

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.3(h)(2)

17 August 1960

Copy No. CEd-5

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 41
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 9 JUN 1980 REVIEWER:

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with representatives of departments and agencies of the United States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable, the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk. Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including [redacted]

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

~~SECRET~~

17 AUGUST 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

North Korean federation proposal is move
to take propaganda initiative from Seoul. ①


Chinese Communist delegation offends
Japanese; may hinder Japanese overtures
to Peiping. ②

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Congo--Hammarskjold to seek Security
Council backing in dispute with Lumumba. ③

Jordan--King Husayn believes prospects
fair for anti-Nasir coup in Syria; now
more inclined to aid plotters. ④

Iraq--New arrest of conspirators is fur-
ther evidence of erosion of Qasim's posi-
tion. ⑤



LATE ITEM

⑥ The situation in Laos.

⑦ South Korean Assembly rejects Kim
To-yun for prime minister.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

17 August 1960

SIRAB

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

North Korea - South Korea: Premier Kim Il-sung on 14 August proposed a loose federation of North and South Korea in an apparent effort to take the propaganda initiative from the new South Korean regime, which has indicated support for UN-supervised elections to reunify the peninsula. Khrushchev can be expected to dramatize Communist proposals for a Korean settlement when he visits Pyongyang in early October. The Communists will attempt to use South Korea's rejection of the federation idea as grounds for charges that Seoul is responsible for the continued division of Korea.

(Page 1)

OK

Communist China - Japan: Chinese Communist party officials who have just concluded a visit to Tokyo reportedly told the Japanese that Peiping will not automatically equate the Ikeda government with the Kishi regime. They made it clear that Communist China's future attitude will depend on Ikeda's moves toward meeting Communist China's conditions for normalization of relations--that Tokyo agree to government-to-government contacts and stop supporting the "two Chinas" concept. The behavior of the Chinese Communist delegation during its visit antagonized the Japanese and may have temporarily discouraged possible Japanese overtures for improving relations.

OK

II. ASIA-AFRICA

The Congo: Secretary General Hammarskjold, who has rebuffed Lumumba's demand for withdrawal of non-African UN contingents from the Congo, is calling an early meeting of the Security Council. He is expected to request a council ruling

^{OIC}
delete #
1, P 2, +
2nd sent
in P 4

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

concerning his opinion that the UN force cannot be used on Lumumba's behalf to subdue Katanga. The action by Leopoldville police on 16 August in detaining for investigation several hundred Europeans--including UN personnel--suggests that as he develops his own police force Lumumba may attempt even greater harassments in dealing with the UN and his political opponents. Later on the 16th Lumumba decreed martial law over the entire country for a period of six months.

(Page 2)

Jordan-Syria: [King Husayn on 14 August expressed the belief that prospects for a successful anti-Nasir army coup in Syria are "fair," and he now appears more inclined to support the plotters. The Jordanian defense minister has recently been in touch with a leader of the conspiracy in Beirut who reportedly said the situation could "become suitable for action very soon." Meanwhile, the UAR and Jordan are continuing their intensive propaganda warfare involving charges and countercharges of plotting against each other.]

(Page 3)

Iraq: The Qasim regime reportedly has uncovered another conspiracy and arrested, among other officers, the commander of the 4th Armored Division and the flying wing commander at the Habbaniyah air base. This evidence of continued plotting coincides with other suggestions of widespread disillusionment with the Qasim regime. Qasim's position is gradually eroding, despite the slackening of overt UAR attacks on him.

(Page 4)

LATE ITEMS

*Laos: [A ranking member of General Phoumi's "counterrevolutionary group" claims that King Savang is secretly in sympathy with the group's plans to suppress the revolt led by Kong Le. Phoumi's plan to retake Vientiane is said to involve a coordinated attack by air-dropped paratroopers and by ground forces, including some infantry already being transported by river craft from Luang Prabang.]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[Preparations for an operation of this scope would take a considerable length of time and its execution would require outside logistic and air transport support. Meanwhile, Captain Kong Le gives evidence of harboring political ambitions of his own and of considering the newly formed Souvanna Phouma government to be merely a way station to some other type of regime. Souvanna has admitted that his government is a provisional one intended to last only until "peace" is restored throughout the country. Aside from Souvanna, the government is made up largely of second-rate officials.]

(Page 5)

*South Korea: Newly elected South Korean President Yun probably will nominate former Vice President Chang Myon for prime minister following the House of Representatives' rejection of Kim To-yun, the President's first selection for the post. However, the narrow margin of Kim's defeat--three votes less than the simple majority necessary for confirmation--suggests that a government headed by Chang would have tenuous support. Chang, titular chief of the majority Democratic party, controls a little less than half of his party's two-thirds majority in the powerful 233-seat lower house. 6K

(Page 7)

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Kim Il-sung Calls for Federation of North and South Korea

Keynoting a "liberation day" celebration in Pyongyang, North Korean Premier Kim Il-sung on 14 August attempted to take the propaganda initiative on Korean reunification from the new South Korean Government, which has indicated support for UN-supervised peninsula-wide elections.

Kim called for elections "without outside intervention" and suggested an interim North-South federation in which a "supreme national committee" with representatives from both sides would work out economic and cultural cooperation. Such cooperation, Kim said, would help to solve South Korea's "economic catastrophe." Kim also suggested that North and South Korea each reduce its troop strength to "100,000 or less." Implicit in the premier's speech was Pyongyang's usual insistence on withdrawal of US forces from South Korea before "peaceful unification" can be achieved.

A South Korean Democratic party spokesman has publicly rejected the North Korean proposal, and on 15 August acting Prime Minister Huh Chung termed it "another rehash of a worn-out propaganda tactic." Pyongyang probably now will attempt to exploit this rejection in efforts to make Seoul appear responsible for continued division of Korea.

Khrushchev, who has accepted an invitation to visit Pyongyang in early October, can be expected to provide dramatic publicity on Communist proposals for a Korean settlement. He also may use this visit to amplify Moscow's position in the current Sino-Soviet dispute, just before a high-level meeting of Communist parties which may be held in Moscow in conjunction with the USSR's Bolshevik Revolution celebration. [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~The Situation in the Congo

Secretary General Hammarskjold, who has rebuffed Lumumba's demand for the withdrawal of non-African UN contingents from the Congo, is calling an early meeting of the Security Council. [He has indicated that should Lumumba formally request the withdrawal of non-African contingents he would recommend the withdrawal of the UN force in its entirety.]

[Hammarskjold has interpreted the UN resolution of 9 August as meaning that the UN command in the Congo could not be used on behalf of the central government, as in any move to subdue Katanga. He will request a ruling on this interpretation at the Security Council meeting.]

The action by the Leopoldville police on 16 August in detaining for investigation several hundred Europeans--including UN personnel--suggests that as he develops his own security forces Lumumba will increase his harassment of both the UN and his political opponents. An estimated 400 to 500 Europeans were detained for document checks after Lumumba charged that Belgian officials still in Leopoldville were avoiding arrest by wearing UN arm bands.

Meanwhile, Ghanaian President Nkrumah--who together with Guinea's Sékou Touré has warmly supported Lumumba's cause--may be moving to dissociate himself somewhat from Lumumba's extreme position regarding Katanga. [On 13 August, Nkrumah indicated [redacted] that his earlier offer of Ghanaian troops to Lumumba had been a "political move" and would not be followed up.] According to Ghana radio, Nkrumah is giving "active consideration" to an invitation from President Tshombé to visit Katanga and see conditions there. In Monrovia, President Tubman has stated that Nkrumah now agrees with him that an African "summit" meeting scheduled for Leopoldville from 25 to 30 August is not required, and that any meeting there could be held on the ministerial level.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~King Husayn Sees Chance for Anti-Nasir Move by Syrian ArmyKing Husayn

[King Husayn] was optimistic about prospects for an anti-Nasir army coup in Syria. As a result he seems more inclined to support the plotters, although a firm Jordanian commitment apparently has not yet been given. The plotting group has asked Jordan for a "small amount" of financial support and for immediate recognition of the post-coup government in Syria, which might imply Jordanian military support in the event of outside intervention. The group also reportedly asked Husayn to seek American support for the conspiracy.]

[Husayn's assessment is based on information recently obtained by Jordanian Defense Minister Wasfi Mirza, whom the King sent to Beirut for a meeting with retired Syrian Army Colonel Khalid Jadah, head of the conspiracy's planning group. Jadah is quoted as saying the situation in Syria "could become suitable for action very soon." According to an earlier report from Beirut, the plotters planned to begin their action by assassinating Nasir and attacking other key individuals and pre-assigned targets. Their original assumption was that Nasir would open the Damascus trade fair on 15 August, affording them their opportunity. The conspiracy allegedly involves key Syrian Army elements, including the Qatana garrison near Damascus, and a civilian group headed by five unnamed UAR ministers--presumably from the Syrian region.]

[Meanwhile, the UAR and Jordan are continuing their intensive propaganda warfare, each accusing the other of subversive plots. Radios in both countries have broadcast appeals for rebellion in the other, and UAR transmitters are publicizing and belittling a press report from Amman that Husayn is organizing a free Syrian army to "liberate" Syria. Damascus radio also claims that Jordan is attempting to jam Cairo newscasts and political commentaries.]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~Unrest and Plotting Continue in Iraq

The reported arrest on 13 August of Major General Sadiq Ismail Hasan, commander of the 4th Armored Division at Habbaniyah, along with some of his staff officers and Lt. Col. Arif Abd al-Razzaq, flying wing commander at Habbaniyah air base, emphasizes the continued erosion of Prime Minister Qasim's prestige. Abd al-Razzaq was a leader in a revolutionary organization which was supported by the UAR and was planning to overthrow the Qasim regime,

King Husayn may have revealed the conspiracy to Qasim in order to undermine Nasir.

Although overt UAR attacks on the Qasim regime have diminished, a number of Baathists left Iraq in early August to receive military training in the Syrian region.

Senior Iraqi military officers are dissatisfied with Qasim, but their resources appear to be so fragmented and they so divided on the question of a successor regime that a successful move against him in the near future appears unpromising. The arrest of the subversive group at Habbaniyah is likely to make other disaffected elements increasingly cautious.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Situation in Laos

King Savang is now secretly in sympathy with General Phoumi's plans to suppress the revolt led by Kong Le. Khamphan also claimed that nine of the 14 members of the Somsanith government, excluding the ex-prime minister, are members of Phoumi's "counterrevolutionary group." Other reports indicate that the King's acceptance of the Somsanith government's resignation on 14 August and his designation of Souvanna Phouma to form a new government the next day were taken reluctantly and only to avoid bloodshed. In the interim Khamphan and other followers of Phoumi may have persuaded Savang of the necessity and the feasibility of Phoumi's plans to retake Vientiane.]

These plans are said to embrace a coordinated attack on Vientiane utilizing air-dropped paratroopers and ground forces approaching the city by road. Included in the ground forces are about 500 infantry troops who are already being transported by river craft from Luang Prabang. They will presumably debark above Vientiane, where they will remain until the day of the attack. Armored elements within Vientiane, ostensibly under Kong's control, are also reportedly ready to participate. Preparations for an operation of this scope would take a considerable length of time, and its execution would require outside logistic and air support. A further complicating factor is the decision of the French Government to deny Phoumi the use of Seno military base, which they control. This may force Phoumi to transfer his headquarters to Pakse farther south.]

Meanwhile, Captain Kong Le shows signs of developing personal political ambitions. He is reported to have told a group of Thai news-men that the newly formed Souvanna Phouma government is merely provisional and that the Youth party, organized by the rebels and to be headed by Kong Le, will be the only legal political group once order is restored. Souvanna Phouma [new government was in fact provisional and would resign when 'peace' is restored throughout the country.]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Souvanna's new government will receive the approval of the National Assembly shortly. Aside from Souvanna, the most noteworthy appointment is that of Quinim Pholsena as interior minister. Quinim is the leftist, neutralist leader of the Santiphab party, which was in parliamentary alliance with the pro-Communist Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) when both parties were represented in the assembly. Otherwise, the cabinet is made up largely of unknowns. The King must give his approval for the government to be legitimate.⁷

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Selection of South Korean Prime Minister

Newly elected South Korean President Yun Bo-sun probably will nominate former Vice President Chang Myon for prime minister following the House of Representatives' rejection on 17 August of Kim To-yun, the President's first selection for the post. Under the constitution, if the President's second nominee is rejected, the lower house selects the prime minister whose election then requires only a plurality of votes. The President must announce his second choice within five days and the house must act upon his recommendation in not less than 24 hours and not more than 48 hours.

Kim's defeat by a narrow margin of only three votes suggests that a government headed by Chang would have a tenuous majority. Chang, titular chief of the Democratic party, controls slightly less than half of the party's two-thirds majority in the powerful 233-seat lower house. Kim, leader of the party's right-wing faction, has strongly opposed any compromise with Chang's followers and at times he has appeared to favor a party split.

Chang has stated that if he becomes prime minister he would select a broadly representative cabinet, which would include members of both factions and presumably independents. Early press reports indicate that Kim was defeated after a group of independents rejected his answers to a list of questions which they submitted to him and Chang. Should most of the 44 independents in the lower house act as a unified group they might exercise the balance of power between the nearly evenly divided pro- and anti-Chang factions of the majority party. [redacted]

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~