



# **A Systematic Approach to Information Systems Security Education**

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# Overview

## **Introduction**

## **Comprehensive Model of Information Systems Security (McCumber Cube)**

## **Asset Protection Model (APM)**

Cognitive Complexity - Miller Index

## **Asset Cube**

System – Systems Engineering Community

Target – Information Assurance Community

Threat – Justice, Legal and IC Communities

## **Information Systems Security Framework**

System Framework

Target Framework

Threat Framework

## **Dynamic System Security Model**

## **Preliminary Results from Team Use**

## **Summary, Conclusions**



# Introduction

## Purpose

- Establish an expanded conceptual model for asset protection

## Constraints

- Human short-term reasoning capability
- Rate of technology and organizational change
- Involvement of multiple professional communities
- Expert knowledge differentiated from novice knowledge
- Lack of commonly accepted legal infrastructure

## Proposed New Model


- Supports human reasoning capabilities
- Establishes recursively defined levels of abstraction
- Supports computer-enhanced reasoning at detailed level
- Implemented independent of organization and technology

## Outcomes

- Conducted team test with CISO focus (one academic quarter)
- Strong positive feedback from team and instructor



## McCumber Cube




- Represents durable risk assessment model for information assurance (IA) community
- Configures to a 'matrix' of 9 elements
- Accommodates short-term human cognition capabilities
- Reflects structural design principles from systems science




# Asset Protection Model

Recursive design for adaptable computer support


*Highest Level of  
Abstraction – Level 1*




*Abstraction  
Level 2*



*The Threat  
Cube*




*The Target Cube  
[Domain-Specific]*



*The System  
Cube*




## Asset Cube - System



- Represents durable systems model for systems engineering (SE) community
- Configures to a 'matrix' of 9 elements
- Accommodates short-term human cognition capabilities
- Reflects structural design principles from systems science




## Asset Cube - Threat



- Represents durable threat model for Justice, Legal, and IC communities
- Provides level of detail to support information classification
- Configures to a 'matrix' of 9 elements
- Accommodates short-term human cognition capabilities
- Reflects structural design principles from systems science



## Asset Cube - Target



- Represents durable risk assessment model for information assurance (IA) community
- Configures to a 'matrix' of 9 elements
- Accommodates short-term human cognition capabilities
- Reflects structural design principles from systems science





## APM Framework – ‘Sub-Cube’ Structure (1 of 3)

X Axis	Y Axis	Z Axis
System Type	Threat Exposure	Target Configuration
System Type	Threat Exposure	Target Value
System Type	Threat Exposure	Target Protection
System Type	Threat Action	Target Configuration
System Type	Threat Action	Target Value
System Type	Threat Action	Target Protection
System Type	Threat Effect	Target Configuration
System Type	Threat Effect	Target Value
System Type	Threat Effect	Target Protection



## APM Framework – ‘Sub-Cube’ Structure (2 of 3)

X Axis	Y Axis	Z Axis
System Specification	Threat Exposure	Target Configuration
System Specification	Threat Exposure	Target Value
System Specification	Threat Exposure	Target Protection
System Specification	Threat Action	Target Configuration
System Specification	Threat Action	Target Value
System Specification	Threat Action	Target Protection
System Specification	Threat Effect	Target Configuration
System Specification	Threat Effect	Target Value
System Specification	Threat Effect	Target Protection



## APM Framework – ‘Sub-Cube’ Structure (3 of 3)

X Axis	Y Axis	Z Axis
System Program	Threat Exposure	Target Configuration
System Program	Threat Exposure	Target Value
System Program	Threat Exposure	Target Protection
System Program	Threat Action	Target Configuration
System Program	Threat Action	Target Value
System Program	Threat Action	Target Protection
System Program	Threat Effect	Target Configuration
System Program	Threat Effect	Target Value
System Program	Threat Effect	Target Protection



# APM Level 1 Interfaces

## Interface Communications


- Well-defined interfaces with clear, structured patterns
- Experts can focus on their particular area of expertise
- Novices have a way of identifying where/why data contributes to their decision making

## Level 1 Interfaces

- System – Threat Interface
- Threat – Target Interface
- Target – System Interface



## APM Framework - Interfaces





# APM Dynamic System Security Model

## Existing Systems Dynamics Model

- Articulates the “arms race” between cyber attackers and cyber defenders
- Created using a high level of abstraction

## State of System and Target Security

- System and Target Defensive Capabilities
- Defense Success Rate
- Improve System and Target Security
- System and Target State


## State of Threat Capability

- Threat Capability
- Threat Success Rate
- Improve Threat Capability
- System and Target State

**APM will provide the ability to build a more comprehensive dynamic systems security model**



# Dynamic System Security Model





## Preliminary Results from Team Use (1 of 2)

### Team objectives

- Understand the current state of cyber security incident reporting
- Determine the data quality associated with threat incident reporting
- Recommend methods for improved data quality collection

### Asset Protection Model (APM) Application

- Used to organize a vast volume of existing data including:
  - Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
  - Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
  - National Vulnerability Database (NVD)

### APM Model Semantic Calibration

- Applied model to several standard non-cyber security threat instances
  - Bank robbery – threat actor, threat mechanism, threat vector
  - Car hijacking – threat actor, threat mechanism, threat vector
  - Terrorist attack – threat actor, threat mechanism, threat vector





## **Preliminary Results from Team Use (2 of 2)**

### **Team APM Model Utilization**

- Used to place incident data in context of cyber security
- Guided team judgments regarding applicability, quality of the data
- Supported analysis of information gaps and poor data quality

### **Team Results**

- APM provided a structural context that could be analyzed by experts from a particular field
- Structure allowed communication of data between novice and experts
- APM viewed as effective
- APM provided structure needed to organize existing cyber security incident data
- Threat Cube concepts supported categorization, and definition of interrelationships between common threat types and attack patterns



# Summary, Conclusions

## **The Asset Protection Model (APM)**

- Establishes modules that allow internal controls, with communication and interaction at the interfaces
- Supports recursive definition of levels of abstraction
- Provides a focal point for the key asset protection communities – the IA, Systems, and Justice/Legal/IC
- Establishes a common framework for tailoring curriculum based on changes in technology and the threat spectrum
- Supports dynamic analysis of specific types of cyber defense activities
- Supports both human short-term cognition, and computer-enhanced reasoning methods
- Is independent of specific organizations and technologies, and will remain stable for an extended period of time

**More Research Is Needed to Refine the APM  
Concepts, and Its' Applications**



***Questions???***

***Comments...***