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1 October 1960




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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

1 October 1960

### DAILY BRIEF

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#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

#### II. ASIA-AFMCA

South Korea: Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Choi Kyong-nok believes that the dismissal of top general officers associated with the corruption of the Rhee regime is the basic requirement for eliminating dissatisfaction among junior officers and restoring discipline in the armed forces. Choi believes that failure to take early action on this problem will create the real possibility of a revolt supported by the great majority of officers, who as yet have not agitated. While contending that a coup is not the proper solution, Choi noted that military rule has been suggested by civilian as well as military elements.

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Laos: A showdown may be approaching between Captain Kong Le and the Souvanna Phouma government following Kong Le's apparent refusal to abide by the cease-fire reached between Souvanna's military commanders and General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee. While Souvanna has publicly rebuked Kong Le, his ability to bring Kong Le into line is still open to serious question. [REDACTED]

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Morocco-France: Moroccan Acting Deputy Premier Abdelkhalek Torres--the ranking executive in Morocco in the absence of both the King and the crown prince--reportedly will order military action against the French Army in Algeria if alleged recent border violations continue. Torres is said to have the King's permission for such extreme action if necessary. Torres is reported to believe that Moroccan military counteraction would create an international incident on the basis of which Morocco could request the intervention of UN forces. Such intervention is the avowed aim of the Algerian rebels and seems to be the motive underlying Tunisian President Bourguiba's interest in "close union" of the Tunisian and Algerian rebel governments. [REDACTED]

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## III. THE WEST

Berlin: Some NATO governments are refusing to cooperate in imposing travel restrictions on East German officials as a countermeasure to recent East German interference with access to West Berlin. Denmark has stated that trade considerations and the importance of cooperation between the Danish and East German railway systems prevent it from concurring in the restrictions placed by the Allied Travel Office in West Berlin on travel by semiofficial or trade representatives. The Dutch Government has relaxed its travel ban on East German officials in response to urging by the KLM airline that these officials would merely use alternative routes to Western countries.

\*On 30 September Bonn denounced the 1961 interzonal trade pact with East Germany, over the apparent opposition of Britain and France. The West German move will not affect interzonal trade before the end of the year. East German officials who have threatened Bonn with retaliations for such a step now may feel compelled to take some action. Possibly aware that Western countermeasures were being contemplated, Foreign Minister Gromyko stressed to British Foreign Secretary Home on 28 September that Moscow was "fully aware" of recent East German actions and warned that if a crisis developed it would be the fault of the West. He indicated, however, that Khrushchev was prepared to resume negotiations on Berlin after a new American administration took office.

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 Purge of Top Generals in South Korean Army

South Korean Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Choi Kyong-nok believes that the "one-shot" dismissal of top general officers associated with the corruption of the Rhee regime is the basic requirement for eliminating the dissatisfaction among junior officers and restoring discipline in the armed forces. Prime Minister Chang Myon, faced with disunity in the Democratic party, also favors removal of these generals, believing they might align with opposition political leaders. The purge probably will include Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. Gen. Choe Yong-hui, First Army Commander Lt. Gen. Kim Chong-o, Second Army Commander Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong, and others senior in rank to Choi.

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Choi said that he also recognized the necessity of disciplining junior officers who, hoping for promotion, are agitating for the ouster of senior commanders. He added, however, that failure to remove the generals in the near future could encourage a revolt supported by the great majority of officers who as yet have not agitated. He intimated that the intensity of the feelings of Korean junior officers on this issue is not fully appreciated outside Korean circles.

The junior officers concerned recently visited Chang and the minister of national defense to present their demands. Officials of the ministry, [redacted] believe that these officers are becoming increasingly confident of their influence, that the prime minister is afraid of them, and that the officers believe they can take over the government if the situation warrants.

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Choi noted that a military coup had been suggested by well-informed civilian as well as military elements to restore political stability to the country. Students of two leading Seoul universities are reported to support Choi's program to remove the general officers. One group indicated it would not oppose a military coup by young, honest officers to restore stability in South Korea. [redacted]

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### The Situation in Laos

An apparently rancorous exchange between Premier Souvanna Phouma and Captain Kong Le in two separate press conferences indicates that a showdown between the Vientiane government and the paratrooper may be imminent. Kong Le announced that he would continue his offensive against the Phoumi forces east of Paksane despite the cease-fire reached at Luang Prabang and accused Souvanna of being "very soft." He warned that the "people" would have to remove Souvanna if he did not "lead his country in the right direction." He also made slurring remarks about General Ouane, the armed forces commander and his ostensible chief. Souvanna subsequently retorted that Kong Le "was making up stories. Do not talk about him. That will be decided by army headquarters."

It is problematical whether Souvanna's top commanders--General Ouane and General Amkha, the Vientiane garrison commander--could win in any test of strength with Kong Le. Although the bulk of Kong Le's 2nd Paratroop Battalion is now outside of Vientiane, he probably can count on the support of the numerous irregulars he armed in the period immediately after his 9 August coup d'etat. He is also believed to have generated considerable popular support in the capital. In earlier phases of the crisis, moreover, neither Ouane nor Amkha showed much appetite for action against Kong Le. The scales might be tipped decisively against Kong Le, however, were Phoumi's forces east of Paksane to unite with Amkha's units in Vientiane.

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Phoumi's Radio Savannakhet, meanwhile, has issued an appeal "to our foreign friends" for help in the face of the alleged presence in Laos of three North Vietnamese units. Such statements, whether true or not, would be calculated to excite Thai Premier Sarit and would possibly be used by him to justify increased support.

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British Ambassador Addis in Vientiane reports being informed by Souvanna that the USSR has accepted Laos' proposal

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25X1 [redacted] that nonresident diplomatic relations be established. Souvanna claimed all he needed now was the approval of the King. Under Souvanna's proposal, the Soviet ambassador to Cambodia would also be accredited to Laos, while the Laotian ambassador to France would be accredited to the USSR. The King's decision could well be delayed pending the outcome of political discussions that may result in a new government.

25X1 The Soviet counselor in Peiping recently told [redacted]

that Peiping did not intend to intervene in Laos, but if the Chinese should decide to send troops to counter a United Nations move into Laos, the USSR would support Peiping "even to the extent" of sending Soviet troops. The US consul general in Hong Kong points out that the authority of the Soviet counselor is probably limited but that his statement is indicative of the impression Moscow wants conveyed to the West.

Moscow propaganda has emphasized the gravity of the Laotian situation and, together with Peiping and Hanoi, is making an effort to forestall intervention by Laos' pro-Western neighbors or the United Nations while avoiding any specific threat of bloc counteraction. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Moroccan Government Seeks New Means of Embroiling UN  
In Algerian Question

The Moroccan Government is reported to have protested sharply several recent incidents of alleged shelling by French military units in Algeria of Moroccan territory along the eastern border of Morocco where several thousand armed Algerian rebels are based. Such incidents occur fairly regularly, but are seldom publicized. Abdelkhalek Torres--Morocco's acting deputy premier and, in the absence of both King Mohamed V and Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, the ranking Moroccan official--is reported to have decided that should similar incidents recur he will order the Moroccan armed forces to take military action against the French.

Such a Moroccan counterattack would be designed to create an international incident enabling Morocco to request the intervention of the United Nations. General Ben Hamou Kettani, commander of Morocco's forces in the Congo, returned to Rabat on 29 September and may have been summoned to advise Torres on this question. Torres is said to have the King's permission to take even such extreme measures as military retaliation.

Torres has recently held talks with Algerian rebel leaders, who may have sought to enlist Morocco's support in enlarging the Algerian conflict just before the question is debated by the UN General Assembly.

Meanwhile, the Tunisian Government is exploring ways to implement the Algerian-Tunisian "union" which President Bourguiba suggested on 3 September might be formed if such an action "would hasten the end of the war." Bourguiba designed his announcement as a gambit to break the Algerian-French deadlock resulting from the failure of the Melun talks last June and is aware that any such "union" would entail the risk of war with France.

North African leaders apparently consider the use of the United Nations forces to restore and maintain order in the

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(Congo as a precedent which may be followed to obtain Algerian independence if De Gaulle cannot be induced to open negotiations with the rebel leaders. There have been North Africa overtures to some of France's NATO allies to exert pressure on De Gaulle to reopen talks with the Algerians. [REDACTED]

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Allied Restrictions on Travel by East German Officials

Some NATO governments now are refusing to cooperate in imposing travel restrictions on East German trade and travel representatives as a countermeasure to recent East German interference with access to West Berlin. Previously, the Benelux governments had given support to the restrictions by a tentative decision to withhold visas from East Germans who had not been cleared through the Allied Travel Bureau in West Berlin. The Netherlands even suspended short-stay permits for those in transit to other countries.

The Danish Government has informed the American Embassy in Copenhagen that because of trade considerations and the importance of cooperation between the Danish and East German railway systems, it is unable to concur in the proposed restrictions. There is evidence that since early this year, the government has been under considerable pressure from Danish trade and travel interests to expand contacts with East Germany. Despite reported opposition from the justice and defense ministries, the Foreign Ministry has acceded to certain East German requests for privileges and permitted the East German railways to open an office in Copenhagen.

The Dutch Government has modified its travel ban as a result of pressure from the KLM airline on behalf of an East German official en route to Cuba, and it now appears likely that entry will be granted to East Germans making a stopover in transit to other countries. The airline argued that if the Netherlands refused such entry, the East Germans would merely use alternate routes.

On 30 September Bonn denounced the 1961 interzonal trade pact with East Germany, over the apparent opposition of British and French officials. The West German move will not affect interzonal trade before the end of the year. Bonn's move may compel the East Germans to give meaning to the

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threat made by Foreign Trade Minister Heinrich Rau on 6 September, when he said that if West Germany took steps to interfere with trade between East and West Germany, "it will only hasten the measures needed to make West Berlin a free city." Possibly aware that Western countermeasures were being contemplated, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko stressed to British Foreign Secretary Home on 28 September that Moscow was "fully aware" of recent East German actions and warned that if a crisis developed it would be the fault of the West. He indicated, however, that Khrushchev was prepared to resume negotiations on Berlin after a new American administration took office. [REDACTED]

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