

POL 396: International Organization

Precept 11

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April 23, 2024

Reminders

- Final Weekly Assignment
 - Due April 26, 11:59pm
 - Two questions on Tuesday reading, Two on anything else
- Due Dean's Date (May 7, 5pm)
 - Mnemonic Devices (x3)
 - Extra Credit Assignments (x2): Movie; Sport
- Preceptor-Led Review Session: May 2, 1:30pm, McCosh 50
- Final Additional Office Hour: May 2, 10:30am - 12:00pm
 - By appointment, [Click Here](#)



First, let's review for the final exam.

How to read regression tables (Pevehouse 2002)


TABLE 2. Estimates of the determinants of the transition to democracy,
1950–1992


	<i>Polity98</i>	<i>Gasiorowski</i>	<i>Polity98</i>	<i>Gasiorowski</i>
<i>IOScore</i> _{<i>it</i>–1}	0.089*** (3.74)	0.065** (2.25)	0.009*** ^a (2.75)	0.112*** ^a (2.67)
Δ <i>IOScore</i> _{<i>it</i>–1}	0.087 (1.41)	0.073 (1.38)	−0.325 ^a (−1.48)	−0.228 ^a (−1.18)
<i>pcGDP</i> _{<i>it</i>}	-2.79×10^{-5} (−0.45)	-3.34×10^{-5} (−0.65)	-2.49×10^{-5} (−0.42)	-3.76×10^{-5} (−0.70)
Δ <i>pcGDP</i> _{<i>it</i>}	−0.0005* (−1.81)	3.44×10^{-5} (0.45)	−0.0004 (−1.32)	6.88×10^{-5} (1.08)
<i>Contagion</i> _{<i>it</i>}	0.057** (2.21)	0.085 (1.60)	0.069*** (2.63)	0.098** (1.98)
<i>PastDem</i> _{<i>it</i>}	1.634*** (5.18)	0.551** (2.00)	1.757*** (5.49)	0.555** (1.98)
<i>RegConflict</i> _{<i>it</i>}	−0.456*** (−2.74)	−0.094 (−1.02)	−0.459*** (−2.80)	−0.100 (−1.10)
<i>IntViolence</i> _{<i>it</i>–1}	2.359*** (4.10)	1.073*** (2.75)	2.285*** (4.10)	1.049*** (2.70)
<i>Milreg</i> _{<i>it</i>}	−1.856*** (−2.75)	−1.709*** (−3.26)	−1.872*** (−2.76)	−1.655*** (−3.17)
<i>Indep</i> _{<i>it</i>}	0.005 (1.37)	0.003 (0.77)	0.006* (1.71)	0.004 (1.11)
<i>Constant</i>	−7.022*** (−12.64)	−5.135*** (−12.21)	−7.487*** (−12.27)	−6.004*** (−9.74)
<i>N</i> =	2776	2299	2777	2302
<i>Log likelihood</i>	−195.44	−244.50	−197.25	−243.90
<i>X</i> ²	104.94***	63.31***	103.99***	69.49***

1. Dependent variable
2. Unit of analysis
3. Independent variable
4. Positive/Negative
5. Statistically Significant



Hazard Rate over Time





- The preference has two dimensions! (Region vs. ROW)
- WTO is not ideal if C only wants regional liberalization.
- Complainant (C) prefers $(SQ_D, SQ_{ROW}) = (1, -0.5)$
- Status quo is $(-1, -0.5)$
- If goes to WTO, outcome is $(1, 1.5)$
- If goes to NAFTA, outcome is $(-0.1, -0.5)$
- So NAFTA is better than WTO (closer to C's ideal point).

Time to wrap up.

It's been quite a journey.

But let's first go back to the beginning.

Abbot and Snidal (1998)

Centralization and Independence

- **Centralization:** a concrete and stable organization structure and an administrative apparatus managing collective activities
- **Independence:** the authority to act with a degree of autonomy, and often with neutrality, in defined spheres



UNITED NATIONS



EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS



WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION



Do International Organizations Make Any Difference?

Do International Organizations Make Any Difference?

How would the world look like without international organizations?

- Trilemma & Financial crisis
- International development
- Wars and peacekeeping
- Human rights
- Trade & Investment
- Global health
- ...

What Determines Governments' Choices?

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Leaders want to stay in power

- Democracies: votes, interest groups, etc.
- Autocracies: avoid protests, elites, etc.

International politics (governments & IOs) actually depends on **domestic politics**

The Silver Lining

The Silver Lining

It really depends on everyone

Individual preference $\xrightarrow{\text{Institutions}}$ Policy outcomes

It's my honor to be your preceptor.

To conclude my teaching at Princeton.

Thank you!