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13 March 1951

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUMMARY

GENERAL

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FAR EAST

4. Espionage and guerrilla activities reported in northeastern Korea (page 4).
5. De Lattre anticipates Viet Minh offensive (page 5).


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
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FAR EAST

4. Espionage and guerrilla activities reported in northeastern Korea:



Recent North Korean military messages indicate the existence of espionage and guerrilla activities in the coastal region of northeastern Korea.

~~Korea~~

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On 27 February, a police official was ordered to bring "the criminals

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connected with the incident" to Songjin. On 10 March, the arrest of 8 "spies" near Chongjin was reported. On the same day, North Korean authorities in Chongjin transmitted a delayed report of a guerrilla attack on a train on the coastal rail line on 14 February.

Comment: The focus of Korean guerrilla activity reported heretofore has been in the area northwest of Seoul, where the North Koreans have taken strong restrictive measures against guerrilla forces. These new reports are the first to indicate the existence of guerrilla elements in the mountainous northeastern provinces of Korea, which have been under Pyongyang's control since 1945.

5. De Lattre anticipates Viet Minh offensive:




Commenting on recent French intelligence reports to the effect that the Viet Minh will launch an offensive between 15 and 20 March, French Commander-in-Chief de Lattre states that he

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does not believe the attack can start before 25 March, because of delays in the delivery of materiel from China and "other considerations." General de Lattre "hopes" to repulse the attack, even without reinforcements, since his preparations are well advanced and his troops in good spirits. De Lattre does not believe that the Chinese Communists will participate in this attack, although he feels that such participation is possible in August or September, at the end of the rainy season.

Comment: The intelligence reports referred to by General de Lattre appear to be the same as those reported in the Current Intelligence Bulletin for 8 March. Although no evidence is yet available definitely indicating an imminent Viet Minh attack,



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