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## 1. CLOSER SOVIET-AFGHAN RELATIONS PROBABLE RESULT OF TRIBAL ASSEMBLY

Afghan prime minister Daud has been strengthened and has been given considerable freedom in foreign policy by the Grand Assembly of the Tribes, which ended in Kabul on 20 November.

The assembly approved Daud's demands for independence of the Pushtoon areas of Pakistan and advised the government to strengthen national defense "by any possible ways and means" with any material which is "honorably procurable." Since American military aid to Pakistan was blamed for upsetting the balance of power between the two countries, approval was implied for Daud to obtain support from the Soviet bloc.

Some assembly objections to receiving weapons from the Soviet bloc were silenced by references to arms negotiations with the bloc by Moslem Egypt and the Saudi Arabian "custodians of the holy places." King Zahir Shah apparently did not make effective use of President Eisenhower's letter offering assistance in reconciling Afghan-Pakistani differences and thus failed to check Daud's Soviet-oriented proposals.

Encouraged by the assembly's vote of confidence and the recently reported arrival in Kabul of 235 truckloads of Czech automatic weapons, ammunition, and grenades, Daud may make a final attempt to bargain with the West. If not immediately successful, he is likely to extend his negotiations with the Soviet bloc.

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## 2. EXECUTION OF GEORGIAN POLICE OFFICIALS

The execution of six and imprisonment of two former security officials of the Georgian Republic appear to be another step in the discrediting of the extralegal and arbitrary use of police power which characterized the Stalin regime and was epitomized by L. P. Beria. Soviet prosecutor-general Rudenko conducted the prosecution, thus lending Kremlin authority to the proceedings. The accused were charged with helping Beria and using illegal prosecution methods.

Of the eight men involved, the most prominent were former Georgian security chiefs A. N. Rapava and N. M. Rukhadze. Rapava appears to have been a protégé of Beria, but Rukhadze has long been considered one of the leaders of an anti-Beria faction in Georgia. Rukhadze was removed in June 1952 and Rapava in July 1953. Thus it would appear that the linking of these people to Beria was a pretext to try them publicly. The trial may have been intended only as a warning to the police and as reassurance to the populace that present emphasis on legality will continue.

On the other hand, such a trial could have the effect of reminding Soviet citizens as well as high officials that individuals found guilty of serious political crimes will still be executed. [redacted]

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### 3. BRAZILIAN CONGRESS BLOCKS CAFE'S RETURN TO PRESIDENCY

The Brazilian Congress' resolution of 22 November against Joao Café Filho's resumption of office, not made under the constitutional provision for impeachment,

represented the legislature's insistence that the leave of absence granted the president for reasons of health on 8 November should be continued. Support for the resolution from two parties which opposed President-elect Kubitschek in the 3 October election probably indicates a widespread desire in Brazil for an end to the uncertainties which have surrounded the presidency in the past two weeks.

Those opposing the inauguration of Kubitschek next January may move to contest the constitutionality of Congress' resolution before the Federal Supreme Court.

Congress' insistence on retaining Acting President Nereu Ramos in office has the support of War Minister General Lott and probably the dominant group in the armed forces, although the navy and the air force are reportedly giving only grudging support.

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#### 4. BRITAIN PROPOSES NEW FORMULA FOR CYPRUS

[Redacted] [Redacted]  
London is seeking Cypriot and Greek acceptance of a new formula for Cyprus under which Britain would offer to grant a wide measure of self-government now, and to consider self-determination when self-governing institutions have been proved capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the Cypriot community. Britain has indicated, however, that any ultimate self-determination would have to take into consideration not only the wishes of the Cypriots, but the strategic interests of parties to Eastern Mediterranean defense treaties.

The proposed formula shows the desire of the British to re-establish law and order by interesting the Cypriots in self-government. The proposal to postpone discussion of the colony's future, however, suggests that the British see no possibility of an immediate solution of the dispute. This is in part due to the unwillingness of the British military to jeopardize further the security of their Middle East headquarters being established on Cyprus. London, moreover, is aware that Turkey remains implacably opposed to any change in the status of Cyprus.

Neither the Greek government nor Cypriot nationalist leader Archbishop Makarios is likely to agree to Britain's proposal. Acceptance now would probably lead to the defeat of the Karamanlis government in the Greek national elections next spring. Similarly, Makarios would probably forfeit leadership of the Cypriot enosis movement if he agreed to any proposal that failed to promise early self-determination.

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## 5. JAPANESE DIPLOMATS FORESEE FULL RECOGNITION FOR COMMUNIST CHINA IN 1957

[redacted] Participants at a recent conference of Japanese diplomats in Bangkok agreed that Communist China would be admitted to the United Nations by the spring of 1957 and would gain full recognition later that year, [redacted]

The conferees agreed that in view of this probability, the strategic value of Taiwan and the importance of keeping it from Communist China should be emphasized, and the status of the Chiang Kai-shek regime de-emphasized.

The Japanese officials showed concern over the fact that the Chinese were shipping large quantities of inferior but cheap goods to Southeast Asia, and that this was posing a serious threat to a market vital to Japan.

Comment              Long-standing Japanese policy has envisaged the eventual recognition of Communist China and the relegation of the Chinese Nationalist government to a relatively minor role in international affairs. Tokyo, however, has tended previously to avoid involvement in the problem.

At the Bandung conference last April, the Chinese Communists declared that neighboring countries could now be supplied with Chinese machinery. No machinery is known to have arrived as yet, but large quantities of consumer goods from Communist China have appeared on the market during 1955. (Concurred in by ORR)

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## 6. EAST PAKISTAN POLICE STRIKE

[redacted] Five hundred local police who began a strike in Dacca, capital of East Pakistan, on 21 November, have been arrested by the East Pakistan Rifles, the province's special security police unit, [redacted] The army's 14th Division, which is stationed in East Pakistan, has been called out by the civil administration to take over the Rifles' normal duties while they engage in street patrol. An additional battalion of troops is moving to Dacca from another city.

The general officer commanding the division feels the situation can be handled if the East Pakistan Rifles remain loyal.

**Comment** The police strike, ostensibly for higher pay, expresses the growing demoralization of the police force and climaxes a week of popular unrest over rice and salt shortages. It may have been encouraged by several hundred political agitators, many of them Communists, who were released last month by the United Front chief minister of the province.

A recent request from the army commander in chief for transfer of the East Pakistan Rifles to his control indicated that there is some doubt as to the 3,000-man unit's loyalty, but changes in its officers may have remedied this danger.

The police strike follows three months of degeneration of political stability in East Pakistan and directly challenges the central government. While Karachi will probably be able to weather the crisis by a judicious mixture of strength and concessions, its freedom of action will be limited by the fact that the central government depends for its survival on the United Front Party, which is deeply entrenched in East Pakistan and will probably oppose any attempt by Karachi to take over direct control of the province. [redacted]

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## THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION (Information as of 1700, 22 November)

New incidents continue to occur on both the Israeli-Egyptian and Israeli-Jordanian borders. The Israeli radio noted on 21 November that terrorist attacks, which it called "part of an organized campaign of guerrilla war," have occurred with "disturbing regularity" since 5 November.

Such a series of incidents has been followed in the past by an Israeli "retaliatory" raid, and there is no reason to believe that Israel's policy in this respect has changed. As yet the massing of Israeli reserve forces which usually precedes a raid against Egypt has not been reported. A raid against Jordan, however, might not involve extensive troop movements.