CS251 Fall 2025

(cs251.stanford.edu)

Stablecoins & Lending Protocols

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Recap: Solidity

Everything is a contract:

- Contracts manage state variables
- Contracts have functions that can be called externally
- Can inherit code from other contracts (`contract A is B,C`)

Global objects: `block, tx, msg`

(e.g. `block.number, tx.gasprice, msg.sender`)

An example: ERC20 tokens

- https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-20.md
- A standard API for fungible tokens. (ERC-721 for non-fungible tokens)
- An ERC20 token is itself a smart contract that maintains all user balances:

  mapping(address => uint256) internal **_balances**;

- A standard interface allows other contracts to interact with every ERC20 token. No need for special logic for each token.

ERC20 token interface

function **transfer**(address _to, uint256 _value) external returns (bool);

function **transferFrom**(address _from, address _to, uint256 _value) external returns (bool);

function **approve**(address _spender, uint256 _value) external returns (bool);

function **totalSupply**() external view returns (uint256);

function **balanceOf**(address _owner) external view returns (uint256);

function **allowance**(address _owner, address _spender) external view returns (uint256);

An example …

Consider two ERC-20 tokens: say USDC and WETH

- USDC is a contract that maintains a **_balances[]** mapping
- WETH is a different contract that also maintains **_balances[]**

Say Bob owns 5 USDC and 2 WETH. This is recorded as:

In USDC contract: **_balances[Bob's address] == 5**

In WETH contract: **_balances[Bob's address] == 2**

Wallet software shows all the coins associated with Bob's address

Anyone can read ERC20 _balances[]

Transaction Hash: 0x6b85ca95e484d94503d1276456bfc32cc55f6fdb8bb231ff83….

Tells the USDC contract to transfer 10,010.00 USDC
from Circle's account to 0x7656159E42209A95b77aD374d…

recipient's entry

Circle's entry

(Circle's balance after)

(etherscan.io)

Calling other contracts

Addresses can be cast to contract types.

```
address _usdc = 0x7656159E42209A95b77aD374d…;
ERC20Token usdcContract = ERC20Token(_usdc);
```

To call the “transfer” function of contract at address _usdc:

```
usdcContract.transfer(_to,  _value);
```

The world of DeFi



The world of DeFi



DeFi app #1: Stablecoins

Stable Coins

A cryptocurrency designed to trade at a fixed price

- Examples: **1 coin = 1 USD**, 1 coin = 1 EUR, 1 coin = 1 USDX

Goals:

- Integrate real-world currencies into on-chain applications
- Enable people without easy access to USD,
  to hold and trade a USD-equivalent asset

Types of stable coins

	centralized	algorithmic
collateralized	custodial stablecoins (USDC)	synthetics (DAI, RAI)
Un(der)collateralized	central bank (digital) currency	Undercollateralized stablecoins

Custodial stablecoins: minting



Custodial stablecoins: transfers

pay Carol 15$: transfer(Bob → Carol, 15)

(and gas fee)

Transfers are done on-chain
(custodian is not involved)

135 USD

Bob: 85

Alice: 35

Carol: 15

_balances

Custodial stablecoins: withdrawal

withdraw 60 USD

60 USD

Custodian

burn(Bob, 60)

Bob: ~~80~~ 85

Alice: 35

Carol: 15

_balances

135 USD

Two Examples

	Coins issued	24h volume
USDC	76 B	20.4 B
USDT	184 B	164.6 B



stablecoin providers are a large holder of U.S. debt.

Some issues

Custodian keeps treasury in a traditional bank

- Must be audited to ensure treasury is available
- Earns interest on deposits

Custodian has strong powers:

- Can freeze accounts / refuse withdrawal requests
- Custodian can remove funds from user balances

In countries with rampant inflation, people turn to stablecoins to protect their assets



source: state of crypto report

DeFi app #2: Lending Protocols

Goal: explain how decentralized lending works

This is not investment or financial advice

The role of banks in the economy

Banks bring together lenders and borrowers



bank spread

(borrow interest – deposit interest)

The role of banks in the economy



bank spread

(borrow interest – deposit interest)

Crypto: CeFi lending (e.g., Nexo)

Same as with a traditional bank:



Alice gives her assets to the CeFi institution to lend out to Bob

The role of collateral

(1 ETH = 100 UNI)

CeFi's concern: what if Bob defaults on loan?

$\Longrightarrow$ CeFi will absorb the loss

Solution: require Bob to lock up collateral



The role of collateral

Several things can happen next:

(1) **Bob repays loan**

(1 ETH = 100 UNI)

repay 1 ETH

redeem UNI collateral
(minus interest)

debt position:

+ 50 UNI
– 1 ETH

The role of collateral

Several things can happen next:

(1) Bob repays loan

(2) Bob defaults on loan

(1 ETH = 100 UNI)

Ok, I'll keep
(100 + penalty) UNI

I can't repay 1 ETH

redeem remaining UNI collateral
(400 − interest − penalty) UNI

debt position:

+ 5[illegible] UNI
− 1 ETH

The role of collateral

(1 ETH = 400 UNI)

Several things can happen next:

(1) Bob repays loan

(2) Bob defaults on loan

(3) Liquidation: value of loan increases relative to collateral

I need to liquidate your collateral (and charge a penalty = 20 UNI)

debt position:

+ 80 UNI
− 0 ETH

lender needs to liquidate **before** value(debt) > value(collateral)

Terminology

Collateral: assets that serve as a security deposit

Over-collateralization: to borrow, borrower has to provide

$0.8 \times value(collateral) > value(debt)$

Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio

Liquidation Threshold

Liquidation:

if $0.83 \times value(collateral) < value(debt)$

then collateral is liquidated to pay debt until inequality flips

(liquidation reduces both sides of the inequality)

Loan-to-Value (LTV)

Loan-to-Value (LTV) $\in [0,1]$

- Max value that can be borrowed using this collateral

- High volatility asset $\Longrightarrow$ low LTV
- Relatively stable asset $\Longrightarrow$ higher LTV

Examples: (on Aave)

LTV:	ETH: 80.5%,	USDC: 75%,	DAI: 63%
Liquidation th.:	ETH: 83%,	USDC: 78%,	DAI: 77%

Health of a debt position

$$\text{BorrowCapacity} = \sum_i \text{value}(\text{collateral}_i) \times \text{LTV}_i$$

(in ETH)

$$\text{health} = \frac{\sum_i \text{value}(\text{Collateral}_i) \times (\text{Liquidation Threshold}_i)}{\text{value}(\text{TotalDebt})}$$

helath < 1 $\implies$ triggers liquidation until (health ≥ 1)

Example: Aave dashboard (a DeFi lending Dapp)



DAI is deposited as collateral

UNI is borrowed

The borrowing interests the borrower needs to pay

In Aave, the collteral is also lent out. Hence the borrower can also earn interests.

actions

Credit: Arthur Gervais

Why borrow ETH?

If Bob has collateral, why can't he just buy ETH?

- Bob may need ETH (e.g., to buy in-game assets),
  but he might not want to sell his collateral (e.g., an NFT)
- As an investment strategy: using UNI to borrow ETH
  gives Bob exposure to both

The problem with CeFi lending

Users must trust the CeFi institution:

- Not to get hacked, steal assets, or miscalculate
- This is why traditional finance is regulated

- Interest payments go to the exchange, not liquidity provider Alice

- CeFi fully controls spread (borrow interest – deposit interest)

DeFi Lending

Can we build an on-chain lending Dapp?

$\Longrightarrow$ no central trusted parties

$\Longrightarrow$ code available on Ethereum for inspection

A first idea: an order book Dapp



(large institutions, banks)

Credit: Eddy Lazzarin

Challenges

- **Computationally expensive**: matching borrowers to lenders requires many transactions per person (post a bid, retract if the market changes, repeat)
- **Concentrated risk**: lenders are exposed to their direct counterparty defaulting
- **Complex withdrawal**: a lender must wait for their counter-parties to repay their debts

A better approach: liquidity pools

Over-collateralized lending: Compound and Aave



Example: Compound cTokens

Liquidity Provider

supply assets

10 ETH, 1000 DAI, 500 UNI

mints cTokens for Alice (ERC-20)

X cETH, Y cDAI, Z cUNI

4 markets

DAI ETH UNI AXS

Compound

Value of X, Y, Z is determined by the current exchange rate:
Token to cToken exchange rate is calculated every block

Borrowers



supply assets to any market

get cTokens

I want to borrow ETH

Bob's cTokens are locked up as collateral

Compound sends ETH to Bob

Bob's accrued interest increases ETH/cETH exchange rate

$\Longrightarrow$ benefit cETH token holders (ETH liquidity providers)

The interest rate: constantly updates

Key idea: determined by demand for asset vs. asset market size

Utilization ratio: $$U_{ETH} = \frac{\text{totalBorrowBalance}_{ETH}}{\text{availableBalance}_{ETH} + \text{totalBorrowBalance}_{ETH}}$$

higher totalBorrowBalance, or
lower availableBalance in contract

higher $U_{ETH} \in [0,1]$

$$\text{interestRate}_{ETH} = \text{BaseRate}_{ETH} + U_{ETH} \times \text{slope}_{ETH}$$

Liquidation: debt > BorrowCapacity

If user's health < 1 then **anyone** can call:

liquidate(borrower, CollateralAsset, BorrowAsset, uint amount)

address of borrower being liquidated

Liquidator wants cTokens in this asset (e.g., cDAI)

Liquidator is providing this asset (e.g., ETH)

This function transfers liquidator's ETH into ETH market, and gives the liquidator cDAI from user's collateral

Liquidation: debt > BorrowCapacity

If user's health < 1 then **anyone** can call:

lic ... t)

Liquidator is repaying the user's ETH debt
and getting the user's cDAI
[at a discounted exchange rate -- penalty for user]

add ... set

(e.g., cDAI) (e.g., ETH)

This function transfers liquidator's ETH into ETH market,
and gives the liquidator cDAI from user's collateral

This happens …

Liquidations on Ethereum:



Caused by collateral price drops or debt APR spikes

What is liquidation risk?

Historical UNI interest rate on Aave (APR):

Demand for UNI spikes

$\Longrightarrow$ price of UNI spikes

$\Longrightarrow$ user's debt shoots up

$\Longrightarrow$ user's health drops

$\Longrightarrow$ liquidation …



Borrowers must constantly monitor the health of their position, and quickly repay loans if it drops (several services automate this)

Summary & stats

- Liquidity providers can earn interest on their assets
- DeFi lending usage (on Ethereum):





Flash loans

What is a flash loan?

A flash loan is taken and repaid in a single transaction

$\Longrightarrow$ zero risk for lender $\Longrightarrow$ borrower needs no collateral



(Tx is valid only if funds are returned in same Tx)

"Attacking the DeFi Ecosystem with Flash Loans for Fun and Profit"

Use cases

- Risk free arbitrage
- Collateral swap
- DeFi attacks: price oracle manipulation

Risk free arbitrage

Alice finds a USDC/DAI price difference in two pools



Collateral swap

start:

Alice @Compound

end goal:

Alice @Compound

-1000 DAI
+1 cETH

borrowed DAI using ETH as collateral

Take 1000 DAI flash loan
Repay 1000 DAI debt
Redeem 1 cETH
Swap 1 cETH for 3000 cUSDC
Deposit 3000 cUSDC as collateral
Borrow 1000 DAI
Repay 1000 DAI flash loan

(a single Ethereum transaction)

-1000 DAI
+3000 cUSDC

borrowed DAI using USDC as collateral

Aave v1 implementation

```
function flashLoan(address _receiver, uint256 _amount) {
    ...
    // transfer funds to the receiver
    core.transferToUser(_reserve, userPayable, _amount);

    // execute action of the receiver
    receiver.executeOperation(_reserve, _amount, amountFee, _params);
    ...
    // abort if loan is not repaid
    require( availableLiquidityAfter == availableLiquidityBefore.add(amountFee),
            "balance inconsistent");
}
```

END OF LECTURE

Next lecture: Decentralized Exchanges (DeX)