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SECURITY INFORMATION~~

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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## SOVIET UNION

1. Moscow Embassy comments on Soviet governmental reorganization:

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The American Embassy in Moscow believes that the centralization of the new government in the hands of Malenkov and four other experienced leaders has created what may be

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the best balance among the top Soviet leaders. This does not necessarily mean, however, that possible differences are permanently settled. The primary task has been one of filling the power vacuum and presenting an immediate appearance of unity.

The organizational changes in strategic industries are viewed as an attempt to intensify control over the Soviet war potential. No change in Soviet foreign policy is expected.

The Embassy points to the possibility that Mao Tse-tung may be less amenable to direction by a group which has yet to prove its ability to survive. Mao's importance has been clearly recognized in the special attention accorded the Chinese over all other Communist associates during the Stalin obsequies.

2. USSR reinforces air strength in Eastern Europe:

[redacted] [redacted] a fighter division was recently transferred from the western USSR, possibly Minsk, to the 59th AIR ARMY in Hungary and is now based near Budapest. Between 16 and 22 January advance elements apparently moved to a new base about 30 miles west of Budapest; group flights from the USSR noted in late February and early March probably represent the ferrying of division aircraft.

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Comment: This forward displacement follows recent Soviet measures effecting close coordination among Soviet and Satellite Air Forces in Eastern and Western Europe.

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Soviet air strength in Hungary had previously included one jet-equipped fighter division, with an authorized strength of 111 tactical aircraft.

#### NEAR EAST - AFRICA

3. Mossadeq asks removal of Point IV personnel from Caspian area:

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Prime Minister Mossadeq has asked Ambassador Henderson to withdraw American Point IV personnel from the Caspian area within four or five weeks. The Soviet personnel reportedly have not yet been withdrawn from the fisheries, and Mossadeq argued that they will refuse to leave as long as Americans are there.

Henderson believes that under the circumstances, the Americans should be transferred to other parts of Iran, possibly to return to the Caspian area later.

Comment: As recently as 4 March, Mossadeq told Henderson that the Soviet Union had again complained about Point IV activities in northern Iran.

The Prime Minister has been under increasing pressure to implement his internal reform program and recently suggested that Point IV be taken over by the Iranian Government. The request to remove American personnel may be a step in that direction.

#### EASTERN EUROPE

4. Yugoslavia would rebuff any Soviet overtures:

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Edvard Kardelj, second ranking Yugoslav Communist, told Ambassador Allen on 6 March that Yugoslavia would rebuff any

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overture the Soviet Union might now make. He said that the Yugoslav quarrel was not with Stalin personally, but with the "bureaucratic, dictatorial system" and as long as that system continued, there was no possibility of a change in the Yugoslav attitude.

**Comment:** Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet Union came about through a distinct clash in national interests. Kardelj's statement supports previous estimates that the Yugoslav Communists would not seek a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

**5. Yugoslavia to abandon collective farms:**

Milovan Djilas, a top-level Yugoslav Communist, has informed Ambassador Allen that his government is now drafting a decree, to be effective before the spring planting,

which would permit all peasants to withdraw their land and all personal property from collectives. He admitted that most peasants would leave the collectives.

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**Comment:** The dissolution of a vast majority of the existing collectives, which have been admittedly inefficient and account for only 20 percent of the country's agricultural production, would probably be a prelude to the introduction of a new agricultural system designed to conform with the regime's program of decentralization and industrial self-management.

Last year at this time, the regime was waging a concerted campaign to keep the peasants from exercising a legal right to withdraw from the collectives after a three-year period.

## WESTERN EUROPE

**6. Comment on effect of Italian decision to postpone EDC ratification:**

The decision of the Italian Government to postpone parliamentary consideration of the EDC treaty until the second

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half of 1953 adds another complication to those already obstructing creation of a European Army.

The French, West German, and Benelux governments are holding back from final ratification primarily because of other problems, including the French protocols. There will now be an increasing disinclination to press for early action because of this delay on the part of one of the most zealous proponents of European integration.

Indications had been increasing that Premier de Gasperi would not introduce the controversial EDC measure into parliament before this spring's national elections, despite promises to the contrary. He had also told American representatives several times that it would be difficult to secure EDC ratification unless the Trieste problem was solved.

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