Protecting sensitive data against offline attacks

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
jd@avast.com




Agenda

- focus
- why
- how
- what
- content
- summary

3 defining aspects of apps



Records Settings Records Settings



#1 what they look like

Records Settings Records



#2 what they seem to be doing

(as perceived through the UI)

#3 what they are actually doing

learning from mistakes

inspired by apps available on the AppStore

3 key ideas

+ a few additional side notes

ACME Corporation

Snippets

Bob, Alice



Part 1 Apparent Security

Bob

Demo 1

App Walkthrough & Code

Alice

Jailbreaking

- altering iOS through exploits
- code signing, file system access, root access, Cydia



Demo 2

Retrieving data from the filesystem

Objective-C Runtime

- runtime oriented language
- allows inspection and modification in runtime
- relevant to Swift



Demo 3

Objective-C runtime capabilities

Snoop-it

https://code.google.com/p/

snoop-it/

source: repo.nesolabs.de

a debugging tool for analysing apps in runtime



Snoop-it

Demo 4

Bypass the UI using Snoop-it


house with doors but holes instead of windows

Part 2 Encryption

Bob

Encryption scheme

Rijndael



Alice

Demo 5

Sniffing sensitive APIs using Snoop-it

we've added windows, but we are leaving the key under the doormat


Part 3

Tradeoffs

Bob

Updated encryption scheme

Verifying password without storing it



Alice

Demo 6

Bruteforcing the pin using a fake app


we've added an emergency exit with a poor lock

Part 4 Summary

Bob

Updated encryption scheme

Password required for initial unlock



Alice

when leaving, we block the emergency exit

Summary

- 1. Encrypt
- 2. Do not store full information needed for decryption persistently
- 3. Beware of tradeoffs between UX and security

github.com/jirid/mdevtalk2