to a two-party system for Poland, he replied, "We shall not ask Khrushchev."

In discussing Poland's economic situation, Hochfeld also said, "We shall approach the United States for economic aid. . . ." In other comments, he maintained that the Russians "could not put the clock back" in Poland and that great progress would be made under Gomulka. He stressed that workers' councils along the lines of Yugoslav experiments would be established.

Comment	Hochfeld is expressing the views of a significant segment of those elements within the Communist party who favor liberalization. Hochfeld recently distinguished himself before the Sejm with outspoken criticism of the regime for blaming past excesses on individuals rather than the system.
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Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800010001-9

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA RDP79T00975A002800010001-9

5. JAPAN AND THE USSR RESTORE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

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The declaration restoring diplomatic relations between Japan and the USSR, signed by Prime Minister Hatoyama and Premier Bulganin on 19 October,

seems certain to receive Diet approval and probably will be acceptable to most Japanese. The Soviet pledge to return Shikotan and the Habomai Islands when a peace treaty is concluded and to continue discussions on the status of the southern Kurils will probably placate irredentist sentiment critical of the agreement and prevent a serious division in the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party. The present agreement, however, does not remove a major obstacle to concluding a peace treaty, since the USSR may continue to make the return of Shikotan and the Habomai Islands contingent on Japanese recognition of Soviet sovereignty over Sakhalin and the Kurils.

Disappointment over failure to gain the immediate return of the territories will be largely overcome by promises of Soviet support for Japan's admission to the UN--which the Japanese delegation has stated is unconditional--the early repatriation of Soviet-held Japanese prisoners, the assurance that the fishery pacts will be implemented, and optimistic projections of Japanese-Soviet trade.

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The USSR will probably increase its economic, cultural and political overtures toward Japan and intensify its campaign for the withdrawal of American forces and for a neutral Japan. As Japanese detainees are released, Communist propaganda can be expected to contrast this with the continued imprisonment of American-convicted war criminals.

20 Oct 56

Current Intelligence Bulletin 25X1A Page 7

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800010001-9

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800010001-9

6. BONN ANNOUNCES NATO FORCE GOALS FOR 1956 WILL NOT BE MET

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The West German government has announced that it will not meet the NATO force goals for 1956. Germany's submission to the NATO annual review will be amended at the next NATO council meeting. The Bonn government has blamed the Western allies for this situation, charging that they have not released barracks as originally planned.

The embassy says the source of the difficulty is the failure of the Refugee Ministry to relinquish occupied barracks and administrative delays in starting new construction.

Comment

These modifications in Bonn's defense effort are designed to win support for Adenauer in the 1957 election in face of the unpopularity of the rearmament program.

Adenauer continues to maintain that the total German force goal of 500,000 will not be affected by these changes. Citing the alleged barracks shortage, the Defense Ministry has halted the recruiting of volunteers.

20 Oct 56

Current Intelligence Bulletin 25X1A Page 8

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800010001-9

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800010001-9

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800010001-9