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14 March 1951

[redacted]  
Copy No. C1-9

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

#33

DOCUMENT NO.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X

DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: T3 S

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: MR 70-2

DATE: 12-15-79

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[redacted] 3.5(c)

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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## GENERAL

## 1. Schuman analyzes Soviet strategy regarding Germany:

[redacted] On 26 February French Foreign Minister Schuman expressed the view that the purpose of present Soviet strategy with regard to Germany is to restore the quadripartite ar-

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rangements which the USSR abandoned in 1948. If this could be accomplished, the USSR could retain control of its zone and also prevent the integration of Western Germany into Western Europe. Schuman believes that the USSR cannot agree to a peace treaty and the withdrawal of occupation forces (which would free East Germany from Soviet control), and that it is turning, therefore, to the formula of a provisional government for a reunited Germany, presented as the first step toward a peace treaty. Once a provisional government is established and plans for German participation in NATO abandoned, the peace treaty could be indefinitely delayed. Since this would put the Soviet Government in a position to assert quadripartite control over the German government, it could then accept even the Western requirement for free elections. Schuman concludes, therefore, that the German question cannot be considered separately from other European problems and that French policy must not abandon its emphasis on the continued participation in a suitable European framework of any German government resulting from free elections. Schuman noted that "we cannot go back to formulas of quadripartite control at a time when we are progressively giving up tripartite control."

Comment: The first point of a Council of Foreign Ministers agenda proposed by Soviet Deputy Gromyko called for discussion of "fulfillment by the four powers of the Potsdam Agreement regarding the demilitarization of Germany and prohibition of the remilitarization of Germany." If the Potsdam Agreement were utilized as a basis for regulating German military affairs, it would imply in itself at least a partial restoration of quadripartite controls, a situation of greater advantage to the Soviet Union than to the Western powers.

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**2. UK and French delegations anxious for Foreign Ministers' Conference:**

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At a tripartite meeting of the US, UK, and French delegations to the Deputy Foreign Ministers' Conference in Paris, the Chief of the UK delegation, supported by the French, appealed strongly for doing everything possible, "excluding appeasement or the acceptance of the Soviet agenda," to insure the holding of a Foreign Ministers' Conference in an effort to buy time and avert war. The chiefs of the UK and French delegations admitted that they wanted "to make it easier" for Gromyko to seek revised instructions and for Moscow to accept the Western delegations' agenda proposal, and insisted on agreeing to "demilitarization of Germany" as an item in the revised agenda proposal.

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Ambassador Jessup anticipates that meetings will continue for some time while the Soviets wait for a break in the Western position. He believes that the situation is still in hand, but that if the apparent stalemate continues it might be difficult to keep the French and British from urging concessions that would be unacceptable to the US.

Comment: French and British public opinion expects that a Foreign Ministers' Conference will be held, and both governments are under considerable pressure to explore every avenue to this end, regardless of the chances for reaching a modus vivendi at such a conference. These governments are not inclined to believe that concessions regarding the agenda would necessarily prejudice the Western position at the final conference.


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**FAR EAST****4. Communist ground forces building up behind central sector in Korea:**

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Comment: It is evident that enemy forces are engaged in important activity behind the front lines in the Kumhwa-Chorwon area. The Chinese Communist 24th, 26th and 37th Armies, have been in the area for three weeks. It is possible that this concentration includes other Chinese units, as well as three unlocated divisions of the North Korean VII Corps.

The enemy concentration is in position to launch an offensive down the corridors of central Korea, with the objective of capturing the key UN defense point of Chungju.

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## EASTERN EUROPE

## 5. Internal tension mounting in Albania:



The French Minister in Tirana reports  
that since November 1950 Albanian officials  
have progressively yielded control to  
"Soviet specialists," whose numbers have

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increased daily. The Minister regards the adoption of Soviet-inspired laws for the reorganization of industry and agriculture as a tacit admission of the partial failure of the two year plan--which he believes is also responsible for the recent dropping of two young Communist militants from the cabinet.

According to the Minister, increasing aerial violations of Albanian territory and the discovery of a well-organized, well-supplied underground have given Albanian leaders concern for the internal solidarity of their regime. They have appealed to the police and the courts to intensify the prosecution of "enemies of the people" and have enacted further repressive decrees. In addition, the Albanian press and radio are making daily announcements of aggressive preparations on the part of Yugoslavia and Greece, apparently in order to justify overt Soviet control over Albania and to rally the people by appealing to their patriotic sentiments.

Comment: The French Minister in Tirana has reportedly noted previously a sharp increase in the number of Soviet civilian and military personnel in Albania, including Soviet air and armored force officers. A reported bombing attack by two Albanians on the Soviet Legation in Tirana on 19 February indicates active opposition and resistance to Soviet domination.

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