International Military Operations in the 21st Century

This book examines the challenges that military forces will face in multinational operations in the twenty-first century.

Expanding on Rupert Smith's *The Utility of Force*, the volume assesses the changing parameters within which force as a political instrument is ultimately exercised. By analysing nine carefully selected mission types, the volume presents a comprehensive analysis of key trends and trajectories. Building upon this analysis, the contributors break the trends and parameters down into real and potential tasks and mission types in order to identify concrete implications for military forces in future multinational operations.

The context of military intervention in conflicts and crises around the world is rapidly evolving. Western powers' shrinking ability and desire to intervene makes it pertinent to analyse how the cost of operations can be reduced and how they can be executed more intelligently in the future. New challenges to international military operations are emerging and this book addresses these challenges by focusing on three key areas of change: an increasingly urbanised world; the changing nature of missions; and the commercial availability of new technologies. In answering these questions and embracing some of the insights of the growing field of future studies, the volume presents an innovative perspective on future international military operations.

This book will be of much interest to students of international intervention, military and strategic studies, war and conflict studies, security studies and international relations in general.

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Preface and acknowledgements

This book has been a long time in the making. But the result, we hope, is a truly different perspective on international military operations in the twenty-first century, one that will prove helpful to practitioners and policymakers, and thought-provoking for anyone interested in issues of international intervention today. The project began in 2011 when the Challenges in Peace and Stabilisation Operations group at the FFI was challenged to say something about what future international operations might look like, as part of the institute's support activities for the Norwegian Armed Forces' long-term defence planning. The group then consisted (in alphabetical order) of Stian Kjeksrud, Anders Kjølberg, Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, Tore Nyhamar and Jacob Aasland Ravndal. Actually, the question we most often get is 'where will our armed forces be engaged next'. We do not particularly care for this question, as our research does not tell us what future events have in store for Western decision-makers. We had recognised even prior to our first brainstorming session that our response would have to be something other than our best guess on where Norway would engage next. Indeed, the resulting FFI-Report 2011/01697 *Fremtidens internasjonale operasjoner [Future international operations]* by Norheim-Martinsen *et al.* explains why the question 'where will be next' is misguided. The report was co-published with FFI-Report 2011/01667 *Trender, scenarioer og sorte svaner – utfordringer for fremtidens landmakt [Trends, Scenarios and Black Swans – Challenges for Future Land Power]* by Norheim-Martinsen, in which the methodology for the present volume was first laid out.

The former report was presented at an FFI seminar in Oslo with Lt Gen Robert Mood, who headed the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) in 2012, and Prime Minister Erna Solberg, then leader of the Conservative Party, commenting. During the stimulating discussion, Solberg observed: 'I hear what the military is saying about what kind of international operation we ought to engage in, but it is not easy to be a politician, sometimes things just happen, and it is necessary to act.' This is the premise of the book in a nutshell. International military operations are rarely the result of a neat planning process, where the capabilities we

want to send are the capabilities needed, the timeframe is ideal, and the challenges what we thought they would be when the decision to deploy was made. We cannot stress enough that this book is not an attempt to *predict* what the future of international military operations will look like. But we hold that the option of international use of force to confront crimes against humanity and manage crises that threaten local, regional and global security is one that will be, and should be, open in the future also. This requires constant adaptation of national and international military structures and capabilities to a changing conflict environment. With this book we want to encourage foresight in planning by raising the awareness, among practitioners, policymakers and students alike, of what new challenges this changing conflict environment may pose in the future.

The present volume builds and improves on the first report in two ways. First, the number of mission types is expanded. Cyber operations, Special Forces operations, United Nations (UN) operations and protection operations have been added. Second, it was possible to cover each mission in depth, and further develop and utilise the conceptual framework. We were so fortunate to be able to expand the team and include the expertise of Alexander William Beadle, Gen (ret.) Sverre Diesen, Robert Egnell, Iver Johansen, Siw Tynes Johnsen, Guro Lien and David Ucko. In addition to being a pleasure to work with, they all contributed in so many ways to making this book a truly joint effort. We also take the opportunity to express our gratitude to Lene Ekhaugen, Lt Col Egil Daltveit, Anne Kjersti Frøholm, Kirsten Gislesen, Anne Lise Hammer, Maj Tor-Erik Hanssen, Torbjørn Kveberg, Lt Col Kjell Pedersen, Ragnhild Siedler, Henning Søgaard, Anders S. Vaage and Lt Col Palle Ydstebø.

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Tore Nyhamar and Per M. Norheim-Martinsen
Oslo

Abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
BOPE	Special Police Operations Battalion (Brazil)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (United States)
COIN	Counter-insurgency
DDOS	Distributed Denial of Service
DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of Western African States
EU	European Union
EW	Electronic Warfare
FARC	*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Columbia*
FARDC	Congolese Army
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
FFI	Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
GSG 9	German Police Counterterrorist Unit
IC	International Community
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDF	Israeli Defence Force
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army (Uganda and around)
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH	UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MONUSCO	The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NTC	National Transitional Council (Libya)
OUP	Operation Unified Protector (NATO)
OMLT	Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
P–5	Permanent Five Members of the Security Council
PMC	Private Military Company
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SAS	Special Air Service (British)
SOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNISFA	UN Interim Security force for Abyei
UNMISS	UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNMIX	Imaginary Peacekeeping Force
UNSC	UN Security Council
UNSMIS	UN Supervision Mission in Syria
UPP	Pacification Police Units, Brazil
US	United States
US CERT	US Computer Emergency Response Team
USCYBERCOM	US Cyber Command

1 Introduction

Trends and scenarios in international military operations

Per M. Norheim-Martinsen

The context in which international military operations are carried out is constantly changing, as is the nature of war itself. The purpose of this book is nothing less than an attempt to understand how current trends, and the trajectories they may take, will affect tomorrow's military operations. We are fully aware of the pitfalls of trying to look into the future – many are those who have failed to do so in the past. But we hold that by thinking about the future we will be better prepared to deal with both the expected and the unexpected.

The book is ultimately about finding the utility of force in a modern world. The reference to General Sir Rupert Smith's opus magnum from 2005 is, of course, no coincidence (Smith 2005). Regarded by many as the 'most important book on war for over a century and a half' (Gow 2006, p. 1152), Smith offers an insightful account of the changing nature of military strategy, operations and tactics. But where Smith starts his analysis by asking what our desired end for using force is, we ask how the parameters in which force as a political instrument is ultimately exercised will affect its use in the future. In light of demographic and economic shifts, how can operations be carried out cheaper or smarter? How will the fact that half of the world's population already lives in cities affect future operations? How will emerging powers like China, India, Brazil and Turkey affect how future peacekeeping operations are carried out? What missions must military forces expect to carry out in the future? And how will new technologies affect future operations?

By addressing these questions, the individual chapters of the book aim to break down general trends and trajectories into tasks and mission types in order to identify concrete implications for military forces in tomorrow's international military operations. As such, the book has a more specific aim than some of the excellent books on the market, including Smith's, which address the changing character of war from a more general perspective (Barnett 2004, Gray 2005, Haug and Maao 2011, Strachan and Scheipers 2011). It also takes a more explicitly forward-looking perspective than much of the recent literature on peace and stabilisation operations, which is for the most part based on historical analysis of past and present

operations (Daniel *et al.* 2008, Paris and Sisk 2009, Mayall and de Oliveira 2011). By embracing instead some of the insights of the growing field of future studies, and merging them with traditional scenario thinking, the individual authors of this book are able to offer fresh insights and perspectives on some of the challenges that military forces may have to face in the future.

This introductory chapter first discusses briefly some of the limits and potentials of studying the future, and outlines the methodological basis for the book. It explains the difference between forecast and foresight, and points towards how future studies may complement long-term defence planning. The chapter then offers an overview of key global trends and trajectories, and outlines how they relate to future international military operations. The analysis covers trends in areas like demographics, economics, technology and geopolitics and leads into nine scenarios or generic mission types, which are then analysed in each of the remaining chapters of the book. A key objective of the volume has also been to come up with a comprehensive set of generic parameters for analysing emerging tasks and requirements arising from each mission type. These are set out and discussed in Chapter 2.

Future studies and long-term defence planning

Coming from a research community intimately involved in defence planning on both the national and international (NATO) levels, we see the need for a different approach to long-term defence planning than the traditional models applied today. Modern defence planning is usually based on scenarios. They are, as such, studies of what are perceived to be likely but unwanted future events, and ways of managing these events. However, there is no guarantee that other events, which are not planned for, will occur. In fact, unexpected events represent rather the rule than the exception, a fact of life that has earned future studies a rather dodgy reputation, especially in academic circles. However, we hold that this understanding is dated, and ultimately misses what future studies are really about.

Future studies are often criticised for trying to predict the future – and, in the end, for usually getting it wrong. But the purpose of future studies is *not* to predict. Rather, future studies are about improving our capacity to manage the *uncertainty* that inevitably defines the future – it is about thinking 'outside the box'. To be able to say at some point down the line that our analysis of the future corresponded with the actual events is not really the key. The aim of future studies is to make sure that decision makers and planners do not get locked in to rigid and/or faulty interpretations of continuity and change, and therefore make rash decisions, or hesitate to make decisions, when unexpected or expected events occur. But, before moving on to discuss some of the limits and potentials of future studies, it is necessary to clarify what we mean by 'the future'.

There is no set timeframe for the book, insofar as the time horizon for the studies on which our analysis of global trends draw varies. For example, in demographics, it is not unusual to have a 30–50-year-perspective. In technology studies, it is typically less than 25 years. In demographics, one is fairly certain how many people are born in a given year, providing a relatively firm basis for predicting how the population will develop in the future. In technology studies, the time horizon is shorter because breakthroughs and rapid change lead to significantly greater uncertainty. In any case, giving an exact date for how far into the future one would wish to see may imply a degree of certainty that simply does not exist and may thus be misleading.

Instead, it is more fruitful to contrast our perspective with the timeframe and methodology of traditional long-term defence planning. The book is intended to complement this process, which in most Western states is carried out in four-year cycles leading up to major reviews. In our experience, it is difficult to include upcoming needs for change in this process, and this is a problem which is shared with colleagues in most NATO countries. Some countries, such as Norway, have moved towards a continuous demand-driven planning process, which takes place simultaneously with implementation, to counter this tendency. However, a problem with this approach is that it tends to be too reactive and does not encourage a more fundamental analysis of continuity and change at regular intervals (see Norheim-Martinsen *et al.* 2011). A key objective of future studies is precisely to 'look beyond the horizon', and to illustrate to decision makers how global trends and alternative scenarios may pose both expected and unexpected challenges in a longer perspective. Accordingly, the timeframe of the book stretches beyond – but does include – the 4–12-year-perspective adopted in long-term defence planning, but it takes a different perspective and methodology in order to complement this approach.

Looking into the crystal ball – limits and potentials of future studies

As stated above, the purpose of future studies is not to try to *predict* the future, but rather to improve our capacity to manage *uncertainty*. This is also why contemporary future studies literature tends to prefer the term 'fore*sight*' to 'fore*cast*'. However, despite the usual caveats included in the forewords and introductions of the numerous trend reports, books and future blurbs that are published each year, they cannot escape the criticism that they more often than not fail to predict the intensity and direction even of trends that come across as fairly certain, or fail to predict the important events that in hindsight come across as perfectly predictable (see e.g. Gardner 2010). The latter are often referred to as ruptures, strategic surprises or shocks, or in more popular terms, 'black swans'.

In his 2007 international bestseller *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*, Nicholas Nassim Taleb claims that almost everything in the world, from major scientific discoveries to historical events, or the directions our own lives take, are due to 'black swans' – rare, unexpected and completely unpredictable events, which, nevertheless, come across as completely rational when seen in hindsight. He cites the development of the Internet, the computer, World War I and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks as examples of such events. Taleb's key message is that even if we are able to predict certain trends with some degree of probability, we cannot predict the really important, but rare, events that will have the greater impact on our lives. The fact that they are, indeed, rare is what makes them fall outside the remits of human imagination – human psychology is biased towards what is known to us. This does not imply that the events themselves are rare, merely that we are unable to predict when, where and how the next black swan will strike.[1] Hence, having better or more statistics does not necessarily improve our ability to predict the future. Likewise, trends and projections are nothing more than future expectations based on developments over time – or like driving by looking in the rear-view mirror.

The black swan problem is an important corrective to a growing belief that risk analysis and management may put us in a position to identify and remove, or at the very least reduce, any threat. Over the latter years, there has emerged a virtual industry dedicated to future studies, and risk analysis in particular. For example, the United Nations University Millennium Project Handbook, which is updated regularly, describes more than 25 different future analysis methods (see Glenn and Gordon 2009). None of them is able to offer certainty about the future. Yet all risk analysis is based on calculations in which risk is a function of the probability that a threat will occur, and the consequences of it occurring. A precondition for all risk analysis, therefore, is that any event can be predicted with some degree of precision. History tells us that is not the case. Rather, the increased belief that risk can be managed, and the corresponding development of new methods aimed at increasing the accuracy of future studies, may quickly become a form of collective self-deception. The question is then: why should this book concern itself with the future of international military operations?

First, although we cannot predict the future, it makes perfect sense to anticipate that *something* is going to happen, and to try to limit the negative consequences of potential future threats. The paradox of military power is that it is most effective when it is *not* used. Rather, it is the existence or threat of force, and the corresponding knowledge about the inevitable costs of going to war, that will ensure its effectiveness. We hold that the option of international use of force to confront crimes against humanity and manage crises that threaten local, regional and global security is one that will be, and should be, open in the future also. This requires

constant adaptation of national and international military structures and capabilities to a changing conflict environment. With this book we want to encourage foresight in planning by raising the awareness, among practitioners, policymakers and students alike, of what new challenges this changing conflict environment may pose in the future.

Second, thinking actively about the future may feed into scenarios or mission types other than those planned for today. Scenarios represent a key tool for states and international security organisations to test and prepare military structures and capabilities for the kind of tasks they are likely to (have to) carry out. They make it possible to prioritise and make decisions under conditions of uncertainty. However, it is important that military planners, when they develop their scenarios, do not rule out the kind of tasks and missions that at present come across as less likely. As such, future studies and scenarios may mutually reinforce each other by contributing towards robust structures and capabilities, while, at the same time, ensuring that future studies are made relevant for long-term defence planning. The identification and analysis of nine different mission types against five generic parameters, which we argue in Chapter 2 will define emerging tasks and requirements for future forces, is meant as a modest first step in this regard.

Third, despite the usual criticism launched against future studies, that they tend to get the future wrong, they also often get it right. Conservative analyses of trends and trajectories within isolated areas, such as economics or demographics, may, in fact, prepare the ground for good decisions, and make sure that the proper precautions are taken. Black swans are admittedly all about the major, course-changing events, but planning is also about the small-to-medium events. It is, for example, unwise not to start revising expensive pension and welfare schemes when we expect that the proportion of older people in society will rise. Trends analyses may counter tendencies towards near-sightedness in defence planning by showing how even conservative prognoses may incur completely new security challenges over time. By actively exploring how major global trends, which are not at the outset connected to security and defence, may affect the use of international military force in the future, we want to contribute towards countering such tendencies.

Finally, future studies and trends analyses are a constant reminder that the world is changing. Such activities stimulate alternative thinking and contribute towards avoiding so-called 'cognitive closure' – i.e. human desire to eliminate ambiguity and arrive at definite conclusions. In our search for certainty, we tend to stick with what we know, or what has already happened (see e.g. Webster and Kruglanski 1997).[2] It is, for example, an historical fact that armies prepare for the last war. Or in the famous words of Sir Basil Liddell-Hart: 'The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out'. Studying the future contributes in itself towards nurturing a collective

awareness that unexpected events will occur. By not thinking about the future we succumb to the false idea that the world remains the same.

To sum up, the purpose of the book is not to predict but to provide fore*sight*, as opposed to fore*cast*. Accordingly, we make no attempt to predict what trends or mission types are most likely in the future, nor assign probabilities to the mission types. In this sense our approach differs from, for example, the Correlates of War project (see www.correlatesofwar.org/) or any other approaches aiming to improve statistical predictions regarding the likelihood of war (see e.g. Hegre *et al.* 2013). Instead, foresight handles uncertainty by spelling out a number of scenarios rather than narrowing down to only those that are considered likely at present. It is sufficient that a scenario is plausible. Also, the sample of scenarios or mission types does not need to be exhaustive to provide foresight. It only needs to find enough interesting new challenges to be helpful.

With this aim in mind, we arrived at the nine mission types analysed in this book by considering two ways in which new challenges for the international use of military force might arise. The first is how present mission types will evolve in a conflict environment shaped by global trends. The second is how the global trends may give rise to completely new mission types. We shall return to what the nine mission types are shortly, but only after we outline what we expect to be key global trends and explain how they may shape international military operations in the future.

Demographics of discord – the shrinking of the West

Changing demographics represents a first set of trends that directly or indirectly will affect the conduct of international military operations in the future. Some commentators have even begun to talk about a new 'population bomb' (Goldstone 2010). The numbers speak for themselves.

Given expected growth rates, the world's total population is expected to stabilise at somewhere between 7.7 and 11.2 billion people by 2050 (United Nations Population Reference Bureau, www.prb.org/). But 90 per cent of the population growth will take place outside the Western world. Since 2007, more people have been dying than have been born in Europe. Russia is losing some 0.5 per cent of its population every year. It has been remarked that, pandemics apart, the Russian situation lacks historical precedents (Howe and Jackson 2008, p. 7). In contrast, China's population is expected to grow to 1.4 billion but will be surpassed by India, whose population will grow to 1.8 billion by 2050. The United States' population will grow to 400 million people, while the total population of the Western world will be around one billion people. In 2050, this will make up only one-tenth of the world's total population, compared to just below one-seventh today.

The consequences of this demographic shift are serious enough. But the West's relative decline is also reinforced by a second megatrend: a

dramatic ageing of the population in this part of the world. At present, the proportion of people over 60 years old in the United States (US), Canada and the European Union (EU) is 15–22 per cent. But, as the post-war baby boomers are nearing retirement and life expectancy increases, the proportion of people over 60 will increase to 30 per cent. At the same time, the number of people of working age will go down, due to declining birth rates. In some countries, the consequences of these demographic shifts will be harder felt than in others: South Korea will, despite an expected total population loss of only 9 per cent (from 48.3 to 44.1 million) by 2050, experience a 36 per cent decline of its working age population, while its proportion of people over 60 will grow by 150 per cent. As a result, South Korea's working age population will barely outnumber those over 60 years old. Europe will lose some 24 per cent of its working age population, while the proportion of those over 60 will increase by 47 per cent. It is also worth remarking that China will be facing similar prospects (from 12 per cent over 60 today to 30 per cent in 2050), which will, among other factors, have severe consequences for its economic growth. India is again the demographic winner but faces a redistribution problem, as the majority of its population growth will take place in the rural, poor north (US Government 2010, p. 15).

The ageing of the West is, in turn, reinforced by a third demographic megatrend: roughly nine out of ten children under the age of 15 are growing up in the developing world. On the one hand, this emerging 'youth bulge' may provide the basis for improved economic growth in countries like Turkey, Iran, the Maghreb states (Morocco, Algeria and Tunis), Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia (US Government 2008, p. 22). On the other, it may lead to a wave of 'angry youth' if state authorities fail to provide them with opportunities, including education, jobs, income and the prospects of a worthy life. Of the world's total population growth towards 2050, 70 per cent will take place in countries which are classified by the World Bank as low income countries (i.e. average income below US$3.855 in 2008), such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Nigeria and Yemen (US Government 2008, p. 22; Goldstone 2010).

Finally, the world is urbanising at an unprecedented rate (UN-HABITAT 2008, Goldstone 2010). Today, more than 50 per cent of the world's population is living in cities, a share that is expected to grow to 70 per cent by 2050. This trend is particularly strong in Asia and Africa, which contain most of the world's 19 megacities, i.e. cities with more than ten million people. In sub-Saharan Africa, more than one billion people are expected to live in cities (from a proportion of 35 per cent today to 67 per cent in 2050). The total number of megacities in the world is expected to increase to 25 as early as 2025, but only one of them (Paris) will be in the Western world (US Government 2008, p. 23). From an economic point of view, the concentration of people in urban centres is expected to have

positive effects, insofar as roughly 65 per cent of all economic activity and 85 per cent of all innovation take place in cities (UN-HABITAT 2008). But there is a risk that urbanisation will have a destabilising effect upon many countries. The urbanising states in sub-Saharan Africa in particular are characterised by fast growing cities, urban sprawl, the growth of slums and massive inequalities between rich and poor. These environments are prone to rising violence and crime. They are also identified by lack of management and control, which, in turn, may open them up to radical groups, terrorist networks and organised criminals gaining a foothold and being able to operate unchecked (Kilcullen 2013).

All of the abovementioned demographic trends will give rise to new challenges in and for international military operations. Ageing populations in the Western world will have consequences for recruitment to national military forces. Western states already have difficulties sustaining large military deployments overseas, due to shrinking armies and defence budgets (see below). Moreover, shrinking youth rates may increase the threshold for Western states to engage in military operations, given the economic and human costs that the use of armed force inevitably carries. Other states, especially in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, which will often have youth rates above 50 per cent, may, in turn, have a lower threshold for engaging in armed conflict (US Government 2010, p. 15). Among the top ten troop-contributing countries to UN peacekeeping operations, there are no Western states. States like Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Egypt, Nepal and Jordan continue to bear the greatest burden, while a state like China has become the largest troop contributor among the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the fourteenth largest contributor altogether. Emerging powers, such as Brazil, are moving in to take the lead in new UN operations (see discussion below).

Many of the challenges already seen in today's operations will be exacerbated. Ethical dilemmas in dealing with child soldiers will continue to pose a challenge to intervening forces, especially in countries in Africa with extremely youthful populations. The dividing line between soldiers and civilians will become ever more blurred, as operations move from rural to urban conflict environments. The urbanisation trend of the last 20 years has made it increasingly harder to avoid military operations in urban areas, such as in Beirut (1982), Los Angeles (1992), Mogadishu (1993), Gaza (2009), Grozny (1995, 2000), Baghdad (2003) and Fallujah (2004) (Vautravers 2010, p. 439). In the future, the danger of vulnerable cities collapsing completely, or being subject to massive systemic breakdown, as a result of natural disasters, energy shortages, lack of law and order etc. will have wide security and humanitarian consequences. The need to be able to operate in urban environments will have vast implications for Western militaries when it comes to tactics, doctrine, equipment and training. Tomorrow's megacities may typically contain small pockets of heavily armed opposing forces, lawless areas under the control of

criminal gangs, but also areas with relative stability, often in the immediate vicinity of each other. International forces may, therefore, have to carry out tasks such as community policing and more demanding combat operations simultaneously and within the same theatre of operations. The UN operation MINUSTAH (*Mission des Notions Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haiti)* in Haiti showed how military forces might be a blunt yet effective instrument for confronting excessive urban violence. Similar-type operations have been carried out in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, which illustrates how emerging powers like Brazil, which has been lead nation for MINUSTAH since 2004, are developing the type of experience and capabilities needed in tomorrow's urban military operations. This is covered in depth by Per M. Norheim-Martinsen in Chapter 7 of the book.

Finally, as a result of urbanisation, most refugees come from cities, and therefore seek out other cities for protection. Protection of civilians is a main objective in all UN peace operations today (see also below). The challenges of protection in contemporary conflicts became all too apparent in the 2010 international military campaign in Libya, in which the limitations of air power were revealed as the warring parties retreated to the cities. Protection of civilians in international military operations is covered in depth by Alexander W. Beadle in Chapter 9.

Economic trends – spending smarter or going out of business

Economic developments are closely connected to the demographic trends above. Here too the main trend is a relative weakening of the West due to lack of workers, fewer consumers and low expected economic growth in the years to come. To put recent developments in perspective: in the period after the industrial revolution, the US, Canada and Europe increased their share of global GDP from 32 per cent in 1900 to 68 per cent in 1950. Between 1950 and 2003, this share fell to 47 per cent. However, even with an expected economic growth rate equal to the period between 1973 and 2003 (average 1.68 per cent for the United States, Canada and Europe, and 2.47 per cent for the rest of the world), Western states' share of global GDP is expected to sink below 30 per cent by 2050 – less than it was in 1820 (Goldstone 2010). Some 80 per cent of future economic growth will take place outside the Western world. This will, in turn, result in a massive transfer of markets to other regions, in which the middle class population is booming. According to World Bank projections, the middle class in these parts of the world will reach some 1.2 billion people by 2030. This number is higher than the expected number of people in Europe, Japan and the US put together (Goldstone 2010). The trends inevitably point towards an already ongoing transfer of economic power away from the Western world towards emerging powers, such as Brazil, Russia, India and China (the so-called BRICs), but also towards

states like Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey. Views differ as to the sustainability of economic growth in the BRICs in particular – Russia, for example, should perhaps rather be seen as a declining power. Economic forecasts are, in any case, uncertain, and black swans will occur, as seen in the ongoing global financial crisis.

However, the shape of things to come is already evident in massive cuts in national defence budgets. For example, in its military strategy from 2011, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff regard US foreign debt levels to be a significant threat to national security (US Government 2011). US foreign debt already amounts to more than US$3.5 trillion. In the future, the US will be spending more than 7 per cent of its GDP just to pay the interest (US Government 2010, p. 21). In comparison, the US national defence budget equalled only 4.7 per cent of its GDP in 2010. President Obama has signalled that the US will have to cut defence expenditure by US$78 billion over the next couple of years, but others expect even tougher cuts (see e.g. Mandelbaum 2010). This will inevitably lead to a change in priorities regarding where, when and how the US will use military force in the future. These changes can already be observed in a general shift of military focus away from the relatively stable Europe towards the Asia–Pacific region. However, future cuts will also affect what is often referred to as the US' 'hidden export', i.e. the securing of global trade and communication routes – or the so-called global commons – and the peace and stability ensured by the continuing US military presence in several regions and conflict zones around the world (US Government 2010, p. 22).

In Europe, we may also observe a general trend towards a tightening of defence budgets. Given the economic realities of the ongoing crisis of the Eurozone, this trend will only grow stronger in the years to come (see US Government 2008, p. 32). Yet it is worth noting the fact that together European states still spend more than US$200 billion per year – more than double the amount of China – and still have some two million soldiers on active duty (see International Institute for Strategic Studies 2008, chapter 4).[3] The problem is that only a limited share of these forces is deployable internationally, while effective spending is hampered by unnecessary (and necessary) duplication of capabilities. The solution, as held by most security and defence policy analysts today, lies in more integration by way of 'pooling and sharing' of capabilities, and more role specialisation amongst the European states. In light of the financial crisis there seems to be a growing political momentum for more military collaboration, as reflected in the NATO initiative on 'smart defence' (see NATO 2010) and the EU's Ghent framework for pooling and sharing of military capabilities (Germany/Sweden 2010). However, as remarked by Tomas Valasek (2011): 'What makes obvious sense to experts and officials looks very different to national defence ministers.' Collaboration takes years to yield rewards and may initially cost more than it saves, while also carrying real political risks, insofar as opposition politicians and journalists will

often accuse defence ministers of undermining national sovereignty. Europe knows it will have to spend smarter, but it is a slow train coming.

Until the incentives become strong enough for policymakers to move beyond the politically safer route of inaction, therefore, Western states will have to explore other options that may save money in the short to medium term. Privatisation is but one obvious solution in this regard. Private Military Companies (PMCs) have previously played an important role in the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s and in numerous civil wars and armed conflicts in countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and the DRC. The US-led intervention in Iraq in 2003 is often described as a breakthrough for the ongoing privatisation of military services in Western states. And the tendency is increasing, despite serious issues raised with regard to, for example, what used to be Blackwater's role and activities in Iraq (see e.g. Avant 2004, 2005). This trend may, on the one hand, be reversed given greater awareness of the ethical issues and command and control challenges incurred by outsourcing military force. On the other hand, it may also grow stronger with the increased pressure on national defence budgets. Policymakers may, perhaps in international military operations in particular, be tempted to let increased competition in a growing marketplace for military services push the costs of intervention down. By outsourcing tasks to PMCs, policymakers may also avoid the political costs of having the nation's young men and women return in body bags. Such use of 'foreign legionnaires' or 'colonial forces' is, of course, a practice that has been around in states like the UK, France and Spain for centuries.

Another option may be to rely more on smaller deployments, often using Special Forces to carry out limited raids, or to make use of mentoring and training of local forces to avoid having to bear the costs of deploying and sustaining large units in the field. NATO has highlighted the increased use of 'indigenous forces' as a key component in its future international operations (NATO ACT 2009). It is held that having the host nation carry out stabilisation may even increase the operational effect in theatre, while avoiding the problem of mission creep. However, such operations necessarily involve large cadres of Western officers who have the language and cultural skills to carry out mentoring and liaison tasks in often extremely hostile environments. These and other challenges are discussed by Guro Lien in Chapter 5, while the increased use of Special Forces as a key Western asset in international military operations is treated in depth by Iver Johansen in Chapter 4.

Technological trends – back to basics

Most future studies hold that scientific and technological developments will grow ever faster and spread to new areas. A halt in or reversal of technological developments is not considered likely, even if there are historical examples of technology and knowledge lost.[4] Exactly *what* the

future will bring of technological innovation is impossible to anticipate, but much is expected to happen in the areas of information technology, nanotechnology and biotechnology. In addition, new fields of technology may emerge. These developments will open up new opportunities for growing numbers of people. But they will also lead to new challenges.

First, society today is becoming more reliant on information and communication technology, but the infrastructure for these technologies is vulnerable. NATO's strategic concept cites cyber attacks as a key threat against the Alliance in the years to come (NATO 2010, para. 12). Second, increased access to communication technology may destabilise countries, as seen, for example, in the demonstrations that led to the downfall of the regimes in Tunis and Egypt, in which mobile phones were used actively to spread information amongst the demonstrators. The ongoing Arab Spring continues to demonstrate the difficulties totalitarian regimes face in trying to control their populations in today's information age. Third, increased awareness of inequalities within and between countries and regions, as a result of increased access to cheap communication technology, may lead to anger and frustration amongst the have-nots. Fourth, new knowledge and technology may be utilised by potential adversaries, referred to below as terrorists, to harm societies in ever new ways. The result of these developments may be local and regional conflicts that may require international intervention. The dynamics within these eventual operations may, in turn, change as the local populations' expectations of and attitude towards the intervening force will be affected by greater awareness of the outside world, instant knowledge of negative events on the ground, and the ability to mobilise and coordinate large crowds of people as mobile phones and social media become effective means of 'command and control'.

Technology and innovation have played a particularly important role for the military. In his essay 'The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy', Sir Michael Howard shows how technological superiority has had a decisive effect upon the outcome on almost every war in (modern) history (Howard 1983, p. 104). Yet Howard cautions against forgetting the social, logistical and operational dimensions of strategy. Throughout military history, the importance placed on technological and human factors has tended to shift as technological innovations have been met with effective counter measures. However, a brief look at the last 20 years shows that the faith in advanced technology as *the* solution to all challenges of war has gained an increasingly dominant role, as epitomised by the so-called 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA). This is again changing.

In the US, the technological dimension is now being toned down (see e.g. Department of the Army 2009). That is, the continued emphasis on and investments in technology will not go away, but it will not necessarily claim as central a role as it has in the past. These developments will have to be seen in conjunction with the economic challenges discussed above. For example, in the US there have been cuts in the F-35 joint strike fighter

programme, while prestige projects such as the Future Combat System have been cancelled. The shift of focus is evident in the US Army's capstone doctrine from 2009, which states that RMA proponents have disregarded many of the universal characteristics of war, while at the same time putting too much emphasis on new technologies and capabilities. It is held that concepts emphasising long-range precision-guided weapons in particular have disregarded war's political, cultural and psychological context (Department of the Army 2009, p. 6). The resonance with Howard's 20-year-old warning is obvious.

Whether the emphasis will move back to technology in the future is impossible to say. However, it is worth reflecting on the fact that future technological innovation may not necessarily take place inside the Western defence industrial complex, which so far has given birth to innovations such as the Global Positioning System (GPS), the Internet, etc. Major innovations today are developed by civilian companies, such as Google and Apple. These companies are still predominantly located in the Western world, which continues to score higher on innovation indexes than countries such as China and India. But the gap is expected to be reduced over the next ten years, as these countries learn to utilise their comparative advantage in new fields of technology (US Government 2008, p. 13). In any case, in the years to come it is expected that the technological superiority, which has benefitted Western military forces for decades, will gradually wither, as '[f]uture adversaries will use commercial off-the-shelf capabilities (to include information technology) to construct a well-organised, dispersed force capable of complex operations' (Department of the Army 2009, p. 13). Understanding how people might use technology will be more important than the technology itself.

At the core of many of the emerging challenges described so far is the simultaneous vulnerability that increased technological dependency creates. This is a challenge for Western military forces in particular. Most weapon systems today are to some degree reliant on network technology and/or GPS. Neutralising these systems, for example through various forms of jamming, will have major consequences for how Western forces operate. The US Army's *Capstone Concept* takes as a point of departure that, in the future, US forces cannot expect to be able to operate with all systems intact. Protection of one's own, and the ability strike against an opponent's, networks and systems – i.e. cyber warfare – will, therefore, grow in importance. This is reflected, for example, by NATO's signalling that a cyber attack may trigger a collective response under article five of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO 2010). Insofar as the frequency and effects of cyber attacks increase significantly, or for example effective GPS jammers become commercially available, it may trigger a trend towards more robust, low-tech solutions. The growing importance of the cyber domain for international military operations is covered in depth by Siw Tynes Johnsen in Chapter 9.

Finally, technological developments will affect how Western forces operate on the battlefield whether at home or abroad. The pressure on European forces in particular to transform and adapt to stay interoperable with US forces will continue to set the agenda for some time to come. But, in the long run, an evening out of the technological differences between the current haves and the have-nots may also have a democratising effect on how multinational operations are carried out, as emerging actors are challenging the traditional lead nations.

New conflicts, new actors, new missions

The trends discussed above will give rise to new types of conflict, new challenges and solutions within existing types of missions, and also completely new types of missions and approaches, all as new state and non-state actors are entering the scene. The Arab Spring illustrates, for example, how technological developments, such as a world in which 'everyone' has access to cheap information technology, fuel the disappointment young people especially feel, as their expectations of democratic development and increased living standards are not met – or are not met soon enough. It is becoming increasingly difficult for even authoritarian regimes to control their own citizens. Mobile phones as a tool for mass mobilisation and instant spread of information have proved to be very effective weapons. Moreover, increased awareness of inequalities within and between countries and regions may also cause conflicts to spread, as seen in waves of demonstrations in states that are subject to rapid development, such as Turkey and Brazil.

Limited access to natural resources also carries a significant conflict potential, not least in light of the economic and demographic trends described above. Limited access to water in the Middle East and Africa may spur new water wars. The consequence may be a demand for international action to alleviate humanitarian crises or intervene in conflicts in operational environments that will offer severe logistical challenges for international forces. Finally, competition for coal, steel and other minerals, on which industrialising states especially depend, may also lead to new conflicts in the future.

In other words, there is little to suggest that the *demand* for international military operations will go down in the future, even if this demand is not necessarily as hard felt among the states at the receiving end of the interventions, nor among some of the emerging powers such as China, India or Brazil. The key problem is rather to be found on the *supply* side, as the capacity and will among the states that have traditionally championed international interventions in the past is bound to wither. This is not to say that one always has a choice of intervention, as is sometimes implied by distinguishing between 'wars of choice' and 'wars of necessity'. Insofar as national interests in a globalising world will be increasingly

threatened outside national borders, international military operations far away from home may rather become 'wars of necessity' in the future. The controversies surrounding these operations will, at the same time, increase as their legitimacy comes under pressure, domestic debate grows and the more altruistic motives behind these operations are toned down.

However, this development must be seen in relation to another trend, which has partly moved in the opposite direction, and which follows much in line with Sir Rupert Smith's thoughts on war among the people. Protecting *people* regardless of nationality has over the last decade become a key priority for and in operations across the entire conflict spectrum. In light of previous failures, the UN in particular has made protection of civilians a top priority in its peacekeeping operations today. The adoption of the principle of the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) represents the latest attempt to address the issue of mass violence against civilians happening in the first place. However, as Alexander W. Beadle discusses in Chapter 11, protecting civilians has also become an objective beyond the moral imperative. Protecting people has become a military–strategic necessity in most types of operations, including operations where it is not the primary objective; this first and foremost derives from the changing nature of contemporary conflict in which civilians are increasingly targeted. Yet a key question is whether emerging powers, such as China, Russia, India and Brazil, which have all grown critical of using armed force in instances where regimes attack their own populations, will support these types of counter-regime operations in the future. Such operations have also posed a number of challenges to the intervening parties in the recent past, which raises questions about their desirability with those who have championed them in the UN, an issue that is discussed by General (Ret.) Sverre Diesen in Chapter 3. As we shall see, counter-regime operations may still be hard to avoid.

In any case, a rather obvious consequence of the trends discussed in this chapter is that, as a result of economic expansion and a general transfer of power from the Western world to emerging powers to the South and East, new actors will (have to) take on an expanding role in and for international military operations in the time to come. As an example of the inherent logic of these developments, take China's current role and interests in Africa: currently, China has more than 100,000 'settlers' in Angola – young, highly educated individuals, who have contributed to rebuilding critical infrastructure, such as roads, and restarting the economy after decades of civil war. Even if the image of China's role in Africa is complex – China's interests in South Sudan are, for example, seen as more controversial – the Chinese enjoy much legitimacy and respect in many African countries. This presence leaves a very different impression of China than the usual threat images painted in the West (see e.g. Brautigam 2009). Nevertheless, there is little reason to doubt that China will move to protect its interests if, for example, threatened by civil

war. The international community will then have to decide whether an eventual Chinese operation should be sanctioned by the UN, who would lead it, whether to participate in the operation, etc. These questions will, in turn, have wider consequences for the UN as the central sanctioning authority in matters concerning war. China is already the largest troop contributor to UN missions amongst the permanent members of the Security Council, and is, therefore, an actor with which Western forces will have to cooperate to stay relevant as global security providers in the future. Generally, Western forces will have to prepare for more cooperation with states like Brazil, India, Indonesia and others – with the operational and cultural challenges this will pose.

These expected changes in global security provision must also be seen in relation to the increased awareness of challenges to the so-called 'global commons': the high seas, the atmosphere, outer space and cyberspace. Western states, with the US at the forefront, have for long secured free access to and passage through the commons through international regimes with various degrees of formalisation, such as the Law of the Seas. Whether these regimes will be respected by emerging powers remains an open question, especially if they are seen to run counter to shifting national interests. The US' traditional dominance in the world is under pressure, which may lead to more of an international division of labour when it comes to keeping the commons open. The naval operations to counter the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden represent but one example of an international effort to secure free passage in one of the commons. Similar types of international military operations may become more common in the future. Such operations may involve 'taking out' hackers operating in states or cities with limited governmental control, taking out servers, taking out pirate bases onshore, supporting other states' cyber warfare, etc. A common denominator for these operations is that they will be limited in scope and duration. This will, in turn, increase the demand for highly specialised assets capable of operating alongside other states' forces and/or units from other branches within and beyond the military.

In sum, the trends described above may point towards more limited, interest-based operations, following a period in which humanitarian operations – or at least an emphasis on humanitarian motives for intervention – have been the norm. This may require some form of role specialisation in and between those states that want to take part in these operations in the future. Issues such as the legality and legitimacy of intervention are also becoming more muddled, as seen for example in changes in the way that consent is handled and mandates are given. These are issues that are, in turn, complicated by the fact that many challenges – and thus solutions – today are transnational. Economic shifts suggest that Western countries have to find cheaper forms of intervention, such as Military Advising and Assistance operations or privatising military tasks, a trend that has been

coming for quite some time already. There is still the danger that the global community will stumble into operations of the kind that they do not want to carry out, typically involving state or nation building, tasks that require enormous resources and not least time. The recurring question is still how to devise appropriate exit strategies, not necessarily how to avoid these operations. And then we have the new forms of conflict, or old conflicts in new guise, including tomorrow's urban conflicts.

Nine mission types for twenty-first century international intervention

In this book, we try to cover some of the emerging challenges drawn from the analysis of key global trends and trajectories – and seek to identify the utility of force in dealing with them – by analysing nine carefully selected mission types, which we believe will be relevant for future international military operations. We arrived at this selection by considering two ways that new challenges for the international use of military force might arise. The first is how present mission types will evolve in a conflict environment shaped by global trends. The following belong in this category:

- high-intensity operations (Chapter 3)
- counter-insurgency operations (Chapter 4)
- military advising and assistance operations (Chapter 5)
- special forces operations (Chapter 6)
- UN operations (Chapter 7).

The second way is how the global trends may give rise to completely new mission types. The following belong in this category:

- new urban operations (Chapter 8)
- transnational operations (Chapter 9)
- cyber operations (Chapter 10)
- protection of civilians in operations (Chapter 11).

We could have chosen other mission types, or other ways of grouping them. Some would, for example, question why we have chosen to include a chapter on UN operations, which is not exactly a new type of mission. But we would argue that the UN is such an important actor in international military operations, and that it imposes such essential boundaries on other actors' behaviour in all international interventions, that it deserves to be analysed as a mission type of its own. This is not least because changes to the way the UN operates, and its role as the key sanctioning authority in matters relating to war, will have huge implications for international interventions in the future. In fact, all of the first five mission types analysed are partly about salvaging some of the

hard-won lessons of previous operations, rather than succumbing to the politically tempting, but arguably false, idea that they can be avoided in the future. In the chapters on military advising and assistance and special operations, we also explore the feasibility of carrying out these operations more cheaply and efficiently in the future. Some of the mission types include elements of nation building, which some might argue deserved its own chapter. However, we have chosen to deal with this challenge by looking at nation building as intrinsic to many of the mission types and by drawing some general observations across the mission types in the concluding chapter.

Others will miss chapters on, for example, anti-piracy operations and littoral operations, which have received some attention lately (see e.g. Kilcullen 2013). However, we have deliberately avoided purely naval operations, retaining rather a focus on land operations. Littoral operations, in turn, are touched upon in the chapter on the new urban operations, as the trends towards littoralisation can be seen as more or less intrinsic to urbanisation. Although other mission types may also be missed by some readers, it is necessary to stress again that for foresight it is sufficient that a scenario is plausible. The sample of scenarios or mission types does not need to be exhaustive. It only needs to find sufficient interesting new challenges to be helpful. We believe that the nine mission types selected for this volume fulfil that objective.

Finally, our instructions to each author were that they analyse their mission type using five generic parameters, which are set out in Chapter 2, while taking an explicitly forward-looking perspective. But, to encourage originality and out-of-the-box thinking, we gave them some freedom as to how to approach each mission type, and how to relate to the parameters in their analysis. Accordingly, some of the chapters take a case study approach, some use a more traditional scenario approach, while others take a more general approach. The result, we believe, is a truly innovative perspective on international military operations in the twenty-first century, which will prove helpful to practitioners and policymakers, and thought provoking for anyone interested in issues of international intervention today.

Notes

1 The problem is far from new. Philosophers such as David Hume, John Stuart Mill and Karl Popper in particular were all preoccupied with the problem of induction in logical thinking – i.e. drawing general conclusions from the specific, and making future predictions based on the past.

2 Cognitive closure is a term borrowed from psychology, but it is often used to explain why intelligence analysts and decision makers in general have difficulties breaking out of established thought patterns.

3 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database, China spent US$99.8 billion on defence in 2009, although the real number is probably higher.

4 The Mayans performed brain surgery, and the early Middle Ages were recognised by a generally lower level of development than previous times. A more recent example can be found in Germany's decision to abandon nuclear power due to its potential negative consequences.

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