

Going Public over the Business Cycle

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Motivation

“For business owners who want to take their companies to the next level, this bill will **make it easier for you to go public**. And that’s a big deal because **going public is a major step towards expanding and hiring more workers**.”

Source: *Remarks by President Obama at JOBS Act Bill Signing* (April 5th, 2012)

What does **going public** mean?

- *Private* firms become *public* as they begin trading shares in the public stock market
- Firms typically go public through an Initial Public Offering (IPO)

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- **The timing of an IPO matters for post-IPO employment growth**

→ Firms going public during recessions experience **persistently slower growth**

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How does the cyclicality of IPOs matter for aggregate employment dynamics?

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⇒ Job creation margin during economic downturns

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- **Simulate recovery process from a negative shock on aggregate productivity**
 - Quantify the role of IPO cyclicalities on aggregate employment response

Literature and contributions

- **Cyclical IPOs** Empirics (Helwege and Liang (2004), Tran and Jeon (2011), Angelini and Foglia (2018))
Theory (Alti (2005), Pastor and Veronesi (2005), Aghamolla and Guttman (2021))
- **IPO decision and firm dynamics** Firm dynamics over the business cycle (Lee (2005), Choi (2014), Lee and Mukoyama (2015), Sedlacek (2015), Clementi and Palazzo (2016), Moreira (2016), Sedlacek and Sterk (2017))
Endogenous IPO choice (Clementi (2004), Gonzalez (2021), Casella, Lee and Villavazo (2023))
- **Capital misallocation over the business cycle** (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Khan and Thomas (2013), Gopinath, Kalemli-Ozcan, Karabarbounis, and Villegas-Sanchez (2017))

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→ Examine the misallocation driven by the **dynamics between private and public firms**

Empirical evidence

Data

- **Compustat/CRSP**

- Panel data based on the financial reporting of public firms in the U.S.
- Sample: 1980 - 2019
 - ... ~ 110,400 firm-year observations
 - ... ~ 10,900 number of IPOs

◀ Sample selection

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- **Timing of IPO is identified by IPO dates**

- Define cohorts: **Expansion** (trough-peak) and **Contraction** (peak-trough)

Descriptive statistics

Median, at the IPO

	Expansion	Contraction
Debt-to-assets ratio	0.41	0.44
Industry		
Mining	0.06	0.12
Manufacturing	0.47	0.46
Service	0.47	0.42
Employment (1K)	0.20	0.13
Assets (1M, \$)	2,575	470
Sale of stock (1M, \$)	622.60	54.41
relative to Assets	0.35	0.12

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
- Selection in size

- **Contraction** cohort is smaller

- Cyclical capital injection

- **Contraction** cohort raises less capital through IPOs [◀ Regression](#)


Heterogeneous Post-IPO growth



(Controls: Pre-IPO size / sales per worker / capital intensity / debt to asset, detrended GDP)

◀ Equation

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


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
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What drives this growth disparity?

- Different exit patterns? ◀ Exit rate
- Cyclical capital injection?

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
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
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What drives this growth disparity?

- Different exit patterns? ◀ Exit rate
 - Balanced panel
- Cyclical capital injection?
 - Control for the **sales of stock** in the IPO year

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IPO Cyclicalality

- Procyclical number of IPOs
- IPO firms during **contractions** ...
 - **are smaller** (different selection)
 - **raise less capital** (capital injection cyclicalality)
 - **grow persistently slower after the IPO** (heterogeneous post-IPO growth)

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 - **grow persistently slower after the IPO** (heterogeneous post-IPO growth)
- **Next step**
 - Develop **heterogeneous firm dynamics model** with **business cycle**
 - Financial frictions + Competitive labor market
 - Endogenous entry/exit
 - **Endogenous transition** from private to public through **IPO decisions**

The model

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- Discrete time and infinite horizon

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- **Aggregate productivity** $\log(z_{t+1}) = \rho_z \log(z_t) + \varepsilon_{z,t}, \quad \varepsilon_{z,t} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_z)$
- **Idiosyncratic productivity** $\log(s_{t+1}) = \rho_s \log(s_t) + \varepsilon_{s,t}, \quad \varepsilon_{s,t} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_s)$

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- **Initial Public Offering**
 - **Financially constrained private firms** can raise capital from the public stock market

Initial Public Offering

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→ From $t + 1$, χ share of public firms belongs to public investors

- Dividend payment to public investors

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
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- **The amount of capital injection depends on the aggregate state!**


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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


- Public firm




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Operating: $\tilde{V}^{pb}(\mathcal{S}) = \max_{a'} (1 - \chi)d + \mathbb{E}[M(z, z')V^{pb}(\mathcal{S}')|\mathcal{S}]$

$$\text{s.t. } d + a' = \underbrace{y - wl - (r + \delta)k - f^{pb}}_{\pi(\mathcal{S})} + (1 + r)a, \quad k \leq \frac{a}{1 - \theta^{pb}}, \quad d \geq 0$$

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Exit: $V^{x,pb}(\mathcal{S}) = (1 - \chi)[\pi(\mathcal{S}) + (1 + r)a]$

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Stay private: $\tilde{V}^{pr}(\mathcal{S}) = \max_{a'} d + \mathbb{E}[M(z, z')V^{pr}(\mathcal{S}')|\mathcal{S}]$

s.t. $d + a' = y - wl - (r + \delta)k - f^{pr} + (1 + r)a, \quad k \leq \frac{a}{1 - \theta^{pr}}, \quad d \geq 0$

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- **Potential entrants solve**

$$V^e(\mathcal{S}_0) = \max_{a'} -a' + \mathbb{E}[M(z, z')V^{pr}(\mathcal{S}')|\mathcal{S}_0]$$

- Given $\mathcal{S}_0 = (s_0, z, a_0)$, choose to enter if $V^e(\mathcal{S}_0) \geq c_e$.

Quantitative Analysis

Calibration

- **U.S. non-financial firm sector, 2000Q1-2019Q4** (quarterly)

Calibration

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→ Public ~ Compustat, Private ~ BDS & Flow of Funds, IPO cost ~ Compustat + BDS

Externally calibrated

	Meaning	Value
η	Returns to scale	0.88
α	Capital share	0.30
δ	Depreciation rate	0.03
ρ_z	Persistence aggregate shock	0.95
σ_z	SD aggregate shock	0.007
χ	Equity share sold at IPO	0.10
β	Time discount	0.97
ϕ_0	Stochastic discount factor	28.59
ϕ_1	Stochastic discount factor	-30.90

Internally calibrated

	Meaning	Value	Target	Data	Model
ρ_s	Persistence idio. shock	0.93	AC of log sales	0.63	0.41
σ_s	SD idiosyncratic shock	0.07	SD of log sales	0.35	0.35
θ^{pb}	Borrowing constraint	0.55	Debt-to-assets	0.77	0.77
θ^{pr}	Borrowing constraint	0.35	Debt-to-assets	0.42	0.40
f^{pb}	Operating cost	5.2	Exit rate	0.02	0.03
f^{pr}	Operating cost	1.5	Exit rate	0.09	0.08
κ	IPO fixed cost	170	Emp. share of public	0.33	0.35

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
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
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⇒ **Costs and benefits of IPO**

Model performance: Size distribution



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


- **Most firms are small**

... consistent with the data

Size	1-9	10-19	20-99	100+
Data	0.77	0.12	0.10	0.02
Model	0.61	0.24	0.12	0.03

Model performance: Size distribution




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- **Public firms are larger**


Size	1-9	10-19	20-99	100+
Private	0.65	0.25	0.10	0.01
Public	0.04	0.13	0.50	0.32
Data	0.04	0.03	0.17	0.76

Model performance: IPO dynamics

- **Firm-level IPO effect** (Untargeted)
 - On one-year employment growth
 - ... Data: 0.37 (Borisov et al., 2021)
 - ... Model: 0.42


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


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


Capital Injection Cyclicity




- **Capital injection at IPO** ◀ by prod.
for the most productive firm

Capital Injection Cyclicity



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→ **Procyclical!**

Capital Injection Cyclicity




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Example

For a firm with $a = 300$,
an IPO would increase a by ...

Capital Injection Cyclicity



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
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→ 40% during booms

Capital Injection Cyclicity



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
For a firm with $a = 300$,
an IPO would increase a by ...

→ 40% during booms

→ 22% during recessions

IPO decision

IPO Threshold (Firms above the threshold go public)




◀ Original

- **Stationary**

IPO decision

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
→ **Selection at IPO**

Small & productive firms

(most financially constrained)

IPO decision

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
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IPO decision

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
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
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
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
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
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
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- ⇒ **IPO cyclicity!**



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How does IPO cyclicalities affect aggregate employment dynamics?

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

- Simulate recovery process from -1% shock on aggregate productivity



Counterfactual analysis

How does IPO cyclicality affect aggregate employment dynamics?

- Simulate recovery process from -1% shock on aggregate productivity
- **Shut down cyclicality of IPOs** (Assign stationary IPO policy function)



Results and mechanisms

- Without IPO cyclicalities, **employment decreases less**

	Baseline	Counterfactual	Dev. (%)
Employment	-6.44	-5.77	10.40
Mean size of firms	-4.05	-3.68	9.14
Public firm share	-2.39	1.12	146.86
Number of firms	-2.35	-1.99	15.32
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- **They grow fast, increasing mean size of firms**

Results and mechanisms

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→ IPO cyclicalities **exacerbates** capital misallocation

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→ Expected future value of entry ↑

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→ Expected future value of entry ↑



→ **More entries,**
increasing the number of firms

Counterfactual analysis II

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 - Share of IPO decreases by at most 30%



Results

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	Baseline	Counterfactual II	Dev. (%)
Employment	-6.44	-6.35	1.40
Mean size of firms	-4.05	-4.03	0.49
Public firm share	-2.39	-2.10	10.64
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- It amplifies aggregate employment volatility by **10 percent!**

- Fewer IPOs during recessions

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
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- Promoting more IPOs during recessions could accelerate economic recovery!

Procyclical Number of IPOs



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Sample Selection

- **Exclude ...**

- Utilities, financial firms, and public administration
- Headquartered outside the U.S.
- Underwent leveraged buyouts and subsidiaries

- **Focus on IPO firms seeking financing**

- Firms typically conduct IPOs to **raise funds** or **establish public valuation**
- Exclude firms delisted shortly after going public for the following reasons:
 - *Acquisition or merger* (11.8%)
 - *Reverse acquisition* (1.3%)
 - *Leveraged buyout* (0.5%)

Industry Composition - Service

	Expansion	Contraction
Service		
Wholesale Trade	0.04	0.04
Retail Trade	0.06	0.03
Transportation and Warehousing	0.02	0.02
Information	0.17	0.13
Real Estate	0.01	0.01
Professional, Scientific, and Technical	0.06	0.06
Management	0.02	0.02
Administrative	0.01	0.01
Educational	0.03	0.04
Health	0.01	0.01
Arts and Entertainment	0.03	0.03
Accommodation	0.01	0.00

- **Mostly no difference**

→ including *Professional, Scientific, and Technical*

- **Expansion** cohort's 5 pp higher share of service comes from ...

→ *Retail Trade* (6% vs. 3%)

→ *Information* (17% vs. 13%)

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Capital Injection Cyclicity

Log sale of stock at IPO	(1)	(2)	(3)
IPO in Contraction	-0.378* (-2.22)		
Detrended Log GDP		0.295*** (13.87)	0.195*** (7.50)
Detrended PE Ratio			0.062*** (6.67)
Firm Characteristics at IPO	✓	✓	✓
Industry FE	✓	✓	✓
State FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	5,096	5,096	5,096
R^2	0.297	0.322	0.328

- **IPO Firms in Contraction**

→ Raise 38% less capital compared to those in **Expansion**.

- **Detrended Log GDP**

→ 1% increase in GDP
 ⇒ 30% increase

→ When controlling for stock market performance,
 ... ⇒ 20% increase

Non-parametric Regression

$$\Delta^{ipo} N_{it} = \beta_{a,c} Age_{it} \times Cohort_i^{ipo} + \Phi Y_t + \Gamma \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

- $\Delta^{ipo} N_{it}$: employment growth (log difference) from the year of IPO

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→ $\beta_{a,c}$ refers to the cohort c 's cumulative employment growth in the a th year post-IPO
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Exit Rates by IPO Cohort

Delisting rate	Expansion	Contraction
in 5 years	0.34	0.34
Merger and acquisition	0.11	0.08
Exit (Bankruptcy or unknown)	0.16	0.22
Back to private	0.06	0.02
in 3 years	0.18	0.19
Merger and acquisition	0.02	0.01
Exit (Bankruptcy or unknown)	0.11	0.16
Back to private	0.03	0.00
in a year	0.05	0.06
Exit (Bankruptcy or unknown)	0.04	0.05
Back to private	0.01	0.00

- **Delisting rates are similar**

- **Contraction cohort**

- Higher likelihood of exiting the market

- **Expansion cohort**

- More likely to delist due to mergers or reverting to private ownership

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Aggregate fluctuation

- **Stochastic discount factor** (Clementi and Palazzo, 2019)

$$M(z_t, z_{t+1}) \equiv \beta \exp(\phi_0 \log(z_t) + \phi_1 \log(z_{t+1}))$$

→ $\phi_0 > 0$, $\phi_1 < 0$... **procyclical**


- **Interest rate**

→ Defined as the inverse of the expected stochastic discount factor


$$r(z_t) = \frac{1}{\beta} \exp \left(-z_t(\phi_0 + \rho_z \phi_1) - \frac{\phi_1^2 \sigma_z^2}{2} \right) - 1$$

→ $\phi_0 + \rho_z \phi_1 > 0$... **countercyclical**

Capital injection at IPO



Capital injection at IPO



- **Asymmetric increase**

over firm-specific productivity

→ **Large variance in small firms**

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IPO threshold

